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Testimony:
Before the Subcommittee on Environment and Hazardous Materials,
Committee on Energy and Commerce, House of Representatives:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
For Release on Delivery Expected at 12:30 p.m. EDT:
Thursday, September 30, 2004:
Drinking Water:
Experts' Views on How Federal Funding Can Best Be Spent To Improve
Security:
Statement of John B. Stephenson, Director
Natural Resources and Environment:
GAO-04-1098T:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-04-1098T, testimony before the Subcommittee on
Environment and Hazardous Materials, Committee on Energy and Commerce,
House of Representatives
Why GAO Did This Study:
After the events of September 11, 2001, Congress appropriated over
$140 million to help drinking water systems assess their
vulnerabilities to terrorist threats and to develop response plans.
Utilities are asking for additional funding, however, not only to plan
security upgrades but also to support their implementation.
This testimony is based on GAO’s report, Drinking Water: Experts’ Views
on How Future Federal Funding Can Best Be Spent to Improve Security
(GAO-04-29, October 31, 2003). Specifically, GAO sought experts’ views
on (1) the key security-related vulnerabilities affecting drinking
water systems, (2) the criteria for determining how federal funds are
allocated among drinking water systems to improve their security, and
the methods by which those funds should be distributed, and (3)
specific activities the federal government should support to improve
drinking water security.
What GAO Found:
GAO’s expert panel cited distribution systems as among the most
vulnerable physical components of a drinking water utility, a
conclusion also reached by key research organizations. Also cited were
the computer systems that manage critical utility functions; treatment
chemicals stored on-site; and source water supplies. Experts further
identified two key factors that constitute overarching vulnerabilities:
(1) a lack of the information individual utilities need to identify
their most serious threats and (2) a lack of redundancy in vital
system components, which increases the likelihood an attack could
render an entire utility inoperable.
According to over 90 percent of the experts, utilities serving high-
density areas deserve at least a high priority for federal funding.
Also warranting priority are utilities serving critical assets, such
as military bases, national icons, and key academic institutions.
Direct federal grants were clearly the most preferred funding
mechanism, with over half the experts indicating that such grants
would be “very effective” in distributing funds to recipients.
Substantially fewer recommended using the Drinking Water State
Revolving Fund for security upgrades.
When asked to identify specific security-enhancing activities most
deserving of federal support, experts’ responses generally fell into
three categories:
* physical and technological upgrades to improve security and research
to develop technologies to prevent, detect, or respond to an attack
(experts most strongly supported developing near real-time monitoring
technologies to quickly detect contaminants in treated drinking water
on its way to consumers);
* education and training to support, among other things, simulation
exercises to provide responders with experience in carrying out
emergency response plans; specialized training of utility security
staff; and multidisciplinary consulting teams to independently analyze
systems’ security preparedness and recommend improvements; and
* strengthening key relationships between water utilities and other
agencies that may have key roles in an emergency response, such as
public health agencies, law enforcement agencies, and neighboring
drinking water systems; this category also includes developing
protocols to encourage consistent approaches to detecting and
diagnosing threats.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO recommended that as EPA refines its efforts to help drinking water
utilities reduce their vulnerability to terrorist attacks, the agency
consider the information in this report to help determine how best to
allocate security-related federal funds among drinking water
utilities; which methods should be used to distribute the funds; and
what specific security-enhancing activities should be supported.
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-1098T.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click
on the link above. For more information, contact John B. Stephenson @
(202) 512-6225 or Stephensonj@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:
Drinking water utilities across the country have long been recognized
as potentially vulnerable to terrorist attacks of various types,
including physical disruption, bioterrorism, chemical contamination,
and cyber attack. Damage or destruction by terrorists could disrupt not
only the availability of safe drinking water, but also the delivery of
vital services that depend on these water supplies, such as fire
suppression. Such concerns were greatly amplified by the September 11,
2001, attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon and then by
the discovery of training manuals in Afghanistan detailing how
terrorist trainees could support attacks on drinking water systems.
Congress has since committed significant federal funding to assist
drinking water utilities--with over $140 million appropriated from
fiscal year 2002 through fiscal year 2004--to help systems assess their
vulnerabilities to terrorist threats and develop response plans. As
significant as these funds are, drinking water utilities are asking the
federal government to support efforts that go beyond the planning for
upgrading drinking water security to the actual implementation of
security upgrades. Consequently, at the request of the Senate Committee
on Environment and Public Works, we examined (1) the key security-
related vulnerabilities affecting the nation's drinking water systems;
(2) the criteria that experts believe should be used to determine how
federal funds are allocated among recipients to improve their security,
and the methods that should be used to distribute these funds; and (3)
specific activities that experts believe the federal government should
support to improve drinking water security. My testimony is based on
our October 2003 report entitled, Drinking Water: Experts' Views on How
Future Federal Funding Can Best Be Spent to Improve Security.
To prepare our October 2003 report on these issues, we assembled a
panel of nationally recognized experts. In selecting members for the
expert panel, we sought individuals who were widely recognized as
possessing expertise on one or more key aspects of drinking water
security. We also sought to achieve balance in representation from key
federal agencies, key state or local agencies, key industry and
nonprofit organizations, and water utilities of varying sizes.
In summary:
* Our expert panel identified several key physical assets as the most
seriously vulnerable to terrorist attacks. Nearly 75 percent of the
experts (32 of 43) identified one or more components of the
distribution system. In fact, more experts identified the distribution
system as the single most important vulnerability (12 of 43) of all
system components. The other physical assets most frequently cited were
source water supplies, critical information systems, and chemicals that
are stored on site for use in the treatment process. Importantly, the
experts also identified overarching vulnerability issues that may
involve multiple system components, or even an entire drinking water
system. Chief among these issues were (1) a lack of redundancy in vital
systems, which increases the likelihood that an attack could render a
system inoperable; and (2) the difficulty many systems face due to a
lack of information on the most serious threats to which they are
exposed. In general, the panelists' observations were similar to those
of major public and private organizations that have assessed the
vulnerability of these systems to terrorist attacks, including the
National Academy of Sciences, Sandia National Laboratories, and key
industry associations.
* About 90 percent of the experts agreed "strongly" or "somewhat" that
allocation decisions should be based on assessments of drinking water
utilities' vulnerabilities, which the utilities are required to prepare
by the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and
Response Act of 2002. In addition, the experts favored funding priority
for utilities serving high-density populations, with over 90 percent
indicating that they deserve at least a "high" priority and over 50
percent indicating they deserve "highest" priority. Utilities serving
critical assets (such as military bases and other sensitive government
facilities, national icons, and key cultural or academic institutions)
were also recommended as high-priority recipients. When asked to
identify the most effective mechanisms for distributing these federal
funds to recipients, over half the experts indicated that direct
federal grants would be "very effective" in doing so. Many also favored
including a requirement for matching funds as a grant condition. Fewer
experts recommended using the Drinking Water State Revolving Fund
(DWSRF) for this purpose, particularly to support upgrades that need to
be implemented quickly.
* When asked to identify and set priorities for security-enhancing
activities most deserving of federal support, the experts most
frequently identified activities that fell into three broad categories:
* Physical and technological improvements--needed for both physical
alterations to improve the security of drinking water systems, and for
the development of technologies to prevent, detect, or respond to an
attack. The need to develop near real-time monitoring technologies,
which would be particularly useful in quickly detecting contaminants in
water that has already left the treatment plant for the consumer, had
by far the strongest support.
* Education and training--to be provided to both utility and nonutility
personnel responsible for preventing, responding to, and recovering
from an attack. These activities include, among other things, support
for simulation exercises to provide responders with experience in
carrying out utilities' emergency response plans; specialized training
of utility personnel responsible for security; general training of
utility personnel to augment security awareness among all staff; and
multidisciplinary consulting teams to independently analyze utilities'
security preparedness and recommend security-related improvements.
* Strengthened operational relationships--especially between water
utilities and other agencies (public health agencies, enforcement
agencies, and neighboring utilities, among others) that may have key
roles in an emergency response. This category also includes developing
common protocols to engender a consistent approach among utilities in
detecting and diagnosing threats, and the testing of local emergency
response systems to ensure that participating agencies coordinate their
actions effectively.
Background:
Drinking water systems vary by size and other factors, but as
illustrated in figure 1, they most typically include a supply source,
treatment facility, and distribution system. A water system's supply
source may be a reservoir, aquifer, or well, or a combination of these
sources. Some systems may also include a dam to help maintain a stable
water level, and aqueducts and transmission pipelines to deliver the
water to a distant treatment plant. The treatment process generally
uses filtration, sedimentation, and other processes to remove
impurities and harmful agents, and disinfection processes such as
chlorination to eliminate biological contaminants. Chemicals used in
these processes, most notably chlorine, are often stored on site at the
treatment plant. Distribution systems comprise water towers, piping
grids, pumps, and other components to deliver treated water from
treatment systems to consumers. Particularly among larger utilities,
distribution systems may contain thousands of miles of pipes and
numerous access points.
Figure 1: Key Components of a Typical Drinking Water System:
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO.
[End of figure]
Nationwide, there are more than 160,000 public water systems that
individually serve from as few as 25 people to 1 million people or
more. As figure 2 illustrates, nearly 133,000 of these water systems
serve 500 or fewer people. Only 466 systems serve more than 100,000
people each, but these systems, located primarily in urban areas,
account for early half of the total population served.
Figure 2: Number of Drinking Water Systems That Serve Various
Populations:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Until the 1990s, emergency planning at drinking water utilities
generally focused on responding to natural disasters and, in some
cases, domestic threats such as vandalism. In the 1990s, however, both
government and industry officials broadened the process to account for
terrorist threats. Among the most significant actions taken was the
issuance in 1998 of Presidential Decision Directive 63 to protect the
nation's critical infrastructure against criminal and terrorist
attacks. The directive designated the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) as the lead federal agency to address the water infrastructure
and to work with both public and private organizations to develop
emergency preparedness strategies. EPA, in turn, appointed the
Association of Metropolitan Water Agencies to coordinate the water
industry's role in emergency preparedness. During this time, this
public-private partnership focused primarily on cyber security threats
for the several hundred community water systems that each served over
100,000 persons. The partnership was broadened in 2001 to include both
the drinking water and wastewater sectors, and focused on systems
serving more than 3,300 people.
Efforts to better protect drinking water infrastructure were
accelerated dramatically after the September 11 attacks. EPA and the
drinking water industry launched efforts to share information on
terrorist threats and response strategies. They also undertook
initiatives to develop guidance and training programs to assist
utilities in identifying their systems' vulnerabilities. As a major
step in this regard, EPA supported the development, by American Water
Works Association Research Foundation and Sandia National Laboratories,
of a vulnerability assessment methodology for larger drinking water
utilities. The push for vulnerability assessments was then augmented by
the Public Health Security and Bioterrorism Preparedness and Response
Act of 2002 (Bioterrorism Act). Among other things, the act required
each community water system serving more than 3,300 individuals to
conduct a detailed vulnerability assessment by specified dates in 2003
or 2004, depending on their size.
Since we issued our report in October, several Homeland Security
Presidential Directives (HSPDs) were issued that denote new
responsibilities for EPA and the water sector. HSPD 7 designates EPA as
the water sector's agency specifically responsible for infrastructure
protection activities, including developing a specific water sector
plan for the National Infrastructure Protection Plan that the
Department of Homeland Security must produce. HSPD 9 directs EPA to
develop a surveillance and monitoring program to provide early warning
in the event of a terrorist attack using diseases, pests, or poisonous
agents. EPA is also charged, under HSPD 9, with developing a nationwide
laboratory network to support the routine monitoring and response
requirements of the surveillance program. HSPD 10 assigns additional
responsibilities to EPA for decontamination efforts.
To obtain information for our analysis, we conducted a three-phase,
Web-based survey of 43 experts on drinking water security. In
identifying these experts, we sought to achieve balance in terms of
area of expertise (i.e., state and local emergency response,
engineering, epidemiology, public policy, security and defense,
drinking water treatment, risk assessment and modeling, law
enforcement, water infrastructure, resource economics, bioterrorism,
public health, and emergency and crisis management). In addition, we
attempted to achieve participation by experts from key federal
organizations, state and local agencies, industry and nonprofit
organizations, and water utilities serving populations of varying
sizes. To obtain information from the expert panel, we employed a
modified version of the Delphi method. The Delphi method is a
systematic process for obtaining individuals' views and seeking
consensus among them, if possible, on a question or problem of
interest. Since first developed by the RAND Corporation in the 1950s,
the Delphi method has generally been implemented using face-to-face
group discussions. For this study, however, we administered the method
through the Internet. We conducted our work in accordance with
generally accepted government auditing standards between July 2002 and
August 2003.
Experts Identified Key Vulnerabilities That Could Compromise Drinking
Water Systems' Security:
Our panel of experts identified several key physical assets of drinking
water systems as the most vulnerable to intentional attack. In general,
their observations were similar to those of public and private
organizations that have assessed the vulnerability of these systems to
terrorist attacks, including the National Academy of Sciences, Sandia
National Laboratories, and key industry associations. In particular, as
shown in figure 3, nearly 75 percent of the experts (32 of 43)
identified the distribution system or its components as among the top
vulnerabilities of drinking water systems. Experts also identified
overarching issues compromising how well these assets are protected.
Chief among these issues are (1) a lack of redundancy in vital systems,
which increases the likelihood that an attack could render a system
inoperable; and (2) the difficulty many systems face in understanding
the nature of the threats to which they are exposed.
Figure 3: Key Vulnerabilities Identified As Compromising Drinking Water
Systems' Security:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
I would first like to discuss the distribution system, since it was
cited most frequently as a key vulnerability by our panelists. The
distribution system delivers drinking water primarily through a network
of underground pipes to homes, businesses, and other customers. While
the distribution systems of small drinking water utilities may be
relatively simple, larger systems serving major metropolitan areas can
be extremely complex. One such system, for example, measures water use
through 670,000 metered service connections, and distributes treated
water through nearly 7,100 miles of water mains that range from 2
inches to 10 feet in diameter. In addition to these pipelines and
connections, other key distribution system components typically include
numerous pumping stations, treated water storage tanks, and fire
hydrants.
In highlighting the vulnerability of distribution systems, our
panelists most often cited their accessibility at so many points. One
expert, for example, cited the difficulty in preventing the
introduction of a contaminant into the distribution system from inside
a building "regardless of how much time, money, or effort we spend
protecting public facilities." Experts also noted that since the water
in the distribution system has already been treated and is on the way
to the consumer, the distribution of a chemical, biological, or
radiological agent in such a manner would be virtually undetectable
until it was too late to prevent harm. While research on the fate and
transport of contaminants within water treatment plants and
distribution systems is under way, according to one expert, limited
technologies are readily available that can detect a wide range of
contaminants once treated water is released through the distribution
system for public use.
Several other components, though not considered as critical as the
distribution system, were still the subject of concern. Nearly half the
experts (20 of 43) identified source water as among drinking water
systems' top vulnerabilities. One expert noted, for example, that
"because of the vast areas covered by watersheds and reservoirs, it is
difficult to maintain security and prevent intentional or accidental
releases of materials that could have an adverse impact on water
quality." Yet some experts cited factors that mitigate the risks
associated with source water, including (1) the source water typically
involves a large volume of water, which in many cases could dilute the
potency of contaminants; (2) the length of time (days or even weeks)
that it typically takes for source water to reach consumers; and (3)
the source water will go through a treatment process in which many
contaminants are removed.
Also cited as vulnerabilities were the sophisticated computer systems
that drinking water utilities have come to rely upon to manage key
functions. These Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA)
systems allow operators to monitor and control processes throughout
their drinking water systems. Although SCADA systems have improved
water utilities' efficiency and reduced costs, almost half of the
experts on our panel (19 of 43) identified them as among these
utilities' top vulnerabilities.
Thirteen of the 43 experts identified treatment chemicals, particularly
chlorine used for disinfection, as among utilities' top
vulnerabilities. Experts cited the inherent danger of storing large
cylinders of a chemical on site, noting that their destruction could
release toxic gases in densely populated areas. Some noted, however,
that this risk has been alleviated by utilities that have chosen to use
the more stable liquid form of chlorine instead of the more vulnerable
compressed gas canisters that have traditionally been used.
Finally, experts identified overarching issues that compromise the
integrity of multiple physical assets, or even the entire drinking
water system. Among these is the lack of redundancy among vital
systems. Many drinking water systems are "linear"--that is, they have
single transmission lines leading into the treatment facility and
single pumping stations along the system, and often use a single
computer operating system. They also depend on the electric grid,
transportation systems, and single sources of raw materials (e.g.,
treatment chemicals). Many experts expressed concern that problems at
any of these "single points of failure" could render a system
inoperable unless redundant systems are in place. Experts also cited
the lack of sufficient information to understand the most significant
threats confronting individual utilities. According to the American
Water Works Association, assessments of the most credible threats
facing a utility should be based on knowledge of the "threat profile"
in its specific area, including information about past events that
could shed light on future risks. Experts noted, however, that such
information has been difficult for utilities to obtain. One expert
suggested that the intelligence community needs to develop better
threat information and share it with the water sector.
Experts' Views on the Allocation and Distribution of Federal Funds:
Many drinking water utilities have been financing at least some of
their security upgrades by passing along the costs to their customers
through rate increases. Given the cost of these upgrades, however, the
utility industry is also asking that the taxpayer shoulder some of the
burden through the appropriations process. Should Congress and the
administration agree to this request, they will need to address key
issues concerning who should receive the funds and how they should be
distributed. With this in mind, we asked our panel of experts to focus
on the following key questions: (1) To what extent should utilities'
vulnerability and risk assessment information be considered in making
allocation decisions? (2) What types of utilities should receive
funding priority? and (3) What are the most effective mechanisms for
directing these funds to recipients?
Regarding the first of these questions, about 90 percent of the experts
(39 of 43) agreed "strongly" or "somewhat" that funds should be
allocated on the basis of vulnerability assessment information, with
some citing the vulnerability assessments (VAs) required by the
Bioterrorism Act as the best available source of this information.
Several experts, however, pointed to a number of complicating factors.
Perhaps the most significant constraint is the Bioterrorism Act's
provision precluding the disclosure of any information that is
"derived" from vulnerability assessments submitted to EPA. The
provision protects sensitive information about each utility's
vulnerabilities from individuals who may then use the information to
harm the utility. Hence, the law specifies that only individuals
designated by the EPA Administrator may have access to the assessments
and related information. Yet, according to many of the experts, even
those individuals may face constraints in using the information. They
may have difficulty, for example, in citing vulnerability assessments
to support decisions on allocating security-related funds among
utilities, as well as decisions concerning research priorities and
guidance documents. Others cited an inherent dilemma affecting any
effort to set priorities for funding decisions based on the greatest
risk--whatever does not receive attention becomes a more likely target.
Regarding the second question concerning the types of utilities that
should receive funding priority, 93 percent of the experts (40 of 43)
indicated that utilities serving high-density population areas should
receive a high or the highest priority in funding (See figure 4.).
Fifty-five percent deemed this criterion as the highest priority. Most
shared the view of one expert who noted that directing limited
resources to protect the greatest number of people is a common factor
when setting funding priorities. Experts also assigned high priority to
utilities serving critical assets, such as national icons representing
the American image, military bases, and key government, academic, and
cultural institutions.
Figure 4: Experts' Views on Which Types of Water Utilities Should
Receive Priority for Federal Funds:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
At the other end of the spectrum, only about 5 percent of the experts
(2 of 43) stated that utilities serving rural or isolated populations
should receive a high or highest priority for federal funding. These
two panelists commented that such facilities are least able to afford
security enhancements and are therefore in greatest need of federal
support. Importantly, the relatively small percentage of experts
advocating priority for smaller systems may not fully reflect the
concern among many of the experts for the safety of these utilities.
For example, several who supported higher priority for utilities
serving high-density populations cautioned that while problems at a
large utility will put more people at risk, utilities serving small
population areas may be more vulnerable because of weaker treatment
capabilities, fewer highly trained operators, and more limited
resources.
Regarding the mechanisms for distributing federal funds, 86 percent of
the experts (37 of 43) indicated that direct grants would be "somewhat"
or "very" effective in allocating federal funds (See figure 5.) One
expert cited EPA's distribution of direct security-related grant funds
in 2002 to larger systems to perform their VAs as a successful
initiative. Importantly, 74 percent also supported a matching
requirement for such grants as somewhat or very effective. One expert
pointed out that such a requirement would effectively leverage limited
federal dollars, thereby providing greater incentive to participate.
Figure 5: Recommended Approaches to Distribute Federal Funds:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
The Drinking Water State Revolving Fund (DWSRF) received somewhat less
support as a mechanism for funding security enhancements. About half of
the experts (22 of 43) indicated that the fund would be somewhat or
very effective in distributing federal funds, but less than 10 percent
indicated that it would be very effective.[Footnote 1] One expert
cautioned that the DWSRF should be used only if a process were
established that separated funding for security-related needs from
other infrastructure needs. Others stated that as a funding mechanism,
the DWSRF would not be as practical as other mechanisms for funding
improvements requiring immediate attention, but would instead be better
suited for longer-term improvements.
Activities Experts Identified as Most Deserving of Federal Support:
When experts were asked to identify specific security-enhancing
activities most deserving of federal support, their responses generally
fell into three categories: (1) physical and technological upgrades to
improve security and research to develop technologies to prevent,
detect, or respond to an attack, (2) education and training to support,
among other things, simulation exercises to provide responders with
experience in carrying out emergency response plans, and specialized
training of utility security staff; and (3) strengthening key
relationships between water utilities and other agencies that may have
key roles in an emergency response, such as public health agencies, law
enforcement agencies, and neighboring drinking water systems.
As illustrated in figure 6, specific activities to enhance physical
security and support technological improvements generally fell into
nine subcategories. Of these, the development of "near real-time
monitoring technologies," capable of providing near real-time data for
a wide array of potentially harmful water constituents, received far
more support for federal funding than any other subcategory--over 93
percent of the experts (40 of 43) rated this subcategory as deserving
at least a high priority for federal funding. More significantly,
almost 70 percent (30 of 43) rated it the highest priority--far
surpassing the rating of any other category. These technologies were
cited as critical in efforts to quickly detect contamination events,
minimize their impact, and restore systems after an event has passed.
The experts' views were consistent with those of the National Academies
of Science, which in a 2002 report highlighted the need for improved
monitoring technologies as one of four highest-priority areas for
drinking water research and development.[Footnote 2] The report noted
that such technologies differ significantly from those currently used
for conventional water quality monitoring, stating further that sensors
are needed for "better, cheaper, and faster sensing of chemical and
biological contaminants."
Figure 6: Activities Identified by Expert Panel to Enhance Physical
Security and Support Technological Improvements:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
In addition to real-time monitoring technologies, the experts voiced
strong support for (1) increasing laboratories' capacity to deal with
spikes in demand caused by chemical, biological, or radiological
contamination of water supplies, and (2) "hardening" the physical
assets of drinking water facilities through improvements such as adding
or repairing fences, locks, lighting systems, and cameras and other
surveillance equipment. Regarding the latter of these two, however,
some experts cited inherent limitations in attempting to
comprehensively harden a drinking water facility's assets. In
particular, they noted in particular that, unlike nuclear power or
chemical plants, a drinking water system's assets are spread over large
geographic areas, particularly the source water and distribution
systems.
Regarding efforts to improve education and training, over 90 percent of
the experts (39 of 43) indicated that improved technical training for
security-related personnel warrants at least a high priority for
federal funding. (See figure 7.) Over 55 percent (24 of 43) indicating
that it deserved the highest priority. To a lesser extent, experts
supported general training for other utility personnel to increase
their awareness of security issues. The panelists also underscored the
importance of conducting regional simulation exercises to test
emergency response plans, with more than 88 percent (38 of 43) rating
this as a high or highest priority for federal funding. Such exercises
are intended to provide utility and other personnel with the training
and experience needed both to perform their individual roles in an
emergency and to coordinate these roles with other responders. Finally,
about half the experts assigned at least a high priority to supporting
multidisciplinary consulting teams ("Red Teams"), comprising
individuals with a wide array of backgrounds, to provide independent
analyses of utilities' vulnerabilities.
Figure 7: Activities Identified by Experts to Improve Education and
Training:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
As illustrated in figure 8, experts also cited the need to improve
cooperation and coordination between drinking water utilities and
certain other organizations as key to improving utilities' security.
Among the organizations most often identified as critical to this
effort are public health and law enforcement agencies, which have data
that can help utilities better understand their vulnerabilities and
respond to emergencies. In addition, the experts cited the value of
utilities' developing mutual aid arrangements with neighboring
utilities. Such arrangements sometimes include, for example, sharing
back-up power systems or other critical equipment. One expert described
an arrangement in the San Francisco Bay Area--the Bay Area Security
Information Collaborative (BASIC)--in which eight utilities meet
regularly to address security-related topics. Finally, over 90 percent
of the experts (39 of 43) rated the development of common protocols
among drinking water utilities to monitor drinking water threats as
warranting a high or highest priority for federal funding. Drinking
water utilities vary widely in how they perceive threats and detect
contamination, in large part because few common protocols exist that
would help promote a more consistent approach toward these critical
functions. Some experts noted, in particular, the need for protocols to
guide the identification, sampling, and analysis of contaminants.
Figure 8: Activities Identified by Experts to Strengthen Relationships
Among Agencies and Utilities:
[See PDF for image]
[End of figure]
Observations:
In 2002, EPA's Strategic Plan on Homeland Security set forth the goal
of significantly reducing unacceptable security risks at water
utilities across the country by completing appropriate vulnerability
assessments; designing security enhancement plans; developing
emergency response plans; and implementing security enhancements. The
plan further committed to providing federal resources to help
accomplish these goals as funds are appropriated.
Key judgments about which recipients should get funding priority, and
how those funds should be spent, will have to be made in the face of
great uncertainty about the likely targets of attacks, the nature of
attacks (whether physical, cyber, chemical, biological, or
radiological), and the timing of attacks. The experts on our panel have
had to consider these uncertainties in developing their own judgments
about these issues. These judgments, while not unanimous on all
matters, suggested a high degree of consensus on a number of key
issues.
We recognize that such sensitive decisions must ultimately take into
account political, equity, and other considerations. But we believe
they should also consider the judgments of the nation's most
experienced individuals regarding these matters, such as those included
on our panel. It is in this context that we offer the results presented
in this testimony as information for Congress and the administration to
consider as they seek the best way to use limited financial resources
to reduce threats to the nation's drinking water supply.
Mr. Chairman, this completes my prepared statement. I would be happy to
respond to any questions you or other Members of this Subcommittee may
have.
FOOTNOTES
[1] The DWSRF program provides federal grant funds to states, which in
turn allow the states to help public water systems in their efforts to
protect public health and ensure their compliance with the Safe
Drinking Water Act. States may use the funds to provide loans to public
water systems, and may reserve a portion of their grants to finance
other projects that protect sources of drinking water and enhance the
technical, financial, and managerial capacity of public water systems.
[2] Making the Nation Safer: The Role of Science and Technology in
Countering Terrorism, p. 250. The National Research Council of the
National Academies. (Washington, D.C.: The National Academies Press,
2002).