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entitled 'Border Security: Strengthened Visa Process Would Benefit from
Improvements in Staffing and Information Sharing' which was released on
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Report to Congressional Committees:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
September 2005:
Border Security:
Strengthened Visa Process Would Benefit from Improvements in Staffing
and Information Sharing:
GAO-05-859:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-05-859, a report to congressional committees:
Why GAO Did This Study:
GAO reported in October 2002 that the visa process needed to be
strengthened as an antiterrorism tool and recommended that the
Secretary of State, in consultation with appropriate agencies, (1)
develop a clear policy on the role of national security in the visa
process, (2) create more comprehensive guidance on how consular
officers should screen against potential terrorists, (3) fundamentally
reassess staffing requirements, and (4) revamp and expand consular
training. This report examines State’s and other agencies’ progress in
implementing changes to the visa process since 2002, in the areas of
policy and guidance; consular resources, including staffing and
training; and information sharing.
What GAO Found:
The Department of State (State), the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS), and other agencies have taken many steps to strengthen the visa
process as an antiterrorism tool. Led by the Assistant Secretary of
State for Consular Affairs, consular officers have received clear
guidance on the importance of national security. We observed that
consular officers at eight posts, including those of interest to
antiterrorism efforts, regard security as their top priority, while
recognizing the importance of facilitating legitimate travel. State has
also increased hiring of consular officers, targeted recruitment of
foreign language speakers, revamped consular training with a focus on
counterterrorism, and increased resources to combat visa fraud.
Further, intelligence and law enforcement agencies have shared more
information for consular officers’ use in conducting name checks on
visa applicants.
Additional issues require attention. For example, State has not
consistently updated the consular and visa chapters of the Foreign
Affairs Manual to reflect recent policy changes. Consular officers we
interviewed also said that guidance is needed on DHS staff’s roles and
responsibilities overseas. Actions are also needed to ensure that State
has sufficient experienced staff with the necessary language skills at
key consular posts. In particular, staffing shortages at the
supervisory level place a burden on new officers. In February 2005, we
found that the visa sections in critical posts in Saudi Arabia and
Egypt were staffed with first-tour officers and no permanent midlevel
visa chiefs to provide guidance. Further improvements in training and
fraud prevention are also needed, and additional information from FBI
criminal history files would allow consular officers to help facilitate
efficient visa adjudication.
Improvements and Remaining Challenges to the Visa Process
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO.
[End of table]
What GAO Recommends:
To further improve the visa process as an antiterrorism tool and
facilitate legitimate travel, GAO is making seven recommendations to
the Secretaries of State and Homeland Security in the areas of visa
policy, consular resources, and information sharing. GAO is also
suggesting that Congress consider reviewing visa adjudicators’ access
to FBI criminal history information.
State agreed with most of the conclusions, but did not agree on the
need for a comprehensive staffing plan. DHS agreed with the
conclusions, and the Department of Justice provided information on
steps it is taking to improve interagency information sharing.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-859.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
the link above. For more information, contact Jess T. Ford at
(202) 512-4128 or fordj@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
Visa Process Strengthened, and Further Actions Would Support Ongoing
Improvements:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Matter for Congressional Consideration:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of State:
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Justice:
Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
Table:
Table 1: Improvements in Consular Training Since 2002:
Figures:
Figure 1: Visa Adjudication Process at a U.S. Embassy:
Figure 2: Improvements and Remaining Challenges to the Visa Process:
Figure 3: Authorized Foreign Service Officer Consular Positions and
Distribution of Staff by Grade, as of April 30, 2005:
Figure 4: Fingerprint Requirements for Access to Detailed Information
in FBI Files and Proposed Changes:
Abbreviations:
CLASS: Consular Lookout and Support System:
DHS: Department of Homeland Security:
FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation:
NCIC: National Crime Information Center:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
September 13, 2005:
Congressional Committees:
All 19 of the September 11, 2001, terrorist hijackers were issued a
nonimmigrant visa,[Footnote 1] which is a U.S. travel document that
foreign citizens must generally obtain before entering the country
temporarily for business, tourism, or other reasons.[Footnote 2] In
deciding to approve or deny a visa application, Department of State
(State) consular officers are on the front line of defense in
protecting the United States against potential terrorists and others
whose entry would likely be harmful to U.S. national interests.
Consular officers must balance this security responsibility against the
need to facilitate legitimate travel. In October 2002, we identified
shortcomings and made recommendations on State's policy on the role of
national security in the visa process, procedures for addressing
heightened border security concerns, staffing, and counterterrorism
training of consular officers.[Footnote 3] Similarly, staff of the
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, or the
9-11 Commission, reported that while there were efforts to enhance
border security prior to September 11, no agency of the U.S. government
at that time thought of the visa process as an antiterrorism
tool[Footnote 4]. Indeed, the 9-11 Commission staff reported that
consular officers were not trained to screen for terrorists.[Footnote
5]
Given the widespread congressional interest in ensuring that visa
operations are a tool to prevent those who might pose a threat from
obtaining a visa, we reviewed the changes that State, the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS), and other agencies have made since our 2002
report to address potential vulnerabilities in the visa process, and
determined whether additional vulnerabilities remain. To assess
agencies' progress in implementing changes to the visa process since
2002, we reviewed changes in visa policy and guidance; consular
resources, including staffing and training; and the extent to which
U.S. agencies share information with visa adjudicators. In addition, we
conducted structured interviews with visa chiefs and other consular
affairs staff from 25 posts overseas, either via telephone or in
person, on issues related to visa policy and consular resources, among
others. We observed visa operations and interviewed U.S. government
officials at 8 U.S. consular posts in seven countries--Egypt,
Indonesia, Malaysia, Morocco, Spain, Saudi Arabia, and the United
Kingdom. We chose these countries because they are of interest to
antiterrorism efforts. In Washington, D.C., we interviewed officials
from State, DHS, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). We
conducted our work from August 2004 through August 2005, in accordance
with generally accepted government auditing standards (see app. I for
more information on our scope and methodology).
Results in Brief:
Since our 2002 report, State, DHS, and other agencies have taken many
steps to strengthen the visa process as an antiterrorism tool. Under
the leadership of the Assistant Secretary of State for Consular
Affairs, consular officers are receiving clear guidance on the
importance of addressing national security concerns through the visa
process. Our observations of consular sections at eight posts confirmed
that consular officers overseas regard security as their top priority,
while also recognizing the importance of facilitating legitimate travel
to the United States. In addition, State has established clear
procedures on visa operations worldwide, as well as management controls
to ensure that visas are adjudicated in a consistent manner at each
post. State has also increased its hiring of consular officers;
increased hiring of foreign language proficient Foreign Service
officers; revamped consular training with a focus on counterterrorism;
strengthened fraud prevention efforts worldwide; and improved consular
facilities. In addition, consular officers now have access to more
information from intelligence and law enforcement databases when
conducting name checks on visa applicants.
Despite these improvements, additional actions can further enhance the
visa process. For example, Consular Affairs has not consistently
updated the consular and visa chapters of the Foreign Affairs Manual--
State's central resource for all regulations, policies, and guidance--
to reflect recent changes. In addition, consular officers at several
posts told us it is difficult to identify points of contact at DHS's
overseas offices because DHS has not issued guidance on its staff's
roles and responsibilities overseas. Further, State has not conducted a
worldwide, comprehensive assessment of staffing requirements for visa
operations, as we recommended in 2002. We continue to see a need for
such an assessment and believe that further actions are needed to
ensure that State has sufficient staff with the necessary skills at key
consular posts, especially in light of the increased workload per visa
applicant due to additional border security requirements. In
particular, as of April 2005, 26 percent of midlevel positions were
either vacant or filled by entry-level officers, placing a large burden
on these officers. During our February 2005 visits to posts in Riyadh
and Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, and Cairo, Egypt, the visa sections were
staffed with first-tour, entry-level officers, with no permanent
midlevel visa chiefs to provide guidance, support, and oversight. In
addition, resource constraints alongside new procedural requirements
may create extensive waits for visa interviews, though data gaps
prevent a reliable assessment of these wait times worldwide. Further,
despite the large responsibility placed on consular officers,
particularly entry-level officers, we found that post-specific training
was offered in only about half of the posts we reviewed, and that
officers at these posts desired additional training--in such areas as
terrorist travel trends, fraudulent documentation detection, and
counterterrorism techniques. Moreover, we observed that information
sharing at posts between the consular section and the law enforcement
and intelligence communities was inconsistent. Lastly, additional
information from FBI criminal history files would allow consular
officers to help facilitate visa adjudication and the efficient and
effective approval of visas for legitimate travelers to the United
States.
We are making recommendations to the Secretaries of State and Homeland
Security to, in consultation with appropriate agencies,
* clarify certain visa policies and procedures and facilitate their
implementation;
* ensure that consular sections have the necessary tools to enhance
national security and promote legitimate travel, including effective
human resources and training;
* ensure that consular managers report, on a weekly basis, posts' wait
times for applicant interviews; and:
* further encourage interactions between consular sections, law
enforcement officials, and intelligence officials at post to increase
information sharing with consular officers on terrorism issues relevant
to the visa process.
We also suggest that Congress consider requiring State and the FBI to
develop and report to Congress on a plan to provide visa adjudicators
with more efficient access to certain information in the FBI's criminal
history records to help facilitate the approval of legitimate
travelers. The plan should describe any potential technical or policy
concerns regarding sharing this information with visa adjudicators, and
how these concerns can be mitigated. The plan should also identify any
legislative changes that may be necessary for its implementation.
We received written comments from State, DHS, and the Department of
Justice, which we have reprinted in appendixes II, III, and IV,
respectively. State agreed with most of our recommendations and stated
that it is taking actions to implement them. State, however, also noted
its belief that it already had a plan to address vulnerabilities in
consular staffing and that the development of a comprehensive plan that
we recommended was not necessary. DHS agreed with our recommendation to
provide additional guidance on the relationship between DHS and State.
The Department of Justice did not comment on the matter for
congressional consideration regarding visa adjudicators' access to
certain information in the FBI's criminal history records; it provided
additional information about other actions that the department is
taking to enhance the sharing of law enforcement and intelligence
information in connection with visa processing.
Background:
The 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, is the primary
body of law governing immigration and visa operations.[Footnote 6] The
Homeland Security Act of 2002 generally grants DHS exclusive authority
to issue regulations on, administer, and enforce the Immigration and
Nationality Act and all other immigration and nationality laws relating
to the functions of U.S. consular officers in connection with the
granting or denial of visas.[Footnote 7] As we reported in July 2005,
the act also authorizes DHS, among other things, to assign employees to
any consular post to review individual visa applications and provide
expert advice and training to consular officers regarding specific
security threats related to the visa process.[Footnote 8] A subsequent
September 2003 Memorandum of Understanding between State and DHS
further outlines the responsibilities of each agency with respect to
visa issuance. DHS is responsible for establishing visa policy,
reviewing implementation of the policy, and providing additional
direction. State manages the visa process, as well as the consular
corps and its functions at 211 visa-issuing posts overseas. In
addition, State provides guidance, in consultation with DHS, to
consular officers regarding visa policies and procedures. In technical
comments on a draft of this report, State emphasized that the Secretary
of State has the lead role with respect to foreign policy-related visa
issues.
Several agencies stationed at U.S. embassies and consulates can assist
consular officers and support the visa adjudication process. On a
formal basis, all embassy sections and agencies involved in security,
law enforcement, and intelligence activities are expected to
participate in the congressionally mandated "Visas Viper" terrorist
reporting program. This program is primarily administered through a
Visas Viper Committee at each overseas post and chaired by the deputy
chief of mission or the post's principal officer. The committees meet
at least monthly to share information on known or suspected terrorists
and determine whether such information should be sent to Washington,
D.C., for potential inclusion on watch lists. Interagency information
sharing at post can also occur on an informal basis. For example,
overseas FBI officials can assist consular officers when questions
about an applicant's potential criminal history arise during
adjudication. Additionally, DHS's U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
Services, Customs and Border Protection, and Immigration and Customs
Enforcement have responsibility for some immigration and border
security programs overseas, and consular officers may seek advice from
these officials on issues such as DHS procedures at U.S. ports of
entry.
The process for determining who will be issued or refused a visa
contains several steps, including documentation reviews, in-person
interviews, collection of biometrics[Footnote 9] (fingerprints), and
cross-referencing an applicant's name against the Consular Lookout and
Support System (CLASS) [Footnote 10] (see fig. 1).
Figure 1: Visa Adjudication Process at a U.S. Embassy:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
In 2002, we recommended actions to strengthen the visa process as an
antiterrorism tool, including:
* establishing a clear policy on the priority attached to addressing
national security concerns through the visa process;
* creating more comprehensive, risk-based guidelines and standards on
how consular officers should use the visa process as a screen against
potential terrorists;
* performing a fundamental reassessment of staffing and language skill
requirements for visa operations; and:
* revamping and expanding consular training courses to place more
emphasis on detecting potential terrorists.
Visa Process Strengthened, and Further Actions Would Support Ongoing
Improvements:
Since our 2002 report, State, DHS, and other agencies have taken
numerous steps to strengthen the visa process as an antiterrorism tool
and increase its overall efficiency and effectiveness. In particular,
the Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of Consular Affairs has taken a
leadership role in implementing changes to the visa process and
promoting the use of the process as a screen against potential
terrorists. However, additional actions could enhance the visa process.
State has increased and clarified visa policies and guidance, but
additional steps are needed to ensure these changes are implemented.
Additionally, State has increased resources to strengthen the visa
process, including hiring additional consular officers, targeting
recruitment, and expanding training efforts; however, staffing
limitations remain a concern, posts seek further training, and other
gaps remain. Lastly, while interagency information-sharing efforts have
increased, consular officers do not have direct access to detailed
information from the FBI's criminal history records, which would help
facilitate the approval of visas for legitimate travelers. Figure 2
summarizes the steps taken to improve the visa process since 2002 and
areas that require additional management attention.
Figure 2: Improvements and Remaining Challenges to the Visa Process:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Visa Policies, Procedures, and Guidance Enhanced, but Additional Steps
Needed to Ensure They Are Implemented:
We reported in October 2002 that consular officers held differing views
on balancing the need for national security and customer service in the
visa process. In addition, State had not issued comprehensive policy
guidance to posts regarding how consular officers should react to the
heightened border security concerns following the September 11 attacks.
Since our report, State implemented several changes to address these
issues, and consular officials stated that our 2002 report and its
recommendations provided a framework for these changes. For example, in
February 2003, Consular Affairs issued guidance identifying national
security as the first priority of the visa process. Consular officers
we interviewed said the guidance was generally clear, and officers at
all eight posts we visited viewed security as the most critical element
of the visa process. In addition, Consular Affairs identified certain
areas where additional guidance was needed to improve visa procedures.
For example, State has issued more than 80 standard operating
procedures, in consultation with DHS, to inform consular officers on
issues such as:
* citizens of countries requiring special clearance requirements and
other name-check procedures;[Footnote 11]
* fingerprint requirements; and:
* annotating visas with current and historical information about a visa
applicant to assist immigration inspectors at ports of entry.
To reinforce standard operating procedures and internal controls, State
created Consular Management Assistance Teams that conduct management
reviews of consular sections worldwide. These teams comprise Consular
Affairs officials, diplomatic security officials, and DHS officials,
and they report directly to the Assistant Secretary for Consular
Affairs. According to State, as of June 2005, the teams have completed
81 field visits and have provided guidance to posts on standard
operating procedures, as well as other areas where consular services
could become more efficient. In addition, State has regional consular
officer positions overseas, through which five experienced officers
serve as regional officers to 56 posts in Europe, Near East, and
Africa. These officers provide support and guidance to less-experienced
officers in small consular sections at neighboring posts where, in many
instances, there are no other officers at post with recent consular
experience.
Despite these improvements, some consular officers we interviewed
stated that it has been difficult to synthesize and consistently apply
all of the changes to the visa process. The guidance provided to
consular officers in the field is voluminous and can change rapidly,
according to consular officials. The Consular Affairs Bureau may notify
its officers overseas of policy changes through cables, postings on its
internal Web site, and informal communications. However, the bureau has
not consistently updated the consular and visa chapters of the Foreign
Affairs Manual--State's central Internet resource for all regulations,
policies, and guidance--to reflect these changes. Throughout 2005, the
bureau updated several portions of the manual, but, as of June 2005,
some sections had not been updated since October 2004, such as policies
on consular duties, clearances at post, and the submission of
fingerprints to the FBI for visa applications. Consular officials also
stated that they are overhauling the standard operating procedures to
eliminate those that are obsolete and incorporate current requirements
into the manual. While the Consular Affairs Bureau's internal Web site
contains all of the standard operating procedures, it also links to out-
of-date sections in the manual, which do not yet incorporate all
updated procedures. As a result, there is no single, reliable source
for current information. The visa chief at one post in Africa told us
that while the additional guidance from Consular Affairs has been a
positive step, consular officers should not have to go back to paper
files to locate it. Some posts we visited had developed their own
methods--such as creating standard operating procedure reference books
and holding weekly staff meetings to discuss all new policies--to help
ensure that all consular officers were applying the new procedures
consistently and appropriately. The consular section in London, for
example, created a post-specific internal Web site to post guidance for
consular officers. According to State officials, in August 2004,
Consular Affairs developed a classified Web site to post additional
guidance that is accessible to all consular officers, but only 48
percent of visa chiefs we interviewed reported having used the Web
site.
Consular officers also indicated that additional guidance is needed on
certain interagency protocols. Specifically, 15 out of 25 visa chiefs
we interviewed reported that additional guidance would be helpful
regarding the interaction between the Bureau of Consular Affairs and
DHS. For example, DHS personnel stationed overseas work on a variety of
immigration and border security activities and largely serve in a
regional capacity. U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services staff, for
instance, have regional offices in Rome, Bangkok, and Mexico City that
can assist consular officers in surrounding posts. However, DHS has not
provided guidance to consular officers regarding the roles and
geographic responsibilities of its personnel. In addition, consular
officers at several posts told us it is difficult to identify points of
contact at DHS's overseas offices when questions arise on issues such
as immigration violation records in CLASS. Further, consular officers
at all posts we reviewed stated they would like additional information
on DHS procedures at the ports of entry into the United States, such as
guidance on how to resolve cases in which visa holders have been denied
entry to the United States. For example, detailed information on the
reason why a visa holder was not allowed into the United States--the
person was recently placed on a watch list, for example--is not
automatically transferred to CLASS. A senior consular official stated
that State and DHS are working to create a link between consular and
border inspectors' databases that would allow the transfer of data,
including transcripts of interviews at ports of entry.
Resources for Visa Function Increased, but Staffing Shortages and Other
Gaps Remain a Concern:
In 2002, we found that at some posts the demand for visas, combined
with increased workload per visa applicant, exceeded the available
staff. As a result, we recommended that State perform a fundamental
reassessment of staffing requirements for visa operations. We continue
to see the need for such an assessment. While State has been able to
hire more entry-level officers in recent years, we found that more than
one-quarter of State's midlevel consular positions were either vacant
or filled by an entry-level officer.[Footnote 12] In addition, consular
headquarters officials may not have accurate statistics on wait times
for visa interviews from which to allocate resources effectively, and
visa applicants may be using inaccurate wait-time information when
planning their travel to the United States. State has also increased
its targeted recruitment of foreign language proficient officers, but
gaps remain. Further, State has expanded its training efforts, but
additional training would further benefit consular officers. Moreover,
State has strengthened its fraud prevention efforts, but has not
developed systematic criteria to identify high-fraud posts. Finally,
State has increased funding to improve consular facilities, but many
posts' facilities remain inadequate.
State Has Hired More Consular Officers, but Has Not Assessed Overall
Resource Needs:
Since 2002, State has received funding to address ongoing staffing
shortfalls, but we continue to see the need for a fundamental
reassessment of resource needs worldwide. Through the Diplomatic
Readiness Initiative and other sources,[Footnote 13] State has
increased the number of Foreign Service officer consular positions by
364, from 1,037 in fiscal year 2002 to 1,401 in fiscal year 2005.
Moreover, human resource officials anticipate that many officers hired
under the Diplomatic Readiness Initiative will begin to reach promotion
eligibility for midlevel positions within the next two years. However,
as we previously reported in 2003,[Footnote 14] the overall shortage of
midlevel Foreign Service officers would remain until approximately
2013. As of April 30, 2005, we found that 26 percent of midlevel
consular positions were either vacant or filled by an entry-level
officer (see fig. 3). In addition, almost three-quarters of the vacant
positions were at the FS-03 level--midlevel officers who generally
supervise entry-level staff--which consular officials attribute to low
hiring levels prior to the Diplomatic Readiness Initiative and the
necessary expansion of entry-level positions to accommodate increasing
workload requirements after September 11, 2001.
Figure 3: Authorized Foreign Service Officer Consular Positions and
Distribution of Staff by Grade, as of April 30, 2005:
[See PDF for image]
Note: Vacancy figures may not reflect recent promotions of officers to
a higher grade who were still serving in lower-grade positions as of
April 30, 2005.
[End of figure]
During our February 2005 visits to Riyadh, Jeddah, and Cairo, we
observed that the consular sections were staffed with entry-level
officers on their first assignment with no permanent midlevel visa
chief to provide supervision and guidance. Although these posts had
other mid-or senior-level consular officers, their availability on visa
issues was limited because of their additional responsibilities. For
example, the head of the visa section in Jeddah was responsible for
managing the entire section, as well as services for American citizens
due to a midlevel vacancy in that position. At the time of our visit,
the Riyadh Embassy did not have a midlevel visa chief. Similarly, in
Cairo, there was no permanent midlevel supervisor between the winter of
2004 and the summer of 2005, and Consular Affairs used five temporary
staff on a rotating basis during this period to serve in this capacity.
Entry-level officers we spoke with stated that due to the constant
turnover, the temporary supervisors were unable to assist them
adequately. At the U.S. consulate in Jeddah, entry-level officers
expressed concern about the lack of a midlevel supervisor. Officers in
Jeddah stated that they relied on the guidance they received from the
DHS visa security officer assigned to the post. However, as of July
2005, visa security officers are stationed only at consular posts in
Saudi Arabia--not at any of the other 209 visa-issuing posts overseas.
If the Consular Affairs Bureau identifies a need for additional staff
in headquarters or overseas, it may request that the Human Resources
Bureau establish new positions. In addition, posts can also describe
their needs for additional positions through their consular package--a
report submitted annually to the Consular Affairs Bureau that details
workload statistics and staffing requirements, among other things. For
example, in December 2004, during the course of our work, the consular
section in Riyadh reported to Washington that there was an immediate
need to create a midlevel visa chief position at post, and consular
officials worked with human resource officials to create this position,
which according to State officials, will be filled by summer 2005.
However, the current assignment process does not guarantee that all
authorized positions will be filled, particularly at hardship posts.
Historically, State has rarely directed its employees to serve in
locations for which they have not bid on a position, including hardship
posts or locations of strategic importance to the United States, due to
concerns that such staff may be more apt to have poor morale or be less
productive.[Footnote 15] Due to State's decision to not force
assignments, along with the limited amount of midlevel officers
available to apply for them,[Footnote 16] important positions may
remain vacant.
According to a deputy assistant secretary for human resources, Consular
Affairs can prioritize those positions that require immediate staffing
to ensure that officers are assigned to fill critical staffing gaps.
For example, Consular Affairs could choose not to advertise certain
positions of lesser priority during an annual assignment cycle.
However, senior Consular Affairs officials acknowledged that they
rarely do this. According to these officials, Consular Affairs does not
have direct control over the filling of all consular positions and can
often face resistance from regional bureaus and chiefs of mission
overseas who do not want vacancies at their posts. Thus, as we have
previously reported, certain high-priority positions may not be filled
if Foreign Service officers do not bid on them.
Increased Consular Workload Exacerbates Staffing Shortages:
Additions to consular workload since the September 11 attacks have
exacerbated State's resource constraints. Both Congress and State have
initiated a series of changes since our 2002 report to increase the
security of border security policies and procedures, which have added
to the complexity of consular officers' workload. These changes include
the following:
* Consular officers are no longer able to routinely waive interviews;
as of August 2003, waivers for visa applicant interviews are limited to
a few categories, such as the elderly, diplomats, and young children.
* As of October 2004, consular officers are required to scan foreign
nationals' right and left index fingers and clear the fingerprints
through the DHS Automated Biometric Identification System before an
applicant can receive a visa.[Footnote 17]
* Some responsibilities previously delegated to Foreign Service
nationals[Footnote 18] and consular associates[Footnote 19] have been
transferred to consular officers. For example, as of September 30,
2005, consular associates will no longer be authorized to adjudicate
visas.
Due to the new interview requirements and screening procedures, as well
as potential staffing shortages, applicants may face extensive wait
times for visa interviews at some consular posts overseas. According to
consular officials, in general, State considers that posts with
consistent wait times for visa interview appointments of 30 days or
longer may signal a resource or management problem. However, reliable
data that could determine the extent to which posts face long delays
are not available. To monitor posts' progress in achieving this goal,
according to consular headquarters officials, State requires that posts
report, on a weekly basis, the wait times for applicant interviews to
allow officials to monitor posts' workload. State's data showed that
between November 2004 and May 2005, 63 posts reported wait times of 30
or more days in at least one month; at 13 posts, the wait times were in
excess of 30 days for the entire 6-month period. As of July 2004, these
data are posted on State's Web site so that applicants will have the
information when applying for a visa. However, posts are often late to
report these data, according to consular officials. Indeed, our
analysis of State's data on wait times revealed significant numbers of
posts that did not report on a weekly basis during this 6-month period.
Therefore, the data are not sufficiently reliable to fully determine
how many posts have wait times in excess of 30 days. Consular
headquarters officials may not have accurate workload statistics from
which to allocate resources effectively, and visa applicants may be
using inaccurate wait-time information when planning their travel to
the United States. For example, there could be additional posts with 30-
day or more wait times that have not reported these data to Consular
Affairs.
Targeted Recruitment Has Increased Number of Foreign Language
Proficient Officers, but Gaps Remain:
In our 2002 report, we found that not all consular officers were
proficient enough in their post's language to hold interviews with
applicants. In 2003, we reported that State had not filled all of its
positions requiring foreign language skills.[Footnote 20] We noted that
a lack of staff with foreign language skills had weakened the fight
against international terrorism and resulted in less effective
representation of U.S. interests overseas. In addition, we reported
that some entry-level officers did not meet the minimum language
proficiency requirements of the positions in countries of strategic
importance to the United States. In response, State has created
programs to better target its recruitment of Foreign Service officers
who speak critical languages. For example, in March 2004, State created
the "Critical Needs Language Program," which increases the
opportunities for appointment to the Foreign Service for new hires
proficient in Arabic, Chinese, Indic, Korean, Russian, or Turkic, and
who have passed the Foreign Service Exam.[Footnote 21] From March 2004
through May 2005, 172 of the 564 Foreign Service officers hired were
proficient in one of these languages.
Despite these improvements, language gaps still exist. As of April 30,
2005, State reported that about 14 percent of consular-coned[Footnote
22] Foreign Service officers in language-designated positions did not
meet language requirements for their assigned position. Our interviews
with visa chiefs at 25 posts identified 8 posts with at least one
consular officer who did not meet the designated language proficiency
requirements for their position. To increase the proficiency of Foreign
Service officers, State supports post-specific language programs, among
others. According to language training officials, the department
allocated $1.2 million in fiscal year 2004 for these programs, which
teach a new language or enhance the language of the participant. Twenty-
three of the 25 posts we contacted offer a language-training program at
post. State has also developed training modules for specific languages
that include technical vocabulary that might be beneficial to consular
officers.
Consular Training Expanded, and Additional Courses and Information
Sharing Would Further Benefit Consular Officers:
In 2002, we reported that training for new consular officers was
focused on detecting intending immigrants through the visa process,
with little training given on detecting possible terrorists. In
addition, we found that consular officers wanted more training in how
to interview applicants more effectively for the purposes of detecting
possible terrorists. Since our report, State has revamped and expanded
consular training at the Foreign Service Institute[Footnote 23] to
enhance visa security. Table 1 outlines additions to consular training.
Table 1: Improvements in Consular Training Since 2002:
Date of improvement;
Course: Basic consular: October 2003;
Course: Fraud prevention for managers: April 2005;
Course: Advanced name checking: March 2002.
Type of improvement;
Course: Basic consular: Course enhancement;
Course: Fraud prevention for managers: Course enhancement;
Course: Advanced name checking: New course.
Improvements;
Course: Basic consular:
* Increased length of course from 26 days to 31 days;
* Added classes in analytical interviewing and fraud prevention;
* Counterterrorism training at CIA;
* Briefings on 9/11 Commission report;
Course: Fraud prevention for managers:
* Expanded course offerings from 2 to 10 times a year;
* Participation by DHS in training of fraud prevention managers;
* Training at DHS's Forensic Document Laboratory;
Course: Advanced name checking:
* Includes 1 day of training in analytical interviewing;
* Identifies name structures and variations, helping consular officers
spot anomalies;
* Explains how Consular Affairs name-check systems search for,
identify, evaluate, rank, and return matches.
Source: GAO.
[End of table]
Training efforts have been bolstered by contributions from law
enforcement and intelligence agencies and DHS, as well as by improved
information sharing. For example, as part of the basic consular
training course, consular officers receive a counterterrorism briefing
by the Central Intelligence Agency. Additionally, the Homeland Security
Act of 2002 granted DHS the authority to develop homeland security
training programs for consular officers, and the Memorandum of
Understanding between State and DHS outlined DHS's participation in
this training. Since 2003, DHS has contributed to several aspects of
the consular training program. For example,
* for the basic consular course, DHS has funded a presentation to
consular officers by former 9/11 Commission staffers;
* officials from the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services provide
training at State's course for fraud prevention managers; and:
* DHS officials have accompanied consular officials at regional
leadership conferences for consular managers overseas.
In July 2003, State issued guidance to chiefs of mission regarding
consular training at posts, and encouraged the regular exchange of
information between consular sections and relevant agencies on fraud
and law enforcement issues, as well as security trends that may impact
consular work. However, additional training could further assist
consular officers. For example, despite guidance from the Consular
Affairs Bureau, 12 of the 25 visa chiefs we interviewed reported that
the embassy did not offer post-specific training. In addition, all of
the posts we contacted reported that additional training on terrorist
travel trends would be helpful, with 16 posts responding that such
training would be extremely helpful. For example, the visa chief at a
consular post in the Middle East said that an in-depth class that
trains officers to better identify high-risk applicants based on
specific intelligence information would be helpful. Consular officials
in Washington, D.C., acknowledged that this type of training would be
useful, but noted that it requires support from chiefs of mission and
other agency officials overseas. Some posts also reported that
additional post-specific briefings on counterterrorism techniques and
fraud prevention would be helpful. State is currently developing
distance-learning courses in the areas of fraud prevention and
disruption of terrorist mobility, which, once implemented, will be
available to consular officers worldwide. Given that some terrorists
make use of fraudulent documents, training in these subjects is useful
for helping consular officers detect terrorists and criminals applying
for visas.
Inconsistent Information Sharing at Posts:
Although Consular Affairs has advised chiefs of mission to encourage
interagency information sharing, we found that information sharing at
posts between the consular section and the law enforcement and
intelligence communities varied. While we found that some posts had
frequent communications, others had little or no communication. For
example, at one post, we noted frequent communication and proactive
information sharing between the consular section, law enforcement, and
intelligence communities. Consular officials told us that this
cooperation strengthened the visa process at this post. During our
visit to another post, the consular section requested regular
counterterrorism briefings from intelligence officials, who conducted
the first such formal briefing in March 2005 following our visit. The
Consul General stated that these briefings will become a standard
practice at the post. At another post we reviewed, however, consular
officials stated that they were concerned about the lack of
communication between their section and law enforcement and
intelligence officials, despite repeated inquiries for guidance in
areas such as watch list records in CLASS.
State Strengthened Fraud Prevention Programs, but Efforts to Establish
Systematic Criteria to Identify High Visa Fraud Posts Have Not Been
Completed:
As the 9-11 Commission staff highlighted, the September 11 terrorists
were able to obtain U.S. visas through fraudulent means. For example,
according to the 9-11 Commission staff report on terrorist travel, two
hijackers used passports that had been manipulated in a fraudulent
manner to obtain visas to the United States. State has taken several
steps to increase its focus on preventing and detecting fraud in the
visa process. For example, by 2004, State's Bureau of Diplomatic
Security had deployed 25 visa fraud investigators to U.S. embassies and
consulates. In addition, State's Office of Fraud Prevention Programs
has developed several ways for consular officers in the field to learn
about fraud prevention, including:
* developing an Internet-based "E-room," with more than 500 members,
that serves as a discussion group for consular officers, as well as a
place to post cables and lessons learned from prior fraud cases;
* publishing fraud prevention newsletters; and:
* assigning liaison officers to work with consular sections worldwide
on fraud prevention.
However, until recently, the department has not used a systematic
process to identify consular posts with the highest degree of visa
fraud. According to State officials, fraud rankings for consular posts
have not been based on an objective analysis using standardized
criteria, but have been self-reported by each post. Therefore,
according to the Director of the Office of Fraud Prevention Programs,
State's fraud rankings were not a quantifiable assessment of posts'
actual fraud conditions. As a result, previous resources for fraud
prevention may not have been allocated to posts with the highest need,
including the 25 visa fraud investigators assigned overseas in 2004.
In response to the Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act of
2004, State is now developing systematic criteria to identify high-
fraud posts. The act mandates that State identify the posts
experiencing the greatest frequency of visa fraud and place in those
posts at least one full-time anti-fraud specialist. The presence of
full-time fraud officers at high-fraud posts is particularly important
given that entry-level officers may serve as fraud prevention
managers[Footnote 24] on a part-time basis, in addition to their other
responsibilities. Moreover, of the 25 posts we reviewed, only 2 had
full-time fraud prevention managers, and 10 visa chiefs reported that
their fraud prevention managers had not yet received training specific
to these duties. In June 2005, the Office of Fraud Prevention Programs
was awaiting final approval of its reassessment of posts' fraud levels
using weighted criteria such as:
* refusal rates for certain classes of visas;
* DHS data on visa holders who applied for permanent residence once in
the United States on a temporary tourist or business visa; and:
* State's threat assessments for the post.
Consular Affairs is also developing a fraud prevention computer program
that will allow State to quantify and analyze fraud workload data,
according to the Fraud Prevention Programs director.
Increased Funding to Improve Consular Facilities, but Many Posts Remain
Inadequate:
State's Bureau of Overseas Building Operations is responsible for
managing the department's property overseas, including the
rehabilitation of existing facilities and the construction of new
embassies and consulates. In March 2003, we reported that working
conditions at many U.S. embassies and consulates were inferior and
unsafe.[Footnote 25] In particular, we found that the primary office
building at more than half of the posts did not meet certain fire/life
safety standards, and at least 96 posts had reported serious
overcrowding. Despite increased funding to improve consular facilities,
needs remain. Many of the new requirements in the visa adjudication
process, such as the increased interview requirements and the
collection of applicants' fingerprints, have strained consular
facilities. Indeed, many visa chiefs we interviewed reported problems
with their facilities. For example, 14 of 25 rated the consular
workspace at their post as below average, and 40 percent reported that
applicants' waiting rooms were below average. In addition, due to
overcrowded waiting rooms at four of the eight posts we visited, we
observed visa applicants waiting for their interviews outside or in
adjacent hallways. A senior consular official acknowledged that many
consular facilities are located in run-down buildings with insufficient
adjudicating windows and waiting rooms. In fiscal year 2003, Congress
directed the Overseas Building Operations Bureau to begin a 3-year
Consular Workspace Improvement Initiative to improve the overall
working environment for consular officers[Footnote 26]. In fiscal years
2003 and 2004, State obligated $10.2 million to 79 workspace
improvement projects at 68 posts. State officials currently plan to
fund up to $18.1 million for fiscal year 2005. Improvement projects
ranged from adding more interview windows to increase visa processing
in Seoul to a complete consular section reconfiguration in London.
However, according to a senior consular official, these funds are being
used to provide temporary solutions at posts that may require a new
embassy, as part of State's multibillion-dollar embassy construction
program.
Number of Intelligence and Law Enforcement Records in CLASS Increased,
but Additional Information Would Help Facilitate Legitimate Travel:
The September 11 attacks highlighted the need for comprehensive
information sharing.[Footnote 27] In January 2005, GAO identified
effective information sharing to secure the homeland as a high-risk
area of the U.S. government because the federal government still faces
formidable challenges sharing information among stakeholders in an
appropriate and timely manner to minimize risk.[Footnote 28] With
cooperation from other federal agencies, State has increased the amount
of information available to consular officers in CLASS. Name-check
records from the intelligence community have increased fivefold from
48,000 in September 2001 to approximately 260,000 in June 2005,
according to consular officials. Moreover, consular officials told us
that, as of the fall of 2004, CLASS contained approximately 8 million
records from the FBI. In addition, State has developed more efficient
methods of acquiring certain data from law enforcement databases. For
example, State established a direct computer link with the FBI to send
descriptive information from the FBI's National Crime Information
Center (NCIC) to CLASS on a daily basis.
While the additional records in CLASS have helped consular officers
detect those who might seek to harm the United States, many consular
officers we interviewed stated that the increased volume of records and
lack of access to other detailed information can lead to visa-
processing delays for applicants. In particular, consular officers do
not have direct access to detailed information in criminal history
records. Section 403 of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001[Footnote 29]
directs the Attorney General and the FBI to provide State with access
to extracts of certain files[Footnote 30] containing descriptive
information for the purpose of determining whether a visa applicant has
a criminal history record contained in the NCIC Interstate
Identification Index (or Index). The USA PATRIOT Act also states that
access to an extract does not entitle consular officers to obtain the
full contents of the corresponding records. In accordance with this
mandate, the FBI stated that the bureau provides to CLASS extracts that
contain all available biographical information, such as the date of
birth and height of the person with the criminal record.[Footnote 31]
However, when conducting a CLASS name check, consular officers told us
that they are not able to conclusively determine whether an FBI file
matches a visa applicant because the extracts lack sufficient
biographical information. Moreover, the FBI stated that, in accordance
with section 403, the extracts do not contain details such as charges
and dispositions of cases, which are necessary to determine if the
applicant might be ineligible for a visa.[Footnote 32] For example, the
information in CLASS does not distinguish between a conviction for a
crime such as kidnapping or drug possession, or an acquittal on a
charge of driving while intoxicated.
Consular officers, therefore, must fingerprint applicants who have a
potential match in the Index for positive identification in the FBI
records; if there is a match, they can then ascertain whether the
information contained in the criminal record would make the applicant
ineligible for a visa.[Footnote 33] In fiscal year 2004, of the more
than 40,000 sets of fingerprints consular officers sent to the FBI for
verification, about 29 percent were positive matches between the
applicant and a criminal record in the Index. State officials we spoke
with estimated that of those applicants who were positively identified
by fingerprints, only about 10 percent were denied a visa based on the
criminal history record information provided by the FBI. Moreover,
fingerprinted applicants are charged an additional $85 processing fee
and, as of the spring of 2005, must wait an estimated 4 to 8 weeks for
a response from Washington, D.C., before adjudication can proceed.
According to FBI and State officials, the processing delays are due to
inefficiencies in the way the fingerprints are sent to the FBI for
processing (see fig. 4).
Figure 4: Fingerprint Requirements for Access to Detailed Information
in FBI Files and Proposed Changes:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
To facilitate more efficient fingerprint processing, State and the FBI
are implementing an electronic fingerprint system whereby consular
officers will scan the applicants' fingerprints at post and submit them
directly into the FBI's database if there is a potential match in
CLASS. FBI and State officials told us that posts would be notified if
the record in question matched the applicant within 24 hours. However,
thousands of visa applicants could still face wait times and additional
fingerprinting fees that they would otherwise not have incurred because
consular officers do not have enough information at the time of the
interview to determine if the records in CLASS match the applicants.
There are several options that the FBI and State have discussed to help
ensure that consular officers can facilitate legitimate travel;
however, each would require legislative changes and the agencies would
need to weigh the associated trade-offs inherent in each option. These
options include the following:
* Consular officials told us that access to additional information in a
criminal history file, such as the charge and disposition of a case,
would allow their officers to determine which crimes are serious enough
to require a positive fingerprint match prior to adjudication. However,
FBI officials noted that there are some technical limitations on
extracting specific pieces of data from the criminal history records in
the Index.
* To avoid some of the technical limitations associated with the Index,
FBI officials stated that it would be easier to provide the full
criminal history records to consular officers for the purpose of visa
adjudication. However, these officials told us that assurances would
need to be in place to prevent misuse of the information, given its
sensitive nature. Indeed, State and the FBI have already negotiated a
Memorandum of Understanding aimed at protecting the information passed
to CLASS. Consular officials indicated that their officers may need
access only to the criminal charge and disposition of the case to
adjudicate a visa case more efficiently.
Conclusions:
The visa process presents a balance between facilitating legitimate
travel and identifying those who entry into the United States might be
harmful to U.S. national interests. Since our 2002 report, State, in
coordination with other agencies, has made substantial improvements to
the visa process to strengthen it as a tool to prevent terrorists and
others who might pose a threat from entering our country. However,
given the large responsibility placed on consular officers,
particularly entry-level officers, it is critical that State continue
to improve the tools, guidance, and training necessary for them to be
effective. In particular, State's assignment system is not effectively
meeting the staffing needs of its consular posts. A rigorous assessment
of staffing priorities is needed for State to achieve its goal of
having the right people in the right place with the right skills,
especially at critical posts of national security concern.
Additionally, while visa policies and procedures have been updated and
enhanced, these changes must be more clearly communicated to all
consular staff to ensure they are consistently and properly applied.
Action is also needed at the interagency level to encourage
interactions between consular sections, law enforcement officials, and
other security officials at post to increase information sharing on
terrorism issues relevant to the visa process.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
We are making seven recommendations to further strengthen the visa
process. These recommendations are being directed to the Secretary of
State, who is generally responsible for visa operations, and to the
Secretary of Homeland Security, who is generally responsible for visa
policy.
To further clarify current visa policies and procedures, we recommend
that:
* the Secretary of State update the Foreign Affairs Manual on a regular
basis to incorporate all changes in visa policies and procedures; and:
* the Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation with the
Secretary of State, develop additional guidance on the relationship
between DHS and State in the visa process, including the roles and
responsibilities of DHS personnel overseas who assist consular sections
and DHS's procedures at points of entry.
To ensure consular sections have the necessary tools to enhance
national security and promote legitimate travel, we also recommend that
the Secretary of State:
* develop a comprehensive plan to address vulnerabilities in consular
staffing worldwide, including an analysis of staffing requirements and
shortages, foreign language proficiency requirements, and fraud
prevention needs, among other things--the plan should systematically
determine priority positions that must be filled worldwide based on the
relative strategic importance of posts and positions and realistic
assumptions of available staff resources;
* report to Congress, within 1 year of this report, on the
implementation of this plan;
* ensure that consular chiefs update interview wait-time data on a
weekly basis; and:
* in consultation with law enforcement and intelligence agencies,
further expand consular training in terrorist travel trends, post-
specific counterterrorism techniques, and fraud prevention, either at
the Foreign Service Institute or at overseas posts.
To ensure that consular officers have access to all relevant
information on known or suspected terrorists, we recommend that the
Secretary of State, in consultation with appropriate agencies,
* further encourage interactions between consular sections, law
enforcement officials, and other security officials at post to increase
information sharing with consular officers on terrorism issues relevant
to the visa process, including regional or post-specific terrorism
trends, either through the Visas Viper process, or other similar
interagency mechanisms.
Matter for Congressional Consideration:
As GAO has reported,[Footnote 34] information is a crucial tool in
fighting terrorism, and the timely dissemination of that information is
critical to maintaining the security of our nation. Although State and
the FBI have taken steps to increase the amount of information
available to consular officers in the visa process, further information
from criminal history files would help facilitate visa adjudication for
legitimate travelers. Thus, Congress may wish to require that the
Department of State and the Federal Bureau of Investigation develop and
report on a plan that details:
* the additional information from criminal history records that should
be made available to visa adjudicators;
* how the FBI proposes to provide this additional information to State;
* the potential concerns associated with increased access to this
information such as technology limitations and privacy concerns, and
how the agencies propose to mitigate these concerns; and:
* any legislative changes that may be necessary to facilitate the
exchange of this information between the FBI and State.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
State, DHS, and the Department of Justice provided written comments on
a draft of this report (see apps. II, III, and IV, respectively).
State noted that the report is a fair and balanced evaluation of the
improvements made in the visa process since our 2002 report. State
agreed with most of our conclusions, and indicated that it is taking
action to implement the majority of our recommendations. For example,
the department indicated that it is revising consular guidance located
in the Foreign Affairs Manual and standard operating procedures, and is
working with DHS to clarify guidance on the roles and responsibilities
of various DHS personnel overseas. In addition, State agreed that
additional training would be beneficial for consular officers, and
stated that it intends to provide further guidance to overseas posts
about the importance of interactions between consular officers and law
enforcement and intelligence officials at post. With regard to the
matter for congressional consideration, State agreed to work with the
FBI to determine how additional information from the FBI might be
shared with visa adjudicators.
State disagreed with our recommendation that it prepare a comprehensive
plan to address vulnerabilities in consular staffing. State argued that
it already had such a plan. Moreover, State claimed that it appreciates
that priority positions must be filled worldwide based on the relative
strategic importance of posts and positions. While State argued that
every visa consular officer is serving a strategic function, the
department identified one post, Embassy Baghdad, as a clear example of
a priority post. Further, State acknowledged that it has fewer midlevel
consular officers than it needs. We continue to believe it is incumbent
on the department to conduct a worldwide analysis to identify high-
priority posts and positions, such as supervisory consular positions in
posts with high-risk applicant pools or those with high workloads and
long wait times for applicant interviews. As we note in our report, at
the time of our work, the midlevel visa chief positions in Riyadh and
Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, and Cairo, Egypt, were not filled with permanent
midlevel officers. This was a serious deficiency given that the visa
sections were staffed with officers on their first tour. Although State
noted that it anticipated addressing this shortage of midlevel consular
officers before 2013, it did not indicate when that gap would be
filled. Moreover, State's bidding and assignment process does not
guarantee that the positions of highest priority will always be filled
with qualified officers. Therefore, a further assessment is needed to
ensure that State has the right people in the right posts with the
necessary skill levels. State's comments are reprinted in appendix II,
along with its summary of improvements to the visa process since
September 11, 2001. In addition, State provided technical comments on a
draft of this report, which we have incorporated, as appropriate.
DHS concurred that, in consultation with State, it needed to develop
additional guidance on the relationship between DHS and State in the
visa process, and agreed to provide that guidance to all overseas
posts. DHS also indicated that it would work to ensure that all posts
understand the roles and responsibilities of DHS personnel conducting
visa security functions, as well as DHS procedures at ports of entry.
The Department of Justice did not comment on the matter for
congressional consideration in our report. The department provided
additional information on other actions it is taking, in collaboration
with State and DHS, to improve interagency information sharing. In
particular, the department detailed U.S. government efforts to
integrate various databases aimed at providing fast access to
biometrically-verified criminal history record information for visa
adjudication and immigration purposes, which it stated would increase
the accuracy and reliability of criminal history record checks. The
Department of Justice also provided technical comments on a draft of
this report, which we have incorporated, as appropriate.
We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of State and
Homeland Security, the Attorney General, and other interested Members
of Congress. We will also make copies available to others upon request.
In addition, this report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web
site at http://www.gao.gov.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please
contact me at (202) 512-4128 or fordj@gao.gov. Contact points for our
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on
the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to
this report are listed in appendix V.
Signed by:
Jess T. Ford:
Director, International Affairs and Trade:
List of Committees:
The Honorable Susan M. Collins:
Chairman:
The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman:
Ranking Minority Member:
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Tom Davis:
Chairman:
Committee on Government Reform:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Christopher Shays:
Chairman:
Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International
Relations:
Committee on Government Reform:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable Don Young Acting:
Chairman:
Committee on Homeland Security:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr.:
Chairman:
Committee on the Judiciary:
House of Representatives:
The Honorable John N. Hostettler:
Chairman:
The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee:
Ranking Minority Member:
Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims:
Committee on the Judiciary:
House of Representatives:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:
To review the changes to the visa process since 2002, we analyzed
consular policies and procedures; resources that support consular
functions; and the types of information on known or suspected
terrorists that are used to screen visa applicants. For example, we
reviewed the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act,[Footnote 35] as
amended; the Homeland Security Act of 2002;[Footnote 36] and other
related legislation. In addition, we examined State's Foreign Affairs
Manual and consular standard operating procedures, and analyzed
consular workload and staffing data. We also attended several consular
training courses, including those on analytical interviewing
techniques, advanced name checking, and fraud prevention, conducted at
State's George P. Shultz National Foreign Affairs Training Center. In
Washington, D.C., we interviewed officials from State's Bureaus of
Consular Affairs and Human Resources. We also spoke with officials from
the Department of Homeland Security's Border and Transportation
Security Directorate, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, and
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, as well as officials from the
Federal Bureau of Investigation in Washington, D.C., and West Virginia.
We visited U.S. consular posts in seven countries--Egypt, Indonesia,
Malaysia, Morocco, Spain, Saudi Arabia, and the United Kingdom. During
these visits, we observed visa operations and interviewed consular
staff and embassy management about visa adjudication policies,
procedures, and resources. In addition, we spoke with officials from
other U.S. agencies that assist consular officers in the visa
adjudication process.
We also administered 25 structured interviews between January and April
2005 regarding the impact of State's changes to policies and guidance,
staffing, training, resources, and interagency coordination on the visa
process The interviews were conducted in-person and by telephone with
visa chiefs and other consular affairs staff in overseas posts. We
selected posts that were of interest to antiterrorism efforts or
received a large number of third-country national applications from
countries of interest to antiterrorism efforts: Abu Dhabi, Beirut,
Brussels, Cairo, Casablanca, Damascus, Dubai, Frankfurt, Islamabad,
Jakarta, Jeddah, Jerusalem, Kuala Lumpur, Lagos, London, Madrid, Mexico
City, Muscat, Nairobi, Paris, Riyadh, Rome, Sana'a, Tunis, and Toronto.
The responses to the structured interviews are not intended to be
representative of all posts.
The structured interview contained open-and close-ended questions about
staffing, policy guidance, screening procedures, training, workload,
facilities, foreign language proficiency, fraud prevention, and the
impact of changes to the visa process since September 11, 2001. We
developed the interview questions based on our review of the
documentation and data listed above. We also pretested the interview
with four current and former visa chiefs to ensure that the questions
were clear and could be answered. We modified the interview questions
on the basis of the pretest results and an internal expert technical
review. We provided the visa chiefs and other consular officials with
the questions in advance to allow them time to gather any data
necessary for the interview. We also conducted follow-up discussions
with each of the posts for more detailed information about staffing.
To assess the reliability of State's human capital data on consular
staffing and officers' foreign language proficiency, we queried human
capital officials at State and examined the data electronically. We
determined that the data were sufficiently reliable to report on
consular staffing and language proficiency data from fiscal year 2002
through April 2005.
To determine the reliability of State's data on wait times for
applicant interviews, we reviewed the department's procedures for
capturing these data, interviewed the officials in Washington who
monitor and use these data, and examined the data electronically. We
analyzed interview wait times for applicants applying for visas for
temporary business or tourism purposes, but not for other types of
visas, including student visas. Specifically, we queried the database
to show the (1) consular post, (2) date of last entry, and (3) reported
wait time for all visa-issuing posts from October 2004 through March
2005. We performed independent checks of these data during our
structured interviews with 25 consular posts, as well as our visits to
8 posts overseas. We found missing data throughout the 6-month period
because posts were not reporting each week. Based on our analysis, we
determined that the data were not sufficiently reliable to determine
the exact magnitude of the problem because the exact number of posts
with a 30-day or more wait could not be determined. Consular officials
who manage consular sections overseas acknowledged that many posts are
not reporting on a weekly basis. We conducted our work from August 2004
through August 2005, in accordance with generally accepted government
auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Comments from the Department of State:
United States Department of State:
Assistant Secretary and Chief Financial Officer:
Washington, D.C. 20520:
Ms. Jacquelyn Williams-Bridgers:
Managing Director, International Affairs and Trade:
Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20548-0001:
AUG 30 2005:
Dear Ms. Williams-Bridgers:
We appreciate the opportunity to review your draft report, "BORDER
SECURITY: Strengthened Visa Process Would Benefit from Improvements in
Staffing and Information Sharing," GAO Job Code 320301.
The enclosed Department of State comments are provided for
incorporation with this letter as an appendix to the final report.
If you have any questions concerning this response, please contact
Diane Bean, Senior Adivsor, Visa Office, Bureau of Consular Affairs, at
(202) 647-6373.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Sid Kaplan (Acting):
cc: GAO - Katie Hartsburg;
CA - Maura Harty;
State/OIG - Mark Duda:
Department of State Comments on GAO Draft Report:
BORDER SECURITY: Strengthened Visa Process Would Benefit from
Improvements in Staffing and Information Sharing GAO-05-859, GAO Code
320301:
Thank you for the opportunity to respond to the report Strengthened
Visa Process Would Benefit from Improvements in Staffing and
Information Sharing. We appreciate the GAO's acknowledgment of the many
initiatives the Department of State ("the Department") has undertaken
to strengthen the visa process as an antiterrorism tool and the
recognition that consular officers know that national security in the
visa process is "Job 1."
The Department, working with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS),
has made significant changes to the visa process and entry screening
requirements since September 11, 2001, in an effort to "push out" our
border security to the maximum extent possible while still facilitating
legitimate travel. We have attached at Exhibit 1 a summary of some of
our more significant improvements to the visa process since 9/11, which
also include our ongoing participation in interagency efforts to
implement the provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act, the Enhanced Border
Security and Visa Entry Reform Act, the Homeland Security Act, and the
National Security Entry Exit Registration System (NSEERS).
On the whole, although we do not agree with every observation and
recommendation, we find the report is fair and balanced as an
evaluation of the many improvements made in the visa process since your
October 2002 report Visa Process Should Be Strengthened as an
Antiterrorism Tool. We wish to provide the following comments and
clarifications on the report's observations and on the recommendations
made to the Secretary of State.
Recommendation 1: The Secretary of State should update the Foreign
Affairs Manual on a regular basis to incorporate all changes in visa
policies and procedures.
We concur in this recommendation but note that this is not a simple
matter. Updating the FAM is like painting an aircraft carrier; one can
never say the job is done. Guidance to the field has changed rapidly
over the past four years. The Visa Office is making every effort to
keep the FAM as up-to-date as possible, and has been engaged in a
Department-wide effort to update and modernize the FAM. The sections
mentioned on page 10 of the report regarding consular duties and
clearances at posts are a part of this effort and should be completed
soon. Page 10 also mentions submission of visa applications to the FBI.
Because we now share information electronically with the FBI, we no
longer send hard copies of visa applications to them. The heading
"Submission of Visa Applications to the FBI" is being deleted from the
Table of Contents.
However, because guidance changes so rapidly and because we are
developing so many new programs, it will never be possible to say that
the FAM is completely up-to-date. We literally make changes every day.
Additionally, it is sometimes necessary to issue guidance as cables and
wait until a new program has stabilized before we include the material
in the FAM. However, when possible, the Visa Office now includes
updated FAM notes in all cables that deal with FAM-related material. We
make every effort to post these in the FAM as quickly as possible after
the cable is sent.
The normally short delays in incorporating the material into the FAM
are caused by the need to format the material for submission to the
Office of Directives Management, which publishes the FAM, by the time
needed for the Office of Directives Management to review and post the
material, and occasionally by a desire to obtain additional clearances.
We note that until guidance is posted in the FAM, SOPS and other ALDACs
are all available on the CA Bureau's intranet site, which is accessible
by all officers worldwide. We are currently overhauling the SOP list to
make it more accessible, by categorizing SOPs by subject matter (e.g.,
NIVs, IVs, etc.) and, for SOPs that have been incorporated into the
FAM, listing the relevant sections of the FAM that incorporate the
material.
Recommendation 2: The Secretary of Homeland Security, in consultation
with the Secretary of State, should develop additional guidance on the
relationship between DHS and State in the visa process, including the
roles and responsibilities of DHS personnel overseas who assist
consular sections and DHS's procedures at points of entry.
We concur in this recommendation. We have been working closely with DHS
to clarify the roles and responsibilities of their "legacy-INS"
officers overseas. This process is complicated by the designation of
overseas DHS officers as either ICE, CIS or CBP (Immigration and
Customs Enforcement, Citizenship and Immigrations Services, and Customs
and Border Protection, the separate DHS branches) and the resulting
shifts in their functions. As soon as we have clarified certain points,
we will transmit cables drafted by CIS that will provide specific
contact information for their field offices and describing their
overseas responsibilities.
Recommendation 3: The Secretary of State should develop a comprehensive
plan to address vulnerabilities in consular staffing worldwide.. The
plan should systematically determine priority positions that must be
filled worldwide based on the relative strategic importance o posts and
positions and realistic assumptions of available staff resources.
We do not concur that the Department does not have a comprehensive
worldwide consular staffing plan. The Department (CA and M/DGHR)
periodically reviews consular staffing needs to ensure that workload
needs are met around the world. Every two years, the Bureau of Human
Resources (HR) updates the consular portion of the Overseas Staffing
Model (OSM) to account for workload changes. For example, in 2004, work
rates were increased by 19% to take into account changes in visa
processing. HR coordinates the OSM with CA, which in turn annually
reviews consular staffing requirements on a worldwide basis. It is
important to note that the reviews are comprehensive and take into
account not just visa processing requirements and fraud prevention, but
also American citizen services needs such as adoptions, passport
services, and emergency services, which must be met at all posts as a
priority. Based on these reviews, the Department has established just
over 400 new consular positions between FY-2002 and FY-2005.
The report frequently cites the shortage of mid-level Foreign Service
officers, particularly at the FS-03 level, and the 2003 analysis that
such mid-level gap would not be closed until approximately 2013. We are
confident that the staffing gap at the FS-03 level will be closed long
before 2013. Our increased level of hiring in fiscal years 2002-2004 is
just beginning to pay dividends at the mid-level as evidenced by the
2005 Summer Session of the Commissioning and Tenure Board, which
produced the largest tenure class ever with 152 generalists recommended
for tenure. This brings the total of generalists recommended for tenure
in 2005 to 237, including approximately 70 consular cone generalists.
Once recommended for tenure, employees are eligible to compete for mid-
level FS-03 jobs but would appear in personnel data, such as that cited
in this report, as entry-level personnel at the FS-04 level.
To further strengthen its staffing planning, CA in collaboration with
HR will develop a plan for staffing consular posts which takes into
account the increased number of Foreign Service officers at the mid-
grade. The bureaus will also coordinate to ensure that sufficient
numbers of consular officers are available at all grades to allow for a
sufficient language training "float." CA will continue to use, and
hopes to increase its use, of WAE (retired) consular officers to cover
gaps and assist posts.
Finally, the Department appreciates that "priority positions must be
filled worldwide based on the relative strategic importance of posts
and positions." Baghdad is clearly such a post, for example, and it is
treated as a priority. However, every visa-issuing post is "strategic"
in that a visa, regardless of where issued, grants the holder
permission to travel to the United States. Therefore, every visa
application must and does receive the same scrutiny, regardless of at
which post the application is presented, and every visa consular
officer is serving a strategic function.
Recommendation 4: The Secretary of State should report to Congress
within one year of this report on the implementation of the consular
staffing plan.
As explained above, we believe a comprehensive worldwide staffing plan
already exists and is being revised on an on-going basis. Of course,
upon request, we would be pleased to report to Congress at any time on
these efforts.
Recommendation 5: The Secretary of State should ensure that consular
section chiefs update interview wait times data on a weekly basis.
We concur in this recommendation, and have already taken steps to
implement it. On August 12, 2005, we sent a cable to all diplomatic and
consular posts (STATE 152644) reminding them of the importance of
keeping wait times current both in the Consular Consolidated Database
(CCD) and on their post websites. In addition, we have reviewed the
records in the CCDs and have contacted delinquent posts directly to
instruct them to update their wait time information. We will continue
to monitor this closely.
Recommendation 6: The Secretary of State should, in consultation with
law enforcement and intelligence eg agencies, further expand consular
trainin in terrorist travel trends, post-specific counterterrorism
techniques, and fraud prevention, either at the Foreign Service
Institute (FSI) or at overseas posts.
We concur in this recommendation and agree with GAO's conclusions
regarding the importance of consular training in terrorist travel
trends, post-specific counterterrorism techniques, and fraud
prevention. As the report notes, FSI has taken steps to enhance such
training, including several additions to, and lengthening of, the Basic
Consular Course. The number of offerings of FSI's special course on
Fraud Prevention for Managers has quadrupled this year. 139 consular
personnel have completed this course thus far in FY-2005. The content
of the course has also been revised to incorporate additional material
on counter-terrorism and a briefing from the National Targeting Center.
As noted in the GAO report, FSI is also developing distance-learning
courses on fraud prevention; one of these will focus specifically on
countering terrorist travel.
Because terrorist travel trends are inherently changeable and often
post-specific, FSI believes that additional training should center on
ways to access current intelligence data. The draft report refers to
the classified intranet web site recently developed by the Bureau of
Consular Affairs. In order to teach consular officers effectively to
access relevant information from that web site and from other USG
agency sources, FSI has developed a special training module on "SIPRnet
for Consular Officers." This two and a half hour training session,
presented by expert trainers from FSI's School of Applied Information
Technology, features hands-on practice at a classified computer
terminal. All new consular officers now receive this training as part
of the Basic Consular Course. The module has also been incorporated
into the course on Fraud Prevention for Managers and the Advanced
Consular Course. To date, 335 consular officers have completed this
training.
The draft report also cites the need for post-specific training. As the
report notes, some posts have developed more extensive programs than
have others. FSI offered guidance on how to implement on-the-job
training during three recent Consular Leadership Development
Conferences attended by consular officers from 70 posts in Latin
America, Europe, Africa, and the Middle East. FSI is currently
developing detailed guidance for consular sections worldwide on how to
implement on-the-job training for consular personnel, to include
security-related material specific to each post on impeding terrorist
travel.
The report cites the need for both greater amounts and more targeted
language training for consular officers. FSI's language and consular
training sections, along with personnel at posts, have developed
consular-specific modules for most of the languages. We have also
expanded upon the post language programs described in the report
through additional programs at posts funded directly by FSI. However,
for entry-level officers, the overall limitation on the amount of time
they may be in training status before their initial assignments limits
the Department's capacity to bring them to high levels of proficiency
in the more difficult languages. In light of the security concems
raised in this report, the Department will give careful consideration
to extending that time limitation for entry-level officers assigned to
critical threat countries.
Recommendation 7: The Secretary of State, in consultation with
appropriate agencies, should further encourage interactions between
consular sections, law enforcement officials and other security
officials at post to increase information-sharing with consular
officers on terrorism issues relevant to the visa process, including
regional or post-specific terrorism trends, either through the Visas
Viper process or other similar interagency mechanisms.
We concur in this recommendation. The Department will send instructions
to chiefs of missions reminding them of the importance of the visa
function as an antiterrorism tool and instructing them to ensure that
all members of their mission, regardless of agency, are responsible for
keeping consular officers informed of terrorist trends or travel
patterns affecting their host country.
Matter for Congressional Consideration:
Although this suggestion is not directed at the Department of State, we
support it. The Department strongly agrees that complete information
for consular officers is a crucial tool in fighting terrorism and that
more complete information from NCIC criminal files would facilitate
visa adjudications. The Department would be happy to work with the FBI
to develop the plan proposed in this section and to report back to
Congress as suggested.
Exhibit 1:
CHANGES TO THE VISA PROCESS SINCE SEPTEMBER 11, 2001:
The Department of State, working with the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS), has made significant changes to the visa process and
entry screening requirements since September 11, 2001, to provide
better security in light of the revised threat assessment to our
national security. The steps outlined below are some of our more
important efforts to improve the security of U.S. borders, which also
include our ongoing participation in interagency efforts to implement
the provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act, the Enhanced Border Security and
Visa Entry Reform Act, the Homeland Security Act, and the National
Security Entry Exit Registration System (NSEERS).
Improvements Made in Visa Processing:
Application Processing:
* Greatly increased the percentage of nonimmigrant applicants
interviewed worldwide and set a written standard on interviews to
achieve consistency around the world. On August 1, 2003, new
regulations were implemented that limit waiver of personal appearance
for nonimmigrant visa applicants to only a few categories of
exceptions, such as diplomats, children, and the elderly. These
regulations were codified in statute in December 2004.
* In coordination with the Departments of Justice and Homeland
Security, added more interagency security checks for counter-terrorism
purposes for certain groups of visa applicants from certain countries.
* Provided nonimmigrant and immigrant visa data access to DHS
inspectors at ports of entry. The data includes detailed information on
all visas issued, including photographs and fingerprints of
nonimmigrant and immigrant visa applicants.
* The Consular Consolidated Database (CCD) had earlier been made
available to consular officers worldwide in May 2001.
* Expanded intranet resources for consular adjudicators to assist them
in reading and verifying entry/exit cachets in Arabic or Persian
script. Deployed a classified CA web site.
* Concurred with the Department of Justice in the removal of Argentina
(February 2002) and Uruguay (April 2003) from the Visa Waiver Program
and imposition of limitations on Belgium's participation (May 2003).
* Currently working with DHS to finalize reviews of the Visa Waiver
Program for 25 countries.
* In March 2003, centralized the flow of fiancee visa petitions from
USCIS to the National Visa Center (NVC) in New Hampshire. NVC compiles
certain FBI and special checks before sending the files to overseas
posts.
* Developed Internet site that allows applicants to complete NIV
application on-line. Resultant application form includes a 2-D bar code
enabling quick scanning of data into the NIV system. Forms are
available in English, Spanish, and a number of other languages.
* Implemented Presidential Proclamation number 7750, which suspends the
entry into the United States of certain corrupt public officials and
their dependents.
* In Spring 2004 we centralized the flow of approved nonimmigrant visa
petitions from USCIS to overseas posts through the Kentucky Consular
Center (KCC). In a second phase, petitions that posts identify as
warranting return to CIS for revocation will go first to KCC for review
and tracking.
Namechecks:
* Since June 2002, have incorporated approximately 8.9 million records
from the FBI's National Crime Information Center (NCIC) into our
Consular Lookout and Support System (CLASS) namecheck database. This
more than doubled the records on file. (This was authorized by the USA
PATRIOT Act.)
* Entered over one million additional records into CLASS on open or
unresolved removal or deportation cases. Cases were entered in January
2004 and provide more timely notice to consular officers in the field
of pending removal and detention actions.
* Eliminated the periodic purge program for lookout records that fit a
certain predefined profile. As of May 2005, the CLASS database
contained over 19.5 million prime records, and an additional 8.6
million alias records. In addition, the system contains records on over
866,000 lost and/or stolen foreign passports.
* From September 2001 to May 2005 increased namecheck records from the
intelligence community from 48,000 to 180,000 (through the National
Counter Terrorism Center [NCTC], a clearinghouse for sensitive
intelligence and watchlist entries in CLASS). The Terrorist Screening
Center (TSC) feeds terrorist-related lookout information to the CLASS
system.
* Started automated cross-checking of new derogatory information
concerning terrorists or suspected terrorists (including TSC entries)
against records of previously-issued visas in order to provisionally
revoke existing valid visas in the hands of those who may be a threat.
Since 9/11, we have revoked the visas of some 1,500 individuals
suspected of having a connection to terrorism.
* In May 2003, implemented the Alternate Processing Center (APC) for
the CLASS namecheck system. Located in the Kentucky Consular Center,
several hundred miles from Washington, DC, the APC provides additional
namecheck production resources and load sharing capability with the
primary computer complex in the Washington area. APC also improves
CLASS survivability.
* Effective November 2002, discontinued the use of a CD-ROM based back-
up namecheck system. No visa is now issued without a CLASS check that
provides real-time lookout information.
* Implemented the Hispanic algorithm in all Western Hemisphere posts
and eighty percent of all posts worldwide.
* Joined with DOJ and others in establishing the Terrorist Threat
Integration Center (TTIC), now known as the National Counterterrorism
Center (NCTC), and the Terrorist Screening Center (TSC). Both entities
are engaged in integrating government watchlists, including TIPOFF, and
TSC checks visa applicants against the terrorist database.
* Upgraded the central namecheck processing facility to increase
computer power and provide system scalability:
* Established a communication link with the FBI's Criminal Justice
Information Division to ensure that the NCIC entries are received into
CLASS in a timely manner. Since February 1, 2005, we get updates and
new records daily.
* Have improved the capacity of CLASS to handle additional information
such as Interpol and deportation lookout information, the Hispanic
algorithm, and lost and stolen passport data.
* Reduced significantly the response time to every category of Security
Advisory Opinion (SAO) clearing out long-overdue cases and making SAO
response wait times more reasonable and predictable.
Enhanced Data Collection:
* Completed worldwide deployment of biometric NIV software in October
2004. Applicants for whom fingerprints are collected are checked
against the DHS database before a visa is issued.
* Included 25 additional data elements in the automated nonimmigrant
visa processing system beginning in September 2002. These fields are
viewable worldwide through the Consular Consolidated Database. This
data includes U.S. contact information.
* Effective October 26, 2004, implemented facial recognition screening
of all visa applicants not subject to the biometric fingerprinting
requirement.
* Deployed on-line electronic registration for the Diversity visa
program. Registration for the DV-2005 "lottery" was successfully
conducted exclusively through a dedicated web site. This enables us to
better identify duplicate entries, including, through extensive use of
facial recognition technology, those submitted under fraudulent
identities.
* Created two new forms for nonimmigrant visa applicants: the DS-157
(November 2001), required of all men aged 16 to 45 from every country
in the world; and the DS-158 (July 2002), required of all applicants
for student visas. The DS-157 is used to identify applicants who
require a security advisory opinion from Washington agencies.
* In the spring of 2002, provided all posts with software and scanners
to allow scanning of supporting evidence in serious refusals. This
evidence is thus available in its electronic format to all consular
operations and DHS border inspection offices. This is part of the
effort to replace paper files with image-storage and retrieval and to
improve the access to information by consular officers making
adjudication decisions.
* In April 2002, began requiring photo-capture for refused nonimmigrant
visa applicants.
* Revised the Immigrant Visa system to capture and store a digitized
photograph of the applicants as well as two fingerprints. The
fingerprints are checked against the DHS fingerprint database (IDENT).
The new Immigrant Visa is now printed on the Lincoln visa foil, and
affixed in the applicant's passport. This system has been deployed to
all immigrant visa processing posts worldwide.
* Revised photo standards for visa applicants to improve the quality of
data for facial recognition and other purposes.
* Included several additional data elements in the automated immigrant
visa processing system to support datasharing with the Social Security
Administration.
Expanded Information Sharing:
* Created a new staff office, VO/l, in the Visa Office in August 2002
to coordinate information management and liaison activities. We expect
this office to continue to grow and to play a key role in interagency
discussions.
* The Border Biometric Program office in the Visa Office has been
reorganized as the Office of Border and International Programs to allow
for expanded efforts at information sharing and coordination with like-
minded nations and multilateral organizations.
* Developed and implemented the Security Advisory Opinion Improvement
Project (SAO-IP), a re-engineering of the interagency visa clearance
process to allow quicker processing and greater accountability.
Improved software was piloted overseas in November 2003 and deployed
worldwide in the spring of 2004. Deployment to other USG agencies began
in December 2003. A number of upgrades are planned for implementation
in 2005 including the elimination of cables to rely fully on electronic
transmission of data.
* In the fall of 2001, began storing serious refusal files for posts at
risk (or with space problems) at the Kentucky Consular Center (KCC).
KCC has begun scanning old files, making these files available to all
CCD users. This process will be expanded to include serious refusal
files from all posts worldwide, thereby making them available to all
posts worldwide and to domestic offices.
* Implemented technology support in the visa lookout system to support
DHS's National Security Entry Exit Registration System (NSEERS).
* Successfully launched the Interim Student and Exchange Authentication
System (ISEAS) (September 2002), which provided electronic verification
of the acceptance of foreign students and exchange visitors who apply
to enter the United States on student ("F," "M") and exchange visitor
("J") visas. ISEAS was created to satisfy the mandates of Section
501(c) of the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of
2002 and remained active until February 2003 when DHS's Student and
Exchange Visitor Information System (SEVIS) was implemented.
* Worked with DHS on the implementation of the SEVIS student tracking
system. All student visas are now verified and registered in SEVIS.
Over 1.4 million records from SEVIS have been downloaded to CA's
Consular Consolidated Database where the information is available for
the electronic verification, adjudication, and reporting of student and
exchange visitor visas.
* Make consular data available via the interagency OSIS (Open Sources
Information System) network. Work with agencies concerned with Border
Security (DHS, FBI, etc.) to develop an MOU that will allow this
access. Signed an MOU on datasharing, with the FBI on July 15, 2004.
Internal Controls:
* Removed direct Foreign Service National access to detailed namecheck
information in consular automated systems. Reviewed the visa referral
system and reminded post/consular managers of the controls needed. The
referral form was revised and its use was made mandatory worldwide. The
form now requires written certification by the referring officer that
the visa applicant is personally known to the referring officer and
does not pose a threat to the United States.
* Implemented recommendations resulting from the OIG review of the
referral system to strengthen accountability.
* In July 2002, installed new management tools to monitor user accounts
on consular automated systems.
* Mandated a special worldwide review of management controls in
September 2002 and again in August 2003. This has now been made a
required annual report from all consular sections.
* Implemented a system of Consular Management Assistance Teams (CMAT)
to visit posts to review management controls and procedures. The first
such visits were made in February 2003. As of January 1, 2005, CA has
conducted sixty-one CMAT visits.
* Began the process of formalizing and disseminating Standard Operating
Procedures for visa processing.
* In January 2004 began implementing a new software utility to further
improve the security and integrity of password assignment in consular
systems.
* Re-issued comprehensive instructions for accountability of controlled
items, including strengthened procedures.
* Provided a checklist to guide posts in prevention and reporting of
malfeasance.
* Provided a checklist to guide front office oversight of consular
operations, including supervisory officer review of visa issuances and
refusals.
* Instituted a reporting requirement for posts to report instances of
disciplinary action and/or termination of locally hired consular
employees for malfeasance or misconduct.
* Announced to the field establishment of an ombudsman for issues
relating to instances of real or perceived undue pressure on the visa
process.
* Announced to the field that checks of the IDENT and Facial
Recognition systems are covered by Visa Lookout Accountability
procedures.
Fraud Prevention Efforts:
In March 2002, pilot tested the new, tamper-resistant Lincoln
nonimmigrant visa foil with worldwide deployment completed in September
2003.
* Developed a more secure way of canceling machine-readable visas to
deter malefactors from "washing" the cancellation stamp from the visa.
The system was made available to posts in March of 2003.
* In April 2003, established a Vulnerability Assessment Unit (VAU)
staffed by personnel from Consular Affairs and Diplomatic Security. VAU
personnel employ data-mining and other techniques to identify baseline
trends and patterns and detect variations that could indicate possible
malfeasance. The unit analyzes data anomalies and makes recommendations
for action. The unit also participates in State Department training
efforts to ensure consular employees are well informed about issues
related to malfeasance.
* In August 2003, established a fraud prevention unit at the National
Visa Center (NVC) in Portsmouth, New Hampshire. The unit focuses on
data validation/fraud screening using automated search tools. In
September 2004 established a fraud prevention unit at KCC to work with
DV and petition-based NIV cases.
* Created an e-form for easy reporting of lost/stolen/missing visaed
passports, with automatic forwarding to DHS.
* Continue to update our database of foreign lost and stolen passports.
We currently have over 680,000 entries of blank and individually-issued
lost and stolen passports in the database.
* Review facial recognition results from initial test deployment at
visa posts. In October 2004, further deployed facial recognition
technology to screen certain visa cases.
Training:
* In March 2002, initiated an Advanced Namechecking Techniques course
at the Foreign Service Institute. Hundreds of consular officers have
now received this training.
* In May 2004 established an Advanced Namechecking course targeting
Passport Adjudicators.
* Lengthened the Basic Consular Course, also known as ConGen, from 26
to 31 days. This change is the result of the added emphasis that we are
giving to visa security, counter-terrorism awareness and interviewing
techniques. Among the new modules is a two-day interviewing "mini-
course" that focuses students on ways to identify lying/deception by
applicants. The new curriculum also includes a half-day program on
counter-terrorism at the CIA Headquarters in Langley. The new, longer
ConGen training schedule began October 17, 2003.
* Increased training for Ambassadors, Deputy Chiefs of Mission and
Principal Officers on their supervisory role in the visa function.
Provided written guidance to chiefs of mission and their deputies to
assist them in their oversight of consular sections.
* Increased training for consular officers in the Visas Mantis SAO
program that seeks to prevent the illegal transfer of sensitive
technology. Training takes place in Washington, at posts, and through a
regular series of videoconferences with a variety of posts.
Security Improvements:
* Eliminated crew-list visas and required that seamen obtain individual
visas as of June 16, 2004. (Crew list visas do not allow for the same
verification of identity and bona fides as do individual applications.)
* In February 2003, eliminated the waiver of visas for permanent
residents of Canada and Bermuda.
* In March 2002, amended regulations to close a loophole and limit the
ability of persons with expired visas to reenter the U.S. from
contiguous territory (i.e. Mexico, Canada, the Caribbean). The change
removed from the automatic revalidation provision those persons who
apply for a new visa and are refused in Canada or Mexico and all
nationals of countries designated as state sponsors of terrorism
regardless of whether or not they apply for a visa.
* Supported implementation of the Aviation and Transportation Security
Bill.
* Started discussions with Mexico and Canada about greater cooperation
on immigration, security, and visa issues.
* Dedicated a full-time Visa Office representative to US-VISIT (United
States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology program).
Phase one deployed in January 2004 allows DHS officers at primary
inspection lanes at 115 airports and 14 seaports to scan visas and view
on computer screens the visa data transmitted from the Consular
Consolidated Database, which should practically eliminate counterfeit
and photo-substituted visas. US- VISIT and the Biometric Visa Program
are fully compatible and coordinated, adding strength to our border
security through biometric enrollment.
FUTURE IMPROVEMENTS TO THE VISA PROCESS AND TIMETABLES:
The Department continues to implement requirements set forth in the USA
PATRIOT Act, the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act,
and the Homeland Security Act. Major initiatives not outlined above
that are currently planned include:
Application Processing:
* Continue investigation of "rules based process" as a tool for visa
screening.
* Revamp the visa processing sections of the Foreign Affairs Manuals,
including a complete reexamination of all existing guidance to overseas
posts. Existing standard operating procedures are being redrafted and
reissued, and new standard operating procedures SOPs are being
developed.
* Developing fully automated NIV application that will consolidate all
three NIV application forms and provide for more efficient data
collection and analysis.
Namechecks:
* Explore opportunities to improve performance on namechecking of Asian
names.
* Continue to support Department of State entities at the National
Counter Terrorism Center (NCTC) and the Terrorist Screening Center
(TSC).
* Continue to pursue with the FBI additional data pertaining to NCIC
lookouts to reduce "false positive" hits.
Enhanced Data Collection:
The Department will continue to work with countries that are eligible
for the Visa Waiver Program (VWP) and with ICAO to meet the requirement
that those countries have programs to incorporate biometric identifiers
in their passports, as required by the Border Security Act.
Expanded Information Sharing:
* Continue to expand datashare opportunities with federal agencies,
maximizing the value of consular data to the USG while developing
procedures to ensure proper use of this information.
* Continue working on a number of programs with Canada and Mexico as
part of our U.S.-Canada Smart Border Action Plan (30 point plan) and
U.S.-Mexico Border Partnership (22 point plan).
Internal Controls:
* Restrict further the access of Foreign Service National employees to
namecheck information.
* Provide additional guidance to the field on supervisory officer
review of visa issuances and refusals.
* Maintain a robust schedule of visits by consular management
assistance teams to posts to review management controls and procedures.
Fraud Prevention Programs:
* Expand the efforts of the newly created Fraud Trends Analysis Unit to
employ data mining tools to identify trends in fraud around the world.
[End of section]
Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Washington, DC 20528:
August 30, 2005:
Mr. Jess T. Ford:
Director, International Affairs and Trade:
Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Dear Mr. Ford:
RE: GAO 05-859, Border Security: Strengthened Visa Process Would
Benefit From Improvements in Staffing and Information Sharing (GAO Job
Code 320301). Thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on
the draft report. We commend GAO's efforts to highlight the importance
of the visa process as a critical element of homeland security.
The Department of Homeland Security is committed to ensuring that a
secure visa process serves as the United States' first line of defense.
DHS is engaging and partnering with the Department of State in numerous
ways to achieve this goal. As your report indicates, much has been
accomplished, yet additional work remains.
We fully endorse GAO's assessment that the visa process must have both
an infrastructure that supports information sharing, and a staffing
model that puts "the right people in the right place with the right
skills." DHS has an important role to play in both of these areas.
DHS supports the goal of information integration and is making
substantial progress through such initiatives as US-VISIT, expanded
sharing of law enforcement data, and other efforts. We will continue to
work with State and other partners to ensure that the full information
resources of the U.S. government are brought to bear on the visa
process.
Through our expanding deployment of Visa Security Officers, we are also
addressing the critical human resource needs identified in this report:
the need for law enforcement expertise and guidance at high risk
locations, and the need for closer coordination between consular and
law enforcement officials at post. With State's assistance, we are
working to expand the deployment of these officers so that additional
posts can benefit from the operational partnership highlighted in Saudi
Arabia. Considering the many demands placed upon consular officers, we
strongly believe that the assignment of dedicated DHS officers who are
members of a law enforcement profession and have experience in the
broad range of DHS border security functions can mitigate fundamental
resource gaps.
Finally, we concur with GAO's recommendation that the Secretary of
Homeland Security, in consultation with the Secretary of State, should
develop additional guidance on the relationship between DHS and State
in the visa process. We will provide this additional guidance and
ensure that all posts understand the roles and responsibilities of DHS
personnel conducting visa security functions, and DHS' procedures at
ports of entry.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Steven J. Pecinovsky:
Director:
Departmental GAO/OIG Liaison Office:
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Comments from the Department of Justice:
U.S. Department of Justice:
Washington, D.C. 20530:
AUG 31 2005:
Mr. Jess T. Ford:
Director, International Affairs and Trade:
United States Government and Accountability Office:
Washington, D.C. 20548:
Re: GAO REPORT 05-859:
Dear Mr. Ford:
Thank you for the opportunity to review the Government Accountability
Office (GAO) draft report entitled "BORDER SECURITY: Strengthened Visa
Process Would Benefit from Improvements in Stafrmg and Information
Sharing." The draft report has been reviewed by various components of
the Department of Justice (DOJ), including the Federal Bureau of
Investigation's (FBI's) Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS)
Division. This letter constitutes the formal DOJ comments to the GAO
draft report and it is requested that it be included in the GAO final
report.
The GAO report pertains to the United States (U.S.) Department of State
(DOS) procedures and processes for adjudicating applications for
nonimmigrant visas. The report discusses the process by which
information from fingerprint-based criminal history records and other
non-fingerprint-based information maintained by the FBI is provided to
DOS in the form of extracts for use in DOS's name check database,
Consular Lookout and Support System (CLASS), in processing visa
applications. The extract process was developed pursuant to authority
established under section 403(0) of the Uniting and Strengthening
America by Providing Appropriate Tools to Intercept and Obstruct
Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act. The draft report notes certain information
sharing limitations that are inherent in n the extract process. The
report, however, fails to mention the parallel effort required and
underway pursuant to section 403(c) of the USA PATRIOT Act to adopt a
biometric technology standard and establish a fully integrated system
for sharing law enforcement and intelligence information in connection
with visa processing. As discussed below, the fingerprint-based,
interoperable information sharing system being developed by DOJ, DOS,
and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), will provide a more
accurate, efficient, and cost-effective means of sharing criminal
history record information used in visa adjudication decisions,
replacing the temporary, name-based checks that use the extracts
provided for under section 403(0).
Section 403 of the USA PATRIOT Act authorized DOS and the former
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) to access certain
identifying and biographical information from the criminal history
record file and the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) file
maintained by the CJIS Division for nonimmigrant visa applicants and
applicants for admission to the U.S. The U.S. Attorney General and the
FBI Director were authorized, pursuant to the section of the
Immigration and Nationality Act amended by section 403(a), 8 U.S.C.
1105(b)(1), to provide access to biographical information from mutually
agreed upon files contained in the NCIC and certain biographical
information contained in the Interstate Identification Index (III)
System for determining whether or not a nonimmigrant visa applicant or
an applicant for admission to the U.S. has a criminal history record
indexed in any such file. Name checks are conducted against these
extracts to determine whether the applicant has a record and, under 8
U.S.C. 1105(b)(4), the DOS must submit fingerprints positively
identifying the applicant to obtain the full criminal history record
from the FBI.
Beginning in May 2002 and continuing to the present, the CJIS Division
has provided over 9,000,000' data extracts from the NCIC and the III
System to the DOS for placement in the CLASS. Beginning in August 2004,
the III System data extract has been provided on a weekly basis to DOS
via an electronic file transfer process and beginning in February 2005,
the NCIC data extract has been provided to DOS daily through the same
electronic file transfer.
At the same time, section 403(c)(1) of the USA PATRIOT Act required the
Attorney General and the Secretary of State jointly, through the
National Institute of Standards and Technology, and in consultation
with other Federal law enforcement and intelligence agencies (including
relevant agencies now in DHS) to develop and certify a technology
standard that can be used to verify the identity of persons applying
for a United States visa or such persons seeking to enter the United
States pursuant to a visa for the purposes of conducting background
checks, confirming identity, and ensuring that a person has not
received a visa under a different name. Section 403(c)(2) requires that
the technology standard so developed be the technological basis for a
"cross-agency, cross-platform electronic system that is a cost-
effective, efficient, fully integrated means to share law enforcement
and intelligence information necessary to confirm the identity of such
persons applying for a United States visa or such person seeking to
enter the United States pursuant to a visa."
[NOTE] As of August 9, 2005, the total numbers for the data extracts
provided by the CJIS Division are as follows: III data extracts:
7,972,407; NCIC data extracts: 1,033,725 (including records from the
Wanted Persons, Deported Felons, and Violent Gang and Terrorist
Organization Files)
The GAO report focuses on the name-check process using extracts under
section 403(a) that was only intended to be an interim solution while
the biometric interoperability required under section 403(c) is being
developed and implemented. A fingerprint-based check for visa
applicants is both feasible and the most effective and accurate way to
determine whether a relevant criminal history record exists on an
applicant. Name-checks are not reliable and present problems of both
security gaps from false negatives and unfairness to applicants from
false positives. Collecting applicants' fingerprints will also enable a
search against latent prints, including latent prints collected from
scenes of terrorist activity. The limited accuracy of name checks and
the need to move toward positive identification in the background check
process for visa applicants is acknowledged in section 403(c)'s
requirement to establish and adopt a biometric technology standard and
a fully integrated system.
The same policy concern of ensuring the accuracy of checks of criminal
history records underlies the requirement of fingerprints or other
approved forms of positive identification in the National Crime
Prevention and Privacy Compact Act of 1998 (42 U.S.C. 14611), or
Compact Act. The Compact Act requires fingerprints for all criminal
history record checks using the III System for noncriminal justice
purposes, which are defined to include immigration and naturalization
matters. On June 22, 2005, the National Crime Prevention and Privacy
Compact Council (Compact Council) published a rule in the Federal
Register that allows noncriminal justice agencies to submit 10-flat
fingerprints to satisfy the "positive identification" component of the
Compact Act. The option for noncriminal justice agencies to submit 10-
flat or slaps to the FBI will provide a quicker, easier method for
noncriminal justice agencies to submit fingerprints. DOS is currently
conducting a pilot using 10-flat submissions from select consulates and
embassies in Mexico and Europe.
Finally, it is important to note that, pursuant to section 403(c), DOJ,
DHS, and DOS are moving forward in developing an approach to achieve
interoperability among their various databases. This includes the DHS
and DOS transition from a two-print to a ten-print based environment
for its criminal and noncriminal justice activities. In addition the
DOJ/FBI, DHS/US-VISIT, and DOS/Consular Affairs have formally chartered
an Integrated Project Team (IPT) to establish a fingerprint-based
interoperable system Information regarding the Ws accomplishments and
progress has been presented to Congressional staff. When full
interagency interoperability is achieved, both DOS and DHS will have
fast access to biometrically verified criminal history record
information for visa adjudication and immigration purposes, increasing
the accuracy and reliability of the checks of criminal history records
in support of these decisions. The implementation of this approach will
help eliminate much of the need for extracts and name-based checks -
thus increasing the accuracy of the process and bolstering national
security.
Thank you for the opportunity to comment on your report.
Sincerely yours,
Signed by:
Paul R. Corts:
Assistant Attorney General for Administration:
[End of section]
Appendix V: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments:
GAO Contact:
Jess T. Ford, (202) 512-4128 or fordj@gao.gov.
Staff Acknowledgments:
In addition to the contact named above, John Brummet, Assistant
Director, and Joseph Carney, Daniel Chen, Etana Finkler, Kathryn
Hartsburg, Amanda Miller, John F. Miller, and Mary Moutsos made key
contributions to this report.
[End of section]
FOOTNOTES
[1] The United States also grants visas to people who intend to
immigrate to the United States. In this report, we use the term "visa"
to refer to nonimmigrant visas only.
[2] Most citizens of the 27 countries that participate in the Visa
Waiver Program, Canada, and certain other locations are not required to
obtain a visa for business or pleasure stays of short duration.
[3] GAO, Border Security: Visa Process Should Be Strengthened as an
Antiterrorism Tool, GAO-03-132NI (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21, 2002).
[4] 9-11 Commission, 9/11 and Terrorist Travel: Staff Report of the
National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States
(Washington, D.C; Aug. 21, 2004).
[5] The 19 September 11, 2001, hijackers received a total of 23 visas
at five different posts from April 1997 through June 2001. See GAO-03-
132NI.
[6] P.L. 82-414, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 et seq.
[7] State retains authority in certain circumstances as outlined in the
act. See P.L. 107-296.
[8] The act also requires that DHS on-site personnel in Saudi Arabia
review all visa applications prior to adjudication by consular
officers. P.L. 107-296, Sec. 428(e) and Sec. 428(i). See GAO, Border
Security: Actions Needed to Strengthen Management of Department of
Homeland Security's Visa Security Program, GAO-05-801 (Washington,
D.C.: July 29, 2005).
[9] Biometrics is a wide range of technologies that can be used to
verify a person's identity by measuring and analyzing that person's
physiological characteristics. In this case, and for the purposes of
this report, "biometric identifiers" refers to fingerprints. See GAO,
Technology Assessment: Using Biometrics for Border Security, GAO-03-174
(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 14, 2002).
[10] CLASS is a State Department name-check database that posts use to
access critical information for visa adjudication. The system contains
records provided by numerous agencies and includes information on
persons with visa refusals, immigration violations, and terrorism
concerns.
[11] Section 306 of the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform
Act of 2002 restricts the issuance of visas to aliens who are nationals
of countries that are state sponsors of international terrorism unless
the Secretary of State determines the alien does not pose a safety or
security threat. Currently, citizens from Cuba, Iran, Libya, North
Korea, Sudan, and Syria must, under this provision, undergo security
clearances from agencies in Washington, D.C., prior to adjudication by
a consular officer.
[12] Foreign Service officers are assigned a grade, which ranges from
FS-06 to FS-01, corresponding from entry-level to midlevel,
respectively. According to State, officers at grades 6 through 4 are
classified as junior officers; 3 through 1 are midlevel officers. In
addition, members of the senior Foreign Service are senior officers. In
this report, we refer to them as entry-level, midlevel, and senior-
level officers.
[13] In fiscal year 2002, State launched the Diplomatic Readiness
Initiative--a 3-year effort to ensure global diplomatic readiness--
through which State reported that it hired 834 Foreign Service
officers. In addition, the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention
Act of 2004 authorized the hiring of an additional 150 consular
officers per year for fiscal years 2006 through 2009. See P.L. 108-458
§ 7203.
[14] GAO, State Department: Targets for Hiring, Filling Vacancies
Overseas Being Met, but Gaps Remain in Hard-to-Learn Languages, GAO-04-
139 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 19, 2003).
[15] State defines hardship posts as those locations where the U.S.
government provides differential pay incentives--an additional 5
percent to 25 percent of base salary depending on the severity or
difficulty of the conditions--to encourage employees to bid on
assignments to these posts and to compensate them for the hardships
they encounter. According to State officials and Foreign Service
employees, the incentive provided by hardship pay for overseas service
has been diminished because unlike private sector employees, Foreign
Service employees serving overseas do not receive locality pay or a
salary comparability benefit to attract workers in the continental
United States to the federal government. See GAO, State Department:
Staffing Shortfalls and Ineffective Assignment System Compromise
Diplomatic Readiness at Hardship Posts, GAO-02-626 (Washington, D.C.:
June 18, 2002).
[16] The assignment process begins when Foreign Service employees who
are eligible to be transferred from their current assignment each year
receive a list of instructions and upcoming vacancies for which they
may compete. Staff then must submit a list of those positions for which
they want to be considered.
[17] The Automated Biometric Identification System is a DHS database
that includes some 5 million people who may be ineligible to receive a
visa. For example, the Automated Biometric Identification System data
includes, among other records, FBI information on all known and
suspected terrorists, selected wanted persons, and previous criminal
histories for high-risk countries. See GAO, Border Security: State
Department Rollout of Biometric Visas on Schedule, but Guidance Is
Lagging, GAO-04-1001 (Washington, D.C.: Sept 9, 2004).
[18] Foreign Service national employees are non-U.S. citizens employed
at a U.S. Foreign Service post by a U.S. government agency.
[19] Consular associates are U.S. citizens and relatives of U.S.
government direct-hire employees overseas who, following successful
completion of the required Basic Consular Course, are hired by the
Consular Section at their post. Beginning in fiscal year 2002, State
began a 3-year transition to remove adjudication functions from
consular associates and provide additional consular officers.
[20] Most of State's positions that require general proficiency in
speaking and reading abilities are categorized as "language-designated"
positions. In addition, State has some positions categorized as
"language-preferred," where State considers language proficiency useful
but not essential. See GAO-02-626.
[21] After candidates pass both the written and oral exams, they are
placed on a register of eligible hires and will remain there for up to
18 months or until being placed in an initial training class, according
to State officials. During training, entry-level officers are required
to bid on a list of available jobs from which State's Entry-Level
Division will assign them to an overseas post. The officers receive
language and job-specific training after they receive their
assignments. See GAO, State Department: Targets for Hiring, Filling
Vacancies Overseas Being Met, but Gaps Remain in Hard-to-Learn
Languages, GAO-04-139 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 19, 2003).
[22] State requires that a generalist applicant to the Foreign Service
select a "cone," which is a functional area of specialization, when
applying to take the written examination. For generalists, the Foreign
Service specializations are management, consular, economic, political,
and public diplomacy.
[23] The George P. Shultz National Foreign Affairs Training Center's
Foreign Service Institute, is the federal government's primary training
institution for officers and support personnel of the U.S. foreign
affairs community.
[24] Consular officers who serve as fraud prevention managers are in
charge of investigating cases of fraud, conducting fraud training for
the consular section, and providing information on fraud relevant to
the consular section at post.
[25] GAO, Overseas Presence: Conditions of Overseas Diplomatic
Facilities, GAO-03-557T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 20, 2003).
[26] See House Conference Report 108-10, attached to P.L. 108-7,
Consolidated Appropriations Resolution, 2003.
[27] See the Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act of 2004
(P.L. 108-458), which requires that the Director of the National
Counterterrorism Center report to Congress on a strategy to combine
terrorist travel intelligence, operations, and law enforcement into a
cohesive effort. This strategy may address, among other things,
granting consular officers and immigration adjudicators, as
appropriate, the security clearances necessary to access law
enforcement sensitive and intelligence databases.
[28] GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-05-207 (Washington, D.C.:
January 2005).
[29] P.L. 107-56.
[30] The files include the NCIC's Interstate Identification Index,
which is the FBI's database of criminal history records, Wanted Persons
Files, and any other files maintained by NCIC that may be mutually
agreed upon by the Attorney General and the agency receiving access.
[31] According to FBI officials, examples of the information provided
to CLASS, when available, include the FBI record number, name and
alias, date of birth, place of birth, citizenship, sex, race, eye
color, hair color, height, or weight, among other things.
[32] To render an alien ineligible under INA 212(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), the
conviction must be for a statutory offense that involves moral
turpitude, which includes many serious crimes, such as kidnapping and
murder, but does not include other crimes that may be reflected in the
NCIC database.
[33] This requirement is also consistent with the National Crime
Prevention and Privacy Compact Act of 1998 (42 U.S.C. 14611 et seq.)
(or Compact Act), which organizes an electronic information-sharing
system among the federal government and states to exchange criminal
history records, such as those contained in the Index, for noncriminal
justice purposes. The Compact Act requires that consular officers, as
noncriminal justice personnel, first submit the visa applicant's
fingerprints, or other approved form of identification, for positive
identification before the record can be released.
[34] GAO-05-207.
[35] P.L. 82-414, 8 U.S.C. §1101 et seq.
[36] P.L. 107-296.
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