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entitled 'Land Border Ports of Entry: Vulnerabilities and 
Inefficiencies in the Inspections Process' which was released on August 
18, 2003.

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On January 4, 2004, this document was revised to add various 
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August 18, 2003:

The Honorable Robert C. Bonner:

Commissioner, Bureau of Customs and Border Protection:

Department of Homeland Security:

Subject: Land Border Ports of Entry: Vulnerabilities and Inefficiencies 
in the Inspections Process:

Dear Mr. Bonner:

The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 
mandates that we track, monitor, and evaluate the Attorney General's 
strategy to deter illegal entry and report our findings to 
Congress.[Footnote 1] In response, we have evaluated immigration-
related inspections at land border POEs and made recommendations 
regarding (1) the integrity of the inspections process; (2) the 
efficiency and effectiveness of inspections-related port operations; 
and (3) the collection, analysis, and use of intelligence information. 
Due to your Bureau's concern that the public release of our detailed 
findings could compromise law enforcement operations, our report is 
restricted to Limited Official Use.

This letter is intended to summarize our overall findings and confirm 
your agreement to take action to address vulnerabilities and 
inefficiencies in the inspections process.

Most of our work was conducted before the Department of Justice's 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and the Department of the 
Treasury's Customs Service were merged into the newly created Bureau of 
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) in the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS). However, the issues we address remain relevant as DHS 
merges the functions previously performed by the two agencies and 
implements major changes to its border inspections process.

In performing our review, we visited 15 land border POEs--6 along the 
southern border and 9 along the northern border. At these ports we met 
with INS and Customs Port Directors, INS intelligence officers, and INS 
training officers. We interviewed INS inspectors in groups, involving a 
total of 82 inspectors. We also observed more than 100 INS and Customs 
inspectors conduct inspections. In addition, we met with INS District 
Office and Customs Management Center officials. At headquarters, we met 
with INS officials responsible for the inspections program, field 
operations, and intelligence; Customs officials responsible for 
passenger programs; and DHS officials when making contacts after March 
1, 2003. We also spoke with officials from CBP, the Immigration Officer 
Academy, and the Forensic Document Laboratory about issues related to 
immigration inspector training. We reviewed INS and Customs Inspections 
Program policies and procedures, and memoranda issued after September 
11, 2001; related studies and reports; and relevant laws and 
regulations. We conducted our work between July 2002 and May 2003 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Results in Brief:

Our observations and interviews at 15 land border POEs identified 
several vulnerabilities in the integrity of the inspections process, 
which raise the risk of unlawful entry. For example, inspectors can 
experience difficulties in verifying the identity of travelers, 
traveler inspections were not always done consistently and according to 
policy, and inspectors did not always receive the training they needed.

Inspections-related port operations were hampered by inefficiencies 
related to technology and equipment. Inspectors faced cumbersome 
procedures in order to access data systems, and the lack of automation 
for routine data collection cost time and resources. Furthermore, 
inspectors lacked a standard issue of equipment, which could create 
operational inefficiencies. On a positive note, planned expansion of 
dedicated commuter lanes for travelers determined to be low risk will 
increase efficiency and give inspectors more time to focus on travelers 
whose risk is unknown.

Regarding the collection, analysis, and use of intelligence 
information, lack of time and training impedes intelligence development 
and use. In addition, there was no structure in place to support the 
analysis and use of intelligence information in the field, despite the 
fact that INS and others have long recognized this as a need. Given the 
threat of terrorism confronting the country, having and using 
intelligence information effectively at land border POEs has never been 
more important.

We recommended actions to improve inspector training and equipment and 
develop a program to facilitate the collection, analysis, and use of 
intelligence information in the field. CBP officials generally 
concurred with our findings and described actions that it planned to 
take to address both our findings and recommendations.

Background:

Most travelers enter the United States through the nation's 166 land 
border POEs. According to INS data, of the estimated 453 million 
inspections that occurred in 2002, about 363 million, or 80 percent, 
occurred at land border POEs.[Footnote 2] About two-thirds of these 
inspections involved aliens and about one-third involved returning U.S. 
citizens. The vast majority of travelers who cross at land POEs arrive 
by vehicle, although a small percentage arrive on foot or by bus, 
mainly through southern border ports.

The purpose of the immigration-related portion of the inspections 
process is to determine if the person is a U.S. citizen or alien, and 
if an alien, whether the alien is entitled to enter the United 
States.[Footnote 3] The great majority of persons arriving at land POEs 
are residents of the border area who cross frequently and are familiar 
with U.S. entry requirements. Consequently, a screening procedure 
called primary inspection has been established to rapidly inspect 
travelers and identify those who are readily admissible. In general, 
inspectors are to question travelers about their nationality and 
purpose of their visit and review any travel documents the traveler may 
be required to present. Typically, primary inspections are conducted in 
less than 1 minute. Of the about 363 million persons inspected at land 
border POEs in 2002, about 354 million (98 percent) were admitted after 
a primary inspection.

Travelers whose admissibility cannot be readily determined, about 9 
million in 2002, are referred for a more intensive, or secondary, 
inspection. A secondary inspection consists of a more detailed review 
of travel documents and belongings; in-depth questioning by an 
inspector; and multiple computer checks to verify specific 
corroborating information, such as the traveler's stated identity. 
Depending on the results of the secondary inspection, the traveler 
could, among other outcomes, be admitted for entry, denied admission, 
allowed to return to the country of origin voluntarily, or detained 
while admissibility is determined in formal proceedings.

Because of the large volume of traffic at POEs, INS established 
dedicated commuter lanes to expedite the inspection of low-risk 
travelers. As of February 2003, dedicated commuter lanes had a total 
enrollment of about 80,000 persons. Along the southern border, commuter 
lanes are at 3 POEs--San Ysidro and Otay Mesa in California and Stanton 
Street Bridge in El Paso, Texas. Along the northern border, commuter 
lanes are located at 7 POEs--Pacific Highway, Point Roberts, and Peace 
Arch Crossing in Washington; Blue Water Bridge, Detroit Tunnel, and the 
Ambassador Bridge in Michigan; and Peace Bridge in New York. Travelers 
enrolled in these commuter lane programs have been prescreened through 
background checks and determined to pose a low risk to border security.

The inspections process at the nation's land borders will likely 
undergo significant changes in the near future. A series of laws 
enacted between 1996 and 2002 required the Attorney General to develop 
an automated entry and exit system that would create a record for every 
alien arriving in the United States and match it with a record when the 
alien departs. The system is to be in place at all air and sea ports by 
December 31, 2003, at the 50 busiest land border ports by the end of 
2004, and at all land border ports by the end of 2005. On April 29, 
2003, the Secretary of Homeland Security announced plans for the new 
U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) 
system. The system is to use biometric identifiers, such as 
photographs, fingerprints, or iris scans, to build an electronic check 
in/check out system for people coming to the United States to work, 
study, or visit. The US-VISIT system is intended to address the 
congressional requirements of the automated entry and exit system.

DHS Needs to Address Vulnerabilities and Inefficiencies in the 
Inspections Process:

Our visits to various ports, conducted in the months leading up to the 
establishment of DHS, identified issues affecting the integrity of the 
inspections process, deficiencies and inefficiencies in technology and 
equipment, and deficiencies in field level operations to collect, 
analyze, and use intelligence information. Persons seeking to illegally 
enter the United States may exploit weaknesses in any of these areas. 
Given the threat of terrorism against the country, it is particularly 
important that inspectors at land border POEs have the support they 
need to collect, analyze, and use intelligence information.

Officials we interviewed and studies we reviewed offered various 
options for addressing some of the vulnerabilities discussed in our 
report. DHS has work groups in place to examine many of these 
vulnerabilities, but it must take swift action to address them, given 
the threats to the nation. As a newly established department, DHS is 
tasked with expeditiously integrating multiple agencies and units into 
a cohesive and effective organization. The challenges before it are 
many, but resolving the issues we raised should help place DHS in a 
better position to protect the nation from the entry of unlawful 
travelers at land border POEs.

In addition to the Department of Homeland Security, we are sending 
copies of this report to the Senate and House Committees on the 
Judiciary, the House Select Committee on Homeland Security, the 
Department of State, and other interested parties. We will also make 
copies available to others upon request. In addition, the report will 
be available at no charge on GAO's Web site at http://www.gao.gov. If 
you or your staff have any questions about this report, please call me 
at (202) 512-8777 or Michael P. Dino, Assistant Director, at (213) 830-
1150.

Sincerely yours,

Richard M. Stana:

Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues:

(440239):

FOOTNOTES

[1] P. L. 104-208, div. C, ยง 110, 8 U.S.C. 1103 note.

[2] INS Performance and Analysis System. We did not assess the 
reliability of the data since the information is presented for 
background purposes. 

[3] While our work focused on how inspectors determined the 
admissibility of persons, inspectors are also responsible for 
determining whether travelers could be violating criminal laws (such as 
the smuggling of narcotics) and are in compliance with other laws 
related to importing products and animals.