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entitled 'Security Assistance: Lapses in Human Rights Screening in 
North African Countries Indicate Need for Further Oversight' which was 
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Report to Congressional Requesters: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 

GAO: 

July 2006: 

Security Assistance: 

Lapses in Human Rights Screening in North African Countries Indicate 
Need for Further Oversight: 

Security Assistance: 

GAO-06-850: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-06-850, a report to congressional requesters 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia are important U.S. allies in the war on 
terrorism. The United States provides these countries with security 
assistance, however, Congress restricts funding when credible evidence 
exists that foreign security units have committed gross human rights 
violations. GAO (1) describes the goals of U.S. security assistance to 
these countries and examines U.S. agencies’ assessment of this 
assistance, (2) assesses U.S. agencies’ implementation in Morocco and 
Tunisia of State’s policy to screen foreign security forces to ensure 
compliance with congressional human rights funding restrictions, and 
(3) examines agencies’ efforts to monitor the use of U.S.-origin 
defense articles provided through U.S. security assistance programs in 
the three countries, including Western Sahara, to ensure that they are 
not misused or diverted. GAO visited U.S. posts in Morocco and Tunisia 
and analyzed trainee files to determine compliance with human rights 
vetting policy. 

What GAO Found: 

The goals of the U.S. security assistance programs in Algeria, Morocco, 
and Tunisia are to support counterterrorism and broader security 
cooperation goals, such as maintaining regional stability and security, 
building the military capacity of foreign partners, and promoting 
interoperability with U.S. forces. To support these goals, the 
Departments of State (State) and Defense (DOD) have allocated 
approximately $146.6 million, from fiscal years 2002 to 2005, to train 
and equip security forces in these countries. DOD and State assess 
these programs together with other related activities through 
evaluations of security cooperation, counterterrorism, and other 
country goals. 

State policy requires human rights vetting of individuals and units of 
foreign security forces receiving U.S.-provided training. In Morocco 
and Tunisia, GAO found lapses in the vetting of trainees during fiscal 
years 2004 and 2005. These lapses include more than 400 trainees for 
whom no vetting files existed at the posts. In addition, even though 
posts maintained vetting files on 468 trainees, GAO estimates that 27 
percent of these files did not have evidence of vetting. The lapses in 
vetting trainees resulted from unclear guidance on vetting procedures, 
undefined roles and responsibilities for vetting, and the lack of a 
systematic monitoring mechanism to ensure that procedures were 
followed. Although State has issued a guide to clarify procedures and 
has required posts to assign an official responsible for vetting, it 
does not monitor whether posts are following vetting procedures. 

Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia do not have any sensitive U.S.-origin 
defense articles subject to DOD’s systematic monitoring requirements, 
such as physical inventory and inspection requirements. According to 
DOD officials and human rights organizations, no allegations of 
unauthorized use of U.S.-origin equipment have been made that would 
call for greater scrutiny of end use by these countries. 

Figure: The United States Provides Excess Defense Articles to Morocco 
and Tunisia: 

[See PDF for Image] 

Source: GAO. 

[End of Figure] 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends that the Secretary of State, in consultation with the 
Secretary of Defense, strengthen the process for human rights vetting 
of foreign security forces by establishing a systematic monitoring 
mechanism that will ensure that State’s vetting procedures are carried 
out at overseas posts. State concurred with our recommendations. 

[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-850]. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
the link above. For more information, contact Joseph Christoff at (202) 
512-8979 or christoffj@gao.gov. 

[End of Section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Results in Brief: 

Background: 

U.S.-Provided Security Assistance Is Intended to Support 
Counterterrorism and Other Security Cooperation Goals and Is Assessed 
Collectively with Other Activities: 

Lapses in Human Rights Vetting of Foreign Trainees Resulted from 
Unclear Procedures and the Lack of Monitoring to Ensure Posts' 
Compliance with State Policy: 

Morocco and Tunisia Do Not Have U.S.-Origin Defense Articles that 
Require Systematic Monitoring: 

Conclusion: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Human Rights Vetting Process in Morocco and Tunisia as of 
February 2006: 

Appendix III: Tables on Number of Trainees with No Evidence of Vetting 
in Morocco and Tunisia, Fiscal Years 2004-2005: 

Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of State: 

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments37: 

Tables: 

Table 1: U.S. Allocations to Security Forces in Algeria, Fiscal Years 
2002-2005: 

Table 2: U.S. Allocations to Security Forces in Morocco, Fiscal Years 
2002-2005: 

Table 3: U.S. Allocations to Security Forces in Tunisia, Fiscal Years 
2002-2005: 

Table 4: Offices Implementing Training Programs in Morocco and Tunisia: 

Table 5: Estimated Number of Trainees with No Vetting Files, Fiscal 
Years 2004-2005: 

Table 6: GAO Sample of Files Maintained on Training Nominees in Morocco 
and Tunisia, Fiscal Years 2004-2005: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Total Security Assistance Allocations to Algeria, Morocco, 
and Tunisia, Fiscal Years 2002-2005: 

Figure 2: Total Security Assistance Allocations by Program to Algeria, 
Morocco, and Tunisia, Fiscal Years 2002-2005: 

Abbreviations: 

ACES: Abuse Case Evaluation System: 

ALP: Aviation Leadership Program: 

ATA: Antiterrorism Assistance: 

CTFP: Regional Defense Counterterrorism Fellowship Program: 

DOD: Department of Defense: 

DSCA: Defense Security Cooperation Agency: 

EDA: Excess Defense Articles: 

EUCOM: U.S. European Command: 

FMF: Foreign Military Financing: 

IMET: International Military Education and Training: 

INCLE: International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement: 

JCET: Joint Combined Exchange Training: 

OIG: Office of Inspector General: 

PART: Program Assessment Rating Tool: 

UN: United Nations: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

July 28, 2006: 

The Honorable Tom Coburn: 
Chairman: 
Subcommittee on Federal Financial Management, Government Information, 
and International Security: 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen: 
Chairwoman: 
Subcommittee on the Middle East and Central Asia: 
Committee on International Relations: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Ted Poe: 
House of Representatives: 

The U.S. government views Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia as stable 
Islamic countries that are key partners in the war on terrorism. These 
countries are adjacent to vast expanses of ungoverned desert and have 
porous borders vulnerable to exploitation by terrorist organizations. 
The Department of State (State) and the Department of Defense (DOD) 
provide these countries with security assistance[Footnote 1] to further 
U.S. foreign policy and security goals, such as supporting 
counterterrorism, promoting stronger bilateral relationships, 
strengthening self-defense capabilities, and promoting greater respect 
for democracy and human rights. To further human rights goals, Congress 
restricts certain security assistance funds from being provided to any 
units of foreign security forces when credible evidence exists that 
such units have committed gross violations of human rights.[Footnote 2] 
However, we recently found lapses in State's process for human rights 
screening, or vetting,[Footnote 3] of foreign candidates for U.S.- 
funded training in other countries.[Footnote 4] Additionally, an 
unresolved territorial dispute in the Western Sahara is viewed as an 
impediment to regional cooperation and contributes to concerns about 
human rights abuses. 

In response to your request, this report (1) describes the goals of 
U.S. security assistance to Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia and examines 
U.S. agencies' assessment of this assistance; (2) assesses U.S. 
agencies' implementation in Morocco and Tunisia of State's policy to 
screen foreign security forces to ensure compliance with congressional 
human rights funding restrictions; and (3) examines U.S. agencies' 
efforts to monitor the use of U.S-origin defense articles provided 
through U.S. security assistance programs in the three countries, 
including in Western Sahara, to ensure that they are not misused or 
diverted for unauthorized uses. 

To address these objectives, we reviewed relevant State and DOD 
planning, funding, and evaluation documents, and the agencies' policies 
and procedures. We spoke with State and DOD officials in Washington, 
D.C; Rabat, Morocco; and Tunis, Tunisia. We also interviewed DOD 
officials at the U.S. European Command (EUCOM) in Stuttgart, Germany. 
In addition, we met with government officials from Morocco to discuss 
U.S.-provided security assistance and spoke with the commander of the 
United Nations (UN) peacekeeping force in Western Sahara regarding 
Morocco's military presence there. In Rabat and Tunis, we analyzed a 
stratified random probability sample of 273 out of 468 available human 
rights vetting case files to determine U.S. agencies' compliance with 
State's human rights vetting policy. These State and DOD files were 
maintained for nominees for U.S.-provided training during fiscal years 
2004 and 2005. We did not collect data on whether any individual or 
unit trained by the United States, whether vetted or not, had committed 
human rights violations. We did not visit Algeria because the United 
States provides much less security assistance to Algeria than it does 
to Morocco and Tunisia. Appendix I contains a more detailed description 
of our scope and methodology. We performed our work from October 2005 
to July 2006 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 
standards. 

Results in Brief: 

The goals of the U.S. security assistance programs in Algeria, Morocco, 
and Tunisia are to support counterterrorism and broader security 
cooperation goals, such as maintaining regional stability and security, 
building the military capacity of foreign partners, and promoting 
interoperability with U.S. forces. To support these goals, State and 
DOD have allocated[Footnote 5] approximately $146.6 million to train 
and equip security forces in these countries from fiscal year 2002 
through fiscal year 2005. All three countries participated in a variety 
of U.S.-provided training programs for their domestic and military 
security forces. The U.S. government also provided Morocco and Tunisia 
with excess military equipment from U.S. stockpiles, such as used 
transport vehicles and 1960s-era helicopters. The government also 
provided Foreign Military Financing grants, which were used to purchase 
spare parts to refurbish and maintain the equipment. State and DOD 
assess whether and how these security assistance programs, in addition 
to other activities such as humanitarian assistance and military-to- 
military events, support U.S. foreign policy and security goals through 
evaluations of security cooperation and counterterrorism goals. 

In Morocco and Tunisia, we found lapses in the human rights vetting of 
foreign security forces receiving U.S.-funded training in fiscal years 
2004 and 2005. We found that the lapses in vetting took two forms: (1) 
no files existed to determine whether vetting occurred for 
approximately 438 trainees and (2) for the 468 trainees for whom posts 
maintained files, we estimate that 27 percent of the files (127 
trainees)[Footnote 6] lacked evidence of vetting. These lapses in 
vetting trainees resulted from unclear guidance on vetting policies and 
procedures, undefined roles and responsibilities for vetting, and a 
lack of a systematic monitoring mechanism to ensure that procedures 
were followed. In July 2005, we found similar lapses at U.S. posts in 
Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand. Since then, State has taken 
steps to address two of the three weaknesses. State has clarified 
vetting policies and procedures by issuing a guide to human rights 
vetting for posts. State has also defined roles and responsibilities by 
requiring each post to assign a single point of contact with 
responsibility for oversight of vetting procedures. However, State has 
not established a systematic monitoring mechanism. In Morocco and 
Tunisia, we found that the assigned points of contact did not routinely 
monitor whether vetting procedures were followed at the posts. In 
addition, State headquarters does not monitor whether posts are 
following procedures for vetting foreign security forces. 

Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia do not have any sensitive U.S.-origin 
equipment subject to DOD's systematic monitoring requirements, which 
include physical inventory and inspection requirements. U.S. law 
generally limits the transfer of defense articles and services to 
countries for purposes of internal security, legitimate self-defense, 
or regional or collective arrangements. To ensure compliance with these 
limitations, DOD employs an end-use monitoring program, which requires 
systematic monitoring only for the most sensitive defense articles, 
such as stinger missiles and night vision devices. For nonsensitive 
articles, DOD guidance directs security assistance officers at overseas 
posts to conduct monitoring in conjunction with other routine visits 
with host country officials. According to DOD officials and human 
rights organizations, there have been no allegations of unauthorized 
use of U.S.-origin equipment in Tunisia, Morocco and Western Sahara 
that would require greater scrutiny. Because there are no sensitive 
U.S.-origin defense articles or allegations of unauthorized use, DOD 
officials have not conducted end-use monitoring activities involving 
Morocco's use of equipment in Western Sahara. 

We are recommending that the Secretary of State, in consultation with 
the Secretary of Defense, further strengthen the process of human 
rights vetting of foreign security forces by establishing a systematic 
monitoring mechanism that will ensure that State's vetting procedures 
are carried out at overseas posts. Specifically, we recommend the 
following two actions: 

* The point of contact responsible for human rights vetting at each 
post should verify that the various offices implementing U.S. training 
at the post comply with State's vetting policy. 

* Posts should report the results of their monitoring efforts to a 
designated State headquarters unit to provide State with assurance of 
posts' compliance with its human rights vetting policy. 

We provided a draft of this report to the Secretaries of Defense and 
State for their review and comment. DOD did not comment on our draft. 
State provided a written response that is reprinted in appendix IV and 
technical comments, which we incorporated in the report as appropriate. 
In commenting on our draft and in a subsequent e-mail, State concurred 
with our recommendations and indicated that they are taking steps to 
implement them. State also noted that our review did not uncover any 
evidence that the U.S. government has trained any individual or unit 
that has committed gross violations of human rights. However, our 
review only focused on whether State and the posts in Rabat and Tunis 
vetted trainees. We did not collect data on whether any individual or 
unit trained by the United States, whether vetted or not, had committed 
human rights violations. 

Background: 

State and DOD provide a variety of security assistance programs to 
train and equip security forces (military and police) in North Africa. 
Many of these programs are funded by State and implemented by DOD. DOD 
manages security assistance under its Theater Security Cooperation 
umbrella along with a variety of other activities.[Footnote 7] The 
European Command, which is the U.S. military entity responsible for 
these countries' programs, focuses its security cooperation activities 
on assisting allies and partner countries to develop the capabilities 
to conduct peacekeeping, participate in the war on terrorism, and 
perform contingency operations with U.S. forces. 

State funds the following programs to train and equip foreign security 
forces: 

* Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) provides strategic, operational, and 
technical training and equipment to foreign law enforcement agencies to 
assist them in detecting and eliminating terrorist threats and in 
protecting facilities, individuals, and infrastructure. State 
implements this program. 

* Foreign Military Financing (FMF) provides grants and loans for the 
acquisition of U.S. defense equipment, services, and training by 
foreign governments. The goal of these grants is to enable key allies 
to improve their defense capabilities and to foster closer military 
relationships between the United States and recipient nations. DOD 
implements the program. 

* International Military Education and Training (IMET) provides 
training to foreign military and related civilian personnel. IMET 
training is intended to promote professional militaries around the 
world and strengthen U.S. military alliances. DOD implements the 
program. 

* International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) seeks to 
enhance the law enforcement capabilities of foreign governments in 
combating criminal, drug, and terrorist threats. INCLE programs support 
counternarcotics, intelligence, border patrol, and interdiction 
activities. State implements the program through interagency agreements 
with other U.S. government agencies, including the Departments of 
Justice and Homeland Security. 

DOD funds and implements several programs to train foreign security 
forces. 

* The Regional Defense Counterterrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP) 
provides education and training on counterterrorism activities to 
foreign military and related civilian officials. This training is 
intended to bolster the capacity of friendly foreign nations to detect, 
monitor, and interdict or disrupt the activities of terrorist networks. 

* Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) permits U.S. special 
operations forces to train with foreign military forces to enhance 
readiness through language proficiency, cultural immersion, knowledge 
of foreign environments, and instructor skills. The training primarily 
benefits U.S. forces. Benefits to the host nation's security forces are 
incidental. 

* The Aviation Leadership Program (ALP) is a U.S. Air Force-funded 
program that provides undergraduate pilot training to a small number of 
international students from friendly, less developed countries. 

* Regional Centers for Security Studies provide a forum for bilateral 
and multilateral communication, and military and civilian exchanges 
within a region. Activities at five regional centers range from 
extended academic programs to conferences on topics such as regional 
security issues, defense planning, and civilian-military relations. 

* DOD's three service academies conduct traditional academic exchange 
programs of varying length and content. Up to 60 foreign students may 
attend one of the service academies as members of an academy class. The 
goal of the program is to expose future foreign leaders to their U.S. 
peers and to promote military professionalism. 

State and DOD also coordinate to provide nonappropriated assistance for 
foreign security forces. 

* Excess Defense Articles (EDA) is nonappropriated assistance to help 
build the defense capabilities of friendly countries in the form of 
excess U.S. defense articles drawn from DOD stocks. Defense articles 
declared as excess by the military departments can be transferred in an 
"as-is, where-is" condition to the recipient. 

* Drawdown is nonappropriated assistance that transfers in-stock 
defense articles and services from DOD's inventory, as well as from any 
other U.S. agency of the U.S. government, to foreign countries and 
international organizations in response to unforeseen military 
emergencies, humanitarian catastrophes, peacekeeping needs, or 
counternarcotics requirements. 

The governments of Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia are considered stable, 
although State has reported problems with their human rights 
practices.[Footnote 8] 

* Algeria. Algeria has emerged from a period of terrorist and related 
violence during the 1990s when more than 100,000 lives were lost, 
according to State. Since then, as Algeria has made progress toward 
democratization, casualties have declined sharply. Although Algerian 
government actions have weakened terrorist groups domestically, 
Algerians have been found among suicide bombers and terrorists captured 
in Iraq. Terrorist cells operate in the Algerian east and far south and 
in the Sahel, the area bordering southern Algeria. State's most recent 
human rights report stated that the Algerian government had several 
human rights problems, including impunity of security forces, 
allegations of abuse and torture of detainees, and arbitrary arrest and 
prolonged pretrial detention. State also credited the Algerian 
government for taking steps to strengthen human rights, which resulted 
in fewer such incidents than in the past. 

* Morocco. The United States views Morocco as a stable, moderate Arab 
regime; an ally against terrorism; and a free trade partner. King 
Mohammed VI retains ultimate power, including over the military. In May 
2003, Moroccan suicide bombers attacked several sites in Casablanca. In 
response, the government arrested an estimated 3,000 people and 
sentenced at least 900 for crimes under counterterrorism laws, 
according to State. Moroccan-born extremists associated with al Qaeda 
affiliates were implicated in the March 2004 train blasts in Madrid. 
According to State's human rights report, Morocco's human rights record 
"remained poor in many areas." The report highlighted accusations of 
excessive force and harsh sentences against demonstrators in Western 
Sahara and torture of human rights activists in that region. Also 
included among the human rights problems were reports of police 
impunity, arbitrary arrest, and incommunicado detention. 

* Western Sahara. Morocco and the independence-seeking Popular Front 
for the Liberation of Saqiat al-Hamra and Rio de Oro (Polisario) have 
disputed the independence of Western Sahara since the 1970s, when Spain 
decolonized the territory.[Footnote 9] Following a long war in Western 
Sahara between Morocco and the Polisario, the UN brokered a ceasefire 
that went into effect in 1991, and a UN peacekeeping force remains in 
the region. Morocco currently occupies 80 percent of Western Sahara. 
The United States, which does not recognize Moroccan sovereignty over 
Western Sahara, supports efforts to reach a mutually acceptable 
resolution under UN auspices; however, the situation remains at an 
impasse. This issue is the main impediment to improving bilateral 
relations between Morocco and Algeria, as Algeria backs the Polisario. 

* Tunisia. Tunisia has a stable yet authoritarian government with a 
dominant majority political party and a president who has been in power 
since 1987. The Tunisian government harshly suppressed an Islamist 
opposition movement in the late 1980s and early 1990s. More recently, 
suspected terrorists bombed a synagogue on the Tunisian island of 
Djerba in 2002 and Tunisian expatriates have been arrested in Europe 
and North America on terrorism-related charges. State's human rights 
report stated that Tunisia's human rights record remained poor. Among 
the human rights problems reported were incidents of torture and abuse 
of prisoners and detainees, police impunity, and sanctioned attacks by 
police on citizens who criticize the government. 

U.S.-Provided Security Assistance Is Intended to Support 
Counterterrorism and Other Security Cooperation Goals and Is Assessed 
Collectively with Other Activities: 

The United States uses security assistance to Algeria, Morocco, and 
Tunisia to support the broad goals of security cooperation and 
counterterrorism. Security assistance programs provide these countries 
a mixture of training and equipment through programs such as IMET, FMF, 
EDA for foreign military forces, and counterterrorism and other 
training for domestic security forces. To carry out these security 
assistance programs, State and DOD have allocated[Footnote 10] the 
equivalent of approximately $146.6 million from fiscal years 2002 to 
2005. The contributions of these security assistance programs to 
achieving security cooperation and counterterrorism goals are assessed 
collectively with those of other activities, such as military-to- 
military events and economic and humanitarian assistance. 

U.S. Security Assistance Programs Are to Support Counterterrorism and 
Security Cooperation Goals: 

In Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia, the goals for U.S.-provided security 
assistance programs are to enhance security and political 
relationships, fight terrorism, improve foreign military capabilities 
and interoperability, and increase U.S. access for overflight rights 
and port visits. The security assistance programs in each of these 
countries may support one or more of these goals. Security assistance 
programs attempt to achieve these goals by training and equipping 
foreign security forces. 

State has a mission performance process in which the posts outline 
goals for their countries and identify the security assistance and 
other programs that would support those goals. For example, State has a 
goal to increase Tunisia's antiterrorism capabilities. State planning 
documents list the ATA program, which provides training in airport 
security and crisis management, as one of the resources it will employ 
to meet its goal. Additionally, State has a goal to cooperate with 
Morocco on counterterrorism and provides communications equipment and 
intelligence officer training, under the FMF and IMET programs, as a 
means to achieve this goal. 

Similarly, DOD develops country campaign plans that include country 
security cooperation goals and implementation activities, which 
encompass security assistance programs. For example, DOD's goals in 
Algeria are to increase military professionalization and 
interoperability. To achieve these goals, DOD uses security assistance 
programs, such as IMET and JCET. Additionally, DOD links its goals to 
State's mission planning documents. 

State and DOD Provided Security Assistance to Train and Equip Security 
Forces in Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia: 

State and DOD collectively allocated approximately $146.6 million 
through their security assistance programs to Algeria, Morocco, and 
Tunisia from fiscal years 2002 to 2005. Tunisia was the largest 
recipient of U.S.-provided security assistance in this region, 
receiving $74.8 million, although about 40 percent of this came from 
the estimated value of excess U.S. equipment delivered in fiscal year 
2002 under the EDA program. Morocco received approximately $66.9 
million, and Algeria received $5 million. Figure 1 illustrates a 
breakdown of total assistance to each North African country. 

Figure 1: Total Security Assistance Allocations to Algeria, Morocco, 
and Tunisia, Fiscal Years 2002-2005: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO analysis of State and DOD agency data. 

[End of figure] 

Figure 2 shows the total allocations by program that Algeria, Morocco, 
and Tunisia received from fiscal years 2002 to 2005. 

Figure 2: Total Security Assistance Allocations by Program to Algeria, 
Morocco, and Tunisia, Fiscal Years 2002-2005: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO analysis of State and DOD agency data. 

[End of figure] 

Security Assistance to Algeria Primarily Funded Training for Military 
Forces: 

State and DOD allocated approximately $5 million to Algeria in security 
assistance from fiscal year 2002 to fiscal year 2005. The IMET and ATA 
programs were the principal security assistance programs (85 percent of 
funding) in Algeria. IMET was used to train approximately 263 Algerian 
security force personnel during this period.[Footnote 11] Unlike 
Morocco and Tunisia, Algeria does not receive FMF funding or EDA 
equipment transfers. Table 1 shows the U.S. agency, program, 
allocations, and examples of U.S.-provided security assistance. 

Table 1: U.S. Allocations to Security Forces in Algeria, Fiscal Years 
2002-2005: 

Dollars in thousands. 

Funding agency: State; 
Program: IMET; 
Allocation: $2,321.0; 
Examples of assistance provided: Trained approximately 263 Algerian 
security personnel in courses such as intelligence, English, and basic 
officer training. 

Funding agency: State; 
Program: ATA; 
Allocation: 1,847.5; 
Examples of assistance provided: Trained Algerian security personnel in 
hostage negotiation and incident management. 

Funding agency: DOD; 
Program: CTFP; 
Allocation: 247.5;
Examples of assistance provided: Trained 25 Algerian security personnel 
in counterterrorism. 

Funding agency: DOD; 
Program: JCET; 
Allocation: 212.8; 
Examples of assistance provided: Provided joint training for U.S. 
Special Operations Forces and Algerian security forces. 

Funding agency: DOD; 
Program: Other; 
Allocation: $293.1; 
Examples of assistance provided: Provided training for 182 Algerian 
security personnel at Regional Centers for Strategic Studies. 

Source: GAO analysis of State and DOD agency data. 

[End of table] 

Security Assistance to Morocco Funded a Mixture of Training and 
Equipment Programs for Security Forces: 

State and DOD allocated approximately $66.9 million in security 
assistance to Morocco for training and equipment from fiscal years 2002 
to 2005. Of U.S. security assistance programs in Morocco, FMF and EDA 
are the largest, accounting for about $47 million (71 percent) of the 
total. IMET trained approximately 458 Moroccan security forces. Also, 
State-funded training was provided in fiscal year 2005 through the 
INCLE program for border security at ports-of-entry. Morocco is an 
active user of the EDA program, acquiring hundreds of used U.S. 5-ton 
and 2.5-ton trucks, which they use for spare parts. Additionally, 
Morocco uses the FMF program to obtain spare parts to sustain aging 
equipment. According to DOD officials in Morocco, as the equipment 
continues to age, it will become unsustainable, and Morocco will need 
to find resources to replace this equipment. Table 2 shows the U.S. 
agency, program, allocations, and examples of U.S.-provided security 
assistance. 

Table 2: U.S. Allocations to Security Forces in Morocco, Fiscal Years 
2002-2005: 

Dollars in thousands. 

Funding Agency: State; 
Program: FMF; 
Allocation: $33,468.0; 
Examples of assistance provided: Purchased spare parts for aircraft and 
other vehicles, radio equipment, and packaging and shipping charges for 
EDA transfers. 

Funding Agency: State; 
Program: IMET; 
Allocation: 6,533.0; 
Examples of assistance provided: Trained approximately 458 Moroccan 
security personnel in logistics readiness, munitions inspections, and 
command and general staff training. 

Funding Agency: State; 
Program: INCLE; A
Allocation: 2,992.0; 
Examples of assistance provided: Trained Moroccans in border 
interdiction and border control. 

Funding Agency: State; 
Program: ATA; 
Allocation: 8,394.1; 
Examples of assistance provided: Funded hostage negotiation, management 
of mass casualty, and cyberterrorism training. 

Funding Agency: DOD; 
Program: EDA; 
Allocation: 13,931; 
Examples of assistance provided: Provided several hundred 2.5-ton-cargo 
and other truck acquisitions. 

Funding Agency: DOD; 
Program: CTFP; 
Allocation: 508.2; 
Examples of assistance provided: Trained 19 Moroccan security personnel 
in counterterrorism. 

Funding Agency: DOD; 
Program: JCET; 
Allocation: 246.0; 
Examples of assistance provided: Provided joint training for U.S. 
Special Operations Forces and Moroccan security forces. 

Funding Agency: DOD; 
Program: Other; 
Allocation: $836.3; 
Examples of assistance provided: Provided one slot for Morocco at the 
U.S. Air Force Academy in fiscal years 2003 and 2004. Provided training 
at Regional Centers for Strategic Studies. 

Source: GAO analysis of State and DOD agency data. 

[End of table] 

Security Assistance to Tunisia Primarily Funded Equipment Procurement 
Programs: 

State and DOD allocated approximately $74.8 million for training and 
equipment to Tunisia from fiscal years 2002 to 2005. FMF and EDA were 
the largest security assistance programs in Tunisia, accounting for 80 
percent of the country's total security assistance. EDA value is based 
on DOD's estimated value of the equipment at the time of delivery. 
Tunisia received EDA in fiscal year 2002 only. The United States 
offered Tunisia 15 UH-1H 1960s-era helicopters in fiscal year 2005, 7 
of which are being refurbished as of April 2006 and will be delivered 
thereafter, according to DOD officials. DOD would like to refurbish one 
or two additional helicopters, if additional funds can be found. As in 
Morocco, the equipment becomes unsustainable as it ages, and Tunisia 
will need to find resources to replace it, according to State and DOD 
officials. IMET funding was used to train approximately 406 Tunisian 
security personnel from fiscal year 2002 to fiscal year 2005. State 
provided ATA training in fiscal years 2003 and 2004, but not in 2005. 
Table 3 shows the U.S. agency, program, allocations, and examples of 
U.S.-provided security assistance. 

Table 3: U.S. Allocations to Security Forces in Tunisia, Fiscal Years 
2002-2005: 

Dollars in thousands. 

Funding agency: State; 
Program: FMF; 
Allocation: $28,634.0; 
Examples of assistance provided: Purchased spare parts for vehicles and 
radios, helicopter refurbishment, and miscellaneous equipment. 

Funding agency: State; 
Program: IMET; 
Allocation: 6,272.0; 
Examples of assistance provided: Trained approximately 406 Tunisian 
security personnel in English language skills, crisis command and 
control, and water treatment. 

Funding agency: State; 
Program: ATA; 
Allocation: 1,999.8; 
Examples of assistance provided: Provided training in crisis management 
and airport security. 

Funding agency: DOD; 
Program: EDA; 
Allocation: 30,929.0; 
Examples of assistance provided: Provided surplus guided chaparral 
missiles, guided missile system, and tool kits. 

Funding agency: DOD; 
Program: CTFP; 
Allocation: 158.3; 
Examples of assistance provided: Trained 19 Tunisian security personnel 
in counterterrorism. 

Funding agency: DOD; 
Program: JCET; 
Allocation: 311.0; 
Examples of assistance provided: Provided joint training for U.S. 
Special Operations Forces and Tunisian security forces. 

Funding agency: DOD; 
Program: Drawdown; 
Allocation: 5,000.0; 
Examples of assistance provided: Provided maintenance of C-130 aircraft 
to Tunisia in fiscal year 2002. 

Funding agency: DOD; 
Program: Other; 
Allocation: $1,480.7; 
Examples of assistance provided: ALP provided two scholarships to two 
cadets at the Tunisian Air Force Academy in fiscal year 2003. The 
United States also provided several slots for Tunisians to attend U.S. 
service academies in fiscal years 2004 and 2005. 

Source: GAO analysis of State and DOD agency data. 

[End of table] 

State and DOD Assess the Broader Goals of Security Cooperation and 
Counterterrorism: 

For these countries, State and DOD assess whether and how security 
assistance programs support U.S. foreign policy and security goals 
through their evaluation of how broad goals, such as counterterrorism, 
regional stability goals, and security cooperation goals, are being 
achieved. State assesses these goals in its annual mission planning 
process. While the goals are rated for the degree to which they are 
being achieved, the effectiveness of specific programs, such as FMF or 
IMET, is not assessed. State officials in Tunis and Rabat said that the 
assessments of goals in country planning documents are qualitative and 
that the outcomes or results are difficult to measure, requiring 
professional judgment to determine the progress made from one year to 
the next. 

DOD assesses the collective effectiveness of its programs, which 
include security assistance and other activities. DOD's unified command 
for the region, EUCOM, is developing a new evaluation tool to assess 
how they are achieving their country goals. This tool will attempt to 
measure the degree to which desired outcomes, such as reduction in 
terrorist activities, are achieved. EUCOM plans to use these 
assessments to allocate its resources and set priorities. 

Although neither State nor DOD conducts assessments for specific 
security assistance programs, results from some programs are 
periodically reported to Congress, and some results indicators are 
monitored for other programs.[Footnote 12] The ATA program annually 
reports to Congress on program activities and provides some examples of 
how these activities were implemented worldwide. For example, the ATA 
fiscal year 2005 report states that Morocco's use of ATA cyberterrorism 
training supported U.S. efforts to arrest a primary terrorism suspect. 
The IMET program tracks individuals trained through IMET if they rise 
to important positions within their government. IMET program officials 
are also developing a survey tool to be administered to foreign 
trainees to measure whether the training has affected their 
preparedness for joint military activities with the United States and 
has instilled respect for U.S. values of democracy, human rights, rule 
of law, and civilian control of the military. 

Lapses in Human Rights Vetting of Foreign Trainees Resulted from 
Unclear Procedures and the Lack of Monitoring to Ensure Posts' 
Compliance with State Policy: 

In Morocco and Tunisia, lapses in vetting trainees for human rights 
abuses occurred in fiscal years 2004 and 2005. We found that these 
lapses consisted of (1) the absence of vetting files at posts for 
approximately 438 trainees[Footnote 13] and (2) the absence of vetting 
evidence in an estimated 27 percent[Footnote 14] (127 of 468 
trainees[Footnote 15]) of the vetting files maintained at 
posts.[Footnote 16] These lapses resulted from unclear vetting 
procedures, undefined roles for vetting, and the lack of a monitoring 
mechanism to ensure posts' compliance with vetting procedures. State 
took steps in December 2005 to address the need for clear procedures 
and defined vetting roles. However, we found that responsible officials 
at the posts in Morocco and Tunisia did not monitor whether offices 
within each post were following vetting procedures, and State 
headquarters did not monitor the efforts of the posts to vet trainees. 

To Comply with U.S. Laws, State Policy Calls for Human Rights Vetting 
of Foreign Security Forces Receiving U.S. Assistance: 

Each of the annual Foreign Operations Appropriations Acts since 1998 
has included a provision, commonly referred to as the Leahy Amendment, 
that restricts the provision of assistance appropriated in these acts 
to any foreign security unit when the Secretary of State has credible 
evidence that the unit has committed gross violations of human 
rights.[Footnote 17] DOD's appropriations acts have contained a similar 
restriction on DOD-funded training since fiscal year 1999.[Footnote 18] 
While the legal provisions restrict funding to "any unit of the 
security forces of a foreign country," State policy applies the 
restrictions to individual members of security forces, as well. 

To implement these legislative restrictions, State's guidance calls for 
posts and State headquarters units to vet individuals or units proposed 
for training or assistance to determine whether these foreign security 
forces have committed gross human rights violations. The various State 
or DOD offices that implement different training programs at each post 
initiate the vetting process by submitting names of training candidates 
for vetting by post officials. These offices also receive the results 
of human rights vetting conducted at each post and State headquarters, 
and they maintain vetting files for trainees. See table 4 for various 
offices implementing training in Morocco and Tunisia. See app. II for 
details on the description of the human rights vetting process. 

Table 4: Offices Implementing Training Programs in Morocco and Tunisia: 

Office implementing training at posts: Office of Defense Cooperation 
(DOD); 
Applicable training program: IMET, CTFP, FMF, ALP. 

Office implementing training at posts: Defense Attaché Office (DOD); 
Applicable training program: Regional centers, service academies. 

Office implementing training at posts: Office of Regional Security 
(State); 
Applicable training program: ATA, INCLE. 

Source: GAO analysis of State and DOD agency data. 

[End of table] 

Lapses in Human Rights Vetting Existed at Posts Due to Unclear 
Guidance: 

In Morocco and Tunisia, we found two categories of lapses in human 
rights vetting in fiscal years 2004 and 2005. The first category 
consisted of approximately 438 trainees[Footnote 19] for whom posts did 
not maintain vetting files. The second category consisted of files that 
were maintained at the posts but lacked evidence of vetting. Based on 
our review of 273 out of 468 files, we estimate that 27 percent (127 
trainees)[Footnote 20] lacked evidence of vetting.[Footnote 21] 

Of the 438 trainees for whom posts maintained no vetting files, post 
officials stated that no vetting occurred for approximately 148 
Moroccan and Tunisian trainees.[Footnote 22] These trainees included 
those who attended DOD-implemented IMET and CTFP training courses 
outside of the United States, as well as attendees of regional centers 
and service academies. In addition, we found that the two posts did not 
maintain vetting documentation on approximately 290 trainees and were, 
therefore, unable to determine whether vetting occurred. These 
trainees, who may not have been vetted for human rights abuses, 
attended State-provided training, including all 168 trainees who 
attended fiscal year 2004 INCLE courses in Morocco, all 42 trainees who 
attended fiscal year 2004 ATA courses in Tunisia, and some (80) of the 
trainees who attended fiscal year 2005 ATA courses in Morocco. See 
table 5 in app. III for more information on the number of trainees and 
types of training for which no vetting files existed at the two posts. 

The two posts did maintain vetting files for 468 trainees. However, we 
estimated that 27 percent (127 trainees) of the files did not contain 
evidence of human rights vetting. This estimate is based on a 
stratified random sample of 273 of 468 available files at the two 
posts. For these files lacking vetting evidence, posts could not locate 
any documentation indicating that either the posts or State 
headquarters provided the implementing office with results on vetting. 
Based on the results of our sample, we estimate that 100 percent of the 
files for DOD-implemented training in Tunisia had evidence of vetting. 
In Morocco, however, we estimate that about two-thirds of the files for 
DOD-implemented training contained no evidence of vetting. We also 
reviewed all the available files of State-implemented training in 
Morocco and found that about one-sixth of them contained no evidence of 
vetting. Table 6 in app. III shows the results of the sample of 
trainees we reviewed at each post for evidence of human rights vetting. 

According to agency officials at both posts, lapses in vetting 
candidates in fiscal years 2004 and 2005 were generally attributable to 
unclear guidance that had been provided over the past decade. The 
guidance did not clearly identify all types of training to which the 
vetting requirement applied. Until December 2005, the guidance had been 
issued through multiple cables from headquarters to posts dating from 
January 1994 through February 2005. Moreover, in Tunisia, State 
officials stated that, in keeping with their understanding of standard 
State record retention policies, which were distinct from human rights 
vetting guidance on record retention, they destroyed files that may 
have contained evidence of vetting for attendees of ATA training 
courses. Additionally, in Morocco, a State official stated that he did 
not know if past vetting occurred because staff responsible for 
implementing training at that time had rotated to a new post. 

State Has Clarified Procedures and Responsibilities for Human Rights 
Vetting, but Lacks a Monitoring System to Ensure that Posts Comply with 
Vetting Procedures: 

Lapses in vetting occurred in prior years because of weaknesses in 
agencies' management controls: lack of clear and consistent vetting 
procedures at departments and posts; lack of clear roles and 
responsibilities for vetting foreign officials; and lack of an 
established system to monitor compliance with these procedures at State 
and posts.[Footnote 23] Although State has taken steps to correct the 
first two weaknesses, State still lacks a mechanism to monitor 
compliance. 

State Has Taken Steps to Clarify Procedures and Responsibilities for 
Vetting: 

To address our prior recommendation for State to establish clear and 
consistent vetting procedures, State drafted a standard guide to human 
rights vetting and distributed it to overseas posts in December 2005. 
This guide clarifies the vetting procedures, outlines key steps in the 
vetting process, requires each post to assign a single point of contact 
with responsibility for vetting procedures, and provides required 
vetting documentation and record retention policy. Moreover, the guide 
suggests that each post develop standard vetting operating procedures 
that take into consideration its needs and circumstances. In Morocco 
and Tunisia, State officials established post-specific vetting 
procedures. For example, the procedures at both posts require that the 
office implementing training prepare a standard memorandum and send it 
to other offices within the post to request vetting of training 
candidates. According to these officials, the issuance of a written 
guide has clarified post officials' understanding of vetting 
requirements under State's policy. For example, the two posts did not 
always maintain the records of completed vetting results in fiscal 
years 2004 and 2005. The new State guidance and posts' standard 
operating procedures now specify a requirement to maintain these 
records for 3 years. 

State Has Required Points of Contact at Posts: 

Furthermore, in response to our prior recommendation that State 
establish clear roles and responsibilities at posts for human rights 
vetting, State has required that each post assign a point of contact 
with responsibility over human rights vetting. Specifically, State's 
December 2005 guide specified that this official would have 
responsibility for oversight of vetting procedures. At the posts in 
Morocco and Tunisia, an official from the political affairs section 
serves as the designated point of contact responsible for human rights 
vetting. 

State Lacks a Monitoring Mechanism to Ensure Posts' Compliance with 
State Policies: 

As we found in Southeast Asian countries, post officials in Morocco and 
Tunisia, along with officials from State headquarters office, do not 
monitor posts' compliance with State's human rights vetting procedures. 
However, our internal control standards state that an organization 
should ensure that ongoing monitoring occurs as part of normal 
operations to assess the quality of performance over time. State's 
December 2005 guide states that each post's point of contact should 
have oversight of vetting procedures, with the Chief of Mission 
responsible for ensuring that vetting procedures are in place and being 
followed. However, neither post had established specific activities to 
carry out this oversight responsibility. For example, the points of 
contact did not regularly verify with the State and DOD offices 
implementing training at posts that all relevant trainees were vetted. 
Also, they did not monitor whether these offices were following vetting 
procedures, such as maintaining documentation of completed vetting of 
trainees. 

Furthermore, as of June 2006, no headquarters office within State is 
charged with monitoring posts' compliance with State's human rights 
vetting procedures. State's December 2005 guide specifically states 
that no single bureau is tasked with monitoring human rights vetting 
procedures. According to State, some oversight is provided through the 
established channel of periodic post inspections conducted by the 
Office of the Inspector General (OIG). However, as of May 2006, 
assessments of posts' compliance with State's human rights vetting 
process were not part of State OIG's post inspections. In March 2006, 
State officials requested the OIG to include reviews of human rights 
vetting procedures in post inspections. In May 2006, a State OIG 
official stated that the OIG workplan for inspection would incorporate 
a check that posts are vetting candidates appropriately. However, 
inspections of a post would be conducted approximately once every 5 or 
6 years, according to a State OIG official. This periodic inspection of 
posts' compliance does not meet our standard for ongoing monitoring. 

Without a monitoring system in place, State has no means of determining 
whether posts are complying with required procedures intended to ensure 
that trainees do not have records of human rights abuses. Consequently, 
State lacks the information it needs to ensure that all posts are 
following procedures to prevent foreign security forces with suspected 
human rights records from receiving U.S. assistance. 

Morocco and Tunisia Do Not Have U.S.-Origin Defense Articles that 
Require Systematic Monitoring: 

To comply with the Arms Export Control Act, DOD established the Golden 
Sentry program to monitor countries' use of U.S.-origin defense 
articles provided through government-to-government transfers. This 
program requires systematic monitoring, such as conducting physical 
inventories, of only the most sensitive defense articles. Morocco and 
Tunisia do not have any sensitive U.S.-origin equipment subject to this 
systematic monitoring, and Algeria does not participate in any programs 
involving government transfers of U.S.-origin equipment, such as 
foreign military sales or EDA. Monitoring of non-sensitive defense 
articles is done in conjunction with other assigned duties with no 
reporting requirements or additional resources. DOD officials in Rabat 
have not conducted any end-use monitoring in Western Sahara. 
Additionally, according to State and based on our work, there have been 
no allegations of unauthorized use of U.S.-origin equipment in Tunisia, 
Morocco, and the Western Sahara that would trigger greater scrutiny of 
end use. 

End-Use Monitoring Program Established to Comply with Arms Export 
Control Act: 

In compliance with the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as 
amended,[Footnote 24]DOD established an end-use monitoring program 
called Golden Sentry to ensure the proper end-use monitoring of 
government-to-government transfers.[Footnote 25] To make optimum use of 
the limited resources available for such monitoring purposes, the 
Golden Sentry program requires different levels of monitoring for 
different types of defense articles. For those articles deemed 
sensitive by Golden Sentry such as man-portable air defense systems and 
night vision devices, systematic monitoring, including physical 
inventory and inspection procedures, is required. In addition, other 
conditions or events can affect the level of monitoring that may occur. 
For example, allegations of a country's misuse, a country's development 
of ties with countries prohibited from receiving U.S. exports, or 
unusual political or military upheaval can result in greater scrutiny. 

The monitoring of nonsensitive defense articles and services, such as 
trucks and spare parts, is referred to as routine end-use monitoring. 
This routine end-use monitoring is performed by DOD officials in 
conjunction with other assigned duties. Because DOD applies its 
resources to end-use monitoring of sensitive items, it does not expend 
additional resources nor require specific reporting on routine 
monitoring that is performed incidental to its normal business contacts 
in these countries. 

Only routine end-use monitoring is required in Morocco and Tunisia 
because these countries do not have any sensitive U.S.-origin 
equipment. The U.S. government gives these countries excess equipment 
through the EDA program and sells them material to sustain their aging 
stocks of U.S.-origin equipment with the help of FMF grants. Algeria 
does not obtain any defense articles from the U.S. government. In 
accordance with DOD and EUCOM guidelines for routine end-use 
monitoring, DOD officials at the posts in Morocco and Tunisia stated 
that they visit a sample of host country bases while conducting other 
business, such as meetings, exercises, or exchange events, at those 
locations. These visits help DOD officials confirm the proper use and 
condition of non-sensitive U.S.-origin equipment. Additionally, 
according to DOD officials from EUCOM, DSCA, and at the posts in Rabat 
and Tunis, there have been no allegations of unauthorized use of U.S.- 
origin equipment, including in Western Sahara, that would trigger 
greater scrutiny. 

Morocco's Use of Equipment in Western Sahara: 

According to State, the United States has not placed any special 
restrictions on Morocco's use of equipment in Western Sahara beyond 
those provided for in the Arms Export Control Act and the Foreign 
Assistance Act.[Footnote 26] Since DOD officials in Morocco do not 
generally conduct other business in the Western Sahara, they have not 
conducted end-use monitoring activities involving Morocco's use of 
equipment in Western Sahara, according to a DOD official in Rabat. This 
official and a DSCA official responsible for DOD's end-use monitoring 
program noted that, given the absence of sensitive defense articles or 
allegations of misuse, DOD has no reason to commit resources to 
inspections there. According to State and other officials, State 
representatives do, however, visit Western Sahara on other business 
including fact finding and humanitarian activities. In addition, a 
State official stated and DOD guidance indicate that, should an 
allegation of misuse arise, procedures exist for investigation. In 
addition, the commanding general of the UN peacekeeping mission in 
Western Sahara stated that there had been no allegations of Moroccan 
military misuse of U.S.-origin equipment in the Western Sahara. 
Representatives of the human rights organizations we spoke with also 
reported that they had no reports of misuse. 

Conclusion: 

Security assistance is used as a tool to advance U.S. foreign policy 
and security goals, including respect for human rights. In 2005, we 
reported that U.S. agencies did not have adequate assurance that U.S. 
training funds were used to train and equip only foreign security 
forces with no violations of human rights. Although State has taken 
steps to ensure more consistent human rights vetting of foreign 
security forces receiving U.S.-provided training, it still lacks a 
mechanism to monitor whether or not posts are following its guidance, 
which is intended to ensure that trainees do not have records of human 
rights abuses. State's guide, issued in December 2005, assigned 
responsibility for monitoring the vetting process to points of contact 
at U.S. posts but did not provide them with guidance in carrying out 
this responsibility. Posts' points of contact in Morocco and Tunisia 
were not monitoring posts' compliance with vetting procedures, and 
State headquarters lacks assurance that posts are following its vetting 
policy. This suggests that additional action is needed to strengthen 
the monitoring element of internal controls. Although State OIG 
inspections of posts once every 5 years may be a means of monitoring 
whether posts follow vetting guidelines, internal control standards 
recommend ongoing monitoring in the course of normal operations. A 
routine monitoring mechanism would provide greater assurance that all 
individuals are properly vetted for human rights issues before 
receiving U.S. assistance and that any lapses in the proper screening 
of recipients of U.S. assistance could be corrected. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

To provide assurance that foreign candidates of U.S. security 
assistance programs comply with existing legislative restrictions and 
State policies on human rights, we recommend that the Secretary of 
State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, further 
strengthen the process of human rights vetting of foreign security 
forces by establishing a systematic monitoring mechanism that will 
ensure that State's vetting procedures are carried out at overseas 
posts. Specifically, we recommend the following two actions: 

* The point of contact responsible for human rights vetting at each 
post should verify that the various offices implementing U.S. training 
at the post comply with State's vetting policy. 

* Posts should report the results of their monitoring efforts to a 
designated State headquarters unit to provide State with assurance of 
posts' compliance with its human rights vetting policy. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

We provided a draft of this report to the Secretaries of Defense and 
State for their review and comment. DOD did not comment on our draft. 
State provided a written response that is reprinted in appendix IV and 
technical comments, which we incorporated in the report as appropriate. 
In commenting on our draft and in a subsequent e-mail, State concurred 
with our recommendations and indicated that they are taking steps to 
implement them. State also noted that our review did not uncover any 
evidence that the U.S. government has trained any individual or unit 
that has committed gross violations of human rights. However, our 
review only focused on whether State and the posts in Rabat and Tunis 
vetted trainees. We did not collect data on whether any individual or 
unit trained by the United States, whether vetted or not, had committed 
human rights violations. 

We are providing copies of this report to the Secretaries of Defense 
and State and interested congressional committees. We will also make 
copies available to others upon request. In addition, this report will 
be available on the GAO Web site at [Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please 
contact me at (202) 512-8979 or christoffj@gao.gov. Contact points for 
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found 
on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions 
to this report are listed in appendix V. 

Signed by: 

Joseph A. Christoff: 
Director, International Affairs and Trade: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

To determine the goals of U.S. security assistance and how these goals 
are assessed, we interviewed officials from the Department of Defense 
(DOD) and the Department of State (State) in Washington, D.C., 
responsible for overseeing security assistance programs. We also 
interviewed DOD officials at the U.S. European Command in Stuttgart, 
Germany; U.S. Embassy officials in Rabat, Morocco, and Tunis, Tunisia; 
and foreign government officials in Rabat. We did not include Algeria 
in our site visits because its level of participation in U.S. security 
assistance programs was significantly lower than Morocco's and 
Tunisia's. Additionally, we reviewed State's Mission Performance Plans 
and DOD's Country Campaign Plans for Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia, as 
well as a variety of other State and DOD documents to determine how 
U.S. security assistance programs were linked to State and DOD goals. 
We obtained data on the nature and extent of the activities funded by 
these programs in Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia from program officials 
and State and DOD documents. We reviewed the reliability of funding 
data provided by State and DOD by comparing it with similar data 
obtained from other sources to check for completeness, consistency, and 
reasonableness. We also interviewed program officials responsible for 
managing the data to assess how it was developed and maintained. We 
found the data sufficiently reliable for representing the nature and 
extent of program funding and activities. 

To assess U.S. agencies' implementation in Morocco and Tunisia of 
State's policy to screen foreign security forces to ensure compliance 
with congressional human rights funding restrictions, we reviewed 
relevant statutes and implementing guidelines. These include the fiscal 
years 2004 through 2006 Foreign Operations Appropriations Acts and the 
DOD Appropriations Acts, and the DOD Security Assistance Management 
Manual. We also reviewed program policy and procedures issued by State 
and DOD officials in Washington, D.C., and at the posts in Rabat and 
Tunis. To understand human rights vetting requirements and processes, 
we interviewed relevant officials in Washington, D.C., the U.S. 
European Command, and the two posts to discuss vetting requirements and 
processes. We also reviewed the recommendations made in our July 2005 
report on human rights vetting in Southeast Asia. Furthermore, we 
communicated with a State Office of Inspector General (OIG) official to 
determine the extent to which State OIG has oversight of human rights 
vetting at posts. To obtain a general understanding of the human rights 
situation in Morocco and Tunisia, we met with State human rights 
officers and representatives of nongovernmental organizations involved 
with human rights issues. 

To determine the extent to which the two posts complied with human 
rights vetting policy in fiscal years 2004 and 2005, we asked the 
relevant State and DOD officials in Washington, D.C., and at each post 
to determine the number of foreign security force personnel receiving 
training implemented at the posts in fiscal years 2004 and 2005. We 
further asked post officials to identify the total number of vetting 
files maintained at the post for trainees in this time frame. To 
identify the approximate number of trainees for whom posts did not 
maintain vetting files and, therefore, who may not have been vetted, we 
used training data provided by agency reports as well as State and DOD 
officials. For vetting files that were available at the posts, we drew 
a stratified random probability sample of 273 of 468 trainee vetting 
files available at the U.S. posts in Morocco and Tunisia. With our 
probability sample, each member of the study population had a nonzero 
probability of being included, and that probability could be computed 
for any member. We stratified the population by country and by agency 
implementing training into the Morocco DOD, Morocco State, and Tunisia 
DOD case files. Each sample case file was subsequently weighted in the 
analysis to account statistically for all the case files in the 
population, including those who were not selected. We reviewed the 
files for compliance with State human rights vetting policy. To conduct 
the file review, we used a data collection instrument to systematically 
capture whether key steps in the post's human rights vetting process 
occurred, such as whether the political affairs office at each post was 
involved. We did not collect data on whether any individual or unit 
trained by the United States, whether vetted or not, had committed 
human rights violations. 

Because we followed a probability procedure based on random selections, 
our sample is only one of a large number of samples that we might have 
drawn. Since each sample could have provided different estimates, we 
express our confidence in the precision of our particular sample's 
results as 95 percent confidence intervals (e.g., plus or minus 7 
percentage points). These are intervals that would contain the actual 
population values for 95 percent of the samples we could have drawn. As 
a result, we are 95 percent confident that each of the confidence 
intervals in this report will include the true values in the study 
population. 

To examine U.S. agencies' efforts to monitor the use of U.S.-origin 
defense articles provided to these countries, we reviewed relevant 
federal laws governing the use of arms exports, including the Arms 
Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, and the Foreign Assistance Act 
of 1961, as amended, and reviewed DOD end-use monitoring guidance. We 
interviewed DOD officials responsible for end-use monitoring at the 
Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), EUCOM, and the posts in 
Rabat and Tunis to determine what monitoring activities took place in 
these countries, whether these countries have any sensitive defense 
articles requiring systematic monitoring under DOD guidelines, and 
whether there have been any allegations of misuse of U.S.-origin 
equipment. Algeria does not receive U.S.-origin defense articles from 
the U.S. government. We also interviewed State human rights officers in 
Rabat, Tunis and Washington, D.C. as well as representatives of Human 
Rights Watch and Amnesty International to determine if there have been 
any allegations of misuse involving U.S.-origin defense articles. 
Furthermore, we spoke with the commander of the United Nations 
peacekeeping force in Western Sahara regarding Morocco's military 
presence there. We also received intelligence briefings from EUCOM and 
DIA officials. To determine U.S. policy on the use of U.S.-origin 
equipment by Morocco in Western Sahara, we interviewed State and DOD 
officials in Washington, D.C., and at the post in Morocco and reviewed 
relevant State and DOD congressional testimony regarding Western 
Sahara. 

We conducted this review from October 2005 to July 2006 in accordance 
with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Human Rights Vetting Process in: 

[End of section] 

Morocco and Tunisia as of February 2006: 

Agency vetting of candidates for human rights concerns in Morocco and 
Tunisia typically includes the following steps. First, the office at 
the post implementing the training programs receives names of training 
candidates and reviews background information from the host government. 

Second, the implementing office forwards the names of training 
candidates to the point of contact at State's political affairs office 
at the post for screening, which includes searches using paper and 
electronic files, for evidence of the candidates' involvement in human 
rights violations. The political office may also consult human rights 
nongovernmental organizations for any information they have on the 
candidates. The implementing office also circulates the candidates' 
names to other relevant offices within the post, such as State's 
regional security office and consular affairs office, for vetting. 
These offices respond to the implementing office with their vetting 
results. 

The point of contact in the post's political affairs office sends the 
training candidates' names via cable to the relevant regional bureau, 
such as the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, to request human rights 
screening by State headquarters. The regional bureau checks candidates' 
names against bureau files, and then forwards these names to other 
bureaus at State headquarters for further vetting. These bureaus-- 
including the Bureaus of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor; 
Intelligence and Research; and Political-Military Affairs--screen 
candidates' names using paper and electronic files available to them 
and then report vetting results to the regional bureau. 

Finally, the regional bureau communicates State headquarters' vetting 
results via cable to the post to inform the point of contact and the 
implementing office whether credible evidence of gross human rights 
violations existed for training candidates. 

When vetting candidates' names, the political affairs office at posts 
and the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor access State's 
Abuse Case Evaluation System (ACES), a database that contains 
information on alleged human rights abuses. Data in the system come 
from post reporting, the press, nongovernmental organizations, national 
human rights commissions, and other sources. Users at posts and State 
headquarters enter comments on allegations, and the Bureau of 
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor validates information for 
completeness and accuracy. In screening training candidates, post 
officials use ACES to conduct vetting checks by entering names into the 
database to determine whether it contains derogatory information on an 
individual. Although State implemented ACES in February 2005, officials 
at posts and State headquarters informed us that ACES does not contain 
entries for Morocco and Tunisia because they had no derogatory 
information on specific individuals to report as of June 2006. 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: Tables on Number of Trainees with No Evidence of Vetting 
in Morocco and Tunisia, Fiscal Years 2004-2005: 

We obtained the estimated number of trainees for whom posts lacked 
vetting files using data provided by State and DOD training reports and 
agency officials. See Table 5 for more information on the types of 
training which lacked vetting files. 

Table 5: Estimated Number of Trainees with No Vetting Files, Fiscal 
Years 2004-2005: 



Implementing agency and country: DOD: International Military Education 
and Training, Morocco; 
Number of trainees with no files maintained at posts: 29. 

Implementing agency and country: DOD: International Military Education 
and Training, Tunisia; 
Number of trainees with no files maintained at posts: 25. 

Implementing agency and country: DOD: Regional Defense Counterterrorism 
Fellowship Program, Morocco; 
Number of trainees with no files maintained at posts: 6. 

Implementing agency and country: DOD: Regional Defense Counterterrorism 
Fellowship Program, Tunisia; 
Number of trainees with no files maintained at posts: 10. 

Implementing agency and country: DOD: Regional centers, Morocco; 
Number of trainees with no files maintained at posts: 29. 

Implementing agency and country: DOD: Regional centers, Tunisia; 
Number of trainees with no files maintained at posts: 35. 

Implementing agency and country: DOD: Service academies, Morocco; 
Number of trainees with no files maintained at posts: 1. 

Implementing agency and country: DOD: Service academies, Tunisia; 
Number of trainees with no files maintained at posts: 13. 

Implementing agency and country: DOD subtotal; 
Number of trainees with no files maintained at posts: 148. 

Implementing agency and country: State: Antiterrorism Assistance, 
Morocco; 
Number of trainees with no files maintained at posts: 80. 

Implementing agency and country: State: Antiterrorism Assistance, 
Tunisia; 
Number of trainees with no files maintained at posts: 42. 

Implementing agency and country: State: International Narcotics Control 
and Law Enforcement, Morocco; 
Number of trainees with no files maintained at posts: 168. 

Implementing agency and country: State subtotal; 
Number of trainees with no files maintained at posts: 290. 

Implementing agency and country: Total; 
Number of trainees with no files maintained at posts: 438. 

Source: GAO analysis of State and DOD agency data. 

[End of table] 

Our review of a sample of human rights vetting files showed that an 
estimated 27 percent had no evidence of vetting. Details by the 
implementing office and country are shown in Table 6. 

Table 6: GAO Sample of Files Maintained on Training Nominees in Morocco 
and Tunisia, Fiscal Years 2004-2005: 

Implementing agency and country: DOD: Morocco[A]; 
Number of trainees with files maintained at posts: 148; 
GAO sample size by agency/ country: 49; 
Estimated percentage of files with no evidence of vetting: 65%. 

Implementing agency and country: DOD: Tunisia[B]; 
Number of trainees with files maintained at posts: 143; 
GAO sample size by agency/ country: 47; 
Estimated percentage of files with no evidence of vetting: 0%. 

Implementing agency and country: State: Morocco[C]; 
Number of trainees with files maintained at posts: 177; 
GAO sample size by agency/ country: 177; 
Estimated percentage of files with no evidence of vetting: 17%. 

Implementing agency and country: Morocco subtotal[D]; 
Number of trainees with files maintained at posts: 325;
GAO sample size by agency/ country: 226; 
Estimated percentage of files with no evidence of vetting: 39%. 

Implementing agency and country: Tunisia subtotal[E]; 
Number of trainees with files maintained at posts: 143; 
GAO sample size by agency/ country: 47; 
Estimated percentage of files with no evidence of vetting: 0%. 

Implementing agency and country: Total[F]; 
Number of trainees with files maintained at posts: 468; 
GAO sample size by agency/ country: 273; 
Estimated percentage of files with no evidence of vetting: 27%. 

Source: GAO. 

[A] This number is composed of training nominees for International 
Military Education and Training (IMET), the Regional Defense 
Counterterrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP), and Foreign Military 
Financing. We are 95 percent confident that the percentage of DOD 
Morocco files with no evidence of vetting is between 53 percent and 76 
percent. 

[B] This number is composed of training nominees for IMET, CTFP, and 
the Aviation Leadership Program. We are 95 percent confident that the 
percentage of DOD Tunisia files with no evidence of vetting is between 
0 percent and 6 percent. 

[C] This number is composed of Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) training 
nominees for whom State maintained vetting files. Some training 
nominees may not have attended the training course due to 
cancellations. State's data indicated that Morocco held additional ATA 
courses; however, we did not find vetting files for training nominees 
for these courses. The sample size represents the entire population of 
available State-provided training courses with vetting files. 

[D] We are 95 percent confident that the percentage of Morocco files 
with no evidence of vetting is between 34 and 44 percent. 

[E] See table note b. 

[F] We are 95 percent confident that the percentage of total files with 
no evidence of vetting is between 24 and 31 percent. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of State: 

United States Department of State: 
Assistant Secretary for Resource Management and Chief Financial 
Officer: 
Washington, D. C. 20520: 

Jul 19 2006: 

Ms. Jacquelyn Williams-Bridgers: 
Managing Director: 
International Affairs and Trade: 
Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20548-0001: 

Dear Ms. Williams-Bridgers: 

We appreciate the opportunity to review your draft report, "Security 
Assistance: Lapses in Human Rights Screening in North African Countries 
Indicate Need for Further Oversight," GAO Job Code 320382. 

The enclosed Department of State comments are provided for 
incorporation with this letter as an appendix to the final report. 

If you have any questions concerning this response, please contact 
Ellen Germain, Deputy Director, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, at 
(202) 647-4679. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Bradford R. Higgins: 

cc: 
GAO - Muriel Forster: 
NEA - C. David Welch: 
State/OIG - Mark Duda: 

Department of State Comments on GAO Draft Report: 

Security Assistance: Lapses in Human Rights Screening in North African 
Countries Indicate Need for Further Oversight (GAO-06-850, GAO Code 
320382): 

We are grateful for the opportunity to comment on the GAO's report on 
USG security assistance to North Africa. We are concerned that the 
audit found lapses in the vetting procedure for members of Moroccan and 
Tunisian security forces who receive USG training, and are taking steps 
to correct that. However, we are pleased that the GAO review did not 
uncover any evidence that the USG has trained any individual or unit 
that has committed gross violations of human rights. 

The report's first recommendation is that a single point of contact at 
post be responsible for verifying that all offices comply with the 
vetting process. We have already taken steps to implement this 
recommendation. As the report notes, in December 2005 the State 
Department issued a guide to vetting procedures: "Compliance with the 
State Leahy Amendment: A Guide to the Vetting Process." This guide 
directs posts to assign a single point of contact in the mission with 
responsibility for oversight of, and compliance with, vetting 
procedures. 

The report also recommends that posts report the results of their 
monitoring to the State Department, so that State can monitor posts' 
compliance with vetting requirements. We believe that this 
recommendation complements the efforts we have already initiated to 
improve our compliance with the Leahy vetting requirements. 

We have provided technical comments on the report separately. 

[End of section] 

Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

[End of section] 

GAO Contact: 

Joseph Christoff (202) 512-8979 or christoffj@gao.gov: 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

In addition, Muriel Forster, Assistant Director; Lynn Cothern; Howard 
Cott; David Dornisch; James Krustapentus; Victoria Lin; Mary Moutsos; 
and Sidney Schwartz made key contributions to this report. 

FOOTNOTES 

[1] For the purposes of this report, we defined security assistance as 
U.S. government assistance aimed at training or equipping foreign 
security forces (military and police). 

[2] This restriction, commonly referred to as the "Leahy Amendment," 
first appeared in the1997 Foreign Operations Export Financing and 
Related Appropriations Act (P.L. 104-208) and only applied to funds 
appropriated to State's International Narcotics Control program. It was 
broadened in fiscal year 1998 to apply to all funds appropriated under 
the 1998 Foreign Operations Export Financing and Related Appropriations 
Act (P.L. 105-118). In fiscal year 1999, a similar provision appeared 
in the Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1999 (P.L. 105-262), 
which applied to funds appropriated under the act. The two provisions 
have appeared each year since in the annual Foreign Operations 
Appropriations Acts and the Department of Defense Appropriations Acts, 
respectively. 

[3] Human rights vetting involves checking the names of individuals or 
units proposed for training against files, databases, and other sources 
of information to ensure that they do not have records of gross human 
rights violations. 

[4] GAO, Southeast Asia: Better Human Rights Reviews and Strategic 
Planning Needed for U.S. Assistance to Foreign Security Forces, GAO-05-
793 (Washington, D.C.: July 2005). 

[5] We use the terms allocated and allocations to include 
appropriations, expenditures, or estimated values dependent upon the 
data available for each program. 

[6] We are 95 percent confident that the percentage of total files with 
no evidence of vetting is between 24 and 31 percent and that the total 
number of files with no evidence of vetting is between 110 and 143. 

[7] These activities include multinational exercises, military-to- 
military contacts, and humanitarian assistance. 

[8] See State's 2005 country reports on human rights practices, 
[Hyperlink, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2005]. 

[9] Western Sahara, a Spanish possession from the 1880s until the 
1970s, is a desert area that has a population of approximately 267,000, 
bordering the Atlantic Ocean between Mauritania and Morocco. It has 
valuable phosphate resources and fishing grounds and the possibility of 
off-shore oil reserves. 

[10] We use the terms allocated and allocations to describe a broad mix 
of appropriated and nonappropriated assistance provided to foreign 
security forces in Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia. For State's FMF, 
IMET, and INCLE programs, we used appropriations as allocated by State 
to these countries' programs. For State's ATA program and DOD's CTFP, 
JCET, and other funded programs, we used expenditure data because no 
separate appropriation and country allocation data existed. The EDA and 
Drawdown programs are nonappropriated equipment transfers. 

[11] The data provided for Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia did not allow 
us to determine if some individuals received training in more than one 
fiscal year. Therefore, there may be some over-counting of trainees in 
the numbers reported from 2002 to 2005. 

[12] The Office of Management and Budget assesses government programs 
using the Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART), which is intended to 
help form conclusions about program benefits and whether the program is 
meeting its annual and long-term goals. The ATA program was included in 
a PART assessment of State and international assistance programs, in 
which the worldwide ATA program was rated effective. In addition, State 
officials expect a PART review of security assistance to the Middle 
East and North African countries in August 2006. 

[13] We were unable to determine if specific individuals in this set of 
training instances participated in more than one course; consequently, 
there may be fewer than 438 unique individuals. 

[14] We are 95 percent confident that the percentage of total files 
with no evidence of vetting is between 24 and 31 percent. 

[15] We are 95 percent confident that the total number of files with no 
evidence of vetting is between 110 and 143. 

[16] In this report, we determined no evidence of vetting to mean that 
a post could not locate at least some documentation or indication that 
the post or State headquarters responded to the sponsoring office with 
vetting results, which would demonstrate that training candidates had 
been screened for human rights abuses. 

[17] Specifically, the most recent provision in the Foreign Operations 
Export Financing and Related Appropriations Act for 2006 (P.L. 109-102, 
§551) states, "None of the funds made available by this Act may be 
provided to any unit of the security forces of a foreign country if the 
Secretary of State has credible evidence that such unit has committed 
gross violations of human rights, unless the Secretary determines and 
reports to the Committees on Appropriations that the government of such 
country is taking effective measures to bring the responsible members 
of the security forces unit to justice." The provision has also 
appeared in prior Foreign Operations Appropriations Acts. See P.L. 105- 
118, §570 (FY1998); P.L. 105-277, §568 (FY1999); P.L. 106-113, § 564 
(FY2000); P.L. 106-429, §563 (FY2001); P.L. 107-115, §556 (FY2002); 
P.L. 108-7, § 553 (FY2003); P.L. 108-199, § 553 (FY2004); P.L. 108-447, 
§551 (FY 2005). 

[18] The most recent provision in the DOD Appropriations Act for 2006 
states, "None of the funds made available by this Act may be used to 
support any training program involving a unit of the security forces of 
a foreign country if the Secretary of Defense has received credible 
information from the State that the unit has committed a gross 
violation of human rights, unless all necessary corrective steps have 
been taken." (P.L. 109-148 §8069) Similar provisions have also appeared 
in prior DOD appropriations acts. See P.L. 105-262, §8130 (FY1999); 
P.L. 106-79, §8098 (FY2000); P.L. 106-259, §8092 (FY2001); P.L. 107- 
117, §8093 (FY2003); P.L. 107-248, §8080 (FY2003); P.L. 108087, §8077 
(FY2004); P.L. 108-287, §8076 (FY 2005). 

[19] We were unable to determine if specific individuals in this set of 
training instances participated in more than one course; consequently, 
there may be fewer than 438 unique individuals. 

[20] We are 95 percent confident that the percentage of total files 
with no evidence of vetting is between 24 and 31 percent and that the 
total number of files with no evidence of vetting is between 110 and 
143. 

[21] In this report, we determined no evidence of vetting to mean that 
post could not locate at least some documentation or indication that 
the post or State headquarters responded to the implementing office 
with vetting results, which would demonstrate that training candidates 
have been screened for human rights abuses. 

[22] We identified the approximate number of trainees for whom no 
vetting files existed by using trainee data provided by State and DOD 
reports and officials. 

[23] In the July 2005 report reviewing human rights vetting in 
Southeast Asia, we recommended that State establish clear and 
consistent vetting procedures, clear roles and responsibilities for 
human rights vetting, and monitoring mechanisms to verify that vetting 
procedures are carried out properly. See GAO, Southeast Asia: Better 
Human Rights Reviews and Strategic Planning Needed for U.S. Assistance 
to Foreign Security Forces, GAO-05-793 (Washington, D.C.: July 2005). 

[24] In 1996, P.L. 104-164, Title 1, section 150(a), amended the Arms 
Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.) to require the President to 
establish an end-use monitoring program for defense articles and 
services sold, leased, or exported under the act or the Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1961. The provision requires that, to the extent 
practicable, such a program shall be designed to provide reasonable 
assurances that the recipient is complying with the requirements 
imposed by the U.S. government with respect to the use, transfer, and 
security of defense articles and services, and that such articles and 
services are being used for the purposes for which they are provided. 
22 U.S.C. 2785. 

[25] Section 4 of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended, provides 
that defense articles and defense services shall be sold or leased to 
friendly countries solely for internal security, legitimate self- 
defense, preventing or hindering the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction, participation in regional or collective arrangements or 
measures consistent with the Charter of the United Nations, or 
otherwise to permit the recipient country to participate in collective 
measures requested by the United Nations for the purpose of maintaining 
or restoring international peace or security, or for the purpose of 
enabling foreign military forces in less-developed friendly countries 
to construct public works or engage in other activities helpful to the 
economic and social development of friendly countries. 22 U.S.C 2754. 
The Arms Export Control Act does not provide any further standards or 
definitions to apply in determining whether these eligibility criteria 
are met. The Act does provide that either the President, by a report to 
Congress, or Congress by joint resolution, may determine whether a 
violation has occurred that will render a country ineligible for 
further assistance. 22 U.S.C. 2753(c)(3)(A). Under the statute the 
President is required to report promptly to Congress upon receipt of 
information that a substantial violation of an agreement entered into 
under the Arms Export Control Act may have occurred. 22 U.S.C. Sec. 
2753(c)(2). 

[26] In congressional testimony in 1980, State and DOD articulated the 
U. S. position that the use of U.S.-origin defense articles by Morocco 
in Western Sahara was consistent with the Arms Export Control Act's 
criteria. State officials told us that this position has not changed 
and noted that it does not imply U.S. recognition of Moroccan 
sovereignty over Western Sahara. See testimonies of Harold Saunders, 
Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, 
Department of State; and Lieutenant General Ernest Graves, Director, 
Defense Security Assistance Agency before the U.S. House of 
Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittees on 
International Security and Scientific Affairs and on Africa 
(Washington, D.C.: Jan. 24, 1980). 

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