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Energy, Science and Environment Needs to Take Prompt, Coordinated 
Action to Meet the New Design Basis Threat' which was released on July 
26, 2005. 

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Report to Congressional Requesters: 

July 2005: 

Nuclear Security: 

DOE's Office of the Under Secretary for Energy, Science and Environment 
Needs to Take Prompt, Coordinated Action to Meet the New Design Basis 
Threat: 

[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-611]: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-05-611, a report to congressional requesters: 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

A successful terrorist attack on a Department of Energy (DOE) site 
containing nuclear weapons material could have devastating effects for 
the site and nearby communities. DOE’s Office of the Under Secretary 
for Energy, Science and Environment (ESE), which is responsible for DOE 
operations in areas such as energy research, manages five sites that 
contain weapons-grade nuclear material. A heavily armed paramilitary 
force equipped with such items as automatic weapons protects ESE sites. 
GAO was asked to examine (1) the extent to which ESE protective forces 
are meeting DOE’s existing readiness requirements and (2) the actions 
DOE and ESE will need to take to successfully defend against the 
terrorist threat identified in the October 2004 design basis threat 
(DBT) by DOE’s implementation deadline of October 2008.

What GAO Found: 

Protective forces at the five ESE sites containing weapons-grade 
nuclear material generally meet existing key DOE readiness 
requirements. Specifically, GAO determined that ESE protective forces 
generally comply with DOE standards for firearms proficiency, physical 
fitness levels, and equipment standardization and that the five ESE 
sites had the required training programs, facilities, and equipment. 
However, GAO did find some weaknesses at ESE sites that could adversely 
affect the ability of ESE protective forces to defend their sites. For 
example, despite the importance of training exercises in which 
protective forces undergo simulated attacks by a group of mock 
terrorists (force-on-force exercises), DOE neither sets standards for 
individual protective force officers to participate in these exercises, 
nor does it require sites to track individual participation. In another 
example, GAO found that protective force officers at all five of the 
ESE sites reported problems with their radio communications systems. 
Specifically, according to 66 of the 105 protective force officers GAO 
interviewed, they did not always have dependable radio communications 
as required by the DOE Manual 473.2-2, Protective Force Program Manual. 
Security officials stated that improvements were under way. 

To successfully defend against the larger terrorist threat contained in 
the 2004 DBT by October 2008, DOE and ESE officials recognize that they 
will need to take several prompt and coordinated actions. These include 
transforming its current protective force into an “elite force”—modeled 
on U.S. Special Forces, developing and deploying new security 
technologies to reduce the risk to protective forces in case of an 
attack, consolidating and eliminating nuclear weapons material between 
and among ESE sites to reduce security costs, and creating a sound ESE 
management structure that has sufficient authority to ensure 
coordination across all ESE offices that have weapons-grade nuclear 
material. However, because these initiatives, particularly an elite 
force, are in early stages of development and will require significant 
commitment of resources and coordination across DOE and ESE, their 
completion by the 2008 October DBT implementation deadline is 
uncertain. 

DOE Protective Force Member: 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

What GAO Recommends: 

To ensure that DOE and ESE protective forces can meet the terrorist 
threat contained in the 2004 DBT, GAO is making five recommendations to 
the Secretary of Energy to, among other things, address weaknesses with 
protective officers’ equipment and coordinate ESE efforts to address 
the 2004 DBT. DOE concurred with the report, accepted GAO’s 
recommendations and provided an update on actions it anticipated taking 
to address GAO’s recommendations.

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-611.

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
the link above. For more information, contact Gene Aloise at (202) 512-
3841 or AloiseE@gao.gov.

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Results in Brief: 

Background: 

Protective Forces at ESE Sites Generally Meet Established DOE Readiness 
Requirements, but Some Weaknesses in Protective Force Practices Exist: 

DOE and ESE Officials Need to Take Several Prompt and Coordinated 
Actions to Address the New DBT Requirements by 2008: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendixes: 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Energy: 

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Tables: 

Table 1: DOE/ESE Category I Special Nuclear Material Sites: 

Table 2: DOE/ESE Relevant Program Offices and Fiscal Year 2006 Funding 
Requests for Security: 

Table 3: ESE Protective Force Deployment: 

Figure: 

Figure 1: DOE Fiscal Year 2006 Budget Request: 

Abbreviations: 

CFR: Code of Federal Regulations: 

DBT: design basis threat: 

DOD: Department of Defense: 

DOE: Department of Energy: 

EM: Environmental Management: 

ESE: Energy, Science and Environment, DOE's Office of the Under 
Secretary for: 

NNSA: National Nuclear Security Administration: 

Letter July 15, 2005: 

The Honorable Christopher Shays: 
Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and 
International Relations: 
Committee on Government Reform: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Charles F. Grassley: 
United States Senate: 

The Department of Energy (DOE) has long recognized that a successful 
terrorist attack on a site containing the material used in nuclear 
weapons, such as plutonium or highly enriched uranium, could have 
devastating consequences for the site and its surrounding communities. 
The risks associated with these materials, which in specified forms and 
quantities are referred to as Category I special nuclear material, vary 
but include theft for use in an illegal nuclear weapon; the creation of 
improvised nuclear devices capable of producing a nuclear yield; and 
the creation of so-called "dirty bombs," in which conventional 
explosives are used to disperse radioactive material. 

Because terrorist attacks could have such devastating consequences, an 
effective safeguards and security program is essential. For many years, 
a key component for DOE security programs has been the development of 
the design basis threat (DBT), a classified document that identifies 
the potential size and capabilities of adversary forces. DOE issued its 
current DBT in October 2004 in response to recommendations in our April 
2004 report,[Footnote 1] congressional criticism, and a new review of 
intelligence data. The October 2004 DBT identifies a larger terrorist 
threat for DOE sites than had previous DBTs. Consequently, DOE is not 
requiring full compliance until October 2008 in order to allow its 
sites adequate time to implement measures to defeat this larger 
terrorist threat. Private contractors, who operate DOE's facilities, 
counter the terrorist threat contained in the DBT with a multifaceted 
protective system. While specific measures vary from site to site, a 
key universal component of DOE's protective system is a heavily armed 
protective force equipped with such items as automatic weapons, night 
vision equipment, body armor, and chemical protective gear. 

The following two major organizations in DOE are responsible for 
securing Category I special nuclear material: 

* The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), a separately 
organized agency within DOE, is responsible for the nation's nuclear 
weapons programs and manages six sites that contain Category I special 
nuclear material. 

* DOE's Office of the Under Secretary for Energy, Science and 
Environment (ESE) is responsible for DOE operations in areas such as 
energy research, basic physical science research, and environmental 
cleanup and manages five sites that collectively contain substantial 
quantities of Category I special nuclear material. 

We reported on security at NNSA sites in May 2003 and April 
2004.[Footnote 2] We found that NNSA needed to improve the management 
of its safeguards and security program and that while some action had 
been taken in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, 
additional action was needed to ensure that DOE's sites were adequately 
prepared to defend themselves. Since the attacks of September 11, DOE 
has focused on the security of its NNSA sites more than it has on its 
ESE sites.[Footnote 3] Consequently, you asked us to determine for the 
five ESE sites with Category I special nuclear material (1) the extent 
to which ESE protective forces are meeting DOE's existing readiness 
requirements and (2) what actions DOE and ESE will need to take to 
successfully defend against the larger terrorist threat identified in 
the October 2004 DBT by DOE's implementation deadline of October 2008. 

To determine the extent to which protective forces at ESE sites are 
meeting existing DOE readiness requirements, we reviewed DOE policies 
and other pertinent literature about the factors that affect the 
readiness of forces, such as military forces, that are like those 
defending ESE sites. We conducted structured interviews with 105 ESE 
protective force officers at the five ESE sites that contain Category I 
special nuclear material. While the responses from these interviews are 
not projectable to the entire universe of ESE protective force 
officers, we did speak to about 10 percent of the total protective 
forces at the five sites. Even though not projectable, we randomly 
selected protective force officers to interview at each site in order 
to help assure their independence from the views of site management. We 
asked the officers questions designed to determine their readiness to 
defend the sites, including questions about their morale, training, and 
equipment. We also reviewed the training records of the 105 officers to 
determine if key elements of their training complied with existing DOE 
training requirements. In particular, we reviewed selected firearms and 
physical fitness qualifications to determine if these officers complied 
with existing DOE requirements and regulations. Finally, we reviewed 
the equipment used by ESE protective forces to determine if it met 
current DOE requirements. Further details on our interview procedures 
and random selection methods are found in the scope and methodology 
appendix at the end of this report. 

To determine what actions DOE and ESE will need to take to successfully 
defend against the new threat identified in the October 2004 DBT by 
DOE's implementation deadline of October 2008, we reviewed the October 
2004 DBT and associated guidance documents. We discussed the October 
2004 DBT with officials in DOE's Office of Security and Safety 
Performance Assurance and with officials in ESE's Offices of 
Environmental Management; Nuclear Energy, Science and Technology; and 
Science. Finally, where available, we reviewed documents prepared by 
ESE officials on how they plan to comply with the October 2004 DBT. 
Appendix I presents a detailed description of our scope and 
methodology. We performed our work between March 2004 and July 2005 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Results in Brief: 

Protective forces at the five ESE sites containing Category I special 
nuclear material generally meet existing DOE readiness requirements. 
However, we did find some weaknesses at ESE sites that could adversely 
affect the ability of ESE protective forces to defend their sites. With 
respect to current readiness, 102 of the 105 officers we interviewed 
stated that they believed that they and their fellow officers 
understood what was expected of them if the site were attacked by a 
terrorist group. Moreover, 65 of the 105 officers rated themselves as 
highly ready to defend their site while 20 officers rated themselves as 
somewhat or moderately ready. Supporting their views, we found that the 
five ESE sites we visited had the required training programs, 
facilities, and equipment, and that the 105 protective force members 
whose records we reviewed generally complied with existing DOE 
standards for firearms proficiency, physical fitness levels, and 
equipment standardization. However, we did identify some weaknesses. 
For example, despite the importance of training exercises in which 
protective forces undergo simulated attacks by a group of mock 
terrorists (force-on-force exercises), DOE does not have a requirement 
for individual protective force officers to participate in these 
exercises or a requirement that sites track the individual officers' 
participation. While 84 of the 105 protective force officers we 
interviewed stated they had participated in a force-on-force exercise, 
only 46 of the 84 protective force officers believed that the force-on- 
force exercises they had participated in were either realistic or 
somewhat realistic. Additionally, protective force officers often told 
us that they did not have frequent and realistic tactical training. In 
another example, 66 of the 105 protective force officers, at all five 
of the ESE sites, stated that they did not always have dependable radio 
communications. However, according to DOE Manual 473.2-2 Protective 
Force Program Manual, the radios protective force officers use must be 
capable of intelligible two-way communications. Site security officials 
stated that improvements were under way and would be completed this 
year. Finally, some ESE sites currently do not have the protective 
force capabilities found at NNSA sites with similar special nuclear 
material. Specifically, while not a DOE requirement, all NNSA sites 
with Category I special nuclear material currently operate armored 
vehicles. However, only one ESE site with Category I special nuclear 
material equipped protective forces with such vehicles at the time of 
our review. 

To successfully defend against the larger terrorist threat contained in 
the 2004 DBT by 2008, DOE and ESE officials recognize that they need to 
take several prompt and coordinated actions. These include the 
transformation of its current protective force into an elite force, the 
development and deployment of new security technologies, the 
consolidation and elimination of special nuclear material, and 
organizational improvements within ESE's security program. However, 
because these initiatives, particularly an elite force, are in early 
stages of development and will require significant commitment of 
resources and coordination across DOE and ESE, their completion by the 
2008 DBT implementation deadline is uncertain. Specifically, the status 
of these initiatives is as follows: 

* Elite forces. DOE officials, and 85 of the 105 protective force 
officers we interviewed, now believe that the way DOE sites, including 
ESE sites, currently train their contractor-operated protective forces 
will not be adequate to defeat the much larger terrorist threat 
contained in the October 2004 DBT. In response, the department has 
proposed the development of an elite force that would be patterned 
after the U. S. military's Special Forces and might eventually be 
converted from a contractor-operated force into a federal force. 
However, this proposal is only in the conceptual phase, and completing 
this effort by the 2008 DBT implementation deadline is unlikely. 

* New security technologies. DOE is seeking to improve the 
effectiveness and survivability of its protective forces by developing 
and deploying new security technologies. It believes technologies can 
reduce the risk to protective forces in case of an attack and can 
provide additional response time to meet and defeat an attack. Sixteen 
of the 105 protective forces we interviewed generally supported this 
view and said they needed enhanced detection technologies that would 
allow them to detect adversaries at much greater ranges than is 
currently possible at most sites. However, a senior DOE official 
recently conceded that the department has not yet taken the formal 
steps necessary to coordinate investment in emerging security 
technologies and that the role of technology in helping sites meet the 
new threats contained in the 2004 DBT by the department's deadline of 
October 2008 is uncertain. 

* Consolidation and elimination of materials. ESE's current strategy to 
meet the October 2008 deadline relies heavily on the consolidation and 
elimination of special nuclear material between and among ESE sites. 
For example, the Office of Nuclear Energy, Science and Technology plans 
to down-blend special nuclear material and extract medically useful 
isotopes at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory--an Office of Science 
site. This action would eliminate most of the security concerns 
surrounding the material. Neither program office, however, has been 
able to formally agree on its share of additional security costs, which 
have increased significantly because of the new DBT. In addition, 
neither ESE nor DOE has developed a comprehensive, departmentwide plan 
to achieve the needed cooperation and agreement among the sites and 
program offices to consolidate special nuclear material as we 
recommended last year in our April 2004 report. In the absence of a 
comprehensive plan, completing most of these consolidation activities 
by the October 2008 DBT implementation deadline is unlikely. 

* Organizational improvements. The ESE headquarters security 
organization is not well suited to meet the challenges associated with 
implementing the 2004 DBT. Specifically, there is no centralized 
security organization within the Office of the Under Secretary, ESE. 
The individual who serves as the Acting ESE Security Director has been 
detailed to the Office by DOE's Office of Security and Safety 
Performance Assurance and has no programmatic authority or staff. This 
lack of authority limits the Director's ability to facilitate ESE and 
DOE-wide cooperation on such issues as material down-blending at Oak 
Ridge National Laboratory and material consolidation at other ESE 
sites. 

In order to ensure that DOE and ESE protective forces can meet the new 
terrorist threat contained in the 2004 DBT, we are making five 
recommendations to the Secretary of Energy to track and increase 
protective force officer participation in force-on-force training 
exercises, correct weaknesses with protective force officers' 
equipment, coordinate implementation of DOE's various efforts designed 
to meet the 2004 DBT, and create a more effective ESE security 
organization. 

We provided DOE with a copy of our report for review and comment. DOE 
concurred with the report, accepted our recommendations, and provided 
an update on actions it anticipated taking to address our 
recommendations. While we believe that most of DOE's anticipated 
actions will be responsive to our recommendations, we are concerned 
about DOE's response to our recommendation that it develop a 
departmentwide, multiyear implementation plan for meeting the 2004 DBT 
requirements. Specifically, in responding to this recommendation, DOE 
cited only individual efforts to address the development of an elite 
force, the deployment of enhanced security technologies, and the 
consolidation of special nuclear material, not the development of a 
comprehensive plan. While each of these efforts is important, we 
continue to believe that DOE cannot be successful in meeting the 
requirements of the 2004 DBT by its deadline of October 2008 without an 
integrated effort that is built around a comprehensive plan. 

Background: 

The Office of the Under Secretary for Energy, Science and Environment 
comprises nine program offices, including the Offices of Environmental 
Management; Nuclear Energy, Science and Technology; and Science and 
accounts for about 57 percent of DOE's fiscal year 2006 budget request 
(see fig. 1). 

Figure 1: DOE Fiscal Year 2006 Budget Request: 

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure] 

ESE has five sites that collectively have substantial quantities of 
Category I special nuclear material. (See table 1.) For fiscal year 
2006, DOE requested over $300 million for security at these five sites. 
This represents about 70% of the entire security budget request for 
ESE. (See table 2.) Contractors operate all of these sites. 

Table 1: DOE/ESE Category I Special Nuclear Material Sites: 

Responsible program office: Office of Environmental Management; 
Site: Savannah River Site; 
Location: Aiken, South Carolina. 

Responsible program office: Office of Environmental Management; 
Site: Hanford Site; 
Location: Richland, Washington. 

Responsible program office: Office of Nuclear Energy, Science and 
Technology; 
Site: Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory; 
Location: Idaho Falls, Idaho. 

Responsible program office: Office of Nuclear Energy, Science and 
Technology; 
Site: Argonne National Laboratory-West; 
Location: Idaho Falls, Idaho. 

Responsible program office: Office of Science; 
Site: Oak Ridge National Laboratory; 
Location: Oak Ridge, Tennessee. 

Source: GAO. 

Note: The two Idaho sites were consolidated as a single site, now known 
as the Idaho National Laboratory, in February 2005. In addition, 
federal oversight of the Idaho National Laboratory has been 
consolidated at DOE's Idaho Operations Office. Previously, DOE's 
Chicago Operations Office oversaw Argonne National Laboratory-West. 

[End of table]

Table 2: DOE/ESE Relevant Program Offices and Fiscal Year 2006 Funding 
Requests for Security: 

Dollars in millions. 

Office of Environmental Management; 
Total budget request: $6,505; 
Total security request: $287; 
Security as a percentage of total budget request: 4%. 

Office of Nuclear Energy, Science and Technology; 
Total budget request: $511; 
Total security request: $75; 
Security as a percentage of total budget request: 15%. 

Office of Science; 
Total budget request: $3,463; 
Total security request: $74; 
Security as a percentage of total budget request: 2%. 

Source: DOE. 

[End of table]

Within DOE's Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance, DOE's 
Office of Security develops and promulgates orders and policies to 
guide the department's safeguards and security programs. DOE's overall 
security policy is contained in DOE Order 470.1, Safeguards and 
Security Program, which was originally approved in 1995. The key 
component of DOE's approach to security is the DBT, a classified 
document that identifies the characteristics of the potential threats 
to DOE assets. A classified companion document, the Adversary 
Capabilities List, provides additional information on terrorist 
capabilities and equipment. The DBT has been traditionally based on a 
classified, multiagency intelligence community assessment of potential 
terrorist threats, known as the Postulated Threat. The threat from 
terrorist groups is generally the most demanding threat contained in 
the DBT. 

DOE counters the terrorist threat specified in the DBT with a 
multifaceted protective system. While specific measures vary from site 
to site, all protective systems at DOE's most sensitive sites employ a 
defense-in-depth concept that includes the following: 

* a variety of integrated alarms and sensors capable of detecting 
intruders;

* physical barriers, such as fences and antivehicle obstacles;

* numerous access control points, such as turnstiles, badge readers, 
vehicle inspection stations, radiation detectors, and metal detectors;

* operational security procedures, such as a "two person" rule that 
prevents only one person from having access to special nuclear 
material; and: 

* hardened facilities and vaults. 

Each site also has a heavily armed protective force that is often 
equipped with such items as automatic weapons, night vision equipment, 
body armor, and chemical protective gear. These protective forces 
comprise Security Police Officers that are classified into three 
groups: Security Police Officer-I, Security Police Officer-II, and 
Security Police Officer-III. Security Police Officer-Is are only 
assigned to fixed, armed posts. Generally, very few of these officers 
are used at ESE sites because of the limited roles they can fill. 
Security Police Officer-IIs generally are assigned to posts such as 
access control booths, or to foot or vehicle patrols. Finally, Security 
Police Officers-IIIs are responsible for operations such as hostage 
rescue and the recapture and recovery of special nuclear material. 
According to federal regulations, Security Police Officers-IIIs have 
more demanding physical fitness and training standards than Security 
Police Officers-Is or Security Police Officers-IIs. At the ESE sites we 
visited, protective forces work for private contractors and are 
unionized. The number of qualified Security Police Officers-IIs and 
Security Police Officers-IIIs at ESE sites is shown in table 3. 

Table 3: ESE Protective Force Deployment: 

DOE site: Savannah River Site; 
Security Police Officers (II and III): 551. 

DOE site: Hanford Site; 
Security Police Officers (II and III): 241. 

DOE site: Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory; 
Security Police Officers (II and III): 149. 

DOE site: Argonne National Laboratory-West; 
Security Police Officers (II and III): 48. 

DOE site: Oak Ridge National Laboratory; 
Security Police Officers (II and III): 51. 

Total; 
Security Police Officers (II and III): 1,040. 

Source: DOE. 

[End of table]

Protective force duties and requirements, such as physical fitness 
standards, are explained in detail in DOE Manual 473.2-2, Protective 
Force Program Manual, as well as in DOE regulations (10 C.F.R. pt. 
1046, Physical Protection of Security Interests). DOE issued the 
current Protective Force Program Manual in June 2000. Although 
protective forces are expected to comply with the duties and 
requirements established in DOE policies, deviations from these 
policies are allowed as long as certain approval and notification 
criteria are met. Following are the three types of deviations: 

* Variances: Variances are approved conditions that technically vary 
from DOE security requirements but afford equivalent levels of 
protection. 

* Waivers: Waivers are approved nonstandard conditions that deviate 
from DOE security requirements that, if uncompensated, would create a 
potential security vulnerability. As such, waivers require 
implementation of what DOE calls compensatory measures. Compensatory 
measures could include deploying additional protective forces or 
curtailing operations until the asset can be better protected. 

* Exceptions: Exceptions are approved deviations from DOE security 
requirements that create a safeguards and security vulnerability. 
Exceptions are approved only when correction of the condition is not 
feasible, and compensatory measures are inadequate. 

In addition to complying with these security requirements, DOE 
protective systems, including protective forces, also must meet 
performance standards. For example, DOE sites are required to 
demonstrate that their protective systems are capable of defending 
special nuclear material against terrorist forces identified in the 
DBT. The performance of protective systems is formally and regularly 
examined through vulnerability assessments. A vulnerability assessment 
is a systematic evaluation process in which qualitative and 
quantitative techniques are applied to detect vulnerabilities and 
arrive at effective protection of specific assets, such as special 
nuclear material. To conduct such assessments, DOE uses, among other 
things, subject matter experts, such as U.S. Special Forces; computer 
modeling to simulate attacks; and force-on-force exercises, in which 
the site's protective forces undergo simulated attacks by a group of 
mock terrorists. In addition to their use in evaluating the 
effectiveness of physical protection strategies, DOE believes force-on- 
force exercises are the most realistic representation of adversary 
attacks that can be used to train protective forces. 

Through a variety of complementary measures, DOE ensures that its 
contractors are complying with DOE's safeguards and security policies, 
including protective force duties and requirements, and that its 
systems are performing as intended. Contractors perform regular self- 
assessments and are encouraged to uncover any problems themselves. In 
addition to routine oversight, DOE orders require field offices to 
comprehensively survey contractors' operations for safeguards and 
security every year. DOE's Office of Independent Oversight and 
Performance Assurance provides yet another check through its 
comprehensive inspection program. This office performs comprehensive 
inspections roughly every 18 months at each DOE site that has specified 
quantities of Category I special nuclear material. All deficiencies 
(findings) identified during surveys and inspections require the 
contractors to take corrective action. 

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, DOE security 
policies have been under almost constant reexamination and have 
undergone considerable change. For example, the department's security 
polices have been undergoing a streamlining process for nearly 2 years. 
In addition, as we pointed out in our April 2004 report, DOE worked for 
almost 2 years to develop and issue a new DBT. When DOE issued its 
first post-September 11 DBT in May 2003, we recommended that DOE 
reexamine it because, among other things, it contained a terrorist 
threat that was less than the threat identified in the intelligence 
community's Postulated Threat. DOE agreed to reexamine the 2003 DBT and 
issued a revised and more demanding DBT in October 2004. The October 
2004 DBT significantly increased the terrorist threat to DOE facilities 
and required enhanced protection strategies for DOE facilities. Under 
the new DBT, sites with Category I special nuclear material will not 
have to be fully prepared to defend their sites against the terrorist 
threat contained in the new 2004 DBT until October 2008. By July 29, 
2005, DOE sites will have to forward 2004 DBT implementation plans to 
the Deputy Secretary of Energy and, within 3 months, begin submitting 
quarterly DBT implementation reports. At the time of our review, cost 
estimates were still preliminary, but security officials at ESE sites 
said that they may require collectively an additional $384-$584 million 
over the next several years in order for all ESE sites with Category I 
special nuclear material to meet the 2004 DBT. 

Protective Forces at ESE Sites Generally Meet Established DOE Readiness 
Requirements, but Some Weaknesses in Protective Force Practices Exist: 

We found that the majority of the 105 protective force members we 
interviewed at ESE sites generally believe that they currently are 
ready to perform their mission of protecting the site's special nuclear 
material. Consistent with that belief, the five ESE sites we visited 
had the required training programs, facilities, and equipment, and the 
105 protective force members whose records we reviewed were generally 
meeting the readiness requirements contained in the DOE orders and 
federal regulations. However, we did find some weaknesses at ESE sites 
that could adversely affect the ability of ESE protective forces to 
defend their sites. These include protective force officers' lack of 
regular participation in force-on-force exercises; the frequency and 
quality of training opportunities; the lack of dependable 
communications systems; and insufficient protective gear, including 
protective body armor and chemical protective gear, and the lack of 
armored vehicles. 

Protective Force Officers Are Confident in Their Current Overall 
Readiness: 

Readiness is defined by the Department of Defense (DOD) as the ability 
of forces to deploy quickly and to accomplish specific goals and 
missions. In particular, DOD believes that a ready force should possess 
a sufficient number of experienced, trained, and properly equipped 
personnel. Through realistic and comprehensive training, these 
personnel are forged into a cohesive unit that can perform its tasks 
even under extreme conditions. DOE orders and federal regulations 
establish the framework for ensuring that DOE protective forces are 
ready to perform their mission. 

ESE protective force officers generally believe that they are ready to 
perform their mission. Specifically, 102 of the 105 officers we 
interviewed stated that they believed that they, and their fellow 
officers, understood what was expected of them should the site be 
attacked by a terrorist group. Moreover, 65 of the 105 officers rated 
the readiness of their site's protective force as high, while 20 
officers rated their protective force as somewhat or moderately ready 
to defend the site. Only a minority of the officers (16 of 105) we 
interviewed rated the readiness of their force to defend their sites as 
low. Two officers were uncertain of their forces' readiness, and two 
did not respond to the question. 

In addition, the majority of officers we interviewed believed they and 
the protective force officers with whom they worked on a regular basis 
formed a cohesive unit that would be able to perform their most 
essential mission of protecting special nuclear material. Specifically, 
of the 105 officers we interviewed,

* 86 reported that they were satisfied with their jobs,

* 73 reported that their morale was high or at least moderately high,

* 91 reported that protective force officers had developed the 
necessary teamwork to defend the site against a terrorist attack,

* 84 officers responded that they had a high degree of confidence in 
their fellow officers in the event of a terrorist attack, and: 

* 88 reported that their fellow officers would be willing to risk their 
lives in defense of their site. 

ESE Protective Forces Generally Meet the DOE Training and Equipment 
Requirements We Reviewed: 

As called for in DOE's Protective Force Program Manual, readiness is 
achieved through appropriate training and equipment. Each of the five 
sites we visited had formally approved annual training plans. Each site 
generally had the training facilities, such as firearms ranges, 
classrooms, computer terminals, and exercise equipment, which enabled 
them to meet their current DOE and federal training requirements. 
Furthermore, each site maintained computerized databases for tracking 
individual protective force officers' compliance with training 
requirements. To determine if these programs and facilities were being 
used to implement the DOE requirements and federal regulations, we 
focused on three key areas--firearms proficiency, physical fitness, and 
protective force officer equipment. 

Firearms Proficiency: 

DOE's Protective Force Program Manual states that protective force 
officers must demonstrate their proficiency with the weapons that are 
assigned to them every 6 months. According to the training records of 
the 105 protective force officers we interviewed, 79 had met this 
proficiency requirement with their primary weapon, the M-4 or M-16 
semiautomatic rifle. Of the 26 officers who had not met this 
requirement within the 6 month time frame, 11 officers were all located 
at one site with 8 of the 11 officers not meeting the requirement until 
2 to 5 months after the required time. According to an official at this 
site, 7 of the 8 officers could not complete the requirement in a 
timely fashion because the site's firing range was closed for the 
investigation of an accidental weapon discharge that had resulted in an 
injury to a protective force officer. Although the DOE Protective Force 
Program Manual provides guidance that allows for off-site training to 
meet requirements, officials noted that a stand-down of all firearms 
training prevented training requirements from being met. We determined 
that 2 of the 26 officers did not complete the requirement for medical 
reasons. We were not given reasons why the remaining officers did not 
meet the requirement. 

Physical Fitness: 

Under DOE regulations,[Footnote 4] protective force personnel employed 
by DOE contractors who are authorized to carry firearms must meet a 
minimum standard for physical fitness every 12 months. There are two 
standards for such personnel--Offensive Combative and Defensive 
Combative. All Security Police Officer-IIIs, which include DOE special 
response team members, must meet the Offensive Combative standard which 
requires a 1-mile run in no more than 8 minutes 30 seconds and a 40- 
yard prone-to-running dash in no more than 8 seconds. All other 
protective officers authorized to carry firearms must meet the 
Defensive Combative standard, which requires a one-half mile run in no 
more than 4 minutes 40 seconds and a 40-yard prone-to-running dash in 
no more than 8.5 seconds. According to the training records of the 105 
protective force officers we reviewed, 103 of the 105 protective force 
officers had met the standard required by federal regulation for their 
position. Two officers who did not meet the requirement were on medical 
restriction. The records for another officer showed him as having met 
the requirement, but additional records provided by the site showed the 
officer had completed the run in a time that exceeded the standard. 
Site officials could not provide an explanation for this discrepancy. 

Protective Officer Equipment: 

DOE's Protective Force Program Manual sets a number of requirements for 
protective force equipment. Among these requirements are the following: 

* Minimum standard duty equipment. All Security Police Officers are 
required to carry a minimum set of equipment, including a portable 
radio, a handgun, and an intermediate force weapon such as a baton. In 
addition, a mask to protect against a chemical attack must be carried 
or available to them. All Security Police Officer-IIs and Security 
Police Officer-IIIs must also have access to personal protective body 
armor. 

* Firearms serviceability. Firearms must be kept serviceable at all 
times and must be inspected by a DOE-certified armorer at least twice a 
year to ensure serviceability. All DOE sites with armed protective 
force personnel are required to have the services of a certified 
armorer who is responsible for inspecting, maintaining, and repairing 
firearms. 

* Firearms inventories. Issued firearms must be inventoried at the 
beginning of each shift, and an inventory of all firearms in storage 
must be conducted weekly. A complete inventory of all firearms must be 
conducted on a monthly basis. 

* Appropriate equipment to counter the DBT. In line with DOE's 
performance standards, DOE protective forces equipment must be tailored 
to counter adversaries identified in the DBT. To this end, sites employ 
a variety of equipment including automatic weapons, night vision 
equipment, and body armor. 

In most cases, each site's protective forces carried or had access to 
the required minimum standard duty equipment. Most sites demonstrated 
that they had access to certified armorers, and each site maintained 
the required firearms maintenance, inspection, and inventory records, 
often kept in a detailed computerized database. We did not, however, 
conduct a detailed inspection of these records nor did we conduct an 
independent inventory of each site's firearms.[Footnote 5] The 
appropriate policies and procedures were also in place for the 
inventory of firearms. In addition, some sites have substantially 
increased their protective forces weaponry since September 11, 2001, or 
have plans to further enhance these capabilities to meet the 2004 DBT. 
For example, one site provided us with a list of upgrades since 
September 11, 2001, including new M-4 carbines, grenade launchers, 
Barrett .50 caliber rifles, armor piercing ammunition, chemical and 
biological protection suits, and decontamination kits, as well as 
additional units that use specially trained dogs (K-9 units) and 
portable X-ray machines to detect explosives. 

Some Weaknesses in ESE Site Protective Force Practices Exist: 

While protective forces at ESE sites are generally meeting current DOE 
requirements, we identified some weaknesses in ESE protective force 
practices that could adversely affect the current readiness of ESE 
protective forces to defend their sites. These include protective force 
officers' lack of regular participation in force-on-force exercises; 
the frequency and quality of training opportunities; the lack of 
dependable communications systems; and insufficient protective gear, 
including protective body armor and chemical protective gear, and the 
lack of armored vehicles. 

Performance Testing and Training: 

According to DOE's Protective Force Program Manual, performance tests 
are used to evaluate and verify the effectiveness of protective force 
programs and to provide needed training. Performance tests can also 
identify protective systems requiring improvements, validate 
implemented improvements, and motivate protective force personnel. A 
force-on-force exercise is one type of performance test during which 
the protective force engages in a simulated battle against a mock 
adversary force, employing the weapons, equipment, and methodologies 
postulated in the DBT. DOE believes that force-on-force exercises are a 
valuable training tool for protective force officers. Consequently, DOE 
policy requires that force-on-force exercises must be held at least 
once per year at sites that possess Category I quantities of special 
nuclear material or Category II quantities that can be rolled up to 
Category I quantities. 

We asked protective force members whether they had participated in 
force-on-force exercises during their service at their site and when 
they most recently had participated. Eighty-four of the 105 protective 
force officers we interviewed reported that they had participated in a 
force-on-force exercise, but 8 reported they had never participated 
during their service at the site, and 13 did not respond to this 
question. Of the 84 protective force officers that had participated,

* 60 reported participating within 12 months of the interview,

* 10 had participated within the last 2 to 5 years,

* one had participated 13 years ago,

* one could not remember the last force-on-force he had participated 
in, and: 

* 12 did not respond to the question. 

We were unable to verify whether protective force officers' 
recollections were accurate because DOE sites are not required to track 
individual participation in force-on-force exercises. However, DOE's 
Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance 2004 review of 
protective forces found that the average protective force officer is 
only likely to participate in a force-on-force exercise once every 4 to 
6 years. DOE's Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance has 
concluded that this frequency is not adequate for the training of 
protective forces. 

DOE's 2004 protective force review also found that the frequency, 
quality, and rigor of performance tests and training exercises vary 
widely throughout the complex. Our interviews of protective force 
officers and protective force managers produced a similar result. For 
example, we asked protective force members whether they believed the 
force-on-force exercises they participated in were realistic and 
challenging. Only 23 of the 84 protective force officers that had 
participated in these exercises believed they were realistic while 23 
stated they were somewhat realistic. In contrast, 38 officers believed 
that the force-on-force exercises they had participated in were not 
realistic. Twenty officers did not respond to the question. In 
addition, 33 of the 84 protective force officers reported that safety 
considerations interfered with the realism of the force-on-force 
exercises with some protective force officers stating that they were 
limited in the tactics they could employ. For example, some protective 
force officers stated that they were not allowed to run up stairwells, 
climb fences, or exceed the speed limit in patrol vehicles. Some 
protective force officers at one site reported that for safety reasons 
they were no longer allowed to deploy on the roof of a facility 
although this position provided a significant advantage over 
adversaries approaching the facility. Some contractor protective force 
managers agreed that safety requirements limited the kind of realistic 
force-on-force training and other forms of realistic training that are 
needed to ensure effective protective force performance. 

More broadly, most of the 105 protective force officers reported some 
negative attitudes about the training they had received. Specifically, 
85 of the 105 protective force officers we interviewed identified a 
number of deficiencies with their training, especially regarding the 
frequency and quality of firearms and tactical training. The following 
deficiencies were identified: 

* 43 protective force officers reported that there was a lack of 
adequate firearms training, with 13 officers noting that the only 
training they had was when they went to satisfy the semiannual DOE 
qualification requirements. Some officers also reported that they did 
not have first priority at firing ranges because other local or federal 
law enforcement agencies were using them. 

* 42 protective force members, including 16 officers who are members of 
special response teams, reported that tactical training opportunities-
-where protective force officers move, shoot, and communicate as a 
unit--at their respective sites were very limited. A review of the 
standard DOE training curricula for Security Police Officer-IIs showed 
that these officers currently receive very little tactical training. 

Communications Equipment: 

According to DOE's Protective Force Program Manual, protective force 
officers must have the capability to communicate information among 
themselves. The radios these officers use must be capable of two-way 
communications, provide intelligible voice communications, and be 
readily available in sufficient numbers to equip protective force 
personnel. In addition, a sufficient number of batteries must be 
available and maintained in a charged condition to support routine, 
emergency, and response operations. 

Protective force officers at all five of the sites we visited reported 
problems with their radio communications systems. Specifically, 66 of 
the 105 protective force officers reported that they did not always 
have dependable radio communications, with 23 officers identifying 
sporadic battery life, and 29 officers reporting poor reception at some 
locations on site as the two most significant problems. In addition, 
some of the protective force officers believed that radio 
communications were not sufficient to support their operations and 
could not be relied on to transfer information between officers if a 
terrorist attack occurred. Site security officials at two sites 
acknowledged that efforts were under way to improve radio 
communications equipment. In addition, some security officials said 
other forms of communications, such as telephones, cellular telephones, 
and pagers, were provided for protective forces to ensure that they 
could communicate effectively. 

Protective Body Armor: 

DOE's Protective Force Program Manual requires that Security Police 
Officer-IIs and -IIIs wear body armor or that body armor be stationed 
in a way that allows them to quickly put it on to respond to an attack 
without negatively impacting response times. At one site, we found that 
most Security Police Officer-IIs had not been issued protective body 
armor because the site had requested and received in July 2003 a waiver 
to deviate from the requirement to equip all Security Police Officer- 
IIs with body armor. The waiver was sought for a number of reasons, 
including the (1) increased potential for heat-related injuries while 
wearing body armor during warm weather, (2) increased equipment load 
that armor would place on protective force members, (3) costs of 
acquiring the necessary quantity of body armor and the subsequent 
replacement costs, and (4) associated risks of not providing all 
Security Police Officer-IIs with body armor could be mitigated by using 
cover provided at the site by natural and man-made barriers. According 
to a site security official, this waiver is currently being reviewed 
because of the increased threat contained in the 2004 DBT. 

Special Response Team Capabilities: 

Security Police Officer-IIIs serve on special response teams 
responsible for offensive operations, such as hostage rescue and the 
recapture and recovery of special nuclear material. Special response 
teams are often assigned unique equipment, including specially 
encrypted radios; body armor that provides increased levels of 
protection; special suits that enable officers to operate and fight in 
chemically contaminated environments; special vehicles, including 
armored vehicles; submachine guns; light machine guns; grenade 
launchers; and precision rifles, such as Remington 700 rifles and 
Barrett .50 caliber rifles. These response teams are also issued 
breaching tools to allow them to reenter facilities to which terrorists 
may have gained access. 

Each site with Category I special nuclear material must have a special 
response team capability available on a continuous basis. However, one 
ESE site does not have this capability and, instead, relies on another 
organization, through a formal memorandum of understanding, to provide 
a special response team. This arrangement, however, has not been 
comprehensively performance tested, as called for in the memorandum of 
understanding. Site officials state that they will soon conduct the 
first comprehensive performance test of this memorandum of 
understanding. 

Chemical Protective Gear: 

DOE's Protective Force Program Manual specifies that all Security 
Police Officer-II and -IIIs be provided, at a minimum, with protective 
masks that provide for nuclear, chemical, and biological protection. 
Other additional chemical protective gear and procedures are delegated 
to the sites. At the four sites with special response teams, we found 
that the teams all had special suits that allowed them to operate and 
fight in environments that might be chemically contaminated. For 
Security Police Officer-IIs, chemical protective equipment and 
expectations for fighting in chemically contaminated environments 
varied. For example, two sites provided additional protective equipment 
for their Security Police Officer-IIs and expected them to fight in 
such environments. Another site did not provide additional equipment, 
but expected its Security Police Officer-IIs to evacuate along with 
other site workers. Finally, the one site that did not have a special 
response team expected its Security Police Officer-IIs to fight in 
chemically contaminated environments. However, the site provided no 
additional protective gear for its officers other than standard-duty 
issue long-sleeved shirts and the required protective masks. 

Protective Force Vehicles: 

DOE's Protective Force Program Manual requires that protective force 
vehicles exhibit a degree of reliability commensurate with their 
intended functions and enhance the efficiency, speed, and safety of 
routine and emergency duties under all expected weather conditions. 
Vehicles must be maintained in serviceable condition, with preventive 
maintenance performed at intervals that meet or exceed the manufacturer 
recommendations. 

Nearly half (14 of 30) of the protective force officers we interviewed 
at two sites reported that patrol vehicles were old, in poor physical 
condition, and not suitable for pursuit and recovery missions. Some 
reported maintenance as a significant problem, with one officer 
observing that more vehicles were in the shop than on patrol. Some 
protective force officers also reported that door handles on patrol 
vehicles did not work, which made it difficult for them to enter and 
exit the vehicles. A site security official told us that they had never 
had problems with the physical condition or maintenance of patrol 
vehicles, but did note that they had experienced difficulties in 
acquiring new vehicles. 

We also found that ESE sites currently do not have the same level of 
vehicle protection as NNSA sites that also have Category I special 
nuclear material. Specifically, while not a DOE requirement, all NNSA 
sites with Category I special nuclear material currently operate 
armored vehicles. However, only one of the five ESE sites with Category 
I special nuclear material operated armored vehicles at the time of our 
review. One other ESE site was planning to purchase armored vehicles. 

DOE and ESE Officials Need to Take Several Prompt and Coordinated 
Actions to Address the New DBT Requirements by 2008: 

To successfully defend against the much larger terrorist threat 
contained in the 2004 DBT by October 2008, DOE and ESE officials 
recognize that they need to take several prompt and coordinated 
actions. These include the transformation of current protective forces 
into an "elite force," the development and deployment of new security 
technologies, the consolidation and elimination of special nuclear 
material, and organizational improvements within ESE's security 
program. However, because these initiatives, particularly an elite 
force, are in early stages of development and will require significant 
commitment of resources and coordination across DOE and ESE, their 
completion by the October 2008 DBT implementation deadline is 
uncertain. 

DOE Proposes Creating an "Elite Force" to Protect Its Sites in the New 
Threat Environment: 

DOE officials believe that the way its sites, including those sites 
managed by ESE, currently train their contractor-operated protective 
forces will not be adequate to defeat the terrorist threat contained in 
the 2004 DBT. This view is shared by most protective force officers (74 
out of 105) and their contractor protective force managers who report 
that they are not at all confident in their current ability to defeat 
the new threats contained in the 2004 DBT. In response, DOE has 
proposed the development of an "elite force" that would be patterned 
after the U. S. military's Special Forces. However, creating this elite 
force is a complex undertaking and will be a challenge to fully realize 
by the October 2008 implementation deadline. 

Even before the issuance of the 2004 DBT, DOE had become concerned 
about protective force preparedness because of intense demands placed 
on protective forces following the September 11, 2001, terrorist 
attacks. The need to increase security at DOE sites as rapidly as 
possible following the 2001 attacks meant that DOE protective forces 
worked extensive overtime. DOE's Inspector General, DOE's Office of 
Security and Safety Performance Assurance, and GAO reported on the 
potential for large amounts of protective force overtime to increase 
fatigue, reduce readiness, and reduce training opportunities for 
protective forces.[Footnote 6]

In recognition of this situation, in September 2003, the Secretary of 
Energy directed DOE's Office of Performance Assurance and Independent 
Assessment, now a part of the Office Security and Safety Performance 
Assurance, to conduct a special review to determine the effectiveness 
of the management of protective forces and protective force 
capabilities. This classified review, which was issued in June 2004 and 
covered five NNSA sites and one ESE site, found that the current 
organization and tactics of DOE protective forces need improvement to 
deal with possible terrorist threats. Historically, DOE protective 
forces had been more concerned with a broad range of industrial 
security and order-keeping functions than with preparation to conduct a 
defensive battle against a paramilitary attacker, as is described in 
the 2004 DBT. The June 2004 review recommended a shift to an aggressive 
military-like, small-unit, tactical defense posture, which included 
enhanced tactical training standards to allow protective forces to 
move, shoot, and communicate effectively as a unit in a combat 
environment. The review also recommended more frequent, realistic, and 
rigorous force-on-force performance testing and training for the 
department's protective forces. 

Based on this review, the Secretary of Energy proposed transforming 
DOE's protective force that safeguards special nuclear material into an 
"elite force" with training and capabilities similar to the military's 
Special Forces units. Subsequently, in June 2004, the Deputy Secretary 
of Energy directed the formation of a Protective Forces Working Group 
to formally review missions, standards, and current protective force 
status as the basis for developing recommendations on policy, training, 
and equipment that, if enacted, could serve as the basis for creating 
an elite force. This working group consisted of representatives from 
DOE's Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance, NNSA, and 
ESE's Office of Environmental Management. In August 2004, the working 
group recommended a set of near-term actions that could be used to 
elevate protective force capabilities. These included instituting more 
demanding medical and physical fitness standards, increasing tactical 
training, and reorganizing protective forces into tactically cohesive 
units. In October 2004, the working group also recommended considering 
federalizing DOE protective forces as a long-term option. In January 
2005, the Deputy Secretary of Energy endorsed the report's findings and 
directed that implementation actions begin. 

Most protective force officers we interviewed generally support some of 
the ideas embodied in the elite force concept. Specifically, most 
protective force officers (74 out of 105) at the ESE sites we visited 
reported that they are not at all confident in their current ability to 
defeat the new threats contained in the 2004 DBT. In particular, some 
protective force officers believed that they would be outgunned and 
overwhelmed by the terrorist force identified in the 2004 DBT. In 
addition, some feared they could be surprised by a large terrorist 
force because of the sites' security strategy and the physical layout 
of their sites. Some sites are already responding to the elite force 
concept by increasing tactical training, and others plan to institute 
"training relief shifts," which will increase the amount of time 
protective force officers have available for uninterrupted training. 
Some sites also have ambitious plans for constructing new facilities to 
enable increased tactical training. 

Nevertheless, despite broad support and some sites' progress, DOE's 
proposal for an elite force remains largely in the conceptual phase. 
DOE has developed a preliminary draft implementation plan that lays out 
high-level milestones and key activities, but this plan has not been 
formally approved by the Office of Security and Safety Performance 
Assurance. The draft implementation plan recognizes that DOE will have 
to undertake and complete a number of complex tasks in order to develop 
the elite force envisioned. For example, DOE will have to revise its 
existing protective forces policies to incorporate, among other things, 
the increased training standards that are needed to create an elite 
force. This may be a time-consuming effort. 

As we reported in April 2004, the DOE policy process emphasizes 
developing consensus through a laborious review and comment process by 
program offices. We found that this policy process contributed to the 
nearly 2 years it took the department to develop DOE's first post- 
September 11, 2001, DBT. Likewise, DOE has been working on a 
streamlined overall security policy for nearly 2 years. Once this 
streamlined policy is formally issued, now scheduled for summer 2005, 
DOE's draft implementation plans for an elite force call for the new 
policy to immediately undergo revision to incorporate elements of the 
elite force concept. DOE's Office of Security has not yet identified a 
time frame for completing these actions. In addition, DOE officials 
believe that broader DOE policies will have to be revised. For example, 
DOE security officials, as well as contractor protective force 
managers, see some DOE health and safety policies and practices as an 
impediment because they do not allow the kind of realistic and 
physically demanding training that is required for an elite force. 
According to these officials, revising these policies will require 
broad, high-level support within DOE. Furthermore, some DOE protective 
force requirements, such as medical, physical fitness, and training 
standards are mandated by DOE regulations. Changing these regulations, 
according to a DOE security official, would require DOE to follow rule- 
making procedures. All these protective force policies and regulations, 
as well as broader DOE policies are contained in collective bargaining 
agreements between protective force unions and protective force 
contractors and in protective force contracts, which also will need to 
be modified to create the kind of elite force that DOE believes is 
necessary to defeat the 2004 DBT. 

Some site security officials recognize that they will have to carefully 
craft transition plans for currently employed protective force officers 
who may not be able to meet the new standards required for an elite 
force. Some of these officials have expressed concern about the ability 
of some protective force officers to meet more rigorous physical and 
training standards that are likely to be part of an elite force. DOE 
field security officials and contractor protective force managers 
likewise have expressed concern about finding ways for less capable 
protective force officers to move into different roles or retire from 
service with a sense of dignity. Because all the protective forces at 
the five ESE sites we visited operated, at the time, under separate 
contracts and separate collective bargaining agreements, there is no 
uniform benefit or retirement plan for protective forces, and these 
benefits, according to one contractor security official, differ 
considerably among sites. Some contractor protective force managers 
recognized that they needed such mechanisms as early retirement 
incentives and more attractive retirement packages to make the 
effective transition to an elite force. They believed, however, that 
they would not be able to provide these mechanisms, most of which are 
quite expensive, without DOE's help. Officials from the one protective 
force contractor, which had a placement and income protection program 
for protective force officers who could no longer meet existing DOE 
requirements, said that payouts from the program have far exceeded 
contributions and that the program will have to be restructured in the 
near future. 

Given these complexities, DOE security officials recently told us that 
implementing all the measures associated with the elite force concept 
will take about 5 years to complete. With this time line, the 
development of the elite force will be under way by the new DBT's 
implementation deadline of October 2008, but the full benefit of an 
elite force, according to DOE's own preliminary plans, will not be 
realized until fiscal year 2010. 

DOE Believes Security Technologies Can Improve the Effectiveness of 
Protective Forces: 

DOE is seeking to improve the effectiveness and survivability of its 
protective forces through the development and deployment of new 
security technologies. The department believes technologies can reduce 
the risk to protective forces in case of an attack and provide 
additional response time to meet and defeat an attack. Many of the ESE 
sites we visited currently possess some advanced security technology. 
For example, all sites operate central alarm stations that often 
integrate hundreds of alarms and dozens of sensors, such as video 
cameras and infrared and microwave detection systems, as well as 
redundant communications systems. Some sites also have thermal imaging 
sensors, which can detect adversaries at long ranges and in all types 
of weather. Some of these sensors have data links that allow the 
information to be rapidly shared. One site deploys classified devices 
that can immobilize or delay the movement of an adversary. 

DOE officials believe that additional technology can further enhance 
site security. The Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance 
is assisting sites in identifying and deploying existing technologies 
to enhance protection systems, principally through the following 
programs: 

* Technology and Systems Development Program. DOE has funded this 
program for many years, although funding has been reduced in recent 
years. Specifically, DOE provided over $20 million for this program in 
fiscal year 2004. However, DOE only requested $14.5 million for this 
program in fiscal year 2006-about 1 percent of the entire DOE security 
program budget. Moreover, the program has had only limited success in 
developing technologies that can actually be deployed. The Director of 
DOE's Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance recently 
stated that DOE has not yet taken the formal steps necessary to 
coordinate investment in emerging security technologies to ensure they 
are deployed at DOE sites in a timely manner. 

* Site Assistance Visit Program. Immediately after the issuance of the 
2004 DBT, DOE's Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance 
embarked on site assistance visits--a targeted effort to encourage the 
use of technologies that could offset the more costly manpower- 
intensive approaches needed to meet the more demanding requirements of 
the DBT. These site assistance visits focus on new and emerging 
security technologies. Each site visit lasts approximately 2 weeks and 
consists of exercises and simulations designed to evaluate each site's 
preliminary plans for meeting the new DBT and to demonstrate how 
technologies can assist in countering the 2004 DBT in a cost-effective 
manner. DOE conducted these visits between October 2004 and April 2005. 
Four of the five ESE sites we examined have received these visits. 
DOE's Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance completed the 
final report on the results of the site assistance visits in May 2005. 
DOE plans to use the results of these visits to help justify its fiscal 
year 2007 budget. 

Even before the site assistance visits, ESE sites were actively 
considering advanced security technologies. For example, at least two 
ESE sites are considering installing automatic weapons that can be 
operated from remote, secure locations--known as remotely operated 
weapons systems within DOE. A few ESE protective forces also supported 
this push toward technology, especially technology that allows more 
timely detection of adversaries. Specifically, 16 of the 105 protective 
force officers we interviewed said they needed enhanced detection 
technologies that would allow adversaries to be detected and engaged at 
much greater ranges than is currently possible at most sites. 

ESE's Strategy for Meeting the New DBT Relies Heavily on the 
Consolidation of Special Nuclear Materials: 

ESE's current strategy for meeting the October 2008 deadline for 
compliance with the 2004 DBT relies heavily on the consolidation and 
elimination of special nuclear materials between and among other ESE 
sites. At all five of the ESE sites with Category I special nuclear 
material, material consolidation and elimination are important goals 
for the site and the responsible DOE program office and are 
inextricably tied to security plans. However, neither ESE nor DOE has 
developed a comprehensive, departmentwide plan to achieve the needed 
cooperation and agreement among the sites and program offices to 
consolidate special nuclear material, as we recommended in our April 
2004 report. In the absence of such a comprehensive, coordinated plan, 
completing some of these significant activities by the October 2008 DBT 
implementation deadline is unlikely. In particular: 

* Savannah River Site. Currently, special nuclear material is stored in 
three separate, widely dispersed areas at the Savannah River Site--an 
Office of Environmental Management (EM) site. In November 2004, EM 
directed the site to consolidate all its current and future storage of 
Category I special nuclear material into a single area by fiscal year 
2007. This consolidation will free up over 100 protective force 
officers who currently guard facilities at the sites' two other areas. 
It will also allow for a substantially increased protective force 
presence at the single remaining area and could save the site over $100 
million in expected costs to implement measures to defend the site 
against the 2004 DBT. 

* Hanford Site. Hanford, another EM site, had plans to transfer most of 
its special nuclear material to the Savannah River Site by the end of 
fiscal year 2006. However, a number of factors threaten to delay this 
transfer of material. These factors include (1) NNSA's Office of Secure 
Transportation's shipping and load restrictions on transporting special 
nuclear material across the United States, (2) the Savannah River 
Site's inability to store some of Hanford's special nuclear material in 
its present configuration, and (3) the Savannah River Site's current 
lack of facilities to permanently dispose of Hanford's special nuclear 
material. Faced with these challenges, EM decided in February 2005 to 
postpone shipping material from Hanford until these issues could be 
resolved. Hanford had begun planning for such a contingency, but the 
site will now have to expend additional funds of about $85 million 
annually to protect these materials against the 2004 DBT. 

* Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory and Argonne 
National Laboratory-West.[Footnote 7] Managed by the Office of Nuclear 
Energy, Science and Technology, the Idaho National Engineering and 
Environmental Laboratory had removed--by NNSA's Office of Secure 
Transportation--its currently known Category I special nuclear material 
from its single Category I storage facility in May 2005. Removal will 
allow a substantial number of its protective forces to transfer to the 
nearby Argonne National Laboratory-West site, which has a continuing 
Category I special nuclear material mission. These additional 
protective forces will be critical to helping the site meet the 2004 
DBT. However, a recent DOE site assistance visit suggested that several 
other facilities at the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental 
Laboratory may have some previously unrecognized Category I special 
nuclear material. Site security officials report that they are trying 
to resolve these issues with DOE's Office of Security and Safety 
Performance Assurance. If any of these other Idaho National Engineering 
and Environmental Laboratory facilities do have Category I special 
nuclear material, they will require additional protection, which could 
severely damage the current DBT implementation plans for both Idaho 
sites. In addition, because of its remote location, the robust design 
of some of its facilities, its large protective force, and extensive 
training facilities, the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental 
Laboratory is now being evaluated as a potential future consolidation 
location for NNSA Category I special nuclear material. 

* Oak Ridge National Laboratory. Oak Ridge National Laboratory, an 
Office of Science Site, plans to eliminate its Category I special 
material. Current plans call for down-blending this material in place 
to less attractive forms and for extracting medically useful isotopes 
that may help treat certain forms of cancer. The Office of Nuclear 
Energy, Science and Technology is responsible for this down-blending 
program. However, the costs for this program have risen steeply, even 
without the additional security costs of the meeting the 2004 DBT. In 
addition, the Office of Nuclear Energy, Science and Technology and the 
Office of Science have not formally agreed on which program office will 
bear the brunt of the estimated $53 million annual security costs 
required to meet the implementation deadline for the 2004 DBT. If these 
issues can be resolved, down-blending operations are scheduled to begin 
in fiscal year 2009 and to be completed in fiscal year 2012. If down- 
blending operations do not take place, Oak Ridge National Laboratory 
will face high additional security costs--approaching an additional $43 
million each year, according to preliminary site estimates--as long as 
the material remains on-site. 

ESE's Headquarters Security Organization Is Not Well Suited to Meet the 
Challenges of the 2004 DBT: 

ESE's current organization is not well suited to meeting the challenges 
associated with implementing the 2004 DBT. First, ESE lacks a formally 
appointed senior security advisor or a centralized security 
organization. In contrast, NNSA has such a position. Specifically, 
Title 32 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2000, which created NNSA, established the position of Chief, Defense 
Nuclear Security, to serve as the primary security advisor to the NNSA 
Administrator. The Chief is responsible for the development and 
implementation of NNSA security programs, including the physical 
security for all NNSA facilities. Over the past several years, ESE has 
recognized the need for such a position and has sought to fill the 
security advisor role through the use of employees temporarily detailed 
from other organizations. For example, beginning in 2004, a detailee 
from the Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance has served 
as the Acting Director for ESE Security. The current acting director 
was preceded by a visiting White House Fellow. However, the position of 
the Director for ESE Security has no programmatic authority or staff. 
This lack of authority limits the director's ability to help facilitate 
ESE and DOE-wide cooperation on such issues as material down-blending 
at Oak Ridge National Laboratory and material consolidation at other 
ESE sites. 

Second, ESE does not have a consolidated headquarters security office. 
In April 2005, the recently confirmed ESE Under Secretary stated that 
ESE was composed of "institutional 'stovepipes'" and that this 
structure has hampered strategic management within ESE. ESE has 
explored creating a consolidated headquarters security office, but each 
of the three program offices we examined continues to maintain its own 
headquarters security offices. These offices, however, are organized 
and staffed differently. For example, the Office of Environmental 
Management's headquarters security office has more than 17 professional 
security personnel on staff. In contrast, the headquarters offices of 
Science and of Nuclear Energy, Science and Technology each have only 
one and two security professionals on staff, respectively. For the 
Office of Nuclear Energy, Science and Technology this situation is 
problematic because its security responsibilities are increasing with 
the consolidation of two of its sites into the Idaho National 
Laboratory and with the Oak Ridge National Laboratory's down-blending 
program. Indeed, safeguards and security funding is a much larger 
percentage of the Office of Nuclear Energy, Science and Technology's 
total budget--$75 million out of a total fiscal year 2006 budget 
request of $511 million, about 15 percent--than it is for either the 
Office of Science or the Office of Environmental Management. As a 
result, according to the EM Security Director and Acting Director, ESE 
security, the Environmental Management security office provides 
informal support to the other ESE programs offices, including the 
Offices of Nuclear Energy, Science and Technology and Science. 

Conclusions: 

Successfully defending against the increased terrorist threat contained 
in the 2004 DBT will require a significant coordinated effort by DOE, 
ESE, and the ESE sites that contain Category I special nuclear 
material. While ESE sites are not required to meet the requirements of 
the 2004 DBT until October 2008, we believe that ESE needs to take 
action to correct weaknesses with its current training and equipment 
practices. Addressing these issues will put ESE protective forces in a 
better position to defend their sites, in the short run, while DOE and 
ESE press ahead on the broader initiatives, such as the elite force 
concept and materials consolidation that they believe will be necessary 
to meet the requirements of the 2004 DBT. While we support DOE's and 
ESE's broader initiatives, we believe that these initiatives cannot be 
successfully implemented without a more strategic approach. Such an 
approach will need to include a comprehensive plan for all of the 
initiatives DOE and ESE are considering and will need to be supported 
by a sound ESE management structure that has sufficient authority to 
ensure coordination across all ESE program offices that have Category I 
special nuclear material. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

In order to ensure that DOE and ESE protective forces can meet the new 
terrorist threat contained in the 2004 DBT, we are making the following 
five recommendations to the Secretary of Energy: 

* Develop a requirement for individual protective force officer 
participation in force-on-force exercises. 

* Require that sites track protective force member participation in 
force-on-force exercises. 

* Take immediate action to correct weaknesses in protective force 
equipment at ESE sites by providing the following where needed: 

* dependable radio communications,

* body armor,

* chemical protective gear,

* special response team capabilities, and: 

* vehicles that provide enhanced protection for protective forces. 

* Develop and implement a departmentwide, multiyear, fully resourced 
implementation plan for meeting the new 2004 DBT requirements that 
includes detailed plans for: 

* the creation of an elite force through the revision of existing DOE 
protective force policies and practices,

* the development and deployment of enhanced security technologies, 
and: 

* the transportation and consolidation of special nuclear materials. 

* Require the Under Secretary, ESE, to establish a security 
organization to oversee the development, implementation, and 
coordination of ESE, and broader DOE efforts, to meet the 2004 DBT. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

We provided DOE with a copy of this report for review and comment. DOE 
stated that it concurred with the report and accepted our 
recommendations. In that context, DOE provided an update on the actions 
it anticipated would address our recommendations. While we believe that 
most of DOE's anticipated actions will be responsive to our 
recommendations, we are concerned about DOE's response to our 
recommendation that it develop a departmentwide, multiyear, fully 
resourced implementation plan for meeting the 2004 DBT requirements. 
Specifically, in responding to this recommendation, DOE cited only 
individual efforts to address the development of an elite force, the 
deployment of enhanced security technologies, and the consolidation of 
special nuclear material, not the development of a comprehensive plan. 
While each of these efforts is important, as we demonstrated in our 
report, the success of these efforts requires close coordination across 
numerous DOE, ESE, as well as NNSA organizations. We continue to 
believe that DOE cannot be successful in meeting the requirements of 
the 2004 DBT by its deadline of October 2008 without an integrated 
effort that is built around a comprehensive plan. DOE also provided 
three additional technical changes that we have incorporated. DOE's 
letter commenting on our draft report is presented in appendix II. 

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents 
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days 
from the report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report 
to the Secretary of Energy, the Director of the Office of Management 
and Budget, and appropriate congressional committees. We also will make 
copies of this report available to others upon request. In addition, 
the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at 
[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report or need 
additional information, please contact me at (202) 512-3841 or 
[Hyperlink, aloisee@gao.gov]. Contact points for our Offices of 
Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last 
page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this 
report are listed in appendix III. 

Signed by: 

Gene Aloise: 
Director, Natural Resources and Environment: 

[End of section]

Appendixes: 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

To obtain an overall perspective on how protective forces are prepared 
to defend Department of Energy (DOE) sites, we reviewed relevant 
literature focusing on Special Nuclear Materials, DOE's protective 
forces, and reports by DOE's Inspector General, as well as previous GAO 
reports. We conducted multiple rounds of interviews with DOE 
headquarters officials and conducted document reviews. We also met with 
DOE and protective force officials at five sites under the oversight of 
DOE's Office of the Under Secretary for Energy, Science and 
Environment: Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Idaho National Engineering 
and Environmental Laboratory, Argonne National Laboratory-West, the 
Savannah River Site, and the Hanford Site. 

To determine the extent to which protective forces at Office of the 
Under Secretary for Energy, Science and Environment sites are meeting 
DOE's existing readiness requirements, we reviewed DOE policies to 
determine current requirements. We also reviewed pertinent literature 
about the factors that affect the readiness of military forces. We 
conducted structured interviews with 105 ESE protective force officers 
at the five ESE sites. We took several steps to ensure that we selected 
protective force officers independently and interviewed protective 
force officers with varying levels of experience. We interviewed a 
nonprobability sample of protective force officers from all five ESE 
sites.[Footnote 8] Even though we are not generalizing to the 
population as a whole, at each site we randomly selected the protective 
force officers to interview. Random selection protects against 
selection bias and helps assure that the officers we interviewed were 
independent of site management. Specifically, we obtained a complete 
roster of all protective force officers at each site, which included 
the name, position, area assignment, and length of service for each 
protective force officer and identified the dates and potential time 
slots for the interviews during our site visits. We submitted modified 
rosters to the security contractor with the potential interview time 
slots, and the contractor resubmitted this roster with the availability 
of each protective force officer. We then stratified protective force 
officers by position, rank, and length of service and assigned them 
random numbers from a random number table. We also assigned random 
numbers, in sequence from the random number table, to protective force 
officers at each site, eliminating random numbers to ensure that no 
random number was ever used twice. The random numbers assigned to 
protective force officers were placed in chronological order and 
officers were selected based on the lowest random number assigned, 
their availability during the prescribed time slots, position, area 
assignment, and length of service. Lastly, we informed the security 
contractor at each site of those protective force officers we wished to 
interview prior to our site visit. The structured interviews were 
administered by two-person teams to Security Police Officer-IIs and 
Security Police Officer-IIIs. We asked the officers questions designed 
to determine their readiness to defend the sites, including questions 
about their morale, training, and equipment. We also reviewed the 
training records and physical fitness qualifications of the 105 
officers to determine if key elements of their training complied with 
existing DOE training requirements. In particular, we reviewed selected 
firearms and physical fitness qualifications to determine if these 
officers complied with existing DOE requirements and federal 
regulations. 

Finally, we reviewed the equipment ESE protective forces use to 
determine if it met current DOE requirements. For example, we reviewed 
the minimum standard duty equipment that was employed at each site. We 
also checked to ensure that most sites' armorers were certified as 
required by DOE and, for most sites, we inspected armories, inspection 
records, as well as firearms inventory procedures. Finally, we reviewed 
the types of equipment that some sites are evaluating and/or planning 
to purchase. 

To determine what actions DOE and ESE will need to take to successfully 
defend against the new threat identified in the 2004 DBT by DOE's 
implementation deadline of October 2008, we reviewed the 2004 DBT and 
associated guidance documents. We discussed the 2004 DBT with officials 
in DOE's Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance and with 
officials in ESE's Offices of Environmental Management; Nuclear Energy, 
Science and Technology; and Science. Where available, we reviewed 
documents prepared by ESE and contractor officials on how they plan to 
comply with the 2004 DBT. We discussed DOE's initiative to transform 
its current protective force into an elite force with DOE's Office of 
Security and Safety Performance Assurance and security officials at all 
five of the ESE sites with Category I special nuclear material. We also 
discussed site assistance visits and their concentration on security 
technology with DOE security officials. Furthermore, we reviewed recent 
DOE congressional testimony on the role of security technology and 
reviewed the relevant portion of the fiscal year 2006 DOE budget 
submission. In addition, we discussed plans for special nuclear 
material consolidation with ESE program security officials and site 
security officials. Finally, we discussed ESE's security organization 
with DOE's Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance, ESE's 
Acting Security Director, and ESE program security offices. We also 
reviewed congressional testimony given by the Under Secretary of Energy 
at his recent confirmation hearing. 

[End of section]

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Energy: 

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY: 
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY: 

Washington, DC 20585: 

July 1, 2005: 

Mr. Gene Aloise: 
Director, National Resources and Environment: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC: 

Dear Mr. Aloise: 

This is in response to your correspondence of June 21, 2005 requesting 
Department of Energy (DOE) comments on the Government Accountability 
Office's (GAO's) draft report GAO-05-611 titled "DOE's Office of 
Energy, Science and Environment Needs to Take Prompt Coordinated Action 
to Meet the New Design Basis Threat."

The Department appreciates the results of GAO's efforts with regard to 
this review and concurs in and accepts each of the recommendations as 
provided. 

We would also like to take this opportunity to provide a brief update 
on DOE's current and anticipated actions which, we believe, will 
address the recommendations set forth in the report. 

GAO Recommendation: Develop a requirement for individual protective 
force officer participation in force-on-force exercises. 

DOE Resuonse: DOE's Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance 
(SSA) is in the process of revising several elements of DOE's 
protective force policy. 

SSA advises that these revisions will include specific requirements and 
standards for individual officer participation in force-on-force 
exercises. SSA expects these revisions to be entered into the DOE 
Directives System for Departmental review in December 2005. 

GAO Recommendation: Require that sites track protective force member 
participation in force-on-force exercises. 

DOE Response: The Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance 
(SSA) advises that, as appropriate sections of DOE policy are revised 
to establish individual training and exercise participation standards, 
requirements for appropriate recording, tracking and review of 
individual officer participation will, likewise, be included. These 
revisions will also be targeted for a December 2005 submission into the 
DOE Directives System. 

GAO Recommendation: Take immediate action to correct weaknesses in 
protective force equipment at ESE sites by providing where needed: 

* dependable radio communications 
* body armor: 

* chemical protective spray: 

* special response team capabilities, and: 

* vehicles that provide enhanced protection for protective forces. 

DOE Response: ESE will survey each site and ensure that protective 
force equipment is compliant with current DOE policy in each case. 

GAO Recommendation: Develop and implement a department-wide, multi- 
year, fully resourced implementation plan for meeting the new DBT 
requirements: 

DOE Response: Site implementation plans setting forth how each site 
plans to implement the requirements of the October 2004 Design Basis 
Threat are scheduled to be submitted by the end of July 2005. 

GAO Recommendation: The implementation plan should include: 

* The creation of an elite force through the revision of existing DOE 
protective force policies and practices. 

DOE Response: The Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance 
has advised that policy revisions regarding this initiative are 
scheduled to be completed for final Departmental approval no later than 
the end of December 2005. 

* The development and deployment of enhanced security technologies. 

DOE Response: To facilitate the Department's efforts to develop and 
deploy enhanced security technologies, the Office of Security and 
Safety Performance Assurance (SSA) conducted a series of Site 
Assistance Visits (SAVs) at key field sites to explore and recommend 
the use of new security technologies that could off-set more costly 
manpower-intensive approaches to meet the current DBT requirements. In 
addition, SSA has established a Center of Excellence for Technology 
Deployment to further ensure that new and recently developed 
technologies are rapidly deployed to help improve the effectiveness and 
efficiency of the Department's protection program. 

* The transportation and consolidation of special nuclear materials. 

DOE Response: In February 2005, the Secretary established the Nuclear 
Materials Disposition and Consolidation Coordinating Committee (NMDCC) 
which is chartered to identify opportunities for materials disposition 
and consolidation. Chaired by the: 

Secretary's National Security Advisor, the NMDCCC is charged with 
considering all aspects of material consolidation to include impacts on 
operations, transportation assets and realistic schedules. 

GAO Recommendation: Require the Under Secretary, ESE, to establish a 
security organization to oversee the development, implementation, and 
coordination of ESE, and broader efforts, to meet the 2004 DBT. 

DOE Response: The Under Security of Energy for Energy, Science, and 
Environment recently established the position of Director of Security 
for ESE. This position is responsible for overall management, 
oversight, and coordination of ESE security programs. 

We would also like to take this opportunity to point out three areas of 
the report which we believe should be revised for greater accuracy: 

1. Page 7 under "Consolidation and Elimination of Materials " the 
report states that neither the Office of Nuclear Energy, Science and 
Technology (NE) nor the Office of Science (SC) "has been able to agree 
on its share of security costs (at ORNL) which have increased 
significantly because of the new DBT."

DOE believes that it is clearly understood by both programs that SC is 
responsible for basic security needs at Oak Ridge National Laboratory 
and that NE is expected to fund any additional security requirements 
associated with the proposed down-blending project. 

2. Page 12, paragraph 1, - "DOE believes force-on-force exercises are 
the most realistic representation of adversary attacks that can be used 
to evaluate the effectiveness of physical protection strategies and 
train protective forces."

With regard to training, DOE does believe that force-on-force training 
is the most realistic experience we can provide to protective force 
members and to tactical leaders to prepare them to meet an actual 
attack. However, with regard to evaluating the effectiveness of 
physical protection strategies, DOE employs a combination of force-on- 
force performance tests together with computer simulations, other 
performance testing and expert judgment to determine overall 
effectiveness. 

3. Page 32, under "Idaho National Engineering and Environmental 
Laboratory and Argonne National Laboratory - West" - GAO may wish to 
reflect that these two sites were officially combined in February 2005 
to form the Idaho National Laboratory (still under the management 
oversight of NE) and that the material cited to be removed by June 2005 
was actually removed in May 2005. 

Once again, thank you for the opportunity to comment on the draft 
report. Should you have any questions or need further clarification, 
please do not hesitate to contact me at 202-586-7700. 

Sincerely,

Signed by: 

Robert J. Walsh: 
Director of Security for Energy, Science and Environment: 

[End of section]

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Gene Aloise (202) 512-3841: 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the individual named above, Don Cowan, Joyce Evans, 
Doreen Feldman, Jonathan Gill, Preston Heard, James Noel, Joe Oliver, 
and Carol Hernstadt Shulman made key contributions to this report. 

(360431): 

FOOTNOTES

[1] See GAO, Nuclear Security: DOE Needs to Resolve Significant Issues 
Before It Fully Meets the New Design Basis Threat, GAO-04-623 
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 27, 2004). 

[2] See GAO, Nuclear Security: NNSA Needs to Better Manage Its 
Safeguards and Security Program, GAO-03-471 (Washington, D.C.: May 30, 
2003) and GAO-04-623. 

[3] For example, DOE's Office of Security and Safety Performance 
Assurance examined five NNSA sites and only a single ESE site in a 
recent review. See Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance, 
Department of Energy Protective Force Management and Capabilities (U) 
(Washington, D.C.: June 28, 2004). 

[4] 10 C.F.R. pt. 1046, subpt. B, app. A. 

[5] Recent firearms inventories by the DOE-Inspector General have 
uncovered some problems with DOE and NNSA firearms inventories. For 
examples, see the following DOE-Inspector General Reports: Inspection 
Report: Inspection of Selected Office of Security and Emergency 
Operations Firearms Inventories, DOE/IG-0517, August 2001; Inspection 
Report: Inspection of Firearms Internal Controls at Los Alamos National 
Laboratory, DOE/IG-0587, February 2003; Inspection Report: Firearms 
Internal Controls at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, DOE/IG-
0621, September 2003. 

[6] Audit Report: Management of the Department's Protective Forces, 
DOE/IG-0602, Department of Energy Office of Inspector General, June 
2003; Department of Energy Protective Force Management and Capabilities 
(U), Office of Security and Safety Performance Assurance, (Washington, 
D.C.: June 28, 2004); GAO-04-623. 

[7] The two Idaho sites were consolidated as a single site, now known 
as the Idaho National Laboratory, in February 2005. 

[8] Results from a nonprobability sample cannot be used to make 
inferences about a population because in such a sample some elements of 
the population being studied have no chance or an unknown chance of 
being selected as part of the sample.