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Radiation Detection Equipment at U.S. Ports-of-Entry, but Concerns 
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Report to Congressional Requesters: 

March 2006: 

Combating Nuclear Smuggling: 

DHS Has Made Progress Deploying Radiation Detection Equipment at U.S. 
Ports-of-Entry, but Concerns Remain: 

GAO-06-389: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-06-389, a report to congressional requesters: 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

Preventing radioactive material from being smuggled into the United 
States is a key national security objective. To help address this 
threat, in October 2002, DHS began deploying radiation detection 
equipment at U.S. ports-of-entry. This report reviews recent progress 
DHS has made (1) deploying radiation detection equipment, (2) using 
radiation detection equipment, (3) improving the capabilities and 
testing of this equipment, and (4) increasing cooperation between DHS 
and other federal agencies in conducting radiation detection programs. 

What GAO Found: 

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has made progress in 
deploying radiation detection equipment at U.S. ports-of-entry, but the 
agency’s program goals are unrealistic and the program cost estimate is 
uncertain. As of December 2005, DHS had deployed 670 portal monitors 
and over 19,000 pieces of handheld radiation detection equipment. 
However, the deployment of portal monitors has fallen behind schedule, 
making DHS’s goal of deploying 3,034 by September 2009 unlikely. In 
particular, two factors have contributed to the schedule delay. First, 
DHS provides the Congress with information on portal monitor 
acquisitions and deployments before releasing any funds. However, DHS’s 
lengthy review process has caused delays in providing such information 
to the Congress. Second, difficult negotiations with seaport operators 
about placement of portal monitors and how to most efficiently screen 
rail cars have delayed deployments at seaports. Regarding the 
uncertainty of the program’s cost estimate, DHS would like to deploy 
advanced technology portals that will likely cost significantly more 
than the currently deployed portals, but tests have not yet shown that 
these portals are demonstrably more effective than the current portals. 
Consequently, it is not clear that the benefits of the new portals 
would be worth any increased cost to the program. Also, our analysis of 
the program’s costs indicates that DHS may incur a $342 million cost 
overrun. 

DHS has improved in using detection equipment and in following the 
agency’s inspection procedures since 2003, but we identified two 
potential issues in Customs and Border Protection (CBP) inspection 
procedures. First, although radiological materials being transported 
into the United States are generally required to have a Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC) license, regulations do not require that 
the license accompany the shipment. Further, CBP officers do not have 
access to data that could be used to verify that shippers have acquired 
the necessary documentation. Second, CBP inspection procedures do not 
require officers to open containers and inspect them, although under 
some circumstances, doing so could improve security. In addition, DHS 
has sponsored research, development, and testing activities to address 
the inherent limitations of currently fielded equipment. However, much 
work remains to achieve consistently better detection capabilities. 

DHS seems to have made progress in coordinating with other agencies to 
conduct radiation detection programs; however, because the DHS office 
created to achieve the coordination is less than 1 year old, its 
working relationships with other agencies are in their early stages of 
development and implementation. In the future, this office plans to 
develop a “global architecture” to integrate several agencies’ 
radiation detection efforts, including several international programs. 

What GAO Recommends: 

The Secretary of Homeland Security should work with other agencies, as 
necessary, to (1) streamline internal review procedures so that 
spending data can be provided to the Congress in a more timely way; (2) 
update the current deployment plan; (3) analyze the benefits and costs 
of advanced portals, then revise the program’s cost estimates to 
reflect current decisions; (4) develop ways to effectively screen rail 
containers; (5) revise agency procedures for container inspection; and 
(6) develop a way for CBP officers to verify NRC licenses. 

In commenting on a draft of this report, DHS stated that it agreed 
with, and will implement, our recommendations. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-389. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
the link above. For more information, contact Gene Aloise, (202) 512-
3841. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Results in Brief: 

Background: 

DHS Has Made Progress in Deploying Radiation Detection Equipment, but 
the Agency's Program Goals Are Unrealistic and the Cost Estimate Is 
Uncertain: 

CBP Officers Have Made Progress in Using Radiation Detection Equipment 
Correctly and Adhering to Inspection Guidelines, but There Are 
Potential Issues with Agency Procedures: 

DHS Is Working to Improve the Capabilities of Currently-fielded and New 
Radiation Detection Equipment, but Much Work Remains to Achieve Better 
Equipment Performance: 

The Newly Created Domestic Nuclear Detection Office Is Structured to 
Improve Coordination of Executive Branch Radiation Detection Programs: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendixes: 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security: 

Related GAO Products: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Status of Portal Monitor Deployments as of December 2005: 

Table 2: Cooperation with DNDO Brought about by Presidential Directive: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Monthly Cumulative Values of Work Planned but Not Finished As 
Planned: 

Figure 2: Monthly Cumulative Cost Overruns: 

Figure 3: CBP Officers Conducting an External Secondary Inspection at a 
Seaport: 

Figure 4: A CBP Officer Entering a Cargo Container During a Secondary 
Inspection at a Seaport: 

Figure 5: The "SMARTCART," a Mobile Portal Monitor Using Advanced 
Detection Technology, Being Tested at the CMTB in New York: 

Abbreviations: 

ANSI: American National Standards Institute: 

CBP: Customs and Border Protection: 

CMTB: Counter Measures Test Bed: 

DHS: Department of Homeland Security: 

DNDO: Domestic Nuclear Detection Office: 

DOD: Department of Defense: 

DOE: Department of Energy: 

FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation: 

FLETC: Federal Law Enforcement Training Center: 

GAO: Government Accountability Office: 

LSS: Laboratories and Scientific Services: 

NIST: National Institute for Standards and Technology: 

NTS: Nevada Test Site: 

NRC: Nuclear Regulatory Commission: 

PNNL: Pacific Northwest National Laboratory: 

S&T: DHS Science and Technology Directorate: 

TSA: Transportation Security Administration: 

Letter March 24, 2006: 

Congressional Requesters: 

Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, combating terrorism has been 
one of the nation's highest priorities. As part of that effort, 
preventing radioactive material from being smuggled into the United 
States--perhaps to be used by terrorists in a nuclear weapon or in a 
radiological dispersal device (a "dirty bomb")--has become a key 
national security objective. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
is responsible for providing radiation detection capabilities at U.S. 
ports-of-entry.[Footnote 1] Until April 2005, U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection (CBP) managed this program. However, on April 15, 2005, the 
president directed the establishment, within DHS, of the Domestic 
Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO), whose duties include acquiring and 
supporting the deployment of radiation detection equipment.[Footnote 2] 
CBP continues its traditional screening function at ports-of-entry to 
prevent illegal immigration and to interdict contraband, including the 
operation of radiation detection equipment. The Pacific Northwest 
National Laboratory (PNNL), one of the Department of Energy's (DOE) 
national laboratories, manages the deployment of radiation detection 
equipment for DHS.[Footnote 3] 

DHS's program to deploy radiation detection equipment at U.S. ports-of- 
entry has two goals. The first is to use this equipment to screen all 
cargo, vehicles, and individuals coming into the United States. The 
United States has over 380 border sites at which DHS plans to deploy 
radiation detection equipment. The volume of traffic entering the 
United States also adds to the size and complexity of the job. For 
example, each day, DHS processes about 64,000 containers arriving in 
the United States via ships, trucks, and rail cars; 365,000 vehicles; 
and more than 1.1 million people. The second goal of the program is to 
screen all of this traffic without delaying its movement into the 
nation. To illustrate the difficulty of achieving this second goal, 
CBP's port director at the San Ysidro, California, land border crossing 
estimated that prior to initiating radiation screening, the volume of 
traffic through the port-of-entry was so great that, at times, the wait 
to enter the United States from Mexico was about 2.5 hours. He noted 
that had radiation detection screening added a mere 20 seconds to the 
wait of each vehicle, the wait during those peak times could have 
increased to about 3.5 or 4 hours--an unacceptable outcome in his view. 
DHS's current plans call for completing deployments of radiation 
detection equipment at U.S. ports-of-entry by September 2009. 

To screen commerce for radiation, CBP uses several types of detection 
equipment and a system of standard operating procedures. Current 
detection equipment includes radiation portal monitors, which can 
detect gamma radiation (emitted by all of the materials of greatest 
concern) and neutrons (emitted by only a limited number of materials, 
including plutonium--a material that can be used to make a nuclear 
weapon). CBP officers also carry personal radiation detectors--commonly 
referred to as "pagers"--small handheld devices that detect gamma 
radiation, but not neutrons. For the most part, pagers are meant to be 
personal safety devices, although they are used in some locations to 
assist with inspections. Finally, CBP officers also use radioactive 
isotope identification devices, which are handheld devices designed to 
determine the identity of radioactive material--that is, whether it is 
a nuclear material used in medicine or industry, a naturally occurring 
source of radiation, or weapons-grade material. All of these devices 
have limitations in their ability to detect and identify nuclear 
material. 

Generally, CBP's standard procedures direct vehicles, containers, and 
people coming into the country to pass through portal monitors to 
screen for the presence of radiation. This "primary inspection" serves 
to alert CBP officers that a radioactive threat might be present. All 
traffic that causes an alarm during primary inspection is to undergo a 
"secondary inspection" that consists of screening with another portal 
monitor to confirm the presence of radiation, and includes CBP officers 
using radiation isotope identification devices to determine the source 
of radiation being emitted, (e.g., harmless sources, such as ceramics, 
or dangerous sources, such as weapons-grade nuclear material). If CBP 
officers identify a nuclear or radiological threat during a secondary 
inspection, or if the officers' pagers register a dangerously high 
level of radiation, then officers are to establish a safe perimeter 
around the nuclear material and contact scientists in CBP's 
Laboratories and Scientific Services (LSS) for further 
guidance.[Footnote 4] In some cases, CBP identifies incoming sea-bound 
cargo containers through a system that targets some containers for 
inspection based on their perceived level of risk. In these situations, 
CBP works with seaport terminals to have containers moved to an agreed- 
upon location for inspection. These inspections include the use of 
active imaging, such as an x-ray, and passive radiation detection, such 
as a radiation isotope identification device. Typically, if CBP 
officers find irregularities, physical examinations are conducted. 

In September 2003, we reported on CBP's progress in completing domestic 
deployments. In particular, we reported that certain aspects of CBP's 
installation and use of the equipment diminished its effectiveness and 
that coordination among agencies on long-term research issues was 
limited. Since the issuance of our 2003 report, questions have arisen 
about the efficacy of the detection equipment CBP has deployed--in 
particular, its purported inability to distinguish naturally occurring 
radioactive materials from a nuclear bomb. 

Because of the complexity and importance of these issues, you asked us 
to assess the progress made in (1) deploying radiation detection 
equipment at U.S. ports-of-entry and any problems associated with that 
deployment, (2) using radiation detection equipment at U.S. ports-of- 
entry and any problems associated with that use, (3) improving the 
capabilities and testing of this equipment, and (4) increasing the 
level of cooperation between DHS and other federal agencies in 
conducting radiation detection programs. 

To address these objectives, we (1) analyzed CBP's project plan, 
including the project's costs and deployment schedules, to deploy 
radiation detection equipment at U.S. ports-of-entry; (2) visited 
several ports-of-entry, including two international mail and express 
courier facilities, five seaports, and three land border crossings; (3) 
participated in radiation detection training for CBP officers; and (4) 
visited four national laboratories, the Nevada Test Site, and an Air 
Force base involved with testing and deploying radiation detection 
equipment. We focused primarily on the issues surrounding radiation 
portal monitors because they are a major tool in the federal 
government's efforts to thwart nuclear smuggling. We also focused on 
this equipment because its procurement and installation cost far 
exceeds the cost of procuring and deploying other radiation detection 
equipment such as handheld equipment also used at U.S. ports-of-entry. 
We reviewed documentation, such as deployment and cost figures, 
equipment test plans and results, and agency agreements to cooperate in 
detecting radiation. We also interviewed key program officials at each 
of these agencies to discuss the deployment of radiation detection 
equipment, attempts to improve the equipment's capabilities, and 
cooperation among agencies to protect the United States from nuclear 
terrorism. We performed a data reliability assessment of the data we 
received, and interviewed knowledgeable agency officials on the 
reliability of the data. We determined the data were sufficiently 
reliable for the purposes of this report. More details on our scope and 
methodology appear in appendix I. We conducted our review from March 
2005 to February 2006 in accordance with generally accepted government 
auditing standards. 

Results in Brief: 

Between October 2000 and October 2005, the United States spent about 
$286 million to deploy radiation detection equipment at domestic ports- 
of-entry. However, the deployment of portal monitors has fallen behind 
schedule, making DHS's goal of deploying 3,034 by 2009 unlikely. To 
meet its long-term goal, DHS would have to deploy about 52 portal 
monitors a month for the next 4 years--a rate that far exceeds the 2005 
rate of about 22 per month. Moreover, the program's estimated total 
cost of $1.3 billion is highly uncertain. Several factors have 
contributed to the slow pace of deployment. First, program officials 
typically disburse funds to the contractor managing the deployment late 
in the fiscal year. For example, the contractor did not receive its 
fiscal year 2005 allocation until September 2005. These delays have 
caused the contractor to postpone or cancel contracts, sometimes 
delaying deployments. According to the House Appropriations Committee 
report on the CBP portion of DHS's fiscal year 2005 budget, CBP should 
provide the Congress with an acquisition and deployment plan for the 
portal monitor program prior to funding Pacific Northwest National 
Laboratory (PNNL). This plan took many months to finalize, mostly 
because it required multiple approvals within DHS and the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB) prior to being submitted to the Congress. 
The lengthy review process delayed the release of funds and, in some 
cases, disrupted and delayed deployment. In fiscal year 2005, this 
process was further delayed by the creation of DNDO, and the 
uncertainty regarding the new office's responsibilities. Second, 
negotiations with seaport operators to deploy portal monitors have 
taken longer than anticipated because some operators believe screening 
for radiation will adversely affect the flow of commerce through their 
ports. DHS has adopted a deployment policy designed to achieve 
cooperation with seaport operators because agency officials believe 
such arrangements are more efficient and, in the long term, probably 
more timely. Third, devising an effective way to conduct secondary 
inspections of rail traffic departing seaports without disrupting 
commerce has delayed deployments. This problem may worsen because the 
Department of Transportation (DOT) has forecast that the use of rail 
transit out of seaports will probably increase in the near future. 
Addressing and solving the problems with screening rail transport is 
critical to the successful completion of the DHS program. 

Regarding the total cost of the project, CBP's $1.3 billion estimate is 
highly uncertain and overly optimistic. The estimate is based on CBP's 
plans for widespread deployment of advanced technology portal monitors 
currently being developed. However, the prototypes of this equipment 
have not yet been shown to be more effective than the portal monitors 
now in use, and DHS officials say they will not purchase the advanced 
portal monitors unless they are proven to be superior. Moreover, when 
the advanced technology portal monitors become commercially available, 
experts estimate that they will cost between about $330,000 and 
$460,000 each--far more than the currently-used portal monitors which 
cost between $49,000 and $60,000. The installation cost for both types 
of portal monitor is roughly $200,000. Even if future test results 
indicate better detection capabilities, without a detailed comparison 
of the two technologies' capabilities it is not clear that the 
dramatically higher cost for this new equipment would be worth the 
investment. Finally, our analysis of CBP's deployment data indicates 
that the program will probably experience a significant cost overrun of 
between $88 million and $596 million, with a $342 million overrun most 
likely. 

The CBP officers we observed conducting primary and secondary 
inspections appeared to use radiation detection equipment correctly and 
to follow inspection procedures. In contrast, in 2003 we reported that 
CBP officers sometimes used radiation detection equipment in ways that 
reduced its effectiveness and sometimes did not follow agency 
procedures. Generally, CBP requires that its officers receive formal 
training in using radiation detection equipment, and many officers have 
gained experience and proficiency in using the equipment since the 
program's inception. However, we also identified two potential issues 
in CBP inspection procedures that, if addressed, could strengthen the 
nation's defenses against nuclear smuggling. For example, individuals 
and organizations shipping radiological materials to the United States 
generally must acquire a Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) license, 
but regulations do not require that the license accompany the shipment. 
Further, according to CBP officials, CBP officers lack access to NRC 
license data that could be used to verify that shippers of radiological 
material actually obtained required licenses, and to authenticate 
licenses that accompany shipments. The second potential issue pertains 
to CBP's guidance for conducting secondary inspections. Currently, CBP 
procedures require only that officers locate, isolate, and identify 
radiological material. Typically, officers perform an external 
examination by scanning the sides of cargo containers with a radiation 
isotope identification device during secondary inspections. The 
guidance does not specifically require officers to open containers and 
inspect their interiors, even when an external examination cannot 
unambiguously resolve an alarm. However, at one port-of-entry we 
visited, CBP officers routinely opened and entered commercial truck 
trailers to conduct secondary inspections when an external inspection 
could not locate and identify the radiological source. This approach 
increases the chances that the source of the radioactivity that 
originally set off the alarm will be correctly located and identified. 
According to senior CBP officials at this port-of-entry, this 
additional procedure has had little negative impact on the flow of 
commerce and has not increased the cost of CBP inspections, despite 
being implemented at one of the busiest commercial ports-of-entry in 
the nation. 

DHS would like to improve the capabilities of currently-fielded 
radiation detection equipment. Today's equipment lacks a refined 
capability to rapidly determine the type of radioactive materials they 
detect, which means that CBP officers often conduct secondary 
inspections of containers carrying non-threatening material. To address 
this limitation, DHS has sponsored research, development, and testing 
activities that attempt to improve the capabilities of existing 
radiation portal monitors and to produce new, advanced technologies 
with even greater detection and identification enhancements. However, 
much work remains for the agency to achieve consistently better 
detection capabilities, as the efforts undertaken so far have had only 
mixed results. For example, DHS sponsored the development of a software 
package designed to reduce the number of false alarms from portal 
monitors already in widespread use. However, tests of the software have 
been largely inconclusive. In some test scenarios, there was little 
difference in detection capability between portal monitors equipped 
with--and without--the new software. Experts have recommended further 
testing to improve the software's capabilities. Further, DHS is testing 
new, advanced portal monitors that use a technology designed to both 
detect the presence of radiation and identify its source. However, in 
tests performed during 2005, the detection capabilities of the advanced 
technology prototypes demonstrated mixed results--in some cases they 
worked better, but in other cases, they worked about the same as 
already deployed systems. In addition, DHS also sponsors a long-range 
research program aimed at developing innovative technologies designed 
to improve the capabilities of radiation detection equipment. For 
example, DHS is supporting research at two national laboratories on a 
new system designed to better detect radiation sources, even when 
shielded with materials designed to hide their presence. The two 
laboratories have constructed several prototypes, but currently the 
high cost of this technology limits its commercial attractiveness. 
Finally, DHS plans to use its new testing facility being built at the 
Nevada Test Site to improve on existing test capabilities and to 
support the agency's development, testing, acquisition, and deployment 
of radiation detection technologies. 

Historically, cooperation between agencies conducting radiation 
detection programs has been limited. Currently DHS, largely through 
DNDO, cooperates with DOE, the Department of Defense (DOD), and other 
agencies to coordinate these programs; however, because DNDO was 
created less than 1 year ago, its cooperative efforts--and its working 
relationships with other federal agencies--are in their early stages of 
development and implementation. Currently, other federal agencies are 
providing staff to work directly with DNDO. However, it is too soon to 
determine the overall effectiveness of these efforts. DHS also works 
with other agencies to make current detection efforts more efficient 
and effective. For example, in April 2005, DHS and DOE entered into a 
memorandum of understanding to, among other things, exchange 
information on radiation detection technologies to improve the 
effectiveness of their deployment; the agencies also agreed to share 
lessons learned from operational experiences, and data received from 
radiation detection equipment deployed at U.S. and foreign ports. Also 
in April 2005, DHS entered into an agreement with the Port Authority of 
New York and New Jersey to, among other things, integrate lessons 
learned from field experience into domestic radiation detection 
efforts. In the future, DNDO intends to develop an integrated worldwide 
system. The resulting "global architecture," as it is being called by 
DNDO officials, would be a multi-layered defense strategy that includes 
programs that attempt to secure nuclear materials and detect their 
movements overseas, such as DOE's Second Line of Defense program; to 
develop intelligence information on nuclear materials' trans-shipments 
and possible movement to the United States; and to integrate these 
elements with domestic radiation detection efforts undertaken by 
governments--federal, state, local, and tribal--and the private sector. 

We are recommending a series of actions designed to help DHS speed up 
the pace of portal monitor deployments, better account for schedule 
delays and cost uncertainties, make the most efficient use of program 
resources, and improve its ability to interdict illicit nuclear 
materials. 

We provided a draft of this report to DHS for its review and comment. 
DHS stated that it agreed with, and will implement, our 
recommendations. 

Background: 

Initial concerns about the threat posed by nuclear smuggling were 
focused on nuclear materials originating in the former Soviet Union. As 
a result, the first major initiatives concentrated on deploying 
radiation detection equipment at borders in countries of the former 
Soviet Union and in Central and Eastern Europe. In particular, in 1998, 
DOE established the Second Line of Defense program, which, through the 
end of fiscal year 2005, had installed equipment at 83 sites mostly in 
Russia.[Footnote 5] In 2003, DOE implemented a second program, the 
Megaports Initiative,[Footnote 6] to focus on the threat posed by 
nuclear smuggling overseas by installing radiation detection equipment 
at major seaports around the world.[Footnote 7]In the United States, 
the U.S. Customs Service began providing its inspectors with portable 
radiation detection devices in 1998. After September 11, 2001, the 
agency expanded its efforts to include the deployment of portal 
monitors--large-scale radiation detectors that can be used to screen 
vehicles and cargo.[Footnote 8] In March 2003, the U.S. Customs Service 
was transferred to DHS, and the border inspection functions of the 
Customs Service, including radiation detection, became the 
responsibility of CBP.[Footnote 9] 

Deploying radiation detection equipment at U.S. borders is part of 
DHS's strategy for addressing the threat of nuclear and radiological 
terrorism. DHS's strategy includes: (1) countering proliferation at the 
source by assisting foreign governments in their efforts to detect and 
interdict nuclear and radiological smuggling; (2) controlling the 
illegal export of technology and equipment from the United States that 
terrorists could use to develop a nuclear or radiological weapon; (3) 
detecting and interdicting potential smuggling attempts before they 
reach the United States; and (4) securing U.S. ports-of-entry through 
multiple technologies that include radiation detection and nonintrusive 
inspections to view images of cargo in sea containers. 

CBP plans to deploy radiation portal monitors in five phases, or 
"categories of entry" (1) international mail and express courier 
facilities; (2) major northern border crossings; (3) major seaports; 
(4) southwestern border crossings; and (5) all other categories, 
including international airports, remaining northern border crossings 
and seaports, and all rail crossings. In this final phase, CBP also 
plans to replace the currently-fielded portal monitors with newer, more 
advanced technology. Generally, CBP prioritized these categories 
according to their perceived vulnerability to the threat of nuclear 
smuggling. CBP did not, however, conduct a formal threat assessment. 
International mail and express courier facilities present a potential 
vulnerability because mail and packages arrive with no advance notice 
or screening. Northern border crossings are also vulnerable, according 
to CBP, because of the possible presence of terrorist cells operating 
in Canada. The third category, major seaports, is considered vulnerable 
because sea cargo containers are suitable for smuggling and because of 
the large volume of such cargo. Seaports account for over 95 percent of 
the cargo entering the United States. Southwestern borders are 
vulnerable because of the high volume of traffic and because of the 
smuggling that already occurs there. Although airlines can quickly ship 
and deliver air cargo, CBP considers air cargo to be a slightly lesser 
risk because the industry is highly regulated. 

In deploying radiation detection equipment at U.S. borders, CBP 
identified the types of nuclear materials that might be smuggled, and 
the equipment needed to detect its presence. The radiological materials 
of concern include assembled nuclear weapons; nuclear material that 
could be used in a nuclear weapon but that is not actually assembled 
into a weapon ("weapons-grade nuclear material"); radiological 
dispersal devices, commonly called "dirty bombs;" and other illicit 
radioactive material, such as contaminated steel or inappropriately 
marked or manifested material. Detecting actual cases of attempted 
nuclear smuggling is difficult because there are many sources of 
radiation that are legal and not harmful when used as intended. These 
materials can trigger alarms (known as "nuisance alarms") that are 
indistinguishable from those alarms that could sound in the event of a 
true case of nuclear smuggling. Nuisance alarms are caused by patients 
who have recently had radiological treatment; a wide range of cargo 
with naturally occurring radiation, such as fertilizer, ceramics, and 
food products; and legitimate shipments of radiological sources for use 
in medicine and industry. In addition, detecting highly-enriched 
uranium, in particular, is difficult because of its relatively low 
level of radioactivity. Furthermore, a potential terrorist would likely 
attempt to shield the material to reduce the amount of radiation 
reaching the detector and thereby decrease the probability of 
detection. 

The process of deploying portal monitors begins with a site survey to 
identify the best location at an entry point for installing the 
equipment. While in some cases the choice may be obvious, operational 
considerations at many entry points require analysis to find a location 
where all or most of the cargo and vehicles can pass through the portal 
monitor without interfering with the flow of commerce. After 
identifying the best option, CBP works with local government and 
private entities to get their support. At many U.S. entry points, the 
federal government does not own the property and therefore collaborates 
with these entities to deploy the equipment. It is CBP's policy to 
depend exclusively on such negotiations, rather than to use any kind of 
eminent domain or condemnation proceeding. The actual installation of 
the portal monitors involves a number of tasks such as pouring 
concrete, laying electrical groundwork, and hooking up the portal 
monitors to alarm systems that alert officers when radiation is 
detected. Finally, PNNL tests the equipment and trains CBP officers on 
its operation, including how to respond to alarms. 

To coordinate the national effort to protect the United States from 
nuclear and radiological threats, in April 2005, the president directed 
the establishment of DNDO within DHS. The new office's mission covers a 
broad spectrum of responsibilities and activities, but is focused 
primarily on providing a single accountable organization to develop a 
layered defense system. This system is intended to integrate the 
federal government's nuclear detection, notification, and response 
systems. In addition, under the directive, DNDO is to acquire, develop, 
and support the deployment of detection equipment in the United States, 
as well as to coordinate the nation's nuclear detection research and 
development efforts. For fiscal year 2006, DNDO's total budget is 
approximately $318 million, which includes at least $81 million for 
research and development of advanced nuclear detection technologies and 
$125 million for portal monitor purchase and deployment. 

The Homeland Security Act of 2002 gave DHS responsibility for managing 
the research, development, and testing of technologies to improve the 
U.S. capability to detect illicit nuclear material.[Footnote 10] Prior 
to the creation of DNDO, DHS's Science and Technology (S&T) directorate 
had this responsibility. DNDO has assumed these responsibilities and 
works with S&T's Counter Measures Test Beds (CMTB) to test radiation 
detection equipment in New York and New Jersey. As of January 2006, 
DNDO has provided $605,000 to DOE national laboratories that support 
this effort. Additional funding for fiscal year 2006 from S&T and DNDO 
to support test and evaluation activities at the CMTB is yet to be 
determined. The Homeland Security Act also provided DHS the authority 
to use DOE national laboratories for research, development, and testing 
of new technologies to detect nuclear material.[Footnote 11] 

DHS Has Made Progress in Deploying Radiation Detection Equipment, but 
the Agency's Program Goals Are Unrealistic and the Cost Estimate Is 
Uncertain: 

As of December 2005, DHS had completed deployment of portal monitors at 
two categories of entry--a total of 61 ports-of-entry--and has begun 
work on two other categories; overall, however, progress has been 
slower than planned. According to DHS officials, the slow progress has 
resulted from a late disbursal of funds, and delays in negotiating 
deployment agreements with seaport operators. Further, we believe the 
expected cost of the program is uncertain because DHS's plans to 
purchase newer, more advanced equipment are not yet finalized; also we 
project that the program's final cost will be much higher than CBP 
currently anticipates. 

The Program to Install Portal Monitors Has Fallen Behind Schedule: 

Between October 2000 and October 2005, DHS, mainly through its prime 
contractor PNNL, has spent about $286 million to deploy radiation 
detection equipment at U.S. ports-of-entry. As of December 2005, DHS 
had deployed 670 of 3,034 radiation portal monitors--about 22 percent 
of the portal monitors DHS plans to deploy.[Footnote 12] The agency has 
completed portal monitor deployments at international mail and express 
courier facilities and the first phase of northern border sites--57 and 
217 portal monitors, respectively. In addition, by December 2005, DHS 
had deployed 143 of 495 portal monitors at seaports and 244 of 360 at 
southern borders. In addition, three portal monitors had been installed 
at the Nevada Test Site to analyze their detection capabilities and 
four had been retrofitted at express mail facilities. As of February 
2006, CBP estimated that with these deployments CBP has the ability to 
screen about 62 percent of all containerized shipments entering the 
United States, and roughly 77 percent of all private vehicles (POVs). 
Within these total percentages, CBP can screen 32 percent of all 
containerized seaborne shipments; 90 percent of commercial trucks and 
80 percent of private vehicles entering from Canada; and approximately 
88 percent of all commercial trucks and 74 percent of all private 
vehicles entering from Mexico. 

CBP does not maintain a firm schedule for deploying handheld radiation 
detectors, such as pagers and radiation isotope identification devices. 
This is equipment used mainly to help pinpoint and identify sources of 
radiation found during inspections. Instead, according to CBP 
officials, the agency acquires and deploys such equipment each fiscal 
year as needed. The handheld radiation detectors are procured to 
coincide with portal monitor deployments to ensure mission support. 
Since fiscal year 2001, CBP has spent about $24.5 million on pagers, 
and about $6.6 million on radiation isotope identification devices. At 
present, CBP can field roughly 12,450 pagers--enough to ensure that all 
officers conducting primary or secondary inspections at a given time 
have one. The agency intends to deploy about 6,500 additional pagers. 
Similarly, CBP's 549 radiation isotope identification devices are 
deployed at domestic ports-of-entry. CBP intends to acquire another 900 
to ensure that all needs are met. 

Overall, CBP and PNNL have experienced difficulty meeting the portal 
monitor deployment schedule. None of the planned portal monitor 
deployments has progressed according to schedule, and monthly 
deployments would have to increase by almost 230 percent to meet a 
September 2009 program completion date. For example, in November 2005, 
deployments at land crossings were about 20 months and $1.9 million 
behind schedule, while deployments at the first 22 seaports were about 
2 years and $24 million behind schedule.[Footnote 13] Despite these 
delays, PNNL reported in November 2005 that the overall project 
schedule should not extend beyond its current completion date of 
September 2009. However, our analysis indicates that CBP's deployment 
schedule is too optimistic. 

In fact, for CBP and PNNL to meet the current deployment schedule, they 
would have to install about 52 portal monitors per month from November 
2005 to September 2009. In our view, this is unlikely because it 
requires a rate of deployment that far exceeds recent experience. For 
example, during calendar year 2005, PNNL deployed portal monitors at 
the rate of about 22 per month, and deployments have fallen further and 
further behind schedule. Between February and December 2005, for 
example, PNNL did not meet any of its scheduled monthly deployments, 
never deploying more than 38 portal monitors during any single month. 
If CBP continues to deploy portal monitors at its 2005 pace, the last 
monitor would not be deployed until about December 2014. Table 1 
details the status of portal monitor deployments, as of December 2005. 

Table 1: Status of Portal Monitor Deployments as of December 2005: 

Portal monitor deployment phase: International mail and express 
consignment facilities[A] (23 facilities); 
Total portals planned: 57; 
Status: Completed April 2004 4 months late. 

Portal monitor deployment phase: Land border and rail ports-of-entry 
(205 crossings); 
Total portals planned: 967; 
Status: 20 months late. 

Portal monitor deployment phase: Seaports (106 terminals) and 
international airports; 
Total portals planned: 1,205; 
Status: 24 months late. 

Portal monitor deployment phase: Retrofits[B]; 
Total portals planned: 82[C]; 
Status: Projected September 2009 completion. 

Portal monitor deployment phase: Other sites[D]; 
Total portals planned: 3. 

Portal monitor deployment phase: Excess equipment[E]; 
Total portals planned: 721. 

Portal monitor deployment phase: Total; 
Total portals planned: 3,035[F]. 

Sources: PNNL and CBP. 

[A] Excludes FedEx and UPS, both of whom screen packages overseas as 
agreed in a memorandum of understanding with CBP. 

[B] "Retrofitting" refers to replacing currently-fielded portal 
monitors with advanced-technology portal monitors. 

[C] PNNL plans a "net" increase of 82 portal monitors as a result of 
retrofits. 

[D] "Other sites" refers to portal monitors installed at the Nevada 
Test Site for testing purposes. 

[E] "Excess equipment" refers to the older portal monitors being 
replaced through the retrofit process. 

[F] The total number of portal monitors planned for deployment is based 
on December 2005 estimates from CBP and PNNL. It represents a recent 
estimate of CBP's requirements, and according to CBP, it will be used 
to update the agency's current deployment plan, which calls for 
deploying 2,397 portal monitors by September 2009. 

[End of table] 

Further, we analyzed CBP's earned value management data as of November 
2005 and determined that, although CBP planned for the deployment 
program to be 20.5 percent complete by that date, the program is only 
about 16 percent complete. In addition, our analysis indicates that 
since the program's inception, work valued at $48.6 million has fallen 
behind schedule. Moreover, the trend over the past 14 months shows CBP 
and PNNL falling further behind schedule, as seen in figure 1. 

Figure 1: Monthly Cumulative Values of Work Planned but Not Finished As 
Planned: 

[See PDF for image] 

Note: The "zeropoint" on this figure denotes work that was completed at 
its planned cost. A positive number means that all the work completed 
to that point costs less than planned, while a negative number means 
that all the work completed to that point costs more than planned. 

[End of figure] 

There have been at least three major sources of delay that have 
affected the portal monitor deployment program: funding issues, 
negotiations with seaport terminal operators, and problems in screening 
rail cars--particularly in a seaport environment. 

Funding Issues: 

According to CBP and PNNL officials, recurrent difficulties with the 
project's funding are the most important explanations of the schedule 
delays. Specifically, according to DHS and PNNL officials, CBP has been 
chronically late in providing appropriated funds to PNNL, thereby 
hindering its ability to meet program deployment goals. For example, 
PNNL did not receive its fiscal year 2005 funding until September 2005. 
According to PNNL officials, because of this delay, some contracting 
activities in all deployment phases had to be delayed or halted, but 
the adverse effects on seaports were especially severe. For example, 
PNNL reported in August 2005 that site preparation work at 13 seaports 
had to cease because the Laboratory had not yet received its fiscal 
year 2005 funding allocation. According to senior CBP officials, their 
agency's inability to provide a timely spending plan to the Congress 
for the portal monitor deployment program is the main reason for these 
funding delays. According to the House Appropriations Committee report 
on the CBP portion of DHS's fiscal year 2005 budget, CBP should provide 
the Congress an acquisition and deployment plan for the portal monitor 
program prior to funding PNNL.[Footnote 14] However, these plans 
typically take many months for CBP to finalize--in part because CBP 
requires that the plans undergo several levels of review--but also 
because these plans are reviewed by DHS and OMB before being submitted 
to the Congress. In fiscal year 2005, this process was further delayed 
by the creation of DNDO, uncertainty regarding DNDO's responsibilities, 
and negotiations regarding the expenditure of the fiscal year 2005 
appropriations. 

CBP has tried to address this problem by reprogramming funds when money 
from other programs is available. In some cases, the amount of 
reprogrammed funds has been fairly large. For example, about 15 percent 
of fiscal year 2005's funding included money reprogrammed from other 
CBP sources, or almost $14 million. In fiscal year 2004, about $16 
million was reprogrammed--or about a third of the fiscal year's total. 
And in fiscal year 2003, the total of reprogrammed money was about $18 
million--about 20 percent. 

Delays in Gaining Agreements Have Slowed Seaport Deployments: 

Negotiations with seaport operators have been slow and have also 
delayed the portal monitor deployment program. According to CBP and 
PNNL officials, one of the primary reasons behind the seaport phase's 
substantial delay in deployments is the difficulty in obtaining 
contractual agreements with port and terminal operators at seaports. 
DHS has not attempted to impose agreements on seaport operators 
because, according to officials, cooperative arrangements with the port 
operators are more efficient and, in the long term, probably more 
timely. According to CBP and PNNL officials, many operators believe 
screening for radiation will adversely affect the flow of commerce 
through their ports. In addition, deploying portal monitors in major 
seaports presents several unique challenges. For example, seaports are 
much larger than land border crossings, consist of multiple terminals, 
and may have multiple exits. Because of these multiple exits, seaports 
require a greater number of portal monitors, which may entail more 
negotiations with port and terminal operators. In addition, port 
operators at times have insisted on late-stage design changes, 
requested various studies prior to proceeding with final designs, 
insisted on inefficient construction schedules, and delayed their final 
review and approval of project designs. According to CBP and PNNL, 
these efforts often reflect the port and terminal operators' uneasiness 
with portal monitor deployments, and their resolve to ensure that the 
outcome of the deployment process maintains their businesses' 
competitiveness. For example, port officials at one seaport requested 
several changes late in the process, including performing an 
unscheduled survey for laying cable, revising portal monitor locations 
at two gates, and adding a CBP control booth at a third terminal. 
According to CBP and PNNL officials, the agency prefers to accommodate 
these types of changes, even late in the process and even if they slow 
deployment, because in the long term they believe it is more efficient 
and effective. 

Screening Rail Cars in Seaports Presents Unique Problems: 

The difficulty of devising an effective and efficient way to conduct 
secondary inspections of rail traffic departing seaports without 
disrupting commerce has created operational issues that could further 
delay deployments. Four of the five seaports we visited employ rail 
cars to ship significant amounts of cargo. In one seaport, the port 
director estimated that about 80-85 percent of the cargo shipped 
through his port departs via rail. For the other three seaports, the 
percentages for rail traffic were 5 percent, 13 percent, and 40 percent 
respectively. According to port officials, these seaports would like to 
accommodate CBP's efforts to install radiation detection equipment 
designed to screen rail traffic, but they are concerned that the 
logistics of conducting secondary inspections on trains as they prepare 
to depart the seaport could back up rail traffic within the port and 
disrupt rail schedules throughout the region--potentially costing the 
port tens of thousands of dollars in lost revenue. For example, one 
senior port authority official told us that his port lacked ample space 
to park trains for secondary inspections, or to maneuver trains to 
decouple the rail car(s) that may have caused a primary inspection 
alarm. As a result, trains that cause a primary alarm would have to 
wait, in place, for CBP to conduct a secondary inspection, blocking any 
other trains from leaving the port. According to this port official, 
any delay whatsoever with a train leaving the port could cause rail 
problems down the line because track switches are geared to train 
schedules. To avoid these kinds of problems, CBP has delayed deploying 
portal monitors in this seaport until technical and operational issues 
can be overcome. As of December 2005, no portal monitors had been 
deployed at this seaport, although according to PNNL's schedule, 5 of 
its 11 terminals--a total of 19 portal monitors--should have been 
deployed by October 2005. According to the port director at another 
seaport we visited, a port that actually has a rail portal monitor 
installed, similar operational issues exist. However, in addition to 
backing up rail traffic within the port, trains awaiting secondary 
inspections at this port could block the entrance/exit to a nearby 
military base. The director of the state's port authority told us that 
his solution has been to simply turn off the portal monitor. According 
to CBP officials, this was entirely a state decision, since this portal 
monitor is the state's responsibility and not part of CBP's deployment. 
However, these officials also noted that they agreed with the states 
and noted that they would not attempt to impose a solution or deadline 
on either port. CBP officials noted that most seaport operators seem 
willing to accommodate portal monitors, but until a better portal 
monitor technology evolves that can help ensure a smooth flow of rail 
traffic out of the port, negotiations with seaport operators will 
continue to be slow. 

According to CBP and port officials, they have considered several 
potential solutions. For example, there is widespread agreement that 
screening sea cargo containers before they are placed on rail cars 
offers the best solution, but this option is operationally difficult in 
many seaports. Mobile portal monitors, when commercially available, may 
also offer a partial solution. In addition, CBP is optimistic that 
advanced portal monitors, when they become commercially available, may 
help solve some of the problems in the rail environment by limiting the 
number of nuisance alarms. However, according to the CBP and port 
officials we contacted, screening rail traffic continues to pose a 
vexing operational problem for seaports. 

The concerns that seaport operators and CBP expressed regarding 
screening rail commerce in seaports may increase and intensify in the 
future because rail traffic, in general, is expected to increase 
substantially by 2020. DOT has forecast that by 2020, rail will 
transport roughly 699 million tons of international freight--up from 
358 million tons carried in 1998. Officials at 3 of the 5 seaports we 
visited expect rail traffic through their facilities to increase 
dramatically during the next 10 to 15 years. As the volume of trade 
increases, so too will the economic stakes for the port and terminal 
operators, while the regulatory burden for CBP is likely to increase as 
well. Delays--for any reason, including radiation detection--are likely 
to become more costly, and CBP will likely have ever-increasing numbers 
of rail cars to screen. 

In addition, although CBP is not scheduled to begin deploying portal 
monitors to screen rail shipments at land border crossings until 2007, 
the agency will likely experience operational challenges at land border 
crossing similar to those it is now experiencing at seaports. For 
example, at both land border crossings and seaports, if a rail car 
alarms as it passes through a portal monitor, that car will possibly 
have to be separated from the remaining train--sometimes a mile in 
length--to undergo a secondary inspection. Furthermore, because trains 
transport numerous types of cargo containing large quantities of 
naturally occurring radioactive material, CBP faces the challenge of 
maintaining a nuisance alarm rate that does not adversely affect 
commerce. CBP and PNNL are currently conducting testing of a prototype 
rail portal monitor to determine the potential impact of naturally 
occurring radioactive material on rail operations at land border 
crossings. 

Other Factors Have Delayed Portal Monitor Deployments: 

Unforeseen design and construction problems have also played a role in 
delaying portal monitor deployments. For example, deployments at six 
southern border sites have been delayed to coincide with the sites' 
expansion activities. According to CBP officials, there are two 
approaches to accommodating a port-of-entry's alterations, both of 
which may delay portal monitor deployments. First, CBP and PNNL may 
decide to delay the start of portal monitor projects until the port-of- 
entry completes its alterations, to make certain that portal monitor 
placements are properly located. Second, port-of-entry expansion 
activities may alter existing traffic flows and require that PNNL 
redesign its portal monitor deployments. The portal monitor deployments 
at three southern border ports-of-entry has taken much longer than 
planned because of the port's expansion activities. According to PNNL, 
there is now considerable schedule uncertainty associated with these 
deployments, which may ultimately impact the completion of the southern 
land border deployments. 

Portal monitor deployments have also been hampered by poor weather. For 
example, cold weather at several northern sites caused some unexpected 
work stoppages and equipment failures that resulted in construction 
delays of 2 to 3 months. Finally, one southern border site has been 
delayed because of major flooding problems. The flooding issue must be 
resolved before the deployment can be completed. 

DHS's Portal Monitor Deployment Program Cost Estimate Is Uncertain and 
Overly Optimistic: 

DHS's current estimate to complete the program is $1.3 billion, but 
this estimate is highly uncertain and overly optimistic. First, DHS's 
cost estimate is based on a plan to deploy advanced-technology portal 
monitors that have so far shown mixed results for detecting radiation 
compared to currently-fielded portal monitors. Since the efficacy of 
the advanced portal monitors has not yet been proven conclusively, 
there is at least some uncertainty over whether--and, if so, how many-
-of the new portal monitors may be deployed. In addition, the final 
cost of the new portal monitors has not been established. Second, our 
analysis of CBP's earned value data also suggests that the program will 
likely cost much more than planned. 

The current deployment plan calls for installing advanced portal 
monitors at all cargo primary and secondary inspection locations, at 
all secondary inspection locations for private vehicles, and also 
retrofitting many sites with the advanced equipment, when it becomes 
available. However, according to senior officials at DNDO, the advanced 
technology must meet all of DNDO's performance criteria, and must be 
proven superior to the portal monitors already in use, before DNDO will 
procure it for use in the United States. Recent tests of the new portal 
monitors indicate that DNDO's criteria have not yet been met. For 
example, S&T sponsored research in 2004 that compared the detection 
capabilities of currently-fielded portal monitors with the advanced 
portal monitors. The results of that research suggested that, in some 
scenarios, the detection abilities of the two portal monitor types were 
nearly equivalent. In other scenarios, the new equipment's detection 
capability was significantly better. S&T concluded that more work 
remains to be done in optimizing and comparing portal monitors so as to 
understand how they can be used to the greatest effect at U.S. ports- 
of-entry. In 2005, DNDO sponsored additional research designed to 
compare the two types of portal monitor, and determined that the 
advanced portal monitors' detection capabilities were somewhat better 
than those of the currently-fielded equipment. In addition, in October 
2005, DNDO completed the first comprehensive tests for these advanced 
portal monitors at the Nevada Test Site. This advanced technology 
combines the ability to detect radiation and identify its source. 
According to an official who helped supervise these tests, the new 
portal monitors' performance did not meet all of DNDO's expectations 
with regard to providing significant detection improvements over 
currently-fielded equipment in all scenarios. CBP and DNDO officials 
also expressed concerns regarding the advanced portal monitors' 
detection capabilities in light of the Nevada test results. In 
particular, senior CBP officials questioned whether the advanced portal 
monitors would be worth their considerable extra costs, and emphasized 
finding the right mix of current and advanced-technology equipment 
based on the needs at individual ports-of-entry. According to DNDO 
officials, the potential improvement over currently fielded portal 
monitors in capability to identify radioactive sources, and hence to 
detect actual threats as opposed to simply detecting radiation, has not 
yet been quantified. However, these officials believe that the results 
to date have been promising, and DNDO intends to continue supporting 
the advanced portal monitor's development and believe the new 
technology may be ready for deployment early in calendar year 2007. 

There is also considerable uncertainty regarding the eventual cost of 
the advanced portal monitors--if they become commercially available, 
and if DNDO opts to use them. Experts we contacted estimated that the 
new portal monitors could cost between $330,000 and $460,000 each. 
These estimates are highly uncertain because advanced portal monitors 
are not yet commercially available. As a point of reference, the portal 
monitors currently in use typically cost between $49,000 and $60,000. 
These costs include only the purchase price of the equipment, not its 
installation. According to CBP and PNNL officials, installation costs 
vary, but average about $200,000 per portal monitor. Even if future 
test results indicate that the new technology exhibits much better 
detection and identification capabilities, it would not be clear that 
the dramatically higher cost for this new equipment would be worth the 
considerable investment, without the agency having first rigorously 
compared the portal monitors' capabilities taking their costs into 
account. Currently, DNDO and CBP are working together to determine the 
most appropriate technologies and concepts of operation for each port- 
of-entry site. The two agencies are also trying to determine the 
highest priority sites for advanced-technology portal monitors based on 
the extent to which the new portal monitors show improved performance. 

In November 2005, PNNL reported that the portal monitor deployment 
program could experience an overall cost overrun of $36 million. In 
contrast, our analysis of CBP's earned value data indicates that the 
agency should expect a cost overrun of between $88 million and $596 
million. We based our cost overrun projections on the rates at which 
CBP and PNNL deployed portal monitors, through November 2005. The more 
efficient the agency and its contractor are in deploying portal 
monitors, the smaller the cost overruns; conversely, when efficiency 
declines, cost overruns increase.[Footnote 15] 

In fact, as shown in figure 2, recent cumulative program cost trends 
have been negative, indicating that CBP's cost overruns are deepening 
over time. 

Figure 2: Monthly Cumulative Cost Overruns: 

[See PDF for image] 

Note: The "zero point" on this figure denotes work that was completed 
at its planned cost. A positive number means that all the work 
completed to that point costs less than planned, while a negative 
number means that all the work completed to that point costs more than 
planned. 

[End of figure] 

PNNL noted that its management reserve of $62 million should cover the 
anticipated overrun. However, we do not agree.[Footnote 16] First, we 
believe the cumulative cost overrun will far exceed PNNL's estimate of 
$36 million. We believe an overrun of about $342 million, the midpoint 
of our projected overrun range, is more likely. Since 1977, we have 
analyzed over 700 acquisition projects on which EVM techniques have 
been applied. These analyses consistently show that once a program is 
15 percent complete (as is the case with this program), cost 
performance almost never improves and, in most cases, declines. PNNL's 
recent cost trend follows this pattern. Second, based on these 700-plus 
studies, our estimate takes a more realistic view that the portal 
monitor deployment program's cost performance most likely will continue 
to decline; hence the management reserve will be consumed over time as 
the program incurs unexpected expenses. Finally, to meet the deployment 
program's planned costs, PNNL would have to greatly improve its work 
efficiency. However, our analysis of prior EVM-based projects indicates 
that productivity rates nearly always decline over the course of a 
project. We determined that PNNL's efficiency rate for the most recent 
8 months has averaged about 86 percent--PNNL has been delivering about 
$.86 worth of work for every dollar spent. In order to complete the 
remaining work with available funding, PNNL's efficiency rate would 
have to climb to around 98 percent, a rate of improvement unprecedented 
in the 700-plus studies we have analyzed. 

CBP Does Not Know If PNNL's Cost and Schedule Data Are Reliable: 

Federal agencies are required by OMB to track the progress of major 
systems acquisitions using a validated EVM system and to conduct an 
integrated baseline review.[Footnote 17] We found that PNNL has an EVM 
system but has not certified it to show that it complies with guidance 
developed by the American National Standards Institute/Electronic 
Industries Alliance.[Footnote 18] This guidance identifies 32 criteria 
that reliable EVM systems should meet. In addition, we found that PNNL 
has not conducted an integrated baseline review--a necessary step to 
ensure that the EVM baseline for the portal monitor program represents 
all work to be completed, and adequate resources are available. 

However, although the EVM data have not been independently validated, 
we examined the EVM data and found that they did not show any anomalies 
and were very detailed. Therefore, we used them to analyze the portal 
monitor program status and to make independent projections of the 
program's final costs at completion. 

CBP Officers Have Made Progress in Using Radiation Detection Equipment 
Correctly and Adhering to Inspection Guidelines, but There Are 
Potential Issues with Agency Procedures: 

CBP officers we observed conducting primary and secondary inspections 
appeared to use radiation detection equipment correctly and to follow 
the agency's inspection procedures. In fact, in some cases, CBP 
officers exceeded standard inspection procedure requirements by opening 
and entering containers to better identify radiation sources. In 
contrast, in 2003, when we issued our last report on domestic radiation 
detection, CBP officers sometimes deviated from standard inspection 
procedures and, at times, used detection equipment incorrectly. 
However, the agency's inspection procedures could be strengthened. 

CBP Officers Appeared to Use Equipment Correctly and Follow Procedures: 

During this review, at the 10 ports-of-entry that we visited, the CBP 
officers we observed conducting primary and secondary inspections 
appeared to follow inspection procedures and to use radiation detection 
equipment correctly. The officers' current proficiency in these areas 
follows increases in training and in CBP's experience using the 
detection equipment. In contrast, in 2003 we reported that CBP officers 
sometimes used radiation detection equipment in ways that reduced its 
effectiveness. 

CBP has increased the number of its officers trained to use radiation 
detection equipment; in fact, the agency now requires that officers 
receive training before they operate radiation detection equipment. As 
of February 2006, CBP had trained 6,410 officers to use radiation 
isotope identification devices, 8,461 to use portal monitors, and 
22,180 to use pagers. Many CBP officers received training on more than 
one piece of equipment and about 900 have since left the agency. 
Generally, today CBP officers receive radiation detection training from 
4 sources: the CBP Academy in Glynco, Georgia; the Border Patrol 
Academy in Artesia, New Mexico; a DOE-sponsored 3-day training course 
for interdicting weapons of mass destruction, in Washington state; and 
on-the-job training at ports-of-entry. Training at the Academies in 
Georgia and New Mexico includes formal classroom instruction, as well 
as hands-on exercises on how to use portal monitors, isotope 
identifiers, and pagers. This training includes simulated scenarios in 
which officers use radiation detection equipment to conduct searches 
for nuclear and radiological materials. On-the-job instruction 
continues at field locations as senior CBP officers, as well as PNNL 
and other DHS contractor staff, work closely with inexperienced 
officers to provide them with practical training on how the radiation 
detection equipment works and how to respond to alarms. According to 
senior CBP officials, all of the instructors that offer training on 
using radiation detection equipment are certified in its use. Trainees 
must demonstrate proficiency in the use of each system prior to 
assuming full responsibility for radiation detection inspections. About 
1,600 CBP officers have participated in DOE's 3-day training course 
designed to acquaint CBP officers with detection equipment. CBP is 
currently developing refresher training courses on the use of radiation 
detection equipment. To further enhance officers' ability to 
effectively respond to real or potential threats, several of the field 
locations that we visited conduct "table-top exercises" that simulate 
scenarios in which the equipment detects an illicit radiological 
source. 

According to several of the CBP field supervisors we contacted, many 
officers have gained proficiency in following procedures and using 
radiation detection equipment through substantial field experience 
responding to alarms. The number of alarms officers typically handle 
varies according to the size of the site, its location, and type. For 
example, an isolated land border site would probably experience fewer 
alarms than a major seaport because of the differences in the volume of 
traffic. However, it was common for several of the locations we visited 
to experience 15 to 60 alarms per day. One seaport we visited had 9 
terminals, usually with 2 primary and 1 secondary portal monitors. 
According to CBP officials, each terminal recorded about 8 to 12 alarms 
per day. The director of port security for a major eastern seaport we 
visited estimated that her facility records roughly 150 portal monitor 
alarms each day. Virtually all have been nuisance alarms, but CBP 
officials still believe they gained valuable experience in using the 
equipment and following procedures. 

All of the primary and secondary inspections we witnessed were nuisance 
alarms. In all of these cases except one, officers followed CBP's 
guidance--as well as local variations meant to address issues unique to 
the area--and correctly used detection equipment. The lone exception 
occurred at a site whose primary inspection station was staffed by a 
state port police officer. After the station's portal monitor 
registered an alarm for a truck departing the site, the police officer 
did not follow CBP's procedures.[Footnote 19] For example, he did not 
collect any documentation from the driver. At all other sites we 
visited, when a primary portal monitor sounded, CBP officers gathered 
the cargo's manifest, the vehicle registration, and the driver's 
license prior to sending the vehicle through secondary inspection. 
Officers use these documents to check the driver and vehicle cargo. The 
port police officer told us that he recognized the driver in this case, 
and so the officer did not believe it was necessary to collect such 
information. A CBP officer performed the secondary inspection in line 
with agency guidance. In fact, after using a radiation isotope 
identification device to conduct an external inspection and determine 
the source of the alarm--potassium hydroxide--the officer required that 
the driver open the back of the truck so she could make a visual check 
of the cargo. From the time of the initial alarm, until the truck 
departed the site boundary, about 35 minutes elapsed. According to port 
and CBP officials, this particular alarm, its resolution, and the 
amount of time it took to resolve are typical of the site. We also 
discussed the site's radiation detection efforts with the truck driver, 
in particular the delay associated with this alarm. He noted that he 
considers the delays experienced at this site to be relatively minor, 
and that the delays have not had any adverse effects on his business. 

We also visited a seaport that experienced a legitimate alarm in which 
CBP officers used the detection equipment correctly and responded 
according to procedures. Uranium hexafluoride, a potentially hazardous 
chemical containing low levels of radioactivity, caused this alarm. A 
primary portal monitor at the seaport sounded as a truck carrying one 
container attempted to exit a terminal. Following standard operating 
procedures, the truck was diverted to a secondary inspection station, 
where a secondary portal monitor also alarmed. A CBP officer then 
scanned the container and cab of the truck with an isotope identifier, 
which indicated that the radiation source was located in the cab within 
several metal pails. The isotope identifier identified two radiation 
sources, one of which was uranium-235--potentially a weapons-usable 
material. The other source was uranium-238. Again following procedures, 
CBP officers isolated the sources of radiation and provided LSS 
scientists with information collected by the isotope identifier. 
Officers also reviewed the driver's delivery papers; used various CBP 
databases to check the driver, importer, and consignee's history of 
transporting goods; and contacted the driver's dispatcher and the U.S. 
consignee to gather information on and assess the legitimacy of the 
shipment. The consignee explained that the pails contained trace 
amounts of uranium hexafluoride that had been sent to the company's 
laboratory for testing. Following additional investigation, which 
included an X-ray of the pails and a review of DOT requirements 
regarding radiation-warning placard requirements, CBP determined that 
the event was not a security threat and released the driver and 
conveyance. Senior officials at this seaport told us that CBP's 
radiation detection guidance served as an effective and successful 
guide to resolving this alarm. 

Potential Issues in CBP's Inspection Procedures Could Be Mitigated to 
Improve Detection Capabilities: 

We identified two potential issues in CBP's national inspection 
procedures that could increase the nation's vulnerability to nuclear 
smuggling. The first potential issue involves NRC documentation. 
Generally, NRC requires that importers obtain an NRC license for their 
legitimate shipments of radiological materials into the United 
States.[Footnote 20] However, NRC regulations do not require that the 
license accompany the shipment, although in some cases importers choose 
to voluntarily include the license. According to CBP officials, CBP 
lacks access to NRC license data that could be used to verify that 
importers actually acquired the necessary licenses or to authenticate a 
license at the border. At present, CBP officers employ a variety of 
investigative techniques to try to determine if individuals or 
organizations are authorized to transport a radiological shipment. For 
example, CBP officers review their entry paperwork, such as shipping 
papers. Officers also often interview drivers about the details of the 
delivery and observe their behavior for any suspicious or unusual 
signs. At one land border crossing we visited, officers told us that 
frequent and legitimate shippers of radiological material provide 
advance notice that a radiological shipment will be transported. This 
can lead to law enforcement personnel being called in to escort the 
shipment through the port-of-entry. 

The second potential issue pertains to CBP's secondary inspection 
guidelines. Generally, CBP's guidelines require that CBP officers 
locate, isolate, and identify the radiation source(s) identified during 
primary inspections. Customarily, officers use a radiation isotope 
identification device to perform an external examination of cargo 
containers in these situations. (See fig. 3.) However, the 
effectiveness of a radiation isotope identification device is 
diminished as its distance from the radioactive source increases, and 
by the thickness of the metal container housing the radioactive source. 
As a result, secondary inspections that rely solely on external 
examinations may not always be able to locate, isolate, and identify an 
illicit shipment of nuclear material. 

Figure 3: CBP Officers Conducting an External Secondary Inspection at a 
Seaport: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

The local procedures at some ports-of-entry we visited go beyond the 
requirements established by CBP's guidelines by having CBP officers 
open and, if necessary, enter containers when conducting secondary 
inspections. (See fig. 4.) For example, at one high-volume seaport we 
visited, the local inspection procedures require officers to open and, 
if necessary, enter a container to locate and identify a radiological 
source if an external examination with an isotope identifier is unable 
to do so. Under such circumstances, the port's procedures require the 
officer to open the container doors, locate the source, and obtain 
another reading as close to the source as possible. By entering the 
container, an officer may be able to reduce the isotope identifier's 
distance from the radioactive source, and thus obtain a more accurate 
reading. If the isotope identifier is unable to detect and identify the 
source after two readings within the container, officers must contact 
LSS for further guidance. Officers at this seaport have opened 
containers in the past when the isotope identifier had been unable to 
detect naturally occurring radioactive material, such as granite or 
ceramic tile, which is low in radioactive emissions. CBP supervisors at 
this seaport said that this occurs infrequently and that it adds a very 
minimal amount of time to the inspection process. In addition, at a 
land border crossing we visited, the local standard operating 
procedures instruct CBP officers to conduct a physical examination on 
vehicles that alarm for the presence of radiation. Officials at this 
particular port-of-entry said that they have entered vehicles with an 
isotope identifier when the device has been unable to detect or 
identify the radioactive source from vehicles' exterior. During a 
physical examination, officers are supposed to open the vehicle and 
look for high-density materials, such as lead or steel, which can be 
used to shield gamma radiation and solid objects with large quantities 
of liquid that could be used to shield neutron radiation. Because the 
majority of alarms at this land border crossing are caused by medical 
isotopes in people, CBP officers physically inspect vehicles on an 
infrequent basis. 

Figure 4: A CBP Officer Entering a Cargo Container During a Secondary 
Inspection at a Seaport: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Finally, we also visited a land border crossing where CBP officers 
routinely open and enter commercial trucks to conduct secondary 
inspections, even though the site's local procedures do not require 
this additional examination. Officials at this port said that they open 
up containers to verify that the container's manifest and reading from 
the isotope identifier are consistent with the container's load. If 
they are not consistent, CBP officers are supposed to contact LSS for 
further guidance. During our visit, we observed a truck that alarmed at 
primary and secondary portal monitors. CBP officers then required the 
driver to park at a loading dock, where officers first used an isotope 
identifier to screen the truck from the outside; the reading from the 
isotope identifier was inconclusive, however. Officers then opened and 
entered the container with an isotope identifier, conducted a second 
reading of the radioactive source, and determined that the material 
inside the container was a non-threatening radioactive source that 
matched the manifest. A CBP supervisor released the truck. This 
inspection, from the time of the original alarm to the truck's release 
took about 25 minutes--slightly greater than the 20-minute average for 
this site. According to CBP supervisors, officers at this port-of-entry 
follow this practice routinely, even during the site's peak hours. This 
approach enables the officers to get closer to the source and obtain a 
more accurate reading. Furthermore, since this practice enables 
officers to conduct a more thorough examination of the containers' 
contents, it may increase the likelihood that CBP officers will find 
any illicit radioactive material. According to senior CBP officials at 
this port-of-entry, despite being implemented at one of the busiest 
commercial ports-of-entry in the nation, this additional procedure has 
had little negative impact on the flow of commerce and has not 
increased the cost of CBP inspections. 

DHS Is Working to Improve the Capabilities of Currently-fielded and New 
Radiation Detection Equipment, but Much Work Remains to Achieve Better 
Equipment Performance: 

DHS has managed research, development, and testing activities that 
attempt to address the inherent limitations of currently-fielded 
radiation detection equipment and to produce new, advanced technologies 
with even greater detection capabilities. DHS is enhancing its ability 
to test detection equipment by building a new test facility at DOE's 
Nevada Test Site. In addition, DHS tests radiation detection equipment 
under real-life conditions at S&T's CMTB in New York and New Jersey. 
However, much work remains for the agency to achieve consistently 
better detection capabilities, as the efforts undertaken so far have 
achieved only mixed results. 

Currently-fielded Radiation Detection Equipment Has Inherent 
Limitations: 

Currently-fielded radiation portal monitors have two main limitations. 
First, they are limited by the physical properties of the radiation 
they are designed to detect, specifically with regard to the range of 
detection (some radioactive material emits more radiation than others). 
Further, this limitation can be exacerbated because sufficient amounts 
of high-density materials, such as lead or steel, can shield radiation 
emissions to prevent their detection. Second, currently-fielded portal 
monitors cannot distinguish between different types of radioactive 
materials, i.e., they cannot differentiate naturally occurring 
radioactive material from radiological threat materials. CBP officers 
are required to conduct secondary inspections on all portal monitor 
alarms, including nuisance alarms. According to the CBP field 
supervisors with whom we spoke, nuisance alarms comprise almost all of 
the radiation alerts at their ports-of-entry. Port operators noted a 
concern that nuisance alarms might become so numerous that commerce 
could be impeded, but thus far these alarms have not greatly slowed the 
flow of commerce through their ports-of-entry. 

CBP's currently-fielded radiation isotope identification devices also 
have inherent limitations. For example, during some secondary 
inspections, radiation isotope identification devices are unable to 
identify radiological material. In these cases, CBP standard procedures 
require that officers consult LSS to conclusively identify the source. 
According to CBP officers at two of the ports we visited, this usually 
lengthens secondary inspections by 20 to 30 minutes, although in some 
cases an hour or more was needed to resolve the alarm. Furthermore, a 
2003 Los Alamos National Laboratory evaluation of seven isotope 
identifiers, including the one deployed by CBP, concluded that all 
devices had difficulty recognizing radioactive material and correctly 
identifying the material they did recognize. The Los Alamos finding is 
consistent with our field observations, as CBP officers at several of 
the ports-of-entry we visited reported similar trouble with their 
radiation isotope identification devices. 

Laboratory testing of currently-fielded radiation detection equipment 
has further demonstrated their limitations in effectively detecting and 
identifying nuclear material. For example, in February 2005, DHS 
sponsored testing of commercially available portal monitors, isotope 
identifiers, and pagers against criteria set out in American National 
Standards Institute (ANSI) standards. The ANSI standards provide 
performance specifications and test methods for testing radiation 
detection equipment, including portal monitors and handheld devices. 
The actual testing was performed by four DOE laboratories, with 
coordination, technical management, and data evaluation provided by the 
Department of Commerce's National Institute for Standards and 
Technology (NIST). The laboratories tested a total of 14 portal 
monitors from 8 manufacturers against 29 performance requirements in 
the ANSI standards. Overall, none of the radiation detection equipment, 
including the portal monitors and handheld devices deployed by CBP, met 
all of the performance requirements in this first round of testing. 
However, according to S&T officials, many of the limitations noted in 
CBP's equipment were related to withstanding environmental conditions-
-not radiation detection or isotope identification. However, in some 
tests, the portal monitors that CBP employs, along with many others, 
exhibited poor results. For example, in tests conducted to evaluate the 
portal monitors' response to neutron radiation, of which plutonium is a 
primary source, almost all monitors, including a portal monitor fielded 
by CBP, failed to meet the ANSI requirement. However, according to S&T 
officials, the test was conducted using the manufacturer's standard 
configuration, rather than the configuration CBP uses in its field 
operations. In another test, one that used CBP's typical field 
parameters rather than the manufacturer's, the portal monitor passed 
all the radiation detection performance requirements. S&T believes that 
the portals used by CBP would meet all the radiation performance 
requirements if set up with the parameters and configuration as used in 
the field. In addition, isotope identifiers displayed weaknesses. For 
example, the isotope identifier currently in use by CBP was not able to 
simultaneously identify two different isotopes, as required by the ANSI 
standards. When tested with barium-133 and plutonium-239, the isotope 
identifier was able to recognize the barium but failed to recognize the 
plutonium--a weapons-grade nuclear material. As this was a first round 
of testing and modifications were made to both the standards and 
testing protocols after the procedures were completed, NIST plans to 
manage testing of the equipment again in early 2006. The results from 
both rounds of testing are intended to provide guidance for federal, 
state, and local officials in evaluating and purchasing radiation 
detection equipment, and to enable manufacturers to improve their 
equipment's performance. 

DHS Has Sponsored Research and Development to Improve the Capabilities 
of Current Technology and to Develop New Technology but Much Work 
Remains: 

DHS has sponsored research efforts designed to improve the detection 
capabilities of the currently-fielded portal monitors and to provide 
them with the ability to distinguish radiological sources. For example, 
PNNL researched, developed, and tested a new software--known as "energy 
windowing"--to address the currently-fielded portal monitors' inability 
to distinguish between radiological materials. Energy- windowing is 
supposed to identify and screen out material, such as fertilizer or 
kitty litter, that cause nuisance alarms and thereby reduce the number 
of such alarms at cargo screening facilities, while also improving the 
portal monitor's sensitivity to identify nuclear material of concern. 
PNNL has activated energy-windowing on the 556 portal monitors it has 
deployed at land border crossings and seaports. At a few ports-of-entry 
that we visited, CBP officials said that the software has been 
effective in significantly reducing the number of nuisance alarms. 
However, tests of the software have shown that its effectiveness in 
reducing nuisance alarms largely depends on the types of radiation 
sources it has been programmed to detect and differentiate. In tests 
involving some common, unshielded radiation sources, such as cobalt-57 
and barium-153, the new software has shown improved detection and 
discrimination capabilities. However, during scenarios that target 
other common, shielded threat sources--such as those that might be used 
in a shielded radiological dispersal device or nuclear weapon--the 
software has been less able to detect and discriminate. Experts have 
recommended further testing to fully explore the software's 
capabilities. 

DHS is also sponsoring the development of three new technologies that 
are designed to address the main inherent limitations of currently- 
fielded portal monitors. CBP's deployment plan currently calls for the 
widespread installation of the first of these technologies, "advanced 
spectroscopic portal monitors." According to DNDO, the advanced 
spectroscopic technology uses different detection materials that are 
capable of both detecting the presence of radiation and identifying the 
isotope causing the alarm. It is hoped that the spectroscopic portal 
monitor can more quickly identify the sources of alarms, thereby 
reducing the number of nuisance alarms. This increased operational 
effectiveness may allow the portal monitors to be set at a lower 
detection threshold, thus allowing for greater sensitivity to materials 
of concern. DHS commissioned PNNL to determine whether spectroscopic 
portal monitors provide improved performance capabilities over the 
currently-fielded monitors. In July 2004 and July 2005, PNNL conducted 
two small-scale preliminary studies to compare the two types of portal 
monitors in side-by-side tests using shielded and unshielded 
radioactive materials. In the first test, PNNL concluded that the 
relative performance of spectroscopic and currently-fielded portal 
monitors is highly dependent on variables such as the radioactive 
sources being targeted and the analytic methods being used. The results 
of these tests were mixed. In some situations, spectroscopic portal 
monitors outperformed the current technology; in other cases, they 
performed equally well. In the second test, PNNL concluded that the 
spectroscopic monitor's ability to detect the shielded threat sources 
was equal to, but no better than, those of the currently-fielded portal 
monitors. However, because spectroscopic portal monitors have the 
ability to identify isotopes, they produced fewer nuisance alarms than 
the current portal monitors. PNNL noted that because the studies were 
limited in scope, more testing is needed. 

In October 2005, DNDO completed the first round of comprehensive 
testing of spectroscopic portal monitors at its testbed at the Nevada 
Test Site. DNDO tested 10 spectroscopic portal monitors against 3 
currently-fielded monitors in 7,000 test runs involving the portal 
monitors' ability to detect a variety of radiological materials under 
many different cargo configurations. According to senior DNDO officials 
who supervised these tests, preliminary analysis of test data indicates 
that the spectroscopic portal monitors' performance demonstrated 
somewhat mixed results. Spectroscopic portal monitors outperformed 
currently-fielded equipment in detecting numerous small, medium-sized, 
and threat-like radioactive objects, and were able to identify and 
dismiss most naturally occurring radioactive material. However, as the 
amount of source material declined in size, the detection capabilities 
of both types of portal monitors converged. Because the data produced 
by the test runs is voluminous and complex, NIST and another contractor 
are still in the process of analyzing the test data and plan to produce 
a report summarizing the results of the testing in 2006. DNDO received 
responses to the Advanced Spectroscopic Portal Request for Proposal in 
February 2006, and intends to use the data from the Nevada Test Site to 
help evaluate these responses. In fiscal year 2006, DNDO also intends 
to award contracts to two or three manufacturers for further 
engineering development and production. 

The second new technology is "high-Z detection," which is designed to 
better detect high atomic number (high-Z) materials--such as Special 
Nuclear Material (SNM)--and shielding materials--such as lead--that 
could be used to shield gamma radiation from portal monitors. The Cargo 
Advanced Automated Radiography System (CAARS) program within DNDO is 
intended to develop the technologies necessary for automated detection 
of high-Z material. DNDO envisions using the advanced portal monitor 
technology for the detection of lightly shielded nuclear threats and 
radiological dispersal devices, and using CAARS technology for the 
detection of high-Z materials. 

The third new technology is "active interrogation," which is designed 
to better detect nuclear material, especially shielded sources, and 
DNDO expects it to play a role further in the future than advanced 
portal monitors and CAARS. DHS and DOE are supporting research at DOE 
national laboratories, such as Los Alamos and Lawrence Livermore, to 
develop these systems. Active interrogation systems probe or 
"interrogate" containers with neutron or gamma rays to induce 
additional radiation emissions from radioactive material within the 
container. According to DNDO, these systems are too large and costly to 
consider for current use. In addition, because these systems emit 
radiation, care will have to be taken to ensure personnel safety before 
any deployments are made. 

In addition to these relatively near-term research and development 
efforts, DNDO intends to solicit proposals from private, public, 
academic, and federally funded research centers to pursue radiation 
detection projects with a more long-term orientation. The solicitation 
identifies five areas of research: 

* mobile detection systems that can be used to detect potential 
radiological threats that are in transit, at fixed locations, and at 
special events; 

* detection systems that can be integrated into ships, trucks, planes, 
or into containers; 

* active detection technologies, including portal monitors and handheld 
devices that can detect and verify the presence of shielded nuclear 
materials; 

* innovative detector materials that provide improved detection and 
isotope identification capabilities over existing materials, in 
addition to technologies that lead to reductions in the costs to 
manufacture detector materials, increasing the size and choice of the 
shapes of detector materials without a loss in performance; and: 

* alternate means to detect and identify nuclear material other than 
through radiation detection such as mass, density, or temperature. 

DHS Sponsors Test Facilities in Nevada, New York, and New Jersey to 
Support Efforts to Improve Detection Capabilities: 

DHS is testing commercially available portal monitors, advanced portal 
monitors, and handheld devices at its new Radiological and Nuclear 
Countermeasures Test and Evaluation Complex at the Nevada Test Site 
(NTS). DNDO, with assistance from DOE's National Nuclear Security 
Administration, began construction of the complex in 2005.[Footnote 21] 
While construction work is under way, an Interim Test Track was built 
nearby. The complex is to support the DNDO's development, testing, 
acquisition, and support of the deployment of radiation detection 
technologies. When completed, the complex will be comprised of several 
operating areas where testing and evaluation of detection systems will 
be conducted, such as a testing facility to evaluate active 
interrogation technologies; and a large, instrumented outdoor testing 
area to test mobile detection systems. The complex will also have a 
vehicle choke point where detection systems for land border crossings, 
toll plazas, and entrances to tunnels and bridges can be evaluated. 
According to DNDO officials, an important advantage of using NTS is 
that it provides the necessary facilities to test detection system 
capabilities with special nuclear materials in threat-representative 
configurations. The complex will be open to other organizations within 
DHS, including CBP, S&T, the Transportation Security Administration, 
and the U.S. Coast Guard. It will also be open to DOE national 
laboratories, universities, and private companies conducting radiation 
detection development and production for DHS. The facility is expected 
to become fully operational in January 2007. 

In addition to the Nevada complex, DHS manages CMTB to test radiation 
detection equipment in an operational environment. The CMTB originated 
as a DOE funded demonstration project in fiscal year 2003, but 
transferred to DHS in August 2003. The scientific, engineering, and 
technical staff of the CMTB are drawn predominantly from the national 
laboratories. The test bed encompasses various operational settings, 
such as major seaports, airports, roadways, and railways. The CMTB 
deploys commercially available and advanced radiation detection 
equipment at these venues to test and evaluate their performance in 
real-world situations, to develop better standard operating procedures, 
and to assess the impact the equipment has on the flow of commerce. At 
present, CMTB is testing portal monitors at toll crossings of two 
tunnels and one bridge, two seaport terminals, and two air cargo 
facilities. In addition, CMTB is developing several advanced secondary 
inspection mobile technologies. (See fig. 5.) The advanced 
spectroscopic portal monitors that DNDO is developing will likely be 
evaluated at the CMTB, once testing is completed at the Nevada Test 
Site. 

Figure 5: The "SMARTCART," a Mobile Portal Monitor Using Advanced 
Detection Technology, Being Tested at the CMTB in New York: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

The Newly Created Domestic Nuclear Detection Office Is Structured to 
Improve Coordination of Executive Branch Radiation Detection Programs: 

DHS works with DOE, DOD, and other federal, state, and local agencies, 
as well as the private sector to carry out radiation detection 
programs. The newly established DNDO was set up to serve as DHS's main 
instrument for coordinating these efforts. Since its creation in April 
2005, DNDO has entered into working relationships with other agencies 
and is taking the lead in developing what it calls a "global 
architecture," an integrated approach to detecting and stopping nuclear 
smuggling. However, because DNDO was created so recently, these efforts 
are in their early stages of development and implementation. 

DNDO Attempts to Improve Cooperation Among Other DHS Offices, DOE, DOD, 
and Other Agencies in Deploying and Operating Equipment: 

Historically, cooperation among agencies engaged in domestic radiation 
detection has been limited. In April 2005, however, the president 
signed a joint presidential directive that directed the establishment 
of DNDO to, among other things, improve such cooperation by creating a 
single accountable organization with the responsibility for 
establishing strong linkages across the federal government and with 
other entities. As currently envisioned under the directive, DNDO's 
mission covers a broad spectrum of radiological and nuclear protective 
measures, but focuses mainly on nuclear detection. The directive 
includes several provisions directing DNDO to coordinate its activities 
with other entities. For example, DNDO is to work with DOE, DOD, the 
Departments of State and Justice, state and local agencies, and the 
private sector to develop programs to thwart illicit movements of 
nuclear materials. In addition, provisions of the directive require 
consultation between DNDO, law enforcement and nonproliferation 
centers, as well as other related federal and state agencies. Table 2 
provides a summary of the cooperation brought about by the presidential 
directive. 

Table 2: Cooperation with DNDO Brought about by Presidential Directive: 

Department of Homeland Security: 

Agency: S&T; 
Responsibilities: All radiological/nuclear detection programs and staff 
subsumed by DNDO. 

Agency: U.S. Coast Guard (USCG); 
Responsibilities: USCG and DNDO coordinate on detection and reporting 
resources, and protocols to ensure that USCG equipment is state-of-the-
art and that detection events are properly reported. 

Agency: Office of State & Local; Government Coordination and 
Preparedness (SLGCP); 
Responsibilities: DNDO works to ensure good communication, 
coordination, and takes other actions with state and local governments. 
SLGCP personnel help staff DNDO. 

Interagency Components: 

Agency: Department of Energy; 
Responsibilities: Provide staffing to, and coordinates with, DNDO in 
equipping National Incident Response Teams. DOE also provides DNDO with 
information from overseas programs. Makes the NTS and special nuclear 
materials available for DNDO testing. 

Agency: Department of Defense; 
Responsibilities: Provide staffing to DNDO. Facilitate coordination 
between DOD detection programs and domestic programs. Coordinate on 
technical "reachback capabilities." Integrate any domestic detection 
systems in communities near military bases with DNDO assets. 

Agency: Department of Justice; 
Responsibilities: Provide staffing to DNDO. FBI will coordinate on 
establishing and executing "reachback capabilities." FBI remains the 
lead law enforcement agency in terrorist events. 

Agency: Department of State; 
Responsibilities: Provide links and overall coordination between DNDO 
and non-U.S. organizations responsible for radiation detection. 

Agency: Central Intelligence Agency; 
Responsibilities: Primary responsibility for gathering, analyzing, and 
disseminating intelligence information relevant to DNDO operations. The 
agency will accept collection requirements through channels from DNDO. 

Agency: Nuclear Regulatory Commission; 
Responsibilities: Coordinate detection requirements with DNDO. DNDO 
shares detection event data with NRC, and NRC shares information with 
DNDO on legal shipments of radiological materials. 

Source: DNDO. 

[End of table] 

According to senior DNDO officials, although the close cooperation 
called for in DNDO's mandate has been difficult to achieve, there are 
two factors that may help DNDO succeed in this effort. First, the 
presidential directive is explicit in directing other federal agencies 
to support DNDO's efforts. The directive transfers primary 
responsibility for radiation and nuclear detection activities in the 
United States to DNDO, and requires DNDO to include personnel from 
other agencies in its organization. For example, under the directive, 
DOE will provide DNDO with information received from overseas programs, 
including the Megaports Initiative and others, as well as information 
from DOE's international partners involved with radiological and 
nuclear detection systems. Second, all of the radiological and nuclear 
detection programs and staff of S&T became part of DNDO. 

DOE's Second Line of Defense program supports DNDO efforts by working 
with the agency to exchange information, data, and lessons learned from 
overseas deployments. According to senior officials at DNDO, the data 
from overseas deployments are needed to help DNDO efforts to develop 
profiles of potential risks to the United States. In addition, the 
performance of these systems, as evidenced by these data, can help 
improve domestic portal monitors' ability to detect radiation. In 
addition, DOE provides equipment training opportunities for DHS 
personnel. In April 2005, DOE and DHS formalized certain aspects of 
this cooperation in a memorandum of understanding. Specifically, the 
areas of cooperation include, among other things: discussing procedures 
for the rapid analysis of cargo and for operational/emergency 
responses, training CBP officers, exchanging technical and lessons 
learned information, and providing updates on their respective 
programs' implementation. 

DHS has also entered into formal agreements with state and local 
governments to coordinate their radiation detection efforts. For 
example, in April 2005, just prior to DNDO's creation, DHS and the Port 
Authority of New York and New Jersey finalized a memorandum of 
understanding to provide services, personnel, and equipment to run the 
CMTB program. Specifically, the program is designed to evaluate and 
assess the role of threat detection technologies, develop and exercise 
various concepts of operation and response tools, integrate lessons 
learned from field experiences, and provide detection and monitoring 
capabilities for testing and evaluation purposes. The agreement spells 
out each partner's responsibilities, including coordination with other 
agencies. According to a senior DNDO official, DNDO now has 
responsibility for this and other similar agreements under its 
authority to develop and evaluate new radiation detection equipment. 

Finally, DNDO officials also believe that the way the agency has been 
staffed and organized will aid its cooperation efforts. For example, 
staff from DHS, DOD, DOE, the Departments of State and Justice, and 
other agencies, have been detailed to DNDO. All of DNDO's major 
organizational units are staffed with personnel from multiple agencies. 
For example, the strategic planning staff within the Office of the 
Director has employees from DOE, DOD, CBP, Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI), and DHS's Office of State and Local Government 
Coordination and Preparedness. Significantly, DNDO's Office of 
Operations Support, which is designed to provide real-time situational 
data as well as technical support to field units, is headed by an FBI 
executive with senior staff from CBP, DOE, and DHS's Transportation 
Security Administration providing direct management support. According 
to a senior DNDO official, having this broad range of agencies 
represented in DNDO decision making helps ensure that agencies' views 
are heard and fully considered, thereby helping to achieve the greatest 
possible consensus even for difficult decisions. Further, agency 
personnel detailed to DNDO have the authority to "bind" their 
respective agencies, i.e., whatever decisions or agreements are reached 
under the auspices of DNDO will bind their agency to comply to the 
extent permitted by law. Finally, according to senior officials in DOE 
and CBP, the current organizational arrangement appears to be working. 
Officials noted that early in DNDO's history, communication was 
difficult, but has recently improved. For example, CBP and DOE 
officials told us they had hoped to have greater input into DNDO's 
early efforts to develop integrated radiation detection systems. 
However, these officials noted that by October 2005, DNDO seemed to 
have heard and acted upon their recommendations. However, although 
these officials were optimistic about future collaborations with DNDO, 
they also noted that DNDO has not yet completed a large enough body of 
work to conclude firmly that its coordination efforts will always be 
similarly successful. 

DNDO Is Cooperating with Other Agencies to Develop a Global Nuclear 
Detection System: 

Among the main purposes in creating the DNDO, according to its 
Director, is to develop a global nuclear detection system that he 
characterized as a "global architecture." DNDO's intention in 
developing such an approach is to coordinate other agencies' efforts, 
such as the Second Line of Defense and Container Security Initiative, 
with the domestic deployment program to create an integrated, worldwide 
system. The resulting "global architecture" would be a multi-layered 
defense strategy that includes programs that attempt to secure nuclear 
materials and detect their movements overseas; to develop intelligence 
information on nuclear materials' trans-shipments and possible movement 
to the United States; and to integrate these elements with domestic 
efforts undertaken by governments--federal, state, local, and tribal-- 
and the private sector. Much of DNDO's work in terms of acquiring and 
supporting the deployment of radiation detection equipment, as well as 
in supporting research, development, and testing of new detection 
equipment supports the office's mission to develop the U.S. domestic 
portion this global architecture. 

In addition, DHS, in conjunction with selected state and local 
organizations, as well as other federal agencies and the private 
sector, began two pilot projects in fiscal year 2003 to demonstrate a 
layered defense system designed to protect the United States against 
radiological and nuclear threats. DHS's Radiological Pilot Programs 
Office coordinated the projects' initial efforts, and DNDO assumed 
responsibility in October 2005. Field work began in fiscal year 2004 
and will be completed in fiscal year 2007. The project leaders expect 
the final report and lessons learned to be issued in fiscal year 2007. 
Both pilot projects featured a broad selection of federal, state, and 
local agencies, including state law enforcement, counter-terrorism, 
emergency management, transportation, and port authorities. 

Conclusions: 

DHS has made progress deploying radiation detection equipment at U.S. 
ports-of-entry; notably, the department achieved these gains without 
greatly impeding the flow of commerce (i.e., the movement of cargo 
containers out of ports-of-entry). However, we believe that DHS will 
find it difficult under current plans and assumptions to meet its 
current portal monitor deployment schedule at U.S. borders because it 
would have to increase its current rate of deployment by 230 percent to 
meet its September 2009 deadline. Our analysis of CBP's and PNNL's 
earned value data suggests that millions of dollars worth of work is 
being deferred each month and that the work that is completed is 
costing millions more than planned. Currently, we estimate that CBP is 
facing a likely cost overrun of about $340 million, and that the last 
portal monitor may not be installed until late 2014. Unless CBP and 
PNNL make immediate improvements in the schedule performance, then 
additional slippage in the deployment schedule is likely. 

A key overriding cause for these delays is the late disbursal of funds 
to DHS contractors. This late dispersal disrupts and delays some 
ongoing installation projects. In this regard, DHS approval processes 
for documentation requested by the House Appropriations Committee are 
lengthy and cumbersome. In one case, for example, funds for fiscal year 
2005 were not made available to the DHS contractor until September 
2005, the last month of the fiscal year. This process is taking too 
long and needs to be shortened. 

Further, the unsure efficacy and uncertain cost associated with the 
advanced portal monitor technology means that DHS cannot determine, 
with confidence, how much the program will eventually cost. In 
particular, even if the advanced portal monitor technology can be shown 
superior to current technology--which currently does not seem certain-
-DHS does not yet know whether the new technology will be worth its 
considerable additional cost. Only after testing of the advanced portal 
monitors has been completed and DHS has rigorously compared currently- 
fielded and advanced portal monitors, taking into account their 
differences in cost, will DHS be able to answer this question. 

CBP has experienced difficulty deploying portal monitors at seaports, 
at least in part because it has been unable to reach agreements with 
many seaport operators, who are concerned that radiation detection 
efforts may delay the flow of commerce through their ports. As a 
result, the agency has fallen 2 years behind its seaport deployment 
schedule--and seaports continue to be vulnerable to nuclear smuggling. 
Significantly, there is no clear solution and no reason to be 
optimistic that progress can be made soon. CBP's policy of negotiating 
deployment agreements with seaport terminal operators has not yet 
yielded agreements at many seaports and this has caused significant 
delays in the deployment of portal monitors at some seaports. CBP has 
chosen not to attempt to force terminal operators to cooperate. A 
subset of this issue concerns screening rail traffic leaving seaports, 
which is a particularly difficult problem. The operational concerns of 
performing secondary rail inspections in seaports are daunting. Some 
port operators as well as a national study strongly suggest that rail 
transport will increase over the next 10 years. However, unless an 
effective and efficient means to screen rail traffic is developed and 
deployed, seaports will likely continue to either avoid installing 
detection equipment altogether, or simply turn it off when its 
operation might prove to be inconvenient. Without more progress on this 
front, we risk rail cargo becoming a burgeoning gap in our defenses 
against nuclear terrorism. 

CBP appears to have made progress in using radiation detection 
equipment correctly and adhering to inspection procedures. At several 
ports-of-entry we visited, CBP officers physically opened and inspected 
cargo containers to confirm the nature of the radiological source under 
certain circumstances. They did this when they were unable to confirm 
the type of radiological material through current approved procedures. 
Since the currently deployed handheld equipment is limited in its 
ability to accurately identify sources of radiation, opening the 
container allows CBP officers to get closer to the source of the alarm 
and thereby improve their chances of accurately identifying the source. 
It also enables officers to verify that the container's contents are 
consistent with the isotope identifier's initial reading and the 
container's manifest. Furthermore, since DHS and DOE officials have 
expressed concerns that illicit radiological material could be 
shielded, this practice enables officers to conduct a more thorough 
examination of the containers' contents--thereby increasing the 
likelihood that CBP officers will find any illicit radioactive 
material. Importantly, this process, according to border security 
officials, did not impede the progress of commerce through any port-of- 
entry. 

On the other hand, because CBP officers do not have access to NRC 
licensing data, it is difficult for them to verify that shippers have 
obtained necessary NRC licenses and to verify the authenticity of any 
NRC licenses that may accompany shipments of radioactive materials. As 
a result, unless nuclear smugglers in possession of faked license 
documents raised suspicions in some other way, CBP officers could 
follow agency guidelines yet unwittingly allow them to enter the 
country with their illegal nuclear cargo. As we see it, this is a 
significant gap in CBP's national procedures that should be closed. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Since DHS provides the Congress with information concerning the 
acquisition and deployment of portal monitors, and since DHS's 
procedures to obtain internal agreement on this information are lengthy 
and cumbersome--often resulting in delays--we recommend that the 
Secretary of Homeland Security, working with the Director of DNDO and 
the Commissioner of CBP, review these approval procedures and take 
actions necessary to ensure that DHS submits information to the 
Congress early in the fiscal year. 

In order to complete the radiation portal monitor deployment program, 
as planned, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security, 
working with the Director of DNDO, and in concert with CBP and PNNL, 
devise a plan to close the gap between the current deployment rate and 
the rate needed to complete deployments by September 2009. 

To ensure that DHS's substantial investment in radiation detection 
technology yields the greatest possible level of detection capability 
at the lowest possible cost, we recommend that once the costs and 
capabilities of advanced technology portal monitors are well 
understood, and before any of the new equipment is purchased, the 
Secretary of Homeland Security work with the Director of DNDO to 
analyze the benefits and costs of deploying advanced portal monitors. 
This analysis should focus on determining whether any additional 
detection capability provided by the advanced equipment is worth its 
additional cost. After completing this cost-benefit analysis, the 
Secretary of Homeland Security, working with the Director of DNDO, 
should revise its total program cost estimates to reflect current 
decisions. 

To help speed seaport deployments and to help ensure that future rail 
deployments proceed on time, we recommend that the Secretary of 
Homeland Security, in cooperation with the Commissioner of CBP, develop 
procedures for effectively screening rail containers and develop new 
technologies to facilitate inspections. 

To increase the chances that CBP officers find illicit radiological 
material, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security, working 
with the Commissioner of CBP, consider modifying the agency's standard 
operating procedures for secondary inspections to include physically 
opening cargo containers during secondary inspections at all ports-of- 
entry when the external inspection does not conclusively identify the 
radiological material inside. 

To further increase the chances that CBP officers identify illicit 
radiological material, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland 
Security, working with the Chairman of NRC, develop a way for CBP 
border officers to determine whether radiological shipments have the 
necessary NRC licenses and to verify the authenticity of NRC licenses 
that accompany such shipments. 

To ensure that CBP is receiving reliable cost and schedule data, we 
recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct PNNL to have 
its earned value management system validated so that it complies with 
guidance developed by the American National Standards 
Institute/Electronic Industries Alliance. In addition, we recommend the 
Secretary of Homeland Security direct CBP and PNNL to conduct an 
Integrated Baseline Review to ensure its earned value management data 
is reliable for assessing risk and developing alternatives. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

We provided a draft of this report to DHS for comment. In response, we 
received written comments from DHS officials. DHS noted that the report 
is factually correct. Further, the Department agreed with our 
recommendations and committed to implementing them. DHS officials also 
commented that our review did not completely capture the enormity or 
complexity of the Radiation Portal Monitor program. We agree that this 
program is a massive undertaking, and our original draft reflected this 
perspective in several places. In commenting on our recommendation to 
develop a better means for CBP border officers to verify NRC license 
information, DHS stated that "NRC licenses are required to accompany 
certain legitimate shipments of radiological materials…" However, DHS 
is wrong on this point. According to senior NRC officials, no such 
requirement exists. Finally, DHS provided some clarifying comments that 
we incorporated into this report, as appropriate. 

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents 
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days 
from the report date. At that time, we will send copies to the 
congressional committees with jurisdiction over DHS and its activities; 
the Secretary of Homeland Security; the Director of OMB; and interested 
congressional committees. We will also make copies of the report 
available to others upon request. This report will also be available at 
no charge on GAO's home page at [Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please 
contact me at (202) 512-3841. Contact points for our Offices of 
Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last 
page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this 
report are listed in appendix IV. 

Signed by: 

Gene Aloise: 
Director, Natural Resources and Environment: 

List of Requesters: 

The Honorable Norm Coleman: 
Chairman: 
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations: 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Susan M. Collins: 
Chairman: 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Carl Levin: 
Ranking Minority Member: 
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations: 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable John D. Dingell: 
Ranking Minority Member: 
Committee on Energy and Commerce House of Representatives: 

[End of section] 

Appendixes: 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

To assess the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) progress in 
deploying radiation detection equipment, including radiation portal 
monitors, radiation isotope identification devices, and pagers at U.S. 
ports-of-entry and any problems associated with that deployment, we 
reviewed documents and interviewed officials from the U.S. Customs and 
Border Protection (CBP), Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO), and 
Pacific Northwest National Laboratory (PNNL). We focused primarily on 
the issues surrounding radiation portal monitors because they are a 
major tool in the federal government's efforts to thwart nuclear 
smuggling, and because the budget and other resources devoted to these 
machines far exceeds the handheld equipment also used at U.S. ports-of- 
entry. Further, we focused on the use of radiation detection equipment 
in primary and secondary inspections, but we did not examine their use 
as a part of CBP's targeted inspections. To assess CBP's current 
progress in deploying portal monitors, we compared PNNL's December 2004 
project execution plan for deploying radiation portal monitors-- 
including the project's schedule and estimated cost. We analyzed 
budget, cost, and deployment data on portal monitors to determine 
differences between PNNL's plan and its current progress. We also 
assessed PNNL's cost and schedule performance using earned value 
analysis techniques based on data captured in PNNL's contract 
performance reports. We also developed a forecast of future cost 
growth. We based the lower end of our forecast range on the sum of 
costs spent to date and the forecast cost of work remaining. The 
remaining work was forecast using an average of the current cost 
performance index efficiency factor. For the upper end of our cost 
range, we relied on the actual costs spent to date added to the 
forecast of remaining work with an average monthly cost and schedule 
performance index. 

We also visited a nonprobability sample of CBP ports-of-entry, 
including two international mail and express courier facilities, five 
seaports, and three land border crossings.[Footnote 22] We selected 
these ports-of-entry by using criteria such as the types of ports-of- 
entry where CBP plans to deploy equipment; ports-of-entry with wide 
geographic coverage; and ports-of-entry where portal monitors have 
been--or are planned to be--installed. During each visit, we spoke with 
CBP inspectors and local port authority officials on the progress made, 
and any problems experienced in deploying the equipment at their 
locations. 

To assess CBP officers' use of radiation detection equipment, and how 
inspection procedures are implemented at U.S. ports-of-entry, and any 
problems associated with the use of the equipment, we reviewed CBP's 
standard operating procedures for radiation detection; documents on its 
training curriculum; and training materials on how to use the 
equipment. We participated in a 3-day hands-on training course for CBP 
officers at PNNL on how to use radiation detection equipment. We also 
interviewed officials from CBP field and headquarters to discuss 
problems associated with the use of the equipment. During our site 
visits, we toured the facilities, observed the equipment in use, and 
interviewed CBP officers about radiation detection policies and 
procedures and the deployment of equipment at their locations. We 
discussed with CBP officers how they determine the validity of Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission (NRC) licenses when legitimate shipments of 
radioactive material enter the nation. 

To assess DHS's progress in improving and testing radiation detection 
equipment capabilities, we reviewed documents and interviewed officials 
from CBP, DNDO, Science and Technology Directorate (S&T), DOE, PNNL, 
and the National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST). We 
reviewed S&T's April 2005 Program Execution Plan; DHS documentation on 
the development of advanced radiation detection technologies; and test 
results and assessments of the performance of both commercially 
available radiation detection equipment and advanced technologies. We 
visited four national laboratories--Lawrence Livermore, Los Alamos, 
Pacific Northwest, and Sandia--that are involved in the research, 
development, and testing of radiation detection technologies. In 
addition, we visited the Counter Measures Test Bed (CMTB) in New York 
and New Jersey, the Nevada Test Site, and the Department of Defense's 
(DOD) test site at a U.S. Air Force base to observe the testing of 
radiation detection equipment and discuss progress in improving and 
testing radiation detection equipment with onsite experts. 

To assess the level of cooperation between DHS and other federal 
agencies in conducting radiation detection programs, we interviewed 
officials from CBP; S&T; the Transportation Security Administration; 
DOD's Defense Threat Reduction Agency; DOE's National Nuclear Security 
Administration; and Lawrence Livermore, Los Alamos, Pacific Northwest, 
and Sandia National Laboratories. We discussed the current extent of 
coordination and whether more coordination could result in improvements 
to DHS's deployment, development, and testing of radiation detection 
equipment and technologies. We reviewed agency agreements to cooperate, 
including a memorandum of understanding between DHS and DOE to exchange 
information on radiation detection technologies and deployments, and a 
memorandum of understanding between DHS and the Port Authority of New 
York and New Jersey to integrate lessons learned into domestic 
radiation detection efforts. In addition, we reviewed an organizational 
chart from DNDO as well as our past reports on coordination between 
federal agencies on deployment and testing. 

We received training data from CBP, cost and budget data from CBP, and 
deployment data from CBP and PNNL. We obtained responses from key 
database officials to a number of questions focused on data reliability 
covering issues such as data entry access, internal control procedures, 
and the accuracy and completeness of the data. We determined these data 
were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. 

We conducted our review from March 2005 to February 2006 in accordance 
with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Gene Aloise, (202) 512-3841: 

Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the contact named above, Jim Shafer; Nancy Crothers; 
Emily Gupta; Brandon Haller; Richard Hung; Winston Le; Greg Marchand; 
Judy Pagano; Karen Richey; Keith Rhodes, GAO's Chief Technologist; and 
Eugene Wisnoski made key contributions to this report. 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security: 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security: 
Washington, DC 20528: 

March 6, 2006: 

Mr. Eugene Aloise: 
Director: 
Natural Resources and Environment: 
Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Mr. Aloise: 

Thank you for providing us with a copy of the draft report GAO-06-389 
Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS Has Made Progress Deploying Radiation 
Detection Equipment, but Concerns Remain", which examines the 
Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) recent progress in the 
deployment and use of radiation detection equipment, improving the 
capabilities and testing of such equipment, and the level of 
cooperation between DHS and other federal agencies in conducting 
radiation detection programs. 

The GAO report is factually correct; however it does not completely 
capture the enormity or complexity of the Radiation Portal Monitor 
(RPM) program. CBP, in conjunction with the DHS Domestic Nuclear 
Detection Office (DNDO), is continuing the deployment of this vital 
radiation screening technology along the northern land border, 
international mail and express consignment facilities, seaports and 
along the southern border, where DHS has deployed hundreds of RPMs and 
other hand held detection devices. From these deployments, DHS has 
gained significant experience regarding radiation alarms and 
implemented strict national response protocols and standard operating 
procedures to facilitate alarm responses. To date, CBP has screened 
over 80 million conveyances with RPMs and has successfully resolved all 
alarming conveyances, over 318,000 radiation alarms. In fact, nearly 
all radiation alarms that have been encountered have been inspected and 
cleared in a matter of minutes with minimum disruption to the normal 
flow of traffic. 

DHS has engaged numerous stakeholders in cooperative efforts that 
support the goals of the radiation detection program. DHS recognizes 
that security-induced disruptions to the U.S. economy ultimately serve 
the terrorists' goal of harming our economic well being, and is 
determined to raise our security profile while simultaneously 
facilitating the free flow of legitimate trade. We achieve both the 
security and facilitation of trade by coordinating closely with all 
stakeholders throughout the course of the program. 

A wide variety of Department of Energy (DOE) laboratories and offices 
continue to provide technical support to DHS in the areas of threat 
definition, equipment performance standards development, technology 
assessment and evaluations, on-site operational assistance and alarm 
response. DHS is working with DOE Second Line of Defense, now actively 
engaged in similar deployments overseas, supporting the Container 
Security Initiative. To support this program, DHS also forged 
relationships with various port authorities, bridge commissions, and 
federal and state agencies such as the United States Postal Service and 
the General Services Administration, and further has established 
memorandum of understanding with commercial entities such as Federal 
Express and United Parcel Service to implement overseas radiological 
screening of packages destined to the United States. 

To date, DHS has deployed 684 RPMs to our ports of entry. DHS' current 
RPM screening capability for conveyances, travelers and packages 
entering the United States is as follows: 

* Based on our deployment of 57 RPMs to our mail and express courier 
facilities, and in conjunction with our memorandum of understanding 
with Federal Express and United Parcel Service, 100% of all mail and 
packages entering the United States are screened for illicit 
radiological materials. 

* With the 222 RPMs deployed along the northern border, DHS screens 
approximately 80% of personally owned vehicles (POV) traffic and 90% of 
commercial truck traffic entering from Canada. 

With the 154 RPMs deployed at our seaports, DHS screens approximately 
34% of all sea-borne containers entering the United States. 

With the 251 RPMs deployed along the southern border, DHS screens 
approximately 74% of personally owned vehicles (POV) traffic and 88% of 
commercial truck traffic entering from Mexico. 

DHS has also deployed approximately 12,500 personal radiation detectors 
(PRD) and over 550 radiation isotope identification devices (RIID) to 
our ports of entry. At the ports of entry, DHS has implemented a policy 
requiring 100% PRD coverage at primary chokepoints or at passport 
control stations. Additionally, all high-risk conveyances are examined 
with Non-Intrusive Inspection technology and with radiation detection 
technology. No officer is authorized to employ any such detection 
devices without first receiving formal training. 

As part of its future vision, DHS goals are to accelerate the pace of 
radiation monitoring equipment deployments, to improve the overall 
quality and effectiveness of this technology, and to integrate them at 
a national level to facilitate improved alarm response, data collection 
and analysis, as well as maintenance status monitoring and life cycle 
support. DHS will continue looking for new strategies, technologies, 
and partnerships to deter, detect and interdict terrorists attempting 
to transport illicit nuclear and radiological weapons and/or materials 
into the United States. DHS has learned a great deal from our 
deployments of radiation detection technology and will continue to 
review and improve upon the methods and procedures associated with this 
technology. 

With respect to the classification of this report, GAO did not mark the 
document "For Official Use Only." Please note that the information DHS 
provided during the course of this audit concerns the technical 
capabilities and deployment of DHS radiation detection devices around 
the United States. These source materials were forwarded pursuant to 
the GAO statutory authority to examine government records, on the 
condition that GAO accord them the same level of confidentiality that 
DHS accords them pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 716(e). Specifically, these 
materials were provided only for the use of GAO personnel working on 
this matter and may not be released publicly. 

DHS treats its radiation detection capabilities with the highest care. 
DHS considers this material as "For Official Use Only - Law Enforcement 
Sensitive" and thus exempt from public disclosure under FOIA and 
subject to governmental privileges should it be sought in litigation. 
Disclosure to the public of the technical and operational details of 
DHS's radiation detection capabilities is sensitive, and could 
reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of laws DHS enforces, 
including the prevention of unlawful entry of radioactive material into 
the United States. Therefore, this version of the report must be 
treated as "For Official Use Only-Law Enforcement Sensitive." 

The following represents the Departmental response to the 
recommendations contained in the draft report. 

Recommendation 1: In order to complete the radiation portal monitor 
deployment program, as planned, we recommend that the Secretary of 
Homeland Security working with the Director of DNDO, in concert with 
CBP and PNNL, devise a plan to close the gap between the current 
deployment rate and the rate to complete deployments by September 2009. 

Response: Concur. CBP and DNDO will work with the Department to 
facilitate improvements to the development and approval process 
associated with the spend plan. Both CBP and DNDO are in favor of the 
spend plan approval process being revised and streamlined. 

Recommendation 2: We recommend that once cost and capabilities of 
advanced technology portal monitors are well understood, and before any 
new equipment is purchased, the Secretary of Homeland Security will 
work with the Director, DNDO to analyze the benefits and costs of 
deploying advanced portal monitors. 

Response: Concur. The DNDO fully intends to analyze the benefits and 
costs associated with deployment of advance portal monitors. 

Recommendation 3: To help speed seaport deployments and to help ensure 
that future rail deployments proceed-on time, we recommend that the 
Secretary of Homeland Security, in cooperation with the Commissioner of 
CBP, develop procedures for effectively screening rail containers and 
develop new technologies to facilitate inspections. 

Response: Concur. In terms of screening rail shipments at our seaports, 
CBP has deployed and will continue to deploy Radiation Portal Monitors 
(RPM) for on-dock and intermodal containers that are transported, via 
chassis, to railcars. Of the top priority seaports which are comprised 
of 93 terminals and account for approximately 98 percent of all 
arriving containerized sea cargo, 17 sea terminals handle rail 
shipments. Of the 17 terminals, 13 terminals utilize chassis to 
transport their containers to their trains. CBP will instrument these 
sites with RPMs to screen the containers, being carried on the chassis, 
prior to the train being built. Deploying RPMs to chokepoints within 
these terminals provides for an efficient and effective means of 
screening for illicit radiological materials as well as facilitating 
the flow of legitimate commerce. 

For the sites that handle transport containers to rail on equipment 
other than chassis (i.e., straddle carriers), CBP is pursuing both 
innovative deployment strategies and next generation technology that 
will effectively and efficiently screen containers without unduly 
disrupting the flow of commerce. 

Recommendation 4: To increase the chances that CBP Officers find 
illicit radiological material, we recommend that the Secretary of 
Homeland Security, working with the Commissioner of CBP, consider 
modifying the agency's standard operating procedures for secondary 
inspections to include physically opening cargo containers during 
secondary inspections at all ports of entry, and particularly when the 
external inspection does not conclusively identify the radiological 
material inside. 

Response: Partially Concur. This action is already inherent in CBP's 
response policy. CBP's policy is to locate and resolve every radiation 
alarm. If the alarm can be resolved based on the totality of the 
circumstances and if resolution of the alarm can be achieved with an 
external examination with handheld radiation detection technology, the 
opening of a container may not be necessary. 

CBP has consistently provided its field officers with training (e.g., 
at the CBP Academy, RIID training, etc) that stresses the requirement 
to locate and resolve all radiation alarms. Our officers are trained to 
conduct an examination of a container by first performing a methodical 
search of the exterior of the alarming container. If the alarm cannot 
be resolved, the officer should open the container to investigate the 
source more closely. 

CBP will revise its response policy to stress that whenever a secondary 
radiation portal monitor alarm cannot be resolved with an external 
radiation detection technology examination, an officer will open the 
container in order to attempt to resolve the alarm. 

Recommendation 5: To further the chances that CBP Officers identify 
illicit radiological material, we recommend that the Secretary of 
Homeland Security, working with the Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission (NRC), develop a better means for CBP border officers to 
verify the authenticity of NRC licenses. 

Response: Concur. NRC licenses are required to accompany certain 
legitimate shipments of radiological materials and, for the most part, 
only a relatively small number of companies are involved in the 
importation of legitimate radiological shipments that require an NRC 
license. 

For those shipments that require an NRC license, CBP will work with the 
NRC to implement policy and procedures whereby CBP Officers can contact 
the Laboratories and Scientific Services (LSS) National Teleforensics 
Center which is an integral part of the National Targeting Center 
whenever CBP Officers need assistance in verifying the authenticity of 
an NRC license. 

Recommendation 6: To ensure that CBP is receiving reliable cost and 
schedule data, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security 
direct PNNL to have their earned value management system validated so 
that it complies with guidance developed by the American National 
Standards Institute of Electronic Industries Alliance. In addition, we 
also recommend the Secretary of Homeland Security direct CBP and PNNL 
to conduct an Integrated Baseline Review to ensure its earned value 
management data is reliable for assessing risk and developing 
alternatives. 

Response: Concur. PNNL is currently in the process of having their 
project management system certified which will include the validation 
of their earned management system. The DOE/Office of Engineering and 
Construction Management supported by the DOD/Defense Contract 
Management Agency will be conducting a review of the PNNL project 
management system in the 1st quarter of FY07. 

CBP has completed four project baseline reviews since 2002 as reflected 
in the revisions of the Project Execution Plan (PEP). Currently, the 
fifth revision of the PEP is under development, which is being reviewed 
in close coordination with the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office 
(DNDO). It is anticipated that the PEP, Revision 5 will be completed by 
April 2006. 

In response to the Issue Description, it is noted that the current cost 
overruns and the project-at-completion forecasted cost overrun are 
totally within and offset by the project management reserve, thus CBP 
does not expect a project-at-completion overrun for the current scope 
of work. Specifically, this program is made up of many small projects, 
374 at this time. A significant amount of the schedule variance, or 
project delays, can be attributed to the delay of funding transferred 
to PNNL as described in GAO Recommendation #1 of this report. The other 
major item contributing to project delays is underestimating the time 
required to gain stakeholder concurrence/agreement regarding site 
design and operational considerations. These impacts noted, cost and 
schedule concurrency could still be significantly increased because the 
physical deployments, 374 separate projects, are actually mutually 
exclusive and therefore are not dependent on one another. As the result 
of added concurrency and the anticipation of future timely funds, the 
likelihood of a project- at-completion cost and schedule overrun should 
not be realized. 

We thank you again for the opportunity to review the report and provide 
comments. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Steven J. Pecinovsky: 

Director, Departmental GAO/OIG Liaison Office: 

[End of section] 

Related GAO Products: 

Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Corruption, Maintenance, and Coordination 
Problems Challenge U.S. Efforts to Provide Radiation Detection 
Equipment to Other Countries. 
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-311] 
Washington, D.C.: March 14, 2006. 

Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Efforts to Deploy Radiation Detection 
Equipment in the United States and in Other Countries. 
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-840T] 
Washington, D.C.: June 21, 2005. 

Homeland Security: Key Cargo Security Programs Can Be Improved. 
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-466T] 
Washington, D.C.: May 25, 2005. 

Container Security: A Flexible Staffing Model and Minimum Equipment 
Requirements Would Improve Overseas Targeting and Inspection Efforts. 
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-557] 
Washington, D.C.: April 26, 2005. 

Preventing Nuclear Smuggling: DOE Has Made Limited Progress in 
Installing Radiation Detection Equipment at Highest Priority Foreign 
Seaports. 
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-375] 
Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2005. 

Customs Service: Acquisition and Deployment of Radiation Detection 
Equipment. 
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-03-235T] 
Washington, D.C.: October 17, 2002. 

Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. Efforts to Help Other Countries Combat 
Nuclear Smuggling Need Strengthened Coordination and Planning. 
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-02-426] 
Washington, D.C.: May 16, 2002. 

[End of section] 

(360558): 

FOOTNOTES 

[1] The Departments of Energy, Defense, and State are also implementing 
programs to combat nuclear smuggling in other countries by providing 
radiation detection equipment and training to foreign border security 
personnel. See Pub. L. No. 107-296 (2002) Title IV, § 402. We recently 
reported on these programs in Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Corruption, 
Maintenance, and Coordination Problems Challenge U.S. Efforts to 
Provide Radiation Detection Equipment to Other Countries, GAO-06-311 
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 14, 2006). 

[2] See NSPD-43/HSPD-14, Domestic Nuclear Detection (April 15, 2005). 

[3] DOE manages the largest laboratory system of its kind in the world. 
The mission of DOE's 22 laboratories has evolved. Originally created to 
design and build atomic weapons, these laboratories have since expanded 
to conduct research in many disciplines--from high-energy physics to 
advanced computing. 

[4] Laboratories and Scientific Services coordinates technical and 
scientific support to all CBP trade and border protection activities. 
These activities include, among other things, providing 
scientific/forensic support, including on-site support, to CBP officers 
and other government agencies with regard to the investigation and 
interdiction of Weapons of Mass Destruction. 

[5] We originally reported on U.S. efforts to combat nuclear smuggling 
in 2002. See GAO, Nuclear Nonproliferation: U.S. Efforts to Help Other 
Countries Combat Nuclear Smuggling Need Strengthened Coordination and 
Planning, GAO-02-426 (Washington, D.C.: May 16, 2002). See also, GAO, 
Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Corruption, Maintenance, and Coordination 
Problems Challenge U.S. Efforts to Provide Radiation Detection 
Equipment to Other Countries, GAO-06-311 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 14, 
2006). 

[6] We recently reported on the Megaports Initiative. See GAO, 
Preventing Nuclear Smuggling: DOE Has Made Limited Progress in 
Installing Radiation Detection Equipment at Highest Priority Foreign 
Seaports, GAO-05-375 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 2005). 

[7] U.S. radiation detection assistance programs at foreign seaports 
are coordinated with--and complementary to--DHS's Container Security 
Initiative (CSI). Under CSI, which began operating in January 2002, 
U.S. Customs officials stationed in foreign ports review the cargo 
manifests of containers bound directly for the United States and 
attempt to identify containers with potentially dangerous cargo, such 
as explosives or weapons of mass destruction. GAO recently reported on 
CSI. See GAO, Container Security: A Flexible Staffing Model and Minimum 
Equipment Requirements Would Improve Overseas Targeting and Inspection 
Efforts, GAO-05-557 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 26, 2005). 

[8] We initially reported on the U. S. Customs Service's efforts to 
deploy radiation detection equipment at U.S. ports-of-entry in 2002. 
See GAO, Customs Service: Acquisition and Deployment of Radiation 
Detection Equipment, GAO-03-235T (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 17, 2002). 

[9] See Pub. L. No. 107-296 (2002) and DHS Reorganization Plan (Nov. 
25, 2002). 

[10] Pub. L. No. 107-296 (2002). 

[11] Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 309. 

[12] CBP's most recent Project Execution Plan (December 2004) calls for 
deploying a total of 2,397 portal monitors. However, by December 2005, 
the scope of the deployments had grown to 3,034. 

[13] CBP and PNNL use an earned value management system (EVM) to report 
the domestic portal monitor deployment program's status against its 
baseline--scope, schedule, and budget. Essentially, an EVM approach 
compares the value of the work accomplished during a given period with 
the value of the work scheduled to be accomplished during that period. 
Differences from the schedule are measured in both cost and schedule 
"variances." For example, program activities (such as deploying portal 
monitors at a specific site) that are completed ahead of schedule would 
be reported as positive variances, while activities that are completed 
behind schedule would be reported as negative variances. Similarly, the 
EVM system tracks whether completed activities are costing more or less 
than expected. A negative cost variance would indicate that activities 
are costing more than expected, while a positive cost variance would 
mean activities are costing less than expected. We report schedule 
differences in both calendar and EVM terms. Appendix II provides more 
details on the EVM methodology and our analysis. 

[14] H.R. Rpt. No. 108-541, at 25-26 (2004). 

[15] We also assessed PNNL's cost and schedule performance using earned 
value analysis techniques based on data captured in PNNL's contract 
performance reports. We also developed a forecast of future cost 
growth. We based the lower end of our forecast range on the costs spent 
to date added to the forecast cost of work remaining. The remaining 
work was forecast using an average of the current cost performance 
index efficiency factor. For the upper end of our cost range, we relied 
on the actual costs spent to date added to the forecast of remaining 
work with an average monthly cost and schedule performance index. 

[16] Management reserves are part of the total program budget intended 
to be used to fund work anticipated but not currently defined. Most 
programs usually wait until work is almost completed before making a 
judgment that management reserve can be applied to cover cost 
variances. 

[17] See OMB Circular No. A-11, Part 7, "Planning, Budgeting, 
Acquisition, and Management of Capital Assets," June 2005. 

[18] American National Standards Institute (ANSI)/Electronic Industries 
Alliance (EIA) EVM System Standard (ANSI/EIA-748-98), Chapter 2 (May 
19, 1998). 

[19] Since the officer is an employee of the state, he was not required 
to follow CBP procedures. According to the port police supervisor 
present at the scene, the officer acted within the scope of port police 
guidance. 

[20] See 10 CFR § 110.5. 

[21] The National Nuclear Security Administration is a separately 
organized agency within DOE that was created by the National Defense 
Authorization Act for fiscal year 2000 with responsibility for the 
nation's nuclear weapons, nonproliferation, and naval reactors 
programs. See Pub. L. No. 106-65 (1999). 

[22] Results from nonprobability samples cannot be used to make 
inferences about a population, because in a nonprobability sample, some 
elements of the population being studied have no chance or an unknown 
chance of being selected as part of the sample. 

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