Summary

In its review of lessons learned from four rounds of military base closures and realignments, GAO found that many neighboring communities have been able to absorb the economic losses stemming from closed bases. Several federal programs appear to have helped cushion the impact of closing bases on individuals and communities. However, the Defense Department (DOD), which projects billions of dollars in annual savings from closed bases, has yet to produce firm data on expected savings. Given the historical difficulty of closing bases, new legislation will be needed if there are to be future base closures. DOD has proposed that Congress authorize two additional rounds of military base closures and realignments. If future rounds are authorized, decisions will be needed on the number of rounds, when they should be held, and how they will relate to other legislation dealing with downsizing and restructuring DOD's laboratories and test and evaluation facilities. The outcome of future rounds could be improved by resolving, in advance, key organizational and policy issues, such as which military service will be responsible for which support functions and whether some facilities will be managed jointly. The Office of the Secretary of Defense will have to exercise strong leadership to overcome the services' long-standing parochialism and inability to agree on significant cross-service consolidations in common support areas.

GAO noted that: (1) lessons have been learned from prior BRAC rounds that can be used to improve the BRAC process should future rounds be authorized; (2) these lessons relate to the amount of savings and up-front costs associated with closing bases and the economic impact on communities confronted with the loss of jobs; (3) data indicate that savings from base closures, though not well-documented, are expected to be substantial; (4) however, net savings from BRAC were not generated as quickly as initially estimated because the costs of closing bases and environmental cleanup were high and offset the savings; (5) firm data on expected savings have been difficult to obtain primarily because DOD accounting systems, like all accounting systems, track expenses and disbursements, not savings; (6) furthermore, DOD guidance does not require that the services' BRAC savings estimates be developed consistently, well-documented, or updated annually to reflect changes that occur during implementation; (7) also, large revenues initially expected to be generated from land sales have not occurred; (8) some cost avoidances are not fully captured in DOD's savings estimates because defense budget plans do not reflect future costs such as long-term recapitalization costs; (9) while defense civilian job loss and other adverse effects on communities are an inescapable byproduct of base closures, at least in the short term, recent studies indicate that, in a number of communities, the local economies appeared to be able to absorb the economic losses, though some communities are faring better than others; (10) however, in some cases, it is too soon to tell what the ultimate economic impact will be; (11) given the historical difficulty of closing bases, new legislation is needed if there are going to be future base closures; (12) DOD has proposed that Congress authorize two additional BRAC rounds; (13) the outcome of potential future BRAC rounds could be improved by resolving, in advance, key organizational and policy issues, such as which service or services will be responsible for which support functions and whether some facilities will be managed jointly; (14) the Office of the Secretary of Defense will have to exercise strong leadership to overcome the services' long-standing parochialism and inability to agree on significant cross-service consolidations in common support areas; and (15) the Secretary's Task Force on Defense Reform, as a follow-on effort to the Quadrennial Defense Review, could help address some of these key organizational and policy issues.