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Testimony: 

Before the Subcommittee on International Terrorism and 
Nonproliferation, Committee on International Relations, House of 
Representatives: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 

GAO: 

For Release on Delivery Expected at 10:00 a.m. MDT: 

Friday, July 7, 2006: 

Border Security: 

Investigators Transported Radioactive Sources Across Our Nation's 
Borders at Two Locations: 

Statement of Gregory D. Kutz, Managing Director: 

Forensic Audits and Special Investigations: 

Border Security: 

GAO-06-940T: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-06-940T, testimony before the Subcommittee on 
International Terrorism and Non-Proliferation, Committee on 
International Relations, House of Representatives 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

Given today’s unprecedented terrorism threat environment and the 
resulting widespread congressional and public interest in the security 
of our nation’s borders, GAO conducted an investigation testing whether 
radioactive sources could be smuggled across U.S. borders. 

Most travelers enter the United States through the nation’s 154 land 
border ports of entry. Department of Homeland Security U.S. Customs and 
Border Protection (CBP) inspectors at ports of entry are responsible 
for the primary inspection of travelers to determine their 
admissibility into the United States and to enforce laws related to 
preventing the entry of contraband, such as drugs and weapons of mass 
destruction. 

GAO’s testimony provides the results of undercover tests made by its 
investigators to determine whether monitors at U.S. ports of entry 
detect radioactive sources in vehicles attempting to enter the United 
States. GAO also provides observations regarding the procedures that 
CBP inspectors followed during its investigation. 

GAO has also issued a report on the results of this investigation (GAO-
06-545R). 

What GAO Found: 

For the purposes of this undercover investigation, GAO purchased a 
small amount of radioactive sources and one secure container used to 
safely store and transport the material from a commercial source over 
the telephone. One of GAO’s investigators, posing as an employee of a 
fictitious company located in Washington, D.C., stated that the purpose 
of his purchase was to use the radioactive sources to calibrate 
personal radiation detection pagers. The purchase was not challenged 
because suppliers are not required to determine whether prospective 
buyers have legitimate uses for radioactive sources, nor are suppliers 
required to ask a buyer to produce an NRC document when purchasing in 
small quantities. The amount of radioactive sources GAO’s investigator 
sought to purchase did not require an NRC document. Subsequently, the 
company mailed the radioactive sources to an address in Washington, 
D.C. 

The radiation portal monitors properly signaled the presence of 
radioactive material when our two teams of investigators conducted 
simultaneous border crossings. Our investigators’ vehicles were 
inspected in accordance with most of the CBP policy at both the 
northern and southern borders. However, GAO’s investigators, using 
counterfeit documents, were able to enter the United States with enough 
radioactive sources in the trunks of their vehicles to make two dirty 
bombs. According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, a 
dirty bomb is a mix of explosives, such as dynamite, with radioactive 
powder or pellets. When the dynamite or other explosives are set off, 
the blast carries radioactive material into the surrounding area. The 
direct costs of cleanup and the indirect losses in trade and business 
in the contaminated areas could be large. Hence, dirty bombs are 
generally considered to be weapons of mass disruption instead of 
weapons of mass destruction. GAO investigators were able to 
successfully represent themselves as employees of a fictitious company 
present a counterfeit bill of lading and a counterfeit NRC document 
during the secondary inspections at both locations. The CBP inspectors 
never questioned the authenticity of the investigators’ counterfeit 
bill of lading or the counterfeit NRC document authorizing them to 
receive, acquire, possess, and transfer radioactive sources. 

[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-940T]. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
the link above. For more information, contact Gregory D. Kutz at (202) 
512-7455 or kutzg@gao.gov. 

[End of Section] 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

Thank you for the opportunity to discuss our investigation of potential 
security weaknesses associated with the installation of radiation 
detection equipment at U.S. ports of entry. To address the threat of 
dirty bombs and other nuclear material, the federal government has 
programs in place that regulate the transportation of radioactive 
sources and to prevent illegal transport of radioactive sources across 
our nation's borders. The Department of Homeland Security through the 
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) uses radiation detection 
equipment at ports of entry to prevent such illicit entry of 
radioactive sources. The goal of CBP's inspection program is to 
"…thwart the operations of terrorist organizations by detecting, 
disrupting, and preventing the cross-border travel of terrorists, 
terrorist funding, and terrorist implements, including Weapons of Mass 
Destruction and their precursors." Deploying radiation detection 
equipment is part of CBP's strategy for thwarting radiological 
terrorism and CBP is using a range of such equipment to meet its goal 
of screening all cargo, vehicles, and individuals coming into the 
United States. 

Most travelers enter the United States through the nation's 154 land 
border ports of entry. CBP inspectors at ports of entry are responsible 
for the primary inspection of travelers to determine their 
admissibility into the United States and to enforce laws related to 
preventing the entry of contraband, such as drugs and weapons of mass 
destruction. 

Our investigation was conducted as a result of widespread congressional 
and public interest in the security of our nation's borders, given 
today's unprecedented terrorism threat environment. Our investigation 
was conducted under the premise that given today's security 
environment, our nation's borders must be protected from the smuggling 
of radioactive sources by terrorists. 

This testimony will provide the results of our work related to testing 
whether the radiation portal monitors installed at the U.S. ports of 
entry would detect radioactive sources transported in vehicles 
attempting to enter the United States. We will also provide our 
observations regarding the procedures that CBP inspectors followed when 
the radiation portal monitors detected such material. In addition, at 
the request of the Chairman of the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on 
Investigations, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 
Affairs, we issued in March 2006 a detailed report with corrective 
action briefings to CBP and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) on 
the results of our undercover border crossing tests.[Footnote 1] 

We selected two land ports of entry that had radiation portal monitors 
installed: one at the U.S.-Canadian border and one at the U.S.-Mexican 
border. Radiation portal monitors are large pieces of stationary 
equipment that CBP uses as part of its overall strategy to thwart 
radiological terrorism by detecting the presence of radioactive sources 
by screening people, vehicles, and cargo as they pass through ports of 
entry. In order to safely plan and execute our undercover operation, 
several of our investigators attended training at the National 
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) in Gaithersburg, Maryland. 
Our investigators received training on the safe handling, storage, and 
transport of radioactive sources. 

When considering the type of radioactive sources to use in our 
undercover operation, we decided to use one of the most common 
radioisotopes used in industry for its strong radioactivity and also 
used in medical therapy to treat cancer. After consulting with an 
outside expert, we used an amount of radioactive sources that we 
determined was sufficient to manufacture a dirty bomb.[Footnote 2] A 
dirty bomb would most likely result in small radiation exposures and 
would typically not contain enough radiation to kill people or cause 
severe illnesses. However, by scattering the radioactive material, the 
dirty bomb has the effect of contaminating an area. The extent of local 
contamination depends on several factors, including the size of the 
explosive, the amount and type of radioactive material used, and 
weather conditions. While there could be an increase in the cancer risk 
among those exposed to radiation from a dirty bomb, the more 
significant effect of a dirty bomb could be the closing of contaminated 
areas. The direct costs of cleanup and the indirect losses in trade and 
business in the contaminated areas could be large. Hence, dirty bombs 
are generally considered to be weapons of mass disruption instead of 
weapons of mass destruction. 

As part of our investigation, we purchased a small quantity of the 
radioactive sources from a commercial source by posing as an employee 
of a fictitious company. This was to demonstrate that anyone can 
purchase small quantities of radioactive sources for stockpiling 
because suppliers are not required to exercise due diligence to 
determine whether the buyer has a legitimate use for the radioactive 
sources and suppliers are not required to ask the buyer to produce an 
NRC document when making purchases in small quantities. We then 
deployed two teams of investigators to the field to make simultaneous 
border crossings at the northern and southern borders in an attempt to 
transport radioactive sources into the United States. 

While making our simultaneous crossings, we focused our investigation 
on whether the radiation portal monitors would detect the radioactive 
sources we carried and whether CBP inspectors exercised due diligence 
to determine the authenticity of paperwork presented by individuals 
attempting to transport radioactive sources across our borders. 
Although we offer observations on the procedures that CBP inspectors 
followed for our two border crossings, we did not evaluate the adequacy 
of the design or effectiveness of those procedures. Our investigation 
also tested whether an NRC document could be counterfeited using data 
easily accessible and available to the public. We conducted our 
investigation from July 2005 through December 2005 in accordance with 
quality standards for investigations as set forth by the President's 
Council on Integrity and Efficiency. 

Summary: 

For the purposes of this undercover investigation, we purchased a small 
amount of radioactive sources and one container used to store and 
transport the material from a commercial source over the telephone. One 
of our investigators, posing as an employee of a fictitious company 
located in Washington, D.C., stated that the purpose of his purchase 
was to use the radioactive sources to calibrate personal radiation 
detection pagers. The purchase was not challenged because suppliers are 
not required to determine whether a buyer has a legitimate use for the 
radioactive sources, nor are suppliers required to ask the buyer to 
produce an NRC document when making purchases in small quantities. 

The radiation portal monitors properly signaled the presence of 
radioactive material when our two teams of investigators conducted 
simultaneous border crossings. Our investigators' vehicles were 
inspected in accordance with most of the CBP policy at both the 
northern and southern borders. However, our investigators, using 
counterfeit documents, were able to enter the United States with enough 
radioactive sources in the trunks of their vehicles to make two dirty 
bombs. Specifically, they were able to successfully represent 
themselves as employees of a fictitious company and present a 
counterfeit bill of lading and a counterfeit NRC document during the 
secondary inspections at both locations. The CBP inspectors never 
questioned the authenticity of the investigators' counterfeit bill of 
lading or the counterfeit NRC document authorizing them to receive, 
acquire, possess, and transfer radioactive sources. 

Documentation Was Produced to Support Undercover Investigation: 

As part of our undercover investigation, we produced counterfeit 
documents before sending our two teams of investigators out to the 
field. We found two NRC documents and a few examples of the documents 
by searching the Internet.[Footnote 3] We subsequently used commercial, 
off-the-shelf computer software to produce two counterfeit NRC 
documents authorizing the individual to receive, acquire, possess, and 
transfer radioactive sources. 

To support our investigators' purported reason for having radioactive 
sources in their possession when making their simultaneous border 
crossings, a GAO graphic artist designed a logo for our fictitious 
company and produced a bill of lading using computer software. 

With Ease, Investigators Purchased, Received, and Transported 
Radioactive Sources Across Both Borders: 

Our two teams of investigators each transported an amount of 
radioactive sources sufficient to manufacture a dirty bomb when making 
their recent, simultaneous border crossings. In support of our earlier 
work, we had obtained an NRC document and had purchased radioactive 
sources as well as two containers to store and transport the material. 

For the purposes of this undercover investigation, we purchased a small 
amount of radioactive sources and one container for storing and 
transporting the material from a commercial source over the telephone. 
One of our investigators, posing as an employee of a fictitious 
company, stated that the purpose of his purchase was to use the 
radioactive sources to calibrate personal radiation detectors. 
Suppliers are not required to exercise any due diligence in determining 
whether the buyer has a legitimate use for the radioactive sources, nor 
are suppliers required to ask the buyer to produce an NRC document when 
making purchases in small quantities. The amount of radioactive sources 
our investigator sought to purchase did not require an NRC document. 
The company mailed the radioactive sources to an address in Washington, 
D.C. 

Two Teams of Investigators Conducted Simultaneous Crossings at the U.S.-
Canadian Border and U.S.-Mexican Border: 

Northern Border Crossing: 

On December 14, 2005, our investigators placed two containers of 
radioactive sources into the trunk of their rental vehicle. Our 
investigators - acting in an undercover capacity - drove to an official 
port of entry between Canada and the United States. They also had in 
their possession a counterfeit bill of lading in the name of a 
fictitious company and a counterfeit NRC document. 

At the primary checkpoint, our investigators were signaled to drive 
through the radiation portal monitors and to meet the CBP inspector at 
the booth for their primary inspection. As our investigators drove past 
the radiation portal monitors and approached the primary checkpoint 
booth, they observed the CBP inspector look down and reach to his right 
side of his booth. Our investigators assumed that the radiation portal 
monitors had activated and signaled the presence of radioactive 
sources. The CBP inspector asked our investigators for identification 
and asked them where they lived. One of our investigators on the two- 
man undercover team handed the CBP inspector both of their passports 
and told him that he lived in Maryland while the second investigator 
told the CBP inspector that he lived in Virginia. 

The CBP inspector also asked our investigators to identify what they 
were transporting in their vehicle. One of our investigators told the 
CBP inspector that they were transporting specialized equipment back to 
the United States. A second CBP inspector, who had come over to assist 
the first inspector, asked what else our investigators were 
transporting. One of our investigators told the CBP inspectors that 
they were transporting radioactive sources for the specialized 
equipment. The CBP inspector in the primary checkpoint booth appeared 
to be writing down the information. Our investigators were then 
directed to park in a secondary inspection zone, while the CBP 
inspector conducted further inspections of the vehicle. 

During the secondary inspection, our investigators told the CBP 
inspector that they had an NRC document and a bill of lading for the 
radioactive sources. The CBP inspector asked if he could make copies of 
our investigators' counterfeit bill of lading on letterhead stationery 
as well as their counterfeit NRC document. Although the CBP inspector 
took the documents to the copier, our investigators did not observe him 
retrieving any copies from the copier. 

Our investigators watched the CBP inspector use a handheld Radiation 
Isotope Identifier Device (RIID), which he said is used to identify the 
source of radioactive sources, to examine the investigators' vehicle. 
He told our investigators that he had to perform additional 
inspections. After determining that the investigators were not 
transporting additional sources of radiation, the CBP inspector made 
copies of our investigators' drivers' licenses, returned their drivers' 
licenses to them, and our investigators were then allowed to enter the 
United States. At no time did the CBP inspector question the validity 
of the counterfeit bill of lading or the counterfeit NRC document. 

Southern Border Crossing: 

On December 14, 2005, our investigators placed two containers of 
radioactive sources into the trunk of their vehicle. Our investigators 
drove to an official port of entry at the southern border. They also 
had in their possession a counterfeit bill of lading in the name of a 
fictitious company and a counterfeit NRC document. 

At the primary checkpoint, our two-person undercover team was signaled 
by means of a traffic light signal to drive through the radiation 
portal monitors and stopped at the primary checkpoint for their primary 
inspection. As our investigators drove past the portal monitors and 
approached the primary checkpoint, they observed that the CBP inspector 
remained in the primary checkpoint for several moments prior to 
approaching our investigators' vehicle. Our investigators assumed that 
the radiation portal monitors had activated and signaled the presence 
of radioactive sources. 

The CBP inspector asked our investigators for identification and asked 
them if they were American citizens. Our investigators told the CBP 
inspector that they were both American citizens and handed him their 
state-issued drivers' licenses. The CBP inspector also asked our 
investigators about the purpose of their trip to Mexico and asked 
whether they were bringing anything into the United States from Mexico. 
Our investigators told the CBP inspector that they were returning from 
a business trip in Mexico and were not bringing anything into the 
United States from Mexico. 

While our investigators remained inside their vehicle, the CBP 
inspector used what appeared to be a RIID to scan the outside of the 
vehicle. One of our investigators told him that they were transporting 
specialized equipment. The CBP inspector asked one of our investigators 
to open the trunk of the rental vehicle and to show him the specialized 
equipment. Our investigator told the CBP inspector that they were 
transporting radioactive sources in addition to the specialized 
equipment. The primary CBP inspector then directed our investigators to 
park in a secondary inspection zone for further inspection. 

During the secondary inspection, the CBP inspector said he needed to 
verify the type of material our investigators were transporting, and 
another CBP inspector approached with what appeared to be a RIID to 
scan the cardboard boxes where the radioactive sources was placed. The 
instrumentation confirmed the presence of radioactive sources. 

When asked again about the purpose of their visit to Mexico, one of our 
investigators told the CBP inspector that they had used the radioactive 
sources in a demonstration designed to secure additional business for 
their company. The CBP inspector asked for paperwork authorizing them 
to transport the equipment to Mexico. One of our investigators provided 
the counterfeit bill of lading on letterhead stationery, as well as 
their counterfeit NRC document. The CBP inspector took the paperwork 
provided by our investigators and walked into the CBP station. He 
returned several minutes later and returned the paperwork. At no time 
did the CBP inspector question the validity of the counterfeit bill of 
lading or the counterfeit NRC document. 

Corrective Action Briefings: 

We conducted corrective action briefings with CBP and NRC officials 
shortly after completing our undercover operations. On December 21, 
2005, we briefed CBP officials about the results of our border crossing 
tests. CBP officials agreed to work with the NRC and CBP's Laboratories 
and Scientific Services to come up with a way to verify the 
authenticity of NRC materials documents. 

We conducted two corrective action briefings with NRC officials on 
January 12 and January 24, 2006, about the results of our border 
crossing tests. NRC officials disagreed with the amount of radioactive 
material we determined was needed to produce a dirty bomb, noting that 
NRC's "concern threshold" is significantly higher. We continue to 
believe that our purchase of radioactive sources and our ability to 
counterfeit an NRC document are matters that NRC should address. We 
could have purchased all of the radioactive sources used in our two 
undercover border crossings by making multiple purchases from different 
suppliers, using similarly convincing cover stories, using false 
identities, and had all of the radioactive sources conveniently shipped 
to our nation's capital. 

Further, we believe that the amount of radioactive sources that we were 
able to transport into the United States during our operation would be 
sufficient to produce two dirty bombs, which could be used as weapons 
of mass disruption. Finally, NRC officials told us that they are aware 
of the potential problems of counterfeiting documents and that they are 
working to resolve these issues. 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, this concludes my 
statement. I would be pleased to answer any questions that you or other 
members of the Subcommittee may have at this time. 

Contacts and Acknowledgments: 

For further information about this testimony, please contact Gregory D. 
Kutz at (202) 512-7455 or kutzg@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices 
of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last 
page of this testimony. 

FOOTNOTES 

[1] GAO, Border Security: Investigators Successfully Transported 
Radioactive Sources Across Our Nation's Borders at Selected Locations, 
GAO-06-545R (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 28, 2006). 

[2] According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, a 
dirty bomb is a mix of explosives, such as dynamite, with radioactive 
powder or pellets. When the dynamite or other explosives are set off, 
the blast carries radioactive material into the surrounding area. 

[3] None of these documents were available on NRC's Web site. 

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