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Report to the Chairman, Committee on Government Reform, and Chairman, 
Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International 
Relations, House of Representatives:

United States Government Accountability Office:

GAO:

November 2004:

Reserve Forces:

Actions Needed to Better Prepare the National Guard for Future Overseas 
and Domestic Missions:

GAO-05-21:

GAO Highlights:

Highlights of GAO-05-21, a report to the Chairman, Committee on 
Government Reform, and Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security, 
Emerging Threats and International Relations, House of Representatives: 

Why GAO Did This Study:

The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and the global war on 
terrorism have triggered the largest activation of National Guard 
forces since World War II. As of June 2004, over one-half of the 
National Guard’s 457,000 personnel had been activated for overseas 
warfighting or domestic homeland security missions in federal and state 
active duty roles. In addition to increased usage, the Guard has also 
experienced long deployments and high demand for personnel with 
specific skills, such as military police. The high pace of operations 
and the Guard’s expanded role since September 11 have raised concerns 
about whether the Guard is capable of successfully performing its 
multiple missions within existing and expected resource levels, 
especially given the challenges it faces in meeting future 
requirements. 

GAO was asked to assess the extent to which the Guard is: 
(1) adapting to meet warfighting requirements in the post-September 11 
security environment and (2) supporting immediate and emerging homeland 
security needs.

What GAO Found:

The Army and the Air National Guard have begun adapting their forces to 
meet new warfighting requirements since the September 11 attacks, but 
some measures taken to meet short-term requirements have degraded the 
readiness of nondeployed units, particularly in the Army National 
Guard. To deploy ready units for overseas missions, the Army National 
Guard has had to transfer equipment and personnel from nondeploying 
units. Between September 11, 2001, and July 2004, the Army National 
Guard had performed over 74,000 personnel transfers. Similarly, as of 
May 2004, the Army National Guard had transferred over 35,000 equipment 
items to prepare deploying units, leaving nondeployed Army National 
Guard units short one-third of the critical equipment they need for 
war. The Army has developed plans, such as the Army Campaign Plan, to 
restructure its forces to better prepare them for future missions. 
However, it has not finalized detailed plans identifying equipment 
needs and costs for restructuring Guard units. Moreover, the Army is 
still structured and funded according to a resourcing plan that does 
not provide Guard units all the personnel and equipment they need to 
deploy in wartime, so the Army National Guard will be challenged to 
continue to provide ready units for operations expected in the next 3 
to 5 years. The Air National Guard is also adapting to meet new 
warfighting requirements, but it has not been as negatively affected as 
the Army National Guard because it has not been required to sustain the 
same high level of operations. In addition, the Air National Guard 
generally maintains fully manned and equipped units.

While the Army and the Air National Guard have, thus far, also 
supported the nation’s homeland security needs, the Guard’s 
preparedness to perform homeland security missions that may be needed 
in the future is unknown because requirements and readiness standards 
and measures have not been defined. Without this information, policy 
makers are not in the best position to manage the risks to the nation’s 
homeland security by targeting investments to the highest priority 
needs and ensuring that the investments are having the desired effect. 
Since September 11, the Guard has been performing several unanticipated 
homeland missions, such as flying patrols over U.S. cities and guarding 
critical infrastructure. However, states have concerns about the 
preparedness and availability of Guard forces for domestic needs and 
natural disasters while overseas deployments continue at a high pace. 
The Department of Defense (DOD) plans to publish a comprehensive 
strategy for homeland security missions that DOD will lead. However, 
DOD has not reached agreement with multiple federal and state 
authorities on the Guard’s role in such missions. Also, the National 
Guard Bureau has proposed initiatives to strengthen the Guard’s 
homeland security capabilities. However, many of these initiatives are 
at an early stage and will require coordination and approval from other 
stakeholders, such as DOD and the states. In the absence of clear 
homeland security requirements, the Guard’s preparedness to perform 
missions at home cannot be measured to determine whether it needs 
additional assets or training.

What GAO Recommends:

GAO is recommending that the Secretary of Defense submit a plan to 
Congress on how DOD will improve the Army National Guard’s structure 
and readiness for overseas operations and to clearly define the 
National Guard’s role in homeland security. DOD generally agreed with 
the recommendations. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-21.

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
the link above. For more information, contact Janet St. Laurent at 
(202) 512-4402 or stlaurentj@gao.gov.

[End of section]

Contents:

Letter:

Results in Brief:

Background:

National Guard Has Been Adapting to Meet Current Warfighting 
Requirements, but Readiness Challenges Remain for Future Operations:

National Guard Has Supported Homeland Security Needs, but Its Readiness 
for Future Homeland Missions Is Not Measured:

Conclusions:

Recommendations for Executive Action:

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:

Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:

Figures:

Figure 1: Post-September 11 National Guard Federal Activity 
under Title 10:

Figure 2: Percent of Army National Guard Soldiers Alerted, Mobilized, 
or Deployed for Federal Missions as of June 2, 2004:

Figure 3: Percent of Air National Guard Soldiers Mobilized or Deployed 
for Federal Missions as of May 31, 2004:

Abbreviations:

DOD: Department of Defense:

SINCGARS: Single Channel Ground Air Radio System:

United States Government Accountability Office:

Washington, DC 20548:

November 10, 2004:

The Honorable Tom Davis:
Chairman: 
The Honorable Christopher Shays: 
Chairman: 
Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International 
Relations: 
House of Representatives:

The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and subsequent launch of the 
global war on terrorism have resulted in the largest activation of 
National Guard forces--both Army and Air--since World War II. Within 1 
month of the September 11 attacks, the number of Army National Guard 
members activated for federal missions more than quadrupled, from about 
5,500 to about 23,000. By June 2004, over 50 percent of the National 
Guard's nearly 350,000 Army and 107,000 Air National Guard members had 
been activated for overseas warfighting operations in Afghanistan and 
Iraq, peacekeeping operations in Bosnia and Kosovo, or homeland 
missions, such as guarding active Air Force bases. These operations 
have resulted in a high demand for Guard members overall and especially 
for those trained with certain skills, such as security personnel and 
tanker pilots. As a result, National Guard personnel have experienced 
lengthy and repeated deployments since the September 11 terrorist 
attacks.

The National Guard holds a unique dual status in that it performs 
federal missions under the command of the President and state missions 
under the command of the state's governor. After September 11, the 
Guard's duties were expanded to include supporting new homeland 
missions,[Footnote 1] such as flying combat air patrols over U.S. 
cities, securing borders, providing radar coverage for the continental 
United States, and protecting civilian airports, Air Force bases, and 
other critical infrastructure. Governors also activated the Guard to 
perform additional missions, such as guarding bridges and nuclear power 
plants. Guard involvement in state missions almost tripled in the year 
after the attacks, and it has remained well above pre-September 11 
levels. The Guard spent about 236,000 days performing state missions in 
fiscal year 2001, and that number increased to about 645,000 days in 
fiscal year 2002. State mission involvement subsequently declined to 
almost 433,000 days in fiscal year 2003, more than twice the level 
before September 11.[Footnote 2] This high pace of operations has 
raised concerns about the National Guard's ability to perform 
warfighting and homeland missions successfully within its existing 
resources and the challenges it faces in meeting these requirements in 
the future.

The objectives of this report are to assess the extent to which the 
National Guard is (1) adapting to meet current and future overseas 
warfighting requirements in the post-September 11 security 
environment and (2) supporting immediate and emerging homeland 
security needs.[Footnote 3] We testified before the Committee on 
Government Reform on April 29, 2004, and provided observations on high 
Guard usage and the challenges the Guard faces in adapting to the 
demands of the new security environment.[Footnote 4] This report 
updates information contained in our testimony and concludes our work 
in response to your request.

To assess the objectives, we analyzed data on National Guard 
utilization and readiness prior to and after September 11, 2001. We 
interviewed officials in the Departments of Defense (DOD), Army, and 
Air Force and the National Guard Bureau and supplemented this 
information with visits to Army and Air Force commands and Army 
mobilization stations. We also developed case studies of recent federal 
and state National Guard operations in four states--Georgia, New 
Jersey, Oregon, and Texas. We selected these states because they 
represent a mix of geographic areas, Army and Air National Guard units 
with different specialties, and units that had been or were expected to 
be activated for federal and/or state missions. In each of these 
states, we visited the Adjutant General and National Guard 
headquarters, as well as Army and Air National Guard units that had 
been or will be involved in overseas or domestic missions. We also 
reviewed documents on planned changes to the Army Guard's force 
structure, such as the Army Campaign Plan and the Army Transformation 
Roadmap. We conducted our review in accordance with generally accepted 
government auditing standards between April 2003 and September 2004 and 
determined that the data used were sufficiently reliable for our 
objectives. The scope and methodology used in our review are described 
in further detail in appendix I.

Results in Brief:

The Army and the Air National Guard have been adapting their forces to 
meet new warfighting requirements since the September 11 terrorist 
attacks, but some measures taken to meet immediate needs have made 
providing forces for future operations more challenging for the Army 
National Guard. Unlike the Air National Guard, the Army National Guard 
is still organized according to a post-cold war military planning 
strategy that provides it only a portion of the resources needed to 
perform warfighting missions, with the assumption that its units will 
have sufficient time to obtain the additional personnel and equipment 
before deploying. However, recent operations have required that Army 
National Guard units be fully manned and equipped to deploy, sometimes 
within short time frames. To meet warfighting needs, DOD has retrained 
some Army National Guard soldiers and units to perform key functions 
and changed the missions of some units, issuing them new equipment for 
their new activities.[Footnote 5] For example, to respond to a 
continuing demand for military police, the Army has changed some field 
artillery units to security forces and retrained over 7,000 soldiers to 
perform new duties. In addition, because the Army National Guard units 
do not have all of the resources they need for warfighting missions, 
the Army National Guard has had to transfer personnel and equipment 
from nondeploying units to prepare deploying units. As of July 2004, 
the Army National Guard had performed over 74,000 personnel transfers, 
shifting soldiers from one unit to another, to meet warfighting needs. 
Similarly, as of May 2004, it had transferred over 35,000 pieces of 
equipment to deploying units. While the Army National Guard has 
provided ready units thus far, the cumulative effect of these personnel 
and equipment transfers is that the readiness of nondeployed forces has 
declined, challenging the Army to continue to provide ready Guard 
forces for future missions. The Army has taken steps to begin to 
restructure its active, Guard, and Reserve forces into more versatile 
units to improve its ability to respond to the dynamic security 
environment, but it is still in the process of developing plans for 
restructuring Army National Guard forces. Under preliminary plans, 
Guard restructuring would not be completed until 2010. In addition, 
current plans do not address how the Guard's equipment will be 
modernized to make it compatible with active Army equipment or provide 
detailed time frames and costs for converting all Guard equipment. 
Until plans on how the Guard will fit into overall Army reorganization 
plans are finalized and shared with Congress, it is uncertain how they 
will transform the Guard for a new operational role. Further, the Army 
has not reevaluated its resourcing policy for the Army National Guard 
to mitigate the effects of increased usage on its nondeployed forces, 
and current Army funding plans call for continuing to maintain 
nondeployed Army National Guard forces with only a portion of the 
personnel and equipment required for warfighting operations. Like the 
Army National Guard, the Air National Guard has also had to adjust to 
the demands of recent operations and has provided forces to support 
current military operations by extending tours of duty. Although its 
readiness has declined as a result of the high use of personnel and 
equipment, the Air National Guard has not been as negatively affected 
as the Army National Guard because it has not been required to sustain 
the same high level of activations and is funded to maintain more fully 
manned and equipped units.

While the Army and the Air National Guard have supported the nation's 
homeland security needs by providing personnel and equipment for 
unanticipated missions, the Guard's preparedness to perform the 
homeland defense and civil support missions that may be needed in the 
future is unknown because (1) its role in these missions is not defined 
and requirements have not been established and (2) preparedness 
standards and measures have not been developed. Since September 11, the 
Army National Guard has provided security for borders, airports, and 
other key assets, while the Air National Guard has taken on missions 
such as flying air patrols over U.S. cities. The Army and the Air 
National Guard have conducted these missions largely using existing 
forces and equipment that were provided for warfighting missions. 
However, state officials have expressed concern about the Guard's 
preparedness to undertake state missions, including supporting homeland 
security missions, given the increase in overseas deployments and the 
shortages of personnel and equipment among the remaining Guard units. 
Moreover, some homeland security missions could require training and 
equipment, such as decontamination training and equipment, that differ 
from that provided to support warfighting missions. Because DOD, 
specifically the U.S. Northern Command and the Office of Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense,[Footnote 6] has not clearly 
defined what the Guard's role will be or analyzed what personnel, 
training, and equipment may be required to support homeland missions in 
conjunction with the Department of Homeland Security, it is difficult 
to measure the Guard's preparedness for potential missions. DOD and 
Congress have taken some actions to strengthen the Guard's homeland 
capabilities, such as establishing Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil 
Support Teams,[Footnote 7] to support civil authorities in identifying 
whether chemical and biological events have occurred and the type of 
agent used. Moreover, the National Guard Bureau is implementing pilot 
programs to strengthen other capabilities to respond to weapons of mass 
destruction events and improve critical infrastructure protection. 
However, these pilot programs are in the early stages of implementation 
and were developed by the Guard to respond to pressing needs. They are 
not based on a comprehensive analysis of the full spectrum of the 
Guard's role and requirements for homeland security missions. Without 
such a comprehensive analysis, DOD and congressional policy makers may 
not be in the best position to assess whether additional investments 
are needed, and Guard personnel may lack the type of training and 
equipment that would facilitate an effective and timely response to 
future homeland security threats.

We are recommending that the Secretary of Defense develop and submit a 
strategy to Congress for improving the Army National Guard's structure 
and readiness and clearly define the Guard's role in homeland defense 
and providing support to civilian authorities. DOD generally agreed 
with our recommendations and cited several actions it is taking to 
develop a strategy that addresses the Army National Guard's future 
roles and requirements.

Background:

The National Guard of the United States, which performs both federal 
and state missions, represents about 52 percent of the armed services' 
selected reserve[Footnote 8] and consists of approximately 457,000 
members: about 350,000 in the Army National Guard and about 107,000 in 
the Air National Guard. Overall, the Army National Guard makes up more 
than one-half of the Army's ground combat forces and one-third of its 
support forces (e.g., military police or transportation units) and has 
units in more than 3,000 armories and bases in all 50 states and 4 U.S. 
territories. Air National Guard personnel make up 20 percent of the 
total Air Force, with 88 flying units and 579 mission support units at 
more than 170 installations throughout the United States. The majority 
of Guard members are employed on a part-time basis, typically training 
1 weekend per month and 2 weeks per year. The Guard also employs some 
full-time personnel who assist unit commanders in administrative, 
training, and maintenance tasks. The National Guard Bureau is the 
federal entity responsible for the administration of the National 
Guard.

National Guard personnel may be ordered to perform duty under three 
different authorities: Title 10 or Title 32 of the United State Code or 
pursuant to state law in a state active duty status. Personnel in a 
Title 10 status are federally funded and under federal command and 
control. Personnel may enter Title 10 status by being ordered to active 
duty in their status as federal Reserves, either voluntarily or under 
appropriate circumstances involuntarily (i.e., mobilization). 
Personnel in Title 32 status are federally funded but under state 
control. Title 32 is the status in which National Guard personnel 
typically perform training for their federal mission. Personnel 
performing state active duty are state-funded and under state command 
and control. Under state law, the governor may order National Guard 
soldiers to perform state active duty to respond to emergencies, 
disasters, civil disturbances, and for other reasons authorized by 
state law.

National Guard Federal Missions:

The Guard is organized, trained, and equipped for its federal missions, 
which take priority over state missions. As we reported in our April 
2004 testimony, the National Guard's involvement in federal operations 
has increased substantially since the September 11 terrorist attacks. 
Three days after the attacks, the President, under Title 10, authorized 
reservists to be activated for up to 2 years.[Footnote 9] This 
authority was subsequently used to activate reservists for overseas 
warfighting and stabilization missions in Operations Iraqi Freedom and 
Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan as well as for domestic missions, such 
as flying patrols and supporting federal civilian agencies in guarding 
the nation's borders. As figure 1 illustrates, as of May 2004, about 
102,800 Army and Air National Guard members--the vast majority of whom 
were Army National Guard members--were on active duty. Although both 
Army and Air National Guard activations increased in the aftermath of 
September 11, the Air National Guard activations had declined to pre-
September 11 levels by October 2003, while Army National Guard 
activations continued to rise.

Figure 1: Post-September 11 National Guard Federal Activity 
under Title 10:

[See PDF for image]

[A] Army National Guard data represent the number of soldiers 
mobilized. Air National Guard data represent the number of Air National 
Guard personnel who are mobilized, including those who volunteered for 
duty.

[B] Because Army National Guard data for January 2003 were not 
available, chart data point was estimated based on trend.

[End of figure]

When activated under Title 10, the National Guard is subject to the 
Posse Comitatus Act,[Footnote 10] which prohibits the military from law 
enforcement activities unless expressly authorized by the Constitution 
or law.

The Army and the Air Force have different strategies for structuring 
and providing resources for their Guard components that reflect each 
service's planned use and available resources. While the Army National 
Guard's structure requires 375,000 personnel to be fully manned, in 
fiscal year 2004, the Army National Guard was authorized 350,000 
soldiers resulting in many units being manned below wartime 
requirements. Using DOD planning guidance, Army National Guard units 
are provided varying levels of resources according to the priority 
assigned to their warfighting missions. Because much of the Army 
National Guard was expected to be used as a follow-on force in the 
event of an extended conflict, many of its units were structured with 
fewer personnel and lesser amounts of equipment than they would need to 
deploy, with the assumption that there would be time to supply 
additional personnel, equipment, and training before these units would 
be needed. For example, Army National Guard divisions, which include 
over 117,000 soldiers and provide the majority of the combat capability 
in the Army National Guard, are supplied with 65 to 74 percent of their 
required personnel and 65 to 79 percent of their required equipment, 
and are less ready for their missions. This approach to managing 
limited resources is referred to as "tiered readiness." In contrast, 
the Air National Guard was integrated into the Air Force's operational 
force and maintained at readiness levels comparable to its active 
component counterparts. This approach enables the Air National Guard to 
be ready to deploy on short notice.

National Guard State Missions:

Since September 11, Guard members have also been activated for missions 
under the authority of state governors in both Title 32 and state 
active duty statuses. Title 32 status is generally used to train 
National Guard units and personnel to perform their federal mission. 
National Guard personnel also may perform operational (nontraining) 
missions in Title 32 status when authorized by federal statute. 
[Footnote 11] According to DOD, after September 11, the Guard performed 
other operational (nontraining) duties such as providing airport 
security in Title 32 status in response to presidential direction. 
National Guard personnel in Title 32 status have also provided support 
for events such as the G-8 Summit and the Democratic and Republican 
National Conventions. Also, National Guard personnel have served in a 
state active duty status in response to natural disasters.

Additionally, the National Guard performs state missions under the 
command and control of the governor, with costs for these missions 
borne by the state. Guard missions typically performed in this status 
include providing assistance in response to natural disasters such as 
fires and storms that have not been declared federal disasters. 
Since September 11, governors have increasingly used this authority to 
activate Guard members to protect key assets in the states.

National Guard Has Been Adapting to Meet Current Warfighting 
Requirements, but Readiness Challenges Remain for Future Operations:

Both at home and overseas, the Army and the Air National Guard have 
been adapting in several ways to meet the demands of current 
warfighting requirements, but some of the measures taken may challenge 
the Army National Guard's efforts to provide ready forces for future 
operations. While the Army National Guard has met new warfighting 
requirements by retraining some units to acquire in-demand skills, 
tailoring others to provide particular capabilities, changing unit 
missions in some cases, and transferring personnel and equipment to 
meet combatant commander needs, these adaptations have reduced the 
readiness[Footnote 12] of its nondeployed units, in turn challenging 
the Army National Guard to prepare for future operations. The Army 
recognizes the need to restructure its active, Reserve, and Guard 
forces to respond more effectively to the new global security 
environment and is in the process of developing plans to make its 
forces more modular. However, its plans for restructuring Army National 
Guard forces are not finalized and do not provide detailed information 
on time frames for restructuring all the Guard's units, whether the 
Guard's equipment will be compatible with that of active units, or the 
costs of implementing these plans. The Air National Guard has also 
adapted to meet new warfighting requirements, but its readiness has not 
been as negatively affected because it has not experienced continued 
high usage as the Army National Guard has and because its units are 
more fully equipped and manned for war.

Army National Guard Adaptation to Warfighting Requirements Reduced 
Readiness of Nondeployed Units:

The Army National Guard has been adapting to the demands of current 
warfighting requirements but faces future challenges in providing ready 
forces for future operations. The recent increased and expanded use of 
the National Guard illustrates the shift from the post-cold war 
military planning strategy, in which much of the Guard represented a 
force to follow the active military in the event of extended conflict, 
to an operational force similar to the Air National Guard. Using this 
strategy, the Army has generally maintained most Army National Guard 
units at lower readiness levels under the assumption that additional 
personnel and equipment would be provided prior to deployment. While 
the Army National Guard's adaptations since September 11 were intended 
to make deploying units more useful for current operations, these 
adaptations have caused the overall readiness of nondeployed Guard 
units to decline, which may hamper the Guard's ability to meet the 
requirements of future warfighting operations overseas, particularly in 
Iraq.

Army Has Retrained Some Guard Units and Made Other Adjustments:

To meet the high demand for Army National Guard personnel for recent 
operations, the Army has alerted or mobilized over one-half of the Army 
National Guard's personnel since September 11. In June 2004, Army 
National Guard activations peaked with almost 81,000 Army National 
Guard members--more than one-quarter of the Army National Guard's 
force--activated for overseas military operations such as in 
Afghanistan and Iraq. Personnel with certain skills have been in 
particularly high demand. For example, as of June 2004, 95 percent of 
military police units had deployed, with 23 percent having deployed 
more than once, and at least 50 percent of units with specialties such 
as transportation, aviation, medical, and special operations had been 
activated.

To alleviate the stress on these forces, the Army has retrained 
personnel in units with less needed skills, such as field artillery, to 
provide skills in higher demand. For example, the Army recently changed 
the mission of 27 artillery units and retrained over 7,000 personnel to 
meet the need for additional military police and security forces. Some 
of these soldiers have already deployed to Iraq to perform missions 
such as convoy security.

The Army has also adapted Guard units to meet the specific requirements 
of current overseas missions by tailoring units for particular 
purposes. In some cases, the Army took personnel with key capabilities 
from existing units and created new, smaller units whose personnel had 
skills specifically tailored to provide the capabilities required by 
the combatant commander. For example, the Army extracted 55 soldiers 
with military police skills from an armored battalion of about 600 
soldiers to perform a security mission at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. More 
than 35,000 Army National Guard soldiers--almost one-fifth of all 
soldiers utilized--deployed in these newly created, tailored units to 
support recent military operations. Over one-half of these tailored 
units (about 57 percent) were small, containing 10 or fewer soldiers. 
In addition to extracting key capabilities, tailored units have also 
been used to address personnel shortages in deploying units.

The Army has also changed the mission, organization, and tactics of 
some deploying units, issuing them new or different equipment and 
adding personnel to meet combatant commander requirements. For example, 
the 30th Infantry (Mechanized), an enhanced separate brigade[Footnote 
13] that deployed to Iraq in the spring of 2004, was directed to deploy 
as a motorized brigade combat team with humvees instead of with all of 
its assigned heavy-tracked equipment such as Bradley fighting vehicles 
and tanks. To accomplish this change, the unit required an infusion of 
personnel because "light" units require more personnel than "heavy" 
units. In addition, the unit underwent additional training on operating 
and maintaining the newly issued equipment. This unit was operating in 
Iraq in its new, lighter configuration at the time of this report.

Personnel Transfers into Deploying Units Have Degraded Personnel 
Readiness for Future Operations:

To ready deploying units, the Army National Guard had to transfer 
personnel from nondeploying units, but in doing so, it has degraded 
their readiness. This, in turn, challenges the Guard's efforts to 
provide ready forces for future operations. To be ready to deploy, 
units need to have a sufficient number of soldiers who are qualified to 
deploy. According to the tiered-readiness policy, many National Guard 
units do not have all the qualified soldiers they need to be ready for 
their missions. However, in recent operations, the Army's deployment 
goal for Guard combat units has been to be fully manned and for unit 
personnel to be fully qualified for their positions. To meet the 
requirements for units fully manned with qualified personnel, the Guard 
transferred qualified soldiers from nondeployed units. By July 2004, 
the National Guard had initiated over 74,000 personnel transfers to 
meet the combatant commander's needs.

There are a number of reasons that Army National Guard units may not 
have all of the personnel they need to deploy for their warfighting 
missions. First, the Army National Guard is not funded to fully man all 
its units to deployment standards. Second, some soldiers assigned to a 
unit may not have completed required training.[Footnote 14] As of May 
2004, over 71,000 Army National Guard soldiers were not fully trained 
for their positions. Finally, soldiers may be unable to deploy overseas 
for personal reasons, such as medical or dental problems, family 
issues, or legal difficulties. As of June 2004, there were over 9,000 
soldiers in the Army National Guard who were identified as 
nondeployable. When two of the Army National Guard's enhanced separate 
brigades, some of its most ready units, were activated for rotation to 
Iraq in 2003, only 74 percent of their required personnel were 
qualified for their assigned positions and deployable, leaving a 
shortfall of over 2,100 soldiers that had to be filled from other 
units.

To minimize transfers of qualified soldiers from other units, the Army 
Guard ordered 700 untrained soldiers between April and June 2004 to 
report for training so they could become fully qualified in their 
positions before their units were activated for overseas operations. 
However, the Guard has not been able to address all of its shortfalls 
in this manner. For example, the Army National Guard is preparing a 
combat division headquarters and a number of its support units for 
deployment to Iraq in 2005. When the 42nd Infantry Division was 
alerted,[Footnote 15] it lacked 783 qualified personnel--about 
18 percent of the total personnel required--to meet deployment 
requirements. As of June 2004, the National Guard was only able to fill 
415 of these positions through transfers of personnel from other units, 
leaving 368 positions unfilled. Army National Guard officials expect 
that the active Army will have to find personnel to address these 
shortfalls. According to National Guard officials, additional soldiers 
with medical, dental, legal, or family issues may be identified as 
nondeployable after they are mobilized, so the number of personnel 
needed may rise.

As overseas operations continue, it is becoming increasingly 
challenging for the Army National Guard to ready units because the 
number of soldiers who have not been deployed and are available for 
future deployments has decreased and the practice of transferring 
qualified personnel to deploying units has degraded readiness of 
nondeployed units. Our analysis of the decline in Army National Guard 
readiness between September 2001 and April 2004 showed that the most 
frequently cited reasons for the decline in personnel readiness of 
nondeployed units were that personnel were already deployed or not 
available for deployment. Of the almost 162,000 soldiers who are 
available for future deployments, almost 36,000 are in nondeployable 
units that provide maintenance, medical, and legal support to the Army 
National Guard. Approximately 9,000 additional soldiers have medical or 
other conditions that prevent deployment, and about 28,000 soldiers 
will need required training before they will be available for 
deployment. This leaves approximately 89,000 soldiers who are currently 
available to deploy for overseas operations. Because DOD expects the 
high pace of operations to continue for the next 3 to 5 years and 
estimates that operations will require 100,000 to 150,000 National 
Guard and reserve personnel each year, the Army National Guard will 
likely have to alert and mobilize personnel who have been previously 
deployed.

Equipment Transfers to Deploying Units Have Degraded Equipment 
Readiness for Future Operations:

Because the combatant commander has required Army National Guard units 
to have modern, capable, and compatible equipment for recent 
operations, the Army National Guard adapted its units and transferred 
equipment to deploying units from nondeploying units. However, this 
adaptation has made equipping units for future operations more 
challenging. The Army equips units according to when it expects them to 
be needed in combat; thus, the "first to fight" units are given the 
priority for modern equipment. Based on post-cold war plans, it was 
assumed that most Army National Guard units would follow active units 
and that there would be sufficient time to provide them with the 
equipment they need for their missions before they deployed. However, 
when National Guard units were alerted for recent operations, they 
generally did not have sufficient amounts of equipment or equipment 
that was modern enough to be compatible with active units and to meet 
combatant commander requirements.

For recent operations, the Army National Guard has had to fill the 
shortages of equipment among deploying units by transferring equipment 
from nondeploying units. National Guard data showed that in order to 
ready units deploying to support operations in Iraq between September 
2002 and May 2004, the National Guard transferred over 18,000 night 
vision goggles, 1,700 chemical monitors, 900 wheeled vehicles, 700 
radios, and 500 machine guns, among other items, from nondeploying 
units. As a result, by June 2004, the Army National Guard had 
transferred more than 35,000 pieces of equipment and had critical 
shortages[Footnote 16]of about 480 different types of items, including 
machine guns and heavy trucks. In total, the Army National Guard's 
nondeployed force lacks 33 percent of its essential items[Footnote 17] 
and, as of June 2004, its stocks had been depleted to the point where 
it had to request that the Army provide about 13,000 pieces of 
equipment for its deploying units.

Equipment shortages were worsened when the combatant commander and the 
National Guard Bureau barred Army National Guard units from deploying 
with items that were incompatible with active Army equipment or that 
could not be supported with spare parts in the area of operations. For 
example, Army National Guard units equipped with 20 to 30-year-old 
radios were barred from taking them to the Iraqi area of operations 
because they cannot communicate with the Single Channel Ground Air 
Radio System (SINCGARS) used by other Army units. Likewise, some of the 
older rifles the Guard uses for training have been barred because they 
use different ammunition than those of the active Army units. Moreover, 
Guard units alerted for the earlier deployments were not equipped with 
the most modern body armor and night vision goggles that the combatant 
commander subsequently required for deploying units. After units were 
identified for mobilization and deployment, the Army took some steps to 
augment existing Guard equipment using supplemental wartime funding.

Our analysis of DOD data showed that the equipment readiness of 
nondeployed units has continued to decline and, as overseas operations 
continue, it has become increasingly challenging for the National Guard 
to ready deploying units to meet warfighting requirements. As reported 
by the National Guard,[Footnote 18] 87 percent of the 1,527 reporting 
units in fiscal year 2001 met their peacetime equipment readiness 
goals, which are often lower than wartime requirements. By fiscal year 
2002, only 71 percent of the nondeployed reporting units met their 
peacetime equipment goals. The report attributed this decrease in 
readiness posture to equipment shortages and transfers among 
nondeployed units to fill shortages in other units.

Initially, the Guard managed these transfers so that nondeploying units 
shared the burden of providing resources to deploying units and could 
remain at their planned readiness levels. However, this became 
increasingly difficult as the number of activations mounted, and, in 
November 2003, the Director of the Army National Guard issued a 
memorandum to the states directing them to transfer equipment to 
deploying units regardless of the impact on the readiness of remaining 
units.

Plans to Restructure Army National Guard Are Not Fully Developed 
or Funded and May Not Address Future Readiness Challenges:

The Army and the National Guard have recognized that the post-September 
11 security environment requires changes to the Guard's structure and 
an improvement in its readiness posture. However, in the near term, the 
Army National Guard will have difficulty improving its readiness for 
projected operations over the next 3 to 5 years under current plans, 
which assume the Guard will be funded at peacetime readiness levels. 
Over the longer term, DOD, the Army, and the National Guard have 
initiated, but not completed, several restructuring efforts, including 
moving some positions with high-demand skills out of the Guard and into 
the active force, creating new standardized modular units that are 
flexible to respond to combatant commander needs, and establishing 
predictable deployments for units. To improve readiness, the Army 
National Guard seeks to increase the amount of full-time support and 
qualified personnel in its units. However, these measures will require 
additional funding. At this time, it is not clear whether these planned 
actions will fully address the difficulties the Army National Guard has 
experienced in supplying the numbers and types of fully ready forces 
needed for the global war on terrorism.

The Guard may be challenged in the near term to deploy units and 
sustain the high pace of operations required by the global war on 
terrorism with its current resources. While the costs of activated Army 
National Guard units in wartime are borne by the active Army with funds 
provided through supplemental appropriations, for recent operations the 
Guard has had to ready its forces for mobilization using its existing 
resources. The Army National Guard received $175 million in 
supplemental funding in fiscal year 2003, for personnel and operation 
and maintenance, but it did not receive additional fiscal year 2004 
funding to ready nondeployed units so they can train and gain 
proficiency before they are mobilized. In fiscal year 2004, $111 
million was reprogrammed from Army National Guard personnel to Army 
National Guard operation and maintenance appropriation accounts to 
support requirements for units before they were mobilized. These funds 
were available because mobilized Army National Guard personnel are paid 
by the active Army military personnel appropriation. The 2005 
President's budget submission and long-term funding plan are still 
based on the tiered-readiness approach. Because the Army is in the 
process of developing a new budget and long-term funding plan, it is 
not clear at this time whether future budget submissions will include 
funding to support increased readiness levels.

For the long term, DOD and the Army are changing some units' missions 
to increase the availability of certain high-demand Army National Guard 
units, such as military police and transportation units. They have also 
taken steps to rebalance skills among the active and reserve forces to 
decrease the burden of repeated deployments on reserve personnel who 
have skills that are in great demand. To make more efficient use of its 
forces, DOD is also planning to move military personnel out of 
positions involving duties that can be performed by civilians or 
contractors and into high-demand specialties, as well as taking 
advantage of technological advances to reduce personnel needs. However, 
these initiatives are in the early stages of implementation and the 
extent to which they will alleviate the strain on Army National Guard 
forces due to the continuing high pace of operations is uncertain.

In April 2004, the Army published The Army Campaign Plan that sets out 
some specific objectives and assigns responsibilities for actions to be 
taken to plan and execute ongoing operations and transform forces for 
the future. A key element of the Army's plan to transform its forces, 
including National Guard units, is to restructure into "modular" units 
that can be tailored to the specific needs of combatant commanders in 
future operations. After restructuring, the Army National Guard expects 
to have 34 smaller, lighter brigades instead of its current 38 
brigades.[Footnote 19] Current plans call for converting Army National 
Guard units as they return from overseas operations into brigades that 
share a common basic organization with their active counterparts by 
2010. Further, the Army has a goal of restructuring its forces so that 
units will be authorized the qualified personnel they require. However, 
the Army's current plans do not completely address how the Guard's 
equipment will be modernized to make it compatible with active Army 
equipment or include a detailed schedule and funding needs for 
restructuring all Guard units, including support units.

In addition, one of the Army National Guard's initiatives to improve 
readiness by increasing the amount of full-time support personnel 
within its units is still based on its tiered-readiness model, which 
resources some Guard units well below requirements. With this 
initiative, the Army National Guard plans to increase the percentage of 
full-time personnel gradually to about 71 percent of the personnel it 
needs by 2012. Full-time Guard members enhance unit readiness by 
performing tasks such as monitoring soldiers' readiness, recruiting and 
training personnel, and maintaining aircraft, supplies, and equipment. 
However, for fiscal year 2003, the Army National Guard was only funded 
for 59 percent of the full-time personnel it needs to be fully manned, 
as compared to the Air National Guard, which is staffed at 100 percent 
of its required full-time support personnel. Without sufficient full-
time personnel, these tasks, which are critical to unit readiness, 
suffer.

The Army National Guard also has plans to increase the number of 
qualified personnel in each unit by spreading its soldiers over fewer, 
in some cases smaller, units. According to Army National Guard 
officials, using this strategy could increase the number of qualified 
personnel to an estimated 85 percent of unit requirements. However, 
Army deployment goals for combat units are for 100 percent of deploying 
soldiers to be qualified in their positions. Therefore, the Guard will 
likely still need to transfer personnel when units are called to 
deploy.

To avoid overtaxing the force and improve deployment predictability, 
the Army has developed a proposal to establish a rotational deployment 
cycle for its Army National Guard units that would meet the Secretary 
of Defense's goal of no more than one deployment every 6 years. In 
conjunction with this proposal, preliminary Army plans propose 
equipping Guard units that are 4 to 5 years away from an expected 
deployment well below wartime readiness standards. However, this model 
may be difficult to achieve while the high pace of operations 
continues.

Air National Guard Efforts to Adapt to New Warfighting Requirements 
Facilitated by Its Structure and Funding at High-Readiness Levels:

The Air National Guard, like the Army National Guard, has also adapted 
to meet new warfighting requirements since September 11. It made 
several adjustments to accommodate the higher pace of operations, 
including extending tours of duty for some Guard personnel, calling up 
others earlier than expected, and recently extending its rotational 
cycle to lengthen the amount of time personnel are available for 
deployment. However, the demands of ongoing operations have not been as 
detrimental to the Air National Guard for two reasons. First, along 
with the Air Force Reserve, the Air National Guard is funded to 
maintain readiness levels similar to that of the active Air Force and 
is expected to be able to deploy within 72 hours. Second, the Air 
National Guard has not been required to sustain the same high level of 
activations as the Army National Guard. Air National Guard activations 
declined to pre-September 11 levels of about 10,000 by October 2003, 
and have since declined to about 6,000, while the Army National Guard's 
activations have continued to rise. Between 2001 and 2003, the Air 
National Guard unit readiness declined as a result of its high 
utilization of personnel and equipment, but Congress provided 
additional funding to stabilize Air National Guard readiness.

To meet increased personnel requirements during the initial phases of 
current operations, Air National Guard officials activated and deployed 
personnel earlier than planned under their standard rotational 
deployment cycle.[Footnote 20] In January 2003, Air Force officials 
said that over 320 personnel, including some Air National Guard 
members, deployed about 45 days earlier than usual. In addition, the 
Air Force also disrupted the normal rotation cycle by extending tour 
lengths to meet increased requirements. Air Force officials extended 
the duty tours of selected Air National Guard personnel from the usual 
90 days up to 179 days. For example, during the preparation phase for 
Operation Iraqi Freedom the Air Force extended the tours of almost 
2,400 personnel, including some Air National Guard personnel. To 
accommodate ongoing operational requirements, in June 2004, the Air 
Force announced that most Air National Guard personnel scheduled to 
deploy in future cycles would spend 120 days in the deployment phase of 
their cycle. To accommodate the increased tour lengths, the new 
rotational cycle will be 20 months in length, and Guard personnel will 
train for 16 months and be eligible for deployment for 4 months.

Overall, Air National Guard unit readiness has declined since 
September 2001 due to the increased demands for people and usage of 
equipment. Our analysis of DOD data showed that commanders attributed 
this decline in readiness primarily to personnel and equipment 
shortages, damaged or inoperative equipment, and incomplete training. 
In addition, Air National Guard officials in states we visited told us 
that meeting current operational demands has resulted in fewer aircraft 
available to be used for training at home and increased maintenance 
requirements on aircraft being used in current operations. However, Air 
National Guard officials told us that equipment readiness rates have 
remained steady during fiscal year 2004, and they attributed this 
stabilization to supplemental funding of $20 million in fiscal 2003 and 
$214 million in fiscal year 2004 for operation and maintenance 
activities.

National Guard Has Supported Homeland Security Needs, but Its Readiness 
for Future Homeland Missions Is Not Measured:

While Army and Air National Guard forces have, thus far, supported the 
nation's homeland security needs, the Guard's preparedness to perform 
homeland defense and civil support missions that may be needed in the 
future cannot be measured because its role in these missions is not 
defined, requirements have not been identified, and standards have not 
been developed against which to measure preparedness. Since September 
11, the Guard has performed a number of missions, including flying 
patrols over U.S. cities and guarding critical infrastructure. However, 
state and National Guard officials voiced concerns about preparedness 
and availability of Guard forces as overseas deployments continue at a 
high pace. Even though plans and requirements for the homeland missions 
the Guard will support are not fully developed, DOD and the National 
Guard Bureau have taken some actions to address potential needs.

Guard Forces Have Supported Homeland Security Missions, but States Have 
Concerns about Readiness for Future Missions:

Since September 11, Army and Air National Guard forces have supported a 
range of homeland security missions, primarily with the equipment DOD 
has provided for their federal missions. For example, Army National 
Guard units helped guard the nation's borders and airports in the 
aftermath of September 11, and they continue to guard key assets such 
as nuclear power plants. Also, the Army National Guard is currently 
providing security at U.S. military installations, including about 
5,500 Army National Guard soldiers guarding Air Force bases in the 
United States as of June 2004. Similarly, Air National Guard units 
continue to fly patrol missions over the United States.

We performed case studies in four states to examine how the Guard has 
supported new homeland security missions. In all four states we visited 
(New Jersey, Oregon, Georgia, and Texas), Guard officials reported that 
their units supported homeland tasks for both state governors and 
federal authorities. The following are examples of how the Army 
National Guard has supported homeland missions since September 11:

* The New Jersey Army National Guard provided security for bridges, 
tunnels, and nuclear power plants for the state governor during 2003 
and continues to provide security at two nuclear power plants.

* The Oregon Army National Guard provided security at federal 
installations, such as the Umatilla Chemical Depot and Fort Lewis, 
Washington, in 2002 and 2003.

* The Texas Army National Guard performed border security, assisting 
U.S. Customs agents from October 2001 to November 2002, and provided 
security at Air Force installations and state nuclear power plants from 
October 2001 to October 2002.

* The Georgia Army National Guard provided airport security almost 
immediately after September 11 and was still guarding Army bases and 
Air Force facilities at the time of our visit in December 2003.

The Air National Guard has also been called on to perform new missions, 
such as air patrols and providing radar coverage for the continental 
United States. Air National Guard units in the states we visited played 
key roles in homeland defense missions. For example:

* The 177th Fighter Wing in New Jersey, which is strategically located 
near major cities such as New York, Philadelphia, Boston, Baltimore, 
and Washington, D.C., took on the additional mission of flying patrols 
over these cities. Through early November 2003, the 177th had flown 
1,458 air patrol missions.

* The 147th Fighter Wing in Texas flew a total of 284 patrol missions 
over New York City and Washington, D.C., between December 2001 and 
March 2002. Since September 11, the unit has also flown patrols over 
Houston, the Gulf Coast, and in support of special events such as the 
Super Bowl and the Winter Olympics.

Despite the Guard's response to homeland needs, officials in all of the 
states we visited expressed concerns about their Guards' preparedness 
for homeland security missions, especially given the high level of 
National Guard deployments to operations outside of the United States. 
As figure 2 illustrates, at the beginning of June 2004, one-half of the 
50 states and 4 territories had more than 40 percent of their Army 
National Guard forces alerted, mobilized, or deployed for federal 
missions. Montana and Idaho both had high numbers of soldiers alerted, 
mobilized, or deployed with 80 percent and 96 percent, 
respectively.[Footnote 21]

Figure 2: Percent of Army National Guard Soldiers Alerted, Mobilized, 
or Deployed for Federal Missions as of June 2, 2004:

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Figure 3 illustrates the percentage of Air National Guard personnel who 
volunteered or were mobilized or deployed as of the end of May 2004. In 
contrast to the Army National Guard, only two states, New Hampshire and 
Nevada, had more than 20 percent of their Air National Guard mobilized 
or deployed, while 43 of the 54 states and territories had less than 
10 percent of their Air National Guard activated.

Figure 3: Percent of Air National Guard Soldiers Mobilized or Deployed 
for Federal Missions as of May 31, 2004:

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Some Guard officials also expressed concerns that their states' Guards 
had not received additional federal funding to support homeland 
security missions, even as homeland security missions are continuing 
and as the homeland security advisory system threat level has risen. 
While the states have funded some homeland security activities, such as 
guarding critical infrastructure, and purchased some equipment, such as 
decontamination equipment, officials said that homeland security 
requirements must compete with other needs in limited state budgets. 
Furthermore, state officials said that the Guard is not generally 
eligible for funding from the Department of Homeland Security because 
its grants are limited to "first responders," such as police or 
firefighters. Officials in all four states we visited raised concerns 
about their Guards' readiness for homeland security and other state 
missions. For example:

* New Jersey Guard units that responded to a terrorist threat alert in 
December 2003 reported that they lacked some essential equipment, 
such as humvees, night vision equipment, cold weather gear, chemical 
protective suits, and nerve agent antidote. The state paid for some 
essential equipment for its Guard forces during this time on an 
emergency basis. At the time of our visit, New Jersey was preparing to 
deploy large numbers of its state Guard personnel overseas and was 
determining how it would respond to another terrorist threat with 
almost 60 percent of its forces unavailable.

* Georgia officials told us that hosting the 2004 International 
Economic Summit of Eight Industrialized Nations, known as the G-8 
Summit, in June 2004, increased Georgia's security missions such as 
aerial reconnaissance and surveillance, at a time when its Army 
National Guard aviation units were deployed overseas. National Guard 
units from 12 other states participated. The state also received 
federal funds for the G-8 Summit, which reimbursed the state for costs 
of activating Guard personnel. In addition, recognizing the Guard's 
unique role in homeland security, active component forces were 
commanded by a National Guard general for this operation--a new 
arrangement designed to provide unity of command for homeland missions 
that defense officials stated might serve as a model for the 
future.[Footnote 22]

* In 2002, the state of Oregon called up more than 1,400 Army National 
Guard soldiers to respond to one of the worst forest fire seasons in a 
century. Oregon officials said that because many of the state's Guard 
forces and equipment were deployed and the state had only limited 
engineering capability left, it would not be able to provide the same 
level of support to civilian authorities if similar circumstances were 
to occur.

* All of the Texas Guard's aviation assets that would be needed to 
fight fires and all of the state's military police were deployed at the 
time of our visit. However, Texas officials said that the state had 
been able to meet their homeland security needs, even at the height of 
its Guard's overseas deployments, because its largest Army National 
Guard unit had not been fully deployed and, as a large state, it had 
ample state emergency response capability.

States are developing plans and examining resources currently available 
to them to address homeland security needs. For example, each state is 
developing a plan for protecting its infrastructure sites. 
Additionally, most states have entered into mutual assistance 
agreements that may provide them access to another state's National 
Guard forces in times of need. These agreements, known as Emergency 
Management Assistance Compacts, are typically used to facilitate access 
to additional forces for natural disaster response. However, it is not 
clear whether these arrangements will always meet the states' needs for 
forces or capabilities for homeland security because, under Emergency 
Management Assistance Compacts, states can withhold their forces if 
they are needed in their home state. This situation occurred in one of 
our case study states. According to state officials, New Jersey has 
faced an elevated terrorist threat due to specific threats against the 
state as well as its proximity to New York City. The officials said 
they requested access to another state's Weapons of Mass Destruction 
Civil Support Team on three occasions prior to 2004. On two occasions, 
the request was not granted because officials in the team's home state 
determined that it was needed at home. When New Jersey made a third 
request, in response to a specific and credible terrorist threat, 
access was approved.

DOD Lacks Plans and Requirements to Measure Preparedness for Homeland 
Missions but Is Taking Some Actions to Prepare:

DOD's Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense 
and the Northern Command are charged with leading DOD's efforts in 
homeland defense, and while they have taken some actions, they have not 
completed developing requirements or preparedness standards and 
measures for the homeland missions in which the National Guard is 
expected to participate. DOD plans to publish a comprehensive strategy 
for the homeland defense.[Footnote 23] Until the strategy is finalized, 
the Northern Command will not be able to complete its planning to 
identify the full range of forces and resources needed for the homeland 
missions it may lead or civil support missions in which active or 
reserve forces should be prepared to assist federal or state civilian 
authorities. Without this information, policy makers are not in the 
best position to manage risks to the nation's homeland security by 
targeting investments to the highest priority needs and ensuring that 
the investments are having the desired effect.

While the Guard has traditionally undertaken a wide variety of missions 
for states, it is organized, trained, and equipped to perform a 
warfighting mission. DOD measures the readiness of its forces for 
combat missions by identifying the personnel and equipment required to 
successfully undertake the mission and assessing the extent to which 
units have the resources they need. Typically, Guard forces are 
expected to perform civil support missions with either the resources 
supplied for their warfighting missions or the equipment supplied by 
the state. Guard officials said that units have supported state 
missions with capabilities such as aviation, military police, medical, 
and others, as needs have arisen.

However, in the post-September 11 environment, Guard forces may be 
expected to perform missions that differ greatly from their warfighting 
or traditional state missions and may require different equipment, 
training, and specialized capabilities than they currently possess. 
Homeland missions, such as providing large-scale critical 
infrastructure protection or responding to weapons of mass destruction 
events in the United States, could differ substantially from conditions 
expected on the battlefield or from more traditional state missions, 
such as responding to natural disasters or civil disturbances. For 
example, New Jersey units that responded to a terrorist threat alert in 
December 2003 reported that they lacked some essential equipment such 
as humvees, night vision equipment, cold weather gear, chemical 
protective suits, and nerve agent antidote. In addition, state 
officials said that other items, such as pepper spray, which are not 
routinely supplied to all types of units for their warfighting mission, 
might be useful for potential homeland missions involving crowd 
control. New Jersey subsequently paid for some essential equipment for 
its forces during this time on an emergency basis. Until the 
requirements for personnel and equipment are better defined, DOD cannot 
measure how prepared Guard forces are for the missions they may be 
called to undertake. To finalize its plans, the Northern Command will 
have to coordinate with federal agencies, such as the Department of 
Homeland Security, and state emergency management offices to ascertain 
their needs for Guard support. Furthermore, it will have to balance the 
needs for National Guard forces at home and overseas.

Since 1999, DOD has maintained full-time Guard forces in Weapons of 
Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams that are dedicated to homeland 
security missions. These teams are comprised of 22 full-time personnel 
and are maintained at the highest readiness levels and can respond 
rapidly to support civil authorities in an event involving a weapon of 
mass destruction. Their role is to assist local officials in 
determining the nature of the attack, provide medical and technical 
advice, and help to identify follow-on federal and state assets that 
might be needed. Congress has authorized at least one team for each 
state and territory. Currently, 32 teams are fully operational, with 
the remaining 23 estimated to be operational by 2007. These teams are 
federally funded and trained but perform their mission under the 
command and control of the state governor.

The National Guard Bureau has proposed some additional initiatives that 
are in varied stages of implementation, which are intended to further 
prepare states for meeting homeland security needs. For example, the 
National Guard Bureau has:

* Set up a pilot program in April 2004 in 6 states (California, 
Colorado, Georgia, Minnesota, New York, and West Virginia) to jointly 
assess with state officials critical infrastructure protection policy, 
tactics, procedures, and implementation.

* Established a regional task force to provide the capability for 12 
states to respond to a weapon of mass destruction event. These Guard 
forces are designed to locate and extract victims from a contaminated 
environment, perform mass casualty/patient decontamination, and 
provide medical triage and treatment in response to one of these 
events. The 12 participating states are New York, Massachusetts, 
Pennsylvania, West Virginia, Illinois, Missouri, Florida, Texas, 
Colorado, California, Washington, and Hawaii.

* Proposed an initiative to distribute Guard personnel with key 
capabilities, including aviation, military police, engineering, 
transportation, medical, chemical, and ordnance, to each state and 
territory. When stationing personnel with these capabilities in a state 
or territory is not possible, the National Guard Bureau will try to 
maintain all capabilities within the geographical region.

* Developed a proposal for rotational deployment of Guard forces that 
would enable each state to retain 50 percent of its Guard in the state 
to respond to homeland security missions and to support civil 
authorities, while 25 percent of the state's forces deploy, and 
25 percent prepare for future deployments.

While these initiatives would provide enhanced capability for homeland 
security in the National Guard, they will require coordination with the 
Army and the Air Force as well as with the states, and they might face 
implementation challenges. For example, the Chief of the National Guard 
Bureau has developed a proposal to station a mix of forces with skills 
useful for state missions within each state and presented the proposal 
to state governors. However, the Army, the Air Force, Congress, and 
others are also involved in making such decisions. Similarly, 
implementing the National Guard's proposal to retain 50 percent of a 
state's Guard at home for homeland security and civil support missions 
has not been implemented and could be difficult to achieve during 
periods of high-military operations. Officials from the U.S. Army 
Forces Command, the Army command that selects Army Guard personnel for 
federal activation, said that while they try to minimize the impact of 
federal mobilizations on the states, this becomes more and more 
difficult as the level of federal activations increases.

Conclusions:

The September 11 terrorist attacks and the global war on terrorism have 
placed new demands for ready forces on the National Guard--especially 
the Army National Guard--for overseas, homeland security, and homeland 
defense operations. At the same time, it is apparent that the Army 
National Guard's structure as a follow-on force to the active Army is 
not consistent with its current use as an operational force. The 
current demands for large numbers of fully manned and equipped forces 
to support overseas operations have forced the Guard to transfer 
personnel and equipment from nondeploying units to deploying units, 
degrading the readiness of the nondeployed units. This continued 
decline in readiness of nondeployed units hinders the Army National 
Guard's ability to continue to provide the ready forces in the short 
term that DOD estimates will be needed to meet operational needs over 
the next 3 to 5 years. However, DOD's current budget continues to fund 
the Guard at peacetime levels, and it is not clear whether future 
budgets will include funding to improve readiness. In the longer term, 
while DOD is reevaluating its strategy for the new security 
environment, it is important for it to decide what the role of the 
National Guard will be in the 21st century. This decision is important 
because it will determine the missions for which the Guard will have to 
prepare, the number and types of units it will need, and how much 
personnel, equipment, and training it should be provided. Furthermore, 
until DOD establishes the Guard's role in the post-September 11 
environment and develops a strategy to prepare its forces to meet new 
demands, it cannot be sure that it is best managing risks by investing 
its resources to target the highest priority needs and Congress, in 
turn, will not have detailed information on which to base funding and 
policy decisions. Continuing to structure and fund the Guard under 
current policy will result in continued personnel transfers and 
readiness declines for its units that may hamper its ability to sustain 
much needed Guard involvement in the global war on terrorism over the 
long term.

At the same time that the Guard's overseas missions have increased--
reducing the personnel and equipment available for state missions--
homeland security needs have also increased. However, DOD has not fully 
defined what role the National Guard will have in the homeland missions 
DOD will lead or support and how it will balance this role with its 
increased participation in overseas operations. Absent a clearly 
defined role for all its homeland missions, the Guard cannot identify 
requirements for successfully executing this role and the standards and 
measures it will use to assess preparedness for all its homeland 
missions. Until it has these standards and measures, DOD does not have 
the means to determine whether the Guard is prepared to meet homeland 
security needs with its current structure and assets. As such, policy 
makers are not in the best position to manage the risks to the nation's 
homeland security by targeting investments to the highest priority 
needs and ensuring that they are having the desired effect.

Recommendations for Executive Action:

We recommend that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the 
Army to develop and submit to Congress a strategy that addresses the 
Army National Guard's needs for the global war on terrorism, including 
the Army National Guard's anticipated role, missions, and requirements 
for personnel and equipment in both the near and long term. The 
near-term portion of the strategy should address the current decline in 
readiness for overseas missions and the Army National Guard's plans to 
provide the ready forces needed for the global war on terrorism over 
the next 3 to 5 years. Specifically it should include:

* an analysis of how support for current operations will affect the 
readiness of nondeployed Army National Guard forces for future overseas 
and domestic missions and:

* a plan to manage the risk associated with the declining readiness of 
nondeployed Army National Guard forces, including identifying funding 
for any personnel and equipment required to mitigate unacceptable 
levels of risk.

The long-term portion of the strategy should detail how the Army plans 
to restructure and provide the Guard resources--personnel, equipment, 
and training--consistent with its 21st century role, including:

* how the Army National Guard will be restructured to support future 
missions and ensure operational compatibility with active forces and:

* the time frames for implementing restructuring actions, the resources 
needed to achieve compatibility with active forces and the appropriate 
level of readiness for their missions.

As DOD completes its homeland defense strategy and the Northern Command 
refines its concept and operational plans for homeland defense and 
support to civil authorities and defines requirements, we recommend 
that the Secretary of Defense direct the Under Secretaries of Defense 
for Policy and for Personnel and Readiness, in consultation with the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Commander of the U.S. Northern 
Command, Commander of the U.S. Pacific Command, the Chiefs of the Army 
and the Air Force, the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, and 
appropriate officials in the Department of Homeland Security, to take 
the following four actions:

* Establish the full range of the National Guard's homeland missions, 
including those led by DOD and those conducted in support of civilian 
authorities.

* Identify the National Guard's capabilities to perform these missions 
and any shortfalls in personnel, equipment, and training needed to 
perform these missions successfully.

* Develop a plan that addresses any shortfalls of personnel, equipment, 
and training, assigns responsibility for actions, establishes time 
frames for implementing the plan, and identifies required funding.

* Establish readiness standards and measures for the Guard's homeland 
security missions so that the readiness for these missions can be 
systematically measured and accurately reported.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:

The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs provided written 
comments on a draft of this report. The department generally agreed 
with our recommendations and cited actions it is taking to implement 
them. DOD's comments are reprinted in their entirety in appendix II.

DOD partially agreed with our recommendation that DOD develop and 
submit to Congress a strategy that addresses the Army National Guard's 
short-and long-term needs for the global war on terrorism, including 
the Army National Guard's role, missions, and requirements for 
personnel and equipment, and its plans to manage the risk associated 
with the declining readiness of nondeployed Army National Guard forces. 
In its comments, DOD said that the Army has conducted the recommended 
analysis, developed a plan as outlined in the Army Campaign Plan, and 
communicated its plan to numerous members of Congress. We agree 
that the Army Campaign Plan is a significant step in planning to 
address National Guard readiness problems because it identifies goals 
and objectives and assigns responsibilities for actions to plan for 
transforming its forces. However, we believe the Army Campaign Plan 
does not fully meet the intent of our recommendation because it lacks 
specificity about how the Army will address the readiness of 
nondeployed Army National Guard forces in the near term, how all Guard 
units will be converted to the modular design, or how the Guard's 
equipment will be modernized to make it compatible with active Army 
equipment. Furthermore, DOD has not identified the funding needed for 
restructuring all Guard units, including support units. Therefore, we 
believe the Army should develop more detailed plans to fully implement 
our recommendation. In its comments, DOD said that the Army agrees that 
it should continue its analysis to identify and minimize readiness 
impacts to the current force.

DOD concurred with our recommendation to establish the full range of 
the National Guard's homeland missions, to identify the capabilities 
needed to perform those missions and develop a plan to address any 
shortfalls, and to establish readiness standards and measures for the 
Guard's homeland security missions. However, in its comments, DOD said 
it would take a different approach to accomplishing the tasks than we 
recommended. Rather than having the Assistant Secretary for Homeland 
Defense take the lead in all four areas as we recommended, DOD said 
that the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Under Secretary 
of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, working in close coordination, 
should take the lead in implementing the actions we recommended. We 
believe the approach DOD proposes meets the intent of our 
recommendation, and we have modified the wording of our recommendation 
to reflect the proposed change in organizational responsibilities.

As we agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the 
contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution of it 
until 7 days from the date of this letter. We will then send copies to 
the Secretary of Defense; the Secretaries of the Army and the Air 
Force; the Chief, National Guard Bureau; and the Director, Office of 
Management and Budget. We will also make copies available to others 
upon request. In addition, this report will be available at no charge 
on the GAO Website at http://www.gao.gov.

If you have any questions about this report, please contact me at 
(202) 512-4402. Major contributors to this report are listed in 
appendix III.

Signed by: 

Janet A. St. Laurent: 
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management:

[End of section]

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology:

We interviewed officials in the Army National Guard, the Air National 
Guard, the National Guard Bureau, and the Department of the Army 
and Department of the Air Force headquarters. We supplemented this 
information with visits to several Department of Defense (DOD) offices, 
including the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve 
Affairs; the Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; and Joint 
Force Headquarters, Homeland Security. We also developed case 
studies of recent federal and state National Guard operations in 
four states--Georgia, New Jersey, Oregon, and Texas. The states were 
chosen to represent a mix of geographic areas, Air and Army National 
Guard units with different specialties, and units that had been or 
expected to be activated for state or federal missions. In each state 
we visited the Adjutant General and offices within the Joint National 
Guard headquarters. We also interviewed leaders from a field artillery 
battalion, an armor battalion, two enhanced brigades, an air control 
wing, an airlift wing, an air-refueling wing, and three fighter wings.

To examine the National Guard's warfighting requirements in this 
post-September 11, 2001 security environment, we obtained and analyzed 
data on state and federal activations of the Army and the Air National 
Guard before and after September 11, 2001. We supplemented this with 
interviews, briefings, and documentation from officials from the four 
case study states and from the National Guard Bureau, the U.S. Army 
Forces Command, First Air Force, and the U.S. Air Force Air Combat 
Command and Air and Space Expeditionary Force Center. To examine the 
ways in which the National Guard has adapted for its new missions, we 
interviewed officials in the four case study states and officials at 
Army mobilization stations at Fort Hood, Texas, Fort Benning, Georgia, 
and Fort Dix, New Jersey, and at the First and Fifth Continental United 
States Armies. To identify Guard usage trends and stressed 
capabilities, we analyzed DOD's personnel tempo database, Army National 
Guard and Air National Guard data on the types of units mobilized, and 
information from the Army National Guard on the transformation of field 
artillery and other support units into military police and security 
force units. We obtained information on personnel and equipment 
transfers from the National Guard Bureau and information on equipment 
shortages from DOD publications and reports. We reviewed equipment 
data, interviewed data sources, and obtained information on data 
collection methods and internal control measures applied to the data. 
We determined the equipment data were sufficiently reliable for our 
objectives. We also reviewed documents on planned changes to the Army 
Guard's force structure, such as the Army Campaign Plan and the Army 
Transformation Roadmap. We also discussed personnel, training, and 
equipment issues with unit, state, Guard Bureau, and mobilization 
station officials and force providers.

To assess the National Guard's emerging homeland security needs, in 
each of the four case study states we interviewed Guard homeland 
security officials and leaders from Army and Air National Guard units 
with recent homeland security experience. We also met with officials 
from the National Guard Bureau (Homeland Defense), the Department of 
the Army, three Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams, the 
Air Combat Command and Air and Space Expeditionary Force Center, the 
Army Forces Command, the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Reserve Affairs (Military Assistance to Civilian 
Authorities) (now part of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Homeland 
Defense)), the Joint Director of Military Support, and the Joint Task 
Force, Civil Support. We also obtained information from the U.S. Joint 
Forces Command and reviewed unclassified, publicly available documents 
from the U.S. Northern Command. In addition, we reviewed the National 
Guard's role in rotation plans for future operations. We identified the 
challenges facing DOD, the states, and Congress in organizing and 
equipping the Guard for both overseas and homeland security missions 
based upon our analysis of the Guard's current status and discussions 
with National Guard officials.

We conducted our review between April 2003 and September 2004 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards and 
determined that the data were sufficiently reliable to answer our 
objectives. For example, we interviewed data sources about how they 
ensured their own data accuracy and reviewed their data collection 
methods, standard operating procedures, and other internal control 
measures. We reviewed available data for inconsistencies, and, when 
applicable, performed computer testing to assess data validity and 
reliability.

[End of section]

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Defense:

ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE: 
1500 DEFENSE PENTAGON:
WASHINGTON, DC 20301-1500:

RESERVE AFFAIRS:

Ms. Janet A. St. Laurent:
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548:

Dear Ms. St. Laurent:

This is the Department of Defense response to the GAO draft report, 
"RESERVE FORCES: Actions Needed to Better Prepare the National Guard 
for Future Overseas and Domestic Missions," dated September 16, 2004 
(Code 350546/GAO-05-21). The Department partially concurs with 
recommendation 1 and 2 and concurs with recommendation 3. Detailed 
comments on the GAO recommendations and report are enclosed.

The point of contact for this office is Colonel Cora Jackson-Chandler, 
OASD/RA (RT&M), at (703) 695-4126.

We appreciate the opportunity to comment on the draft report.

Sincerely,

Signed for: 

T.F. Hall: 

Enclosure: As stated:

GAO-05-21/GAO CODE 350546:

"RESERVE FORCES: ACTIONS NEEDED TO BETTER PREPARE THE NATIONAL GUARD 
FOR FUTURE OVERSEAS AND DOMESTIC MISSIONS":

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE COMMENTS TO THE RECOMMENDATIONS:

RECOMMENDATION 1: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Secretary of the Army to develop and submit to Congress a 
strategy that addresses the Army National Guard's needs for the global 
war on terrorism, including the Army National Guard's anticipated role, 
missions, and requirements for personnel and equipment in both the 
near-and the long-term. The near-term portion of the strategy should 
address the current decline in readiness for overseas missions and the 
Army National Guard's plans to provide the ready forces needed for the 
global war on terrorism over the next 3 to 5 years. Specifically it 
should include:

* an analysis of how support for current operations will affect the 
readiness of nondeployed Army National Guard forces for future overseas 
and domestic missions, and:

* a plan to manage the risk associated with the declining readiness of 
nondeployed Army National Guard forces, including identifying funding 
for any personnel and equipment required to mitigate unacceptable 
levels of risk. (Page 28/Draft Report):

DoD RESPONSE: Partially concur. The Army has conducted this analysis, 
developed a plan (the Army Campaign Plan) and briefed the results to 
numerous members of Congress. The Army is taking steps to posture the 
Army National Guard for prolonged operations. A cyclical construct has 
been developed to ensure that reserve component units of the Army 
returning from operations Outside the Continental United States reset 
and/or reorganize into modular formations and are placed on a ramp to 
combat readiness over a five-year period. The Army agrees that this 
analysis should continue to identify readiness impacts to the current 
force, both deployed and non-deployed. The Army also agrees that 
measures should be identified to minimize those impacts in the near-
term for non-deployed force.

RECOMMENDATION 2: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Secretary of the Army to develop and submit to Congress a 
strategy that addresses the Army National Guard's needs for the global 
war on terrorism, including the Army National Guard's anticipated role, 
missions, and requirements for personnel and equipment in both the 
near-and long-term. The long-term portion of the strategy should detail 
how the Army plans to restructure and provide the Guard resources-
personnel, equipment, and training-consistent with its 21st century 
role, including:

* how the Army National guard will be restructured to support future 
missions and ensure operational compatibility with active forces, and:

* the time frames for implementing restructuring actions, the resources 
needed to achieve compatibility with active forces, and the appropriate 
level of readiness for their missions. (Page 28/Draft Report):

DoD RESPONSE: Partially concur. The Army has included a strategy for 
Army National Guard modularity and restructuring in the Army Campaign 
Plan. Included in this plan are the timelines and funding priority 
necessary to achieve a modular Army National Guard. The report focuses 
on the Army National Guard's structure and readiness for overseas 
operations and the need for clear definition of the National Guard's 
role in homeland security. Similarly, the Air Force must embrace 
innovative organizational constructs to respond to a decrease in 
platforms due to modernization and reduced infrastructure. To this end, 
the Future Total Force office was created in October 2003 at the 
direction of the Chief of Staff of the Air Force for the purpose of 
leveraging the collective expertise of the Total Force:

RECOMMENDATION 3: As DoD completes its homeland defense strategy and 
the Northern Command refines its concept and operational plans for 
homeland defense and support to civil authorities and defines 
requirements, the GAO recommended that the Secretary of Defense direct 
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense, in 
consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Commander 
of the U.S. Northern Command, the Chiefs of the Army and the Air Force, 
the Chief of the National Guard Bureau, and appropriate officials in 
the Department of Homeland Security, to take the following four 
actions:

* Establish the full range of the National Guard's homeland missions 
including those led by DoD and those conducted in support of civilian 
authorities.

* Identify the National Guard's capabilities to perform these missions 
and any shortfalls in personnel, equipment, and training needed to 
perform these missions successfully.

* Develop a plan that addresses any shortfalls of personnel, equipment, 
and training, assigns responsibility for actions, establishes time 
frames for implementing the plan, and identifies required funding.

* Establish readiness standards and measures for the Guard's homeland 
security missions so that the readiness for these missions can be 
systemically measured and accurately reported. (Page 29/Draft Report):

DoD RESPONSE: Concur. The Secretary of Defense should direct the Under 
Secretary for Personnel and Readiness and the Under Secretary for 
Policy to take the lead for specific actions directed by Recommendation 
3. The two OSD organizations responsible for the four actions will work 
in close coordination with all of the organizations listed in 
Recommendation 3. 

[End of section]

Appendix III: GAO Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:

GAO Contacts:

Janet St. Laurent (202) 512-4402: 
Margaret G. Morgan (202) 512-8975:

Acknowledgments:

In addition to the persons named above Suzanne Wren, Barbara Gannon, 
James Lewis, Tina Morgan, Jacquelyn Randolph, V. Malvern Saavedra, 
Alissa Czyz, Kenneth Patton, Jennifer Popovic, and Jay Smale also made 
major contributions to this report.

FOOTNOTES

[1] According to the National Strategy for Homeland Security (Office of 
Homeland Security, Washington, D.C.: July 2002), homeland security is a 
broad term that encompasses efforts to reduce America's vulnerability 
to terrorism and prevent terrorist attacks as well as respond to an 
attack that might occur. The Department of Defense refers to its 
contributions to the overall homeland security effort as "homeland 
defense," and support to civil authorities.

[2] A National Guard official who maintains data on the extent of 
support to civil authorities explained to us that because some state 
data may not be reported, this figure might underestimate the days 
spent supporting state missions.

[3] We are conducting a separate effort examining the roles and 
readiness of the Army Reserve.

[4] GAO, Reserve Forces: Observations on Recent National Guard Use in 
Overseas and Homeland Missions and Future Challenges, GAO-04-670T 
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 29, 2004).

[5] We previously reported that forces' skills are not well matched 
with the needs of domestic military missions. See GAO-04-670T.

[6] The U.S. Northern Command is responsible for executing homeland 
defense activities and supporting civilian authorities when requested. 
The Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense 
assists the Secretary of Defense in providing policy and guidance to 
combatant commanders regarding air, ground, and maritime defense of 
U.S. territories and supporting civilian authorities. 

[7] The Guard's Weapons of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams are 
each comprised of 22 full-time personnel and maintained at the highest 
preparedness levels so as to respond rapidly to support civil 
authorities in an event involving a weapon of mass destruction. Their 
role is to assist local officials in determining the nature of the 
attack, provide medical and technical advice, and assist with requests 
for additional support.

[8] The reserve components of the U.S. Armed Forces are the Army 
National Guard of the United States, the Army Reserve, the Naval 
Reserve, the Marine Corps Reserve, the Air National Guard of the United 
States, the Air Force Reserve, and the Coast Guard Reserve. The 
selected reserve consists of military members assigned to organized 
reserve units and reservists who participate in at least 48 scheduled 
drills or training periods each year and serve on active duty for 
training of not less than 14 days during each year. 

[9] 10 U.S.C. § 12302.

[10] 18 U.S.C. § 1385.

[11] Examples include counterdrug support (32 U.S.C. § 112) and Weapons 
of Mass Destruction Civil Support Teams (10 U.S.C. § 12310(c)).

[12] Readiness is generally defined as a measure of DOD's ability to 
provide the capabilities needed to execute the mission specified in the 
National Military Strategy. At the unit level, readiness refers to the 
ability of units, such as Army divisions and Air Force wings, to 
provide capabilities required by the combatant commands. Details of DOD 
readiness data are classified.

[13] Enhanced separate brigades have between 3,000 and 5,000 soldiers 
and are the Army National Guard's highest priority combat units. These 
15 brigades receive specialized training and higher priority than other 
National Guard units for personnel and resources during peacetime. Once 
called to active duty, they are expected to be ready to deploy overseas 
within 90 days.

[14] GAO, Military Personnel: DOD Actions Needed to Improve the 
Efficiency of Mobilizations for Reserve Forces, GAO-03-921 (Washington, 
D.C.: Aug. 21, 2003) and Military Personnel: DOD Needs To Address Long-
Term Reserve Force Availability and Related Mobilization and 
Demobilization Issues, GAO-04-1031 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 15, 2004). 

[15] DOD has established in policy a goal to provide reservists a 
minimum of 30 days written notification, referred to as "alert," before 
they are mobilized for active duty.

[16] A critical shortage is defined as having five or less of an item 
in the total Army National Guard inventory.

[17] Essential items are defined as a unit's principal weapon/mission 
systems and equipment that are critical to accomplishment of primary 
mission tasks and critical mission support items.

[18] Department of Defense, National Guard and Reserve Equipment Report 
for Fiscal Year 2003 (Washington, D.C.: February 2002) and National 
Guard and Reserve Equipment Report for Fiscal Year 2004 (Washington, 
D.C.: February 2003).

[19] This includes the Army National Guard's 15 enhanced separate 
brigades, 2 separate brigades, and 21 brigades in its 8 divisions.

[20] The Air Force divides its forces into 10 groups, each containing a 
mix of active, Guard, and reserve forces, and until June 2004, operated 
on a 15-month rotational cycle. The 15-month cycle included a 90-day 
period when a unit was eligible for deployment.

[21] Since the data in figure 2 were reported, forces in several other 
states, including Hawaii, Nevada, and South Carolina, have been alerted 
or mobilized. Deployed forces from other states have also returned 
home.

[22] The 2004 National Defense Authorization Act authorized National 
Guard officers in Title 32 status to retain that status if called to 
active duty under Title 10. This arrangement requires agreement between 
the President and the governor to be in effect and allows a National 
Guard officer to command federal as well as National Guard troops in 
state status. 

[23] We previously reported on the Northern Command's activities in a 
classified report. GAO, Homeland Defense: Progress Made in Organizing 
to Achieve Northern Command's Mission but Challenges Remain, GAO-04-
622C (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 8, 2004).

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