This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-05-790 
entitled 'Homeland Security: Actions Needed to Better Protect National 
Icons and Federal Office Buildings from Terrorism' which was released 
on June 24, 2005. 

This text file was formatted by the U.S. Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as part 
of a longer term project to improve GAO products' accessibility. Every 
attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data integrity of 
the original printed product. Accessibility features, such as text 
descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes placed at the 
end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters, are provided 
but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format of the printed 
version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an exact electronic 
replica of the printed version. We welcome your feedback. Please E-mail 
your comments regarding the contents or accessibility features of this 
document to Webmaster@gao.gov. 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright 
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed 
in its entirety without further permission from GAO. Because this work 
may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the 
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this 
material separately. 

Report to the Chairman, Committee on Government Reform, House of 
Representatives: 

June 2005: 

Homeland Security: 

Actions Needed to Better Protect National Icons and Federal Office 
Buildings from Terrorism: 

GAO-05-790: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-05-790, a report to the Chairman, Committee on 
Government Reform, House of Representatives: 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

The threat of terrorism has made physical security for federal real 
property assets a major concern. Protecting these assets can be 
particularly complex and contentious for agencies whose missions 
include ensuring public access such as the Department of the Interior 
(Interior) and the General Services Administration (GSA). GAO’s 
objectives were to (1) identify any challenges that Interior faces in 
protecting national icons and monuments from terrorism, as well as 
related actions intended to address these challenges; and similarly, 
(2) determine any challenges GSA faces related to the protection of 
federal office buildings it owns or leases and actions that have been 
taken. 

What GAO Found: 

Interior faces a range of major challenges in protecting national icons 
and monuments from terrorism—these include balancing security and 
public access; addressing jurisdictional and competing stakeholder 
issues; and securing assets in rugged, remote areas. In addition, there 
was concern among Interior officials about the department’s ability to 
leverage limited resources for security. Since September 11, 2001, 
Interior has improved security at high-profile sites, created a central 
security office to oversee its security efforts, developed physical 
security plans required by Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7, 
and developed a uniform risk management and ranking methodology. As 
Interior moves forward, linking the results of its risk rankings to 
security funding priorities at national icons and monuments is an 
important next step. Also, given Interior’s complex and often 
contentious environment, setting forth the guiding principles by which 
the department balances its core mission with security could have 
benefits. Other organizations have used guiding principles to foster 
greater transparency in complex environments. 

GSA also faces a range of major challenges, some similar to Interior’s, 
that include balancing security and public access, addressing 
jurisdictional and competing stakeholder issues, securing federally 
leased space, and adjusting to the transfer of the Federal Protective 
Service (FPS) from GSA to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). 
Actions GSA has taken to address the challenges include working to 
develop security standards for securing leased space and establishing a 
memorandum of agreement with DHS on security at GSA’s facilities. 
However, despite these actions, GSA lacks a mechanism—such as a chief 
security officer position or formal point of contact—that could serve 
in a liaison role with FPS and tenant agencies, work to address the 
challenges GSA faces related to security at its buildings, and enable 
GSA to better define its overall role in security given the transfer of 
FPS to DHS. 

Examples of Security Measures at National Icons and Federal Buildings: 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends that the Secretary of the Interior (1) link the results 
of its risk assessments and related risk rankings to its funding 
priorities and (2) develop guiding principles for balancing security 
initiatives with Interior’s core mission. Interior did not comment on 
our recommendations. GAO also recommends that the Administrator of GSA 
establish a mechanism—such as a chief security officer position or 
formal point of contact—so it is better equipped to address security-
related matters related to its federal building portfolio. GSA 
concurred with the recommendation. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-790. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
the link above. For more information, contact Mark Goldstein at (202) 
512-2834 or GoldsteinM@gao.gov. 

[End of section]

Contents: 

Letter: 

Results in Brief: 

Background: 

Terrorist Threat Poses a Range of Challenges for Interior in Protecting 
National Icons and Monuments: 

The Threat Against Federal Office Buildings is Significant, and GSA 
Faces Various Challenges as the Owner and Landlord of These Assets: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendixes: 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Comments from the General Services Administration: 

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Acknowledgments: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: The Statue of Liberty in New York Harbor: 

Figure 2: Security Checkpoint for Liberty Island: 

Figure 3: Hoover Dam and Linked Boom Line Used to Enhance Perimeter 
Security: 

Figure 4: Security Checkpoint on the Arizona Side of Hoover Dam: 

Figure 5: Independence Hall in Philadelphia: 

Figure 6: Vehicle Traffic in Front of Independence Hall and Park 
Service Staff Allowing Visitors to Cross Chestnut Street: 

Figure 7: Jersey Barriers and Fencing on the East Side of the Lincoln 
Memorial: 

Figure 8: Jersey Barriers and Snow Fencing at the Jefferson Memorial: 

Figure 9: Security Camera near the Amphitheatre at Mt. Rushmore: 

Figure 10: Rugged Terrain Surrounding Mt. Rushmore: 

Figure 11: Bollards in Front of a Federal Building in New York: 

Abbreviations: 

BOR: Bureau of Reclamation: 

CFA: U.S. Commission on Fine Arts: 

DHS: Department of Homeland Security: 

EIS: Environmental Impact Statement: 

FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation: 

FPS: Federal Protective Service: 

FSRM: Federal Security Risk Management: 

GSA: General Services Administration: 

HSPD-7: Homeland Security Presidential Directive Number 7: 

ICE: Immigrations and Customs Enforcement: 

IG: Inspector General: 

IMBARC: Independence Mall Business and Residents Coalition: 

Interior: Department of the Interior: 

INHP: Independence National Historical Park: 

ISC: Interagency Security Committee: 

MOU: Memorandum of Understanding: 

NCPC: National Capital Planning Commission: 

NHPA: National Historic Preservation Act: 

NPS: National Park Service: 

NPCA: National Parks Conservation Association: 

NYPD: New York Police Department: 

OLES: Office of Law Enforcement and Security: 

OMB: Office of Management and Budget: 

Park Service: National Park Service: 

Park Police: U.S. Park Police: 

SEPTA: Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority: 

SHPO: State Historic Preservation Officer: 

SSA: sector-specific agency: 

USMS: U.S. Marshals Service: 

Letter June 24, 2005: 

The Honorable Tom Davis: 
Chairman, Committee on Government Reform: 
House of Representatives: 

Dear Mr. Chairman: 

Since the 1995 bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in 
Oklahoma City and the September 11, 2001, attacks, federal agencies 
have devoted significant resources and attention to the physical 
security of their real property assets. Protecting federal real 
property assets can be particularly complex and contentious for 
agencies whose missions include ensuring public access to their assets, 
including the Department of the Interior (Interior) and the General 
Services Administration (GSA). Interior and its eight bureaus are 
charged with protecting the nation's natural, historic, and cultural 
treasures, including thousands of facilities. GSA houses agencies in 
over 8,000 owned and leased facilities that contain roughly 338 million 
square feet. These facilities are used by over a million federal 
employees and contractors and are visited by citizens receiving 
services from, and conducting business with, the federal government. 

In November 2002, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was created 
to bring a central focus to the government's efforts to prevent and 
respond to terrorist threats, including threats to its physical 
infrastructure. DHS, through its Federal Protective Service (FPS), is 
directly responsible for law enforcement and related security functions 
at GSA facilities and also provides policy leadership on facility 
protection issues to other agencies, including Interior. Although law 
enforcement and related security functions were transferred from GSA to 
DHS when FPS transferred to DHS, GSA officials said that it still 
assists FPS and tenant agencies with facility security, implements 
various security measures that FPS recommends, and incorporates 
enhanced security measures into new space it constructs or leases. 

Our objectives were to (1) identify any challenges that Interior faces 
in protecting national icons and monuments from terrorism, as well as 
related actions intended to address these challenges; and similarly, 
(2) determine any challenges GSA faces related to the protection of 
office buildings it owns or leases and the actions that have been 
taken. To do this work, we interviewed officials from Interior, 
including officials at the department level, the National Park Service 
(Park Service), U.S. Park Police (Park Police), and the Bureau of 
Reclamation (BOR); GSA; and DHS, including FPS. We also interviewed 
other agencies and organizations that have an interest in security 
issues, including the National Capital Planning Commission and the 
National Parks Conservation Association. We also reviewed pertinent 
documents and policies that we obtained from these agencies and related 
laws and directives. Our work included visiting sites that Interior and 
GSA identified as particularly illustrative of the challenges they face 
and how they are trying to address them. Additional information about 
our methodology and the sites we visited, along with a complete 
description of the organizations we interviewed, appears at the end of 
this report. We conducted our work between January 2004 and March 2005 
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Separately, we issued a "For Official Use Only" report detailing the 
results of our review. This version of the report, for public release, 
provides a general summary of the challenges identified and our 
recommendations to help Interior and GSA enhance their protection of 
national icons and federal office buildings from terrorism. (The "For 
Official Use Only" report provided technical details to assist Interior 
and GSA in their efforts.)

Results in Brief: 

Interior faces a range of major challenges in protecting national icons 
and monuments from terrorism. First, there is an inherent conflict 
between physical security initiatives and Interior's mission to provide 
access to, and education about, the nation's natural and cultural 
heritage. Striking a balance between protecting its assets from 
terrorism and maintaining public access is a new role for Interior, 
which has historically focused mainly on its preservation and education 
mission. Second, jurisdictional issues and competing stakeholder 
interests are another challenge. Pursuing security improvements that 
Interior believes are needed often puts the department at odds with 
other entities--such as planning commissions, private foundations, and 
local governments--that have jurisdiction over, or input regarding, 
physical enhancements. Third, some icons and monuments are in rugged, 
remote locations and, therefore, pose additional challenges related to 
securing perimeters and ensuring an adequate response in the event of 
an attack. Lastly, leveraging limited resources is an ongoing 
challenge. Interior officials responsible for security at the 
individual icons and monuments were concerned about whether the 
department will have a sustained level of staff and funding resources 
for security initiatives. Effectively addressing these challenges is 
vital for Interior because highly visible assets such as the Washington 
Monument and Mt. Rushmore National Memorial (Mt. Rushmore) could be 
targeted for symbolic reasons and for the purpose of harming people. 
Information from Interior shows that these and other assets are 
vulnerable to attack in a variety of ways. 

In addition to security improvements Interior has made at individual 
locations, several broader actions have been taken that are intended to 
address the department's challenges and improve its security program 
overall. These security improvements are as follows: 

* The administration has identified goals for overcoming challenges and 
vulnerabilities unique to national icons and monuments as part of its 
national strategy for homeland security. 

* Interior has developed physical security plans in response to 
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7). This directive 
establishes a national policy for prioritizing the protection of 
critical infrastructure and requires all departments and agencies to 
develop physical and cyber security plans for the assets they own. In 
addition, the directive designates Interior as a sector-specific agency 
(SSA) for the national icons and monuments sector--SSAs are responsible 
for coordinating protection in their respective sectors across all 
levels of government and the private sector. 

* To centrally manage Interior's security initiatives and address its 
challenges, the department established a central coordination and 
oversight office for homeland security-related activities. This office-
-the Office of Law Enforcement and Security (OLES)--has worked within 
Interior to identify assets that are likely targets, conduct risk 
assessments using a number of external experts, and coordinate efforts 
by Interior's bureaus to enhance security at individual locations. 

* Interior has developed a uniform risk assessment methodology that it 
has used to generate risk rankings for high-profile national icons and 
monuments. 

Overall, these efforts have been positive steps. As Interior moves 
forward, linking the results of its risk assessments and related risk 
rankings to security funding priorities at national icons and monuments 
is an important next step that we are recommending. This should allow 
for well-informed decisions by stakeholders--such as Interior, OMB, and 
Congress--about where to direct resources so that they have an optimal 
return on investment in terms of better protection. Furthermore, given 
Interior's complex and often contentious environment, setting forth the 
guiding principles by which the department balances its core mission 
with security--which we are also recommending--could have benefits. 
Guiding principles have been used by other organizations to foster 
greater transparency and thus allow stakeholders to better understand 
the basis for decisions. By identifying and conveying the principles it 
follows for making security-related decisions, Interior could be better 
positioned to achieve additional transparency and more mutually 
acceptable outcomes with its stakeholders. Interior did not comment on 
our recommendations. 

GSA also faces a range of major challenges--some similar to those 
facing Interior--related to security at buildings it owns or leases. 
First, federal buildings are where the government and the public 
transact business, and striking a balance between security and public 
access is an ongoing challenge. This challenge is of particular concern 
with federally leased space, where the government does not have 
complete control over building access. Second, GSA faces challenges in 
addressing jurisdictional and competing stakeholder interests, 
particularly in urban areas where local governments and others have a 
role in the type of security that is employed. Finally, the transfer of 
FPS to DHS has presented a major challenge for GSA. In addition to no 
longer having direct control over security services in its buildings, 
GSA officials were concerned about their ability to track security 
expenditures and stay informed about FPS protection activities in GSA 
buildings. In general, GSA officials said that GSA is still trying to 
define its overall role in security given the transfer of FPS. 
Addressing these challenges is critical because the terrorist threat 
against federal office buildings is significant. The Oklahoma City 
bombing and September 11 attacks demonstrated that terrorists possess 
the capabilities to destroy these types of assets. In the post- 
September 11 era, warnings from DHS have shown that there is still a 
concern regarding the threat that terrorists will use methods such as 
truck bombs to destroy office buildings. GSA owns many federal office 
buildings, on which an attack could seriously disrupt the business of 
government and harm federal employees and the public. 

To address the challenges associated with protecting federal office 
buildings, a number of actions have been taken. GSA has continued with 
the implementation of security enhancements to buildings in its 
inventory that it began after the Oklahoma City bombing--these 
enhancements are designed, in part, to achieve a balance between 
security and access. GSA has worked with the Interagency Security 
Committee (ISC) to develop security design criteria for newly 
constructed office buildings and security standards for addressing 
challenges associated with federally leased space. Established after 
the Oklahoma City bombing, ISC has a range of governmentwide 
responsibilities related to protecting nonmilitary facilities and has 
representation from all the major property-holding agencies. The 
administration has also identified the challenge of protecting federal 
office buildings as a top priority in the critical infrastructure area. 
In addition, ISC is responsible for coordinating agencies' building 
security efforts. The transfer of FPS to DHS--though a challenge for 
GSA--was intended to improve law enforcement and related functions by 
centralizing building security activities with other homeland security 
functions. A March 2003 operational memorandum of agreement between GSA 
and DHS made FPS responsible for the same types of security services 
that FPS provided for GSA properties prior to the transfer to DHS. 
These include performing risk assessments, managing the installation of 
some security equipment, conducting criminal investigations, and 
managing the contract guard program. These actions are all steps in the 
right direction. However, despite the range of challenges GSA faces, it 
lacks a mechanism--such as a chief security officer position or formal 
point of contact--to coordinate homeland security efforts at its 
buildings with FPS and tenant agencies. The officer/official in such a 
position, which we are recommending, could serve in a liaison role with 
FPS and tenant agencies, work to address the challenges GSA faces 
related to security in buildings it owns and leases, and enable GSA to 
better define its overall role in security given the transfer of FPS to 
DHS. Having such a position is recognized in the security community as 
essential in organizations that own and operate large numbers of 
mission-critical facilities. GSA concurred with this recommendation. 

Background: 

Interior is responsible for the safety of 70,000 employees and 200,000 
volunteers, 1.3 million daily visitors, and over 507 million acres of 
public lands that include a number of sites of historical or national 
significance (national monuments and icons), and the security of dams 
and reservoirs. The Park Service's mission is the unimpaired 
preservation of the natural and cultural resources and values of the 
national park system for the enjoyment, education, and inspiration of 
current and future generations. According to Interior officials, the 
Park Service cooperates with various partners to extend the benefits of 
natural and cultural resource conservation and outdoor recreation 
throughout this country and the world. Within Interior, the Park 
Service is responsible for managing and protecting some of the nation's 
most treasured icons, including the Washington Monument, the Lincoln 
and Jefferson Memorials, the Statue of Liberty, Independence Hall and 
the Liberty Bell in Philadelphia, and Mt. Rushmore in South Dakota. The 
Park Service welcomes 428 million visitors to its 388 national park 
units each year throughout the United States, American Samoa, Guam, 
Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands. 

The Park Police provides security and law enforcement services to Park 
Service monuments and memorials in the District of Columbia, New York 
City, and in conjunction with Park Service rangers in San Francisco. 
Park superintendents and rangers manage and provide security and law 
enforcement services at the other parks throughout the United States in 
conjunction with their other duties. These other duties include 
management of public use, dissemination of scientific and historical 
information, and protection and management of natural and cultural 
resources. 

Among Interior's other bureaus, BOR has an important role in protecting 
critical infrastructure because of its responsibilities related to 
dams. BOR's core mission is to manage, develop, and protect water and 
related resources in an environmentally and economically sound manner. 
It is the largest wholesale water supplier in the nation, delivering 10 
trillion gallons of water to over 30 million people each year. 
According to information from BOR, it manages 471 dams, making it the 
nation's second largest producer of hydropower; the dams generate 
approximately 42 billion kilowatt hours each year. BOR, among other 
things, is responsible for managing and protecting well-known assets, 
such as Hoover Dam in Arizona and Nevada. 

While Interior is responsible for protecting icons, monuments, and 
dams, GSA serves as the federal government's landlord and designs, 
builds, and manages facilities to support the needs of other federal 
agencies throughout all three branches of government. GSA is 
responsible for managing over 8,000 owned and leased buildings that 
comprise roughly 3 billion square feet of building floor area. FPS was 
created in 1971 to provide security services and law enforcement to GSA-
owned facilities across the United States. FPS has the authority to, 
among other things; enforce laws and regulations that protect federal 
property, and persons on such property, and conduct investigations. As 
a result of the Homeland Security Act, 22 agencies-
-including FPS--were centralized under DHS, and FPS retained its role 
related to law enforcement and security at GSA buildings. In accordance 
with the act, the transfer of FPS from GSA to DHS became effective on 
March 1, 2003. GSA officials said that GSA still assists FPS and tenant 
agencies with facility security, implements various security measures 
that FPS recommends, and incorporates enhanced security measures into 
new space it constructs or leases. Within DHS, FPS fell under the 
authority of the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), which, 
according to DHS, is its largest investigative arm. DHS also chairs 
ISC, which has representation from all the major property-holding 
agencies and was established after the Oklahoma City bombing. ISC has a 
range of governmentwide responsibilities related to protecting 
nonmilitary facilities. In July 2004, we reported on issues related to 
the transfer of FPS from GSA to DHS; and in November 2004, we reported 
on progress ISC has made and key practices in facility 
protection.[Footnote 1]

Terrorist Threat Poses a Range of Challenges for Interior in Protecting 
National Icons and Monuments: 

The September 11 attacks demonstrated the nation's vulnerability to the 
threat posed by formidable, well-organized terrorists. As evidenced by 
the attacks, the terrorists are sophisticated, relentless, and patient 
in their planning and execution. This new type of threat represents a 
shift from historical assumptions about national security, where the 
military, foreign policy establishment, and intelligence community are 
responsible for protecting the nation, to a new paradigm where others-
-such as Interior, state and local governments, and the private sector-
-also have a role in homeland security. National icons and monuments 
represent the nation's heritage, tradition, values, and political 
power. Among Interior assets that could logically be categorized as 
potential symbolic targets are national icons and monuments such as Mt. 
Rushmore and the Washington Monument. Destroying these icons would 
likely have a profound effect on the nation's morale. In addition, 
Interior's portfolio includes assets that are part of the nation's 
critical infrastructure, such as the 471 dams it operates that provide 
hydropower to Western states. Information from Interior shows that 
these assets are vulnerable to attack in a variety of ways and that 
Interior faces a range of challenges to improving protection. These 
challenges include the inherent conflict between security and public 
access, jurisdictional issues and competing stakeholder issues 
regarding such matters as access and oversight of enhancements, the 
effect that the rugged and remote location of some assets has on 
perimeter security, and the ability to leverage available resources to 
address vulnerabilities by implementing security enhancements. 

Balancing Security with Public Access at Icons and Monuments Is a Major 
Challenge: 

Interior officials and staff at the icons and monuments we visited 
acknowledged, and the Interior Inspector General (IG) has reported, 
that balancing security with access is a major challenge facing the 
department. Implementing appropriate physical protection measures can 
be a challenge because such measures often run counter to societal 
values that associate access to icons and monuments with living in a 
free society. And, the core missions of some of the Interior's 
agencies--including the Park Service--reflect a high level of public 
accessibility and interaction. As reported by the Interior IG and 
discussed by Interior officials we interviewed, the organizational 
challenge of shifting to a homeland security focus in a culture rooted 
in preservation and education is also significant.[Footnote 2] Overall, 
the challenge of balancing protection against terrorism with public 
access is formidable and transcends other challenges Interior faces, 
including jurisdictional issues and competing stakeholder interests. 

Security versus Access: The Statue of Liberty: 

The Park Service's efforts to balance security with access at the 
Statue of Liberty demonstrate this challenge. The Statue of Liberty is 
one of the nation's most treasured sites and is an international symbol 
of American values. Located on 12-acre Liberty Island in New York 
Harbor, the Statue of Liberty was a gift of international friendship 
from the people of France to the people of the United States and is one 
of the most universal symbols of political freedom and democracy. It is 
a popular tourist attraction for visitors from around the world. In 
fiscal year 2003, over 3.2 million people visited the Statue. Park 
Service management of the Statue of Liberty and Liberty Island also 
includes Ellis Island and its facilities. The Statue consists of three 
sections: the Statue, the pedestal, and a base known as Fort Wood. The 
Park Service and Park Police oversee the monument's security program, 
including operation of screening facilities housed at Battery Park in 
Lower Manhattan in New York and Liberty State Park in New Jersey. Park 
Service and Park Police officials consider these locations, plus 
Governor's Island, part of a 5-point security perimeter that they 
monitor within New York Harbor. Figure 1 shows the Statue of Liberty, 
which is surrounded by New York Harbor. 

Figure 1: The Statue of Liberty in New York Harbor: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Due to concerns about additional terrorist attacks, the Park Service 
closed Liberty Island and the Statue of Liberty immediately following 
September 11. The Park Service reopened Liberty Island in December 2001 
but refrained from allowing access to the Statue until additional 
security and fire safety assessments could be done. These assessments 
identified a number of steps that needed to be taken before visitors 
could be allowed back into the Statue. In addition, the primary threats 
included aerial attacks and explosives detonated inside the structure. 

In August 2004, the Park Service reopened the Statue to visitors with 
access restricted to the top of the pedestal and the exterior 
observation deck. The security improvements were primarily aimed at 
preventing would-be terrorists from gaining access to the interior of 
the Statue and its grounds. Under this revised plan, visitors are able 
to tour the Statue of Liberty Museum, see close-up views of the statue 
from the promenade, view the inside structural elements of the statue, 
and experience a 360-degree panoramic view of New York Harbor from the 
observation deck. In addition, the Park Service and Park Police 
implemented other improvements, including more rigorous visitor 
screening, better explosive detection capabilities, improved fire 
safety, and enhanced communications. Park Service officials also noted 
that new barriers were installed at the Ellis Island service bridge and 
that Park Service and Park Police staffing has been increased since 
September 11 to implement the improved security plan. The Park Service 
reported in mid-2004 that, to make these improvements, it had invested 
$19.6 million and was anticipating an additional $9 million in future 
spending. In addition, the Park Service reported that the Statue of 
Liberty-Ellis Island Foundation, which is a consortium of private 
donors, had partnered with the Park Service to assist with funding a 
number of the safety improvements. Figure 2 shows the security 
checkpoint for Liberty Island. 

Figure 2: Security Checkpoint for Liberty Island: 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

According to Park Service officials, the issue of public access to the 
Statue received high visibility and publicity while a new security plan 
was being developed. Some of the editorial press from this time 
expressed a concern that by closing the Statue, it had "ceded to al 
Qaeda." The Mayor of New York was quoted in a newspaper saying that as 
long as the Statue is closed, "in some sense, the terrorists have won." 
Interior and Park Service officials said that it was difficult to 
communicate the rationale for initially prohibiting, then later 
limiting, public access to the Statue without revealing the specific 
vulnerabilities that led to their decisions. A major reason for 
limiting access to the Statue was the need to adhere to building codes 
related to fire safety. For example, the Statue did not meet standards 
for exits and fire suppression capability. However, Interior and Park 
Service officials were also concerned with the security vulnerabilities 
of the Statue and the fact that knowledge of these vulnerabilities 
could make the Statue an even more attractive target. Although many 
security improvements have been implemented at the Statue of Liberty 
National Monument and Ellis Island, Park Service officials noted that 
several key security challenges remain. 

Security versus Access: Hoover Dam: 

Hoover Dam in Nevada and Arizona is another icon that presents Interior 
with challenges related to public access. Located approximately 38 
miles southeast of Las Vegas, Hoover Dam is a national, historical, 
hydrological, and structural icon that is part of the nation's critical 
infrastructure. Managed by BOR, it receives approximately 1 million 
paid visitors every year and provides water and electricity for 
millions of people throughout the Southwest. Its 4.4 million cubic 
yards of concrete is recognized as a marvel of civil engineering. In 
addition, nearly 9 million people visit adjacent Lake Mead every year, 
which is the nation's largest man-made lake and is a national 
recreational area managed by the Park Service. Hoover generates 
electricity for southwestern states through its 17 turbines using water 
from Lake Mead. Also, Interstate 93 sits on top of the dam, serving as 
the region's main vehicular route across the Colorado River. 

According to BOR officials, following the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, BOR implemented a range of security enhancements, such as 
hiring additional security officers and guards and revising and 
canceling some public tours. In addition, BOR is taking steps to 
provide a long-term solution for its biggest security concern to 
visitors--the proximity of Interstate 93 to large crowds of visitors 
who also have access to the top of the dam. Related to security 
staffing, BOR nearly doubled the number of federal police officers and 
added new contract security guards. To help control the flow of 
tourists and provide additional security, BOR added access doors, and 
contract guards to certain areas of the visitor center. BOR also 
improved security at the visitor center by adding blast-resistant films 
to the windows. In addition, BOR improved gates and fencing in some 
areas surrounding the dam to improve perimeter security. BOR also 
installed a series of buoys and linked "boom lines" to serve as a 
security perimeter at water access points. Figure 3 shows the dam and a 
linked boom line in the water. 

Figure 3: Hoover Dam and Linked Boom Line Used to Enhance Perimeter 
Security: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

To further secure the dam's perimeter, BOR created two traffic security 
checkpoints, one in Arizona and one in Nevada, to screen and inspect 
passenger vehicles crossing the dam. Figure 4 shows a security 
checkpoint on the Arizona side of the dam. 

Figure 4: Security Checkpoint on the Arizona Side of Hoover Dam: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Since September 11, BOR also made other changes to its security 
operations, including performing additional background checks on 
contractor personnel, obtaining security clearances for office 
directors and key personnel, conducting various site security 
inspections, initiating boat patrols on Lake Mead, contracting for the 
design of a new integrated security system, and installing additional 
surveillance cameras to monitor traffic checkpoints and other parts of 
the dam and visitor areas. To address one security concern as far as 
visitors are concerned--public access to the top of the dam due to the 
proximity to Interstate 93--BOR is currently working with Arizona, 
Nevada, the Federal Highway Administration, and others to construct a 
new four-lane bridge across the Colorado River approximately 1,500 feet 
from the dam. This bridge and additional roadways would re-route 
Interstate 93 off of the dam and improve traffic flow for the thousands 
of trucks and vehicles that use this road daily and reduce security 
vulnerabilities for the dam and its visitors. The cost of the project 
is currently estimated at $234 million, with funding coming through a 
combination of federal and state sources. Construction has already 
begun on new highways that approach the bridge, and the project is 
currently scheduled to be completed in 2008. Nonetheless, although it 
appears that BOR has taken the necessary steps to address the security 
concern with the highway, ensuring adequate security while allowing 
vehicle access will remain a unique and significant challenge for the 
next few years. 

Addressing Jurisdictional Issues and Competing Stakeholder Interests Is 
Another Challenge for Interior: 

Complicating its efforts to balance security and access, balancing 
jurisdictional issues and competing stakeholder interests represents 
another challenge facing Interior. Pursuing security improvements that 
Interior believes are needed often puts the department at odds with 
other entities--such as planning commissions, private foundations, and 
local governments--that have jurisdiction over, or input regarding, 
physical security enhancements. For example, efforts to secure the 
perimeter of a national monument or icon in an urban setting by closing 
streets and/or alleyways can be prevented by local governments. 
Similarly, local planning commissions and other oversight groups can 
prevent the placement of various protective measures because of 
aesthetic concerns and other considerations, such as perceived loss of 
revenue. According to information from Interior, limiting the types of 
measures it can employ can lead to delays in enhancing security and the 
use of potentially more costly and/or less effective alternatives. 

Jurisdictional and Competing Stakeholder Issues: Independence National 
Historical Park in Philadelphia: 

One location that illustrates the major challenges Interior faces 
related to jurisdictional issues and competing stakeholder interests is 
Independence National Historical Park (INHP) in Philadelphia, 
Pennsylvania. INHP is an open, national park space in the center of a 
densely populated urban area. Spanning approximately 45 acres, the park 
has about 20 buildings open to the public, including Independence Hall 
(site of the signing of the Declaration of Independence) and the 
Liberty Bell Center. Additionally, INHP houses multiple historically 
irreplaceable buildings and documents, including Carpenter's Hall (site 
of the first Continental Congress), Congress Hall, and an original copy 
of the Declaration of Independence. Figure 5 shows a security sign near 
Independence Hall, where the Declaration of Independence and U.S. 
Constitution were created. 

Figure 5: Independence Hall in Philadelphia: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Due to its urban location, oversight responsibility at INHP involves 
several stakeholders. The Park Service and the city of Philadelphia 
have a memorandum of understanding (MOU) regarding emergency response 
responsibilities and other jurisdictional issues. Public city streets 
that carry both pedestrian and vehicular traffic surround the park and 
its buildings. According to Interior officials, the park is surrounded 
by local businesses that, along with city officials, are consulted 
regarding any change in park operations. Complicating oversight, the 
Park Service owns the land that covers the three blocks known as 
Independence Mall, and the city of Philadelphia owns the Independence 
Hall building and the Liberty Bell. The city and the Park Service 
operate under a cooperative agreement for the management and operation 
of Independence Mall. Also, the focus on security in this area of 
Philadelphia is further heightened because of the presence of other 
federal assets. Within a few block radius of INHP are multiple federal 
buildings, including the U.S. Mint, the Federal Reserve Bank of 
Philadelphia, and a federal courthouse that houses the U.S. District 
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. 

Park Service officials reported that prior to September 11, INHP 
managed its law enforcement and security operation consistently with 
the majority of urban parks across the nation. After the Oklahoma City 
bombing, a blast assessment focused primarily on Independence Hall was 
conducted and influenced the design of the new Liberty Bell Center. 
Aside from this assessment, no comprehensive risk assessment had been 
completed that addressed overall threat potential. Following September 
11, the Park Service decided to keep the park open but added staff 
patrols from parks around the country to support INHP staff for 
approximately 6 to 9 months. A perimeter consisting of temporary 
fencing and concrete jersey barriers was also placed around the two 
city blocks containing the Liberty Bell and Independence Hall and, with 
the approval of city officials, Chestnut Street was closed on December 
12, 2001. With these security improvements, staff coverage was roughly 
doubled, but the Park Service had to have rangers work overtime to 
allow for 24-hour coverage. The Park Service also implemented security 
measures that included the use of magnetometers and individual hand 
searches conducted at Liberty Bell Center and Independence Hall. 

After September 11, the Park Service also contracted with a private 
firm to conduct a threat assessment, which used a pre-existing blast 
assessment. Park Service officials added that the blast assessment, 
however, was too narrowly focused, and the lack of a comprehensive 
assessment of threats and vulnerabilities limited their ability to 
identify the full range of security measures that were needed to fully 
protect the park. In early 2005, an Interior security official told us 
that a comprehensive assessment conducted in compliance with HSPD-7 had 
been completed, and Interior officials are evaluating this assessment 
to determine additional security enhancements. 

Interior officials told us that jurisdictional issues at INHP and the 
political sensitivity of related disagreements have been the greatest 
challenges in terms of implementing security enhancements since 
September 11. These officials said that although there is a standing 
operational agreement between the Park Service and the city of 
Philadelphia, there is no current MOU regarding law enforcement and 
security. INHP security officials stated that their ability to 
effectively secure the park is limited by a lack of authority over 
Chestnut Street and consensus among stakeholders as to how to provide 
the best protection. This challenge is evidenced most clearly by the 
ongoing disagreement between INHP and the city of Philadelphia over the 
closure of Chestnut Street, the street that carries both pedestrian and 
vehicular traffic between Independence Hall and the Liberty Bell 
Center. INHP officials said that the city reopened Chestnut Street on 
April 1, 2003, after local residents and business owners made the case 
to the city that the closure would have an adverse impact on business. 
Chestnut Street currently remains open to pedestrians and traffic with 
the use of a controlled pedestrian intersection at Sixth and Chestnut 
Streets managed by Park Service security staff and contract guards to 
monitor park visitors transiting from the Liberty Bell Center to 
Independence Hall. Figure 6 shows traffic in front of Independence Hall 
and park rangers allowing screened visitors to cross Chestnut Street. 

Figure 6: Vehicle Traffic in Front of Independence Hall and Park 
Service Staff Allowing Visitors to Cross Chestnut Street: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

In addition to addressing jurisdictional issues related to differences 
with the city, Park Service officials at INHP said that their views on 
what security measures are needed often put them directly at odds with 
local stakeholder groups and business owners, specifically the 
Independence Mall Business and Residents Coalition (IMBARC). IMBARC was 
created for the purpose of challenging the closure of Chestnut Street. 
IMBARC's chairman told us that IMBARC members are united in their 
belief that the security measures implemented at INHP since September 
11 are excessive and aesthetically unappealing. In addition, potential 
street closures surrounding Independence Mall also affect the 
Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority (SEPTA), the 
regional transit provider. Chestnut and Sixth Street are considered 
thoroughfares through the city's downtown, and Park Service officials 
said that major changes to the traffic patterns would likely meet 
additional resistance. We did not evaluate the competing views of the 
Park Service, the city of Philadelphia, or IMBARC regarding the Park 
Service's security efforts at INHP. Nonetheless, the situation the Park 
Service faces at this park illustrates the complex and often differing 
jurisdictional and competing stakeholder views that Interior faces 
related to security in the post-September 11 era. 

Jurisdictional and Competing Stakeholder Issues: Monuments on the 
National Mall in Washington, D.C. 

Other national icons where Interior faces jurisdictional and competing 
stakeholder challenges are the monuments on the National Mall (the 
Mall) in Washington, D.C. In particular, Interior has responsibility 
for several major monuments on or near the Mall--including the 
Washington Monument; the Lincoln, Jefferson, and Roosevelt Memorials; 
and the World War II, Korean War, and Vietnam War Memorials. The Park 
Police provides protection for these monuments and icons. 

Prior to September 11, there was a concern that monuments and icons on 
or near the Mall could be the focus of a terrorist attack. According to 
Interior officials, after September 11, Interior worked with a private 
security firm to assess the risk of terrorist attacks at Mall 
monuments. This assessment examined potential threats and alternate 
methods of both prevention and protection. Additionally, the Park 
Service identified specific protection criteria and designated key 
areas with the highest vulnerability as priority status for increased 
security. According to Interior and Park Service officials, they have 
used the report's findings to determine where to allocate appropriated 
funds and implement security upgrades for high-risk structures. 

The Park Service has pursued a number of security enhancements to the 
Washington Monument and Lincoln and Jefferson Memorials, which were the 
focus of our review. Construction is currently under way on a landscape 
security solution for the grounds of the Washington Monument. When 
construction is complete, a 30-inch-high granite retaining wall along 
newly constructed pedestrian pathways will surround the monument. The 
wall will serve as a vehicle barrier while also providing visitor 
seating. In addition, the monument grounds will receive nearly 800 new 
shade and flowering trees, upgraded lighting, and granite paving on the 
plaza. The Park Service closed the monument to the public in September 
2004 to complete the final phase of the security enhancement project 
and reopened it on April 1, 2005. At the Lincoln Memorial, the Park 
Service plans to construct a 35-inch-high granite retaining wall at the 
edge of the roadway around the north, west, and south sides of Lincoln 
Memorial Circle, and install retractable bollards for a portion of the 
circle that does not handle everyday traffic. The Park Service is also 
developing an alternative to a 715-foot line of jersey barriers on the 
memorial's east side, facing the Mall. Figure 7 shows the temporary 
jersey barriers and fencing on the east side of the memorial. 

Figure 7: Jersey Barriers and Fencing on the East Side of the Lincoln 
Memorial: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

For the Jefferson Memorial, the Park Service has proposed the 
construction of a security barrier, closure of a U-shaped driveway next 
to the monument to create a pedestrian plaza, and creation of 
additional parking away from the monument to improve security by 
limiting vehicular access. The Park Service's proposal includes the 
elimination of parking adjacent to the monument. According to the Park 
Service's environmental assessment of various options, the options 
under consideration would have adverse impacts on historic structures 
and the cultural landscape because the proposed security barrier would 
introduce a new element within the historic scene. However, the Park 
Service also said that the historic structures, cultural landscape, and 
aesthetic and visual quality would benefit due to the removal of the 
existing security measures that currently compromise the views, vistas, 
and historic scene. According to the Park Service, safety and security 
would be improved because the barrier would provide a first line of 
defense from the potential threat of a vehicle bomb and would serve as 
a deterrent to terrorists. Figure 8 shows a jersey barrier and 
temporary snow fencing at the memorial. According to Park Service 
officials, the snow fencing is used to control pedestrian flow to and 
from the memorial. 

Figure 8: Jersey Barriers and Snow Fencing at the Jefferson Memorial: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

In addition to these improvements at the monuments, the Park Service 
has upgraded its security camera capabilities in and around the Mall. 
The camera system began its initial test run in July 2002 and was fully 
operational by the fall of 2002. Park Service officials reported that 
the system consists of cameras mounted in and around the Mall that 
digitally record footage. It is designed for redundancy; if one camera 
fails, another camera could quickly cover the same area. Park Service 
officials stated that in the near future, they would like to expand 
coverage and progressively upgrade the camera system. Since September 
11, Interior has also established internal security protocols directly 
tied to the Homeland Security Advisory System.[Footnote 3]

In implementing security enhancements, several entities have an 
oversight, advisory, or advocacy role for the monuments on the National 
Mall and have an interest in security enhancements at the monuments. 
These entities include the National Capital Planning Commission (NCPC), 
Advisory Council on Historic Preservation (Advisory Council), the U.S. 
Commission on Fine Arts (CFA), and the District of Columbia's State 
Historic Preservation Officer (SHPO). In addition, advocacy groups, 
including the National Coalition to Save Our Mall and the National 
Parks Conservation Association (NPCA), are involved in, and offer their 
views on, security enhancements to the monuments. The roles of the 
major entities and organizations are as follows: 

* NCPC (www.ncpc.gov) is the central planning agency for the federal 
and District of Columbia governments in the national capital. 
Established in 1924 as the National Capital Park Commission and later 
renamed, NCPC's responsibilities include conducting comprehensive 
planning to direct federal activities and protect federal interests, 
reviewing and approving all federal development projects in the city 
and outlying region, leading specific initiatives to enhance the 
region, and preparing an annual Federal Capital Improvements Program. 
NCPC is composed of three presidential appointees, two D.C. mayoral 
appointees, the Secretaries of Defense and the Interior, the Chairmen 
of the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 
and House Committee on Government Reform, the Administrator of GSA, the 
Mayor of the District of Columbia, and the Chairman of the D.C. City 
Council. 

* The Advisory Council (www.achp.gov) is an independent federal agency 
that promotes the preservation, enhancement, and productive use of the 
nation's historic resources and advises the president and Congress on 
national historic preservation policy. The National Historic 
Preservation Act (NHPA) established the Advisory Council in 1966. 
According to the Advisory Council, it seeks to have federal agencies 
act as responsible stewards of our nation's resources when their 
actions affect historic properties. The Advisory Council recommends 
administrative and legislative improvements for protecting the nation's 
heritage; advocates full consideration of historic values in federal 
decision making; and reviews federal programs and policies to promote 
effectiveness, coordination, and consistency with national preservation 
policies. 

* CFA (www.cfa.gov) was established by Congress in 1910 as an 
independent agency to advise the federal and District of Columbia 
governments on matters of art and architecture that affect the 
appearance of the nation's capital. CFA's primary role is to advise on 
proposed public building projects, but it also reviews private 
buildings adjacent to important public buildings and grounds. 

* NHPA provides for the designation of a SHPO in each state. SHPOs have 
duties that include locating and recording historic resources; 
nominating significant historic resources to the National Register of 
Historic Places; fostering historic preservation programs at the local 
government level; reviewing all federal projects for their impact on 
historic properties in accordance with Section 106 of NHPA; and 
providing technical assistance on rehabilitation projects and other 
preservation activities to federal agencies, state and local 
governments, and the private sector. 

* The National Coalition to Save Our Mall (www.savethemall.org) was 
founded in 2000 as a coalition of professional and civic organizations 
and other concerned artists, historians, and citizens to provide a 
national constituency dedicated to the protection and preservation of 
the National Mall in Washington, D.C. According to the Coalition's Web 
site, its mission is to: 

"defend our national gathering place and symbol of Constitutional 
principles against threats posed by recent and ongoing proposals--for 
new memorials, security barriers, service buildings and roads--that 
would encroach on the Mall's historical and cultural integrity, its 
open spaces and sweeping vistas, and its significance in American 
public life."

* NCPA (www.ncpa.org) is an advocacy organization whose mission is to 
protect and enhance the National Park System for present and future 
generations. According to its Web site, NCPA has been in existence for 
85 years and has 300,000 members. NCPA's objectives are to advocate for 
the national parks and the Park Service, educate decision makers and 
the public about the importance of preserving the parks, help to 
convince Members of Congress to uphold the laws that protect the parks 
and support of new legislation to address threats to the parks, fight 
attempts to weaken these laws in the courts, and assess the health of 
the parks and park management to better inform its advocacy work. 

Interior and Park Service officials said that implementing security 
measures can be particularly challenging at monuments on the Mall in 
Washington, D.C., because of the number of entities and organizations 
that have jurisdictional, advisory, or advocacy roles regarding 
changes. These officials said that in gaining the approval for projects 
from NCPC and incorporating the views of the other organizations, the 
Park Service tries to strike a balance among the various stakeholders 
and build consensus. For example, in an effort to streamline the 
process for gaining approval and input for enhancements at the 
Washington Monument, the Park Service, NCPC, ACHP, and the D.C. SHPO 
established a streamlined review process in 2002 that allows for public 
participation. However, Interior and Park Service officials 
acknowledged that there is often disagreement over how to balance 
security with public access and aesthetic beauty. For example, as part 
of its plans for security enhancements at the Washington Monument, the 
Park Service gained approval from the NCPC in April 2003 to build an 
underground visitor screening area and tunnel that would lead to the 
basement of the monument. However, after meeting significant resistance 
from NCPA, the Save Our Mall Coalition, and other interested 
stakeholders, a senior Park Service official told us that the Park 
Service abandoned this concept in the interest of maintaining support 
for security enhancements. Due to the high visibility that security 
enhancements at Mall monuments receive, Interior officials said that 
addressing jurisdictional issues and competing stakeholder interests on 
the Mall will remain their biggest challenge. 

Remote Location of Some Interior Assets Poses a Security Challenge: 

Due to the remote and rugged location of some assets, Interior 
officials reported that some icons and monuments pose additional issues 
related to securing perimeters and ensuring an adequate response in the 
event of an attack. According to information from Interior, although 
the remoteness of the locations may reduce the threat exposure 
associated with more "target rich" environments, it can present a 
significant disadvantage when Interior attempts to implement security 
measures. 

Remote Locations: Mt. Rushmore: 

Mt. Rushmore, which is located in the Black Hills of southwestern South 
Dakota, typifies how difficult it can be for Interior to protect icons 
and monuments that are located in remote and often rugged environments. 
Mt. Rushmore is the world's largest sculpture and is one of the most 
widely recognized symbols of the United States. In addition to its 
cultural and symbolic significance, size, and location, Mt. Rushmore 
hosts a large number of visitors each year, including numerous 
dignitaries. The monument has a visitor center, restaurant, gift shop, 
and amphitheatre that are used for various events. Each Fourth of July, 
the park hosts a holiday celebration with fireworks and other 
activities that attracts tens of thousands of visitors. The monument is 
also about 50 miles south of Sturgis, the site of an annual motorcycle 
rally that can bring over 500,000 tourists to the area--many of whom 
visit Mt. Rushmore. Approximately 2.9 million tourists visit the 
monument annually, with up to 40,000 visiting on some days during the 
summer months. 

Mt. Rushmore has a history prior to September 11 of security incidents 
involving domestic terrorists, political demonstrators, and bomb 
threats, according to Park Service officials. The threats and related 
incidents have included the following: 

* Between 1970 and 1973 there were multiple efforts by the American 
Indian Movement to occupy the mountain and deface the monument. 

* In 1975, a bomb was detonated in front of the visitor center--there 
were no injuries because the detonation occurred early in the morning. 

* In 1987, the environmental group Greenpeace illegally climbed the 
mountain and attempted to unfurl a protest banner. 

* In 1991, the Park Service received multiple, credible threats to 
assassinate then-President George H.W. Bush during the 50th anniversary 
celebration of the monument. 

* In 1999, a Colorado man was arrested for making a threat to blow up 
Mt. Rushmore. 

According to Park Service officials, because of these incidents, the 
Park Service took actions, including a security assessment in 1997 that 
recommended a range of countermeasures costing approximately $2.9 
million, most of which were subsequently implemented. However, Park 
Service officials told us that prior to September 11, the focus of 
their security efforts was directed at protecting the monument. In 
light of the September 11 attacks, Park Service officials are now 
including visitors and employees in their protection at Mt. Rushmore. 
With increases in funding for security after September 11, Park Service 
officials told us in mid-2004 that they were in the process of adding 
protection park rangers and other employees. In addition, the Park 
Service made other security enhancements, including the installation of 
security fencing, lighting, and gates at multiple locations; 
improvements to existing mechanical systems for dispatch and incident 
management; and the purchase of all-terrain vehicles for use in patrols 
and at special events. Figure 9 shows a security camera mounted near 
the amphitheatre at the base of the monument. 

Figure 9: Security Camera near the Amphitheatre at Mt. Rushmore: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

Despite these improvements, security at Mt. Rushmore is a major Park 
Service concern, due to the large area to patrol and large number of 
visitors. The park has 1,278 acres, 40 acres of which are part of the 
visitor service area that offers hiking and educational opportunities 
at the sculptor's studio and visitor center's amphitheater, museum, and 
bookstores. In addition, the area immediately surrounding the sculpture 
has steep rock faces and a series of canyons. While terrain serves as a 
natural barrier for most visitors and casual hikers, preventing 
individuals seeking to climb to the top of the monument for nefarious 
purposes is difficult. Park rangers at the monument told us that in 
order to fully secure the monument's perimeter, rangers must regularly 
hike and patrol the mountain--a time-consuming and physically 
challenging task. Figure 10 shows the rugged terrain at the front of 
the sculpture and a canyon in the area behind the sculpture. 

Figure 10: Rugged Terrain Surrounding Mt. Rushmore: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

In addition, the park relies on backup from state and county law 
enforcement agencies, as well as the Federal Bureau of Investigation. 
According to Park Service officials, these agencies also provide 
support during major events at the park. 

Leveraging Limited Resources for Security Improvements Is Viewed by 
Interior Officials as a Challenge: 

In addition to the range of challenges with protecting icons and 
monuments, Interior officials were also concerned about the 
department's ability to leverage limited resources for its protection 
initiatives in terms of security staffing and funding. These officials 
said that the increased emphasis on visitor protection and homeland 
security demands that Interior maintain a well coordinated and highly 
professional law enforcement capability. However, the department's law 
enforcement staff is already spread thin, according to these officials, 
averaging one law enforcement officer for about every 110,000 visitors 
and 118,000 acres of land. Funding challenges for Interior homeland 
security programs have been well documented. According to the August 
2003 Interior IG report mentioned earlier, September 11 and the 
resulting increase in icon park security have had an impact on other 
parks and law enforcement officers across the Park Service.[Footnote 4] 
According to the report, rangers have been detailed from their 
permanent parks to supplement the icon park forces, leaving many other 
parks with a diminished protection staff. The Interior IG also reported 
that law enforcement staff were strained right after September 11 
because officers were working 12-hour shifts 7 days a week for several 
months and with no days off. The Interior IG reported that there is a 
concern about the long-term effectiveness of the protection staff and 
the officers who operate under these conditions. 

At the icons and monuments we visited, concerns about having adequate 
resources for security were evident. In Philadelphia at INHP, Park 
Service officials said that law enforcement represents the largest 
portion of the INHP budget at approximately $8 million per year and 
accounts for more than one-third of the park's budget. By comparison, 
prior to September 11, law enforcement accounted for about $2.4 million 
per year. At the Jefferson Memorial, Park Service officials told us 
that they sometimes leave the snow fencing (shown in fig. 8) in place 
because they lack the staff resources to remove and reinstall the 
fencing before and after each major event on the Mall. At Mt. Rushmore, 
the need for additional staff was, as mentioned before, an ongoing 
concern. 

Although we did not do a detailed assessment of security funding 
issues, officials at the sites we visited told us that they were 
concerned about their ability to implement further security 
enhancements that they believe are needed. They viewed lack of 
additional funding as a major challenge. Interior officials with OLES, 
including the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Law Enforcement and 
Security, expressed concern about the department's inability to obtain 
homeland security funding through DHS. These officials said that state 
and local governments receive significant funding through DHS. These 
officials said that there have been discussions within the 
administration about allowing other federal agencies to receive funding 
through DHS but such actions have not been taken. Nonetheless, with the 
establishment of a central office to manage security matters and 
Interior's efforts to respond to various governmentwide initiatives, 
the department has taken some important steps to better position itself 
to compete for homeland security-related funds. At the individual icons 
and monuments we visited, steps clearly had been taken to improve 
security since September 11, such as the Washington Monument perimeter 
landscaping project, the Lincoln and Jefferson Memorial security 
projects, the visitor screening system at the Statue of Liberty, 
increased staffing at Mt. Rushmore, and the rerouting of Interstate 93 
at Hoover Dam. 

Initiatives to Protect National Icons and Monuments Are Part of the 
National Homeland Security Strategy: 

Initiatives by Congress and the administration since September 11 to 
improve homeland security have been intended to, among many objectives, 
address the range of challenges associated with protecting national 
icons, monuments, and other key assets held by Interior. The September 
11 terrorist attacks prompted Congress to pass the Homeland Security 
Act, which created DHS. DHS's mission includes preventing terrorist 
attacks within the United States, reducing the vulnerability of the 
United States to terrorism, and minimizing the damage and assisting in 
the recovery from attacks that do occur. The creation of DHS 
centralized the government's homeland security efforts, including 
policy setting with regard to protecting national icons and monuments. 
As discussed earlier, several of Interior's assets are highly visible 
and symbolic icons, monuments, and critical infrastructure such as 
dams. Due to the prominence of Interior's assets, protecting them has 
figured heavily into the broad strategic goals set forth by the 
administration after September 11. 

More specifically, the President's July 2002 National Strategy for 
Homeland Security recognized the potential for attacks on national 
icons and monuments, which could be targets for symbolic reasons and 
whose destruction could profoundly damage national morale.[Footnote 5] 
The President's February 2003 National Strategy for the Physical 
Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets provides a 
statement of national policy to remain committed to protecting critical 
infrastructures and key assets--including national monuments, icons, 
and dams that Interior is responsible for--from terrorist attacks and 
is based on eight guiding principles. These principles include 
establishing responsibility and accountability and encouraging and 
facilitating partnering among all levels of government and between 
government and industry. The strategy also establishes three strategic 
objectives, which are to (1) identify and ensure the protection of the 
most critical assets, in terms of national level public health and 
safety, governance, and economic and national security and public 
confidence; (2) ensure protection of infrastructures and assets facing 
specific, imminent threats; and (3) pursue collaborative measures and 
initiatives to ensure the protection of other potential targets that 
may become attractive over time.[Footnote 6]

The critical infrastructure strategy identifies Interior as the lead 
federal entity for taking actions in a number of areas, in conjunction 
with DHS, related to protecting icons, monuments, and other key assets. 
These actions include developing guidance and standards for determining 
criticalities and protection priorities, conducting threat and 
vulnerability assessments, exploring opportunities for using technology 
to protect visitors at monuments, and collaborating with state and 
local governments and private foundations to ensure the protection of 
symbols and icons outside the federal domain. In our prior work, we 
assessed these plans and in February 2004 testified that the national 
strategy related to critical infrastructure contained the most 
desirable characteristics among the strategic plans for homeland 
security that the administration has produced since September 
11.[Footnote 7] These characteristics included addressing such areas as 
purpose, scope, and methodology; problem definition and risk 
assessment; and organizational roles, responsibilities, and 
coordination. 

While the 2002 and 2003 national strategies identified a broad 
framework for homeland security as it relates to critical 
infrastructure, HSPD-7, which the administration issued in December 
2003, establishes a national policy for federal agencies to identify 
and prioritize critical U.S. infrastructure and key resources and to 
protect them from terrorism.[Footnote 8] The directive identified 
several critical infrastructure sectors, such as agriculture, water 
systems, public health, and national monuments and icons. For several 
of the sectors, the directive identifies lead agencies that have sector-
specific knowledge, including Interior for national icons and 
monuments. SSA responsibilities include collaborating with all relevant 
federal entities, state and local governments, and the private sector; 
conducting or facilitating vulnerability assessments of the specific 
sector; and encouraging risk management strategies to protect against 
and mitigate the effects of attacks. Section 35 of the directive also 
requires, on an annual basis, that sector-specific agencies report on 
their efforts to identify, prioritize, and coordinate the protection 
initiatives in their respective sectors. In addition, section 34 of the 
directive requires that all federal departments and agencies develop 
physical and cyber security plans for the assets they own or operate. 

Interior's Actions Have Been Positive, and Further Steps Could 
Strengthen Its Efforts in the Security Area: 

After September 11, the Secretary of the Interior took steps to address 
serious organizational and management problems in the law enforcement 
and security components of the department. Of particular concern, 
according to Interior's IG, was the lack of coordination among these 
components and the absence of a meaningful single point of contact that 
the Secretary and senior managers could depend upon for reliable 
information and advice.[Footnote 9] The Secretary approved a Deputy 
Assistant Secretary for Law Enforcement and Security in July 2002, 
established the security office named OLES, and approved the 
implementation of the additional 24 recommendations from a January 2002 
Inspector General report.[Footnote 10] OLES oversees the department's 
security efforts and seeks to ensure consistent application across 
bureaus and offices. OLES has responsibilities related to (1) 
coordinating the development of policies and standards, (2) 
coordinating and overseeing implementation of policies and standards, 
(3) representing the department externally, (4) conducting compliance 
reviews, and (5) providing leadership during incidents. Because 
Interior was designated as an SSA, OLES prepared a sector-specific 
security plan for icons and monuments, as required by section 35 of 
HSPD-7. Interior also developed a physical security plan for the assets 
it owns and operates in response to section 34 of HSPD-7. These plans 
recognize many of the major challenges facing Interior, including 
security versus access, jurisdictional considerations, security in 
remote locations, and security staffing issues. 

In response to HSPD-7's requirement that Interior formulate a plan for 
identifying, assessing, prioritizing, and developing protective 
programs for critical assets within the national icons and monuments 
sector, Interior developed a uniform risk assessment and ranking 
methodology called the National Monuments and Icons Assessment 
Methodology (NM&I methodology). According to information from Interior, 
the NM&I methodology is specifically designed to quantify risk, 
identify needed security enhancements, and measure risk-reduction 
benefits at icon and monument assets. The NM&I methodology has a 
consequence assessment phase and a risk assessment phase. During the 
consequence assessment phase, there is an asset tier ranking process, 
in which each asset's iconic significance is subjectively determined. 
Specific attack scenarios--such as chemical/biological, aircraft, or 
improvised explosive device--are used to evaluate security at each 
asset and score attack consequences. Consequence categories include 
casualties, economic impact, and length of disruption. During the risk 
assessment phase, Interior uses the methodology to determine the 
effectiveness of existing security systems for preventing or mitigating 
the specified attack scenarios. Using risk values calculated from this 
comparison, Interior assigns asset risk ratings of high, medium, or 
low, and specific mitigation recommendations are formulated. To date, 
Interior has applied this methodology to assets that fall under the 
purview of the Park Service. Interior officials said that BOR has used 
a risk assessment methodology for dams for several years. These 
officials said that BOR's methodology is similar, but also takes into 
account several factors that are unique to dams, such as downstream 
population at risk, structural vulnerability, and the economic impact 
if the asset were to be destroyed. 

Interior has made significant progress in the risk assessment area, 
particularly regarding the new methodology for national icons and 
monuments. Before the development of this approach, Interior did not 
have a uniform, comprehensive risk management approach for icons and 
monuments. It relied instead on the judgment of senior officials in 
determining where resources should be directed, and the risk 
assessments completed at individual sites were done by a number of 
external experts using different methodologies. Given the range of 
challenges Interior faces, particularly with regard to limited 
resources, it is especially important that Interior's funding 
priorities are linked with its risk rankings so that decision makers-- 
including Interior, Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and 
Congress--can direct resources where they will have an optimal return 
on investment in terms of better protection. Setting funding priorities 
for protecting assets using a uniform approach is the foundation of the 
National Strategy for Homeland Security and the National Strategy for 
the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructure and Key Assets. For 
example, the section of the National Strategy related to critical 
infrastructure calls for DHS and stakeholders like Interior to develop 
a uniform methodology for identifying facilities, systems, and 
functions with national level criticality to help establish priorities. 

Government agencies often face a variety of interests whose competing 
demands force policymakers and managers to balance stakeholders' 
concerns and other factors such as quality, cost, and customer 
satisfaction. For Interior, the trade-offs that have to be made between 
security and its cultural mission are often difficult, which was 
apparent at the sites we visited. Full transparency regarding the basis 
for its decisions on security matters could, in our view, improve 
Interior's ability to achieve mutually acceptable and consistent 
outcomes with stakeholders. As Interior continues with the 
implementation of security measures, a clearly defined set of guiding 
principles for balancing security with its core cultural mission could 
also be beneficial due to the complex and often contentious environment 
in which Interior operates. Such principles could be used in 
conjunction with the broader guiding principles the administration set 
forth in the national strategy for critical infrastructure and efforts 
by the department to define its guiding principles in other areas that 
are already in place. For example, the Park Service's strategic plan 
for fiscal years 2001 to 2005 identifies a set of guiding principles 
for achieving its mission that include excellent service, productive 
partnerships, and citizen involvement. 

Guiding principles have been used by other organizations to improve 
transparency and thus allow stakeholders to better understand the basis 
for decisions. For example, the administration has outlined guiding 
principles for postal reform given the U.S. Postal Service's financial 
difficulties and a complex operating environment that involves multiple 
competing interests and stakeholders.[Footnote 11] These principles 
relate to best practices, transparency, flexibility, accountability, 
and financial self-sufficiency. In another example that relates 
directly to security, the government of Canada has identified guiding 
principles that are part of its long-term plan for the Parliament 
Precinct area in Ottawa.[Footnote 12] These principles address the 
issue of balancing openness, accessibility, and security; which, like 
in the United States, is a concern in Canada. 

The Threat Against Federal Office Buildings is Significant, and GSA 
Faces Various Challenges as the Owner and Landlord of These Assets: 

Terrorism is a major threat to federally owned and leased buildings, 
the civil servants and military personnel who work in them, and the 
public who visits them. This threat was evidenced by the Oklahoma City 
bombing in 1995; the 1998 embassy bombings in Africa; the September 11, 
2001, attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon; and the anthrax 
attacks in the fall of 2001. Since the attacks on the World Trade 
Center and the Pentagon, the focus on security in federal buildings has 
been heightened considerably. More recently, DHS raised the national 
threat level to Code Orange in some areas in August 2004 because of 
specific threat information for office buildings with critical 
missions. According to information from DHS, intelligence reports 
indicated that al Qaeda was targeting several specific buildings, 
including the International Monetary Fund and World Bank in the 
District of Columbia, Prudential Financial in northern New Jersey, and 
Citigroup buildings and the New York Stock Exchange in New York. GSA 
owns several federal office buildings on which an attack could 
seriously disrupt the business of government and harm federal employees 
and the public. Overall, GSA controls more than 8,000 buildings that it 
owns and leases nationwide, encompassing about 338 million square feet 
of space. These properties include office buildings, courthouses, 
border stations, and other types of facilities, representing about 6 
percent of all federally owned space worldwide and 39 percent of all 
federally leased space worldwide. In addition to most of the major 
departmental headquarters in Washington, D.C., including the 
Departments of State, Justice, and Interior, GSA owns most of the key 
multiagency federal office buildings in major cities, including New 
York, and Chicago, as well as every federal courthouse in the country. 

Various potential threats--including large-scale attacks using truck 
bombs to other breaches and attempts to bring weapons, explosives, or 
chemical/biological agents into the buildings--pose several challenges 
for GSA as the owner and landlord of these buildings. These include 
maintaining a proper level of security without limiting the public's 
access to federal offices for services that the government provides and 
for other business; working with stakeholders and other jurisdictions 
that have an interest in the type of security that is employed; 
securing access to privately owned buildings and space where GSA leases 
space for federal agencies, but where GSA and FPS do not have control 
over security for the building; and the challenge GSA faces as a result 
of the transfer of FPS, which has responsibility for providing law 
enforcement and security related functions, to DHS. 

Balancing Security with Public Access at Federal Facilities Is a Major 
Challenge: 

A major challenge in protecting federal buildings is balancing 
increased security with the public's access to government offices for 
services and to transact other business. According to GSA, its intent 
is to create an environment that reflects an open, welcome atmosphere, 
but one that challenges those with intent to do harm. In addition, GSA 
also considers federal workers' convenience and privacy an important 
part of these considerations. Nonetheless, striking a balance among 
these competing factors is an ongoing challenge. It is particularly 
challenging for federal agencies in GSA-owned buildings that require 
regular public access such as courthouses, and federal office buildings 
that have agencies that interact often with the public, such as the 
Social Security Administration. A GSA-owned and managed federal 
courthouse in Nevada demonstrates the challenge of balancing public 
access with security needs and how GSA has fostered this balance. This 
large courthouse houses multiple tenants requiring heightened security, 
including the federal courts, the U.S. Attorney's Office, and the U.S. 
Marshals Service (USMS). 

According to GSA officials, the courthouse is unique because it hosts 
cultural events such as concerts and contains many displays of 
sculpture, painting, and photographic art that are open to the public. 
Located in what GSA officials said is a neglected downtown area, the 
courthouse is also a key part of a business and community 
revitalization effort that offers free public events and encourages 
public participation. Balancing the need for securing the facility and 
public accessibility is especially important given the dual roles of 
the courthouse. 

The courthouse has many security features incorporated into its design. 
It is the first courthouse to be designed with federal architectural 
blast-resistance guidelines adopted after the Oklahoma City bombing. 
According to GSA officials, the design of the courthouse incorporated 
many of the lessons learned from Oklahoma City. Some of these many 
security features incorporated into the building design include the 
following: 

* setback from the streets;

* window glazing and hardened exterior building;

* advanced structure design;

* bollards around building perimeter;

* controlled parking for building staff;

* security barriers entrance to mitigate the danger of high-speed 
vehicle attempting to enter the parking garage;

* separate sally port for prisoner transfer and elevators for transfers 
of prisoners to courtrooms;

* unique, unobtrusive design for magnetometer checkpoints at main 
public entrance;

* access card operated doors and nonpublic elevators; and: 

* surveillance cameras both within and outside the structure. 

USMS and FPS provide law enforcement and security functions for federal 
buildings that house court functions. Given the events of September 11, 
FPS and USMS made a number of enhancements to their operations and 
physical security features at the courthouse. For example, FPS and USMS 
officials told us that they now hold weekly meetings with the 
buildings' principal stakeholders to review security issues. In 
addition, USMS officials told us that they have instituted new gun and 
hazardous materials training for their officers and have stepped up 
evacuation drills and training for building employees. FPS and USMS 
officials said that since September 11 there has been a great deal of 
cooperation amongst local law enforcement agencies. For example, one 
local law enforcement agency allowed FPS to link to its radio systems 
to enhance communication between the entities. The local law 
enforcement agency also involved USMS in their regionwide security 
efforts on New Year's eve 2003, when the national threat alert level 
was raised to orange. Finally, USMS and FPS have made physical security 
enhancements, including, among other things, hardening the exterior 
wall of the courthouse that did not have a setback with a reinforced 
retaining wall and a rock garden with large boulders, replacing the 
gates to the vehicle sally port--which is a secure entryway for the 
loading and unloading of prisoners and protected witnesses--with 
stronger iron gates, adding surveillance cameras, adding alarms, and 
constructing a secure gun locker for use by armed officers. 

The fact that office buildings traditionally have been constructed with 
an emphasis on ease of access makes security measures difficult to 
implement. However, as mentioned above, the design of the courthouse 
incorporated many of the lessons learned from the Oklahoma City bombing 
with respect to building security and safety, as well as a design that 
emphasizes openness and accessibility. Nonetheless, according to GSA 
officials, balancing security design and enhancement with access is an 
ongoing challenge. 

Addressing Jurisdictional Issues and Competing Stakeholder Interests Is 
Another Challenge for GSA: 

In addition to the challenges related to balancing security with public 
accessibility at GSA buildings, addressing the competing needs of 
federal agencies, local governments, and private sector entities in 
securing its buildings is a challenge. For example, local governments 
get involved when GSA requests permits to implement additional security 
enhancements that require such actions as closing streets, removing 
public parking spaces, and installing bollards around the perimeter of 
the facility. One location that typifies the jurisdictional and 
stakeholder issues GSA faces is a federal building in New York City. It 
is a GSA-owned and managed building that houses multiple federal 
agencies and is visited by thousands of individuals each year 
conducting business with the government. 

GSA was focused on security at the federal building before the 
September 11 terrorist attacks. In coordination with the FBI and the 
city, GSA had developed a preliminary security upgrade plan, which 
included improvements such as maintaining street control around the 
building, increasing the use of building access controls, and hardening 
the building to protect it from blasts. After September 11, GSA and FPS 
implemented several additional security enhancements, including further 
strengthening perimeter security, access control, surveillance, and 
blast resistance. GSA and FPS took steps to improve the perimeter 
security of the federal building by accelerating plans to install 
bollards and barriers around the perimeter and working with city and 
fire department officials to close some nearby streets to vehicular 
traffic. In addition, GSA instituted a new building access system 
employing smart card technology. Smart cards contain the name, title, 
and picture of the employee; electronic data that can prove the 
authenticity of the card; and biometric data about the employee. Figure 
11 shows the bollards that were installed in front of the federal 
building. 

Figure 11: Bollards in Front of a Federal Building in New York: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

GSA officials said that to implement these and other security 
enhancements, their greatest challenge has been dealing with competing 
stakeholder interests and jurisdictional issues. GSA officials 
indicated that the decision-making process involves multiple 
stakeholders, steps, and requirements, most of which involve the city 
of New York. GSA officials noted that in addition to new steps and 
requirements that arose during the permit process, some requirements 
changed after permit issuance. In these cases, city officials have 
retracted some permits for security enhancements, and GSA has had to 
restart the permitting process. Specifically, GSA officials noted that 
they encountered delays when trying to install bollards along the 
building perimeter. Initially, the city Department of Transportation 
was supportive of the idea; but as the process continued, GSA officials 
said that issues related to historic preservation arose that needed to 
be addressed. Moreover, GSA officials also noted that the city has 
prevented GSA from making some security enhancements that they believed 
were needed. 

GSA has also experienced opposition from various groups in trying to 
close a nearby street due to security concerns. According to GSA 
officials, the city has asked GSA to prepare an environmental impact 
statement (EIS), hold public hearings, and consider traffic and 
economic impacts on the street closure. In contrast with the challenges 
they have encountered with the city, GSA officials said that the New 
York Police Department (NYPD) has been supportive of their security 
efforts. At a recent demonstration near the federal building, GSA 
officials said that NYPD provided police officers to assist with crowd 
control. Although GSA has been faced with various jurisdictional issues 
and the process has been challenging, the city ultimately has also 
allowed GSA to close streets and make several of the previously 
mentioned security upgrades. Nonetheless, GSA's experience at the 
federal building demonstrates the complexities it faces when attempting 
to implement security enhancements for large, multitenant buildings in 
urban settings. 

The Challenge of Security for Leased Space: 

Securing access to privately owned buildings and space that houses 
federal tenants is a unique challenge that may put the government at 
odds with private lessors and other nonfederal building occupants. GSA 
has reported that its goal and biggest challenge in this area is to 
provide the same level of security for occupants of leased facilities 
as it provides for those that GSA owns. However, this is often 
difficult because GSA has to work with lessors to implement changes and 
in some instances coordinate with other nonfederal tenants. As a 
result, GSA may have difficulty getting the lessor to allow security 
countermeasures in buildings that are not fully occupied by federal 
employees. This challenge arises because many private owners resisted 
heightened levels of security because of the adverse impact or 
inconvenience potentially caused to private tenants. GSA officials also 
identified negotiating the need and costs of increased security 
standards in leased properties as a significant challenge in the post- 
September 11 environment. GSA officials said that negotiating with 
private owners presents a challenge of determining how to effectively 
secure mixed-tenant buildings without security being overly burdensome. 
A GSA official, knowledgeable of leasing issues told us, however, that 
September 11 changed the perspective of private owners as they realized 
vulnerabilities and recognized that federal tenants would begin 
requiring increased levels of security in order to continue to lease 
space. 

The D.C. metro area, managed by GSA's National Capital Region, has a 
high concentration of federal leases. One such leased building is a 10- 
story, privately owned facility located in Washington, D.C. The 
property is a mixed-tenant space with both private sector and federal 
tenants. The building posts guards and operates screening checkpoints 
at each entrance and restricts access to elevator banks and stairwells 
to only those authorized or with escort. In addition, a GSA official 
said that at the request of the building's largest federal tenant, 
every individual entering the building must be screened. Additionally, 
the building also operates a mail facility to screen all mail, 
packages, and deliveries. 

Due to security concerns following the September 11 attacks, FPS, along 
with GSA and the building's largest federal tenant, assessed the 
building's risk and began to develop and implement a comprehensive 
security program. FPS conducted a threat assessment of the building and 
determined the building to be classified as a Level IV[Footnote 13] 
property. Once the building had been assessed and classified, agency 
officials from the building's largest federal tenant, GSA, and FPS 
began developing a plan for security program development and 
implementation. The program plan included armed contract guards manning 
magnetometers and X-ray machines, random spot checks of vehicles 
entering the parking garage, and close monitoring of visitor badges. 

Additionally, a GSA official said that technology advancement has 
changed since September 11. The leased building's security program 
incorporates its newest technology, the E-Pop system. The E-Pop system 
can be controlled by security officials; in the event of an emergency, 
it is able to connect to computers in the building and deliver 
emergency messages communicating evacuation instructions. Furthermore, 
E-Pop allows tenants to be immediately informed of an incident, thereby 
increasing their chances of exiting the building safely. The leased 
building is also considering implementing smart card technology, a 
building access system that uses plastic identification cards 
containing an individual's personal and biometric data. This is the 
same system used at the federal building in New York City. 

A GSA leasing official stated that ISC's development of leased space 
security standards, which will be discussed later, has been useful in 
effectively communicating increased physical security needs to private 
owners and involving them directly in the process of security program 
development for their buildings. This official said that the standards 
have established the credibility and validity of increased security 
measures, where no or few guidelines existed before. A GSA official 
said that even though the commercial real estate community in the 
capital area has become attuned to the needs of the federal government 
in the post-September 11 security environment, challenges still exist. 
According to GSA and security officials, one challenge in leasing space 
in property mixed with federal agency and private sector tenants is 
incorporating increased security standards while balancing occupants' 
varying interests and needs. Some private owners and their private 
sector tenants may not want random car checks conducted or 
magnetometers placed at the entrances to their buildings because this 
may, in some way, adversely affect their business. GSA officials also 
noted that negotiating the need and costs of increased security 
standards in leased properties is still a significant challenge, as 
security demands for privately owned buildings are still relatively 
new. 

FPS Transfer to DHS Poses a Challenge for GSA: 

The Homeland Security Act transferred FPS to DHS, effective March 1, 
2003.[Footnote 14] FPS's transfer to DHS was intended to improve law 
enforcement and related security functions by centralizing building 
security activities with other homeland security functions. Under the 
act, DHS became responsible for protecting buildings, grounds, and 
property owned, occupied, or secured by the federal government that are 
under GSA's jurisdiction, as well as other DHS facilities. A March 2003 
operational memorandum of agreement between GSA and DHS made FPS 
responsible for the same types of security services that FPS provided 
for GSA properties prior to the transfer to DHS. These include, among 
other things, performing risk assessments, managing the installation of 
some security equipment, conducting criminal investigations, and 
managing the contract guard program.[Footnote 15] Although law 
enforcement and security related functions were transferred to DHS from 
GSA, GSA officials said that it still assists FPS and tenant agencies 
in implementing various security measures that FPS recommends, and 
incorporating enhanced security measures into new space it constructs 
or leases. In October 2003, GSA and DHS agreed on a number of interim 
support services GSA would provide to FPS during the transition in a 
separate memorandum of agreement. In July 2004, we reported on the 
challenges FPS was facing related to the transfer, including its 
expanding homeland security mission and related increase in 
responsibility; unresolved issues related to how it would be funded, 
because its funds at that time were tied to the rent GSA charges tenant 
agencies; and, difficulties with transferring mission-support functions 
for FPS from GSA to DHS.[Footnote 16] DHS concurred with our findings 
and related recommendations and agreed to take action. 

In addition to the challenges facing FPS, our work for this review 
showed that GSA is facing its own management challenges because it no 
longer has control over the law enforcement and related security 
functions of its properties. GSA officials expressed concern about 
their ability to track security expenditures and stay informed about 
FPS protection activities in GSA buildings. These officials also 
expressed concern about not having a formal mechanism for communicating 
with FPS and for ensuring that FPS is meeting its responsibilities with 
regard to security enhancements and services. The Deputy Commissioner 
of GSA's Public Buildings Service said that since the departure of FPS, 
GSA has had difficulty adjusting to not having responsibility for 
protecting its own buildings and is still trying to define its overall 
role in security. This official said that GSA's new role should be that 
of a coordinator between FPS and the tenant agencies and that GSA was 
examining the MOU between GSA and DHS to determine if GSA's role and 
visibility in facility protection could be enhanced. Concerns about the 
departure of FPS were identified by GSA's Office of the Inspector 
General (IG) in its August 2004 updated assessment of GSA's major 
management challenges. The GSA IG identified protection of federal 
facilities and personnel as one of seven major management challenges 
facing the agency.[Footnote 17] The GSA IG said that although FPS was 
transferred to DHS, GSA will have a continual need to closely interact 
with security personnel due to GSA's mission of housing federal 
agencies. The GSA IG concluded that ensuring federal employees have a 
secure working environment and that building assets are adequately 
safeguarded must remain a primary concern of GSA. 

Prior to the creation of DHS, we expressed concern about separating 
security from other real property portfolio functions, such as site 
location, design, and construction for new federal buildings. Decisions 
on these factors have implications for what type of security will be 
necessary and effective.[Footnote 18] We concluded that if DHS was 
given the responsibility for securing facilities, the role of 
integrating security with other real property functions would be an 
important consideration. Given the transfer of FPS to DHS, the range of 
challenges FPS faces, and the concerns about GSA's new role expressed 
by GSA officials and the GSA IG, it is critical that GSA be well- 
equipped to engage in security-related matters given that it is still 
the owner and landlord of these buildings. However, GSA does not have 
an organizational unit or mechanism that is directly accountable for 
security matters, such as a chief security officer position or formal 
point of contact. Such an officer/official could coordinate GSA's 
responsibilities related to the safety and security of its facilities, 
similar to the role fulfilled by Interior's Deputy Assistant Secretary 
for Law Enforcement and Security and OLES. GSA's Deputy Commissioner 
for public buildings and other GSA officials who are knowledgeable of 
security matters said that it would be beneficial for GSA to have a 
designated position for coordination purposes. Having a chief security 
officer position for physical assets is recognized in the security 
industry as essential in organizations with large numbers of mission- 
critical facilities. According to chief security officer guidelines 
developed by ASIS International:[Footnote 19]

"Traditionally, what has previously been lacking is a single position 
at the senior governance level having the responsibility for crafting, 
influencing, and directing an organization-wide protection strategy. In 
many organizations, accountability is dispersed, possibly among several 
managers in different departments; with potentially conflicting 
objectives….the diversity of today's risks comes in a complex matrix of 
interrelated threats, vulnerabilities, and impacts, the safeguards for 
which must, therefore, be interdependent. The ability to influence 
business strategy and address matters of internal risk exposure 
requires a chief security officer at the appropriate level in the 
organization."

Protecting Government Facilities Is Part of the National Homeland 
Security Strategy: 

The National Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical 
Infrastructures and Key Assets mentioned earlier has clear implications 
for GSA and its role as the owner and landlord of federal facilities. 
The strategy identifies a number of actions intended to improve federal 
facility protection. These included developing a process to screen 
nonfederal tenants and visitors entering private sector facilities that 
house federal organizations, determining the criticality and 
vulnerability of government facilities, developing long-term 
construction standards for facilities requiring specialized security 
measures, and implementing new security technology at federally 
occupied facilities. 

GSA Actions in Response to the National Homeland Security Strategy and 
Other Related Initiatives: 

GSA has taken a number of positive actions, as follows: 

* A senior GSA official chaired ISC's working group on security in 
leasing; after receiving input from ISC member agencies, ISC issued its 
policy on security standards for leased space in July 2003. 

* GSA is working with DHS to utilize a risk management process called 
Federal Security Risk Management (FSRM) for assessing federally owned 
and leased facilities. 

* GSA worked with ISC to develop security design criteria and is 
involved with ISC's ongoing efforts to update the criteria annually. 

* GSA is working with ISC on several technology-related initiatives, 
including smart card and biometrics access control technology, 
nonjersey barrier perimeter protection, and indoor air monitoring 
systems to prevent uncontrolled movement of toxic air substances. 

In the area of risk assessment, FPS uses a computer-based methodology 
that allows FPS to evaluate risk and identify countermeasures on an 
ongoing basis. FPS is able to use a series of input screens and queries 
to maintain pertinent data that can be adjusted as threats and 
vulnerabilities change. The tool allows the user to enter information 
on each asset, identify existing countermeasures, assign an impact of 
loss and a vulnerability rating to each threat, and input 
countermeasure upgrade alternatives and their associated costs. 

As mentioned earlier, HSPD-7 requires, on an annual basis, that sector- 
specific agencies report on their efforts to identify, prioritize, and 
coordinate the protection initiatives in various critical 
infrastructure sectors. Although GSA was not given responsibility for 
any of the sectors identified in the directive, all federal departments 
and agencies are required, under the directive, to develop physical and 
cyber security plans for the assets they own or operate. However, in a 
July 2004 letter to the Director of OMB, GSA stated that "no GSA owned 
or leased space meets the definitions for critical infrastructure and/ 
or key resources." The letter went on to say that "GSA owns and leases 
many buildings where important activities take place, but GSA is unable 
to make a determination as to whether these tenant activities are 
critical infrastructure."

GSA officials said that OMB has not commented on GSA's response to HSPD-
7 regarding a physical security plan. The Executive Director of ISC--
which has responsibility for reviewing agencies' HSPD-7 plans for the 
administration--said that ISC has not completed its review of agencies' 
plans, including GSA's response to HSPD-7. We are deferring to ISC on 
whether GSA's decision not to prepare a physical security plan is 
reasonable. In the future, a chief security officer position or formal 
point of contact could aid in determining GSA's involvement in 
governmentwide critical infrastructure efforts such as HSPD-7. 

Conclusions: 

There is a heightened concern that terrorists may again try to exploit 
the nation's vulnerabilities. In this environment, Interior has a 
critical role in protecting our national icons and monuments and 
ensuring the safety of the millions of people who visit them. National 
icons such as the Statue of Liberty and Mt. Rushmore could be attacked 
for symbolic reasons. Since September 11, Interior has made significant 
progress in improving security by doing vulnerability assessments of 
high-profile sites that are likely targets and implementing various 
security measures. For example, at the individual icons and monuments 
we visited, steps clearly had been taken to improve security since 
September 11, such as the Washington Monument perimeter landscaping 
project, the Lincoln and Jefferson Memorial security projects, the 
visitor screening system at the Statue of Liberty, increased staffing 
at Mt. Rushmore, and the rerouting of Interstate 93 at Hoover Dam. In 
addition, Interior has made management changes, including creating a 
central security office, intended to enhance its homeland security 
initiatives, and has recently developed a uniform risk management 
methodology for national icons and monuments. These actions should help 
Interior address the major challenges it faces--which include balancing 
security and Interior's mission related to access and education; 
addressing jurisdictional and competing stakeholder issues; securing 
icons and monuments in rugged, remote areas; and leveraging limited 
staff and funding resources. 

As Interior moves forward, it could link the results of its risk 
assessments and related risk rankings to its security funding 
priorities. This could allow for well-informed decisions by 
stakeholders--such as Interior, OMB, and Congress--about where to 
direct resources so that they have an optimal return on investment in 
terms of better protection. Also, a set of guiding principles for 
balancing security with its core cultural and educational mission-- 
which Interior lacks but other organizations with complex environments 
have developed--could help in addressing the challenges. A set of 
guiding principles could provide decision makers and Interior's other 
stakeholders with greater transparency regarding the rationale for 
security decisions. An approach with these components should yield 
results that would allow decision makers both within and external to 
the department to better gauge and consider competing priorities. 

Since September 11, security at office buildings has remained a 
concern, as evidenced by threats revealed by DHS in August 2004 that al 
Qaeda was targeting several office buildings in New York, northern New 
Jersey, and Washington, D.C. GSA has taken action to address the 
challenges it faces as the owner and landlord of federal office 
buildings. These challenges include balancing security and public 
access, addressing jurisdictional and competing stakeholder issues, 
securing federally leased space, and adjusting to the transfer of FPS 
to DHS. These actions have included working with ISC to develop 
security standards, continuing with upgrades that GSA began 
implementing after the Oklahoma City bombing, and establishing a 
memorandum of agreement with DHS related to FPS. Despite these actions, 
GSA lacks a mechanism such as a chief security officer position or 
formal point of contact to coordinate security efforts for its federal 
office building portfolio. As a result, GSA is less equipped to 
effectively share information with FPS and tenant agencies, ensure that 
FPS is fulfilling its responsibilities, track security expenditures, 
and define its overall role in security--capabilities that GSA 
officials were concerned the agency was lacking. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

We are making two recommendations to the Secretary of the Interior and 
one recommendation to the Administrator of GSA. First, to ensure that 
useful information is available for decisions on resources for the 
protection of national icons and monuments, we recommend that the 
Secretary of the Interior link the results of the agency's risk 
assessments and related risk rankings to its funding priorities. 
Second, given the complex nature of the challenges Interior faces in 
protecting national icons and monuments, the Secretary should also 
develop guiding principles for balancing security initiatives with 
Interior's core mission so that decision makers and stakeholders will 
have a clearer, more transparent understanding of Interior's rationale 
for security enhancements at individual assets. Regarding GSA, we 
recommend that the Administrator establish a mechanism--such as a chief 
security officer position or formal point of contact--that could serve 
in a liaison role with FPS and tenant agencies, work to address the 
challenges GSA faces related to security in buildings it owns and 
leases, and enable GSA to define its overall role in security given the 
transfer of FPS to DHS. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

We provided a draft of this report to Interior, GSA, and DHS for their 
review and comment. Interior did not comment on our conclusions and 
recommendations. However, Interior provided technical comments, which 
we incorporated, where appropriate. GSA concurred with the report's 
overall findings and stated that it concurs with the recommendation and 
will address it. GSA comments are contained in appendix II. DHS 
provided technical comments, which we incorporated where appropriate. 

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of the 
Interior, Homeland Security, and the Administrator of GSA. Additional 
copies will be sent to other interested Congressional Committees. We 
will also make copies available to others upon request. In addition, 
the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at 
http://www.gao.gov. 

If you have any questions regarding this report, please contact me on 
(202) 512-2834 or at [Hyperlink, goldsteinm@gao.gov]. Contact points 
for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be 
found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major 
contributions to this report are listed in appendix III. 

Sincerely yours,

Signed by: 

Mark L. Goldstein: 
Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues: 

[End of section]

Appendixes: 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

Our objectives were to (1) identify any challenges that the Department 
of the Interior (Interior) faces in protecting national icons and 
monuments from terrorism, as well as related actions intended to 
address these challenges, and similarly, (2) determine any challenges 
the General Services Administration (GSA) faces related to the 
protection of federal office buildings it owns or leases and the 
actions that have been taken. To determine what challenges Interior and 
GSA have faced in their efforts, we interviewed Interior and GSA 
officials to identify the major challenges, and reviewed available 
reports and other documents. In addition, in consultation with these 
officials, we identified sites that are illustrative of these 
challenges. 

From the sites identified, we selected five Interior sites and three 
GSA buildings for further analysis of the challenges. These eight sites 
were geographically dispersed and represented a range of asset types, 
including office buildings and national icons in both densely populated 
and remote areas. The sites included, the Statue of Liberty, New York, 
NY; Independence National Historical Park, Philadelphia, PA; Mt. 
Rushmore National Memorial, Keystone, SD; Hoover Dam, Boulder City, NV; 
the Washington Monument and Lincoln and Jefferson Memorials on the 
National Mall in Washington, D.C.; and three major facilities in the 
GSA inventory. Collectively, the sites we selected provided examples of 
the range of challenges Interior and GSA reported facing. We included 
the Hoover Dam because, in addition to being a source of hydropower, 
the dam has iconic status and attracts large numbers of tourists. At 
each site, we interviewed agency officials with primary responsibility 
for security implementation, operation, and management. We toured each 
site and observed the physical environment, the facilities, and the 
principal security elements to gain firsthand insights on the 
challenges. Furthermore, we interviewed stakeholders with significant 
interest in the security program, including the National Parks 
Conservation Association, the Commission on Fine Arts, the National 
Capital Planning Commission, Independence Mall Business and Residents 
Coalition, the National Coalition to Save our Mall, the U.S. Marshals 
Service, a charitable organization, and local government and law 
enforcement officials. We collected documents, when available, that 
contained site-specific information on security plans, policies, 
procedures, budgets and staffing. Finally, we considered prior GAO work 
on challenges in facility protection and security. 

To determine what actions have been taken by Interior and GSA to 
address its challenges, we collected and analyzed documents from, and 
conducted interviews with Interior and GSA officials. The documents 
collected provided information on these agencies' past and present 
security plans, policies and procedures, organizational structures, 
funding and staffing. The interviews included officials from GSA's 
Public Building Services and Interior's Office of Law Enforcement and 
Security, National Park Service, and Bureau of Reclamation. We also 
interviewed officials from the Federal Protective Service, which is 
part of DHS and protects leased and owned GSA facilities. We reviewed 
relevant laws and guidance including the Homeland Security Act of 2002, 
the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949, and the 
Interagency Security Committee Security Standards for Leased Space. 
Additionally, we reviewed other pertinent reports, including the 
National Strategy for Homeland Security[Footnote 20] and the National 
Strategy for the Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and 
Key Assets.[Footnote 21] We also considered past GAO work related to 
facility protection and security issues at Interior and GSA, as well as 
broader GAO work on homeland security issues. 

Agency officials and the representatives of stakeholder organizations 
provided much of the data and other information used in this report. In 
cases where officials provided their views and opinions within the 
context that they were speaking for their organization, we corroborated 
the information with other officials. We requested official comments on 
this report from Interior, GSA, and DHS. 

[End of section]

Appendix II: Comments from the General Services Administration: 

GSA Administrator: 

May 5, 2005: 

The Honorable David M. Walker: 
Comptroller General of the United States: 
Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Mr. Walker: 

The General Services Administration (GSA) appreciates this opportunity 
to submit agency comments on the Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
"Draft Report to the Chairman, Committee on Government Reform, U.S. 
House of Representatives, Homeland Security. Actions Needed to Better 
Protect National Icons and Federal Office Buildings from Terrorism," 
GAO-05-367 (Draft Report). We agree with the draft report's findings 
and recommendation concerning the challenges GSA faces related to 
security in owned and leased buildings. 

GSA shares GAO's concern about separating security from other real 
property functions, such as site location, design, and construction for 
new Federal buildings. We will continue to work closely with the 
Federal Protective Service (FPS) in the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) to protect Federal facilities and personnel. We will address 
GAO's recommendation that GSA establish a mechanism-such as a chief 
security officer position or formal point of contact-that could serve 
in a liaison role with FPS and tenant agencies, work to address the 
challenges GSA faces related to security in buildings under its custody 
and control, and enable GSA to define its overall role in security 
given the transfer of FPS to DHS. 

If you have any questions or concerns, please contact me. Staff 
inquiries may be directed to Mr. Anthony E. Costa, Deputy Commissioner, 
Public Buildings Service, at (202) 501-1100. 

Sincerely,

Signed by: 

Stephen A. Perry: 
Administrator: 

U.S. General Services Administration: 
1800 F Street, NW:
Washington, DC 20405-0002: 
Telephone: (202) 501-0800: 
Fax: (202) 219-1243: 
www.gsa.gov: 

[End of section]

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Mark Goldstein (202) 512-2834: 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

In addition to those individuals named above, David Sausville, Casey 
Brown, Matt Cail, Erika Carter, Roshni Davé, Daniel Hoy, Anne Izod, 
Donna Leiss, and Susan Michal-Smith were key contributors to this 
report. 

(543134): 

FOOTNOTES

[1] GAO, Homeland Security: Transformation Strategy Needed to Address 
Challenges Facing the Federal Protective Service, GAO-04-537 
(Washington, D.C.: July 14, 2004); GAO, Homeland Security: Further 
Actions Needed to Coordinate Federal Agencies' Facility Protection 
Efforts and Promote Key Practices, GAO-05-49 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 
30, 2004). 

[2] U.S. Department of the Interior, Office of the Inspector General, 
Review of National Icon Park Security, Report 2003-I-0063 (Washington, 
D.C.: August 2003). 

[3] As we reported in GAO, Homeland Security: Communication Protocols 
and Risk Communication Principles Can Assist in Refining the Advisory 
System, GAO-04-682 (Washington, D.C.: June 2004), the Homeland Security 
Advisory System is composed of five color-coded threat conditions, 
which represent levels of risk related to potential terror attack. Red 
is severe, orange high, yellow elevated, blue guarded, and green low. 

[4] 2003-I-0063. 

[5] The President of the United States, National Strategy for Homeland 
Security (Washington, D.C.: July 2002). 

[6] The President of the United States, National Strategy for the 
Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets 
(Washington, D.C.: February 2003). 

[7] GAO, Combating Terrorism: Evaluation of Selected Characteristics in 
National Strategies Related to Terrorism, GAO-04-408T (Washington, 
D.C.: Feb. 3, 2004). 

[8] Homeland Security Presidential Directive Number 7, Critical 
Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and Protection 
(Washington, D.C.: Dec. 17, 2003). 

[9] U.S. Department of the Interior, Office of Inspector General, 
Disquieting State of Disorder: An Assessment of Department of the 
Interior Law Enforcement, Report 2002-I-0014 (Washington, D.C.: January 
2002). 

[10] 2002-I-0014. 

[11] President's Commission on the United States Postal Service, 
Embracing the Future: Making the Tough Choices to Preserve Universal 
Mail Service (Washington, D.C.: July 31, 2003). 

[12] Public Works and Government Services Canada, A Legacy for Future 
Generations: The Long-Term Vision and Plan for the Parliamentary 
Precinct. 

[13] According to Department of Justice standards, a Level IV facility 
has over 450 federal employees. In addition, the facility likely has 
more than 150,000 square feet; a high volume of public contact; and 
tenant agencies that may include high-risk law enforcement and 
intelligence agencies, courts, judicial offices, and highly sensitive 
government records. 

[14] Executive Order 13286 dated February 28, 2003, amended numerous 
executive orders to reflect the transfer of certain functions and 
responsibilities to the Secretary of Homeland Security. Section 23 of 
the Executive Order transferred the ISC chairmanship responsibility 
from GSA to DHS. 

[15] As of September 30, 2003, FPS had approximately 1,100 uniformed 
officer full-time equivalents and 13,000 contract guards to protect GSA-
owned or-occupied facilities. 

[16] GAO-04-537. 

[17] General Services Administration, Office of the Inspector General, 
Updated Assessment of GSA's Major Management Challenges (Washington, 
D.C.: August 2004). The other major management challenges the IG 
identified were procurement activities, contract management, 
information technology, management controls, aging federal buildings, 
and human capital. 

[18] GAO, Building Security: Security Responsibilities for Federally 
Owned and Leased Facilities, GAO-03-8 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 31, 
2002). 

[19] ASIS International has over 33,000 security industry members and 
according to its Web site is the preeminent international organization 
for professionals responsible for security, including managers and 
directors of security. 

[20] The President of the United States, National Strategy for Homeland 
Security (Washington, D.C.: July 2002). 

[21] The President of the United States, National Strategy for the 
Physical Protection of Critical Infrastructures and Key Assets, 
(Washington, D.C.: February 2003). 

GAO's Mission: 

The Government Accountability Office, the investigative arm of 
Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its constitutional 
responsibilities and to help improve the performance and accountability 
of the federal government for the American people. GAO examines the use 
of public funds; evaluates federal programs and policies; and provides 
analyses, recommendations, and other assistance to help Congress make 
informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. GAO's commitment to 
good government is reflected in its core values of accountability, 
integrity, and reliability. 

Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony: 

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no 
cost is through the Internet. GAO's Web site ( www.gao.gov ) contains 
abstracts and full-text files of current reports and testimony and an 
expanding archive of older products. The Web site features a search 
engine to help you locate documents using key words and phrases. You 
can print these documents in their entirety, including charts and other 
graphics. 

Each day, GAO issues a list of newly released reports, testimony, and 
correspondence. GAO posts this list, known as "Today's Reports," on its 
Web site daily. The list contains links to the full-text document 
files. To have GAO e-mail this list to you every afternoon, go to 
www.gao.gov and select "Subscribe to e-mail alerts" under the "Order 
GAO Products" heading. 

Order by Mail or Phone: 

The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies are $2 
each. A check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent 
of Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard. Orders for 100 or 
more copies mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent. 
Orders should be sent to: 

U.S. Government Accountability Office

441 G Street NW, Room LM

Washington, D.C. 20548: 

To order by Phone: 

Voice: (202) 512-6000: 

TDD: (202) 512-2537: 

Fax: (202) 512-6061: 

To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs: 

Contact: 

Web site: www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm

E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov

Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470: 

Public Affairs: 

Jeff Nelligan, managing director,

NelliganJ@gao.gov

(202) 512-4800

U.S. Government Accountability Office,

441 G Street NW, Room 7149

Washington, D.C. 20548: