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entitled 'Aviation Security: Foreign Airport Assessments and Air 
Carrier Inspections Help Enhance Security, but Oversight of These 
Efforts Can Be Strengthened' which was released on May 11, 2007. 

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Report to Congressional Requesters: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 

GAO: 

May 2007: 

Aviation Security: 

Foreign Airport Assessments and Air Carrier Inspections Help Enhance 
Security, but Oversight of These Efforts Can Be Strengthened: 

GAO-07-729: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-07-729, a report to congressional requesters 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

The Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) efforts to evaluate 
the security of foreign airports and air carriers that service the 
United States are of great importance, particularly considering that 
flights bound for the United States from foreign countries continue to 
be targets of coordinated terrorist activity, as demonstrated by the 
alleged August 2006 liquid explosives terrorist plot. 

For this review, GAO evaluated the results of foreign airport and air 
carrier evaluations; actions taken and assistance provided by TSA when 
security deficiencies were identified; TSA’s oversight of its foreign 
airport and air carrier evaluation programs; and TSA’s efforts to 
address challenges in conducting foreign airport and air carrier 
evaluations. To conduct this work, GAO reviewed foreign airport and air 
carrier evaluation results and interviewed TSA officials, foreign 
aviation security officials, and air carrier representatives. 

What GAO Found: 

Of the 128 foreign airports that TSA assessed during fiscal year 2005, 
TSA found that about 36 percent complied with all applicable security 
standards, while about 64 percent did not comply with at least one 
standard. The security deficiencies identified by TSA at two foreign 
airports were such that the Secretary of Homeland Security notified the 
public that the overall security at these airports was ineffective. Of 
the 529 overseas air carrier inspections conducted during fiscal year 
2005, for about 71 percent, TSA did not identify any security 
violations, and for about 29 percent, TSA identified at least one 
security violation. TSA took enforcement action—warning letters, 
correction letters, or monetary fines—for about 18 percent of the air 
carrier security violations. TSA addressed most of the remaining 82 
percent of security violations through on-site consultation. 

TSA assisted foreign officials and air carrier representatives in 
addressing identified deficiencies through on-site consultation, 
recommendations for security improvements, and referrals for training 
and technical assistance. However, TSA’s oversight of the foreign 
airport assessment and air carrier inspection programs could be 
strengthened. For example, TSA did not have adequate controls in place 
to track whether scheduled assessments and inspections were actually 
conducted, deferred, or canceled. TSA also did not always document 
foreign officials’ progress in addressing security deficiencies 
identified by TSA. Further, TSA did not always track what enforcement 
actions were taken against air carriers with identified security 
deficiencies. TSA also did not have outcome-based performance measures 
to assess the impact of its assessment and inspection programs on the 
security of U.S.-bound flights. Without such controls, TSA may not have 
reasonable assurance that the foreign airport assessment and air 
carrier inspection programs are operating as intended. 

TSA is taking action to address challenges that have limited its 
ability to conduct foreign airport assessments and air carrier 
inspections, including a lack of available inspectors, concerns 
regarding the resource burden placed on host governments as a result of 
frequent airport visits by TSA and others, and host government concerns 
regarding sovereignty. In October 2006, TSA began implementing a risk-
based approach to scheduling foreign airport assessments, which should 
allow TSA to focus its limited inspector resources on higher-risk 
airports. TSA is also exploring opportunities to conduct joint airport 
assessments with the European Commission and use the results of airport 
assessments conducted by the European Commission to potentially adjust 
the frequency of TSA airport visits. 

What GAO Recommends: 

In an April 2007 report that contained sensitive information, GAO 
recommended, and the Department of Homeland Security agreed, that TSA 
develop controls for tracking and documenting information and establish 
outcome-based performance measures to strengthen oversight of its 
foreign airport and air carrier evaluation programs. 

[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-729]. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
the link above. For more information, contact Cathleen Berrick at (202) 
512-3404 or berrickc@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Results in Brief: 

Background: 

TSA Found That Some Foreign Airports and Air Carriers Complied with All 
Aviation Security Standards, and When Deemed Necessary, DHS and TSA 
Took Enforcement Action on Those That Did Not: 

TSA Assisted Foreign Officials and Air Carrier Representatives in 
Addressing Security Deficiencies, but Can Strengthen Oversight of the 
Foreign Airport Assessment and Air Carrier Inspection Programs: 

TSA Is Taking Action to Address Some Challenges That Have Limited Its 
Ability to Conduct Foreign Airport Assessments and Air Carrier 
Inspections: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

Results of Fiscal Year 2005 Foreign Airport Assessments and Air Carrier 
Inspections and Actions Taken by TSA in Response to Noncompliance: 

Assistance Provided by TSA to Address Security Deficiencies and 
Oversight of Airport Assessment and Air Carrier Inspection Efforts: 

Challenges That Affected TSA's Ability to Conduct Foreign Airport 
Assessments and Air Carrier Inspections and Actions Taken to Address 
those Challenges: 

Appendix II: International Civil Aviation Organization Standards and 
Recommended Practices Used by TSA to Conduct Fiscal Year 2005 Foreign 
Airport Assessments: 

Appendix III: TSA Security Requirements for U.S.-Based and Foreign 
Carriers Operating Out of Foreign Airports: 

Appendix IV: U.S. Government Aviation Security Training and Technical 
Assistance Programs for Foreign Entities: 

Department of State: Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program: 

U.S. Trade and Development Agency: 

Department of Transportation--Safe Skies for Africa Program: 

Department of State--Bureau of International Narcotics and Law 
Enforcement Affairs--Organization of American States Inter-American 
Committee against Terrorism: 

Department of State--Western Hemisphere Affairs--Organization of 
American States--Inter-American Committee against Terrorism: 

Department of Justice-International Criminal Investigative Training and 
Assistance Program: 

Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security: 

Appendix VI: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Related Products: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Positions That Play a Key Role in TSA's Foreign Airport and 
Air Carrier Inspection Programs: 

Table 2: Comparison of the Severity of Security Deficiencies and 
Corrective Action Taken at One Secretarial Action Airport and One Non- 
Secretarial Action Airport: 

Table 3: Budgeted and Available International Inspectors by IFO, by 
Month for Fiscal Year 2005: 

Table 4: Budgeted Number of Inspectors, Total Scheduled Foreign Airport 
Visits, and Average Number of Scheduled Foreign Airport Visits per 
Inspector, by IFO, for Fiscal Year 2005: 

Table 5: Description and Status of TSA-European Commission Aviation 
Security Working Groups: 

Table 6: Elements of the Aircraft Operator Standard Security Program 
Applicable to International Operations: 

Table 7: Elements of the Foreign Air Carrier Model Security Program 
Applicable to International Operations: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Airport Assessment Activities: 

Figure 2: Process for Taking Secretarial Action against a Foreign 
Airport: 

Figure 3: Air Carrier Inspection Process: 

Abbreviations: 

AEA: Association of European Airlines: 

AOSSP: Aircraft Operator Standard Security Program: 

APEC: Asia-Pacific Economic Conference: 

ATA: Anti-Terrorism Assistance: 

CICTE: Inter-American Committee against Terrorism: 

DHS: Department of Homeland Security: 

DOJ: Department of Justice: 

DOT: Department of Transportation: 

ECAC: European Civil Aviation Conference: 

FAA: Federal Aviation Administration: 

FAARS: Foreign Airport Assessment Reporting System: 

FSD: Federal Security Director: 

GPRA: Government Performance and Results Act: 

IATA: International Air Transport Association: 

ICAO: International Civil Aviation Organization: 

ICE: Immigration and Customs Enforcement: 

ICITAP: International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance 
Program: 

IFO: international field office: 

INL: Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs: 

IPSI: International Principal Security Inspector: 

OAS: Organization of American States: 

PARIS: Performance and Results Information System: 

PART: Performance Assessment Rating Tool: 

PSI: Principal Security Inspector: 

SOP: standard operating procedures: 

TSA: Transportation Security Administration: 

TSAR: Transportation Security Administration Representative: 

USAID: United States Agency for International Development: 

USTDA: United States Trade and Development Agency: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

May 11, 2007: 

The Honorable John L. Mica: 
Ranking Republican Member: 
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Daniel E. Lungren: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Transportation Security and Infrastructure Protection: 
Committee on Homeland Security: 
House of Representatives: 

Flights bound for the United States from foreign countries continue to 
be targets of coordinated terrorist activity, as demonstrated in August 
2006 when British officials uncovered an alleged terrorist plot to 
detonate liquid explosives onboard multiple aircraft departing from the 
United Kingdom for the United States. Similar terrorist activity was 
uncovered in December 2003 when U.S. intelligence officials identified 
terrorists' intent on carrying out attacks on U.S.-bound flights 
originating from foreign airports. Such conditions highlight the 
continued need for the United States to coordinate efforts with foreign 
governments to help ensure the security of U.S.-bound flights. Given 
that there were more than 650,000 flights to the United States from 
foreign locations during calendar year 2005, the security of foreign 
airports and air carriers that service the United States is integral to 
the security of U.S. commercial aviation. 

The Transportation Security Administration (TSA), the federal agency 
with primary responsibility for securing the nation's civil aviation 
system,[Footnote 1] has several efforts under way with other nations to 
help ensure the security of U.S.-bound flights. For example, TSA, 
through its foreign airport assessment program, determines whether 
foreign airports that provide service to the United States are 
maintaining and carrying out effective security measures. Additionally, 
TSA, through its air carrier inspection program, determines whether air 
carriers, U.S.-based or foreign, that service the United States are 
complying with applicable security requirements. According to TSA 
officials, the foreign airport assessment and air carrier inspection 
programs enable TSA to inform the public about foreign airports that do 
not maintain and carry out effective security measures so that the 
public can make informed decisions when planning their travel. 

TSA assesses the effectiveness of security measures at foreign airports 
using the aviation security standards and recommended practices adopted 
by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).[Footnote 2] 
ICAO standards and recommended practices address operational issues at 
an airport, such as ensuring that passengers and baggage are properly 
screened and that unauthorized individuals do not have access to 
restricted areas of an airport. ICAO standards also address 
nonoperational issues, such as ensuring that a foreign government has 
implemented a national civil aviation security program for regulating 
security procedures at its airports and ensuring that airport officials 
implementing security controls go through background investigations, 
are appropriately trained, and are certified according to a foreign 
government's national civil aviation security program. Member states 
have agreed to comply with ICAO standards, and are strongly encouraged 
to comply with ICAO recommended practices. While TSA is authorized 
under U.S. law to conduct foreign airport assessments at intervals it 
considers necessary, TSA may not perform an assessment of security 
measures at a foreign airport without permission from the host 
government. TSA also conducts security inspections of foreign and U.S.- 
based air carriers with service to the United States from foreign 
countries to ensure compliance with applicable security requirements, 
including those set forth in the air carriers' TSA-approved security 
programs.[Footnote 3] As of October 2006, there were a total of 924 air 
carrier stations located in 268 airports around the world that service 
the United States and that TSA may seek to inspect.[Footnote 4] 

Considering the high volume of flights arriving in the United States 
from foreign locations and the history of terrorist threats against 
commercial aviation, TSA's foreign airport assessment and air carrier 
inspection programs are important elements in ensuring the security of 
inbound flights. Given the vulnerability of U.S.-bound flights to acts 
of terrorism, this report addresses the following questions: (1) What 
were the results of TSA's fiscal year 2005 foreign airport assessments 
and air carrier inspections, and what actions were taken, if any, when 
TSA identified that foreign airports and air carriers were not 
complying with security standards? (2) How, if at all, did TSA assist 
foreign countries and air carriers in addressing any deficiencies 
identified during foreign airport assessments and air carrier 
inspections, and to what extent did TSA provide oversight of its 
assessment and inspection efforts? (3) What challenges, if any, 
affected TSA's ability to conduct foreign airport assessments and air 
carrier inspections, and what actions have TSA and others taken to 
address these challenges? In April 2007, we issued a report that 
contained sensitive security information regarding TSA's foreign 
airport assessments and air carrier inspections. This report provides 
the results of our April 2007 report with the sensitive security 
information removed. 

To address these objectives, we obtained and reviewed TSA guidance for 
conducting and reporting the results of foreign airport assessments and 
air carrier inspections. We also obtained and analyzed the results of 
128 foreign airport assessments and 529 air carrier inspections 
conducted by TSA during fiscal year 2005 to determine the extent to 
which foreign airports and air carriers operating overseas complied 
with aviation security standards.[Footnote 5] We assessed the 
reliability of TSA's air carrier inspection data for fiscal year 2005 
and concluded that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes 
of our review. We also interviewed TSA's Office of Security Operations 
and its Transportation Sector Network Management officials, both in 
headquarters and the field,[Footnote 6] who are responsible for 
planning, coordinating, overseeing, and carrying out foreign airport 
assessments and air carrier inspections, to obtain information on TSA's 
efforts to help foreign officials address airport security deficiencies 
and TSA's efforts to overcome challenges identified by TSA officials in 
conducting foreign airport assessments and air carrier inspections. 
Additionally, we visited three European, three Asian, and one other 
North American country where we met with host government aviation 
security officials, air carrier representatives, airport officials, 
aviation industry representatives, and TSA officials to obtain their 
perspectives on TSA's foreign airport assessment and air carrier 
inspection programs. We also accompanied TSA officials during an 
airport assessment and air carrier inspection at an airport in the 
Caribbean. In addition, we interviewed 16 foreign aviation security 
officials stationed in their countries' embassies in Washington, D.C., 
to obtain their perspectives on TSA's foreign airport assessment and 
air carrier inspection programs. However, information obtained from our 
interviews with host government and aviation industry representatives 
cannot be generalized beyond those contacted because we did not use a 
probability sampling method to select these officials for interviews. 
We also conducted phone interviews with four Federal Security Directors 
(FSD)[Footnote 7] and seven TSA aviation security inspectors based in 
U.S. airports to discuss their involvement in foreign airport 
assessments and air carrier inspections. Information from these 
interviews cannot be generalized to all FSDs in U.S. airports or to 
domestic inspectors who support foreign airport assessments and air 
carrier inspections because we did not use a probability sampling 
method to select these officials for interviews. We also met with 
officials from ICAO, the Asia-Pacific Economic Conference (APEC), the 
Association of European Airlines (AEA), the European Commission, the 
European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC), and the International Air 
Transport Association (IATA) regarding their perspectives on TSA's 
foreign airport assessment and air carrier inspection programs and the 
process and standards they use, if any, to conduct their own airport 
assessments.[Footnote 8] Additionally, we interviewed officials from 
the Department of State, Department of Justice, Department of 
Transportation, and the U.S. Trade and Development Agency to learn 
about the aviation security training and technical assistance they 
provide to foreign governments. 

We conducted our work from October 2005 through March 2007 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. More 
details about the scope and methodology of our work are contained in 
appendix I. 

Results in Brief: 

Based on the results of TSA's fiscal year 2005 foreign airport 
assessments and air carrier inspections, some foreign airports and air 
carriers complied with all relevant aviation security standards, while 
others did not, and when deemed necessary, the Secretary of Homeland 
Security and TSA took enforcement action against those that were not in 
compliance. Of the 128 foreign airports with air carriers that provide 
service to the United States and that TSA assessed during fiscal year 
2005, TSA found that at the completion of the assessment, 46 (about 36 
percent) complied with all ICAO standards and recommended practices, 
whereas 82 (about 64 percent) did not meet at least one ICAO standard 
or recommended practice. The most common area of noncompliance for 
foreign airports was related to quality control--mechanisms to assess 
and address security vulnerabilities at airports. For example, one 
airport did not meet quality control standards because it did not have 
a mechanism in place to ensure that airport officials implementing 
security controls were appropriately trained and able to effectively 
perform their duties. According to TSA, access control measures and 
passenger and checked baggage screening are critical elements of 
effective security at foreign airports because these measures are 
intended to prevent terrorists from carrying dangerous items, such as 
weapons and explosives, onto aircraft. However, even if a foreign 
airport does not meet multiple aviation security standards, including 
critical standards, TSA may determine that such deficiencies do not 
warrant review by the Secretary of Homeland Security.[Footnote 9] 
Nonetheless, if TSA determines that secretarial action may be warranted 
and the Secretary of Homeland Security, based on TSA's assessment, 
determines that a foreign airport does not maintain and carry out 
effective security measures, then he or she must take action. These 
actions may include issuing a letter to foreign government officials 
stating that they have 90 days to improve security measures to meet 
ICAO standards or notifying the public that a foreign airport does not 
maintain and carry out effective security measures. For example, during 
fiscal year 2005, the Secretary of Homeland Security determined that 2 
of the 128 foreign airports that TSA assessed were not maintaining and 
carrying out effective security measures. In response, DHS notified the 
general public of these determinations by the Secretary. During fiscal 
year 2005, of the 529 inspections of air carriers operating out of 
foreign airports, there were 373 inspections (about 71 percent) for 
which TSA did not identify any security violations and 156 inspections 
(about 29 percent) for which TSA found that the air carrier did not 
comply with at least one TSA security requirement. There were a total 
of 419 instances of noncompliance identified during these 156 
inspections.[Footnote 10] In some cases, the security deficiencies 
identified during these inspections were corrected or addressed 
immediately. When security deficiencies were not resolved immediately, 
TSA inspectors, at times, recommended enforcement action. Enforcement 
action included issuing letters of warning or correction to air 
carriers or imposing civil penalties--monetary fines--on air carriers. 
Of the 419 security violations identified during fiscal year 2005 air 
carrier inspections, 259 (about 62 percent) were corrected or addressed 
immediately, and 76 (about 18 percent) were recommended for enforcement 
action. TSA could not readily identify the enforcement actions that 
were taken for the remaining 84 (20 percent) security violations. 
Enforcement actions taken by TSA as a result of fiscal year 2005 air 
carrier inspections consisted of 26 enforcement actions and 14 letters 
of correction.[Footnote 11] Civil penalties ranging from $18,000 to 
$25,000 were recommended for 7 enforcement actions. Although TSA has 
not conducted its own analysis of foreign airport assessment and air 
carrier inspection results, TSA officials stated that our analysis of 
the results was consistent with their assumptions regarding the most 
prominent security deficiencies identified among foreign airports and 
air carriers. However, TSA officials stated that it is difficult to 
draw conclusions about the results--such as whether the results are 
generally positive or negative--considering the differences in the 
capabilities and willingness of foreign officials to address security 
deficiencies. TSA officials further stated that the cumulative results 
of the assessments and inspections may be helpful in identifying the 
aviation security training needs of foreign aviation security 
officials. While TSA does not have its own program to provide aviation 
security training and technical assistance to foreign aviation security 
officials, TSA officials stated that they could use the results of 
TSA's foreign airport assessments to refer foreign officials to 
training and technical assistance programs offered by ICAO and several 
other U.S. government agencies. 

During fiscal year 2005, TSA helped improve security at foreign 
airports by assisting foreign officials and air carrier representatives 
in addressing security deficiencies identified during TSA assessments 
and inspections. However, TSA's oversight of the foreign airport 
assessment and air carrier inspection programs could be strengthened. 
TSA assisted foreign officials in addressing security deficiencies 
identified during airport assessments in various ways, including 
providing on-site consultation to help foreign officials immediately 
address security deficiencies, making recommendations to help foreign 
officials sustain security improvements, and helping foreign 
governments obtain aviation security training and technical assistance. 
To help air carriers address security deficiencies that were 
identified, TSA often provided on-site consultation. For example, 
during one inspection, TSA inspectors identified a security deficiency 
related to catering carts, after which the inspectors immediately 
notified the air carrier of the deficiency and made a recommendation 
for better securing catering carts in the future.[Footnote 12] TSA also 
assigned a principal security inspector to each U.S. carrier and 
foreign carrier that provides service to the United States whose 
responsibility was to counsel air carriers and provide clarification on 
TSA security requirements when necessary. TSA has several controls in 
place to ensure that the agency is meeting internal requirements for 
implementing the foreign airport assessment and air carrier inspection 
programs, such as requiring inspectors to use standard operating 
procedures for coordinating with host government officials for 
scheduling, conducting, and reporting the results of foreign airport 
assessments. However, additional controls--including controls for 
tracking, documenting, and measuring the impact of TSA's assessment and 
inspection activities--would help strengthen its oversight of these 
programs. First, TSA does not have controls in place to track the 
status of scheduled foreign airport assessments and air carrier 
inspections, including whether the assessments and inspections were 
actually conducted or whether they were deferred or canceled, which 
could make it difficult for TSA to ensure that scheduled assessments 
and inspections are completed. Second, TSA does not always document the 
results of follow-up conducted by TSA international staff to determine 
progress made by foreign governments in addressing security 
deficiencies identified by TSA. Documentation of such follow-up would 
enable TSA to have access to updated information on the security of 
foreign airports that provide service to the United States. Third, TSA 
does not always track the status of air carrier inspections from 
initiation through completion, which prevents TSA from determining 
whether appropriate action was taken against air carriers that violated 
security requirements. Finally, TSA does not have outcome-based 
performance measures in place to measure the impact that its efforts 
have had on helping foreign airport officials and air carrier 
representatives comply with aviation security standards and 
requirements. Federal standards for internal controls and associated 
guidance suggest that agencies should document key decisions in a way 
that is complete and accurate, and that allows decisions to be traced 
from initiation, through processing, to after completion. Starting in 
August 2006, TSA officials began to develop controls for tracking the 
status of scheduled foreign airport visits, such as tracking the number 
of days remaining until inspectors are to visit a particular foreign 
airport. However, in February 2007, TSA officials acknowledged that 
additional refinements to the tracking system were needed. TSA 
officials also stated that developing performance measures to assess 
the impact of assessment and inspection-related efforts on security at 
foreign airports would be useful, but they identified several concerns 
about developing such measures. For example, TSA officials stated that 
whether foreign officials improve security at their airports is not 
within TSA's control and, therefore, developing a performance measure 
related to TSA's contributions to improving foreign airport security 
may not be appropriate. However, other federal agencies, such as the 
Department of State, have developed performance measures for foreign 
assistance programs for which the outcome is not entirely within the 
agency's control. Even without full control over such measures, it 
would be useful for TSA to develop outcome-based measures for its 
foreign airport assessment and air carrier inspection programs--such as 
the percentage of security deficiencies that were addressed as a result 
of TSA on-site assistance and TSA recommendations for corrective 
action--to identify any aspects of these programs that need 
improvement. Also, with additional oversight of the foreign airport 
assessment and air carrier inspection programs, TSA would have better 
assurance that these programs are operating as intended. 

TSA is taking action to address challenges that have limited its 
ability to conduct foreign airport assessments and air carrier 
inspections, including a lack of available inspectors, concerns 
regarding the resource burden placed on host governments as a result of 
frequent airport visits by TSA and others, and concerns unique to 
specific host governments, such as sovereignty--more specifically, 
concerns that TSA assessments and inspections infringe upon a host 
government's authority to regulate airports and air carriers within its 
borders. According to TSA officials, TSA deferred approximately 30 
percent of the foreign airport visits--including airport assessments 
and air carrier inspections--that were scheduled for fiscal year 2005, 
due to the lack of available inspectors and concerns raised by host 
government officials. TSA officials stated that two key factors 
affected the availability of inspectors during fiscal year 2005. First, 
TSA was operating with fewer inspectors than the agency budgeted for 
fiscal year 2005. Specifically, three of the five international field 
offices were operating with fewer inspectors than they were budgeted 
during at least 9 months out of the fiscal year. According to TSA, the 
shortage of inspectors was due to the high turnover rate for inspectors 
and the lengthy process for hiring additional inspectors to fill vacant 
positions. Second, TSA scheduled more foreign airport visits--which 
includes both airport assessments and air carrier inspections--than the 
budgeted number of inspectors could have reasonably conducted. 
According to TSA, each inspector can reasonably conduct between 8 and 
12 foreign airport visits per year depending on the amount of time 
inspectors remain on site to help foreign authorities address any 
security deficiencies. However, all five international field offices 
scheduled more than 12 foreign airport visits per inspector during 
fiscal year 2005; one international field office scheduled more than 24 
visits per inspector. TSA officials said that their internal policy 
regarding the frequency with which the agency is to conduct foreign 
airport assessments and air carrier inspections drove their decision to 
schedule more foreign airport visits than inspectors could reasonably 
have conducted. According to TSA officials, this internal policy was 
developed by the Federal Aviation Administration, which was responsible 
for conducting foreign airport assessments and air carrier inspections 
prior to TSA. TSA officials also stated that the Federal Aviation 
Administration had more available inspectors to conduct assessments and 
inspections than TSA. Given the lack of available international 
inspectors, TSA also used domestic inspectors--that is, inspectors who 
typically conduct security inspections at U.S. airports--to conduct 33 
percent of the scheduled foreign airport visits for fiscal year 2005. 
However, TSA officials stated that the use of domestic inspectors is 
undesirable because these inspectors lack experience conducting 
assessments in the international environment. During October 2006, TSA 
began implementing a risk-based approach to scheduling foreign airport 
assessments to better allocate its limited inspector resources by 
focusing on foreign airports that pose the greatest security risk to 
U.S.-bound air travel. Another potential benefit to TSA's new risk- 
based approach to scheduling is that it may allow TSA to reduce its 
reliance on domestic inspectors. Our analysis shows that TSA's risk- 
based approach is consistent with generally accepted risk management 
principles. TSA has also taken steps to address concerns regarding the 
resource burden placed on host governments as a result of frequent 
airport visits. Host government officials in three of the seven foreign 
countries we visited, and representatives of various air carrier 
associations, stated that countries are subjected to multiple 
assessments and inspections each year by TSA, ICAO, the European 
Commission, and others, and because foreign government officials and 
air carrier representatives have to escort the various inspectors 
during the assessment and inspections, the frequency of airport visits 
is burdensome on the host government and air carriers. TSA's risk-based 
approach for scheduling airport assessments should help address some 
host governments' concerns regarding the resource burden. TSA has also 
begun to explore other opportunities to alleviate the resource burden 
placed on host governments. Specifically, when the opportunity is 
available, TSA is considering conducting joint assessments and using 
the results of some host government or third party assessments to 
adjust the frequency of TSA visits; collectively, these efforts may 
reduce the number of airport visits experienced by some countries. 
However, TSA officials stated that they are cautious about using the 
results of other entities' assessments because TSA has not 
independently evaluated the quality of the assessments conducted by 
these other entities and because these other entities base their 
assessments on different aviation security standards than TSA. TSA 
headquarters officials stated that working with host governments to 
harmonize aviation security standards as well as the process used to 
conduct assessments--that is, developing similar standards and 
assessment processes that provide the same level of security--would 
facilitate TSA's use of host government and third party assessment 
results. TSA has made efforts to harmonize security standards and 
inspection processes with the European Commission, although, as of 
February 2007, a time frame for completion of these efforts had not yet 
been established. TSA has also harmonized some security standards-- 
particularly those related to the screening of liquids, gels, and 
aerosols--with several European countries, Australia, and Canada. In 
addition to working to address concerns regarding the resource burden 
placed on host governments as a result of frequent airport visits, TSA 
has taken steps to address some country-specific challenges that have 
limited TSA's ability to conduct foreign airport visits. For example, 
TSA said that officials from one country viewed TSA's airport 
assessments as an infringement on their country's sovereignty, and 
therefore would not allow TSA to conduct assessments of airports in 
their country. However, TSA officials negotiated with officials in this 
country so that assessments are conducted under the guise of a TSA 
"visit" to--versus an "assessment" of--the airport, although officials 
from that country prohibit TSA inspectors from assessing airport 
perimeter security and the contents of their national aviation security 
programs. TSA officials stated that when unique concerns arise in the 
future, they will continue to work with countries on a case-by-case 
basis to try to address their concerns. 

In our April 2007 report that contained sensitive security information, 
we made several recommendations to assist TSA in strengthening 
oversight of the foreign airport assessment and air carrier inspection 
programs. These include developing and implementing controls to track 
the status of scheduled foreign airport assessments and air carrier 
inspections from initiation through completion, including reasons why 
assessments and inspections were deferred or canceled; developing and 
implementing a standard process for tracking and documenting host 
governments' progress in addressing security deficiencies identified 
during airport assessments; and developing performance measures to 
evaluate the impact that TSA assistance and enforcement actions have 
had on improving foreign airport and air carrier compliance with 
applicable aviation security standards. We provided a draft of this 
report to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) for review. DHS, in 
its written comments, concurred with our findings and recommendations, 
and stated that the recommendations will help strengthen TSA's 
oversight of foreign airport assessments and air carrier inspections. 
DHS described some actions that TSA is taking to implement these 
recommendations, including enhancing its tracking system to include the 
reason for deferment or cancellation of an airport assessment or an air 
carrier inspection; developing a system whereby outstanding 
deficiencies noted during an assessment will be tracked along with 
deficiency specific information, deadlines, and current status; and 
developing outcome-based performance measures for the foreign airport 
assessment program and air carrier inspection activities. 

Background: 

DHS Responsibilities for Ensuring the Security of U.S.-Bound Flights 
from Foreign Countries: 

Shortly after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, Congress 
passed, and the President signed into law, the Aviation and 
Transportation Security Act, which established TSA and gave the agency 
responsibility for securing all modes of transportation, including the 
nation's civil aviation system, which includes domestic and 
international commercial aviation operations.[Footnote 13] In 
accordance with 49 U.S.C. § 44907, TSA assesses the effectiveness of 
security measures at foreign airports served by a U.S. air carrier, 
from which a foreign air carrier serves the United States, that pose a 
high risk of introducing danger to international air travel, and at 
other airports deemed appropriate by the Secretary of Homeland 
Security.[Footnote 14] This provision of law also identifies measures 
that the Secretary must take in the event that he or she determines 
that an airport is not maintaining and carrying out effective security 
measures based on TSA assessments.[Footnote 15] TSA also conducts 
inspections of U.S. air carriers and foreign air carriers servicing the 
United States from foreign airports pursuant to its authority to ensure 
that air carriers certificated or permitted to operate to, from, or 
within the United States meet applicable security requirements, 
including those set forth in an air carrier's TSA-approved security 
program.[Footnote 16] 

The Secretary of DHS delegated to the Assistant Secretary of TSA the 
responsibility for conducting foreign airport assessments but retained 
responsibility for making the determination that a foreign airport does 
not maintain and carry out effective security measures. Currently, 
TSA's Security Operations and Transportation Sector Network Management 
divisions are jointly responsible for conducting foreign airport 
assessments and air carrier inspections. Table 1 highlights the roles 
and responsibilities of certain TSA positions within these divisions 
that are responsible for implementing the foreign airport assessment 
and air carrier inspection programs. 

Table 1: Positions That Play a Key Role in TSA's Foreign Airport and 
Air Carrier Inspection Programs: 

Office/division: Security Operations; 
Position: Aviation Security Inspector; 
Duties: Inspectors are primarily responsible for performing and 
reporting the results of both foreign airport assessments and the air 
carrier inspections, and will provide on-site assistance and make 
recommendations for security enhancements. Inspectors are also deployed 
in response to specific incidents or to monitor for identified threats. 
Inspectors are based in one of TSA's five international field offices 
(IFO)[A.]. 

Office/division: Transportation Sector Network Management; 
Position: Transportation Security Administration Representative (TSAR); 
Duties: TSARs communicate with foreign government officials to address 
transportation security matters and to conduct foreign airport 
assessments. Specifically, the TSARs serve as on-site coordinators for 
TSA responses to terrorist incidents and threats to U.S. assets at 
foreign transportation modes. TSARs also serve as principal advisors on 
transportation security affairs to U.S. ambassadors and other embassy 
officials responsible for transportation issues to ensure the safety 
and security of the transportation system. For the foreign airport 
assessment program, TSARs are often involved in arranging pre- 
assessment activities, assessment visits, and follow-up visits. 
Additionally, TSARs are responsible for completing portions of the 
airport assessment reports and reviewing completed assessment reports. 
TSARs also help host government officials address security deficiencies 
that are identified during assessments. 

Office/division: Transportation Sector Network Management; 
Position: International Security Principal Inspector (IPSI); 
Duties: IPSIs are responsible for assisting foreign air carriers in 
complying with TSA security requirements by providing counseling and 
clarification to airlines on TSA requirements and providing requested 
information to TSA about these air carriers. 

Office/division: Transportation Sector Network Management; 
Position: Principal Security Inspector (PSI); 
Duties: PSIs are responsible for assisting U.S.-based air carriers in 
complying with TSA security requirements by providing oversight to 
airlines on TSA requirements and providing requested information to TSA 
about these air carriers. 

Source: TSA. 

[A] IFO managers are responsible for the overall planning of assessment 
visits that take place in their respective regions. TSA's IFOs are 
located in Dallas, Miami, Frankfurt, Singapore and Los Angeles. 

[B] TSARs are located in Athens, Bangkok, Beijing, Brussels, Buenos 
Aires, Dallas, Frankfurt, London, Madrid, Manila, Miami, Paris, Rome, 
Singapore, Sydney, Tokyo, and Washington, D.C. 

[End of table] 

TSA's Process for Assessing Aviation Security Measures at Foreign 
Airports: 

TSA conducts foreign airport assessments to determine the extent to 
which foreign airports maintain and carry out effective security 
measures in order to ensure the security of flights bound for the 
United States. Specifically, TSA assesses foreign airports using 86 of 
the 106 aviation security standards and recommended practices adopted 
by ICAO, a United Nations organization representing nearly 190 
countries.[Footnote 17] (See app. II for a description of the 86 ICAO 
standards and recommended practices TSA uses to assess security 
measures at foreign airports.[Footnote 18]) While TSA is authorized 
under U.S. law to conduct foreign airport assessments at intervals it 
considers necessary, TSA may not perform an assessment of security 
measures at a foreign airport without permission from the host 
government. During fiscal year 2005, TSA scheduled assessments by 
categorizing airports into two groups. Category A airports--airports 
that did not exhibit operational issues in the last two TSA 
assessments--were assessed once every 3 years, while category B 
airports--airports that did exhibit operational issues in either of the 
last two TSA assessments, or were not previously assessed--were 
assessed annually. Based on documentation provided by TSA, during 
fiscal year 2005, TSA assessed aviation security measures in place at 
128 foreign airports that participated voluntarily in TSA's Foreign 
Airport Assessment Program.[Footnote 19] 

TSA's assessments of foreign airports are conducted by a team of 
inspectors, which generally includes one team leader and one team 
member. According to TSA, it generally takes 3 to 7 days to complete a 
foreign airport assessment. However, the amount of time required to 
conduct an assessment varies based on several factors, including the 
size of the airport, the number of air carrier station inspections to 
be conducted at the airport,[Footnote 20] the threat level to civil 
aviation in the host country, and the amount of time it takes 
inspectors to travel from the international field office (IFO) to the 
airport where the assessment will take place. An additional 2 weeks is 
required for inspectors to complete the assessment report after they 
return to the IFO. 

As shown in figure 1, regarding the process for conducting a foreign 
airport assessment, before TSA can assess the security measures at a 
foreign airport, the Transportation Security Administration 
Representative (TSAR) must first obtain approval from the host 
government to allow TSA to conduct an airport assessment and to 
schedule the date for an on-site visit to the foreign airport. During 
the assessment, the team of inspectors uses several methods to 
determine a foreign airport's level of compliance with international 
security standards, including conducting interviews with airport 
officials, examining documents pertaining to the airport's security 
measures, and conducting a physical inspection of the airport. For 
example, the inspectors are to examine the integrity of fences, 
lighting, and locks by walking the grounds of the airport. Inspectors 
also make observations regarding access control procedures, such as 
looking at employee and vehicle identification methods in secure areas, 
as well as monitoring passenger and baggage screening procedures in the 
airport. At the close of an airport assessment, inspectors brief 
foreign airport and government officials on the results of the 
assessment. TSA inspectors also prepare a report summarizing their 
findings on the airport's overall security posture and security 
measures, which may contain recommendations for corrective action and 
must be reviewed by the TSAR, the IFO manager, and TSA headquarters 
officials. 

Figure 1: Airport Assessment Activities: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO analysis of information provided by TSA. 

[End of figure] 

If the inspectors report that an airport's security measures do not 
meet minimum international security standards, particularly critical 
standards, such as those related to passenger and checked baggage 
screening and access controls, TSA headquarters officials are to inform 
the Secretary of Homeland Security.[Footnote 21] If the Secretary, 
based on TSA's airport assessment results, determines that a foreign 
airport does not maintain and carry out effective security measures, he 
or she must, after advising the Secretary of State, take secretarial 
action. Figure 2 describes in detail the types of secretarial action 
the Secretary may take during such instances. There are three basic 
types of secretarial action: 

* 90-day action--The Secretary notifies foreign government officials 
that they have 90 days to address security deficiencies that were 
identified during the airport assessment and recommends steps necessary 
to bring the security measures at the airport up to ICAO 
standards.[Footnote 22] 

* Public notification--If, after 90 days, the Secretary finds that the 
government has not brought security measures at the airport up to ICAO 
standards, the Secretary notifies the general public that the airport 
does not maintain and carry out effective security measures.[Footnote 
23] 

* Modification to air carrier operations--If, after 90 days, the 
Secretary finds that the government has not brought security measures 
at the airport up to ICAO standards: 

- The Secretary may withhold, revoke, or prescribe conditions on the 
operating authority of U.S.-based and foreign air carriers operating at 
that airport, following consultation with appropriate host government 
officials and air carrier representatives, and with the approval of the 
Secretary of State. 

- The President may prohibit a U.S.-based or foreign air carrier from 
providing transportation between the United States and any foreign 
airport that is the subject of a secretarial determination. 

* Suspension of service--The Secretary, with approval of the Secretary 
of State, shall suspend the right of any U.S.-based or foreign air 
carrier to provide service to or from an airport if the Secretary 
determines that a condition exists that threatens the safety or 
security of passengers, aircraft, or crew traveling to or from the 
airport, and the public interest requires an immediate suspension of 
transportation between the United States and that airport.[Footnote 24] 

Figure 2: Process for Taking Secretarial Action against a Foreign 
Airport: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO analysis of information provided by TSA. 

[End of figure] 

TSA's Process for Inspecting Air Carriers with Service to the United 
States from Foreign Airports: 

Along with conducting airport assessments, the same TSA inspection team 
also conducts air carrier inspections when visiting a foreign airport 
to ensure that air carriers are in compliance with TSA security 
requirements.[Footnote 25] Both U.S. and foreign air carriers with 
service to the United States are subject to inspection. As of February 
2007, TSA guidance required TSA to inspect each U.S. air carrier 
station once a year, except for those airports in which TSA has 
determined to be an "extraordinary" location,[Footnote 26] where 
inspections are to occur twice a year. Foreign air carriers are to be 
inspected twice in a 3-year period at each foreign airport, except in 
extraordinary locations, where they are to be inspected 
annually.[Footnote 27] According to documentation provided by TSA, 
during fiscal year 2005, TSA conducted 529 inspections of foreign and 
U.S. air carriers serving the United States from foreign airports. When 
conducting inspections, TSA inspectors examine compliance with 
applicable security requirements, including TSA-approved security 
programs,[Footnote 28] emergency amendments to the security programs, 
and security directives.[Footnote 29] Air carrier security programs are 
based on the Aircraft Operator Standard Security Program for U.S.-based 
air carriers and the Model Security Program for foreign air carriers, 
which serve as guidance for what an air carrier needs to include in its 
own security program. The Aircraft Operator Standard Security Program 
is designed to provide for the safety of passengers and their 
belongings traveling on flights against acts of criminal violence, air 
piracy, and the introduction of explosives, incendiaries, weapons, and 
other prohibited items onboard an aircraft. Likewise, the Model 
Security Program is designed to prevent prohibited items from being 
carried aboard aircraft, prohibit unauthorized access to airplanes, 
ensure that checked baggage is accepted only by an authorized carrier 
representative, and ensure the proper handling of cargo to be loaded 
onto passenger flights. When TSA determines that additional security 
measures are necessary to respond to a threat assessment or to a 
specific threat against civil aviation, TSA may issue a security 
directive or an emergency amendment to an air carrier security program 
that sets forth additional mandatory security requirements.[Footnote 
30] Air carriers are required to comply with each applicable security 
directive or emergency amendment issued by TSA, along with the 
requirements already within their security programs and any other 
requirements set forth in applicable law. Appendix III provides 
additional information on security requirements for U.S. and foreign 
air carriers serving the United States from foreign airports. 

Although U.S.-based and foreign air carriers are guided by different 
standards within the Aircraft Operator Standard Security Program and 
the Model Security Program, inspections for both of these entities are 
similar. As in the case of airport assessments, air carrier inspections 
are conducted by a team of inspectors, which generally includes one 
team leader and one team member. An inspection of an air carrier 
typically takes 1 or 2 days, but can take longer depending on the 
extent of service by the air carrier. Inspection teams may spend 
several days at a foreign airport inspecting air carriers if there are 
multiple airlines serving the United States from that location. During 
an inspection, inspectors are to review applicable security manuals, 
procedures, and records; interview air carrier station personnel; and 
observe air carrier employees processing passengers from at least one 
flight from passenger check-in until the flight departs the gate to 
ensure that the air carrier is in compliance with applicable 
requirements. Inspectors evaluate a variety of security measures, such 
as passenger processing including the use of No-Fly and Selectee 
lists,[Footnote 31] checked baggage acceptance and control, aircraft 
security, and passenger screening. Inspectors record inspection results 
into TSA's Performance and Results Information System (PARIS) system, a 
database containing security compliance information on TSA-regulated 
entities. If an inspector finds that an air carrier is violating any 
applicable security requirements, additional steps are to be taken to 
record those specific violations and, in some cases, pursue them with 
further investigation. Figure 3 provides an overview of the air carrier 
inspection and documentation process, including the options for what 
type of penalty, if any, should be imposed on air carriers for 
identified security violations. 

Figure 3: Air Carrier Inspection Process: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO analysis of information provided by TSA. 

[End of figure] 

When an inspector identifies a violation of a security requirement, a 
record of the violation is opened in PARIS. According to guidance 
issued by TSA to inspectors, there are various enforcement tools 
available to address instances of noncompliance discovered during an 
inspection: 

* On-the-spot counseling is generally to be used for noncompliance that 
is minor and technical in nature, and can be remedied immediately at 
the time it is discovered. When this course of action is taken, the 
inspector notes that the noncompliance issue was closed with TSA 
counseling in the finding record and no further action is required. 

* Administrative action is generally to be used for violations or 
alleged violations that are unintentional, not the result of 
substantial disregard for security, where there are no aggravating 
factors present, or first-time violations. An administrative action 
results in either a letter of correction or a warning notice being 
issued to the air carrier. 

* Civil penalties in the form of fines are generally to be used in 
response to cases involving egregious violations, gross negligence, or 
where administrative action and counseling did not adequately resolve 
the noncompliance. Fines can range between $2,500 and $25,000 based on 
the severity of the violation.[Footnote 32] If the violation is severe 
enough, TSA may also recommend revocation of the air carrier's 
certification to fly into the United States, but this action has not 
yet been taken by TSA. 

If a violation is resolved with on-the-spot counseling, that fact is 
recorded in the finding record of PARIS and the matter is closed. 
However, if the inspector opts to pursue administrative action or a 
civil penalty against the air carrier, an enforcement investigation 
record is opened, and an investigation is conducted. Based on the 
investigation findings, the inspector recommends either an 
administrative action or a civil penalty, depending on the finding and 
the circumstances. If the investigation does not provide evidence that 
a violation occurred, the matter is closed with no action taken. 

If the inspector makes a recommendation for an administrative action, 
the supervisory inspector or IFO manager will typically review the 
recommendation and, if appropriate, approve and issue the action. The 
supervisory inspector may also recommend that the action be changed to 
no action or to a civil penalty. In the case of the latter, the case 
will be referred to the Office of Chief Counsel for further review. 

In those cases where the inspector recommends that a civil penalty be 
assessed on the air carrier, it is referred to the Office of Chief 
Counsel for review. The office is responsible for ensuring that the 
action is legally sufficient, and that the recommended fine is 
consistent with agency guidelines. TSA's Office of Chief Counsel makes 
the final determination for any legal enforcement action. The office 
may approve the proposed action or make a recommendation for other 
actions, including administrative action or no action at all. 

TSA Found That Some Foreign Airports and Air Carriers Complied with All 
Aviation Security Standards, and When Deemed Necessary, DHS and TSA 
Took Enforcement Action on Those That Did Not: 

Based on the results of TSA's foreign airport assessments, during 
fiscal year 2005, some foreign airports and air carriers complied with 
all relevant aviation security standards, while others did not. The 
most common area of noncompliance for foreign airports was related to 
quality control--mechanisms to assess and address security 
vulnerabilities at airports. The Secretary of Homeland Security 
determined that the security deficiencies at two foreign airports 
assessed during fiscal year 2005 were so serious that he subsequently 
notified the general public that these airports did not meet 
international aviation security standards. In addition to assessing the 
security measures implemented by the airport authority at foreign 
airports, TSA also inspected the security measures put in place by air 
carriers at foreign airports. When security deficiencies identified 
during air carrier inspections could not be corrected or addressed 
immediately, TSA inspectors recommended enforcement action. TSA 
officials stated that while it is difficult to determine whether the 
assessment and inspection results are generally positive or negative, 
the cumulative foreign airport assessment and air carrier inspection 
results may be helpful in identifying the aviation security training 
needs of foreign aviation security officials. TSA does not have its own 
program through which aviation security training and technical 
assistance are formally provided to foreign aviation security 
officials. However, TSA officials stated that they could use the 
results of TSA's foreign airport assessments to refer foreign officials 
to training and technical assistance programs offered by ICAO and 
several other U.S. government agencies. 

TSA Data Identified That More than One-Third of Foreign Airports 
Complied with All Relevant ICAO Standards during Fiscal Year 2005, and 
the Remaining Airports Had Security Deficiencies: 

Of the 128 foreign airports TSA assessed during fiscal year 2005, TSA 
data show that at the completion of these assessments, 46 (about 36 
percent) complied with all ICAO standards reviewed by TSA,[Footnote 33] 
while 82 (about 64 percent) did not meet at least one ICAO standard 
reviewed by TSA.[Footnote 34] For these 82 foreign airports, the 
average number of standards not met was about 5, and the number of 
standards not met by an individual airport ranged from 1 to 22. Foreign 
airports were most frequently not meeting ICAO standards related to 
quality control. TSA data show that about 39 percent of foreign 
airports assessed during fiscal year 2005 did not comply with at least 
one ICAO quality control standard, which include mechanisms to assess 
and address security vulnerabilities at airports. For example, one 
airport did not meet an ICAO quality control standard because it did 
not have a mechanism in place to ensure that airport officials 
implementing security controls were appropriately trained and able to 
effectively perform their duties. In another instance, an airport did 
not comply with an ICAO quality control standard because, during its 
previous two assessments, inspectors found that the airport did not 
require or have records of background investigations conducted for 
individuals implementing security controls at the airport. Another area 
in which airports were not meeting ICAO quality control standards was 
the absence of a program to ensure the quality and effectiveness of 
their National Civil Aviation Security Program. TSA officials stated 
that quality control deficiencies may be prevalent among foreign 
airports in part because there is no international guidance available 
to aviation security officials to help them develop effective quality 
control measures. However, TSA officials stated that ICAO and other 
regional aviation security organizations offer training courses to help 
aviation security officials worldwide in developing effective quality 
control measures. 

TSA data also identified that at the completion of the assessment, 
nearly half of the foreign airports assessed during fiscal year 2005 
did not meet at least one of the 17 ICAO standards that TSA 
characterized as "critical" to aviation security.[Footnote 35] 
According to TSA, access control, screening of checked baggage, and 
screening of passengers and their carry-on items are critical aspects 
of aviation security because these measures are intended to prevent 
terrorists from carrying dangerous items, such as weapons and 
explosives, onto aircraft. TSA data identified that some foreign 
airports assessed during fiscal year 2005 did not meet at least one 
access control standard. TSA data also identified that some foreign 
airports did not meet ICAO standards related to checked baggage 
screening. One of the baggage screening deficiencies TSA identified 
involved foreign airports not taking steps to prevent checked baggage 
from being tampered with after the baggage had been screened, prior to 
the baggage being placed on the aircraft. TSA data also identified that 
some foreign airports assessed during fiscal year 2005 did not meet 
ICAO standards related to passenger screening. One of the passenger- 
screening problems identified by TSA involved screening personnel not 
resolving hand-held metal detector or walk-through metal detector 
alarms to determine whether the individuals being screened were 
carrying prohibited items. 

The Secretary of Homeland Security Took Action against Foreign Airports 
That Did Not Maintain and Carry Out Effective Security Measures: 

Even if a foreign airport does not meet multiple aviation security 
standards, including critical standards, TSA may determine that such 
deficiencies do not warrant review by the Secretary of Homeland 
Security. However, if TSA determines that secretarial action may be 
warranted and the Secretary of Homeland Security, based on TSA's 
assessment, determines that a foreign airport does not maintain and 
carry out effective security measures, he or she must take secretarial 
action. Since the inception of DHS in March 2003, the Secretary of 
Homeland Security has taken action against five foreign airports he 
determined were not maintaining and carrying out effective security 
measures, four of which received 90-day action letters. The Secretary 
notified the public of his determination with respect to two of these 
airports--Port-au-Prince Airport in Haiti[Footnote 36] and Bandara 
Ngurah Rai International Airport in Bali, Indonesia[Footnote 37]--both 
of which were assessed during fiscal year 2005. 

TSA officials told us that the decision to take secretarial action 
against an airport is not based solely on the number and type of 
security deficiencies identified during TSA airport 
assessments.[Footnote 38] Rather, the secretarial action decision is 
based on the severity of the security deficiencies identified, as well 
as past compliance history, threat information, and the capacity of the 
host government to take corrective action.[Footnote 39] For example, 
there were other foreign airports assessed during fiscal year 2005 that 
did not comply with about the same number and type of critical ICAO 
standards as the five airports that received secretarial action. 
However, according to the former Deputy Director of TSA's Compliance 
Division, secretarial action was not taken against these airports 
either because the security deficiencies were determined to be not as 
severe, the host country officials were capable of taking immediate 
corrective action to address the deficiencies, or TSA did not perceive 
these airports to be in locations at high risk of terrorist activity. 
Table 2 demonstrates how two foreign airports--one for which 
secretarial action was taken and the other for which no secretarial 
action was taken--have about the same number and types of critical 
deficiencies, but differ in the severity of the deficiencies and their 
capability to take immediate corrective action to address identified 
deficiencies. 

Table 2: Comparison of the Severity of Security Deficiencies and 
Corrective Action Taken at One Secretarial Action Airport and One Non- 
Secretarial Action Airport: 

ICAO standard not met by the airport; 
Secretarial action airport: 4.7.1--Each Contracting State shall ensure 
that security restricted areas are established at each airport serving 
international civil aviation and that procedures and identification 
systems are implemented in respect of persons and vehicles. 

Severity of the deficiency;
Secretarial action airport: 
* Security guards failed to check identification (ID) badges properly 
for pedestrians and vehicles entering restricted areas; 
* Guards allowed 54 vehicles to enter a restricted area requiring 
vehicles operators to only show a letter identifying them as a very 
important person (VIP); 
* Guards were not conducting walking or mobile patrols of areas around 
or in the airport; 
* Guards did not prevent persons without proper identification from 
entering restricted areas; 
* The airport did not have a program in place to audit the 
identification system; 
Non-Secretarial action airport: 
* Vehicles that did not have proper permits were parked in a restricted 
area; 
* A door that leads from the ticket counter to the airside was left 
open and unattended. 

Immediate corrective action taken by the airport to address the 
deficiency; 
Secretarial action airport: 
* No immediate action was taken to address the deficiency; 
Non-Secretarial action airport: 
* The airport director immediately removed the vehicles from the 
restricted area and informed vehicle operators that they would not be 
allowed to park in the restricted area until they obtained an 
authorized vehicle permit. 

ICAO standard not met by the airport; 
Secretarial action airport: 4.3.1--Each Contracting State shall 
establish measures to ensure that originating passengers and their 
cabin baggage are screened prior to boarding an aircraft engaged in 
international civil aviation operations. 

Severity of the deficiency; 
Secretarial action airport: 
* Screeners allowed individuals who set off walk-through metal detector 
alarms to pass through the screening checkpoint without determining the 
cause for the alarms; 
* Screeners were not using the hand-held metal detector correctly; 
* Screeners were conducting full-body pat-down searches incorrectly; 
* X-ray screeners were inattentive and did not routinely identify carry-
on bags for further inspection; 
Non-Secretarial action airport: 
* Screeners allowed individuals who set off walk-through metal detector 
alarms to pass through the screening checkpoint without determining the 
cause for the alarms; 
* Screeners were not using the hand-held metal detector correctly; 
* Screeners did not physically inspect all cell phones; 
* Screeners did not rotate positions at the checkpoint; 
* The airport did not sufficiently staff the security checkpoint. 

Immediate corrective action taken by the airport to address the 
deficiency; 
Secretarial action airport: 
* Even after TSA inspectors demonstrated how to properly screen 
passengers and resolve metal detector alarms, screeners were still not 
able to screen passengers and carry-on items correctly; 
Non-Secretarial action airport: 
* After TSA inspectors demonstrated how to properly resolve metal 
detector alarms, prior to the completion of the assessment, the 
inspectors observed that screeners were screening passengers and their 
carry-on items correctly. 

Source: GAO analysis of TSA foreign airport assessment results. 

[End of table] 

According to TSA, secretarial actions are lifted when the Secretary, in 
part based on TSA's assessment of the airport, determines that the 
airport is carrying out and maintaining effective security measures. 
TSA lifted the secretarial action at Port-au-Prince airport in Haiti in 
July 2006, 19 months after the public notification was issued. During 
this 19-month period, TSA assisted Haitian officials in developing a 
national civil aviation security plan and provided training on how to 
properly screen passengers and their carry-on baggage. According to the 
former Deputy Director of TSA's Compliance Division, although TSA 
determined earlier during 2006 that all of the security deficiencies at 
the airport had been addressed by Haitian officials, based on specific 
intelligence information regarding threats to the airport in Haiti, the 
Secretary delayed lifting the secretarial action until July 2006. As of 
February 2007, the public notification for the airport in Bali was 
still in place. TSA officials stated that they are in frequent contact 
with Indonesian officials to discuss Indonesia's progress in addressing 
security deficiencies at the airport. TSA officials also stated that 
they are awaiting Indonesian officials' request for TSA to conduct an 
airport assessment to determine whether the security deficiencies at 
the airport in Bali have been addressed. 

More than Two-Thirds of Fiscal Year 2005 Air Carrier Inspections 
Identified Compliance with All TSA Security Requirements, while the 
Remaining Inspections Identified Some Security Deficiencies: 

In addition to assessing the security measures implemented by the 
airport authority at foreign airports, TSA also inspected the security 
measures put in place by air carriers at foreign airports. According to 
air carrier inspection data maintained by TSA, during fiscal year 2005, 
of the 529 inspections of air carriers operating out of foreign 
airports, there were 373 inspections (about 71 percent) for which the 
air carrier complied with all TSA security requirements, and 156 
inspections (about 29 percent) for which the air carrier did not comply 
with at least one TSA security requirement.[Footnote 40] For these 156 
inspections, the average number of TSA requirements not met was about 
3, and the number of TSA requirements not met by an individual 
inspected air carrier ranged from 1 to 18. The total number of security 
requirements against which air carriers were inspected generally ranged 
from about 20 to 80, depending on the location of the foreign airport 
in which the air carrier operated, the extent of a carrier's operation 
at the airport, and whether the carrier was a U.S.-based or foreign- 
based carrier.[Footnote 41] During fiscal year 2005 air carrier 
inspections, TSA identified security deficiencies in several areas, 
including aircraft security and passenger and checked baggage 
screening.[Footnote 42] 

Because TSA has authority to regulate air carriers that provide service 
to the United States from foreign airports, TSA inspected air carriers 
against specific security requirements established by TSA and included 
in the air carriers' TSA-approved security programs. TSA officials told 
us that they view operational security requirements for air carriers as 
critical--as opposed to documentary requirements associated with the 
air carrier's approved security program--because these requirements are 
designed to prevent terrorists from carrying weapons, explosives, or 
other dangerous items onto aircraft. 

TSA Took Enforcement Action against Some Air Carriers with Security 
Deficiencies That Could Not Be Addressed Immediately: 

When TSA inspectors identify deficiencies that cannot be corrected or 
addressed immediately, the inspectors are to recommend enforcement 
action. Based on data provided by TSA, TSA inspectors identified 419 
violations (security deficiencies) as a result of the 156 air carrier 
inspections conducted during fiscal year 2005 where TSA identified at 
least one security deficiency. Data from TSA showed that 259 violations 
(about 62 percent) were corrected or addressed immediately. TSA 
inspectors submitted 76 violations (about 18 percent) for investigation 
because the violations were considered serious enough to warrant an 
enforcement action.[Footnote 43] TSA can impose three types of 
enforcement action on air carriers that violate security requirements-
-a warning letter, a letter of correction, or a monetary civil penalty. 
Based on information included in TSA's investigation module within 
PARIS, for the 47 investigations we could link to fiscal year 2005 
inspections,[Footnote 44] warning letters were issued in 26 cases, and 
letters of correction were issued in 14 cases. Fines ranging from 
$18,000 to $25,000 were recommended in the 7 cases where inspectors 
recommended civil penalties be imposed. Of those, fines ranging from 
$4,000 to $15,000 were ultimately levied in 3 cases, in 1 case a 
warning notice was issued instead of a civil penalty, and in 2 cases no 
action was taken.[Footnote 45] As of December 2006, 1 case remained 
unresolved. 

TSA Officials Cite Difficulties in Drawing Conclusions about Foreign 
Airport Assessment and Air Carrier Inspection Results: 

TSA officials stated that it is difficult to draw conclusions about the 
cumulative foreign airport assessment and air carrier inspection 
results--such as whether the results are generally positive or 
negative--because the primary concern is not whether security 
deficiencies are identified. Instead, TSA officials are more concerned 
about whether foreign countries have the capability and willingness to 
address security deficiencies. According to TSA, some foreign countries 
do not have the aviation security expertise or financial resources to 
adequately address security deficiencies. TSA officials also stated 
that some foreign countries do not regard aviation security as a high 
priority, and therefore do not intend to correct security deficiencies 
identified during TSA assessments. Further, TSA officials stated that 
foreign officials' capability and willingness also influence the extent 
to which air carriers comply with security requirements. Although TSA 
has not conducted its own analysis of foreign airport assessment and 
air carrier inspection results, TSA officials stated that our analysis 
of the results was consistent with their assumptions regarding the most 
prominent security deficiencies identified at foreign airports and 
among air carriers. Additionally, TSA officials stated that the 
cumulative foreign airport assessment and air carrier inspection 
results may be helpful in identifying the aviation security training 
needs of foreign aviation security officials. TSA does not have an 
internally funded program in place that is specifically intended to 
provide aviation security training and technical assistance to foreign 
aviation security officials. However, TSA officials stated that they 
coordinate with other federal agencies, such as the Department of State 
and the U.S. Trade and Development Agency, to identify global and 
regional training needs and provide instructors for the aviation 
security training courses these federal agencies offer to foreign 
officials. (See app. IV for a description of the aviation security 
training and technical assistance programs offered by U.S. government 
agencies.) While TSA does not always determine which foreign countries 
would receive aviation security training and technical assistance 
offered by other federal agencies, TSA officials stated that they could 
use the cumulative results of TSA's foreign airport assessments to 
refer foreign officials to these assistance programs. 

TSA Assisted Foreign Officials and Air Carrier Representatives in 
Addressing Security Deficiencies, but Can Strengthen Oversight of the 
Foreign Airport Assessment and Air Carrier Inspection Programs: 

TSA used various methods to help foreign officials and air carrier 
representatives address security deficiencies identified during TSA 
assessments and inspections. However, opportunities remain for TSA to 
enhance oversight of its foreign airport assessment and air carrier 
inspection programs. To help foreign airport officials and host 
government officials address security deficiencies identified during 
foreign airport assessments, TSA inspectors provided on-site 
consultation to help address security deficiencies in the short term, 
made recommendations for addressing security deficiencies over the long 
term, and recommended aviation security training and technical 
assistance opportunities for foreign officials to help them meet ICAO 
standards. During fiscal year 2005, TSA resolved 259 of the 419 
security deficiencies identified during TSA inspections through on-site 
consultation. Additionally, TSA assigned all U.S. air carriers and 
foreign air carriers to a principal security inspector and 
international principal security inspector, respectively, to provide 
counseling or clarification regarding TSA security requirements. 
Although TSA has assisted foreign airport officials and air carrier 
representatives in addressing security deficiencies, TSA did not track 
the status of scheduled airport assessments and air carrier 
inspections, document foreign governments' progress in addressing 
security deficiencies at foreign airports, track enforcement actions 
taken in response to air carrier violations, and measure the impact of 
the foreign airport assessment and air carrier inspection programs on 
security. Such information would have provided TSA better assurance 
that the foreign airport assessment and air carrier inspection programs 
are operating as intended. 

TSA Assisted Foreign Officials in Addressing Security Deficiencies at 
Foreign Airports in Various Ways, and Foreign Officials Generally 
Viewed TSA's Assistance as Beneficial: 

TSA officials stated that while the primary mission of the foreign 
airport assessment program is to ensure the security of U.S.-bound 
flights by assessing whether foreign airports are complying with ICAO 
standards, a secondary mission of the program is to assist foreign 
officials in addressing security deficiencies that TSA identified 
during its foreign airport assessments. As part of the foreign airport 
assessment program, TSA officials assisted foreign authorities in 
addressing security deficiencies in various ways, including: 

* providing on-site consultation to help airport officials or the host 
government immediately address security deficiencies, 

* making recommendations to airport officials or the host government 
for corrective action intended to help sustain security improvements, 
and: 

* helping to secure aviation security training and technical assistance 
for foreign governments. 

On-Site Consultation and Recommendations for Corrective Action: 

Based on our review of TSA foreign airport assessment reports, during 
fiscal year 2005, TSA provided on-site consultation to help foreign 
officials immediately address security deficiencies that were 
identified during airport assessments and made recommendations to help 
foreign officials sustain security improvements in the longer term. One 
type of security deficiency identified during TSA's fiscal year 2005 
foreign airport assessments involved a particular passenger checkpoint 
screening function.[Footnote 46] As a short-term solution to this 
security deficiency, on at least two occasions, TSA inspectors provided 
on-site training to instruct screeners on proper passenger screening 
techniques. As a longer-term solution, the assessment reports identify 
that in some cases, TSA inspectors recommended that the airport conduct 
remedial training for screeners and routinely test screeners who work 
at the passenger checkpoint to determine if they are screening 
passengers correctly. Another security deficiency identified at foreign 
airports during fiscal year 2005 related to the security of airport 
perimeters.[Footnote 47] After identifying this deficiency, inspectors 
consulted with foreign airport officials who, in a few cases, took 
immediate action to address the deficiency. According to the assessment 
reports, in some cases, TSA inspectors recommended measures that would 
help the airport sustain perimeter security in the longer term. In 
cases when a short-term solution may not be feasible, TSA inspectors 
may have only recommended longer-term corrective action. For example, 
in some cases, TSA inspectors recommended that foreign airport 
officials embark upon a longer-term construction project to address a 
particular type of security deficiency.[Footnote 48] 

Aviation Security Training and Technical Assistance: 

During fiscal year 2005, TSA also assisted foreign governments in 
securing training and technical assistance provided by TSA and other 
U.S. government agencies to help improve security at foreign airports, 
particularly at airports in developing countries. For example, four of 
the seven TSA Representatives--TSARs---with whom we met said that they 
had assisted foreign governments in obtaining training either through 
the State Department's Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program or through the 
U.S. Trade and Development Agency's aviation security assistance 
programs. The goals of the Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program are to (1) 
build the capacity of foreign countries to fight terrorism; (2) 
establish security relationships between U.S. and foreign officials to 
strengthen cooperative anti-terrorism efforts; and (3) share modern, 
humane, and effective anti-terrorism techniques. The State Department 
addresses the capacity-building goal of the Anti-Terrorism Assistance 
Program by offering a selection of 25 training courses to foreign 
officials, 1 of which focuses on airport security. The State Department 
provided the airport security course, which is taught by TSA 
instructors, to seven foreign countries during fiscal year 2005-- 
Bahamas, Barbados, Dominican Republic, Kazakhstan, Philippines, Qatar, 
and United Arab Emirates. The U.S. Trade and Development Agency also 
provides aviation security training and technical assistance to help 
achieve its goal of facilitating economic growth and trade in 
developing countries. During fiscal year 2005, the U.S. Trade and 
Development Agency provided aviation security training for government 
officials in Haiti, Malaysia, and sub-Saharan Africa. During the same 
year, the agency held regional workshops for various countries 
worldwide on developing quality control programs. Government officials 
from two of the five countries we visited identified the importance of 
obtaining quality control training, particularly given that they have 
not yet established their own quality control function. Appendix IV 
includes a detailed description of aviation security training and 
technical assistance provided to foreign officials by the State 
Department and the U.S. Trade and Development Agency, as well as other 
U.S. government agencies. 

Foreign Officials We Contacted Generally Viewed TSA's Assistance as 
Beneficial: 

Government and airport officials from five of the seven foreign 
countries we visited and officials from 5 of the 16 foreign embassies 
we visited stated that TSA's airport assessments and the resulting 
assistance provided by TSA have helped strengthen airport security in 
their countries. For example, officials from one country said that TSA 
assessments enabled them to identify and address security deficiencies. 
Specifically, officials stated that the government could not 
independently identify security deficiencies because it did not have 
its own airport assessment program--a condition that TSA officials told 
us exists in many countries. Airport officials in another country 
stated that TSA's airport assessments and on-site assistance led to 
immediate improvements in the way in which passengers were screened at 
their airport, particularly with regard to the pat-down search 
procedure. Embassy officials representing another country also stated 
that TSA's assessments reinforce the results of other assessments of 
their airports. In addition, these officials stated that they 
appreciated the good rapport and cooperative relationships they have 
with TSA inspection officials. Airport officials in another country we 
visited stated that TSA assisted them in developing their aviation 
security management program, and that the results of TSA's assessments 
provided them with examples of where they need to concentrate more 
efforts on meeting ICAO standards. Government officials in this same 
country said that the TSAR has helped them to comply with ICAO 
standards related to the contents of a member state's national aviation 
security program. At the recommendation of the TSAR, these officials 
also planned to participate in an aviation security workshop provided 
by the Organization of American States,[Footnote 49] which they also 
felt would be beneficial in helping the government formulate its 
national aviation security programs and associated security 
regulations. 

TSA Provided Assistance to Air Carriers That Did Not Comply with 
Applicable Security Requirements: 

In addition to assisting foreign officials in addressing security 
deficiencies identified during airport assessments, TSA also assisted 
air carrier representatives in addressing security deficiencies that 
were identified during air carrier inspections. Of the 419 instances in 
which TSA inspectors identified noncompliance with TSA security 
requirements during fiscal year 2005, TSA data show 259 were resolved 
through counseling--that is, the security deficiencies were resolved as 
a result of on-site assistance or consultation provided by TSA. For 
example, during one inspection, TSA observed that the security 
contractor employed by the air carrier was not properly searching the 
aircraft cabin for suspicious, dangerous, or deadly items prior to 
boarding. TSA instructed the contractor to fully inspect those 
locations that were not searched properly, and obtained assurance that 
the air carrier would provide information to the contractors to ensure 
proper searches were conducted. In another instance, inspectors 
identified a security deficiency related to catering carts. The 
inspectors notified appropriate catering facility officials, who stated 
that the security deficiency was highly unusual and that it would not 
happen again. The inspectors also informed the air carrier of the 
finding and recommended that during the carrier's internal audits, they 
ensure that catering carts are properly secured. 

In addition to counseling provided by inspectors when deficiencies are 
identified, TSA assigns each air carrier to either a PSI, for U.S.- 
based air carriers, or an IPSI, for foreign air carriers with service 
to the United States, to assist air carriers in complying with TSA 
security requirements. Although PSIs and IPSIs do not participate in 
air carrier inspections, they do receive the inspection results for the 
air carriers that they work with. According to the three PSIs and four 
IPSIs with whom we met, PSIs and IPSIs provide counsel to the air 
carriers and provide clarification when necessary on TSA security 
requirements. For example, they provide air carriers with clarification 
on the requirements contained in security directives and emergency 
amendments issued by TSA. Several of the foreign air carriers we met 
with told us that the IPSIs are generally responsive to their requests. 
In other instances, when an air carrier cannot comply with a TSA 
security requirement--such as when complying with a TSA security 
requirement would cause the air carrier to violate a host government 
security requirement--the air carrier will work with the IPSI or PSI to 
develop alternative security procedures that are intended to provide a 
level of security equivalent to the level of security provided by TSA's 
requirements, according to the PSIs and IPSIs with whom we met. These 
alternative procedures are reviewed by the PSI or IPSI and then 
approved by TSA headquarters officials.[Footnote 50] 

Opportunities Exist for TSA to Strengthen Oversight of the Foreign 
Airport Assessment and Air Carrier Inspection Programs: 

TSA has several controls in place to ensure that the agency is 
implementing the foreign airport assessment and air carrier inspection 
programs as intended. However, there are opportunities for TSA to 
improve its oversight of these programs to help ensure that the status 
and disposition of scheduled foreign airports assessments and air 
carrier inspections is documented and to assess the impact of the 
assessment and inspection programs. Regarding the foreign airport 
assessment program, TSA required inspectors and TSARs to follow 
standard operating procedures when scheduling and conducting foreign 
airport assessments. These procedures outline the process for 
coordinating with host government officials to schedule assessments, 
conduct foreign airport assessments, and report the results of the 
assessments. TSA also provided inspectors with a job aide to help them 
ensure that all relevant ICAO standards are addressed during an 
assessment. The job aide prompts inspectors as to what specific 
information they should obtain to help determine whether the foreign 
airport is meeting ICAO standards. For example, in assessing measures 
related to passenger-screening checkpoints, the job aide prompts the 
inspector to describe the means by which the airport ensures there is 
no mixing or contact between screened and unscreened passengers. In 
addition to the standard operating procedures and the job aide, TSA 
requires inspectors to use a standard format for reporting the results 
of foreign airport assessments and has implemented a multilayered 
review process to help ensure that airport assessment reports are 
complete and accurate. 

With regard to the air carrier inspection program, TSA uses the 
automated Performance and Results Information System to compile 
inspection results. PARIS contains results of air carrier inspections 
conducted by TSA at airports in the United States as well as 
inspections conducted at foreign airports. For air carrier inspections 
conducted at foreign airports, a series of prompts guides inspectors 
regarding what security standards U.S. carriers and foreign carriers 
operating overseas must meet. PARIS also includes a review process 
whereby completed inspection results can be reviewed by a supervisory 
inspector before being approved for release into the database. 

While TSA has controls such as these in place for the foreign airport 
assessment and air carrier inspection programs to ensure consistent 
implementation and documentation, we identified four additional 
controls that would strengthen TSA's oversight of the foreign airport 
assessment and air carrier inspection programs: 

* tracking the status of scheduled airport assessments and air carrier 
inspections, 

* documenting foreign governments' progress in addressing security 
deficiencies, 

* tracking air carrier violations, and: 

* measuring the impact of the foreign airport assessment and air 
carrier inspection programs. 

Additional Controls Are Needed to Track the Status of Scheduled Airport 
Assessments and Air Carrier Inspections: 

TSA has established some controls for tracking the status of scheduled 
airport assessments and air carrier inspections, but additional 
controls are needed. TSA provided us with a list of foreign airport 
assessments that were scheduled to take place during fiscal year 2005 
and identified which of the assessments were actually conducted and 
which assessments were deferred or canceled. We compared the list of 
scheduled assessments provided by TSA to the fiscal year 2005 airport 
assessment reports we reviewed and identified several discrepancies. 
Specifically, there were 10 airport assessments that TSA identified as 
having been conducted, but when we asked TSA officials to provide the 
reports for these assessments, they could not, and later categorized 
these assessments as deferred or canceled. Conversely, there was 1 
airport assessment that TSA identified as having been deferred, but 
according to the assessment reports we reviewed, this assessment was 
actually conducted during fiscal year 2005. There were also five 
foreign airports for which TSA provided us with the fiscal year 2005 
assessment report, but were not included on TSA's list of assessments 
scheduled for fiscal year 2005. Further, there were three foreign 
airports listed under one IFO as having been deferred, whereas these 
same airports were listed under another IFO as having been canceled 
during fiscal year 2005.[Footnote 51] TSA also did not maintain 
accurate information on the status of air carrier inspections scheduled 
for fiscal year 2005. TSA provided us with a list of all air carrier 
inspections conducted during fiscal year 2005. We compared the list to 
the results contained in the PARIS database and found numerous 
inconsistencies. Specifically, we identified 46 air carrier inspections 
at 18 airports that were not included on TSA's list, but were included 
in PARIS as having been conducted during fiscal year 2005. 

Federal standards for internal controls and associated guidance suggest 
that agencies should document key decisions in a way that is complete 
and accurate, and that allows decisions to be traced from initiation, 
through processing, to after completion. TSA officials acknowledged 
that they have not always maintained accurate and complete data on the 
status of scheduled foreign airport assessments and air carrier 
assessments, in part due to the lack of a central repository in which 
to maintain assessment information and the lack of standardization in 
the way in which each IFO manager maintains assessment information. 
Additionally, IFOs had not always documented the reasons why 
assessments and inspections were deferred or canceled. TSA officials 
stated that in August 2006 they began standardizing and refining the 
existing databases used by IFO staff for tracking the status of foreign 
airport assessments and air carrier inspections by including data 
elements such as the dates of previous and planned assessments. TSA 
officials also stated that IFO staff are now encouraged to identify the 
reasons why assessments and inspections were deferred or canceled in 
the comment section of the database. While TSA has made some 
improvements to the way in which it tracks the status of scheduled 
foreign airport assessments and air carrier inspections, there are 
opportunities for additional refinements to TSA's tracking system. For 
example, according to our review of TSA's fiscal year 2007 foreign 
airport assessment and air carrier inspection schedules, TSA did not 
provide an explanation for why 13 of 34 foreign airport visits--that 
is, either assessments or inspections--had not been conducted according 
to schedule. TSA officials acknowledged that their assessment and 
inspection tracking system is a work in progress and that they need to 
make additional decisions regarding the tracking system, such as which 
data elements to include. Without adequate controls in place for 
tracking which scheduled assessments and inspections were actually 
conducted and which were deferred or canceled, it may be difficult for 
TSA to ensure that all scheduled airport assessments and air carrier 
inspections are actually conducted. 

TSA Did Not Consistently Document Foreign Governments' Progress in 
Addressing Security Deficiencies: 

TSARs--the primary liaisons between the U.S. government and foreign 
governments on transportation security issues--are responsible for 
following up on progress made by foreign officials in addressing 
security deficiencies identified during TSA assessments. Although the 
TSARs we interviewed stated that they conducted such follow-up, the 
TSARs did not consistently document the progress foreign governments 
had made in addressing airport security deficiencies. We found 199 
instances in the 128 fiscal year 2005 foreign airport assessment 
reports we reviewed where it was written that the TSAR would follow up 
or was recommended to follow up on the progress made by foreign 
officials in addressing security deficiencies identified during airport 
assessments. However, TSA may not be able to determine whether TSARs 
had actually followed up on these security deficiencies because TSARs 
did not consistently document their follow-up activities. We 
interviewed 8 of the 20 TSARs stationed at embassies throughout the 
world and one Senior Advisor and DHS attaché. Six of those TSARs stated 
that they followed up on outstanding security deficiencies in various 
ways,[Footnote 52] depending on the severity of the deficiency and the 
confidence that the TSAR had in the host government's ability to 
correct the deficiency. For example, one TSAR told us that for less 
critical security deficiencies, she may inquire about the foreign 
government's status in addressing the deficiency via electronic mail or 
telephone call. On the other hand, for a critical deficiency, the TSAR 
said she may follow up in person on the host government's progress in 
addressing the deficiency. However, another TSAR stated that she only 
follows up on the foreign government's progress in addressing national 
program issues. She stated that she does not follow up on operational 
security deficiencies--such as screening of passengers and checked 
baggage--because she believes this is the responsibility of the TSA 
inspection staff. While 4 of the 8 TSARs we interviewed told us that 
they were able to follow up on the status of most or all security 
deficiencies within their area of responsibility, not all of these 
TSARs reported the results of their follow-up to TSA inspection staff, 
in part because they were not required to do so. In addition, TSARs 
stated that when they did document the results of their follow-up, it 
was not done consistently. For example, follow-up results were 
sometimes documented in weekly trip reports (generally electronic mail 
messages) TSARs send to their immediate supervisor in TSA headquarters 
or in action plans.[Footnote 53] In addition, these weekly reports did 
not always contain information from the TSARs' follow-up activities 
with host government or airport officials. Federal standards for 
internal controls and associated guidance suggest that agencies should 
document key activities in such a way that maintains the relevance, 
value, and usefulness of these activities to management in controlling 
operations and making decisions. TSA headquarters officials 
acknowledged that it is important to consistently document foreign 
governments' status in addressing security deficiencies identified 
during TSA assessments, because this information could be helpful to 
TSA inspection staff when determining where to focus their attention 
during future assessments. Additionally, documenting foreign 
governments' progress toward addressing deficiencies would enable TSA 
to have current information on the security status of foreign airports 
that service the United States. TSA established a working group in 
September 2006 to explore how the results of TSAR follow-up should be 
documented and used by TSA inspection staff. Because of the logistical 
challenges of coordination among working group members who are located 
around the world, TSA has not set a time frame for when the working 
group is expected to complete its efforts. 

TSA Did Not Adequately Maintain Information to Link Enforcement Actions 
with Specific Air Carrier Security Violations: 

TSA does not maintain air carrier inspection data in a way that would 
enable the agency to determine what enforcement actions were taken in 
response to identified security violations and thus could not readily 
determine whether appropriate penalties, if any, were given to air 
carriers that violated security requirements. We found two factors that 
contributed to this situation. First, information on violations and 
findings was not consistently recorded, and second, TSA does not link 
enforcement actions to inspection findings. For example, when an 
inspector identifies a violation during an inspection, that information 
is recorded in the inspections database in PARIS and a record is to be 
opened in the findings database.[Footnote 54] The findings database 
record includes information related to the violation, including whether 
the violation was closed with counseling or an investigation was 
opened. However, we found that information is not maintained in a way 
that enables TSA to readily determine the enforcement action that was 
taken in response to a particular violation. For example, the findings 
database did not include information on the action taken by TSA 
inspectors for all security violations that were identified in the 
inspections database. Specifically, the inspections database indicated 
that during fiscal year 2005, 419 air carrier violations were 
identified during 156 inspections. However, the findings database only 
identified the actions taken by TSA inspectors for 335 violations. On 
further analysis we found that of the 156 inspections where violations 
were identified, the number of violations for 79 (51 percent) of those 
inspections were not properly recorded in the findings database. We 
determined that for 66 inspections, the number of violations identified 
in the findings database was less than the number of violations 
identified in the inspections database. Therefore, there is no record 
of what action was taken, if any, by TSA inspectors to address the 
additional violations identified during these inspections. We also 
determined that for 13 inspections, the number of violations identified 
in the findings database was greater than the number of violations 
identified in the inspections database. Another reason TSA could not 
readily identify what enforcement actions were taken in response to 
specific security violations was that TSA often issued one enforcement 
action for multiple security violations, where inspectors were not 
required to identify each individual violation that was addressed by a 
particular enforcement action. Without being able to readily identify 
what enforcement action was taken in response to specific security 
violations, TSA has limited assurance that the inspected air carriers 
received appropriate penalties, if deemed necessary, and that 
identified security violations were resolved. TSA officials told us 
that they are currently developing updates to PARIS that will 
automatically open a finding each time a violation is recorded in the 
inspection database. By doing so, this will require a link between a 
violation and the planned course of action to resolve the violation. 
However, TSA has not established a time frame for when these updates 
will be implemented. 

TSA Did Not Have Outcome-Based Performance Measures to Assess the 
Impact of the Foreign Airport Assessment and Air Carrier Inspection 
Programs: 

TSA is taking steps to assess whether the goals of the foreign airport 
assessment and air carrier inspection programs are being met, but 
identified several concerns about doing so. As previously discussed, 
the goal of the foreign airport assessment and air carrier inspection 
programs are to ensure the security of U.S.-bound flights by evaluating 
the extent to which foreign governments and air carriers are complying 
with applicable security requirements. The Government Performance and 
Results Act of 1993 requires executive branch departments to use 
performance measures to assess progress toward meeting program goals 
and to help decision makers assess program accomplishments and improve 
program performance. Performance measures can be categorized either as 
outcome measures, which describe the intended result of carrying out a 
program or activity, or as output measures, which describe the level of 
activity that will be provided over a period of time, or as efficiency 
measures, which show the relationship between outcome or output of a 
program and the resources used to implement program activities--inputs. 

TSA developed the following output and efficiency measures to evaluate 
its international aviation regulatory and enforcement efforts, which 
include foreign airport assessments and air carrier inspections: 

* percentage of countries with last-point-of-departure service to the 
United States that are provided aviation security assistance at the 
national or airport level, 

* percentage of countries that do not have last-point-of-departure 
service to the United States that are provided aviation security 
assistance at the national or airport level, and: 

* average number of international inspections conducted annually per 
inspector. 

While output measures are useful in determining the number of foreign 
countries for which TSA has provided aviation security assistance and 
the rate at which such assistance is being provided, outcome-based 
measures would be particularly useful because they could be used to 
determine the extent to which TSA has helped to improve security at 
foreign airports that service the United States. However, TSA officials 
identified several challenges in developing outcome measures, 
particularly measures for the foreign airport assessment program. TSA 
officials said that it is difficult to develop meaningful outcome 
measures because TSA does not have control over whether foreign 
authorities implement and meet ICAO standards. Additionally, TSA 
officials stated that if the agency develops outcome measures for the 
foreign airport assessment program, it would suggest that TSA has 
control over whether foreign airports meet ICAO standards, which these 
officials believe may give the appearance that TSA does not respect the 
sovereignty of the countries it assesses. TSA officials further stated 
that if foreign officials perceive that TSA has no regard for their 
country's sovereignty, foreign officials may prohibit TSA from 
conducting assessments in their countries. We recognize that whether or 
not foreign governments meet ICAO standards is not within TSA's control 
and that foreign officials' concerns about sovereignty are important. 
However, TSA officials have acknowledged that the assistance the agency 
provides and, in rare cases, secretarial actions contribute to whether 
foreign governments meet ICAO standards. Also, there is precedent 
within the federal government for developing outcome-oriented 
performance measures to evaluate efforts that are not within an 
agency's control but can be influenced by the agency. For example, the 
State Department developed performance measures and targets for its 
Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program to evaluate the agency's impact on 
helping foreign countries improve their anti-terrorism capabilities. 
Specifically, during fiscal year 2006, the State Department set a 
performance target that two of the six countries that received 
assistance through the Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program would achieve 
a capability to effectively deter, detect, and counter terrorist 
organizations and threats and sustain those capabilities. Another 
performance target for the program that is beyond the State 
Department's control is for all 191 United Nations member states to 
implement a particular United Nations resolution that requires all 
states to take sweeping measures to combat terrorism. 

TSA headquarters officials, including the Director of Compliance and 
Area Directors, who oversee implementation of the foreign airport 
assessment program, questioned whether it would be appropriate to 
measure improvements made by foreign countries as a result of the 
assessment program. They stated that the primary purpose of the foreign 
airport assessment program is not to help foreign officials improve 
security at their airports; rather, the primary purpose of the foreign 
airport assessment program is to identify--not correct--security 
deficiencies at foreign airports and inform the Secretary of Homeland 
Security of such deficiencies. These officials also stated that the 
agency's efforts to assist foreign officials in addressing security 
deficiencies are voluntary and, therefore, do not warrant performance 
measurement. Although TSA may not be required to assist foreign 
officials in addressing security deficiencies identified during foreign 
airport assessments, TSA is in fact using its inspector and TSAR 
resources to this end. Consistent with the Government Performance and 
Results Act of 1993, developing performance measures and associated 
targets, such as the percentage of security deficiencies that were 
addressed as a result of TSA on-site assistance and TSA recommendations 
for corrective action, would enable TSA to evaluate the impact of its 
assistance on improving security at foreign airports and be held more 
accountable for the way in which it uses its resources. TSA could also 
evaluate the impact that secretarial actions have on helping foreign 
airports address security deficiencies in order to meet ICAO standards. 

Another challenge faced by TSA officials in developing outcome-based 
measures for the foreign airport assessment program is the lack of an 
automated system to collect and compile assessment results. TSA 
officials stated that in the absence of an automated system to input 
data and information obtained from airport assessments, they do not 
have enough resources to manually compile and analyze airport 
assessment data that could be used to feed into outcome measures. 
Currently, TSA headquarters maintains airport assessment reports either 
electronically or in hard copy, which makes it difficult to conduct 
systematic analysis of assessment results across foreign airports and 
over time to evaluate the impact TSA's airport assessment program has 
had on helping foreign countries meet ICAO standards. TSA officials 
told us that $1 million was budgeted to develop a secured, automated 
database--the Foreign Airport Assessment Reporting System--to track 
airport assessment results. However, TSA officials stated that the 
development of the Foreign Airport Assessment Reporting System has been 
slow due to challenges TSA has experienced in linking the existing 
electronic systems in which previous airport assessment reports are 
stored with the new database. However, upon completion of the Foreign 
Airport Assessment Reporting System, which is scheduled for fiscal year 
2008, TSA expects that the database will enhance standardization of 
assessment reports as well as accessibility to the results of previous 
foreign airport assessments. TSA also expects that the Foreign Airport 
Assessment Reporting System will enable TSA to conduct analysis of 
foreign airport assessment results. 

As with the foreign airport assessment program, TSA has also not 
developed outcome-based performance measures for its overseas air 
carrier inspection program. However, TSA officials have begun to 
collect and analyze data on air carrier inspections that could be used 
to measure the impact of TSA's inspection program on helping air 
carriers comply with TSA security requirements. During fiscal year 
2006, TSA officials who manage PARIS began analyzing air carrier 
inspection results in an effort to assist the agency in evaluating the 
impact that enforcement actions--including on-site counseling, 
administrative actions, and civil penalties--have had on ensuring air 
carrier compliance with TSA security requirements. These officials plan 
to assess whether there is a relationship between the severity of civil 
penalties and the reoccurrence of security violations. The analysis 
that is being conducted by these officials is consistent with our 
reviews of agency compliance inspection programs, which have cited the 
need for evaluations of enforcement activities and the effectiveness of 
using sanctions such as civil penalties to increase 
compliance.[Footnote 55] However, while the TSA officials managing 
PARIS are conducting such analysis of performance information, 
officials who manage the air carrier inspection program did not intend 
to use the results of this analysis to develop performance measures or 
to influence program decisions. According to TSA officials, considering 
that overall compliance rates are very high among air carriers, and the 
number of enforcement actions taken by TSA is relatively low, there may 
not be enough data to conduct meaningful analysis of the impact of 
enforcement actions. In addition, TSA officials said that they were not 
convinced that air carrier compliance is influenced by enforcement 
actions, especially since air carriers are known to intentionally set 
aside funds when developing their annual budgets in anticipation that 
they will be fined for some type of security violation during the year. 
One TSA official stated that air carrier compliance with TSA security 
requirements is not always within the air carrier's control and is 
largely influenced by the security measures in place at the airport, as 
well as restrictions placed on air carriers by host government laws and 
regulations. When analyzing the fiscal year 2005 air carrier inspection 
results, we identified only one instance where noncompliance due to a 
conflict between TSA requirements and host government law resulted in 
an inspector requesting that enforcement action be taken against the 
air carrier.[Footnote 56] However, TSA chose not to take enforcement 
action against the air carrier and instead decided to work with the 
host government to resolve the conflict. Despite the concerns raised by 
TSA officials, using the analysis of air carrier inspection results to 
develop performance measures, TSA managers may not be able to identify 
which approaches for improving air carrier compliance are working well 
and which approaches could be improved upon. 

TSA Is Taking Action to Address Some Challenges That Have Limited Its 
Ability to Conduct Foreign Airport Assessments and Air Carrier 
Inspections: 

TSA is taking action to address challenges--particularly the lack of 
available inspectors and various host government concerns--that have 
limited its ability to conduct foreign airport assessments and air 
carrier inspections according to schedule. TSA has developed a risk- 
based approach to scheduling foreign airport assessments, and is in the 
process of developing a risk-based approach for scheduling air carrier 
inspections, to enhance the agency's ability to focus its limited 
inspector resources on higher-risk airports. The risk-based scheduling 
approach is also expected to reduce the number of visits TSA conducts 
at low-risk foreign airports, which may help address some host 
governments' concerns regarding the resource burden that results from 
frequent airport assessments by TSA and others. Harmonization--that is, 
mutual recognition and acceptance--of TSA, host government, and third 
party (e.g., European Commission) aviation security standards and 
assessment and inspection processes may also help TSA address host 
government concerns regarding resource burden. Specifically, when the 
opportunity is available, TSA is considering conducting joint 
assessments with some host governments or third parties, such as the 
European Commission, which would reduce the number of airport visits 
experienced by some countries. In addition to addressing concerns 
regarding the resource burden placed on host governments as a result of 
frequent airport visits, TSA has taken steps to address some country- 
specific challenges that have limited TSA's ability to conduct foreign 
airport visits. 

TSA Has Taken Steps to Enhance its Ability to Conduct Foreign Airport 
Assessments and Air Carrier Inspections on Schedule, but Staffing 
Challenges Remain: 

Various challenges have affected TSA's ability to maintain its schedule 
of conducting foreign airport assessments and air carrier inspections. 
The ability to conduct these assessments and inspections as scheduled 
is important, according to TSA officials, because foreign airport and 
air carrier compliance with applicable security requirements may 
deteriorate significantly between assessments. As time between visits 
increases, the likelihood may also increase that security deficiencies 
at foreign airports and among air carriers may arise and go undetected 
and unaddressed. TSA officials also stated that conducting assessments 
and inspections on a consistent basis helps to ensure that foreign 
countries continue to comply with ICAO standards and are operating with 
effective security measures. TSA data show that the agency deferred 90 
of the 303 (about 30 percent) foreign airport visits that were 
scheduled for fiscal year 2005, which include both foreign airport 
assessments and air carrier inspections.[Footnote 57] According to TSA, 
these deferments resulted primarily from a lack of available inspectors 
to conduct the assessments and inspections. Our analysis identified 
that the reported shortage of available inspectors reflected the fact 
that (1) the inspector staff available to conduct the assessments and 
inspections was less than the number authorized at each of TSA's five 
IFOs at some point during fiscal year 2005 and (2) TSA scheduled more 
foreign airport visits during the fiscal year than available inspectors 
could complete. 

TSA officials cited several reasons why the IFOs operated in fiscal 
year 2005 with fewer inspectors than had been budgeted. First, TSA 
officials stated that due to State Department limitations on the number 
of inspectors that can be staffed at IFOs overseas, TSA did not have 
the budgeted number of inspectors on board to complete assessments and 
inspections scheduled for fiscal year 2005.[Footnote 58] Second, TSA 
officials stated that significant turnover among international 
inspectors and the subsequent lengthy process for filling vacant 
inspector positions also contributed to the lack of available 
inspectors. TSA officials attributed the turnover of international 
inspectors to various factors, including TSA's policy that limits the 
term of international inspectors at overseas IFOs to 4 years, the lack 
of opportunities for career advancement when stationed at an IFO, and 
unique difficulties inspectors experience when living and working 
overseas, such as disruptions to family life. As of January 2007, TSA 
officials did not have any specific efforts under way to help reduce 
turnover of international inspectors. Further, TSA officials stated 
that it takes an average of about 6 months to fill a vacant inspector 
position, due to the lengthy process for vetting newly hired 
inspectors. Specifically, once hired, international inspectors must be 
processed through the State Department, which entails applying for and 
receiving medical clearances, security clearances, a diplomatic 
passport, and visas. TSA officials stated that expediting the process 
of filling vacant positions is largely outside of TSA's control. 
However, TSA assigned a headquarters official to oversee this process 
to identify opportunities for accelerating it. Table 3 shows the number 
of inspectors budgeted for and available at the IFOs each month during 
fiscal year 2005. 

Table 3: Budgeted and Available International Inspectors by IFO, by 
Month for Fiscal Year 2005: 

Number of international inspectors: Brussels/Frankfurt: Budgeted 
staffing for fiscal year 2005: 16; 
Number of international inspectors: Dallas: Budgeted staffing for 
fiscal year 2005: 5; 
Number of international inspectors: Los Angeles: Budgeted staffing for 
fiscal year 2005: 4; 
Number of international inspectors: Miami: Budgeted staffing for fiscal 
year 2005: 10; 
Number of international inspectors: Singapore: Budgeted staffing for 
fiscal year 2005: 4. 

Month: October; 
Number of international inspectors: Brussels/Frankfurt: Budgeted 
staffing for fiscal year 2005: 15; 
Number of international inspectors: Dallas: Budgeted staffing for 
fiscal year 2005: 5; 
Number of international inspectors: Los Angeles: Budgeted staffing for 
fiscal year 2005: 2; 
Number of international inspectors: Miami: Budgeted staffing for fiscal 
year 2005: 8; 
Number of international inspectors: Singapore: Budgeted staffing for 
fiscal year 2005: 3. 

Month: November; 
Number of international inspectors: Brussels/Frankfurt: Budgeted 
staffing for fiscal year 2005: 16; 
Number of international inspectors: Dallas: Budgeted staffing for 
fiscal year 2005: 4; 
Number of international inspectors: Los Angeles: Budgeted staffing for 
fiscal year 2005: 2; 
Number of international inspectors: Miami: Budgeted staffing for fiscal 
year 2005: 8; 
Number of international inspectors: Singapore: Budgeted staffing for 
fiscal year 2005: 3. 

Month: December; 
Number of international inspectors: Brussels/Frankfurt: Budgeted 
staffing for fiscal year 2005: 16; 
Number of international inspectors: Dallas: Budgeted staffing for 
fiscal year 2005: 4; 
Number of international inspectors: Los Angeles: Budgeted staffing for 
fiscal year 2005: 2; 
Number of international inspectors: Miami: Budgeted staffing for fiscal 
year 2005: 8; 
Number of international inspectors: Singapore: Budgeted staffing for 
fiscal year 2005: 3. 

Month: January; 
Number of international inspectors: Brussels/Frankfurt: Budgeted 
staffing for fiscal year 2005: 16; 
Number of international inspectors: Dallas: Budgeted staffing for 
fiscal year 2005: 4; 
Number of international inspectors: Los Angeles: Budgeted staffing for 
fiscal year 2005: 2; 
Number of international inspectors: Miami: Budgeted staffing for fiscal 
year 2005: 8; 
Number of international inspectors: Singapore: Budgeted staffing for 
fiscal year 2005: 3. 

Month: February; 
Number of international inspectors: Brussels/Frankfurt: Budgeted 
staffing for fiscal year 2005: 16; 
Number of international inspectors: Dallas: Budgeted staffing for 
fiscal year 2005: 4; 
Number of international inspectors: Los Angeles: Budgeted staffing for 
fiscal year 2005: 2; 
Number of international inspectors: Miami: Budgeted staffing for fiscal 
year 2005: 8; 
Number of international inspectors: Singapore: Budgeted staffing for 
fiscal year 2005: 3. 

Month: March; 
Number of international inspectors: Brussels/Frankfurt: Budgeted 
staffing for fiscal year 2005: 16; 
Number of international inspectors: Dallas: Budgeted staffing for 
fiscal year 2005: 4; 
Number of international inspectors: Los Angeles: Budgeted staffing for 
fiscal year 2005: 2; 
Number of international inspectors: Miami: Budgeted staffing for fiscal 
year 2005: 8; 
Number of international inspectors: Singapore: Budgeted staffing for 
fiscal year 2005: 3. 

Month: April; 
Number of international inspectors: Brussels/Frankfurt: Budgeted 
staffing for fiscal year 2005: 16; 
Number of international inspectors: Dallas: Budgeted staffing for 
fiscal year 2005: 4; 
Number of international inspectors: Los Angeles: Budgeted staffing for 
fiscal year 2005: 2; 
Number of international inspectors: Miami: Budgeted staffing for fiscal 
year 2005: 8; 
Number of international inspectors: Singapore: Budgeted staffing for 
fiscal year 2005: 3. 

Month: May; 
Number of international inspectors: Brussels/Frankfurt: Budgeted 
staffing for fiscal year 2005: 16; 
Number of international inspectors: Dallas: Budgeted staffing for 
fiscal year 2005: 4; 
Number of international inspectors: Los Angeles: Budgeted staffing for 
fiscal year 2005: 2; 
Number of international inspectors: Miami: Budgeted staffing for fiscal 
year 2005: 9; 
Number of international inspectors: Singapore: Budgeted staffing for 
fiscal year 2005: 3. 

Month: June; 
Number of international inspectors: Brussels/Frankfurt: Budgeted 
staffing for fiscal year 2005: 16; 
Number of international inspectors: Dallas: Budgeted staffing for 
fiscal year 2005: 4; 
Number of international inspectors: Los Angeles: Budgeted staffing for 
fiscal year 2005: 2; 
Number of international inspectors: Miami: Budgeted staffing for fiscal 
year 2005: 9; 
Number of international inspectors: Singapore: Budgeted staffing for 
fiscal year 2005: 3. 

Month: July; 
Number of international inspectors: Brussels/Frankfurt: Budgeted 
staffing for fiscal year 2005: 16; 
Number of international inspectors: Dallas: Budgeted staffing for 
fiscal year 2005: 4; 
Number of international inspectors: Los Angeles: Budgeted staffing for 
fiscal year 2005: 2; 
Number of international inspectors: Miami: Budgeted staffing for fiscal 
year 2005: 10; 
Number of international inspectors: Singapore: Budgeted staffing for 
fiscal year 2005: 2. 

Month: August; 
Number of international inspectors: Brussels/Frankfurt: Budgeted 
staffing for fiscal year 2005: 16; 
Number of international inspectors: Dallas: Budgeted staffing for 
fiscal year 2005: 4; 
Number of international inspectors: Los Angeles: Budgeted staffing for 
fiscal year 2005: 3; 
Number of international inspectors: Miami: Budgeted staffing for fiscal 
year 2005: 10; 
Number of international inspectors: Singapore: Budgeted staffing for 
fiscal year 2005: 1. 

Month: September; 
Number of international inspectors: Brussels/Frankfurt: Budgeted 
staffing for fiscal year 2005: 16; 
Number of international inspectors: Dallas: Budgeted staffing for 
fiscal year 2005: 4; 
Number of international inspectors: Los Angeles: Budgeted staffing for 
fiscal year 2005: 3; 
Number of international inspectors: Miami: Budgeted staffing for fiscal 
year 2005: 10; 
Number of international inspectors: Singapore: Budgeted staffing for 
fiscal year 2005: 1. 

Source: GAO analysis of TSA data. 

Note: The bold numbers represent months when, according to TSA, IFOs 
operated below their budgeted number of inspectors. 

[End of table] 

Even if TSA had been operating at its budgeted inspector staffing 
level, the agency may still have deferred some of the foreign airport 
assessments and air carrier inspections scheduled for fiscal year 2005 
because, according to TSA officials, internal policy required them to 
schedule more foreign airport visits than the budgeted number of 
inspectors could reasonably have conducted. According to TSA officials, 
this internal policy was developed by the Federal Aviation 
Administration, which was responsible for conducting foreign airport 
assessments and air carrier inspections prior to TSA. TSA officials 
also stated that the Federal Aviation Administration had more available 
inspectors to conduct assessments and inspections than TSA. TSA 
officials stated that each international inspector should reasonably be 
able to conduct between 8 and 12 foreign airport visits per 
year,[Footnote 59] depending on the amount of time inspectors remain on 
site to assist foreign officials and air carrier representatives in 
addressing security deficiencies that are identified during assessments 
and inspections. However, according to data provided by TSA, each of 
the 5 IFOs scheduled more than 12 foreign airport visits per inspector 
for fiscal year 2005. Table 4 shows the average number of foreign 
airport visits scheduled per international inspector for fiscal year 
2005. 

Table 4: Budgeted Number of Inspectors, Total Scheduled Foreign Airport 
Visits, and Average Number of Scheduled Foreign Airport Visits per 
Inspector, by IFO, for Fiscal Year 2005: 

IFO: Brussels/ Frankfurt; 
Budgeted number of inspectors: 16; 
Total number of foreign airport visits scheduled: 110; 
Average number of foreign airport visits scheduled per inspector a: 
13.8. 

IFO: Dallas; 
Budgeted number of inspectors: 5; 
Total number of foreign airport visits scheduled: 60; 
Average number of foreign airport visits scheduled per inspector a: 
24.0. 

IFO: Los Angeles; 
Budgeted number of inspectors: 3; 
Total number of foreign airport visits scheduled: 19; 
Average number of foreign airport visits scheduled per inspector a: 
12.7. 

IFO: Miami; 
Budgeted number of inspectors: 10; 
Total number of foreign airport visits scheduled: 84; 
Average number of foreign airport visits scheduled per inspector a: 
16.8. 

IFO: Singapore; 
Budgeted number of inspectors: 3; 
Total number of foreign airport visits scheduled: 30; 
Average number of foreign airport visits scheduled per inspector a: 
20.0. 

IFO: Total; 
Budgeted number of inspectors: 37; 
Total number of foreign airport visits scheduled: 303; 
Average number of foreign airport visits scheduled per inspector a: 
16.4. 

Source: GAO analysis of TSA data. 

Note: TSA did not maintain accurate or complete data on the number of 
foreign airport assessments and air carrier inspections scheduled for a 
particular fiscal year. Therefore, our calculations may not include all 
of the assessments and inspections that were conducted, deferred, and 
canceled during fiscal year 2005. 

[A] The average number of foreign airport visits scheduled per 
inspector was calculated by multiplying the total number of foreign 
airport visits that were scheduled by 2 (assuming that 2 inspectors 
conduct each visit), then dividing that number by the total number of 
budgeted inspectors. 

[End of table] 

TSA officials acknowledged that for fiscal year 2005 they scheduled 
more foreign airport visits than the budgeted level of inspectors could 
have reasonably conducted. However, TSA has taken steps to compensate 
for the shortage of international inspectors by utilizing domestic 
inspectors to help complete the foreign airport assessments and air 
carrier inspections that were scheduled for fiscal year 2005. 
Specifically, domestic inspectors were used to assist with about 34 
percent of foreign airport assessments and about 35 percent of air 
carrier inspections.[Footnote 60] However, despite the use of domestic 
inspectors, TSA still had to defer foreign airport assessments and air 
carrier inspections. TSA headquarters officials and IFO staff further 
stated that the heavy reliance on domestic inspectors to conduct 
foreign airport assessments and air carrier inspections is not 
desirable because domestic inspectors lack experience conducting 
assessments using ICAO standards or inspecting foreign operations of 
air carriers, as well as working in the international environment. 
Additionally, using domestic inspectors sometimes presents challenges 
in planning and coordinating foreign airport visits. Specifically, it 
can be difficult to obtain clearance from the State Department and host 
government to allow domestic inspectors to enter foreign countries 
because TSA may not always be able to provide sufficient notice that 
domestic inspectors will be participating in airport visits, 
particularly when the need for a domestic inspector is determined on 
short notice. Moreover, according to TSA officials, the availability of 
domestic inspectors may change unexpectedly when they are needed to 
remain in the United States. TSA officials also said that domestic 
inspectors may not be available for the entire 4-week period that it 
takes to prepare for, conduct, and write reports for foreign airport 
assessments and air carrier inspections. Last, TSA officials stated 
that compared to international inspectors, some domestic inspectors are 
not effective at taking notes while conducting observations at foreign 
airports, nor are some domestic inspectors effective at preparing 
foreign airport reports--specifically, their word choices for 
describing security conditions at airports are not always sensitive to 
the concerns of foreign officials. According to TSA officials, if 
foreign officials take offense at the way in which TSA portrays the 
security deficiencies at their airports, foreign officials may no 
longer allow TSA to conduct airport assessments in their countries. TSA 
officials stated that they enhanced the notetaking module for the 
training provided to personnel conducting assessments and inspections 
overseas. However, for the reasons discussed above, TSA international 
officials plan to lessen their reliance on domestic inspectors. 

Risk-Based Approach: 

A risk-based approach entails consideration of terrorist threats, 
vulnerability of potential terrorist targets to those threats, and the 
consequences of those threats being carried out when deciding how to 
allocate resources to defend against these threats. Risk-based, 
priority-driven decisions can help inform decision makers in allocating 
finite resources to the areas of greatest need. 

During October 2006, TSA began implementing a risk-based approach to 
scheduling foreign airport assessments in order to focus its limited 
inspector resources on higher-risk airports. Another potential benefit 
to TSA's new approach is that it may allow TSA to reduce its reliance 
on domestic inspectors. The objectives of TSA's risk-based scheduling 
approach are to (1) determine the appropriate frequency of foreign 
airport visits, and (2) identify the appropriate number of inspectors 
needed for each IFO based on the deployment availability of inspectors, 
the risk-based priority of each location, and the number of visits 
required each year. 

Under the risk-based approach, when fully implemented, foreign airports 
are categorized based on risk level, and depending on the category in 
which they are placed, are scheduled to be assessed once a year, once 
every 2 years, or once every 3 years. According to information provided 
by TSA, under this approach, the number of foreign airport assessments 
scheduled each year will decrease by about 38 percent (from 170 to 105 
assessments).[Footnote 61] TSA officials stated that the reduction in 
the number of annual foreign airport assessments will help enable 
inspectors to complete foreign airport assessments according to 
schedule. Based on our analysis, TSA's risk-based approach for 
scheduling foreign airport assessments is consistent with generally 
accepted risk management principles. 

While it appears that this risk-based approach will reduce the number 
of foreign airport assessments international inspectors are expected to 
conduct in a year, it is too soon to determine the impact of this 
approach on TSA's ability to complete scheduled foreign airport visits-
-including assessments and inspections--for two key reasons. First, TSA 
has not yet finalized its risk-based approach to scheduling air carrier 
inspections. In February 2007, TSA officials stated that the draft 
version of the risk-based approach to scheduling air carrier 
inspections was being vetted through the agency, but they do not expect 
the final version to be approved until spring 2007. TSA officials 
stated that in developing the risk-based approach for scheduling air 
carrier inspections, they determined that, unlike the situation with 
airports, using previous inspection results was not the best way to 
determine air carrier vulnerability. Rather, TSA officials expect to 
use foreign airport assessment results to determine the vulnerability 
of air carriers operating out of those airports, especially considering 
that the security status of foreign airports influences TSA's decision 
to impose additional security requirements on air carriers operating 
out of foreign airports. 

In addition, it is uncertain how TSA's upcoming audits of foreign 
repair stations will affect the workload of international inspectors. 
In December 2003, Congress passed the Vision 100--Century of Aviation 
Reauthorization Act (Vision 100), which mandated that TSA issue 
regulations to ensure the security of foreign and domestic repair 
stations and, in coordination with the Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA), complete a security review and audit of foreign repair stations 
certified by FAA within 18 months of issuing the regulations.[Footnote 
62] Currently, there are approximately 665 FAA-certified repair 
stations in foreign countries that TSA is required to audit.[Footnote 
63] Of these, 93 are deemed substantial with regard to safety and 
security in that they perform work on the airframe, flight controls, or 
propulsion systems. In addition, another 38 are located in countries 
that, pursuant to Vision 100, TSA and FAA must give priority to because 
they have been identified as posing the most significant security 
risks. TSA plans to initiate security audits of the repair stations 
during fiscal year 2007. Specifically, TSA expects to conduct 127 
audits of foreign repair stations during the initial year, focusing on 
those located in high-threat areas. According to TSA, the majority of 
repair stations deemed substantial (65 of 93)--are located on or near 
foreign airports already subject to assessment by TSA. TSA expects that 
it will take inspectors 3 days to complete initial audits if the 
foreign repair stations are collocated with foreign airports being 
assessed, and 5 days to complete for stations which are not collocated. 
According to TSA, the agency's fiscal year 2006 funding levels were 
sufficient to allow for an additional 13 international inspector 
positions, including a program manager position, to supplement its 
current international inspector staff and help meet the requirement to 
conduct foreign repair station security audits. As of January 2007, all 
13 positions were filled, but TSA had not yet begun to conduct these 
audits. Therefore, it is not yet known how these audits and additional 
inspector positions will actually affect overall inspector workload or 
TSA's ability to complete its foreign assessments and inspections as 
scheduled. 

Harmonization of Security Standards and Assessment and Inspection 
Processes Would Help TSA Address Host Government Concerns Regarding 
Resource Burdens: 

Harmonization of TSA, host government, and third party (e.g., European 
Commission) security standards and the processes used to assess foreign 
airports and air carriers would address concerns regarding the resource 
burden placed on host governments as a result of frequent airport 
visits conducted by TSA and others. Officials from 3 of the 7 foreign 
countries we visited in March 2006, as well as officials representing 
the European Commission--the executive arm of the European Union (which 
is composed of 27 countries[Footnote 64]), stated that the frequency of 
airport assessments and air carrier inspections conducted by TSA and 
others had placed a significant resource burden on the host government. 
In addition, a representative of the Association of European Airlines 
and IATA stated that frequent security inspections by TSA, the host 
government, and other countries, as well as safety inspections, 
including inspections conducted by FAA, burdened the limited personnel 
resources available to air carriers. Specifically, for each inspection, 
the air carrier must assign one of its employees to escort the 
inspection team around the airport. (In general, TSA officials must be 
accompanied by host government officials when conducting foreign 
airport assessments and air carrier inspections because TSA officials 
are not allowed to enter restricted areas of the airport unescorted.) 
Belgian officials, for example, proposed to shorten TSA's fiscal year 
2006 assessment of the airport in Brussels, stating that being assessed 
by TSA, as well as ICAO, the European Commission, and the European 
Civil Aviation Conference[Footnote 65] within a short span of time 
would pose a significant resource burden on the Belgian aviation 
security department. Host government officials in Germany raised 
concerns regarding the resource burden placed on their aviation 
security department due to the frequency of TSA visits. German 
officials said that TSA scheduled 10 airport visits between January 
2006 and September 2006, which German officials viewed as excessive. In 
addition to individual European countries, the Director of Security for 
the Protection of Persons, Goods, and Installations for the European 
Commission's Directorate General of Transport and Energy wrote a letter 
to the TSA Assistant Secretary dated March 9, 2006, expressing concern 
about the frequency of TSA airport assessments and air carrier 
inspections in Europe. The Director suggested that TSA consider the 
high level of quality control exercised within the European Union by 
the European Commission as well as the European Union member states 
when determining the frequency of airport assessment visits and that 
TSA and the European Commission embark upon a joint effort to improve 
coordination of airport visits to alleviate the resource burden placed 
on member states. TSA's risk-based approach for scheduling foreign 
airport assessments could help address some host governments' concerns 
regarding the resource burden placed on them in part due to the 
frequency of airport assessments conducted by TSA. 

In addition to implementing a risk-based approach to scheduling, there 
are other potential opportunities for TSA to address host country 
concerns regarding the resource burden experienced as a result of 
frequent airport visits. Industry representatives and some host 
government officials stated that if TSA and other inspecting entities 
either conducted joint airport assessments and air carrier inspections 
or used the results of each other's assessments and inspections in lieu 
of conducting their own, the frequency of airport visits could be 
reduced, in turn reducing the resource burden placed on host 
governments and air carriers. Airports Council International officials 
we interviewed, who represent airport operators worldwide, stated that 
if TSA and other inspecting entities were to conduct joint assessments, 
the resource burden experienced by airport operators would also be 
reduced. Moreover, officials from 2 of the 7 countries we visited 
suggested that TSA review the results of airport assessments conducted 
by the host government or by third parties either in lieu of conducting 
its own airport assessments or to target its assessments on specific 
security standards. These officials said that by doing this, TSA could 
reduce the length of the assessment period, thereby reducing the 
resource burden placed on host government officials. 

According to TSA, the agency must physically observe security 
operations at foreign airports to determine whether airports are 
maintaining and carrying out effective security measures in order to 
satisfy its statutory mandate to conduct assessments of foreign 
airports. This interpretation precludes TSA from relying solely on 
third party or host government assessments to make this 
determination.[Footnote 66] However, TSA officials stated that they may 
be able to use host government or third party assessments--provided 
that foreign officials make these assessments available to TSA--to help 
refine the agency's risk-based approach to scheduling foreign airport 
assessments, such that TSA would be able to focus its limited 
inspection resources on foreign airports that pose the greatest 
security risk to the United States. For example, instead of visiting a 
foreign airport that TSA considers low risk once every 3 years, TSA, 
hypothetically, could visit such airports once every 5 years, and 
review third party or host government assessments between visits to 
help determine whether the airport is maintaining and carrying out 
effective security measures. This would enable TSA to reduce the number 
of visits to foreign airports, thus addressing host government 
officials' concerns regarding the resource burden they experience as a 
result of frequent airport assessments. However, three of the five IFO 
managers we interviewed said that the option of using host government 
assessments is not currently available to them because host governments 
in their areas of responsibility generally do not have airport 
assessment programs in place. These IFO managers said that even if host 
governments had assessment programs in place, they would be cautious 
about using the assessment reports and conducting joint assessments for 
one of two reasons: (1) TSA has not independently evaluated the quality 
of the assessments conducted by host governments and third parties or 
the quality of the inspectors conducting these assessments, and (2) 
host governments and third party inspectors base their assessments on 
different aviation security standards than TSA. Similarly, foreign 
government officials and industry representatives have cited 
differences in security standards as an impediment to conducting joint 
assessments and using host government or third party assessments. 

Harmonization: 

In the homeland security context, "harmonization" is a broad term used 
to describe countries' efforts to coordinate their security practices 
to enhance security and increase efficiency by avoiding duplication of 
effort. Harmonization efforts can include countries' mutually 
recognizing and accepting each other's existing practices--which could 
represent somewhat different approaches to achieve the same outcome, as 
well as working to develop uniform standards. 

TSA headquarters officials stated that harmonization of airport and air 
carrier security standards and airport assessment and air carrier 
inspection processes would make them less cautious about using other 
assessment reports and conducting joint assessments. To this end, TSA 
has taken steps toward harmonizing airport assessment processes and 
some airport and air carrier security standards with the European 
Commission. In May 2006, in responding to the European Commission's 
concerns regarding the frequency of TSA airport assessments and air 
carrier inspections in Europe, the TSA Assistant Secretary suggested 
that TSA and the European Commission develop working groups to address 
these concerns. Further, in June 2006, TSA initiated efforts with the 
European Commission that will enable each party to learn more about the 
other party's quality control programs. As part of these efforts, TSA 
and the European Commission established six working groups. TSA and the 
European Commission have not established firm time frames for when the 
working groups are to complete their efforts. The objectives and the 
status of the working groups are described in table 5. 

Table 5: Description and Status of TSA-European Commission Aviation 
Security Working Groups: 

Title of working group: SSI Agreement; 
Purpose of working group: Facilitate sharing of Sensitive Security 
Information (SSI) between TSA and the European Commission; 
Status of working group: efforts as of January 2007: 
* TSA and the European Commission agreed upon the verbiage of the 
information-sharing agreement. The agreement is in the final formal 
approval stages at TSA, the European Commission, and the Department of 
State. 

Title of working group: Observer Participation on Inspections; 
Purpose of working group: Facilitate TSA observation of European Union 
airport assessments and European Commission observation of TSA 
assessments of U.S. airports; 
Status of working group: efforts as of January 2007: 
* TSA and the European Commission are currently in the process of 
identifying mutually agreeable dates for a European Commission observer 
to join a TSA inspection of a U.S. airport; 
* Final dates and location for TSA participation in European Commission 
audit are to be determined; 
* European Commission representatives expressed an interest in viewing 
the PARIS database, which is a compilation of U.S. inspection findings; 
* The European Commission is in the process of developing a database 
for its inspection findings. 

Title of working group: Risk Based Assessment Methodology; 
Purpose of working group: Establish a risk-based methodology for 
scheduling U.S. airport assessment visits to European member states; 
Status of working group: efforts as of January 2007: 
* TSA developed a risk-based methodology for scheduling foreign airport 
assessments; 
* TSA and the European Commission will determine next steps. 

Title of working group: Audit Schedules; 
Purpose of working group: Determine how TSA and the European Commission 
will provide advance notice of the dates for planned airport assessment 
visits; 
Status of working group: efforts as of January 2007: 
* TSA and the European Commission agreed to share audit schedule 
information on a quarterly basis; 
* The level of detail on audit schedules that will be shared is to be 
determined. 

Title of working group: Data Interoperability; 
Purpose of working group: Facilitate the exchange of information 
regarding supply chain data monitoring between the United States and 
the European Commission.[A]; 
Status of working group: efforts as of January 2007: 
* TSA and the European Commission developed a data interoperability 
template outlining the purpose, key objectives, and challenges of data 
interoperability; 
* This working group may be restructured to focus on cargo 
harmonization. 

Title of working group: Compare and Contrast U.S./European Commission 
Aviation Security Requirements; 
Purpose of working group: Assess which of TSA's and the European 
Commission's aviation security measures are comparable (not identical) 
and determine where significant differences exist; 
Status of working group: efforts as of January 2007: 
* To accomplish a meaningful comparison, TSA and the European 
Commission have developed a matrix to reflect major aviation security 
categories and measures. Once the SSI agreement is finalized, TSA and 
the European Commission will complete the comparison matrix. 

Source: TSA. 

[A] A supply chain involves the flow of information, product, and funds 
between different parties involved in the development and provision of 
goods. These parties include manufacturers, suppliers, transporters, 
warehouses, retailers, and customers. 

[End of table] 

In December 2006, the TSA Assistant Secretary stated that the agency 
had primarily coordinated with the European Commission on harmonizing 
aviation security standards because airports in the European Union 
generally have a high level of security. The Assistant Secretary 
further stated that TSA should not focus its inspector resources on 
foreign airports that are known to have a high level of security, such 
as several European airports; rather, TSA should focus its limited 
resources on foreign airports that are known to be less secure. The 
Assistant Secretary added that a number of options for better 
leveraging inspector resources are being considered by one of the 
European Commission-TSA working groups, including scheduling European 
Commission and TSA assessments to overlap for 1 or 2 days to enable 
both parties to share their assessment results, which could enable TSA 
to shorten the length of its assessments. The Assistant Secretary also 
stated that TSA could eventually recognize European Commission airport 
assessments as equivalent to those conducted by TSA and have TSA 
inspectors shadow European Commission assessment teams to periodically 
validate the results. However, in January 2007, European Union member 
states reached consensus that they would not share the results of 
European Commission assessments of their airports with TSA until the 
following occur: (1) TSA and the European Commission agree upon 
protocols for sharing sensitive security information; (2) TSA 
inspectors shadow European Commission inspectors on an assessment of a 
European airport, and European Commission inspectors shadow TSA 
inspectors on an assessment of a U.S. airport; and (3) TSA agrees to 
provide the European Commission with the results of U.S. airport 
assessments. TSA and European Commission officials stated that they 
expect information-sharing protocols to be established and shadowing of 
airport assessments to take place during spring 2007. TSA officials 
also stated that once the information-sharing protocols are finalized, 
they would be willing to provide European Union member states with the 
results of U.S. airport assessments. 

Aviation industry representatives stated that in addition to 
facilitating joint assessments and use of third party assessments, 
harmonization of aviation security standards between countries would 
enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of international aviation 
security efforts. For example, IATA representatives we interviewed 
stated that they have met with TSA officials about harmonizing the list 
of items prohibited onboard aircraft with the European Commission. IATA 
officials stated that having different security requirements to follow 
for different countries leads to confusion, and perhaps noncompliance 
with security requirements, among air carriers. The Chairman of the 
Security Committee for the Association of European Airlines stated that 
there are numerous redundancies in the international aviation security 
system that could be reduced through harmonization, particularly with 
regard to screening transfer passengers--passengers who have a layover 
en route from their originating airport to their destination airport. 
For example, for a passenger traveling from Frankfurt to Chicago who 
has to change planes in New York, upon landing in New York, the 
passenger must be rescreened and have his or her checked baggage 
rescreened before boarding the flight for Chicago. According to 
officials from various air carrier and airport operator associations, 
the rescreening of transfer passengers is costly and is only required 
because individual countries do not formally recognize each other's 
aviation security measures as providing an equivalent level of 
security. Air carrier representatives also stated that because air 
carriers must use their limited resources to implement redundant 
security measures, they are not able to focus their resources on 
implementing other security measures that may be more effective at 
preventing a terrorist from carrying out an attack.[Footnote 67] The 
TSA Assistant Secretary agreed that rescreening transfer passengers 
that originate from airports that have a high level of security may be 
unnecessarily redundant. The Assistant Secretary said that TSA plans to 
assess the effectiveness of the checked baggage screening system 
commonly used at European airports to determine if that system provides 
at least the same level of security as TSA's baggage screening system. 
However, TSA officials said that even if the agency determines that the 
baggage screening system in place at European airports provides an 
equivalent level of security, TSA would still have to rescreen checked 
baggage for transfer passengers arriving from Europe because the 
Aviation and Transportation Security Act requires passengers and 
baggage on flights originating in the United States to be screened by 
U.S. government employees.[Footnote 68] According to an attorney in 
TSA's Office of Chief Counsel, Congress would have to change the law in 
order for TSA to discontinue the screening of transfer passengers. 

TSA also made efforts to harmonize some aviation security measures with 
other countries outside of the European Union. For example, TSA 
officials worked with Canadian officials to develop a common set of 
security requirements for air carriers that have flights between the 
United States and Canada. Additionally, in response to the alleged 
August 2006 liquid explosives terrorist plot, TSA initially banned all 
liquids, gels, and aerosols from being carried through the checkpoint 
and, in September 2006, began allowing passengers to carry on small, 
travel-size liquids and gels (3 fluid ounces or less) using a single 
quart-size, clear plastic, zip-top bag. In an effort to harmonize its 
liquid screening procedures with other countries, in November 2006, TSA 
revised its procedures to allow 3.4 fluid ounces of liquids, gels, and 
aerosols onboard aircraft, which is equivalent to 100 milliliters--the 
amount permitted by the 27 countries in the European Union, as well as 
Canada, Australia, Norway, Switzerland, and Iceland. According to the 
Assistant Secretary of TSA, this means that approximately half of the 
world's air travelers will be governed by similar measures with regard 
to this area of security. ICAO also adopted the liquid, gels, and 
aerosol screening procedures implemented by TSA and others as a 
recommended practice. As we reported in March 2007, DHS has also taken 
steps toward harmonizing international air cargo security 
practices.[Footnote 69] As part of this effort, TSA has worked through 
ICAO to develop uniform international air cargo security standards. 

TSA Is Taking Steps to Address Sovereignty Concerns Raised by Foreign 
Officials on a Case-by-Case Basis: 

In addition to concerns regarding the resource burden placed on host 
governments as a result of frequent airport visits by TSA and others, 
TSA, on a case-by-case basis, has also had to address host government 
concerns regarding sovereignty--more specifically, concerns that TSA 
assessments and inspections infringe upon a host government's authority 
to regulate airports and air carriers within its borders. According to 
TSA officials and representatives of the European Commission, several 
foreign governments have stated that they consider TSA's foreign 
airport assessments as an infringement on their sovereignty. For 
example, government officials in one country have prevented TSA from 
assessing the security at their airports and from inspecting non-U.S. 
air carriers because they do not believe TSA has the authority to 
assess airports outside of the United States and that the host 
government is the sole regulator of air carriers that are based out of 
their country.[Footnote 70] Based on the results of air carrier 
inspections provided to us by TSA, we found that during fiscal year 
2005, TSA conducted only one inspection of an air carrier that was 
based out of this particular country. According to TSA, officials from 
this country allowed TSA to conduct this particular inspection to 
accommodate TSA's request to inspect the security of air carriers that 
had flights originating in Europe and arriving in Washington, D.C., 
during the January 2005 U.S. presidential inauguration activities. We 
also found that TSA conducted assessments of four airports in this 
particular country during fiscal year 2005. TSA officials said that 
they were able to conduct these assessments under the guise of a TSA 
"visit" to--versus an "assessment" of--the airport. TSA officials, 
however, stated that because officials from this country do not believe 
TSA has the authority to assess the security at their airports, these 
officials would not accept--neither orally nor in writing--the results 
of TSA airport assessments. TSA officials also stated that officials 
from this country prohibited TSA inspectors from assessing airport 
perimeter security as well as the contents of the country's individual 
airport security programs. 

TSA officials identified that there are at least 3 additional countries 
that raised concerns regarding sovereignty. According to TSA, officials 
from one of these countries stated that they did not know of any 
international requirements compelling them to allow TSA to assess their 
airport and that TSA had too many internal flaws to assess airports in 
other countries. In response to this country's concerns, TSA sent a 
representative to meet with the country's Minister of Transportation. 
At the meeting, the Minister granted TSA future access to the country's 
airports for assessments after being offered the opportunity to visit 
U.S. airports to observe security measures. Additional countries, 
according to TSA, were concerned about their sovereignty being violated 
and TSA gathering intelligence information for the U.S. government 
through the airport assessment program. TSA officials stated that when 
unique concerns arise in the future, they will continue to work with 
countries on a case-by-case basis to try to address their concerns. 

Conclusions: 

The alleged August 2006 terrorist plot to detonate liquid explosives on 
U.S.-bound flights from the United Kingdom illustrates the continuing 
threat of international terrorism to commercial aviation and the 
importance of TSA's foreign airport assessment and air carrier 
inspection programs. As part of these programs, TSA has provided on- 
site consultation and made recommendations to foreign officials on how 
to resolve security deficiencies. In rare cases, DHS and TSA have taken 
more aggressive action by notifying the traveling public that an 
airport does not meet minimum international standards or issuing 
warning letters and letters of correction to air carriers. While 
foreign government officials and air carrier representatives 
acknowledged that TSA's efforts have helped to strengthen the security 
of U.S.-bound flights, there are several opportunities for TSA to 
strengthen oversight of its foreign airport assessment and air carrier 
inspection programs. First, although TSA has made some efforts to 
improve its tracking of foreign airport assessments and air carrier 
inspections, until additional controls are in place to track the status 
of foreign airport assessments and air carrier inspections, such as 
whether scheduled assessments and inspections were actually conducted, 
TSA has limited assurance that all assessments and inspections are 
accounted for and that appropriate action was taken for airports and 
air carriers that did not comply with security standards. Second, while 
TSA has helped to strengthen security at foreign airports by providing 
assistance to foreign officials, because TSA does not consistently 
track and document foreign officials' progress in addressing security 
deficiencies, it may be difficult for TSA to assess the impact of its 
efforts on meeting program goals--to ensure that foreign airports and 
air carriers servicing the United States are meeting, at a minimum, 
applicable ICAO standards and TSA's security requirements, 
respectively. Third, although TSA has established some output 
performance measures and targets related to the assessment and 
inspection programs, the current measures do not enable TSA to draw 
particularly meaningful conclusions about the impact of its foreign 
airport assessment and air carrier inspection programs on the security 
of U.S.-bound flights and how to most effectively direct its 
improvement efforts. 

TSA has faced several challenges in meeting the goals of its assessment 
and inspection programs, including a lack of available staff and 
concerns regarding the resource burden placed on host governments as a 
result of frequent airport visits conducted by TSA and others. TSA's 
development of a risk-based approach to scheduling airport assessments 
and air carrier inspections is a step in the right direction to address 
host government concerns and better leverage limited inspector 
resources. However, it is too soon to determine the extent to which the 
risk-based approach will help to improve TSA's ability to complete 
scheduled foreign airport assessments and air carrier inspections, and 
the extent to which the approach will alleviate host government 
concerns regarding the frequency of airport visits. The collaboration 
between TSA and the European Commission regarding opportunities for 
conducting joint airport assessments and sharing assessment results, as 
well as efforts to harmonize aviation security standards--including 
those related to the screening of liquids, gels, and aerosols--with the 
European Commission and others, are key steps toward addressing host 
government concerns regarding the resource burden that results from 
frequent assessments by TSA and others. It will be important for TSA to 
continue working with foreign officials to address their concerns, such 
as sovereignty issues, in order to continue assessing the security at 
foreign airports that service the United States. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

To help strengthen oversight of TSA's foreign airport assessment and 
air carrier inspection programs, in our April 2007 report that 
contained sensitive security information, we recommended that the 
Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security direct the Assistant 
Secretary for the Transportation Security Administration to take the 
following five actions: 

* develop controls to track the status of scheduled foreign airport 
assessments from initiation through completion, including the reasons 
why assessments were deferred or canceled; 

* develop controls to track the status of scheduled air carrier 
inspections from initiation through completion, including the reasons 
why inspections were deferred or canceled, as well as the final 
disposition of any investigations that result from air carrier 
inspections; 

* develop a standard process for tracking and documenting host 
governments' progress in addressing security deficiencies identified 
during TSA airport assessments; 

* develop outcome-oriented performance measures to evaluate the impact 
TSA assistance has on improving foreign airport compliance with ICAO 
standards; and: 

* develop outcome-oriented performance measures to evaluate the impact 
TSA assistance and enforcement actions have on improving air carrier 
compliance with TSA security requirements. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

On April 13, 2007, we received written comments on the draft report, 
which are reproduced in full in appendix V. DHS generally concurred 
with the findings and recommendations in the report and stated that the 
recommendations will help strengthen TSA's oversight of foreign airport 
assessments and air carrier inspections. 

With regard to our recommendations that TSA develop controls to track 
the status of scheduled airport assessments and air carrier inspections 
from initiation through completion, including the reasons for any 
deferments or cancellations, and the final disposition of 
investigations related to air carrier inspections, DHS stated that TSA 
plans to enhance its tracking system to include the reason for any 
deferment or cancellation of an airport assessment or an air carrier 
inspection. The tracking system also incorporates the risk-based 
methodology and criteria for scheduling foreign airport assessments 
that TSA adopted in October 2006. Enhancing the tracking system should 
provide TSA greater assurance that airport assessments and air carrier 
inspections are conducted within applicable time frames. If properly 
implemented and monitored, this tracking system should address the 
intent of our recommendation. Regarding the disposition of 
investigations related to air carrier inspections, DHS stated that 
TSA's Office of Chief Counsel currently documents the final disposition 
of investigations in PARIS, but TSA will enhance PARIS to ensure that 
inspection activities are linked to investigations so that 
comprehensive enforcement information is readily available. A clear 
link between violations identified as a result of an inspection and the 
final disposition of those violations is important for maintaining 
comprehensive inspection and enforcement information. As we reported, 
TSA often pursued one enforcement action in response to multiple 
violations, and inspectors were not required to identify which 
violations were included in the enforcement action. Without being able 
to readily identify what enforcement action was taken in response to 
specific security violations, TSA cannot readily ensure that air 
carriers receive appropriate penalties, and that security violations 
are resolved. 

Concerning our recommendation that TSA develop a standard process for 
tracking and documenting host governments' progress in addressing 
security deficiencies identified during assessments, TSA stated that it 
is currently developing a system whereby outstanding deficiencies 
identified during an assessment will be tracked along with deficiency- 
specific information, deadlines, and current status. TSA plans to 
archive this information for future trend analysis and to provide a 
historical understanding of each airport's security posture. This 
effort, if properly implemented, will provide additional relevant, 
useful information to TSA in performing its oversight responsibilities. 

TSA concurred with our recommendation that it develop outcome-oriented 
performance measures to evaluate the impact TSA assistance has on 
improving foreign airport compliance with international security 
standards, and on improving air carrier compliance with TSA security 
requirements. TSA is considering several elements to include in the 
performance measures, such as the number of assessments conducted, 
corrective actions recommended, TSA assistance provided, and corrective 
actions achieved. TSA indicated that its outcome-based performance 
measures would be structured to recognize the collaborative nature of 
the process, particularly where corrective action by a foreign 
government is concerned. Such outcome-based performance measures, if 
properly developed and utilized, will enable TSA to determine the 
impact of its airport assessment program and assistance provided for 
improving security at foreign airports. Likewise, these types of 
measures can be applied to air carrier inspections at foreign airports 
to determine he impact that such inspections have on compliance, and to 
identify which approaches to for improving air carrier compliance with 
security requirements work well and which could be improved upon. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please 
contact me at (202) 512-3404 or berrickc@gao.gov. Contact points for 
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found 
on the last page of this report. GAO staff that made major 
contributions to this report are listed in appendix VI. This report 
will also be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at 
http://www.gao.gov. 

Signed by: 

Cathleen A. Berrick: 
Director, Homeland Security and Justice: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

To examine efforts by the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) 
to ensure the security of international aviation, and in particular 
flights bound for the United States from other countries, we addressed 
the following questions: (1) What were the results of TSA's fiscal year 
2005 foreign airport assessments and air carrier inspections, and what 
actions were taken, if any, when TSA identified that foreign airports 
and air carriers were not complying with security standards? (2) How, 
if at all, did TSA assist foreign countries and air carriers in 
addressing any deficiencies identified during foreign airport 
assessments and air carrier inspections, and to what extent did TSA 
provide oversight of its assessment and inspection efforts? (3) What 
challenges, if any, affected TSA's ability to conduct foreign airport 
assessments and air carrier inspections, and what actions have TSA and 
others taken to address these challenges? 

Results of Fiscal Year 2005 Foreign Airport Assessments and Air Carrier 
Inspections and Actions Taken by TSA in Response to Noncompliance: 

Foreign Airport Assessment Results: 

To determine the results of TSA's foreign airport assessments we 
reviewed 128 fiscal year 2005 assessment reports, the most recent year 
for which complete foreign airport assessment reports were 
available.[Footnote 71] To determine the extent to which foreign 
airports complied with International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) 
standards and recommended practices, we looked at the following 
information contained in the reports: 

(1) ICAO standards or recommended practices with which the airport did 
not comply; 

(2) whether issues of noncompliance were "old" (identified during the 
previous assessment) or "new" (identified during the current 
assessment); 

(3) explanation of the problems that existed that caused the airport 
not to comply with ICAO standards or recommended practices, and, if 
provided, any actions taken by the host government to address the 
problems; 

(4) TSA's recommendations for how the airport could correct security 
deficiencies in order to meet ICAO standards or recommended practices; 
and: 

(5) whether issues of noncompliance remained "open" (unresolved) or 
"closed" (resolved) prior to the completion of the assessment. 

We developed an electronic data collection instrument to capture 
information from copies of the assessment reports. All data collection 
instrument entries, with the exception of the problem descriptions and 
recommendations, were verified to ensure they had been copied correctly 
from the assessment reports. Considering that we only intended to 
discuss the problem descriptions and the recommendations anecdotally, 
and given the resources available to verify this information, we 
verified that the problem descriptions and recommendations had been 
copied correctly for a random sample of 20 assessment reports from 
fiscal year 2005. 

We analyzed the data to determine the frequency with which foreign 
airports complied with particular categories of ICAO standards and 
recommended practices, such as passenger screening, checked baggage 
screening, access controls, etc., and the number of airports that 
resolved deficiencies upon completion of the assessment. 

Air Carrier Inspection Results: 

To determine the results of TSA's air carrier inspections, we obtained 
inspection data from TSA's Performance and Results Information System 
(PARIS).[Footnote 72] For the purposes of our review, we analyzed the 
results of inspections conducted in fiscal year 2005 to be consistent 
with the analysis performed on the results of foreign airport 
assessments for fiscal year 2005. 

TSA's inspections database contained information on 529 air carrier 
inspections at 145 foreign airports in 71 countries conducted by TSA 
during fiscal year 2005. Specifically, the inspections database 
included the date and location of the inspection, the inspected air 
carrier, the security requirements being inspected, as well as the 
inspector's determination as to whether the air carrier was or was not 
in compliance with security requirements. Prior to conducting any 
analysis, we assessed the reliability of the inspection data by 
performing electronic testing for obvious errors in accuracy and 
completeness. Our testing revealed a few errors, such as 
inconsistencies in the names of individual air carriers or incorrectly 
identifying the airport as the assessed entity rather than the air 
carrier. We also found instances of inspections conducted at domestic 
airports that were included in the data; those inspection records were 
removed. We also interviewed agency officials familiar with the data, 
and worked with them to resolve the data problems we identified. Based 
on our electronic testing and discussions with agency officials, we 
found the data to be sufficiently reliable for the purposes of our 
report. For our analysis, we also added additional information to the 
inspection records to include the country where the inspection 
occurred, and whether the air carrier being inspected was a U.S.-based 
air carrier or a foreign air carrier. Finally, to facilitate our 
analysis, we grouped the security requirements being inspected into 
several categories, such as aircraft security, cargo, checked baggage, 
passenger and carry-on screening and special procedures. 

Actions Taken by TSA when Foreign Airports and Air Carriers Did Not 
Comply with Security Requirements: 

To determine the actions taken by TSA when foreign airports did not 
comply with ICAO standards and recommended practices, we reviewed TSA's 
Foreign Airport Assessment Program Standard Operating Procedures (SOP). 
We also reviewed relevant statutory provisions that identify specific 
actions to be taken by the Secretary of Homeland Security when the 
Secretary determines that a foreign airport does not maintain and carry-
out effective security measures.[Footnote 73] 

To determine the actions taken by TSA when air carriers did not comply 
with TSA security requirements, we reviewed fiscal year 2005 
information from the findings and investigations databases in PARIS. As 
with the inspection data, to facilitate our analysis, we included 
additional information in the findings database, such as the country 
where the inspection occurred, and whether the air carrier being 
inspected was a U.S.-based air carrier or a foreign air carrier. 
Further, we grouped the security requirements being inspected into 
several categories, such as aircraft security, cargo, checked baggage, 
passenger and carry-on screening, and special procedures. 

To assess the reliability of the findings data, we performed electronic 
testing for obvious errors and completeness and interviewed agency 
officials knowledgeable about the data. We identified two issues of 
concern during our reliability assessment. First, we found that the 
findings database is not linked to the inspections database to allow 
for ready determination of the actions taken by TSA in response to 
specific deficiencies. Second, the findings database did not 
consistently include accurate information on actions taken in response 
to findings. According to TSA officials knowledgeable about the data, 
the findings database should contain information on actions taken by 
TSA for each response of "not in compliance" in the inspections 
database. However, we found that in half of the inspections where 
deficiencies were identified, such information was not properly 
recorded in the findings database. Considering the amount of 
information excluded from the findings database and that this 
information could not be readily provided by TSA, we determined that 
the findings data were not sufficiently reliable for conducting 
evaluative analysis of the actions taken by TSA when security 
violations were identified during air carrier inspections. However, we 
determined that the findings data were sufficiently reliable for 
conducting descriptive analysis of TSA's actions, while including 
appropriate statements as to its reliability, and for anecdotal 
purposes. 

To assess the reliability of the investigations data included in PARIS, 
we conducted electronic testing and interviewed agency officials 
knowledgeable about the data. We found that information in the 
investigations database is not recorded in such a way that one can 
readily determine which air carrier inspection, and in particular which 
specific security violations identified, were the impetus behind a 
particular investigation. TSA officials explained that inspectors are 
not required to link an investigation to the inspection which it 
stemmed from. When we performed our analysis, TSA officials were, 
however, able to provide links to inspections for some of the 
investigations. For the remainder of the investigations data, we 
attempted to make the link between inspections and investigations by 
using information from the inspections database such as the date when 
the investigation record was created and the narrative fields, which in 
some cases identified whether the investigation was a result of an 
inspection or some other offense, such as an air carrier allowing a 
passenger on the No-Fly list to board a U.S.-bound flight.[Footnote 74] 
Our analysis of actions taken by TSA when air carriers did not comply 
with security requirements is, therefore, based on those investigations 
that we were able to link to fiscal year 2005 inspection activity. We 
found these data to be sufficiently reliable for purposes of this 
report. 

For additional information on actions taken by TSA when foreign 
airports and air carriers did not comply with security requirements, we 
interviewed TSA headquarters and field officials in the Office of 
Security Operations--the division responsible for conducting foreign 
airport assessments and air carrier inspections and making 
recommendations for corrective action--and the Transportation Security 
Network Management division--the unit responsible for working with 
foreign officials to coordinate TSA foreign airport visits and 
monitoring host government and air carrier progress in addressing 
security deficiencies. 

Assistance Provided by TSA to Address Security Deficiencies and 
Oversight of Airport Assessment and Air Carrier Inspection Efforts: 

Assistance Provided by TSA to Address Security Deficiencies: 

To identify actions taken by TSA to help foreign officials address 
security deficiencies identified at foreign airports during the fiscal 
year 2005 airport assessments, we obtained and analyzed information 
from the fiscal year 2005 foreign airport assessment reports. To obtain 
information on TSA's efforts to assist air carrier representatives in 
addressing identified security deficiencies, we reviewed information in 
the findings and investigations databases from TSA's PARIS. As 
previously discussed, we assessed the reliability of the findings and 
investigations data by performing electronic testing for obvious errors 
in accuracy and completeness, and interviewed agency officials 
knowledgeable about the data. While we identified errors during our 
reliability assessment, many of which remained unresolved, we 
determined that the findings and investigations data were sufficiently 
reliable for anecdotal descriptions of the assistance TSA provided air 
carriers to help them address security deficiencies. 

To obtain additional information on actions taken by TSA to address 
security deficiencies identified during foreign airport assessments and 
air carrier inspections, we interviewed TSA headquarters officials from 
the Office of Security Operations and the Transportation Sector Network 
Management division. We also made site visits to TSA's five 
international field offices (IFO) located in Los Angeles, Dallas, 
Miami, Frankfurt, and Singapore, where we met with the IFO managers; 
international aviation security inspectors, who conduct foreign airport 
assessments and air carrier inspections; 10 of the 20 TSA 
Representatives (TSAR), who schedule TSA airport visits and follow up 
on host governments' progress in addressing security deficiencies; and 
4 of the 6 International Principal Security Inspectors (IPSI), who are 
responsible for assisting foreign air carriers in understanding and 
complying with TSA security requirements. We also met with 3 of the 15 
Principal Security Inspectors (PSI) located at TSA headquarters that 
are responsible for helping U.S. air carriers understand and comply 
with TSA security requirements. During each of these interviews, we 
discussed these officials' responsibilities related to the foreign 
airport assessment and air carrier inspection programs, including their 
role in assisting foreign officials and air carrier representatives in 
correcting security deficiencies identified during assessments and 
inspections. Information from our interviews with government officials, 
members of the aviation industry, and TSA officials and inspectors 
cannot be generalized beyond those that we spoke with because we did 
not use statistical sampling techniques in selecting individuals to 
interview. To obtain a greater understanding of the foreign airport 
assessment and air carrier inspection processes, as well as the 
assistance TSA provides, we accompanied a team of TSA inspectors and a 
TSAR during the assessment of E.T. Joshua International Airport in 
Kingstown, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and the inspection of 
Caribbean Sun Airlines at that location. Moreover, we identified and 
met with officials from other U.S. government agencies that assist 
foreign officials in enhancing security at foreign airports. 
Specifically, we met with officials from the Department of Justice, 
Department of State, Department of Transportation, and the U.S. Trade 
and Development Administration. 

Oversight of the Foreign Airport Assessment and Air Carrier Inspection 
Programs: 

To obtain information on the extent to which TSA provided oversight of 
its assessment and inspection efforts, we reviewed the agency guidance 
for each program. We also reviewed sections of the fiscal year 2005 
foreign airport assessment reports for completeness and general 
consistency with TSA guidance for preparing assessment reports. In 
addition, we reviewed the inspections, findings, and investigations 
databases in PARIS for completeness and the ability to track air 
carrier inspection activity from initiation through completion, 
including actions taken against air carriers who did not comply with 
security requirements. We compared TSA's guidance and reporting 
mechanisms for the assessment and inspection programs with federal 
standards for internal controls and associated guidance.[Footnote 75] 
We also met with TSA headquarters officials, IFO managers, TSARs, and 
aviation security inspectors to discuss the extent to which they 
documented assessment and inspection activity from initiation through 
completion and follow-up activity for unresolved security deficiencies. 

We obtained additional information on TSA's oversight of the foreign 
airport assessment and air carrier inspection programs, particularly 
with regard to assessing the impact of these programs, by reviewing 
TSA's fiscal year 2006 Performance Assessment Rating Tool (PART) 
submissions. The Office of Management and Budget describes PART as a 
diagnostic tool meant to provide a consistent approach to evaluating 
federal programs as part of the executive budget formulation process. 
PART includes information on an agency's program goals and performance 
measures used to assess whether program goals are being met. We 
compared the program goals identified in TSA's PART submission with the 
Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA), which identifies 
requirements for the types of measures federal agencies should use to 
assess the performance of their programs. We also interviewed TSA 
headquarters and field officials to obtain their perspectives on 
appropriate ways to assess the performance of the foreign airport 
assessment and air carrier inspection programs. 

Challenges That Affected TSA's Ability to Conduct Foreign Airport 
Assessments and Air Carrier Inspections and Actions Taken to Address 
those Challenges: 

To identify challenges that affected TSA's ability to conduct foreign 
airport assessments and air carrier inspections at foreign airports, we 
met with TSA headquarters and field officials in the Office of Security 
Operations and the Transport Sector Network Management division 
regarding their efforts to obtain access to foreign airports to conduct 
assessments and inspections. We also visited the embassies of 16 
nations and the Delegation of the European Commission in Washington, 
D.C., to obtain perspectives of foreign transportation security 
officials on TSA's airport assessment and air carrier inspection 
program.[Footnote 76] In addition, we conducted site visits to meet 
with aviation security officials in Belgium, Canada, Germany, the 
Philippines, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Thailand, and the United 
Kingdom to discuss their perspectives on TSA's foreign airport 
assessment and air carrier inspection activity. We selected these 
locations because they met one or more of the following criteria: a 
relatively high volume of passengers fly to the United States each 
year, TSA assigned a relatively high threat ranking to the country, the 
country received aviation security training or technical assistance 
from a U.S. government agency, or a TSA international field office was 
located in the country. We also met with individuals representing 11 
air carriers, including both U.S. and foreign airlines,[Footnote 77] to 
obtain their perspectives on TSA's foreign airport assessment and air 
carrier inspections programs. Additionally, we met with officials from 
the European Commission, the European Civil Aviation Commission, and 
ICAO to discuss similar efforts these organizations have in place to 
ensure compliance with international aviation security standards. 
Information from our interviews with foreign government officials and 
members of the aviation industry cannot be generalized beyond those 
that we spoke with because we did not use statistical sampling 
techniques in selecting individuals to interview. We also reviewed 
documentation associated with TSA's risk-based methodology for 
scheduling foreign airport assessments and air carrier inspections, 
which TSA intended to address some of the challenges in conducting 
assessments and inspections, and compared the methodology to our risk 
management guidance. 

In addition, we interviewed 4 Federal Security Directors[Footnote 78] 
and 7 aviation security inspectors stationed in the United States to 
discuss their support of the foreign airport assessment and air carrier 
inspection programs as well as the impact, if any, that their 
involvement in these programs has had on their operations at U.S. 
airports. 

We conducted our work from October 2005 through March 2007 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: International Civil Aviation Organization Standards and 
Recommended Practices Used by TSA to Conduct Fiscal Year 2005 Foreign 
Airport Assessments: 

Chapter 1. Definitions: 

Airside. The movement area of an airport, adjacent terrain and 
buildings or portions thereof, access to which is controlled. 

Aircraft Security Check. An inspection of the interior of an aircraft 
to which passengers may have had access and an inspection of the hold 
for the purposes of discovering suspicious objects, weapons, explosives 
or other dangerous devices: 

Background Check. A check of a person's identity and previous 
experience, including any criminal history, where appropriate, as part 
of the assessment of an individual's suitability for unescorted access 
to a security restricted area. 

Cargo. Any property carried on an aircraft other than mail, stores and 
accompanied or mishandled baggage. 

Human Factors Principles. Principles which apply to design, 
certification, training, operations and maintenance and which seek safe 
interface between the human and other system components by proper 
consideration to human performance. 

Human Performance. Human capabilities and limitations which have an 
impact on the safety, security and efficiency of aeronautical 
operations. 

Regulated Agent. An agent, freight forwarder or any other entity who 
conducts business with an operator and provides security controls that 
are see accepted or required by the appropriate authority in respect of 
cargo, courier and express parcels or mail. 

Screening. The application of technical or other means which are 
intended to identify and/or detect weapons, explosives or other 
dangerous devices which may be used to commit an act of unlawful 
interference. 

Note.-Certain dangerous articles or substances are classified as 
dangerous goods by Annex 18 and the associated Technical Instructions 
for the Safe Transport of Dangerous Goods by Air (Doe 9284) and must be 
transported in accordance with those instructions. 

Security. A combination of measures and human and material resources 
intended to safeguard civil aviation against acts of unlawful 
interference. 

Security Control. A means by which the introduction of weapons, 
explosives or other dangerous devices which may be utilized to commit 
an act of unlawful interference can be prevented. 

Security Restricted area. Airside areas of an airport into which access 
is controlled to ensure security of civil aviation. Such are will n 
nasally include, inter alia, all passenger departure areas between the 
screening checkpoint and the aircraft, the ramp, baggage make-up areas, 
cargo sheds, mail centres, airside catering and aircraft cleaning 
premises. 

Unidentified Baggage. Baggage at an airport, with or without a baggage 
tag, which is not picked up by or identified with a passenger. 

Chapter 2. General Principles: 

2.1 Objectives: 

2.1.1 Each Contracting State shall have as its primary objective the 
safety of passengers, crew, ground personnel and the general public in 
all matters related to safeguarding against acts of unlawful 
interference with civil aviation. 

2.1.2 Each Contracting State shall establish an organization and 
develop and implement regulations, practices and procedures to 
safeguard civil aviation against acts of unlawful interference taking 
into account the safety, regularity and efficiency of flights. 

2.1.3 Each Contracting State shall ensure that principles governing 
measures designed to safeguard against acts of unlawful interference 
with international civil aviation are applied to domestic operations to 
the extent practicable. 

2.1.4 Recommendation.-Each Contracting State should ensure appropriate 
protection of aviation security information. 

Note 1.-Guidance material on achieving civil aviation security 
objectives through application of the Standards and Recommended 
Practices in the following chapters is to be found in the Security 
Manual for Safeguarding Civil Aviation Against Acts of Unlawful 
Interference (Doe 8973 Restricted). 

Note 2.-The comprehensive aviation security training material to assist 
States in achieving civil aviation security objectives is contained in 
the ICAO Training Programme for Aviation Security comprising a series 
of Avialion Security Training Packages (ASTPs). 

2.2 Security and facilitation: 

Recommendation.-Each Contracting State should whenever possible arrange 
for the security controls and procedures to cause a minimum of 
interference with, or delay to the activities of civil aviation 
provided the effectiveness of these controls and procedures is not 
compromised. 

2.3 International cooperation: 

2.3.1 Each Contracting State shall ensure that requests from other 
States for special security controls in respect of a specific flight or 
specified flights by operators of such other States are met, as far as 
may be practicable. 

2.3.2 Each Contracting State shall cooperate with other States in 
relation to their respective national civil aviation security 
programmes as necessary. 

2.3.3 Each Contracting State shall cooperate with other States in the 
development and exchange of information concerning training programmes, 
as necessary. 

2.3.4 Each Contracting State shall share with other Contracting States 
threat information that applies to the aviation security interests of 
those States, to the extent practicable. 

2.3.5 Each Contracting State shall provide suitable protection and 
handling procedures for sensitive security information shared by other 
Contracting States, or sensitive security information that affects the 
security interests of other Contracting States, in order to ensure that 
inappropriate use or disclosure of such information is avoided. 

2.3.6 Recommendation.-Each Contracting State should cooperate with 
other States in the field of research and develop-ment of new security 
equipment which will better achieve civil aviation security objectives. 

2.3.7 Recommendation Each Contracting State should include in its 
bilateral agreements on air transport a clause related to aviation 
security. 

2.3.8 Recommendation, Each Contracting State should make available to 
other States on request a written version of the appropriate parts of 
its national civil aviation security programme. 

2.4 Equipment, research and development: 

2.4.1 Recommendation.-Each Contracting State should promote research 
and development of new security equipment which will better achieve 
civil aviation security objectives. 

2.4.2 Recommendation Each Contracting State should ensure that the 
development of new security equipment takes into consideration Human 
Factors principles. 

Note.-Guidance material regarding Human Factors principles can be found 
in the Human Factors Digest - Human Factors in Civil Aviation Security 
Operations* and in Part 1, Chapter 4 of the Human Factors Training 
Manual (Doe 9683). 

Chapter 3. Organization: 

3.1 National organization and appropriate authority: 

3.1.1 Each Contracting State shall establish and implement a written 
national civil aviation security programme to safeguard civil aviation 
operations against acts of unlawful interference, through regulations, 
practices and procedures which take into account the safety, regularity 
and efficiency of flights. 

3.1.2 Each Contracting State shall designate and specify to ICAO an 
appropriate authority within its administration to be responsible for 
the development, implementation and maintenance of the national civil 
aviation security programme. 

3.1.3 Each Contracting State shall establish an organization and 
develop and implement regulations, practices and procedures, which 
together provide the security necessary for the operation of aircraft 
in normal operating conditions and capable of responding rapidly to 
meet any increased security threat. 

3.1.4 Each Contracting State shall keep under constant review the level 
of threat to civil aviation operations within its territory and adjust 
relevant elements of its national civil aviation security programme 
accordingly. 

3.1.5 Each Contracting State shall require the appropriate authority to 
define and allocate tasks and coordinate activities between the 
departments, agencies and other organizations of the State, airport and 
aircraft operators and other entities con-cerned with or responsible 
for the implementation of various aspects of the national civil 
aviation security programme. 

3.1.6 Each Contracting State shall establish a national aviation 
security committee or similar arrangements for the purpose of 
coordinating security activities between the departments, agencies and 
other organizations of the Stale, airport and aircraft operators and 
other entities concerned with or responsible for the implementation of 
various aspects of the national civil aviation security programme. 

3.1.7 Each Contracting State shall require the appropriate authority to 
ensure the development and implementation of training programmes to 
ensure the effectiveness of its national civil aviation security 
programme. These training programmes shall include training of civil 
aviation security personnel in human performance. 

Note.-Guidance material on training in human performance can be found 
in the Security Manual for Safe-guarding Civil Aviation Against Acts of 
Unlawful Interference (Doc8973-Restricted); the Human Factors Digest - 
Human Factors in Civil Aviation Security Operations*; and in Part 2, 
Chapter I of the Human Factors Training Manual (Doe 9683). 

3.1.8 Each Contracting State shall ensure that the appropriate 
authority arranges for the supporting resources and facilities required 
by the aviation security services to be available at each airport 
serving international civil aviation. 

3.1.9 Recommendation.-Each Contracting State should make available to 
its airport and aircraft operators operating in its territory and other 
entities concerned, a written version of the appropriate parts of its 
national civil aviation security programme. 

3.2 Airport operations: 

3.2.1 Each Contracting State shall require each airport serving 
international civil aviation to establish and implement a written 
airport security programme appropriate to meet the requirements of the 
national aviation security programme. 

3.22 Each Contracting State shall arrange for -authority at each 
airport serving international civil aviation to be responsible for 
coordinating the implementation of security controls. 

3.2.3 Each Contracting State shall arrange for the establishment of an 
airport security committee at each airport serving international civil 
aviation to assist the authority mentioned under 3.2.2 in its role of 
coordinating the implemen-tation of security controls and procedures as 
specified in the airport security programme. 

3.2.4 Each Contracting State shall ensure that contingency plans are 
developed and resources made available to safeguard civil aviation, 
against acts of unlawful interference. The contin-gency plans shall be 
practised and exercised on a regular basis. 

3.2.5 Each Contracting State shall ensure that authorized and suitably 
trained personnel are readily available for deploy-ment at its airports 
serving international civil aviation to assist in dealing with 
suspected, or actual, cases of unlawful interference with civil 
aviation. 

3.2.6 Each Contracting State shall ensure that the architectural and 
infrastructure-related requirements necessary for the optimum 
implementation of civil aviation security measures are integrated into 
the design and construction of new facilities and alterations to 
existing facilities at airports. 

3.3 Aircraft operators: 

3.3.1 Each Contracting State shall require operators providing service 
from that State to establish and implement a written operator security 
programme appropriate to meet the requirements of the national civil 
aviation security programme of that State. 

3.3.2 Recommendation-Each Contracting State should take into account 
the ICAO model as a basis for operators' security programmes. 

3.3.3 Recommendation.-Each Contracting State should require operators 
providing service from that State and partici-pating in code-sharing or 
other collaborative arrangements with other international operators to 
notify the appropriate authority of the nature of these arrangements, 
including the identity of the other operators. 

3.4 Quality control: 

3.4.1 Each Contracting State shall ensure that the persons implementing 
security controls are subject to background checks and selection 
procedures. 

3.4.2 Each Contracting State shall ensure that the persons implementing 
security controls are appropriately trained and possess all 
competencies required to perform their duties and that appropriate 
records are maintained. Relevant standards of performance shall be 
established and initial and periodic assessments shall be introduced to 
maintain those standards. 

3.4.3 Each Contracting State shall ensure that the persons carrying out 
screening operations are certified according to the requirements of the 
national civil aviation security programme. 

3.4.4 Each Contracting State shall require the appropriate authority to 
ensure the development, implementation and maintenance of a national 
civil aviation security quality control programme to ensure the 
effectiveness of its national civil aviation security programme. 

3.4.5 Each Contracting State shall arrange for surveys to identify 
security needs, arrange for inspections of the implementation of 
security controls and arrange tests of security controls to assess 
their effectiveness. 

3.4.6 Each Contracting State concerned with an act of unlawful 
interference shall require its appropriate authority to re-evaluate 
security controls and procedures and take action necessary to remedy 
weaknesses so as to prevent recurrence. These actions shall be notified 
to ICAO. 

3.4.7 Recommendation. Each Contracting State should require that the 
effectiveness of individual aviation security measures be assessed by 
considering their role in the overall system performance of aviation 
security systems. 

Chapter 4. Preventive Security Measures: 

4.1 Objective: 

Each Contracting State shall establish measures to prevent weapons, 
explosives or any other dangerous devices which may be used to commit 
an act of unlawful interference, the carriage or bearing of which is 
not authorized, from being introduced, by any means whatsoever, on 
board an aircraft engaged in international civil aviation. 

4.2 Measures relating to aircraft: 

4.2.1 Each Contracting State shall ensure that aircraft security checks 
of originating aircraft assigned to international flights are 
performed. 

4.2.2 Each Contracting State shall require measures to be taken in 
respect of flights under an increased threat to ensure that 
disembarking passengers do not leave items on board the aircraft at 
transit stops on its airports. 

4.2.3 Each Contracting State shall require its operators to take 
adequate measures to ensure that during flight unauthorized persons are 
prevented from entering the flight crew compartment. 

4.3 Measures relating to passengers and their cabin baggage: 

4.3.1 Each Contracting state shall establish measures to ensure that 
originating passengers and their cabin baggage are screened prior to 
boarding an aircraft engaged in international civil aviation 
operations. 

4.3.2 Each Contracting State shall ensure that transfer and transit 
passengers and their cabin baggage are subjected to adequate security 
controls to prevent unauthorized articles from being taken on board 
aircraft engaged in international civil aviation operations. 

4.3.3 Each Contracting State shall ensure that there is no possibility 
of mixing or contact between passengers subjected to security control 
and other persons not subjected to such control after the security 
screening points at airports serving international civil aviation have 
been passed; if mixing or contact does take place, the passengers 
concerned and their cabin baggage shall be re-screened before boarding 
an aircraft. 

4.4 Measures relating to hold baggage: 

4.4.1 Each Contracting State shall establish measures to ensure that 
hold baggage is subjected to appropriate security controls prior to 
being loaded into an aircraft engaged in international civil aviation 
operations. 

4.4.2 Each Contracting State shall establish measures to ensure that 
hold baggage intended for carriage on passenger flights is protected 
from unauthorized interference from the point it is checked in, whether 
at an airport or elsewhere, until it is placed on board an aircraft. 

4.4.3 Each Contracting State shall establish measures to ensure that 
operators when providing service from that State do not transport the 
baggage of passengers who are not on board the aircraft unless that 
baggage is subjected to appropriate security controls which may include 
screening. 

4.4.4 Each Contracting State shall require the establishment of secure 
storage areas at airports serving international civil aviation, where 
mishandled baggage maybe held until forwarded, claimed or disposed of 
in accordance with local laws. 

4.4.5 Each Contracting State shall establish measures to ensure that 
consignments checked in as baggage by courier services for carriage on 
passenger aircraft engaged in international civil aviation operations 
are screened. 

4.4.6 Each Contracting State shall ensure that transfer hold baggage is 
subjected to appropriate security controls to prevent unauthorized 
articles from being taken on board aircraft engaged in international 
civil aviation operations. 

4.4.7 Each Contracting State shall establish measures to ensure that 
aircraft operators when providing a passenger service from that State 
transport only hold baggage which is authorized for carriage in 
accordance with the requirements specified in the national civil 
aviation security programme. 

4.4.8 From 1 January 2006, each Contracting State shall establish 
measures to ensure that originating hold baggage intended to be tamed 
in an aircraft engaged in international civil aviation operations is 
screened prior to being loaded into the aircraft. 

4.4.9 Recommendation Each Contracting State should establish measures 
to ensure that originating hold baggage intended to be carried in an 
aircraft engaged in international civil aviation operations is screened 
prior to being loaded into the aircraft. 

4.4.10 Recommendation.-Each Contracting State should take the necessary 
measures to ensure that unidentified baggage is placed in a protected 
and isolated area until such time as it is ascertained that it dues not 
contain any explosives or other dangerous device. 

4.5 Measures relating to cargo, mail and other goods: 

4.5.1 Each Contracting State shall ensure the implementation of 
measures at airports serving international civil aviation to protect 
cargo, baggage, mail, stores and operators' supplies being moved within 
an airport and intended for carriage on an aircraft to safeguard such 
aircraft against an act of unlawful interference. 

4.5.2 Each Contracting State shall establish measures to ensure that 
cargo, courier and express parcels and mail intended for carriage on 
passenger flights are subjected to appropriate security controls. 

4.5.3 Each Contracting State shall establish measures to ensure that 
operators do not accept consignments of cargo, courier and express 
parcels or mail for carriage on passenger flights unless the security 
of such consignments is accounted for by a regulated agent or such 
consignments are subjected to other security controls to meet the 
requirements of 4.5.2. 

4.5.4 Each Contracting State shall establish measures to ensure that 
catering supplies and operators' stores and supplies intended for 
carriage on passenger flights are subjected to appropriate security 
controls. 

4.6 Measures relating to special categories of passengers: 

4.6.1 Each Contracting State shall establish measures to ensure that 
the aircraft operator and the pilot-in-command are informed when 
passengers are obliged to travel because they have been the subject of 
judicial or administrative proceedings, in order that appropriate 
security controls can be applied. 

4.6.2 Each Contracting State shall ensure that the pilot-in-command is 
notified as to the number of armed persons and their scat location. 

4.6.3 Each Contracting State shall require operators providing service 
from that State, to include in their security programmes, measures and 
procedures to ensure safety on board their aircraft when passengers are 
to be carried who are obliged to travel because they have been the 
subject of judicial or administrative proceedings: 

4.6.4 Each Contracting State shall ensure that the carriage of weapons 
on board aircraft, bylaw enforcement officers and other authorized 
persons, acting in the performance of their duties, requires special 
authorization in accordance with the laws of the States involved. 

4.6.5 Each Contracting State shall consider requests by any other State 
to allow the travel of armed personnel on board aircraft of operators 
of the requesting State. Only after agreement by all States involved 
shall such travel be allowed. 

4.6.6 Each Contracting State shall ensure that the carriage of weapons 
in other cases is allowed only when an authorized and duly qualified 
person has determined that they are not loaded, if applicable, and then 
only if stowed in a place inaccessible to any person during flight 
time. 

4.7 Measures relating to access control: 

4.7.1 Each Contracting State shall ensure that security restricted 
areas are established at each airport serving international civil 
aviation and that procedures and identification systems are implemented 
in respect of persons and vehicles. 

4.7.2 Each Contracting State shall ensure that appropriate security 
controls, including background checks on persons other than passengers 
granted unescorted access to security restricted areas of the airport, 
are implemented. 

4.7.3 Each Contracting State shall require that measures are 
implemented to ensure adequate supervision over the movement of persons 
and vehicles to and from the aircraft in order to prevent unauthorized 
access to aircraft. 

4.7.4 Recommendation.-Each Contracting State should ensure that 
identity documents issued to aircraft crew members conform to the 
relevant specifications set forth in Doc 9303, Machine Readable Travel 
Documents. 

4.7.5 Recommendation.-Each Contracting State should ensure that persons 
other than passengers being granted access to security restricted 
areas, together with items carried, are screened at random in 
accordance with risk assessment carried out by the relevant national 
authorities. 

4.7.6 Recommendation.--Each Contracting State should ensure that checks 
specified in 4.7.2 be reapplied on a regular basis to all persons 
granted unescorted access to security restricted areas. 

Chapter 5. Management Of Response To Acts Of Unlawful Interference: 

5.1 Prevention: 

5.1.1 Each Contracting State shall establish measures to safeguard 
aircraft when a well-founded suspicion exists that the aircraft may be 
subject to an act of unlawful interference while on the ground and to 
provide as much prior notification as possible of the arrival of such 
aircraft to airport authorities: 

5.1.2 Each Contracting State shall establish procedures, which include 
notification to the operator, for inspecting aircraft, when a well- 
founded suspicion exists that the aircraft may be the object of an act 
of unlawful interference, for concealed weapons, explosives or other 
dangerous devices. 

5.1.3 Each Contracting State shall ensure that arrangements are made 
for the investigation and disposal, if necessary, of suspected sabotage 
devices or other potential hazards at airports serving international 
civil aviation. 

5.2 Response: 

5.2.1 Each Contracting State shall take adequate measures for the 
safety of passengers and crew of an aircraft which is subjected to an 
act of unlawful interference until their journey can be continued. 

5.2.2 Each Contracting State responsible for providing air traffic 
services for an aircraft which is the subject of an act of unlawful 
interference shall collect all pertinent information on the flight of 
that aircraft and transmit that information to all other States 
responsible for the Air Traffic Services units concerned, including 
those at the airport of known or presumed destination, so that timely 
and appropriate safeguarding action may be taken en route and at the 
aircraft's known, likely or possible destination. 

5.2.3 Each Contracting State shall provide such assistance to an 
aircraft subjected to an act of unlawful seizure, including the 
provision of navigation aids, air traffic services and permission to 
land as may be necessitated by the circumstances. 

5.2.4 Each Contracting State shall take measures, as it may find 
practicable, to ensure that an aircraft subjected to an act of unlawful 
seizure which has landed in its territory is detained on the ground 
unless its departure is necessitated by the overriding duty to protect 
human life. However, these measures need to recognize the grave hazard 
attending further flight. States shall also recognize the importance of 
consultations, wherever practicable, between the State where that 
aircraft has landed and the State of the Operator of the aircraft, and 
notification by the State where the aircraft has landed to the States 
of assumed or stated destination. 

5.2.5 Each Contracting State in which an aircraft subjected to an act 
of unlawful interference has landed shall notify by the most 
expeditious means the State of Registry of the aircraft and the State 
of the Operator of the landing and shall similarly transmit by the most 
expeditious means all other relevant information to: 

a) the two above-mentioned States; 

b) each State whose citizens suffered fatalities or injuries; 

c) each State whose citizens were detained as hostages; 

d) each Contracting State whose citizens are known to be on board the 
aircraft; and: 

e) the International Civil Aviation Organization. 

5.2.6 Recommendation--Each Contracting State should ensure that 
information received as a consequence of action taken in accordance 
with 5.2.2 is distributed locally to the Air Traffic Services units 
concerned, the appropriate airport administrations, the operator and 
others concerned as soon as practicable. 

5.2.7 Recommendation.-Each Contracting State should cooperate with 
other States for the purpose of providing a joint response in 
connection with an act of unlawful interference. When taking measures 
in their territory to free passengers and crew members of an aircraft 
subjected to an act of unlawful interference, each Contracting State 
should use, as necessary, the experience and capability of the State of 
the Operator, the State of manufacture and the State of registry of 
that aircraft. 

5.3 Exchange of information and reporting: 

5.3.1 Each Contracting State concerned with an act of unlawful 
interference shall provide ICAO with all pertinent information 
concerning the security aspects of the act of unlawful interference as 
soon as practicable after the act is resolved. 

5.3.2 Recommendation.-Each Contracting State should exchange 
information with other States as considered appropriate, at the same 
time supplying such information to ICAO, related to plans, designs, 
equipment, methods and procedures for safeguarding civil aviation 
against acts of unlawful interference. 

Extracts From Annex 14-Aerodromes, Volume I -Aerodrome Design And 
Operations: 

Chapter 3. Physical characteristics: 

3.13 Isolated aircraft parking position: 

3.13.1 An isolated aircraft parking position shall he designated or the 
aerodrome control tower shall be advised of an area or areas suitable 
for the parking of an aircraft which is known or believed to be the 
subject of unlawful interference, or which for other reasons needs 
isolation from normal aerodrome activities. 

3.13.2 Recommendation.-The isolated aircraft parking position should be 
located at the maximum distance practicable and in any case never less 
than 100 m from other parking positions, buildings or public areas, 
etc. Care should betaken to ensure that the position is not located 
aver underground utilities such as gas and aviation fuel and, to the ex 
tent feasible, electrical or communication cables. 

CHAPTER 5. VISUAL AIDS FOR NAVIGATION: 

5.3 Lights: 

5.3.21 Apron floodlighting (see also 5.3.15.1 and 5.3.16.1): 

Application: 

5.3.21.1 Recommendation.-Apron floodlighting should be provided on an 
apron, on a de-icing/anti-icing facility and on a designated isolated 
aircraft parking position intended to be used a1 night. 

Note 1. - Where a de-icing/anti-icing facility is located in close 
proximity to the runway and permanent floodlighting could be confusing 
to pilots, other means of illumination c f the facility may be 
required: 

Note 2. -The designation of an isolated aircraft parking position is 
specified in 3.13. 

Note 3. - Guidance on apron floodlighting is given in the Aerodrome 
Design Manual, Part 4. 

Chapter 8. Equipment And Installations: 

8.1 Secondary power supply: 

General Application: 

8.1.1 Recommendation.-A secondary power supply should be provided, 
capable of supplying the power requirements of at least the aerodrome 
facilities listed below: 

e) essential security lighting, if provided in accordance with 8.5; 

8.4 Fencing Application: 

8.4.2 Recommendation.-A fence or other suitable barrier should be 
provided on an aerodrome to deter the inadvertent or premeditated 
access of an unauthorized person onto a non-public area of the 
aerodrome. 

Note 1.-This is intended to include the barring of sewers, ducts, 
tunnels, etc., where necessary to prevent access. 

Note 2.-Special measures may be required to prevent the access of an 
unauthorized person to runways or taxiways which overpass public roads. 

8.4.3 Recommendation.-Suitable means of protection should be provided 
to deter the inadvertent or premeditated access of unauthorized persons 
into ground installations and facilities essential for the safety of 
civil aviation located off the aerodrome. 

Location: 

8.4.4 Recommendation.-The fence or barrier should be located so as to 
separate the movement area and other facilities or zones on the 
aerodrome vital to the safe operation of aircraft from areas open to 
public access. 

8.4.5 Recommendation.-When greater security is thought necessary, a 
cleared area should be provided on both sides of the fence or barrier 
to facilitate the work of patrols and to make trespassing more 
difficult. Consideration should be given to the provision of a 
perimeter road inside the aerodrome fencing for the use of both 
maintenance personnel and security patrols. 

8.5 Security lighting: 

Recommendation--At an aerodrome where it is deemed desirable for 
security reasons, a fence or other barrier provided for the protection 
of international civil aviation and its facilities should be 
illuminated at a minimum essential level. Consideration should be given 
to locating lights so that the ground area on both sides of the fence 
or barrier, particularly at access points, is illuminated. 

Chapter 9. Emergency And Other Services: 

9.1 Aerodrome emergency planning: 

General: 

Introductory Note.-Aerodrome emergency planning is the process of 
preparing an aerodrome to cope with an emergency occurring at the 
aerodrome or in its vicinity. The objective of aerodrome emergency 
planning is to minimize the effects of an emergency, particularly in 
respect of saving lives and maintaining aircraft operations. The 
aerodrome emergency plan sell forth the procedures for coordinating the 
response of different aerodrome agencies (or services) and of those 
agencies in the surrounding community that could be of assistance in 
responding to the emergency. Guidance material to assist the 
appropriate authority in establishing aerodrome emergency planning is 
given in the Airport Services Manual Part 7. 

9.1.1 An aerodrome emergency plan shall be established at an aerodrome, 
commensurate with the aircraft operations and other activities 
conducted al the aerodrome. 

9.1.2 The aerodrome emergency plan shall provide for the coordination 
of the actions to be taken in an emergency occurring at an aerodrome or 
in its vicinity. 

Note.-Examples of emergencies are: aircraft emergencies, sabotage 
including bomb threats, unlawfully seized aircraft, dangerous goods 
occurrences, building fires and natural disasters. 

9.1.3 The plan shall coordinate the response or participation of all 
existing agencies which, in the opinion of the appropriate authority, 
could be of assistance in responding to an emergency. 

Note.-Examples of agencies are: 

-on the aerodrome: air traffic control unit, rescue and fire fighting 
services, aerodrome administration, medical and ambulance services, 
aircraft operators, security services, and police; 

-off the aerodrome: fire departments, police, medical and ambulance 
services, hospitals, military, and harbour patrol or coast guard. 

9.1.4 Recommendation.-The plan should provide for cooperation and 
coordination with the rescue coordination centre, as necessary. 

9.1.5 Recommendation.-The aerodrome emergency plan document should 
include at least the following: 

a) types of emergencies planned for; 

b) agencies involved in the plan; 

c) responsibility and role of each agency, the emergency operations 
centre and the command post, for each type of emergency; 

d) information on names and telephone numbers of offices or people to 
be contacted in the case of a particular emergency; and: 

e) a grid map of the aerodrome and its immediate vicinity. 

Emergency operations centre and command post: 

9.1.7 Recommendation--A fixed emergency operations centre and a mobile 
command past should be available for use during an emergency. 

9.1.8 Recommendation.-The emergency operations centre should be a part 
of the aerodrome facilities and should be responsible for the overall 
coordination and general direction of the response to an emergency. 

9.1.9 Recommendation.-The command post should be a facility capable of 
being moved rapidly to the site of an emergency, when required, and 
should undertake the local coordination of those agencies responding to 
the emergency. 

9.1.10 Recommendation.-A person should be assigned to assume control of 
the emergency operations centre and, when appropriate, another person 
the command post. 

Communication system: 

9.1.11 Recommendation.-Adequate communication systems linking the 
command post and the emergency operations centre with each other and 
with the participating agencies should be provided in accordance with 
the plan and consistent with the particular requirements of the 
aerodrome. 

Aerodrome emergency exercise: 

9.1.12 The plan shall contain procedures for periodic testing of the 
adequacy of the plan and for reviewing the results in order to improve 
its effectiveness. 

Note.-The plan includes all participating agencies and associated 
equipment: 

9.1.13 The plan shall l be tested by conducting: 

a) a full-scale aerodrome emergency exercise at intervals not exceeding 
two years; and: 

b) partial emergency exercises in the intervening year to ensure that 
any deficiencies found during the full-scale aerodrome emergency 
exercise have been corrected; and: 

reviewed thereafter, or after an actual emergency, sons to correct any 
deficiency found during such exercises or actual emergency. 

Note.-The purpose of a full-scale exercise is to ensure the adequacy of 
the plan to cope with different types of emergencies. The purpose of a 
partial exercise is to ensure the adequacy of the response to 
individual participating agencies and components of the plan, such as 
the communications system. 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: TSA Security Requirements for U.S.-Based and Foreign 
Carriers Operating Out of Foreign Airports: 

Aircraft Operator Standard Security Program: U.S.-based Carriers: 

The aircraft operator standard security program (AOSSP) is designed to 
provide for the safety of persons and property traveling on flights 
against acts of criminal violence and air piracy, and the introduction 
of explosives, incendiaries, weapons, and other prohibited items on 
board an aircraft. TSA requires that each air carrier adopt and 
implement a security program approved by TSA for scheduled passenger 
and public charter operations at locations within the United States, 
from the United States to a non-U.S. location, or from a non-U.S. 
location to the United States, and from a non-U.S. location to a non- 
U.S. location (for example, an intermediate stop such as Singapore to 
Tokyo to the United States). The AOSSP developed by TSA and used by 
U.S.-based carriers is divided into chapters and lays out security 
requirements for operations. Table 6 summarizes requirements applicable 
to flights operating from a non-U.S. location to the United States. 

Table 6: Elements of the Aircraft Operator Standard Security Program 
Applicable to International Operations: 

Chapter: Introduction and definitions; 
Types of requirements: Defines roles and responsibilities for the 
positions of Ground Security Coordinator, In-flight Security 
Coordinator, and the Federal Flight Deck Officer. 

Chapter: Incidents, suspicious activities, and threat information; 
Types of requirements: Requires procedures for notification of the 
Transportation Security Operations Center and law enforcement agencies 
to report incidents and suspicious activities as well as procedures to 
ensure the security of aircraft upon receipt of specific or credible 
threats. 

Chapter: Prescreening procedures and passenger identification checks; 
Types of requirements: Requires air carriers to implement passenger 
prescreening on flights to match passenger names against the No-Fly and 
Selectee screening lists, check of all passenger identification, and 
control of entry into the sterile area. 

Chapter: Passengers designated as selectee passengers; 
Types of requirements: In addition to the above requirements, defines 
requirements for screening the checked baggage of selectee passengers. 

Chapter: International flights; 
Types of requirements: Requires measures specific to checked baggage 
acceptance, protective escorts, jump seat access, prohibited items, 
flights departing to a non-U.S. location, flights departing a non-U.S. 
location, and crew member vetting. 

Chapter: Cargo security measures; 
Types of requirements: Requires measures specific to the acceptance of 
cargo for shipment, cargo screening procedures, accompanied courier 
consignments, cargo for subsequent transfer to another carrier, control 
of access to cargo, notification procedures, and cargo security 
measures at non-U.S. locations. 

Chapter: Catering security measures; 
Types of requirements: Requires procedures to ensure security of 
catering loaded onto a flight, or security at catering facilities. 

Chapter: Additional requirements at extraordinary locations; 
Types of requirements: Some locations outside of the United States have 
been designated by TSA as requiring extraordinary security measures. 
These measures include items such as aircraft security, passenger 
prescreening, screening selectee passengers, and the questioning of 
enplaning passengers. 

Chapter: Aircraft and area security; 
Types of requirements: Requires measures to prevent unauthorized access 
to aircraft, search departing aircraft prior to passengers enplaning, 
sealing procedures for vehicles transporting checked baggage, access 
controls to areas such as baggage rooms and other nonpublic areas, and 
criminal history records check of air carrier employees. 

Chapter: Training; 
Types of requirements: Outlines security training requirements for 
Ground Security Coordinators, In-flight Security Coordinator, crew 
members, air carrier employees, and authorized representatives. 

Chapter: Screening; 
Types of requirements: Outlines requirements for air carriers to 
conduct additional screening at locations outside of the United States 
where screening does not meet requirements. 

Source: TSA. 

[End of table] 

Security Directives: 

* When TSA determines that additional security measures are necessary 
to respond to a threat assessment or to a specific threat against civil 
aviation, TSA may issue a Security Directive setting forth mandatory 
measures. Each air carrier required to have a TSA-approved security 
program must comply with each Security Directive issued to it by TSA, 
within the time frame prescribed in the Security Directive for 
compliance.[Footnote 79] 

Model Security Program: 

TSA requires that the security program of a foreign air carrier provide 
passengers a level of protection similar to the level of protection 
provided by U.S. air carriers serving the same airports.[Footnote 80] 
The security program must be designed to prevent or deter the carriage 
onboard airplanes of any prohibited item, prohibit unauthorized access 
to airplanes, ensure that checked baggage is accepted only by an 
authorized agent of the air carrier, and ensure the proper handling of 
cargo and checked baggage to be loaded onto passenger flights. In 
addition, carriers are requested to provide an acceptable level of 
security for passengers by developing and implementing procedures to 
prevent acts of unlawful interference. 

TSA's foreign air carrier model security program was prepared to assist 
foreign airlines in complying with security requirements for operations 
into and out of the United States. Table 7 summarizes requirements 
applicable to foreign carriers' flights operating from a non-U.S. 
location to the United States. 

Table 7: Elements of the Foreign Air Carrier Model Security Program 
Applicable to International Operations: 

Area of requirement: Screening of passengers and carry-on baggage; 
Description: Sets forth requirements for screening of passengers and 
their property as well as the transport of armed individuals and 
weapons. 

Area of requirement: Checked baggage; 
Description: Sets forth requirements for accepting, handling, and 
screening of checked luggage, including restricting access to baggage 
areas, conducting passenger baggage matches, and the transport of 
misdirected baggage. 

Area of requirement: Cargo; 
Description: Requires procedures be in place to ensure no unauthorized 
explosives, incendiaries, or dangerous articles or persons are included 
in cargo. In addition, sets forth requirements to ensure that once 
cargo is accepted, it is safeguarded to prevent unauthorized access or 
tampering. 

Area of requirement: Security of aircraft and facilities; 
Description: Sets forth requirements for preventing access to aircraft 
while it is unattended and conducting a search of the aircraft interior 
prior to boarding. This also includes requirements for authorized 
personnel to possess and display proper identification. 

Area of requirement: Addressing and reporting acts of unlawful 
interference; 
Description: Requires air carriers to implement procedures to respond 
to threats of hijacking and bomb threats. In addition it requires that 
the carrier establish a procedure for reporting threats when they are 
received. 

Area of requirement: Contingency planning; 
Description: Requires air carriers to establish procedures to implement 
additional security measures (regarding checked baggage, passenger, and 
carry-on baggage screening, aircraft security, and cargo handling) when 
conditions warrant. 

Area of requirement: Training; 
Description: Sets forth requirements for air carriers to ensure that 
employees (screeners, crew members, or other air carrier employees) 
receive adequate training in those security areas for which they have 
responsibilities. 

Source: TSA. 

[End of table] 

Emergency Amendments: 

* When TSA determines that additional security measures are necessary 
to respond to an emergency requiring immediate action with respect to 
safety in air transportation, it may issue an emergency amendment. An 
emergency amendment mandates additional actions beyond those in the air 
carrier's security program. When TSA issues an emergency amendment, it 
also issues a notice indicating the reasons for the amendment to be 
adopted. Air carriers are required to comply with emergency amendments 
immediately.[Footnote 81] 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: U.S. Government Aviation Security Training and Technical 
Assistance Programs for Foreign Entities: 

Department of State: Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program: 

Program Background: 

The State Department's Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) program seeks to 
provide partner countries the training, equipment, and technology they 
need to combat terrorism and prosecute terrorists and terrorist 
supporters. The Anti-Terrorism Assistance program was established in 
1983. 

Program Selection: 

Selection of Countries: 

Countries must meet at least one of the four following criteria to 
participate in the ATA program: 

* The country or region must be categorized as having a critical or 
high threat of terrorism and unable to protect U.S. facilities and 
personnel within the country: 

* There are important U.S. policy interests with the prospective 
country, which may be supported through the provision of antiterrorism 
assistance. For example, officials in one country received assistance 
through the ATA program because they allowed the United States to 
establish air bases in their country. 

* The prospective country must be served by a U.S. air carrier, or is 
the last point of departure for flights to the United States. 

* The prospective country cannot be engaged in gross human rights 
violations. 

Determination of Type of Training: 

The State Department determines whether and what training and 
assistance to provide countries based on needs assessments done by 
State Department personnel along with a team of interagency subject 
matter experts. The assessment team evaluates prospective program 
participants using 25 Antiterrorism Critical Capabilities. Program 
officials stated that the assessment is a snapshot of the country's 
antiterrorism capabilities, including equipment, personnel, and 
available training. ATA program officials stated that the assessment 
includes a review at several levels, including tactical capabilities 
(people and resources), operational management capabilities (overall 
management and ability), and strategic capabilities. 

Two of the 25 capabilities reviewed during the needs assessments are 
related to aviation security. Those are Airspace Security and Air Port 
of Entry Security. The first is an assessment of how a country controls 
what goes through its airspace. The second is an assessment of security 
at the country's main airport. According to program officials, when 
doing an assessment, the ATA team will usually visit the busiest 
airport within the country to examine the operational security of the 
airport and assesses training provided to airport security management. 

Antiterrorism Critical Capabilities: 

Land Border Security: 

Land Port of Entry Security: 

Maritime Border Security: 

Maritime Port of Entry Security: 

Air Space Security: 

Airport of Entry Security: 

Critical Infrastructure Protection: 

National Leadership Security: 

Diplomatic Community Security: 

Preventative Intelligence: 

National Level Major Incident Command and Control: 

Police Special Operations: 

Explosive Incidents Countermeasures: 

Mass Casualty Incident Management: 

Kidnapping/Hostage Incident Management: 

Police Investigative Capability: 

Post Blast Investigations: 

Mass Casualty Incident Management: 

Crime Science and Evidence Management: 

Forensic Examination and Analysis: 

Financial Investigations: 

Prosecutorial Capability: 

Critical Digital Infrastructure Security: 

Cyber Crime Investigations: 

Institutionalization of Anti/Counter Terrorism Training: 

Program Assistance: 

The results of the needs assessments determine what type of assistance 
the State Department will offer to countries participating in the ATA 
program. The various types of training and assistance offered through 
the program include crisis management and response, cyber-terrorism, 
dignitary protection, bomb detection, border control, kidnap 
intervention and hostage negotiation and rescue, response to incidents 
involving weapons of mass destruction, counter terrorist finance, 
interdiction of terrorist organizations, and airport security. During 
fiscal year 2005, 146 countries received antiterrorism training through 
the ATA program; 7 countries received training for aviation security. 

The ATA program offers one course in aviation security, "Airport 
Security Management." This is a 1-week seminar that is generally taught 
in-country. According to State Department officials, TSA employees 
teach the course. State Department officials stated that this course 
helps countries to meet internationally recognized aviation security 
standards established by ICAO. State Department officials stated that 
while most countries' officials know about ICAO, and can obtain ICAO 
manuals and standards, many of the countries do not have the resources 
or equipment to operationalize ICAO standards. State Department 
officials stated that the ATA program offers countries the resources to 
implement ICAO standards. 

Recipient Countries: 

For fiscal year 2005, aviation security training was provided to 7 
countries through the ATA program, Philippines ($94,723), Kazakhstan 
($98,200), Bahamas ($95,000), Barbados ($45,900), Dominican Republic 
($45,900), Qatar ($98,046), and United Arab Emirates ($95,000). 

Relationship to TSA: 

TSA employees teach in-country aviation security training to foreign 
officials through the ATA program. In addition, ATA uses TSA staff as 
subject matter experts when performing needs assessments. 

U.S. Trade and Development Agency: 

Program Background: 

The U.S. Trade and Development Agency (USTDA) works to advance economic 
development and U.S. commercial interests in developing and middle- 
income countries. The agency funds various forms of technical 
assistance, training, and business workshops to support the development 
of a modem infrastructure and a fair and open trading environment. 
USTDA's use of foreign assistance funds to support sound investment 
policy and decision making in host countries is intended to create an 
enabling environment for trade, investment, and sustainable economic 
development. In carrying out its mission, USTDA gives emphasis to 
economic sectors that may benefit from U.S. exports of goods and 
services. For example, according to USTDA, the agency obligated 
approximately 24 percent of its program funding in support of 
transportation sector projects. More specifically, according to USTDA, 
5.6 percent of the agency's budget is obligated toward projects in the 
aviation security sector. The general goals of USTDA's work in the 
aviation security field are to help foreign airports achieve "Category 
I" status (the FAA classification for an airport that meets minimum 
safety standards, which allows foreign air carriers to fly from their 
country of origin directly to the United States), to help countries 
prepare to pass and adhere to ICAO standards, and to offer training to 
increase aviation security. 

Selection of Projects: 

According to USTDA, assistance projects and recipients are selected 
within the framework of USTDA's development and commercial mandate. 
Generally, projects are not selected based strictly on security (i.e., 
not selected based on threat) but on the likelihood of a country 
implementing the recommended actions to obtain greater aviation safety 
and security. USTDA projects are developed through consultations by 
USTDA staff and U.S. and foreign embassies, foreign officials (public 
or private) that have decision-making authority to implement the 
assistance project, or U.S. industry officials that identify a need for 
assistance. According to USTDA, when developing the project, the agency 
evaluates a number of factors, including the priority the government 
places on the project and if the entity has the technical capability to 
implement the project. According to USTDA, this evaluation is conducted 
in order to ensure that U.S. taxpayers' dollars are wisely used on 
projects that will help strengthen a foreign countries' ability to 
transport passengers and goods to the United States. 

After an initial evaluation by USTDA staff, USTDA employs a technical 
expert to conduct an independent evaluation of the proposed assistance 
project. That technical evaluation can take two forms: a Desk Study or 
a Definitional Mission. The Desk Study is completed for proposals where 
sufficient information is provided that allows for a technical expert 
to make an informed decision as to whether or not USTDA should fund the 
project. If the project proposal does not contain sufficient detail to 
evaluate without conducting a field site visit, USTDA then employs a 
small business contractor--or consultant--to conduct a Definitional 
Mission, which, according to USTDA, costs between $25,000 and $40,000. 
The consultant undertaking the Definitional Mission takes 1 to 2 weeks 
to meet with the stakeholders in the foreign country, including the 
potential grant recipients, in order to review project ideas and 
generate additional project opportunities. Upon return from the site 
visits, the consultant prepares a report for USTDA on the findings of 
the Definitional Mission. According to USTDA, consultants typically 
assess more than one proposed assistance project at a time when in the 
field. To avoid conflicts of interest, the consultant that undertakes 
the Definitional Mission is prohibited from participating in any of the 
follow-on work, including the early investment analysis or training 
recommended in the report. 

Program Assistance: 

Early Investment Analysis: 

Early investment analysis is the main form of USTDA assistance. 
According to USTDA, the cost of such assistance typically ranges from 
$100,000 to $500,000. These technical assistance programs may take from 
6 to 18 months to complete. The studies are undertaken by U.S. 
consulting firms under a grant program and are intended to evaluate the 
technical, financial, environmental, legal, and other critical aspects 
of infrastructure development projects that are of interest to 
potential lenders and investors. Host country project sponsors select 
the U.S. companies, normally through open competitions. 

Annex 17 Workshops: 

USTDA organizes Annex 17 workshops to help bring developing countries 
into compliance with ICAO Annex 17. These workshops are designed to 
give countries assistance before ICAO inspections so that they meet 
minimum standards and pass inspections. According to USTDA, the 
workshops suggest ways that relatively poor countries can meet ICAO 
standards with a low level of technological sophistication. According 
to USTDA, the workshops focus on enhancing training and improving human 
resources related to aviation security. 

Recipients: 

According to USTDA, for fiscal year 2005, the agency awarded Chile 
($359,000), Haiti ($150,000), Iraq ($243,000), Malaysia ($100,000), 
Tanzania ($371,000), Ukraine ($625,000), West Africa Regional Training 
($353,000) and Worldwide Aviation Security training ($596,000) grant 
assistance in the aviation security sector. 

Participation by TSA: 

USTDA consults with TSA on an ongoing basis. USTDA used TSA personnel 
as instructors for the Annex 17 workshops. 

Department of Transportation--Safe Skies for Africa Program: 

Background: 

The Department of Transportation (DOT) manages the Safe Skies for 
Africa presidential initiative (Safe Skies), which started in 1998. 
Safe Skies is a technical program that assists participating countries 
in meeting international aviation safety and security standards. 
According to DOT officials, Safe Skies is a small program with an 
annual budget--including operating and administrative costs--between $1 
million and $3 million. According to DOT officials, approximately one-
fourth of the Safe Skies budget goes toward aviation security. Funding 
for Safe Skies is provided by the State Department and the U.S. Agency 
for International Development (USAID). 

Selection of Participants: 

The original Safe Skies participants were selected in 1998 by an 
interagency committee made up of Department of Defense, Department of 
Transportation, State Department, and the U.S. Trade and Development 
Agency. The committee held a series of meetings to consider priority 
lists created by each agency, cables exchanged with U.S. embassies 
across sub-Saharan Africa, and responses to questionnaires sent to 
various states. The committee selected countries that it believed had 
the highest likelihood of successfully complying with international 
aviation safety and security standards set by ICAO and requirements set 
by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and TSA. The committee 
also considered U.S. trade interests and regional diversity issues. In 
the end, countries from across sub-Saharan Africa were selected to 
participate in the program. Since 1998 only two countries have been 
added to the list of Safe Skies participants. Both Uganda and Djibouti 
became Safe Skies countries after President Bush announced the East 
Africa Counterterrorism Initiative in 2003.[Footnote 82] 

Program Assistance: 

General: 

All Safe Skies countries receive some degree of aid, with priority 
going to those countries that demonstrate political will. DOT gauges 
political will based on consultations with embassies and TSA and 
whether a country implements recommended safety and security practices. 
The Administration's priorities are communicated through the State 
Department. According to DOT, all participants except Zimbabwe have had 
aviation security, safety, and air navigation surveys of their civil 
aviation systems performed at their airports by U.S. government subject 
-matter experts. 

Equipment: 

Since September 11, 2001, the State Department has provided $5 million 
in additional resources for DOT to provide security equipment to Safe 
Skies countries. DOT officials stated that they worked with their TSA 
(formerly FAA security) colleagues to perform site visits to help 
agency officials determine country-specific security equipment needs 
for the screening of passengers and baggage. 

Security Advisor: 

According to DOT, Safe Skies has an East Africa aviation security 
advisor stationed in Nairobi, Kenya to provide direct advice and 
technical assistance to Djibouti, Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda in 
meeting ICAO standards and to assist these states in addressing 
potential threats to civil aviation. 

Recipients[Footnote 83] 

According to DOT, fiscal year 2005 recipients of Safe Skies assistance 
were Angola, Cameroon, Cape Verde,[Footnote 84] Djibouti, Kenya, Mali, 
Namibia, Tanzania, and Uganda. 

Collaboration with TSA: 

TSA and DOT responsibilities are laid out in a 2004 TSA-DOT memorandum 
of agreement. Under this agreement, TSA provides advice, technical 
assistance, and training through the TSA Enforcement Academy, in 
addition to providing an aviation security advisor to Safe Skies. These 
activities are funded by DOT, with funds that were appropriated to 
USAID and transferred to DOT for the purposes of implementing Safe 
Skies. TSA also works in partnership with DOT to prioritize recipient 
countries based on need. 

Department of State--Bureau of International Narcotics and Law 
Enforcement Affairs--Organization of American States Inter-American 
Committee against Terrorism: 

Background: 

The Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) 
of the Department of State has a program under way aimed at combating 
alien smuggling and improving border security. The part of the program 
relating to border security contains elements relating to maritime 
security and airport security. These efforts are undertaken in 
cooperation with the Organization of American States' (OAS) Inter- 
American Committee against Terrorism (CICTE). The INL-OAS efforts began 
with maritime security and were broadened to include aviation security 
in 2003. 

Selection of Participants: 

INL officials worked with CICTE officials to select the appropriate OAS 
member countries to receive training. As of August 2006, the aviation 
security effort under way was focused on Caribbean nations, and fiscal 
year 2006 funding was also intended to provide funding for some Central 
and South American nations. Roughly $264,000 was spent in 2004, 
$187,110 in 2005, and $236,610 in 2006 on aviation security. 

Program Assistance: 

INL funds pay for aviation security training courses, and the courses 
are taught by TSA officials. These training courses are aimed at 
helping countries to develop national civil aviation security programs 
and other essential plans based on the ICAO standards as well as crisis 
management. INL funds were used to pay for national development 
workshops for Caribbean countries. These workshops were taught by TSA 
staff who spent 1 week in each Caribbean country. While in country, TSA 
representatives reviewed the country's security program, looked for 
deficiencies within the security program, and attempted to build a 
program that would resolve the deficiencies they identified. According 
to OAS, participants in these workshops identified recommendations to 
improve aviation security and combat terrorism and submitted the 
recommendations to their respective governments. The workshops 
addressed enhancements to the national security program, national 
legislation, oversight, national security committees, and program 
approval processes. According to OAS, in 2006, these workshops took 
place in Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Belize, Dominican Republic, 
Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, St. Kitts and Nevis, and St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines. According to OAS, starting in September 2006, this program 
began functioning in Central America, where national development 
workshops were planned to take place in Costa Rica, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama. 

According to OAS, in addition to the national development workshops, 
this program also offers a 5-day crisis management workshop for 
midlevel to senior-level aviation management and other government 
officials. INL, through CICTE, also funds aviation security courses 
that are taught by ICAO instructors. 

Recipient Countries: 

According to OAS, the recipient countries of CICTE-sponsored aviation 
security training for calendar year 2006 were Antigua and Barbuda, 
Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, Columbia, Costa Rica, Dominican 
Republic, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Jamaica, 
Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St. 
Vincent and the Grenadines, Trinidad and Tobago, and Uruguay.[Footnote 
85] 

TSA Participation: 

TSA officials are the instructors for the on-site workshops. CICTE 
established an memorandum of agreement with TSA, and discussed the best 
approach for helping OAS members develop a long-term international 
aviation security program. CICTE and TSA decided that in-country, on- 
the-ground visits would be the best approach, since these allow CICTE 
and TSA to see which problems are present. 

Department of State--Western Hemisphere Affairs--Organization of 
American States--Inter-American Committee against Terrorism: 

Background: 

According to OAS, during the fourth quarter of 2006, CICTE received 
grant funding to provide aviation security training courses for the 
nine countries that will host the 2007 Cricket World Cup. 

Program Assistance: 

According to OAS, grant funding was used to support two aviation 
security training courses--the Basic Security Training Course and the 
Aviation Security Training Course. The Basic Security Training Course 
is a 7-day course focused on improving aviation security screeners' 
ability to detect threat items using X-ray machines, metal detection 
portals, physical search techniques, and explosive trace detection 
technologies. 

According to OAS, the Aviation Security Training Course is a 9-day 
course that addresses concepts and principles of managing aviation 
security operations within the unique environment of an international 
airport. Course content is also based on ICAO standards and recommended 
practices and focused on the protection of passengers, crew, ground 
personnel, the general public, the aircraft, and airport facilities. 
According to OAS, practical exercises are used to reinforce classroom 
learning. This course provided training to midlevel managers and 
supervisors who are responsible for aviation security program planning, 
oversight, and operations. According to OAS, TSA instructors train 
these officials in identifying vulnerabilities at their airports, 
developing preventive measures, and allocating resources to handle the 
flow of passengers while maintaining adequate security. 

Recipient Countries: 

The recipient countries for calendar year 2006 and the first half of 
2007 are Antigua and Barbuda, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, St. Kitts and 
Nevis, and St. Lucia. 

Department of Justice-International Criminal Investigative Training and 
Assistance Program: 

Background: 

The Department of Justice's (DOJ) International Criminal Investigative 
Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) aims to develop law enforcement 
agencies and systems. Training is only one component of ICITAP's 
holistic approach to this mission. ICITAP has an ongoing relationship 
with the Department of State to offer various types of training. Since 
2000, ICITAP facilitated Department of State-initiated aviation 
security training in Ghana and the Dominican Republic, and conducted an 
assessment in Benin. 

Selection of Participants: 

The Department of Justice's involvement can begin when a foreign 
government makes a request to the U.S. embassy for training to rectify 
perceived weaknesses in aviation security. The embassy then 
collaborates with DOJ to put together a proposal for action, which is 
then sent to the Department of State's Bureau of International 
Narcotics and Law Enforcement. INL attempts to obtain a country- 
specific appropriation for the project, and alerts DOJ as to whether 
funding is available. According to DOJ, INL sometimes targets certain 
countries for assistance and then asks ICITAP to prepare proposals and 
budgets to support training activities and technical assistance to 
improve law enforcement capacity in the host countries. 

Program Assistance: 

ICITAP assistance included on-site aviation security needs assessments, 
with ICITAP serving as facilitator and current and former TSA 
(previously FAA) employees performing the aviation security needs 
assessments. The assessment was based on standards laid out in ICAO 
Annex 17. The assessment attempted to broadly gauge the adequacy of the 
available security systems and each country's ability to manage the 
systems. 

Recipients: 

As of February 2007, the most recent recipients are Benin ($79,500 in 
2002),[Footnote 86] Ghana ($79,500 in 2002), and the Dominican Republic 
($32,000 in 2003). 

In 2003, as a result of information gathered from TSA's foreign airport 
assessment report, ICITAP provided drug interdiction training to 
customs officials in Ghana stationed at the airport. According to DOJ, 
INL granted $79,500 each to Ghana and Benin for the purpose of 
providing airport security training. 

TSA Participation: 

Former and current TSA officials have conducted needs assessments and 
provided training to foreign officials through ICITAP. 

[End of section] 

Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security: 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security: 
Washington, DC 20528: 

April 13, 2007: 

Ms. Cathleen A. Berrick: 
Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues: 
U. S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, NW: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Ms. Berrick: 

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on GAO's report entitled, 
Aviation Security: Foreign Airport Assessments and Air Carrier 
Inspections Help Enhance Security, but Oversight of These G forts Can 
be Strengthened, GAO-07-392SU. We appreciate the analysis GAO has 
conducted over the past 16 months, which reflects the positive aspects 
and impact of the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) Foreign 
Airport Assessment Program (FAAP). TSA generally concurs with GAO's 
report and recommendations. 

The Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA) delegates to TSA 
the FAAP, which requires an assessment of the security of foreign 
airports served by United States (U.S.) air carriers and foreign air 
carriers that serve the U.S., as outlined by the Foreign Airport 
Security Act o^ 1985.[Footnote 87] TSA is responsible for securing all 
modes of transportation, including the protection of persons and 
property aboard aircraft operating in international air transportation 
against acts of criminal violence and aircraft piracy. To this end, TSA 
assesses the effectiveness of security measures at foreign airports 
based on the aviation security standards and recommended practices 
adopted by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). While 
TSA is authorized under U.S. law to conduct foreign airport assessments 
al intervals it considers necessary, TSA may not perform an assessment 
of security measures at a foreign airport without the permission of the 
host government. Accordingly, TSA aims to enhance foreign relations, 
through global and regional outreach to the transportation industry. On 
a global scale, TSA meets regularly with the International Air 
Transport Association (IATA) to discuss, most notably, harmonization of 
aviation security measures. Outreach to the aviation industry on a 
regional level has been established through the Association of European 
Airlines (AEA) in Europe; Association of Asia Pacific Airlines (AAPA) 
and Association of South Pacific Airlines (ASPA) in Asia-Pacific; and 
Association of Latin American Airlines (ALTA) in the Caribbean and 
South America. TSA also works with the U.S. Department of State and its 
embassies worldwide, to foster inter- governmental cooperation and 
coordination. 

TSA conducts security inspections of foreign and U.S.-based air 
carriers that provide service to the United States from foreign 
countries to ensure compliance with applicable security requirements, 
including those set forth in the air carriers' TSA-approved security 
programs. 

The continued threat against U.S. aviation is clearly demonstrated by 
the Richard Reid incident on an American Airlines flight from Paris 
Charles De Gaulle in November 2001; the alleged threat (Flights of 
Interest) to U.S.-bound British and French flights from London Heathrow 
and Paris Charles De Gaulle in December 2003; and, more recently, the 
alleged terrorist plot to detonate liquid explosives onboard multiple 
aircraft departing from the United Kingdom to the United States in the 
summer of 2006. These threats reflect the critical need to determine 
whether international security standards are implemented at all last 
points of departure to the United States as required by the Foreign 
Airport Security Act of 1985. 

In 2005, TSA began developing a tracking system to better determine the 
total numbers of airport assessments and air carrier inspections 
conducted during a fiscal year. TSA has further refined this tracking 
system to record and monitor the reasons why assessments or inspections 
are deferred. In concert with this system, TSA is utilizing a risk- 
based methodology to schedule assessments and inspections. TSA's recent 
activities include exploring an automated means of capturing its 
foreign airport assessment data to track deficiencies identified, 
corrective actions recommended, and the resulting actions taken by the 
entities assessed. This comprehensive tracking system will better 
promote outcome-based performance measures to determine the impact of 
TSA's assessment program. 

The recommendations provided by GAO will help strengthen TSA's 
oversight of foreign airport assessments and air carrier inspections. 
We generally concur with the recommendations and have already taken 
steps to address some of them. What follows are TSA's specific 
responses to the recommendations contained in GAO's report. 

Recommendations 1 and 2: Develop controls to track the status of 
scheduled foreign airport assessments from initiation through 
completion, including the reasons why assessments were deferred or 
cancelled; and develop controls to track the status of scheduled air 
carrier inspections from initiation through completion, including the 
reasons why inspections were deferred or cancelled, as well as the 
final disposition of any investigations that result from air carrier 
inspections. 

TSA Response: TSA concurs with these recommendations and will continue 
to enhance its system to track the status of scheduled foreign airport 
assessments and air carrier inspections from initiation through 
completion. This tracking system records the dates of past airport 
assessments and air carrier inspections, projected dates of future 
assessments and inspections, as well as other foreign airport and air 
carrier information useful for program managers. This tracking system 
also incorporates TSA's risk- based methodologies employed in October 
2006. Further, the enhanced tracking system will reflect the reasons 
why airport assessments or air carrier inspections were deferred or 
cancelled to ensure that scheduled assessments and inspections are 
actually conducted. TSA intends to further refine the system to better 
track both historical information and current inspection information as 
they relate to air carrier inspections conducted in a given year. In 
reference to the final disposition of air carrier investigations, the 
TSA Office of Chief Counsel currently documents the final disposition 
of air carrier investigations that result in referrals for legal 
enforcement action. The final legal dispositions of such cases are 
recorded in TSA's Performance and Results Information System (PARIS) 
when the TSA attorney closes the case. TSA will enhance the PARIS 
database to ensure that inspection activities are linked to 
investigations, so that any enforcement actions are properly associated 
and comprehensive enforcement information is readily available. 

Recommendation 3: Develop a standard process for tracking and 
documenting host governments' progress in addressing security 
deficiencies identified during TSA airport assessments. 

TSA Response: TSA concurs and is currently developing a process through 
which security concerns noted during airport assessments will be 
tracked with fields identifying airport-and deficiency-specific data, 
deadlines, and current status and resolution. Completed items will be 
archived to allow for trend analysis and provide an historical 
understanding of each airport's security posture from one assessment to 
the next. 

Recommendations 4 and 5: Develop outcome-oriented performance measures 
to evaluate the impact TSA assistance has on improving foreign airport 
compliance with ICAO standards; and develop outcome-oriented 
performance measures to evaluate the impact TSA assistance and 
enforcement actions have on improving air carrier compliance with TSA 
security, requirements. 

TSA Response: TSA concurs with these recommendations because TSA 
recognizes the importance of monitoring and documenting the results of 
its efforts; however, TSA believes the outcome-based performance 
measures should be structured in a way that recognizes the 
collaborative nature of the process. TSA is in the planning stages of 
developing an outcome-based performance model using a risk-based 
methodology for conducting foreign airport assessments and air carrier 
inspections. Elements under consideration for inclusion include: 
numbers of assessments conducted and when; ICAO standards and other 
security items identified as deficient; corrective actions recommended; 
TSA assistance provided; coordinated assistance arranged through third 
parties; and lastly, the corrective actions achieved. In coordination 
with the Transportation Security Administration Representatives (TSAR), 
TSA will develop key performance targets and corresponding metrics that 
will inform the assessment/inspection planning process and assist in 
the implementation of corrective measures for foreign airport and air 
carrier compliance and follow-up thereto. Regular analysis and review 
of the process, data recorded, and metrics produced will allow TSA to 
better measure the effectiveness and efficiency of these programs. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to comment on this draft report and 
we look forward to working with you on future homeland security issues. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Steven J. Pecinovsky: 
Director: 
Departmental GAO/OIG Liaison Office: 

[End of section] 

Appendix VI: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contacts: 

Cathleen A. Berrick, (202) 512-3404 or berrickc@gao.gov: 

Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the person named above, Maria Strudwick, Assistant 
Director; Amy Bernstein; Kristy Brown; Alisha Chugh; Emily Hanawalt; 
Christopher Jones; Stanley Kostyla; Kyle Lamborn; Thomas Lombardi; 
Jeremy Manion; and Linda Miller made key contributions to this report. 

[End of section] 

Related Products: 

Aviation Security: Federal Efforts to Secure U.S.-Bound Air Cargo Are 
in the Early Stages and Could Be Strengthened. GAO-07-660. Washington, 
D.C.: April 30, 2007. 

Aviation Security: TSA's Change to its Prohibited Items List Has Not 
Resulted in Any Reported Public Safety Incidents, but the Impact of the 
Change on Screening Operations is Uncertain. GAO-07-623R. Washington, 
D.C.: April 25, 2007. 

Aviation Security: Risk, Experience, and Customer Service Drive Changes 
to Airline Passenger Screening Procedures, but Evaluation and 
Documentation of Proposed Changes Could Be Improved. GAO-07-634. 
Washington, D.C.: April 16, 2007. 

Aviation Security: TSA's Staffing Allocation Model Is Useful for 
Allocating Staff among Airports, but Its Assumptions Should Be 
Systematically Reassessed. GAO-07-299. Washington, D.C.: Feb. 28, 2007. 

Aviation Security: Progress Made in Systematic Planning to Guide Key 
Investment Decisions, but More Work Remains. GAO-07-448T. Washington, 
D.C.: Feb. 13, 2007. 

Aviation Security: TSA Oversight of Checked Baggage Screening 
Procedures Could Be Strengthened. GAO-06-869. Washington, D.C.: Jul. 
28, 2006. 

Aviation Security: TSA Has Strengthened Efforts to Plan for the Optimal 
Deployment of Checked Baggage Screening Systems but Funding 
Uncertainties Remain. GAO-06-875T. Washington, D.C.: June 29, 2006. 

Aviation Security: Management Challenges Remain for the Transportation 
Security Administration's Secure Flight Program. GAO-06-864T. 
Washington, D.C.: June 14, 2006. 

Aviation Security: Further Study of Safety and Effectiveness and Better 
Management Controls Needed if Air Carriers Resume Interest in Deploying 
Less than Lethal Weapons. GAO-06-475. Washington, D.C.: May 26, 2006. 

Aviation Security: Enhancements Made in Passenger and Checked Baggage 
Screening, but Challenges Remain. GAO-06-371T. Washington, D.C.: Apr. 
4, 2006. 

Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration Has Made 
Progress in Managing a Federal Security Workforce and Ensuring Security 
at U.S. Airports, but Challenges Remain. GAO-06-597T. Washington, D.C.: 
Apr. 4, 2006. 

Aviation Security: Progress Made to Set Up Program Using Private-Sector 
Airport Screeners, but More Work Remains. GAO-06-166. Washington, D.C.: 
Mar. 31, 2006. 

Aviation Security: Significant Management Challenges May Adversely 
Affect Implementation of the Transportation Security Administration's 
Secure Flight Program. GAO-06-374T. Washington, D.C.: Feb. 9, 2006. 

Aviation Security: Federal Air Marshal Service Could Benefit from 
Improved Planning and Controls. GAO-06-203. Washington, D.C.: Nov. 28, 
2005. 

Aviation Security: Federal Action Needed to Strengthen Domestic Air 
Cargo Security. GAO-06-76. Washington, D.C.: Oct. 17, 2005. 

Transportation Security Administration: More Clarity on the Authority 
of Federal Security Directors Is Needed. GAO-05-935. Washington, D.C.: 
Sept. 23, 2005. 

Aviation Security: Flight and Cabin Crew Member Security Training 
Strengthened, but Better Planning and Internal Controls Needed. GAO-05- 
781. Washington, D.C.: Sept. 6, 2005. 

Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration Did Not Fully 
Disclose Uses of Personal Information During Secure Flight Program 
Testing in Initial Privacy Notes, but Has Recently Taken Steps to More 
Fully Inform the Public. GAO-05-864R. Washington, D.C.: July 22, 2005. 

Aviation Security: Better Planning Needed to Optimize Deployment of 
Checked Baggage Screening Systems. GAO-05-896T. Washington, D.C.: July 
13, 2005. 

Aviation Security: Screener Training and Performance Measurement 
Strengthened, but More Work Remains. GAO-05-457. Washington, D.C.: May 
2, 2005. 

Aviation Security: Secure Flight Development and Testing Under Way, but 
Risks Should Be Managed as System Is Further Developed. GAO-05-356. 
Washington, D.C.: Mar. 28, 2005. 

Aviation Security: Systematic Planning Needed to Optimize the 
Deployment of Checked Baggage Screening Systems. GAO-05-365. 
Washington, D.C.: Mar. 15, 2005. 

Aviation Security: Measures for Testing the Effect of Using Commercial 
Data for the Secure Flight Program. GAO-05-324. Washington, D.C.: 
Feb.23, 2005. 

Transportation Security: Systematic Planning Needed to Optimize 
Resources. GAO-05-357T. Washington, D.C.: Feb.15, 2005. 

Aviation Security: Preliminary Observations on TSA's Progress to Allow 
Airports to Use Private Passenger and Baggage Screening Services. GAO- 
05-126. Washington, D.C.: Nov.19, 2004. 

General Aviation Security: Increased Federal Oversight Is Needed, but 
Continued Partnership with the Private Sector Is Critical to Long-Term 
Success. GAO-05-144. Washington, D.C.: Nov. 10, 2004. 

Aviation Security: Further Steps Needed to Strengthen the Security of 
Commercial Airport Perimeters and Access Controls. GAO-04-728. 
Washington, D.C.: Jun. 4, 2004. 

Transportation Security Administration: High-Level Attention Needed to 
Strengthen Acquisition Function. GAO-04-544. Washington, D.C.: May 28, 
2004. 

Aviation Security: Challenges in Using Biometric Technologies. GAO-04- 
785T. Washington, D.C.: May 19, 2004. 

Nonproliferation: Further Improvements Needed in U.S. Efforts to 
Counter Threats from Man-Portable Air Defense Systems. GAO-04-519. 
Washington, D.C.: May 13, 2004. 

Aviation Security: Private Screening Contractors Have Little 
Flexibility to Implement Innovative Approaches. GAO-04-505T. 
Washington, D.C.: Apr. 22, 2004. 

Aviation Security: Improvement Still Needed in Federal Aviation 
Security Efforts. GAO-04-592T. Washington, D.C.: Mar. 30, 2004. 

Aviation Security: Challenges Delay Implementation of Computer- 
Assisted Passenger Prescreening System. GAO-04-504T. Washington, D.C.: 
Mar. 17, 2004. 

Aviation Security: Factors Could Limit the Effectiveness of the 
Transportation Security Administration's Efforts to Secure Aerial 
Advertising Operations. GAO-04-499R. Washington, D.C.: Mar. 5, 2004. 

Aviation Security: Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System 
Faces Significant Implementation Challenges. GAO-04-385. Washington, 
D.C.: Feb. 13, 2004. 

Aviation Security: Challenges Exist in Stabilizing and Enhancing 
Passenger and Baggage Screening Operations. GAO-04-440T. Washington, 
D.C.: Feb. 12, 2004. 

The Department of Homeland Security Needs to Fully Adopt a Knowledge- 
based Approach to Its Counter-MANPADS Development Program. GAO-04-341R. 
Washington, D.C.: Jan. 30, 2004. 

Aviation Security: Efforts to Measure Effectiveness and Strengthen 
Security Programs. GAO-04-285T. Washington, D.C.: Nov. 20, 2003. 

Aviation Security: Federal Air Marshal Service Is Addressing Challenges 
of Its Expanded Mission and Workforce, but Additional Actions Needed. 
GAO-04-242. Washington, D.C.: Nov. 19, 2003. 

Aviation Security: Efforts to Measure Effectiveness and Address 
Challenges. GAO-04-232T. Washington, D.C.: Nov. 5, 2003. 

Airport Passenger Screening: Preliminary Observations on Progress Made 
and Challenges Remaining. GAO-03-1173. Washington, D.C.: Sept. 24, 
2003. 

Aviation Security: Progress since September 11, 2001, and the 
Challenges Ahead. GAO-03-1150T. Washington, D.C.: Sept. 9, 2003. 

Transportation Security: Federal Action Needed to Enhance Security 
Efforts. GAO-03-1154T. Washington, D.C.: Sept. 9, 2003. 

Transportation Security: Federal Action Needed to Help Address Security 
Challenges. GAO-03-843. Washington, D.C.: Jun. 30, 2003. 

Federal Aviation Administration: Reauthorization Provides Opportunities 
to Address Key Agency Challenges. GAO-03-653T. Washington, D.C.: Apr. 
10, 2003. 

Transportation Security: Post-September 11th Initiatives and Long-Term 
Challenges. GAO-03-616T. Washington, D.C.: Apr. 1, 2003. 

Airport Finance: Past Funding Levels May Not Be Sufficient to Cover 
Airports' Planned Capital Development. GAO-03-497T. Washington, D.C.: 
Feb. 25, 2003. 

Transportation Security Administration: Actions and Plans to Build a 
Results-Oriented Culture. GAO-03-190. Washington, D.C.: Jan. 17, 2003. 

Aviation Safety: Undeclared Air Shipments of Dangerous Goods and DOT's 
Enforcement Approach. GAO-03-22. Washington, D.C.: Jan. 10, 2003. 

Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities and Potential Improvements for the 
Air Cargo System. GAO-03-344. Washington, D.C.: Dec. 20, 2002. 

Aviation Security: Registered Traveler Program Policy and 
Implementation Issues. GAO-03-253. Washington, D.C.: Nov. 22, 2002. 

Airport Finance: Using Airport Grant Funds for Security Projects Has 
Affected Some Development Projects. GAO-03-27. Washington, D.C.: Oct. 
15, 2002. 

Commercial Aviation: Financial Condition and Industry Responses Affect 
Competition. GAO-03-171T. Washington, D.C.: Oct. 2, 2002. 

Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration Faces 
Immediate and Long-Term Challenges. GAO-02-971T. Washington, D.C.: Jul. 
25, 2002. 

Aviation Security: Information Concerning the Arming of Commercial 
Pilots. GAO-02-822R. Washington, D.C.: Jun. 28, 2002. 

Aviation Security: Vulnerabilities in, and Alternatives for, Preboard 
Screening Security Operations. GAO-01-1171T. Washington, D.C.: Sept. 
25, 2001. 

Aviation Security: Weaknesses in Airport Security and Options for 
Assigning Screening Responsibilities. GAO-01-1165T. Washington, D.C.: 
Sept. 21, 2001. 

Homeland Security: A Framework for Addressing the Nation's Efforts. GAO-
01-1158T. Washington, D.C.: Sept. 21, 2001. 

Aviation Security: Terrorist Acts Demonstrate Urgent Need to Improve 
Security at the Nation's Airports. GAO-01-1162T. Washington, D.C.: 
Sept. 20, 2001. 

Aviation Security: Terrorist Acts Illustrate Severe Weaknesses in 
Aviation Security. GAO-01-1166T. Washington, D.C.: Sept. 20, 2001. 

FOOTNOTES 

[1] See 49 U.S.C § 114(d). 

[2] ICAO was formed following the 1944 Convention on International 
Civil Aviation (also known as the Chicago Convention). In 1947, ICAO 
became a specialized agency of the United Nations. A primary objective 
of ICAO is to provide for the safe, orderly, and efficient development 
of international civil aviation. There are currently 189 signatory 
nations to the ICAO convention, including the United States. Nations 
that are members to the ICAO convention agree to cooperate with other 
member states to meet standardized international aviation security 
measures. The international aviation security standards and recommended 
practices are detailed in Annex 17 to the Convention on International 
Civil Aviation adopted by ICAO. 

[3] Domestic and foreign air carriers that operate to, from, or within 
the United States must establish and maintain security programs 
approved by TSA in accordance with requirements set forth in regulation 
at 49 C.F.R. parts 1544 and 1546. See 49 U.S.C. §§ 44903 44906. In 
conducting air carrier inspections, TSA may consider compliance with 
air carriers' TSA-approved security programs as well as any applicable 
laws, regulations, security directives, and emergency amendments. See 
49 C.F.R. §§ 1544.3 1546.3. 

[4] An air carrier station refers to those locations at an airport 
where an air carrier conducts its operations. 

[5] Complete foreign airport assessment and air carrier inspection 
results for fiscal year 2006 were not available when we initiated our 
review. 

[6] TSA's international field offices are located in Dallas, Frankfurt, 
Los Angeles, Miami, and Singapore. 

[7] FSDs are the ranking TSA authorities responsible for the leadership 
and coordination of TSA security activities at commercial airports in 
the United States. 

[8] APEC is a multilateral organization that aims to sustain economic 
growth in the Asia-Pacific region through a commitment to open trade, 
investment, and economic reform. APEC's transportation subgroups work 
to achieve a balance between trade and security issues related to the 
operation of regional transportation systems. AEA represents more than 
30 airlines and works in partnership with stakeholders in the aviation 
industry to ensure the sustainable growth of the European airline 
industry in a global context. ECAC, created in 1955, currently has 42 
members and seeks to promote aviation safety, security, and economic 
development of its members. One way ECAC contributes to this effort is 
by conducting audits of airports and air carriers when requested to do 
so by a country in accordance with aviation security standards agreed 
upon by ECAC members. IATA is composed of over 260 airlines and aims to 
help airlines simplify processes and increase passenger convenience 
while reducing costs and improving efficiency. 

[9] According to TSA's Foreign Airport Assessment Program Standard 
Operating Procedures, if security concerns and deficiencies identified 
by TSA during assessments are considered "not serious enough for 
secretarial action (e.g., the measure barely satisfies the minimum 
international standard and could be improved)," TSA may develop an 
action plan for addressing these deficiencies without seeking a 
determination for further action from the Secretary of Homeland 
Security. 

[10] Specific details regarding the nature of security deficiencies TSA 
identified during air carrier inspections are sensitive security 
information and are not discussed in this report. 

[11] The number of enforcement actions is not equal to the number of 
violations identified because TSA can issue one enforcement action for 
multiple violations, and TSA could not readily identify what action, if 
any, was taken for some violations. 

[12] The specific details of the catering cart security deficiency 
identified by TSA inspectors are sensitive security information and, 
therefore, are not discussed in this report. 

[13] See Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001). 

[14] 49 U.S.C. § 44907. Prior to the establishment of DHS in March 
2003, authority for conducting foreign airport assessments resided with 
the Secretary of Transportation. Although assessments were originally 
conducted by the Federal Aviation Administration, TSA assumed 
responsibility for conducting the assessments following the enactment 
of the Aviation and Transportation Security Act in November 2001. In 
March 2003, TSA transferred from the Department of Transportation to 
DHS. 

[15] See 49 U.S.C. § 44907(d)-(e). 

[16] Domestic and foreign air carriers that operate to, from, or within 
the United States must establish and maintain security programs 
approved by TSA in accordance with requirements set forth in regulation 
at 49 C.F.R parts 1544 and 1546. See 49 U.S.C §§ 44903 44906. Prior to 
TSA being established in February 2002, the Federal Aviation 
Administration conducted these air carrier inspections. 

[17] International aviation security standards and recommended 
practices are detailed in Annex 17 and Annex 14 to the Convention on 
International Civil Aviation, as adopted by ICAO. An ICAO standard is a 
specification for the safety or regularity of international air 
navigation, with which member states agree to comply; whereas, a 
recommended practice is any desirable specification for safety, 
regularity, or efficiency of international air navigation, with which 
member states are strongly encouraged to comply. Member states are 
expected to make a genuine effort to comply with recommended practices. 
TSA has chosen the 86 standards that it sees as most critical. See 49 
U.S.C. § 44907(a)(2)(C) (requiring that TSA conduct assessments using a 
standard that results in an analysis of the security measures at the 
airport based at least on the standards and appropriate recommended 
practices of ICAO Annex 17 in effect on the date of the assessment). 

[18] Segments of Annex 17 to the Convention of International Civil 
Aviation, Safeguarding International Civil Aviation Against Unlawful 
Acts of Interference, Seventh Edition, April 2002 and Annex 14, 
Aerodrome Design and Operations, Volume I, have been reproduced in 
appendix II with permission of the International Civil Aviation 
Organization. 

[19] Based on documentation provided by TSA, TSA also conducted five 
foreign airport surveys during fiscal year 2005. Surveys are generally 
conducted at foreign airports that are scheduled to provide new service 
to the United States. Unlike airport assessments, airport surveys only 
address whether foreign airports are meeting critical ICAO standards 
and recommended practices, such as those associated with passenger and 
checked baggage screening. Also unlike assessment reports, survey 
reports do not identify whether foreign officials took steps to address 
security deficiencies that were identified at the airport. Because of 
these differences, we did not include the results of the foreign 
airport surveys in our analysis. 

[20] According to TSA, the airport assessment period is extended by 8 
to 12 hours for each air carrier inspection that is conducted. 

[21] According to TSA's Foreign Airport Assessment Program Standard 
Operating Procedures, if security concerns and deficiencies are 
considered "not serious enough for secretarial action (e.g., the 
measure barely satisfies the minimum international standard and could 
be improved)," TSA may develop an action plan for addressing the 
deficiencies identified without seeking a determination from the 
Secretary of Homeland Security. 

[22] The Secretary may bypass the 90-day action and immediately provide 
public notification or withhold, revoke, or prescribe conditions on an 
air carrier's operating authority if the Secretary determines, after 
consultation with the Secretary of State, that a condition exists that 
threatens the safety or security of passengers, aircraft, or crew 
traveling to or from the airport. § 44907(d)(2)(A)(ii). 

[23] Public notification includes publication of the airport's identity 
in the Federal Register, posting and displaying the airport's identity 
prominently at all U.S. airports at which scheduled air carrier 
operations are provided regularly, and notifying news media of the 
airport's identity. 49 U.S.C. § 44907(d)(1)(A). U.S. and foreign air 
carriers providing transportation between the United States and the 
airport shall also provide written notice that the airport is not 
maintaining and carrying out effective security measures on or with the 
ticket to each passenger buying a ticket. § 44907(d)(1)(B). 

[24] Invoking this action does not require that the Secretary base the 
determination upon TSA's airport assessment results, though an 
assessment may provide the basis for invoking this action. 

[25] TSA may conduct air carrier inspections separately from airport 
assessments because foreign airports are generally assessed no more 
than once a year by TSA, while some air carriers are inspected twice a 
year by TSA. 

[26] Extraordinary locations are identified through threat analysis 
conducted by TSA's Office of Intelligence and are contained in the 
Aircraft Operator Standard Security Program. The list of extraordinary 
locations is sensitive security information and, therefore, is not 
included in this report. 

[27] Over the course of our review, TSA was in the process of 
developing new guidelines for determining the frequency of overseas air 
carrier inspections. The draft guidelines would require TSA to inspect 
both U.S. and foreign air carriers once a year, unless the air carrier 
operates out of a foreign airport that TSA determines has a relatively 
high vulnerability level, in which case TSA would inspect the air 
carrier twice a year. TSA had not finalized the draft air carrier 
inspection guidelines as of February 2007. 

[28] TSA requires that each air carrier adopt and implement a TSA- 
approved security program for all scheduled passenger and public 
charter operations at locations within the United States, from the 
United States to a non-U.S. location, or from a non-U.S. location to 
the United States. See 49 C.F.R. pts. 1544-46. 

[29] See 49 C.F.R. §§ 1544.3, 1546.3. 

[30] When circumstances require that air carriers take immediate action 
to mitigate a known or potential threat or vulnerability, TSA may issue 
security directives to impose additional security requirements on U.S. 
air carriers and emergency amendments to impose additional requirements 
on foreign air carriers. See 49 C.F.R. §§ 1544.105(d), 1544.305, 
1546.105(d). 

[31] The No-Fly list contains the names of individuals that pose, or 
are suspected of posing, a threat to civil aviation or national 
security and are precluded from boarding an aircraft. The Selectee list 
includes those individuals of interest that do not meet the criteria to 
be placed on the No-Fly list. Individuals on the Selectee list will be 
subjected to additional screening. There is also a separate selectee 
process--the Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System--by which 
individuals who meet certain criteria are selected for additional 
screening. 

[32] TSA has statutory authority to issue fines and penalties to 
individual air carriers for not complying with established security 
procedures. See 49 U.S.C. § 46301. In general, the penalty for an 
aviation security violation is found at 49 U.S.C. § 46301(a)(4), which 
states that the maximum civil penalty for violating chapter 449 of 
title 49, United States Code, (49 U.S.C. § 44901 et seq.) or another 
requirement under title 49 administered by the Assistant Secretary, 
TSA, shall be $10,000. The maximum civil penalty shall be $25,000 in 
the case of a person operating an aircraft for the transportation of 
passengers or property for compensation. 

[33] TSA assessed foreign airports against 64 required ICAO standards 
and 22 recommended ICAO practices for aviation security. For the 
purpose of this report, we refer to both standards and recommended 
practices as standards. 

[34] TSA found that 104 of the 128 foreign airports initially did not 
meet at least 1 ICAO standard. The average number of ICAO standards not 
met by these 104 airports was about 6, and the range of standards not 
met by an individual airport was 1 to 24. However, by the completion of 
TSA's assessment, 22 of these 104 airports had taken corrective action 
that enabled them to meet all ICAO standards; thus leaving 82 airports 
that did not meet at least 1 ICAO standard at the completion of the 
assessment period. In addition to conducting airport assessments of 
foreign airports, TSA also conducts surveys of foreign airports. 
Surveys are conducted at airports that plan to provide new service to 
the United States. 

[35] At the beginning of the assessment, TSA found that 88 airports did 
not meet at least one critical ICAO standard. However, by the end of 
the assessment period, 27 airports took corrective action that allowed 
them to meet all critical standards, leaving 61 foreign airports not 
meeting at least one critical ICAO standard after TSA completed its 
assessment. 

[36] See 70 Fed. Reg. 3,378 (Jan. 24, 2005). Based on subsequent 
assessments by TSA, the Secretary found that Port-au-Prince 
International Airport maintains and carries out effective security 
measures. See 71 Fed. Reg. 42,103 (July 25, 2006). 

[37] See 71 Fed. Reg. 3,107 (Jan. 19, 2006). The airport in Bali was 
subjected to both a public notification and a 90-dayaction, whereas for 
Haiti, the Secretary by-passed the 90-day action and immediately 
notified the public that the airport in Haiti did not maintain and 
carry out effective security measures. The identity of the foreign 
airports that were subjected to 90-day actions, but did not also 
subjected to public notification, is classified. 

[38] The number of ICAO standards not met by the five secretarial 
action airports at the completion of TSA's assessment ranged from 11 to 
18, and the number of critical standards not met by these airports 
range from 3 to 6. The assessment reports for these airports included 
some standards that did not provide information whether or not the 
standard had been met at the completion of TSA's assessment. Therefore, 
those standards were excluded when calculating these range values. 

[39] TSA officials stated that noncompliance with an ICAO standard, 
which is required, has more influence on a secretarial action 
determination than noncompliance with an ICAO recommended practice, 
which is only suggested. 

[40] Specifically, 108 of the 385 U.S. air carrier inspections and 48 
of the 144 foreign air carrier inspections resulted in violations of at 
least one TSA security requirement. 

[41] During fiscal year 2005, there were a total of 78 security 
requirements that TSA could have imposed on U.S.-based air carriers 
operating at foreign airports and a total of 55 security requirements 
that TSA could have imposed on foreign air carriers. However, depending 
on the location of the foreign airport in which the air carrier 
operated and the extent of an air carrier's operations at the airport, 
not all of the security requirements were applicable to all air 
carriers. 

[42] The percentage of air carrier inspections that resulted in these 
and other types of security deficiencies is sensitive security 
information and, therefore, is not discussed in this report. 

[43] TSA could not readily identify what enforcement actions were 
recommended for the remaining 84 (about 20 percent) security violations 
identified during fiscal year 2005 air carrier inspections. 

[44] The number of enforcement actions is not equal to the number of 
violations identified because TSA can issue one enforcement action for 
multiple violations and TSA could not readily identify what action, if 
any, was taken for some violations. 

[45] An additional fiscal year 2005 enforcement action based on a 
fiscal year 2004 inspection was resolved with a letter of correction 
issued in lieu of a $25,000 civil penalty. 

[46] The specific passenger checkpoint screening deficiency identified 
by TSA is sensitive security information and, therefore, is not 
identified in this report. 

[47] The specific airport perimeter security deficiency identified by 
TSA is sensitive security information and, therefore, is not identified 
in this report. 

[48] The specific security deficiency for which TSA inspectors 
recommended the construction project is sensitive security information 
and, therefore, is not identified in this report. 

[49] The Organization of American States is made up of 35 member 
states, including the independent nations of North, Central, and South 
America and the Caribbean, and is a forum for strengthening democracy, 
promoting human rights, and confronting shared problems among its 
members, such as poverty, terrorism, illegal drugs, and corruption. 

[50] During fiscal year 2005, air carriers made 22 requests for 
alternative procedures. TSA approved 18 requests and 4 requests were 
withdrawn by the air carrier. 

[51] The areas of responsibility for the IFOs are mutually exclusive. 
Therefore, a foreign airport assessment should be listed only under one 
IFO. 

[52] Three of the TSARs did not mention conducting follow-up activities 
during their interview, in part because we did not specifically ask 
about conducting follow-up activities during these interviews. 

[53] TSARs may assist foreign officials in developing action plans to 
address deficiencies identified by TSA during airport assessments. 
According to TSA guidance, TSARs are to assist foreign officials in 
developing action plans when the security deficiencies identified are 
significant, but do not pose an immediate or serious threat to aviation 
security. During fiscal year 2005, TSA developed an action plan for 1 
foreign airport. Action plans are to include (1) the security 
deficiencies identified at the airport, (2) the corresponding 
recommended corrective actions agreed upon by TSA and host government 
officials to address each deficiency, (3) host government officials' 
progress in implementing corrective actions, (4) date when host 
government is expected to complete the corrective action, and (5) the 
host government office or agency responsible for implementing the 
corrective action. 

[54] PARIS is a Web-based method for entering, storing, and retrieving 
performance activities and information on TSA-regulated entities, 
including air carriers. PARIS includes profiles for each entity, 
inspections conducted by TSA, and investigations that are prompted by 
incidents or inspection findings. 

[55] GAO, Aviation Security: Better Management Controls are Needed to 
Improve FAA's Safety Enforcement and Compliance Efforts, GAO-04-646 
(Washington D.C.: July 2004), and GAO, Pipeline Safety: Management of 
the Office of Pipeline Safety Enforcement Program Needs Further 
Strengthening, GAO-04-801 (Washington D.C.: July 2004). 

[56] In this instance, host government law precluded the air carrier 
from complying with TSA requirements for checked baggage screening. 

[57] As discussed previously, TSA did not maintain accurate or complete 
data on the number of foreign airport assessments and air carrier 
inspections scheduled for a particular fiscal year. Therefore, our 
calculations may not include all of the assessments and inspections 
that were conducted, deferred, and canceled during fiscal year 2005. 

[58] The State Department bases the number of American positions 
overseas on the mission priorities of the embassy, the programmatic and 
administrative costs associated with increases in staffing, and 
security issues related to the number of Americans posted overseas. 
According to the State Department, the average cost of putting an 
American position overseas will be approximately $430,000. U.S. Office 
of Management and Budget, Department of State and International 
Assistance Programs, Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal 
Year 2006 (Washington, D.C.: February 2005). 

[59] Airport visits include visits to a foreign airport to conduct an 
airport assessment in conjunction with air carrier inspections or to 
conduct solely an airport assessment or air carrier inspections. 

[60] As of June 2006, there were 65 domestic inspectors stationed at 52 
U.S. airports who were eligible to conduct foreign airport assessments 
and inspections of air carriers operating out of foreign airports. 
There were approximately 700 domestic inspectors stationed at U.S. 
airports at the beginning of fiscal year 2006. According to TSA, teams 
consisting only of domestic inspectors were used to conduct about 2 
percent of foreign airport assessments and only 1 percent of air 
carrier inspections during fiscal year 2005. 

[61] Under the previous scheduling approach, foreign airports that 
exhibited no operational issues in the previous two assessments were 
assessed once every 3 years. Foreign airports that had not been 
previously assessed, subjected to secretarial action within the last 5 
years, or exhibited operational issues in either of the two previous 
assessments were assessed once a year. Operational issues are 
weaknesses in the security system at an airport that pose a direct 
threat to the safety and security of passengers, aircraft, and crew 
(i.e., screening and access control measures). 

[62] See Pub. L. No. 108-176, § 611(b)(1), 117 Stat. 2490, 2571-72 
(2003) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 44924). As of March 2007, TSA had not 
issued final regulations to satisfy this requirement. 

[63] FAA-approved repair stations in foreign countries are facilities 
located overseas that perform maintenance and repairs on aircraft 
operated by U.S. air carriers or aircraft registered in the United 
States. 

[64] The 27 member states of the European Union are Belgium, Bulgaria, 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Estonia, Greece, Spain, France, 
Ireland, Italy, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Hungary, Malta, 
the Netherlands, Austria, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, 
Slovakia, Finland, Sweden and the United Kingdom. 

[65] Founded in 1955 as an intergovernmental organization, ECAC aims to 
promote the continued development of a safe, efficient, and sustainable 
European air transport system. In so doing, ECAC conducts assessments 
of airports within member states, at the request of officials from its 
member states. ECAC derived the standards by which airports are 
assessed from ICAO Annex 17 civil aviation security standards. However, 
ECAC officials stated that their standards are more prescriptive than 
those of ICAO. 

[66] According to TSA officials, TSA conducts its foreign airport 
assessments in a manner consistent with how the Federal Aviation 
Administration conducted its assessments before this responsibility 
transferred to TSA pursuant to the Aviation and Transportation Security 
Act (ATSA). See International Security and Development Cooperation Act 
of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-83, § 551, 99 Stat. 190, 222-25 (authorizing 
the Secretary of Transportation to conduct assessments of the 
effectiveness of the security measures maintained at foreign airports); 
see also H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 99-237, pp. 124-29 (1985). 

[67] These officials, at the time of the interview, were not able to 
offer specific examples of other security measures that would be more 
effective at preventing a terrorist attack. 

[68] Pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 44901(a), the screening of all passengers 
and property that will be carried aboard a passenger aircraft with a 
flight or flight segment originating in the United States shall take 
place before boarding and shall be carried out by a federal government 
employee (or by private screeners under contract to TSA as part of the 
Screener Partnership Program in accordance with § 44920). 

[69] GAO, Aviation Security: Federal Efforts to Secure U.S. Bound Air 
Cargo Are in the Early Stages and Could Be Strengthened, GAO-07-337SU 
(Washington, D.C.: March 2007). 

[70] TSA is authorized under U.S. law to conduct assessments of foreign 
airports. See 49 U.S.C. § 44907. Although TSA does not have any 
authority to compel a foreign airport or government to submit to a TSA 
assessment, the agency does have authority (in conjunction with other 
appropriate U.S. government entities such as FAA and the Department of 
State) to impose restrictions on air travel between that airport and 
the United States in the event it is not permitted to conduct an 
assessment. See id. 

[71] Based on the assessment reports TSA provided us, we determined 
that TSA conducted 128 foreign airport assessments at 126 unique 
airports during fiscal year 2005; that is, 2 foreign airports were 
assessed twice during fiscal year 2005. 

[72] The PARIS database, established in July 2003, provides TSA a Web- 
based method for entering, storing, and retrieving performance 
activities and information on TSA-regulated entities, including air 
carriers. PARIS includes profiles for each entity, inspections 
conducted by TSA, and investigations that are prompted by incidents or 
inspection findings. 

[73] See 49 U.S.C. § 44907. 

[74] The No-Fly list contains the names of individuals that pose, or 
are suspected of posing, a threat to civil aviation for national 
security and are precluded from boarding an aircraft. 

[75] GAO, Internal Control: Standards for Internal Control in the 
Federal Government, GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1 (Washington, D.C.: November 
1999), and GAO, Internal Control: Internal Control Management and 
Evaluation Tool, GAO-01-1008G (Washington, D.C.: August 2001). 

[76] We visited the embassies of Australia, Belgium, Canada, the 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, France, Germany, Indonesia, Israel, Japan, 
Mexico, the Netherlands, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and the 
United Kingdom. 

[77] We met with officials from American Airlines, British Airways, 
Caribbean Sun Airlines, Continental Micronesia, Delta Air Lines, 
Lufthansa, Northwest Airlines, Philippine Airlines, Singapore Airlines, 
Thai Airways International, and Virgin Atlantic. 

[78] The Federal Security Director is the ranking TSA authority 
responsible for the leadership and coordination of TSA security 
activities at the nation's commercial airports. 

[79] The specific Security Directives are sensitive security 
information and, therefore, are not identified in this report. 

[80] See 49 C.F.R. § 1546.103(a)(3). 49 U.S.C. § 44906, however, 
provides that TSA shall not approve the security program of a foreign 
air carrier unless it requires the foreign carrier in its operations to 
and from airports in the United States to adhere to the identical 
security measures required of air carriers serving the same airports. 

[81] The specific emergency amendments are sensitive security 
information and, therefore, are not identified in this report. 

[82] East Africa Counterterrorism Initiative (EACTI) includes military 
training for border and coastal security, programs to strengthen 
control of the movement of people and goods across borders, aviation 
security capacity building, assistance for regional efforts against 
terrorist financing, and police training. EACTI also includes an 
education program to counter extremist influence and a robust outreach 
program. According to DOT, with the exception of Djibouti, which has a 
separate funding course, the Economic Support Funds used to support the 
remainder of the Safe Skies countries can only be used to support those 
aviation security technical assistance and capacity-building activities 
performed by nonmilitary and nonpolice personnel. 

[83] According to DOT, Safe Skies offers technical assistance and 
training for both aviation safety and security and does not track 
funding levels by activity. 

[84] According to DOT, Cape Verde is the only Safe Skies country that 
has successfully achieved FAA Category 1 status for safety oversight in 
accordance with ICAO aviation security standards. Cape Verde also met 
ICAO standards for security oversight and TSA security requirements for 
providing direct service to the United States. As such, DOT provides 
limited assistance to Cape Verde to sustain its safety and security 
status. 

[85] The Department of State did not fund workshops directly, but 
rather through a grant to OAS/CICTE; thus the specific cost information 
is not available. Further, many countries received assistance at 
workshops held for multiple countries at the same time and it is 
difficult to disaggregate cost information. 

[86] Not all money was used due to inability to place an aviation 
security expert on site. 

[87] In August 1985, the International Security and Development 
Cooperation Act of 1985, Pub.L. No. 99-83, was enacted, which included 
a section called the Foreign Airport Security Act. 

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