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Some Challenges Encountered by State and Local Information Fusion 
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Report to Congressional Committees: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 

GAO: 

October 2007: 

Homeland Security: 

Federal Efforts Are Helping to Alleviate Some Challenges Encountered by 
State and Local Information Fusion Centers: 

Homeland Security: 

GAO-08-35: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-08-35, a report to congressional committees. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

In general, a fusion center is a collaborative effort to detect, 
prevent, investigate, and respond to criminal and terrorist activity. 
Recognizing that fusion centers are a mechanism for information 
sharing, the federal government—including the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS), the Department of Justice (DOJ), and the Program 
Manager for the Information Sharing Environment (PM-ISE), which has 
primary responsibility for governmentwide information sharing and is 
located in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence—is 
taking steps to partner with fusion centers. 

In response to your request, GAO examined (1) the status and 
characteristics of fusion centers and (2) to what extent federal 
efforts help alleviate challenges the centers identified. GAO reviewed 
center-related documents and conducted interviews with officials from 
DHS, DOJ, and the PM-ISE, and conducted semistructured interviews with 
58 state and local fusion centers. The results are not generalizable to 
the universe of fusion centers. Data are not available on the total 
number of local fusion centers. 

What GAO Found: 

Most states and many local governments have established fusion centers 
to address gaps in information sharing. Fusion centers across the 
country vary in their stages of development—from operational to early 
in the planning stages. Officials in 43 of the centers GAO contacted 
described their centers as operational, and 34 of these centers had 
opened since January 2004. Law enforcement entities, such as state 
police or state bureaus of investigation, are the lead or managing 
agencies in the majority of the operational centers GAO contacted; 
however, the centers varied in their staff sizes and partnerships with 
other agencies. Nearly all of the operational fusion centers GAO 
contacted had federal personnel assigned to them. For example, DHS has 
assigned personnel to 17, and the FBI has assigned personnel to about 
three quarters of the operational centers GAO contacted. 

DHS and DOJ have several efforts under way that begin to address 
challenges fusion center officials identified. DHS and DOJ have 
provided many fusion centers access to their information systems, but 
fusion center officials cited challenges accessing and managing 
multiple information systems. Both DHS and the FBI have provided 
security clearances for state and local personnel and set timeliness 
goals. However, officials cited challenges obtaining and using security 
clearances. Officials in 43 of the 58 fusion centers contacted reported 
facing challenges related to obtaining personnel, and officials in 54 
fusion centers reported challenges with funding, some of which affected 
these centers’ sustainability. The officials said that these issues 
made it difficult to plan for the future and created concerns about the 
fusion centers’ ability to sustain their capability for the long-term. 
To support fusion centers, both DHS and the FBI have assigned personnel 
to the centers. To help address funding issues, DHS has made several 
changes to address restrictions on the use of federal grants funds. 
These individual agency efforts help address some of the challenges 
with personnel and funding. However, the federal government has not 
clearly articulated the long-term role it expects to play in sustaining 
fusion centers. It is critical for center management to know whether to 
expect continued federal resources, such as personnel and grant 
funding, since the federal government, through the information sharing 
environment, expects to rely on a nationwide network of centers to 
facilitate information sharing with state and local governments. 
Finally, DHS, DOJ, and the PM-ISE have taken steps to develop guidance 
and provide technical assistance to fusion centers, for instance, by 
issuing guidelines for establishing and operating centers. However, 
officials at 31 of the 58 centers said they had challenges training 
their personnel, and officials at 11 centers expressed a need for the 
federal government to establish standards for training fusion center 
analysts to help ensure that analysts have similar skills. DHS and DOJ 
have initiated a technical assistance program for fusion centers. They 
have also developed a set of baseline capabilities, but the document 
was still in draft as of September and had not been issued. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO is recommending that the federal government determine and 
articulate its long-term fusion center role and whether it expects to 
provide resources to help ensure their sustainability. DHS and PM-ISE 
reviewed a report draft and agreed with our recommendation. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
[hyperlink, http://wwww.GAO-08-35].
For more information, contact Eileen Larence at (202) 512-8777 or 
larencee@gao.gov. 

[End of Section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Results in Brief: 

Background: 

State and Local Fusion Centers Vary in Their Stages of Development and 
Characteristics: 

Federal Agencies' Efforts to Support Fusion Centers Help to Address 
Some Reported Challenges and Provide Further Assistance: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Operational Fusion Centers: 

Appendix III: Fusion Centers in the Planning and Early Stages of 
Development: 

Appendix IV: Summary of State and Local Fusion Centers GAO Contacted: 

Appendix V: GAO Contacts and Acknowledgments: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Networks and Systems to Which State and Local Fusion Centers 
May Have Access: 

Table 2: DHS Grant Funds Allocated for Fusion-Related Activities, 
Fiscal Year 2004 through 2006: 

Table 3: Examples of Technical Assistance Services Provided Jointly by 
DHS and DOJ for the Fusion Process: 

Table 4: Selected Characteristics of Operational Fusion Centers We 
Contacted, as of September 2007: 

Table 5: Selected Characteristics of Fusion Centers in the Planning and 
Early Stages of Development We Contacted, as of September 2007: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Reported Stage of Development for Fusion Centers We 
Contacted, as of September 2007: 

Figure 2: Number of Fusion Centers Opened, by Year, Since September 
2001: 

Abbreviations: 

ACS: Automated Case Support: 
AcTIC: Arizona Counter Terrorism Information Center: 
AMBER: America's Missing: Broadcast Emergency Response: 
ATF: Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms: 
BJA: Bureau of Justice Assistance: 
CBP: U.S. Customs and Border Protection: 
CFC: Commonwealth Fusion Center: 
CIAC: Colorado Information Analysis Center: 
CPIC: Chicago Crime Prevention and Information Center: 
CRS: Congressional Research Service: 
CTC: Counterterrorism Center: 
CTIC: Connecticut Intelligence Center: 
DEA: Drug Enforcement Administration: 
DHS: Department of Homeland Security: 
DIAC: Delaware Information Analysis Center: 
DOJ: Department of Justice: 
EPICEl: Paso Intelligence Center: 
FAMS: Federal Air Marshal Service: 
FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation: 
FBINET: Federal Bureau of Investigation Network: 
FDLE: Florida Department of Law Enforcement: 
FEMA: Federal Emergency Management Agency: 
FIG: Field Intelligence Group Fin: 
CEN: Financial Crimes Enforcement Network: 
FPS: Federal Protective Service: 
GISAC: Georgia Information Sharing and Analysis Center: 
HIDTA: High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area: 
HSDN: Homeland Security Data Network: 
HSGP: Homeland Security Grant Program: 
HSIN: Homeland Security Information Network: 
I&A: Office of Intelligence and Analysis: 
ICE: Immigration and Customs Enforcement: 
ICEFISHX: Intelligence Communications Enterprise for Information 
Sharing and Exchange: 
IDW: Investigative Data Warehouse: 
IIFC: Indiana Intelligence Fusion Center: 
INTERPOL: International Criminal Police Organization: 
ISAAC: Information Sharing and Analysis Center: 
ISE: Information Sharing Environment: 
ITACG: Interagency Threat Assessment Coordination Group: 
JRIC: Joint Regional Intelligence Center: 
JTTF: Joint Terrorism Task Force: 
KIFC: Kentucky Intelligence Fusion Center: 
KSTIC: Kansas Threat Integration Center: 
LAPD: Los Angeles Police Department: 
La-SAFE: Louisiana State Analysis and Fusion Exchange: 
LEO: Law Enforcement Online: 
LETPP: Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program: 
MATIC: Montana All-Threat Intelligence Center: 
MCAC: Maryland Coordination and Analysis Center: 
MIOC: Michigan Intelligence and Operations Center: 
MN-JAC: Minnesota Joint Analysis Center: 
MSAIC: Mississippi Analysis & Information Center: 
MWFC: Metropolitan Washington Fusion Center: 
NCIC: National Criminal Information Center: 
NPD: National Preparedness Directorate: 
NDIC: National Drug Intelligence Center: 
NFCCG: National Fusion Center Coordination Group: 
NLETS: International Justice and Public Safety Information Sharing 
Network: 
NMASIC: New Mexico All Source Intelligence Center: 
NTFC: North Central Texas Fusion Center: 
NYPD: New York Police Department: 
NYSIC: New York State Intelligence Center: 
PaCIC: Pennsylvania Criminal Intelligence Center: 
PM-ISE: Program Manager for the ISE: 
RISS: Regional Information Sharing System: 
RISS ATIX: Regional Information Sharing System Automated Trusted 
Information Exchange: 
RISSNET: Regional Information Sharing System: 
Secure Intranet: 
ROIC: Regional Operations Intelligence Center: 
RTTAC: Regional Terrorism Threat Analysis Center: 
SAIC: Strategic Analysis and Information Center: 
SBI: State Bureau of Investigation: 
SCIEX: South Carolina Information Exchange: 
SCIF: Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility: 
SCION: Sensitive Compartmental Information Operational Network: 
SEVIS: Student and Exchange Visitor Information System: 
SHSP: State Homeland Security Program: 
SIPRNet: Secret Internet Protocol Router Network: 
STAC: Southeastern Wisconsin Terrorism Alert Center: 
STIC: Statewide Terrorism and Intelligence Center: 
STTAC: State Terrorism Threat Assessment Center: 
TEW: Terrorism Early Warning: 
TITAN: Terrorism Intelligence and Threat Assessment Network: 
TLO: Terrorism Liaison Officer: 
TRIC: Tennessee Regional Information Center: 
TSA: Transportation Security Administration: 
TS/SCI: Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmented Information: 
UASI: Urban Areas Security Initiative: 
WAJAC: Washington Joint Analytical Center: 
WSIC: Wisconsin Statewide Intelligence Center: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 

Washington, DC 20548: 

October 30, 2007: 

Congressional Requesters: 

A breakdown in information sharing was a major factor contributing to 
the failure to prevent the attacks of September 11, 2001, according to 
the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States 
(the 9/11 Commission). Since then, most states and some local 
governments have, largely on their own initiative, established fusion 
centers to address gaps in homeland security, terrorism, and law 
enforcement information sharing by the federal government and to 
provide a conduit of this information within the state. Indeed, 
developing a fusion center was a high priority of state homeland 
security directors, according to a 2006 National Governors Association 
survey. Although fusion centers vary because they were primarily 
established to meet state and local needs, a fusion center is generally 
"a collaborative effort of two or more agencies that provide resources, 
expertise, and information to the center with the goal of maximizing 
their ability to detect, prevent, investigate, and respond to criminal 
and terrorist activity."[Footnote 1] Fusion centers may include a range 
of federal, state, and local entities and collect and analyze 
information related to homeland security, terrorism, and law 
enforcement. 

With information-sharing weaknesses recognized as a major contributing 
factor to the nation's lack of preparedness for the 9/11 attacks, a 
number of information-sharing initiatives were mandated by the Homeland 
Security Act of 2002 and the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
Prevention Act of 2004 (Intelligence Reform Act). The Homeland Security 
Act, for example, requires that the President prescribe and implement 
procedures under which federal agencies can share relevant and 
appropriate homeland security information with other federal agencies 
and with appropriate state and local personnel, such as law enforcement 
agencies and first responders.[Footnote 2] The President assigned most 
responsibilities for executing this requirement to the Secretary of the 
Department of Homeland Security in July 2003. The Intelligence Reform 
Act, as amended in August 2007 by the Implementing Recommendations of 
the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (9/11 Commission Act), mandates a more 
extensive information-sharing regime that requires the President to 
take action to facilitate the sharing of terrorism and homeland 
security information by establishing an Information Sharing Environment 
(ISE) that is to combine policies, procedures, and technologies that 
link people, systems, and information among all appropriate federal, 
state, local, and tribal entities and the private sector.[Footnote 3] 
This act also requires, among other things, that the President appoint 
a program manager to oversee development and implementation of the ISE, 
which the President did in April 2005. 

Recognizing that state and local fusion centers represent a critical 
source of local information about potential threats and a mechanism for 
providing terrorism-related information and intelligence from federal 
sources, the Program Manager for the ISE (PM-ISE),[Footnote 4] the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and the Department of Justice 
(DOJ) are taking steps to partner with and leverage fusion centers as 
part of the overall information sharing environment. The PM-ISE issued 
an implementation plan in November 2006 that incorporated 
presidentially approved recommendations for federal, state, local, and 
private sector information sharing and largely relied on efforts under 
way by DHS and DOJ with respect to fusion centers. Recognizing that the 
collaboration between fusion centers and with the federal government 
marks a tremendous increase in the nation's overall analytic capacity 
that can be used to combat terrorism, the plan envisions that the 
federal government will work to leverage and promote fusion center 
initiatives to facilitate effective nationwide terrorism-related 
information sharing, with fusion centers becoming the focal point of 
this sharing. Under the plan, DHS and DOJ are to work with states to 
designate a primary fusion center to serve as the statewide or regional 
hub to interface with the federal government and through which to 
coordinate the gathering, processing, analyzing, and disseminating of 
terrorism-related information. DHS and DOJ are to assume the 
responsibility for technical assistance and training to support the 
establishment and operation of the fusion centers. Finally, according 
to PM-ISE officials, the plan envisions that in order to receive grant 
funding, each designated fusion center must develop a coordinated 
approach with any other fusion centers in the state and will eventually 
achieve a baseline level of capability and ensure compliance with all 
applicable privacy laws and standards. Both DHS and DOJ have 
established program offices to oversee their relationships with fusion 
centers. 

In addition, the 9/11 Commission Act contains several provisions 
related to fusion centers.[Footnote 5] For example, the act requires 
the Secretary of DHS, in consultation with the Attorney General, the PM-
ISE, and others to establish a state, local, and regional fusion center 
initiative within DHS to establish partnerships with state, local, and 
regional fusion centers that will, among other things, provide 
operational and intelligence advice and assistance, as well as 
management assistance, and facilitate close communication and 
coordination between fusion centers and DHS. In addition, the 
initiative is to provide training to fusion centers and encourage the 
centers to participate in terrorism-threat-related exercises conducted 
by DHS. 

In response to your request to describe state and local fusion centers 
and federal efforts underway to support them, this report answers the 
following two questions: 

* What are the stages of development and characteristics of state and 
local fusion centers? 

* To what extent do efforts under way by the PM-ISE, DHS, and DOJ help 
to address some of the challenges identified by fusion centers? 

To answer these questions, we reviewed relevant directives, plans, and 
documents and interviewed officials--including many of those from the 
PM-ISE, DHS, and DOJ--who are involved with those entities' efforts to 
support fusion centers. In addition, we spoke with officials from 11 
organizations conducting research on state and local information 
sharing, including officials at the Congressional Research Service 
(CRS) who released a report in July 2007 on fusion centers.[Footnote 6] 
We also conducted semistructured telephone interviews with the director 
(or his or her designee) of every state fusion center, the District of 
Columbia fusion center, and eight local fusion centers to obtain 
information about the centers' characteristics, challenges encountered, 
and support received from DHS and DOJ.[Footnote 7] Our selection 
criteria for the local fusion centers included their relationships with 
the state fusion center, stage of development, and geographic 
diversity. Where a fusion center was in the planning stages, we spoke 
with officials involved in the planning and establishment of the 
center, such as directors of homeland security offices. From February 
through May 2007, we spoke with officials from all 50 states, the 
District of Columbia, and 8 local jurisdictions. While we did contact 
officials in all state fusion centers, we did not contact officials in 
all local fusion centers; therefore our results are not generalizable 
to the universe of fusion centers. Data were not available to determine 
the total number of local fusion centers. 

To describe the challenges fusion centers encountered in establishing 
and operating, we asked officials during our semistructured telephone 
interviews whether they encountered challenges in 10 different 
categories and, if so, the extent to which the category was a challenge 
both at establishment and, for operational centers, in day-to-day 
operations. These categories included federal partnerships, personnel, 
guidance, training, funding, access to information, and security 
clearances. Fusion center officials provided open-ended, descriptive 
responses of challenges faced by their centers. On the basis of a 
content analysis of fusion center officials' responses, we identified, 
categorized, and counted similar challenges. Fusion center officials 
may not have indicated that they encountered all the challenges 
discussed in the report. In addition, individual fusion center 
officials may have identified multiple challenges in a given category, 
for example funding. 

We also obtained and summarized descriptive information from the fusion 
centers including structure, organization, personnel, and information 
technology systems used. Finally, to obtain detailed information about 
centers' operations and challenges encountered, we conducted site 
visits to fusion centers in Atlanta, Georgia; Phoenix, Arizona; 
Richmond, Virginia; Baltimore, Maryland; West Trenton, New Jersey; and 
New York, New York. Our selection criteria for these centers included 
their stage of development, extent of federal partnerships, and 
geographic representation. Appendix I provides further details on our 
objectives, scope, and methodology. We performed our work from August 
2006 through September 2007 in accordance with generally accepted 
government auditing standards. 

Results in Brief: 

Established by state and local governments generally to improve 
information sharing and to prevent terrorism or other threats, fusion 
centers across the country are in varying stages of development--from 
operational to early in the planning stages. Officials in 43 of the 58 
fusion centers we contacted described their centers as operational as 
of September 2007.[Footnote 8] Thirty-four of the operational centers 
are relatively new, having been opened since January 2004, while 9 
centers opened within the couple of years after the attacks of 
September 11. The majority had missions and scopes of operations that 
included more than just counterterrorism-related activities, such as 
collecting, analyzing, and disseminating criminal as well as terrorism- 
related information. Adopting a broader focus helped provide 
information about all threats and, in the opinion of some fusion center 
officials, increased the center's sustainability, for instance, by 
including additional stakeholders. Law enforcement entities, such as 
state police or state bureaus of investigation, are the lead or 
managing agencies in the majority of the operational centers we 
contacted. However, the centers varied in their staff sizes and 
partnerships with other agencies. At least 34 of the 43 operational 
fusion centers we contacted had federal personnel assigned to them. For 
example, officials in 17 of the operational centers we contacted 
reported that they had DHS intelligence officers, and officials in 
about three quarters of the operational centers told us that they had 
FBI special agents or intelligence analysts assigned to their centers. 
Many fusion centers reported having access to DHS's and DOJ's 
unclassified networks or systems, such as 40 with access to the 
Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN) and 39 with access to Law 
Enforcement Online (LEO).[Footnote 9] In addition, 16 of the 43 centers 
said they had or were in the process of obtaining access to DHS's 
classified network, and 23 reported they had or were in the process of 
obtaining access to the FBI's classified systems. Products disseminated 
and services provided also vary. For instance, some centers provide 
investigative support for law enforcement officers. 

DHS and DOJ, recognizing the importance of fusion centers in 
information sharing, have efforts under way that begin to address 
challenges fusion center officials identified in establishing and 
operating their centers, such as accessing information, obtaining 
security clearances, obtaining and retaining personnel, obtaining 
funding, and finding sufficient guidance and training. 

* As we have highlighted, DHS and DOJ have provided many fusion centers 
access to their information systems, but fusion center officials cited 
challenges accessing and managing multiple information systems. For 
example, officials at 31 of the 58 centers we contacted reported 
challenges obtaining access to federal information systems or networks. 
DHS and the FBI have taken some steps to address this challenge, such 
as assisting with needed system security requirements that are a 
prerequisite to obtaining access. Officials at 30 of the fusion centers 
also found the multiple systems or heavy volume of often redundant 
information a challenge to manage. Officials from the PM-ISE's office 
said they are collaborating with agencies, including DHS and DOJ, on an 
effort to review existing federal information systems and users' needs 
to determine opportunities to streamline system access. However, it is 
too early to tell whether these efforts will address the challenges 
reported by fusion centers. 

* Both DHS and the FBI have provided security clearances for state and 
local personnel and have set goals to reduce the length of time it 
takes to obtain a clearance. DHS and the FBI have also provided centers 
with information about the security clearance process and time frames 
in an effort to clarify the time needed to process requests. However, 
obtaining and using security clearances represented a challenge for 44 
of the 58 fusion centers we contacted. For instance, officials at 32 of 
the centers cited difficulties with the length of time it takes to 
receive a security clearance from DHS or the FBI. Further, while law 
and executive order provide that a security clearance granted by one 
federal agency should generally be accepted by other agencies,[Footnote 
10] officials in 19 of the centers encountered difficulties with 
federal agencies, particularly DHS and the FBI, accepting each others' 
clearances. DHS and DOJ officials said that they were not aware of 
fusion centers encountering recent challenges with reciprocity of 
security clearances. However, they said that there were complications 
in the clearance process, for example, multiple federal agencies carry 
out their own processes without central coordination. 

* Officials in 43 of the 58 fusion centers we contacted reported facing 
challenges related to obtaining personnel, and officials in 54 fusion 
centers reported challenges with obtaining and maintaining funding when 
establishing and operating their centers, challenges which some of 
these officials also said affected their centers' sustainability. For 
example, officials in 37 centers said they encountered challenges with 
federal, state, and local agencies not being able to detail personnel 
to their fusion center, particularly in the face of resource 
constraints. Fusion centers rely on such details as a means of staffing 
the centers and enhancing information sharing with other state and 
local agencies. To support fusion centers, as of September 2007, DHS 
had assigned intelligence officers to 17 of the operational fusion 
centers we contacted, and the FBI had assigned personnel to about three 
quarters of the fusion centers we contacted. In terms of funding, 
officials in 35 of the 58 centers encountered challenges with the 
complexity of the federal grant process or uncertain or declining 
federal funding, and officials from 28 of the 58 centers reported 
having difficulty obtaining state or local funding. They said that 
these issues created confusion for their centers over the steps needed 
to secure federal funds, made it difficult to plan for the future, and 
created concerns about the fusion centers' abilities to sustain their 
capabilities for the long-term. Additionally, fusion center officials 
identified challenges with restrictions on the use of federal grant 
funds, and DHS has made several changes to help address these 
challenges by taking steps to ease the grant process and by adjusting 
some of the restrictions on the timing and use of grant funds. While 
these funds are helpful, fusion center officials were concerned about 
the extent of federal support they could expect over the long term. The 
federal government, through the ISE, has stated that it expects to rely 
on a nationwide network of fusion centers as the cornerstone of 
information sharing with state and local governments, but ISE plans or 
guidance to date do not articulate the long-term role the federal 
government expects to play in sustaining these centers, especially in 
relation to the role of their state or local jurisdictions. It is 
critical for center management to know whether to expect continued 
federal resources--such as grant funds, facility support, personnel, 
and information systems--over the long term. While the federal 
government generally cannot commit future resources, articulating the 
extent to which it plans to help support these centers in the long term 
is important for fusion center management in its planning efforts and 
for sustaining the network. 

* DHS, DOJ, and the PM-ISE have taken steps to develop guidance and 
provide technical assistance to fusion centers to address their 
challenges in the areas of guidance and training. For instance, in 
August 2006, DHS and DOJ issued jointly developed Fusion Center 
Guidelines that outline 18 recommended elements for establishing and 
operating fusion centers--for example, ensuring appropriate security 
measures are in place for facility, data, and personnel. Officials in 
48 of the 58 fusion centers we contacted said that they found the 
Guidelines generally good or useful, although officials at 19 fusion 
centers said they lacked guidance on specific policies and procedures 
on information sharing or lacked national standards and guidelines on 
training or qualifications for analysts. Furthermore, officials at 31 
of the fusion centers we contacted said they had challenges training 
their personnel, and officials at 11 centers expressed a need for the 
federal government to establish standards for training fusion center 
analysts to help ensure that analysts have similar skills. DHS and DOJ 
have initiated a technical assistance service program for fusion 
centers and, along with the PM-ISE, sponsored regional and national 
conferences and are developing a baseline capabilities document to 
provide more specific guidelines for fusion centers. However, as of 
September 2007, the baseline capabilities document was still in draft 
form and had not been issued. 

To help address concerns about sustaining centers, we are recommending 
that the federal government determine and articulate its long-term 
fusion center role and whether it expects to provide resources to 
centers to help ensure their sustainability as part of the nationwide 
network of fusion centers. 

We requested comments on a draft of this report from the Secretary of 
the Department of Homeland Security, the Acting Attorney General, and 
the Program Manager for the Information Sharing Environment or their 
designees. In commenting on drafts of the report, DHS and the PM-ISE 
agreed with our recommendation, and DOJ had no comments on the draft. 
Further, DHS commented that it, along with its federal partners, is 
reviewing strategies to sustain fusion centers as part of the work plan 
of the National Fusion Center Coordination Group. This group plans to 
present these strategies to the federal departments before the end of 
the year. 

Background: 

DHS's Role in Fusion Centers: 

As part of its mission and in accordance with the Homeland Security 
Act, DHS has responsibility for coordinating efforts to share homeland 
security information across all levels of government, including 
federal, state, local, and tribal governments and the private sector. 
Specifically with respect to fusion centers, DHS envisions creating 
partnerships with state and local centers to improve information flow 
between DHS and the centers and to improve their effectiveness as a 
whole. As such, the Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A) was 
designated in June 2006 by the Secretary as the executive agent to 
manage a program to accomplish DHS's state and local fusion center 
mission. The Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and Analysis approved 
the establishment of the State and Local Program Office (SLPO) under 
the direction of a Principle Deputy Assistant Secretary to implement 
this mission. Specifically, the office is responsible for deploying DHS 
personnel with operational and intelligence skills to state and local 
fusion centers to facilitate coordination and the flow of information 
between DHS and the center, provide expertise in intelligence analysis 
and reporting, coordinate with local DHS and FBI components, and 
provide DHS with local situational awareness and access to fusion 
center information. As part of this effort, DHS is conducting needs 
assessments at fusion centers to review their status and determine what 
resources, such as personnel, system access, and security, are needed. 
As of September 2007, DHS had conducted 25 fusion center needs 
assessments. The SLPO also coordinates the granting of DHS security 
clearances for personnel located in fusion centers and the deployment 
of DHS classified and unclassified systems for use in the fusion 
center. 

The Homeland Security Grant Program (HSGP) awards funds to states, 
territories, and urban areas to enhance their ability to prepare for, 
prevent, and respond to terrorist attacks and other major disasters. 
HSGP consists of five separate programs, three of which can be used by 
states and local jurisdictions, at their discretion, for fusion center- 
related funding. The State Homeland Security Program (SHSP) supports 
the implementation of the State Homeland Security Strategies to address 
the identified planning, equipment, training, and exercise needs for 
preventing acts of terrorism. The Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention 
Program (LETPP) provides resources to law enforcement and public safety 
communities to support critical terrorism prevention activities. Each 
state receives a minimum allocation under SHSP and LETPP and additional 
funds are allocated based on the analyses of risk and anticipated 
effectiveness. The Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI) program 
addresses the unique planning, equipment, training, and exercise needs 
of high-threat, high-density urban areas and assists them in building 
an enhanced and sustainable capacity to prevent, protect against, 
respond to, and recover from acts of terrorism. UASI funds are 
allocated on the basis of risk and anticipated effectiveness to about 
45 candidate areas. The fiscal year 2007 HSGP grant guidance specified 
the establishment and enhancement of state and local fusion centers as 
a prevention priority, making them a priority for LETPP. DHS's Federal 
Emergency Management Agency National Preparedness Directorate (FEMA/ 
NPD) manages the grant process and allocates these funds to state and 
local entities.[Footnote 11] 

FBI's Role in Fusion Centers: 

The FBI serves as the primary investigative unit of DOJ, and its 
mission includes investigating serious federal crimes, protecting the 
nation from terrorist and foreign intelligence threats, and assisting 
federal, state, and municipal law enforcement agencies. Following the 
attacks on September 11, 2001, the FBI shifted its primary mission to 
focus on counterterrorism; that is, detecting and preventing future 
attacks. The FBI primarily conducts its counterterrorism investigations 
through its Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTF), which are multi-agency 
task forces that generally contain state and local officials. As of 
September 2007, there were JTTFs in 101 locations, including one in 
each of the FBI's 56 field offices. Since 2003, each of the 56 field 
offices has also established a Field Intelligence Group (FIG) to serve 
as the centralized intelligence component responsible for the 
management, execution, and coordination of intelligence functions. 

Recognizing that fusion centers are becoming focal points for the 
sharing of homeland security, terrorism, and law enforcement 
information among federal, state, and local governments, the FBI has 
directed that its field offices, through their FIGs, become involved in 
the fusion centers in order to enhance the FBI's ability to accomplish 
its mission and "stay ahead of the threat." In June 2006, the FBI's 
National Security Branch directed each field office to assess its own 
information sharing environment and, when appropriate, detail a FIG 
special agent and intelligence analyst to the leading fusion center 
within its territory. The FBI's Directorate of Intelligence established 
an Interagency Integration Unit in January 2007 to provide headquarters 
oversight of FBI field offices' relationships with fusion centers. 
While the FBI's role in and support of individual fusion centers varies 
depending on the interaction between the particular center and the FBI 
field office, FBI efforts to support centers include assigning FBI 
special agents and intelligence analysts to fusion centers, providing 
office space or rent for fusion center facilities, providing security 
clearances, conducting security certification of facilities, and 
providing direct or facilitated access to the FBI. FBI personnel 
assigned to fusion centers are to provide an effective two-way flow of 
information between the fusion center and the FBI; participate as an 
investigative or analytical partner uncovering, understanding, 
reporting, and responding to threats; and ensure the timely flow of 
information between the fusion center and the local JTTF and FIG. 

Role of the Program Manager of the Information Sharing Environment in 
Fusion Centers: 

Established under the Intelligence Reform Act, the PM-ISE is charged 
with developing and overseeing implementation of the ISE, which 
consists of the policies, processes, and technologies that enable the 
sharing of terrorism information among local, state, tribal, federal, 
and private sector entities as well as foreign partners, and, as such, 
released an ISE Implementation Plan in November 2006. Recognizing that 
the collaboration between fusion centers and with the federal 
government marks a tremendous increase in the nation's overall analytic 
capacity that can be used to combat terrorism, the plan--integrating 
presidentially approved recommendations for federal, state, local, and 
private sector terrorism-related information sharing--calls for the 
federal government to promote the establishment of a nationwide 
integrated network of state and local fusion centers to facilitate 
effective terrorism information sharing. The plan outlines several 
actions on the part of the federal government, largely through DHS and 
DOJ, to support fusion centers, including providing technical 
assistance and training to support the establishment and operation of 
centers. 

In addition, the PM-ISE has established a National Fusion Center 
Coordination Group (NFCCG), led by DHS and DOJ, to identify federal 
resources to support the development of a national, integrated network 
of fusion centers. The NFCCG is to ensure that designated fusion 
centers achieve a baseline level of capability and comply with all 
applicable federal laws and policies regarding the protection of 
information and privacy and other legal rights of individuals. The 
NFCCG also is to ensure coordination between federal entities 
interacting with these fusion centers and has been tasked to develop 
recommendations regarding funding options relating to their 
establishment. However, to date, the efforts of the NFCCG have not 
included delineating whether such assistance is for the short-term 
establishment or long-term sustainability of fusion centers. In 
addition, the PM-ISE, in consultation with the Information Sharing 
Council--the forum for top information sharing officials from 
departments and agencies with activities that may include terrorism- 
related information--has also established a Senior-Level Interagency 
Advisory Group that oversees the NFCCG as part of its overall 
responsibility to monitor and ensure the implementation of the ISE. 

DHS's and DOJ's Networks and Systems for Sharing Information That 
Fusion Centers May Access: 

We reported in April 2007 that DHS and DOJ have 17 major networks and 4 
system applications that they use to support their homeland security 
missions, including sharing information with state and local entities 
such as fusion centers.[Footnote 12] In addition, state and local 
governments have similar information technology initiatives to carry 
out their homeland security missions. Table 1 provides information on 
the primary networks and systems used by fusion centers. 

Table 1: Networks and Systems to Which State and Local Fusion Centers 
May Have Access: 

System or network: Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN); 
Owner: DHS; 
Sensitivity level: Sensitive but unclassified; 
Brief summary of selected functions: 
* Serves as DHS's primary nationwide information- sharing tool for 
transporting sensitive but unclassified information; 
* Composed of over 35 communities of interest such as emergency 
management, law enforcement, counterterrorism, individual states, and 
private sector communities. Each community of interest has Web pages 
that are tailored for the community and contain general and community- 
specific news articles, links, and contact information; 
Types of information shared: 
* DHS' primary system for sharing terrorism and related information; 
* Supplies suspicious incident and pre-incident information, 24x7 
situational awareness, and analyses of terrorist threats, tactics, and 
weapons. 

System or network: Federal Protective Service (FPS) Secure Portal 
System; 
Owner: DHS; 
Sensitivity level: Sensitive but unclassified; 
Brief summary of selected functions: 
* Supports secure communications and collaboration across the law 
enforcement community; 
Types of information shared: 
* Manages information to help ensure the safety and security of federal 
buildings, protection officers, and visitors. 

System or network: Homeland Secure Data Network (HSDN); 
Owner: DHS; 
Sensitivity level: Secret; 
Brief summary of selected functions: 
* Secret-level classified communications network system with which 
government agencies are able to share information and collaborate in 
order to detect, deter, and mitigate threats to the homeland at the 
Secret level; 
* Provides state and local governments with their own area to post and 
manage collateral-level information for access by their federal law 
enforcement and intelligence community partners; 
Types of information shared: 
* Transmits homeland security data in support of activities including 
intelligence, investigations, and inspections that are classified at 
the Secret level. 

System or network: Federal Bureau of Investigation Network (FBINET); 
Owner: FBI; 
Sensitivity level: Secret; 
Brief summary of selected functions: 
* Serves as a global area network used for communicating Secret 
information; 
* Operated, maintained, and access controlled by the FBI; 
Types of information shared: 
* Communicates Secret information, including investigative case files 
and intelligence pertaining to national security. 

System or network: Law Enforcement Online (LEO); 
Owner: DOJ; 
Sensitivity level: Sensitive but unclassified; 
Brief summary of selected functions: 
* Serves as a real-time on-line controlled-access communications and 
information-sharing data repository; 
* Supports an Internet-accessible focal point for electronic sensitive 
but unclassified communication and information sharing with federal, 
state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies; 
Types of information shared: 
* Contains information about, among other things, antiterrorism, 
intelligence, law enforcement, and criminal justice. 

System or network: Regional Information Sharing Systems (RISS) Secure 
Intranet (RISSNET); 
Owner: State and local officials of the RISS program[A] with funding 
through a DOJ grant; 
Sensitivity level: Sensitive but unclassified; 
Brief summary of selected functions: 
* Serves as a secure network for law enforcement agencies throughout 
the United States and other countries; 
* Offers services such as secure e- mail, document libraries, 
intelligence databases, bulletin boards, a chat tool, and Web pages 
that contain general and community-specific news articles, links, and 
contact information; 
Types of information shared: 
* Provides a secure criminal intelligence network for communications 
and information sharing by local, state, tribal, and federal law 
enforcement agencies; 
* Beyond its collaboration tools, also provides users with access to 
other law enforcement resources such as analytical criminal data-
visualization tools and criminal intelligence databases. 

System or network: Regional Information Sharing Systems Automated 
Trusted Information Exchange (RISS ATIX); 
Owner: State and local officials of the RISS program with funding 
through a DOJ grant; 
Sensitivity level: Sensitive but unclassified; 
Brief summary of selected functions: 
* Offers services similar to RISSNET to agencies beyond the law 
enforcement community, including executives and officials from 
governmental and nongovernmental agencies and organizations that have 
public safety responsibilities; 
* Partitioned into 39 communities of interest such as critical 
infrastructure, emergency management, public health, and government 
officials. Services offered through its Web pages are tailored for each 
community of interest and contain community-specific news articles, 
links, and contact information; 
Types of information shared: 
* Users can post timely threat information, documents, images, and 
information related to terrorism and homeland security, as well as 
receive DHS information, advisories, and warnings. 

Source: GAO-07-455 and GAO analysis of DHS and DOJ information. 

[A] Operated and managed by state and local officials, RISS was 
established in 1974 as a nationwide initiative to share criminal 
intelligence among stakeholders in law enforcement, first responders, 
and the private sector and to coordinate efforts against crime that 
operate across jurisdictional lines. The program consists of six 
regional information analysis centers that offer services to RISS 
members in their regions, including information sharing and research, 
analytical products, case investigation support, funding, equipment 
loans, and training. 

[End of table] 

State and Local Fusion Centers Vary in Their Stages of Development and 
Characteristics: 

Established by state and local governments to improve information 
sharing among federal, state, and local entities and to prevent 
terrorism or other threats, fusion centers across the country vary in 
their stages of development--from operational to early in the planning 
stages. Those centers that are operational vary in many of their 
characteristics, but generally have missions that are broader than 
counterterrorism, have multiple agencies represented--including federal 
partners--in their centers, and have access to a number of networks and 
systems that provide homeland security and law enforcement-related 
information. 

Fusion Centers Have Been Established in Most States: 

Since September 2001, almost all states and several local governments 
have established or are in the process of establishing a fusion center. 
Officials in 43 of the 58 fusion centers we contacted described their 
centers as operational as of September 2007. Specifically, officials in 
35 states, the District of Columbia, and 7 local jurisdictions we 
contacted described their fusion center as operational, officials in 14 
states and 1 local jurisdiction considered their centers to be in the 
planning or early stages of development, and 1 state did not have or 
plan to have a fusion center, as shown in figure 1. In 6 states we 
contacted, there was more than one fusion center established. 

Figure 1: Reported Stage of Development for Fusion Centers We 
Contacted, as of September 2007: 

This figure is an illustration showing reported stage of development 
for fusion centers contacted, as of September 2007: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO analysis of Information provided by fusion center 
officials; Map, Map Resources. 

[End of figure] 

Officials cited a variety of reasons why their state or local 
jurisdiction established a fusion center. To improve information 
sharing--related to homeland security, terrorism, and law enforcement-
-among federal, state, and local entities and to prevent terrorism or 
threats after the attacks of September 11 were the most frequently 
cited reasons. For example, officials in one state said that their 
state was "mentioned 59 times in the 9/11 Commission Report, the 
majority of which were not complimentary," and as a result established 
a 24-hour-per-day and 7-day-per-week intelligence and information 
analysis center to serve as the central hub to facilitate the 
collection, analysis, and dissemination of crime and terrorism-related 
information. Several officials cited the need to enhance information 
sharing within their own jurisdictions across disciplines and levels of 
government as the reason why their jurisdiction established a center. 
While most officials from fusion centers that were in the planning or 
early stages of development stated that they were establishing a fusion 
center in general to enhance information sharing or protect against 
future threats, officials in a few centers also noted that their 
jurisdictions were discussing or establishing fusion centers because of 
available DHS grant funding or their perception that DHS was requiring 
states to establish a center. Appendixes II and III provide basic 
information about operational fusion centers and fusion centers in the 
planning and early stages of development, respectively. Appendix IV 
provides a state-by-state summary of state and local areas' efforts to 
establish and operate fusion centers. 

Operational Fusion Centers and Their Characteristics: 

Officials in operational fusion centers provided varying explanations 
for their centers' stage of development. Officials in 16 of the 43 
operational fusion centers said that their fusion centers were at an 
"intermediate" stage of development, that is, the centers had limited 
operations and functionality. For instance, several of these officials 
said that while they had many operational components (such as policies 
and procedures, analytical personnel, or technical access to systems 
and networks) in place, at least one of these components was still in 
the process of being developed or finalized. For example, officials in 
one fusion center said that its analysts have completed training and 
are producing products, but the center is still in the final stages of 
reconstructing its facility and establishing access to systems and 
networks. Officials in 21of the 43 operational fusion centers 
considered their fusion centers to be "developed," that is, fully 
operational and fully functional. For example, an official in one 
center said that the fusion center has analysts from DHS, FBI, and 
state and local entities; operates at the Top Secret level; and has a 
Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility (SCIF).[Footnote 13] 
Additionally, several officials also stated that even though their 
centers were developed, the centers would continue to expand and 
evolve. Officials in the remaining six fusion centers considered their 
centers to have more than limited operations and functionality but not 
yet be fully operational. For example, one official said that the 
center would like to develop its strategic component, for example 
related to risk assessments. Another official stated that his center 
would like to expand its operations but does not have enough personnel. 

Thirty-four of the operational centers are relatively new, having been 
opened since January 2004, while 9 centers opened in the couple of 
years after September 11, as shown in figure 2. 

Figure 2: Number of Fusion Centers Opened, by Year, Since September 
2001: 

This figure is a bar chart showing number of fusion centers opened, by 
year, since September 2001. The X axis is the number of operational 
fusion centers, and the Y axis is the year opened: 

Year opened: 2001; 
Number of operational fusion centers: 2. 

Year opened: 2002; 
Number of operational fusion centers: 1. 

Year opened: 2003; 
Number of operational fusion centers: 6. 

Year opened: 2004; 
Number of operational fusion centers: 7. 

Year opened: 2005; 
Number of operational fusion centers: 12. 

Year opened: 2006; 
Number of operational fusion centers: 10. 

Year opened: 2007; 
Number of operational fusion centers: 5. 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO analysis, information from fusion centers. 

[End of figure] 

Consistent with the purpose of a fusion center, as defined by the 
Fusion Center Guidelines, officials in 41 of the 43 operational centers 
we contacted said that their centers' scopes of operations were broader 
than solely focusing on counterterrorism. For example, officials in 22 
of the 43 operational centers described their centers' scopes of 
operations as all crimes or all crimes and counterterrorism, and 
officials in 19 operational centers said that their scopes of 
operations included all hazards. There were subtle distinctions in 
officials' descriptions of an all-crimes scope; however, they generally 
either said that their center focused on all "serious" crimes, such as 
violent crimes or felonies, or specified that the center focused on 
those crimes that may be linked to terrorist activity. Officials who 
described their centers as including an all-hazards focus provided 
different explanations of this scope, including colocation with the 
state's emergency operations center or partnerships with emergency 
management organizations or first responders. One official referred to 
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita as reasons why the center had an all- 
hazards scope of operation. 

Officials provided two primary explanations for why their fusion 
centers have adopted a broader focus than counterterrorism. The first 
explanation was because of the nexus, or link, of many crimes to 
terrorist-related activity. For example, officials at one fusion center 
said that they have an all-crimes focus because terrorism can be funded 
through a number of criminal acts, such as drugs, while another said 
that collecting information on all crimes often leads to terrorist or 
threat information because typically if there is terrorist-related 
activity there are other crimes involved as well. The second reason why 
officials said that their fusion centers had a broader focus than 
counterterrorism was in order to include additional stakeholders or to 
provide a sustainable service. For example, one official said that 
because the state is rural with only two metropolitan areas and many 
small communities, the center needed to have a broader focus than 
terrorism to obtain participation from local law enforcement. Officials 
in another center said that their center opened in the months after 
September 2001, so it focused on homeland security and terrorism, but 
since then has evolved to include an all-hazards focus as it has 
established partnerships with agencies outside of law enforcement. An 
official in another center said that while counterterrorism is the 
primary mission of the center, in the past year the center has included 
an all-crimes element since on average the center only receives three 
terrorism-related tips a day, and as a result, it is difficult to 
convince agencies to detail a staff person to the center for this 
mission alone. 

The majority of the operational fusion centers we contacted were 
primarily led by law enforcement entities, such as state police or 
state bureaus of investigation. Some of these centers were established 
as partnerships between state or local law enforcement entities and the 
FBI, and others were established as partnerships with the state 
homeland security offices. While all of the operational fusion centers 
we contacted had more than one agency represented in the centers, the 
staff size and agencies represented varied. For example, three centers 
we contacted had fewer than five people on their staff representing 
fewer than five agencies. Whereas, 2 of the centers we contacted had 
over 80 people staffed to the center, representing about 20 agencies. 
In its fusion center report, CRS determined that the average number of 
full-time staff at about 27 persons.[Footnote 14] In addition to law 
enforcement agencies, such as state police or highway patrol, county 
sheriffs, and city police departments, 29 of the 43 operational centers 
we contacted had personnel assigned to their centers from the state's 
National Guard,[Footnote 15] and some centers' also included emergency 
management, fire, corrections, or transportation partners. 

At least 34 of the 43 operational fusion centers we contacted had 
federal personnel assigned to their centers. Officials in about three 
quarters of the centers we contacted reported that the FBI has assigned 
personnel, including intelligence analysts and special agents, to their 
centers. Most had one or two full-time intelligence analysts or special 
agents at their center. Additionally, 12 of the 43 operational centers 
we contacted were colocated in an FBI field office or with an FBI task 
force, such as a JTTF or a FIG, allowing the center's personnel access 
to FBI systems and networks. Also, officials in 17 of the 43 
operational centers reported that DHS's Office of Intelligence and 
Analysis had assigned intelligence officers to their centers. These 
officers are assigned to fusion centers on a full-time basis and are 
responsible for, among other things, facilitating the flow of 
information between the center and DHS, providing expertise in 
intelligence analysis and reporting, and providing DHS with local 
situational information and access. Finally, officials in 19 of the 43 
operational centers reported that they had other DHS and DOJ components 
represented in their centers including personnel from U.S. Customs and 
Border Protection; U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE); 
United States Secret Service; United States Coast Guard; Transportation 
Security Administration; United States Attorneys Office; Bureau of 
Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms; Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA); 
or the United States Marshals Service. 

As we have previously highlighted, operational fusion centers we 
contacted reported having access to a variety of networks and systems 
for collecting homeland security, terrorism-related, and law 
enforcement information. For example, as of September 2007, 40 and 39 
of the 43 operational fusion centers we contacted told us they had 
access to DHS's and FBI's unclassified networks, such as HSIN and LEO, 
respectively. Further, about half of the operational centers also said 
that they had access to one of the RISS networks. In addition, 16 of 
the 43 operational centers we contacted reported that they had access 
or had plans to obtain access to HSDN, and 23 indicated that they had 
access or were in the process of obtaining access to FBINet or FBI's 
other classified networks. Further, 3 centers also reported having 
access to FBI's Top Secret network.[Footnote 16] Additionally, several 
operational fusion centers reported having access to other classified 
and unclassified federal systems and networks providing defense, 
financial, drug, and immigration-related information, including the 
Department of Defense's Secret Internet Protocol Router Network 
(SIPRNet),[Footnote 17] Financial Crimes Enforcement Network 
(FinCEN),[Footnote 18] El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC),[Footnote 19] 
and the Student and Exchange Visitor Information System 
(SEVIS).[Footnote 20] 

Thus far, products disseminated and services provided also vary. Fusion 
centers reported issuing a variety of products, such as daily and 
weekly bulletins on general criminal or intelligence information and 
intelligence assessments that, in general, provide in-depth reporting 
on an emerging threat, group, or crime. For example, one center's 
weekly bulletin contained sections on domestic and international 
terrorism, cold case investigations, missing persons, officer safety, 
and items of interest to law enforcement. 

Some centers provide investigative support for law enforcement 
officers. For example, one fusion center reported that it provided 
response within 20 minutes to requests for information from law 
enforcement officers who were conducting traffic stops or responding to 
major crime scenes. Further, several of the centers in our review were 
organized into two sections--an operational section that manages and 
processes the information flowing into the center and an analytical 
section responsible for analyzing the information and disseminating 
products. 

Fusion Centers in the Planning and Early Stages of Development and 
Their Characteristics: 

Officials in 7 states and one local jurisdiction said that their fusion 
centers were in the early stages of development and officials in 7 
states said that they were in the planning stage. For example, one 
official said that the center is developing memorandums of 
understanding for agency representation at and support of the center, 
working to get the center's secure space certified, and placing 
equipment and furniture. Officials from another state said that they 
had appointed an officer-in-charge and are in the process of acquiring 
additional staff members but had not acquired access to federal 
networks and systems. Officials in 6 of the 15 centers said that their 
centers had already opened or were expected to open by the end of 2007. 

Efforts to establish a fusion center are being led by homeland security 
offices, law enforcement entities, and in some states, by a partnership 
of two or more state agencies. As with operational centers, these 
centers planned to include all crimes and all hazards scopes of 
operations. While most of these centers were being newly established, a 
few were in the process of transitioning from existing law enforcement 
intelligence units or criminal intelligence centers. For example, an 
official in one center said the fusion center is in the planning stages 
and is transitioning from an intelligence center, which was established 
prior to the 2002 Winter Olympics. One state, Wyoming, was planning to 
partner with an adjacent state instead of building a physical fusion 
center. 

Federal Agencies' Efforts to Support Fusion Centers Help to Address 
Some Reported Challenges and Provide Further Assistance: 

In light of the importance of fusion centers in facilitating 
information sharing among levels of government, DHS and DOJ have 
several efforts under way that begin to address challenges that fusion 
center officials identified in establishing and operating their 
centers.[Footnote 21] DHS and DOJ have made efforts to provide fusion 
centers access to federal information systems, but some fusion center 
officials cited challenges accessing relevant, actionable information 
and managing multiple information systems. As a result, these center 
officials said that their ability to receive and share information with 
those who need it may be limited. Additionally, both DHS and the FBI 
have provided clearances to state and local officials, but some fusion 
center officials told us they had encountered challenges obtaining and 
using security clearances, which interfered with their ability to 
obtain classified information. Further, notwithstanding DHS and FBI 
efforts to deploy personnel to fusion centers and DHS's grant funding 
to support their establishment and enhancement, fusion center officials 
noted challenges obtaining personnel and ensuring sufficient funding to 
sustain the centers. Finally, DHS and DOJ have taken steps to develop 
guidance and provide technical assistance and training, but fusion 
center officials cited the need for clearer and more specific guidance 
in a variety of areas to help address operational challenges. 

DHS, FBI, and the PM-ISE Have Some Actions Under Way to Address 
Challenges Some Fusion Center Officials Cited with Accessing and 
Managing Multiple Information Systems: 

As described earlier, DHS and FBI have provided access to their primary 
unclassified systems (HSIN and LEO) to many of the 43 operational 
fusion centers we contacted. Further, DHS and DOJ have outlined plans 
to provide access to their primary classified networks, HSDN and 
FBINET, to state and local fusion centers that have federal personnel 
at the center. However, officials in 31 of the 58 fusion centers we 
contacted told us that they had difficulty obtaining access to federal 
information networks or systems. For example, officials in some centers 
cited challenges with DHS and FBI not providing fusion center personnel 
with direct access to their classified systems. In these centers, 
fusion center personnel must rely on federal personnel who are assigned 
to the center or other state personnel assigned to FBI task forces to 
access these systems, obtain the relevant information and share it with 
them. Further, officials in 12 of 58 fusion centers reported challenges 
meeting system security requirements or establishing technical 
capabilities necessary to access information systems. For example, 
officials cited challenges with the cost and logistics of setting up a 
secure room or installing the requisite hardware to access the 
information systems. 

DHS and FBI have taken steps to address these logistical challenges to 
providing access to classified systems. For example, as part of its 
needs assessment process, DHS reviews the fusion centers' security 
status and assesses its adequacy in light of DHS's intention to assign 
personnel and information systems in the center. The FBI has provided 
fusion centers access to classified systems through JTTF members and 
has colocated with some fusion centers in FBI space. Finally, several 
FBI field offices have coordinated with fusion centers to rent or build 
and certify facilities or secure rooms for those centers located 
outside of FBI-controlled space. For example according to FBI field 
offices, it is paying estimated costs of about $40,000 and $50,000 
respectively to provide secure facilities in two fusion centers. 

While officials in many fusion centers cited challenges obtaining 
access to systems, primarily classified systems, officials in 30 of the 
58 fusion centers we contacted told us that the high volume of 
information or the existence of multiple systems with often redundant 
information was challenging to manage. More specifically, officials in 
18 fusion centers said that they had difficulty with what they 
perceived to be the high volume of information their center receives, 
variously describing the flow of information as "overwhelming," 
"information overload," and "excessive." For example, officials said 
that center personnel must sort through the large amount of 
information, much of which is not relevant to the center, to find 
information that is useful or important to them. Additionally, 
officials in 18 fusion centers found the lack of integration among 
these multiple, competing, or duplicative information systems 
challenging, or said that they wanted a single mechanism or system 
through which to receive or send information. Finally, officials in 11 
centers said that the redundancy of information from these multiple 
sources posed a challenge. For instance, an official said that the 
center receives volumes of information that contain redundancies from 
DHS and the FBI. CRS also reported that one of the most consistent and 
constant issues raised by fusion center officials relates to the 
plethora of competing federal information-sharing systems, including, 
but not limited to, DHS and DOJ systems such as HSIN, HSDN, LEO, and 
RISS.[Footnote 22] 

DHS/DOJ's current joint guidance on operating fusion centers--the 
Fusion Center Guidelines--does not delineate the primary systems to 
which fusion centers should have access or provide guidance to centers 
about how to manage multiple systems with potentially redundant 
information. For example, the guidance recommends that fusion centers 
obtain access to a variety of databases and systems and provides a list 
of 17 available system and network resources that provide homeland 
security, terrorism-related, or law enforcement information, including 
the LEO, RISS, and HSIN, but do not identify which of the 17 available 
systems are critical to sharing information with federal counterparts. 
In addition, we have previously reported on the redundancies and lack 
of coordination among DHS's HSIN and other systems. For example, we 
found in April 2007 that in developing HSIN, DHS did not work with the 
two key state and local initiatives comprising major portions of the 
RISS program, thereby putting itself at risk that HSIN duplicated state 
and local capabilities.[Footnote 23] In that report, we recommended 
that DHS identify existing and planned information-sharing initiatives 
and assess whether there are opportunities for DHS to avoid duplication 
of effort. In response, DHS initiated efforts to accomplish this goal-
-such as creating a bridge between the RISS and HSIN systems to allow 
reports to flow back and forth between these two systems--though it is 
currently too early to determine the effect of these efforts. 

The PM-ISE also reported that in consultation with the Information 
Sharing Council, it has been coordinating the efforts of a working 
group intended to address the issue of duplicative or redundant 
information systems that handle sensitive but unclassified 
information.[Footnote 24] Officials from the PM-ISE stated that this 
group has completed a review of the most commonly used systems, such as 
LEO, RISS, and HSIN. According to the officials, the review included an 
examination of the services provided by the systems and the needs of 
the systems' users to identify any potential areas to streamline system 
access. The review is in accordance with recommendations that fusion 
centers made during the National Fusion Center Conference in March 
2007.[Footnote 25] Specifically, fusion centers recommended the federal 
government explore using a single sign-on or search capability, which 
would facilitate accessing multiple systems. Further, in our 
interviews, officials in 23 of the 58 fusion centers said that DHS and 
DOJ, to facilitate the implementation of a national network of fusion 
centers, should streamline existing systems or develop a unified 
platform or mechanism for information sharing with fusion centers. In 
addition, PM-ISE officials said that they, along with DHS and DOJ and 
other federal agencies, were taking steps to improve the quality and 
flow of information through the development of an Interagency Threat 
Assessment Coordination Group (ITACG). As part of the National 
Counterterrorism Center,[Footnote 26] this group will provide advice, 
counsel, and subject-matter expertise to the intelligence community 
regarding the types of terrorism-related information needed by state, 
local, and tribal governments and how these entities use that terrorism-
related information to fulfill their counterterrorism responsibilities. 
In doing so, ITACG will enable the timely production by the National 
Counterterrorism Center of clear, relevant, and federally coordinated 
terrorism-related information products intended for dissemination to 
state, local, and tribal officials. As of September 2007, ITACG has 
achieved an initial operational capability, according to PM-ISE 
officials. Additionally, the 9/11 Commission Act, enacted in August 
2007, made the ITACG a statutorily mandated body.[Footnote 27] 

DHS and FBI Provide Clearances to Fusion Center Officials and Have Set 
Timeliness Goals for Doing So, but Officials Cited Some Challenges 
Obtaining and Using Clearances: 

Both DHS and the FBI have provided clearances for numerous state and 
local personnel and have set goals to shorten the length of time it 
takes to obtain a security clearance. DHS and the FBI provide 
clearances at the Secret level for state and local officials with a 
need-to-know national security information classified at the 
Confidential or Secret level, and the FBI, when necessary, also 
provides clearances at the Top Secret level to state and local 
officials with a need-to-know national security information classified 
at this level and who need unescorted access in FBI 
facilities.[Footnote 28] For instance, to date DHS reported that it had 
provided security clearances, typically granted at the Secret level, 
for 1,291 state and local personnel--not necessarily personnel in 
fusion centers.[Footnote 29] The FBI, in fiscal year 2007, reported 
that as of April it had provided 520 security clearances, typically 
granted at the Top Secret level, to state and local fusion center 
personnel.[Footnote 30] Further, CRS reported that on average, as of 
July 2007, each fusion center appeared to have 14 staff with Secret 
clearances and 6 staff with Top Secret clearances.[Footnote 31] 
However, officials in 21 of the 58 fusion centers we contacted reported 
difficulties obtaining the clearances necessary to access different 
levels of classified materials. 

DHS and FBI also have provided centers with information for state and 
local personnel about the security clearance process, stating that 
processing time for individual security clearances can vary depending 
on complexity. For example, DHS set a goal of 90 days to complete a 
Secret clearance, and FBI set a goal of 45 to 60 days to complete a 
Secret clearance and 6 to 9 months to complete a Top Secret 
clearance.[Footnote 32] Yet, officials in 32 of the 58 fusion centers 
at the time we contacted them reported difficulties with the length of 
time it takes to receive a security clearance from DHS or the FBI. For 
example, in one center that receives security clearances from both DHS 
and the FBI, officials said that it was taking 6 to 9 months for a 
Secret clearance and 1 year to 1½ years for a Top Secret clearance. 
While some fusion center officials acknowledged that the process (and 
the associated length of time) was necessary--to perform the requisite 
background checks to ensure that clearances are only given to 
individuals who meet the requirements--others said it was detrimental 
to the fusion center because newly hired or newly promoted analysts 
were unable to work without the clearances to perform their duties. To 
address timeliness concerns, the FBI has taken steps to reduce the 
turnaround time for clearances. According to the FBI, Top Secret 
security clearances granted by the FBI to state and local personnel in 
March 2007 took an average of 63 days to complete, down from an average 
of 116 days in fiscal year 2006. The FBI is also implementing both 
short-term solutions--including prioritization of background 
investigations for state, local, and tribal officials and the 
electronic submission of fingerprints--and long-term solutions, such as 
training fusion center security officers to conduct preliminary 
background checks, according to a May 2007 FBI Interagency Integration 
Unit review of security clearances. Indeed, officials at one fusion 
center told us that when the center was opening in 2003, it took 
approximately 2 years to obtain a clearance, but in January 2007, it 
took only 3 months to obtain a security clearance for new personnel. 

While law and executive order provide that a security clearance granted 
by one federal agency should generally be accepted by other agencies, 
officials in 19 fusion centers we contacted said they faced challenges 
with federal agencies, particularly DHS and the FBI, accepting each 
others' clearances. This reported lack of reciprocity could hinder the 
centers' ability to access facilities, computer systems, and 
information from multiple agencies. For example, an official at one 
fusion center who holds an FBI security clearance said he was unable to 
access other federal agencies' facilities. An official at another 
fusion center said that DHS did not accept clearances that had been 
issued by the FBI to fusion center personnel and therefore would not 
provide access to information technology or intelligence. 

DHS and DOJ officials said that they were not aware of fusion centers 
encountering recent challenges with reciprocity of security clearances, 
but they said that there were complications in the clearance process. 
For example, a DHS official said that multiple federal agencies carry 
out their own clearance processes and grant clearances without central 
coordination.[Footnote 33] For example, both DHS and the FBI could each 
be conducting a separate security clearance investigation and 
determining eligibility for access to classified information on the 
same individual. An FBI official also explained that some agencies and 
some parts of the Department of Defense do require a polygraph 
examination to obtain a clearance and some do not, so reciprocity among 
those agencies with different standards may be an issue. Indeed, the 
DHS official acknowledged that, overall, federal agencies do not have a 
consolidated system for granting and handling security clearances and 
said that currently there are not sufficient federal efforts to develop 
such a system. 

Fusion Center Officials We Contacted Cited Challenges with Personnel 
and Funding; DHS and FBI Are Helping to Address These Issues to Some 
Extent but Have Not Defined Plans for Long-Term Support: 

Officials in 43 of the 58 fusion centers we contacted reported facing 
several challenges related to obtaining personnel, and officials in 54 
of the centers reported encountering funding challenges when 
establishing and operating their centers, challenges which some of 
these officials also indicated affected their centers' sustainability. 
Although many of these reported challenges were attributed to 
difficulties at the state and local level, DHS and FBI have efforts 
under way to help support fusion centers by providing some personnel 
and grant funding. 

Obtaining and Retaining Qualified Personnel Was Reported as a Challenge 
for Many Centers: 

Officials in 37 of the 58 centers we contacted said they had difficulty 
with state, local, and federal agencies assigning personnel to the 
center--one means of staffing the centers--primarily as a result of 
resource constraints. Most (27 of the 37) of these officials identified 
challenges with state and local agencies rather than with federal 
agencies contributing personnel. For instance, an official at one 
fusion center said that, because of limited resources in state and 
local agencies, it is challenging to convince these agencies to 
contribute personnel to the center because they view doing so as a loss 
of resources. In addition, officials in 8 of the 58 centers we 
contacted said that they had difficulty with state and local agencies 
contributing personnel to their centers specifically because the state 
and local agencies had to continue to fund the salaries of personnel 
assigned to the fusion centers from their own budgets. Similarly, CRS 
reported that there are many cases in which local law enforcement 
agencies appear unconvinced of the value of fusion centers--and by 
their cost/benefit analysis, it does not benefit their agencies to 
detail personnel to the center.[Footnote 34] In terms of federal 
personnel, officials in 11 of the 58 fusion centers said that they 
encountered challenges with federal agencies not contributing personnel 
to their centers. 

In addition, officials in 20 of the 58 fusion centers we contacted said 
that they faced challenges finding, attracting, and retaining qualified 
personnel. Specifically, officials from 12 of these centers said that 
they had difficulty finding qualified personnel. For instance, an 
official from one fusion center said that finding personnel with the 
expertise to understand the concept behind the development of the 
center and to use the tools to build the center was challenging, while 
an official at another fusion center acknowledged that there was a very 
limited number of qualified candidates in the state from which to hire 
personnel. Additionally, officials in eight centers reported that 
retention was a challenge because of competition with other entities, 
particularly higher-paying federal agencies and private sector 
companies. In some cases, such as for those analysts hired by the FBI, 
the official said that the federal salaries are almost twice what the 
center could afford to pay. An official at another fusion center 
expressed concern that, if fusion centers do not find a way to offer 
state and local analysts a career path comparable to that offered by 
the federal agencies, fusion centers will see a plateau in the quality 
of available analysts. 

DHS and FBI Have Deployed Personnel to Fusion Centers: 

To support fusion centers and facilitate information sharing, DHS and 
FBI have each assigned federal personnel to centers. As of September 
2007, DHS had deployed intelligence officers to 17 of the 43 
operational fusion centers we contacted, and was in the process of 
staffing 6 additional centers we contacted. The FBI had assigned 
personnel to about three quarters of the operational fusion centers we 
contacted. Additionally, DHS was in the process of staffing 2 local 
fusion centers we did not contact, and the FBI had assigned personnel 
to 7 local fusion centers that were not included in our review. 

In terms of the future, DHS plans to place intelligence officers in as 
many as 35 fusion centers by the end of fiscal year 2008. DHS has not 
determined to what extent it will provide additional staff to centers 
after the first round of assessments and placements are completed. For 
its part, FBI officials noted in January 2007 that the FBI process and 
criteria for staffing personnel to fusion centers remains ongoing. 
Because of the variety of fusion centers, the FBI--through its field 
office leaders--conducts its staffing efforts on a case-by-base basis 
using criteria such as whether the fusion center has a facility, 
connectivity to state and local systems, and personnel from multiple 
agencies. 

Fusion Center Officials Cited Challenges with the Federal Grant 
Process, Obtaining Sustainable Funding, and Federal Grant Restrictions: 

Officials in 35 of the 58 centers we contacted cited a variety of 
challenges with the federal grant process, including its complexity, 
and challenges related to uncertain federal funding or declining 
federal funding, challenges that led to overall concerns about the 
sustainability of the centers. For example, officials in 16 of the 58 
fusion centers we contacted said that they faced challenges with the 
federal grant process, including unclear and changing grant guidance 
and a lack of understanding of how federal funding decisions are made. 
One official said that the fusion center did not perceive a link 
between the work performed at the center and the level of federal 
funding received, and hence, he did not understand how DHS made its 
funding decisions for fusion centers. The official added that it is 
important for local units of government to better understand these 
issues to help them understand the need to provide funding for fusion 
centers. Further, officials in 22 of the fusion centers said that they 
encountered challenges related to the sustainability of federal 
funding, such as the potential for, or actual, declining federal 
funding, which created concerns for the officials about their centers' 
ability to sustain capability for the long term. Officials at another 
fusion center said that they are concerned that they will establish a 
fusion center with DHS funding only to have the funding end in the 
future and the center close because the region is unable to support it. 
When asked about key factors for sustaining their centers, officials in 
41 of the 58 fusion centers indicated funding, and several specified a 
sustainable source or mechanism for that funding. 

Officials in 40 of the 58 fusion centers we contacted identified 
challenges with finding adequate funding for specific components of 
their centers' operations--in particular personnel, training, and 
facilities--and officials in 24 of those 40 centers related these 
challenges to restrictions and requirements of federal grant funding. 
Specifically, officials in 21 fusion centers we contacted said that 
obtaining adequate funding for personnel was difficult, and officials 
in 17 fusion centers found federal time limits on the use of DHS grant 
funds for personnel[Footnote 35] challenging--challenges that they said 
could affect the sustainability of their centers. For example, one 
official at another fusion center said that the 2-year time limit on 
the use of DHS grant funds for personnel makes retaining the personnel 
challenging because state and local agencies may lack the resources to 
continue funding the positions, which could hinder the fusion center's 
ability to continue to operate. Officials in eight of the fusion 
centers expressed concerns about maintaining their personnel levels, 
particularly if federal funding declines. For instance, one fusion 
center official said that a state police official did not want to fund 
analysts with federal grant funds because of a concern that, if the 
federal grant funds end, the center will lose qualified personnel who 
will take away their knowledge base. Furthermore, officials in 17 of 
the 58 fusion centers we contacted found complying with the DHS grant 
requirement for training newly hired analysts (that they attend 
training within 6 months or have previous analytical experience) or the 
funding costs associated with training challenging.[Footnote 36] For 
example, one fusion center official said that the center found 
limitations on the particular training the grant funds can be used for 
to be challenging.[Footnote 37] In addition, officials in 14 of the 
centers said that they had difficulty funding training costs, such as 
when using the funds for training conflicted with buying equipment or 
other tangible goods. Finally, officials in 14 fusion centers said that 
funding their facilities poses a challenge, particularly because of DHS 
restrictions on the use of grant funds for construction and 
renovation.[Footnote 38] For example, officials in eight fusion centers 
said that the DHS grant restrictions on construction and renovation 
have made it challenging to meet security requirements for their 
facilities, build a secure room, or build or renovate their facilities. 

Officials in 17 of the 58 fusion centers we contacted said that 
competition for funding with state and local entities was challenging, 
particularly as a result of the pass-through requirement associated 
with DHS grant funding in which the state must make no less than 80 
percent of the total grant available to local units of 
government.[Footnote 39] For example, one fusion center official said 
that it is very difficult for state-run fusion centers to cover costs 
such as hiring analysts and completing renovations to their physical 
space out of the 20 percent of the DHS grant funds they are eligible to 
receive after the state complies with the pass-through requirement. 
Other officials noted that, even after the state has complied with the 
pass-through requirement, fusion centers must still compete with other 
state and local entities for the remaining DHS funding. For instance, 
one fusion center official said that the state emergency management 
agency wants to dedicate DHS funds to priorities other than the fusion 
center, such as the purchase of new fire-fighting equipment. CRS also 
reported that the 80 percent funding requirement was cited continually 
by fusion center officials as a major hurdle in channeling homeland 
security funds toward statewide fusion center efforts.[Footnote 40] 

Officials in 28 of the 58 fusion centers we contacted told us that they 
also had difficulty obtaining state or local funding for a variety of 
other reasons, including state or local budgetary constraints; 
challenges with convincing state officials, for example, in disciplines 
other than law enforcement, to provide funding to support the fusion 
center; and managing state and local officials who thought the federal 
government should be responsible for funding fusion centers. Further, 5 
of these fusion center officials expressed concerns about their 
centers' long-term sustainability without state or local funding. For 
example, one official said that federal funding for the center will 
eventually end and the state will need to provide funding to support 
the fusion center, but the state currently has no plan for providing 
that support. However, an official at another fusion center expressed 
concern that federal funding could cause states to lose autonomy over 
their centers, and the centers would become federal fusion centers 
located in a state rather than the state fusion centers originally 
envisioned. 

DHS Has Provided Grant Funding for Fusion-Related Activities and Made 
Some Changes to Grants for Fusion Centers: 

DHS homeland security grant programs, such as SHSP, LETPP, and UASI, 
have provided funding to state and local entities for data collection, 
analysis, fusion, and information-sharing projects, and DHS has 
adjusted the programs for fusion centers. Table 2 shows that from 
fiscal years 2004 through 2006, DHS allocated almost $131 million to 
states and local areas from these programs for what DHS defined as 
fusion-related activities.[Footnote 41] 

Table 2: DHS Grant Funds Allocated for Fusion-Related Activities, 
Fiscal Year 2004 through 2006: 

Fiscal year: 2004; 
Funding allocated: $ 29,974,650. 

Fiscal year: 2005; 
Funding allocated: 57,456,112. 

Fiscal year: 2006; 
Funding allocated: 43,103,624. 

Fiscal year: Total; 
Funding allocated: $130,534,386. 

Source: DHS. 

[End of table] 

Further, according to DHS, 49 states and 37 local jurisdictions 
submitted grant investment justifications in fiscal year 2007 in 
support of information-sharing and dissemination efforts, with requests 
for funding totaling nearly $180 million, though exact funding amounts 
had not been determined as of August 2007. Exact funding amounts for 
fusion centers will be determined on the basis of the prioritization 
and allocation of funds by states. For fiscal year 2007, DHS included 
language in its grant guidelines emphasizing fusion center activities 
and explicitly made establishing and enhancing fusion centers a 
priority for the Law Enforcement Terrorism Prevention Program.[Footnote 
42] However, these grant programs are not specifically targeted at or 
limited to fusion centers. As a result, funding provided to states may 
not necessarily reach a particular fusion center because, as a DHS 
official noted, states are free to reprioritize their use of grant 
funds after submitting their grant justifications to DHS and receiving 
allocated funds. Thus, fusion centers cannot be certain that they will 
receive funds to sustain fusion center activities from year to year or 
over the long term. 

Over time, DHS has also made several changes to help address challenges 
identified by fusion centers by focusing homeland security grants on 
fusion-related activities, by taking steps to ease the grant process, 
and by adjusting some of the restrictions on the timing and use of 
grant funds. For example, DHS expanded grant funding in fiscal year 
2006 in the area of allowable costs for information sharing and 
collaborative efforts. Funds could be used by states to develop and 
enhance their fusion centers, particularly by hiring contract or 
government employees as intelligence analysts; purchasing information 
technology hardware, software and communications equipment; hiring 
consultants to make recommendations on fusion center development; or by 
leasing office space for use by a fusion center. In addition, DHS 
continued to make Homeland Security Grant Program adjustments in fiscal 
year 2007 based on outreach to grant program stakeholders. For example, 
DHS gave potential applicants more time to complete the grant 
application process and the period for performance under HSGP grants 
increased from 2 years to 3 years. 

DHS and DOJ Have Provided Guidance, Technical Assistance, and Training 
to Fusion Centers: 

DHS and DOJ have collaborated to provide guidance and technical 
assistance to fusion centers and, along with the PM-ISE, have sponsored 
regional and national conferences, in part to determine the needs of 
fusion centers. For example, DHS and DOJ jointly issued their most 
recent Fusion Center Guidelines in August 2006 that outline 18 
recommended elements for establishing and operating fusion 
centers.[Footnote 43] The Guidelines were intended as a way to ensure 
state and local fusion centers could be established and operated 
consistently and were developed to help fusion center administrators 
create policies, manage resources, and evaluate fusion center services. 
Officials in 48 of the 58 fusion centers told us that the Guidelines 
were generally good and useful. However, officials in 20 of the 58 
fusion centers we contacted found the available federal guidance 
lacking in specificity, conflicting, confusing, or difficult to 
implement in their individual centers. For example, some of these 
officials said that the Guidelines were broad and did not provide 
guidance on specific issues relevant to operating a fusion center, such 
as how to connect the multiple information-sharing systems or set up 
their physical space. In addition, officials in 19 of the 58 fusion 
centers we contacted said that they lacked guidance on specific 
information-sharing policies and procedures, such as sharing or 
handling sensitive or classified information or privacy and civil 
liberties issues. For example, officials in some fusion centers we 
contacted said that they lacked guidance on sharing and handling 
classified information, and officials in five fusion centers said the 
lack of guidance on privacy and civil liberties issues is a concern 
when sharing or storing information. To illustrate, officials at one 
fusion center said that the absence of an encompassing guideline to use 
as a standard makes it difficult to manage information sharing across 
levels of government and among states because of the variations in 
state and federal privacy laws and regulations. For instance, federal 
regulation provides that certain information on individuals may not be 
retained for longer than 5 years, whereas the center's state 
requirement provides that information may not be retained for longer 
than 1 year.[Footnote 44] 

FEMA/NPD, DOJ's Bureau of Justice Assistance (BJA),[Footnote 45] and 
the FBI have partnered to provide a program of technical assistance 
services for fusion centers to facilitate information sharing.[Footnote 
46] As shown in table 3, many of the technical services provided under 
this program provide an overview or general information, and the 
technical assistance efforts focus on giving the state or local area 
the basic tools they need to successfully establish and operate a 
fusion center, such as helping to create a governance board, assisting 
with the development of a fusion process of implementation plan, and 
providing the basics of fusion center operations. As of September 2007, 
there have been 35 service deliveries to 19 fusion centers, according 
to FEMA/NPD and BJA officials. 

Table 3: Examples of Technical Assistance Services Provided Jointly by 
DHS and DOJ for the Fusion Process: 

Services provided: Fusion process orientation; 
Description: Provides an overview of the fusion process and facilitates 
the development of a strategic fusion center process/center development 
plan. 

Services provided: Fusion center governance structure and authority; 
Description: Assists in the development of a comprehensive governance 
structure to include legal foundation and steering/subcommittee 
structure. 

Services provided: Fusion center concept of operations development; 
Description: Organizes the development of the core document used to 
synchronize current operations and plan future operations. 

Services provided: Fusion center privacy policy development; 
Description: Assists with the development of a privacy policy to ensure 
that constitutional rights, civil liberties, and civil rights are 
protected while allowing the fusion center to achieve its mission 
objectives. 

Services provided: Fusion center administration and management; 
Description: Supports the design of a strategic framework to structure 
the management of personnel and organize assets provided by 
participating entities. 

Services provided: State and local antiterrorism training; 
Description: Provides specialized awareness orientation regarding 
terrorism interdiction, investigation, and prevention for law 
enforcement executives, command personnel, intelligence officers, 
investigators, analytical personnel, training directors, and 
prosecutors. 

Services provided: Criminal intelligence for the chief executive; 
Description: Provides an overview regarding the importance of and 
responsibilities associated with developing intelligence capabilities 
within law enforcement agencies. 

Source: BJA. 

[End of table] 

DHS and DOJ have numerous efforts to provide training to fusion 
centers. Also, DHS offers over 90 courses from 45 training partners and 
is working to increase the availability of training under Homeland 
Security Grant Program funding. According to FEMA/NPD officials, DHS 
recently approved for funding three courses, two of which involve 
analyst training. DHS and BJA provide a number of training services 
under their joint technical assistance program, and the FBI provides 
ongoing training for fusion centers through its field offices. However, 
officials in 21 of the 58 fusion centers we contacted said that the 
availability of adequate training for mission-related issues, such as 
training on intelligence analysis was a challenge. Further, officials 
in 11 fusion centers we contacted, most of whom were in fusion centers 
that had been in operation for more than 2 years, said that they lacked 
national standards or guidelines for analyst training or 
qualifications. For example, one fusion center official said that no 
one federal agency has taken responsibility for determining a single, 
standardized training agenda--including content and length of time--for 
both new and experienced analysts. Officials in another fusion center 
said that the center had difficulty creating a training program for its 
analysts because of the lack of a coordinated, trusted set of training 
guidelines. Two other officials said that they would like to see a 
federal baseline for appropriate and necessary training for analysts 
with a certification attached to its completion or a standardized 
course of analyst training to ensure that analysts are trained in the 
same way nationwide. They said that this would help fusion center 
analysts better communicate and be more likely to share information 
with analysts in other centers. 

DHS and FBI officials noted some challenges with designating a single 
training curriculum for fusion center analysts because agencies and 
training groups differ on what should constitute the minimum baseline. 
To remedy this, the NFCCG has developed and documented minimum baseline 
capabilities for state and major urban area fusion centers, and as of 
September 2007 was in the process of evaluating the current level of 
capability of designated state and major urban area fusion centers. The 
minimum baseline capabilities require fusion centers to develop a 
training plan to ensure their personnel are knowledgeable of fusion 
center operations, policies, and procedures, including training on the 
intelligence and fusion processes, analytic processes and writing 
skills, security policy and protocols, and the fusion center mission 
and goals. However, it is too soon to determine the extent to which the 
baseline document sets out minimum training standards for fusion center 
analysts that would address the challenges fusion centers reported to 
us. 

Conclusions: 

Although state and local governments created fusion centers to fill 
their information needs, the centers have attracted the attention of 
the federal government as it works to improve information sharing with 
state, local, and tribal entities in accordance with the Homeland 
Security and Intelligence Reform Acts, as amended. Indeed, recognizing 
that the collaboration between fusion centers and the federal 
government marks a tremendous increase in the nation's overall analytic 
capacity that can be used to combat terrorism, the PM-ISE's 
implementation plan envisions that the federal government will work to 
promote fusion center initiatives to facilitate information sharing and 
designates fusion centers as the focus of sharing with state, local, 
and tribal governments. Given the federal interest in fusion centers 
and the fusion centers' interest in supporting such a national network, 
it is important that the federal government continue to provide fusion 
centers with added value as an incentive to facilitate such a network. 
To date, DHS's and DOJ's efforts to assist fusion centers, such as 
providing access to information systems, security clearances, 
personnel, funding, and guidance have begun to address a number of the 
challenges fusion center directors identified to us. However, it is 
also important for fusion center management to understand the federal 
government's longer-term role with respect to these centers. Many 
fusion center officials were uncertain about the level of future 
resources and the sustainability of federal support. Although the 
federal government cannot make promises regarding future resources, 
decisions could be made and articulated to fusion centers regarding 
whether the federal government views its role with respect to providing 
resources--such as grant funding, facilities, personnel, and 
information-sharing systems--to fusion centers as short term for start- 
up resources or longer term for operational needs. The National Fusion 
Center Coordination Group (NFCCG) is already tasked with identifying 
grant funding, technical assistance, and training to support fusion 
centers. However, to date, the efforts of the NFCCG have not included 
delineating whether such assistance is for the short-term establishment 
or for the long-term sustainability of fusion centers. The NFCCG, 
through the PM-ISE and the Information Sharing Council, would be in the 
best position to articulate whether fusion centers can expect to 
continue to receive this support over the longer term. 

Recommendation: 

To improve efforts to create a national network of fusion centers, we 
recommend that the NFCCG, through the Information Sharing Council and 
the PM-ISE, determine and articulate the federal government's role in, 
and whether it expects to provide resources to, fusion centers over the 
long-term to help ensure their sustainability. Particular emphasis 
should be placed on how best to sustain those fusion center functions 
that support a national information sharing capability as critical 
nodes of the ISE. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

We requested comments on a draft of this report from the Secretary of 
Homeland Security, the Acting Attorney General, and the Program Manager 
for the Information Sharing Environment or their designees. In 
commenting on drafts of the report, DHS and the PM-ISE concurred with 
our recommendation that the federal government should determine its 
long-term fusion center role and whether it expects to provide 
resources to centers to help ensure their sustainability. DOJ had no 
comments on the draft. Further, DHS commented that it, along with its 
federal partners, is reviewing strategies to sustain fusion centers as 
part of the work plan of the National Fusion Center Coordination Group. 
This group plans on presenting these strategies to the federal 
departments before the end of the year. 

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly release the contents 
of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days 
from the report date. We will then send copies of this report to the 
Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, the Acting Attorney 
General, the Program Manager for the Information Sharing Environment, 
selected congressional committees, and other interested parties. In 
addition, this report will be available at no charge on GAO's Web site 
at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please 
contact me at (202) 512-8777 or larencee@gao.gov. Contact information 
for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be 
found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major 
contributions to this report are listed in appendix V. 

Signed by: 

Eileen R. Larence: 

Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues: 

List of Requesters: 

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Peter T. King: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Homeland Security: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Jane Harman: 
Chair: 
The Honorable David G. Reichert: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Intelligence, Information Sharing and Terrorism Risk 
Assessment: 
Committee on Homeland Security: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman: 
Chairman: 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Mark Pryor: 
Chairman: 
Subcommittee on State, Local and Private Sector Preparedness and 
Integration: 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Daniel K. Akaka: 
Chairman: 
Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal 
Workforce and the District of Columbia: 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Tom Davis: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform: 
House of Representatives: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

The objectives of our review were to (1) describe the stages of 
development and characteristics of state and local fusion centers and 
(2) identify to what extent efforts under way by the Program Manager 
for the Information Sharing Environment (PM-ISE), Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS), and Department of Justice (DOJ) help to 
address some of the challenges identified by fusion centers. 

To describe the stages of development and characteristics of state and 
local fusion centers, we conducted semistructured telephone interviews 
with the director (or his or her designee) of every state fusion 
center, the District of Columbia fusion center, and eight local fusion 
centers. We defined "local fusion center" to include centers 
established by major urban areas, counties, cities, and intrastate 
regions. Our selection criteria for local fusion centers included their 
relationships with the state fusion center, stage of development, and 
geographic diversity. Fusion center officials we spoke with included 
state and local police officials, agents in state bureaus of 
investigation, state homeland security directors, and directors in 
state public safety departments. Where a fusion center was in the 
planning stages, we spoke with officials involved in planning and 
establishing the center, such as directors of state homeland security 
offices. We asked fusion center officials about the status and 
characteristics of the fusion centers, including their stages of 
development, reasons for establishing, scopes of operations, and the 
types of funding the centers received. We relied on the centers' own 
definitions of themselves as fusion centers and did not evaluate their 
status, characteristics, or operations. From February through May, we 
spoke with officials from all 50 states, the District of Columbia, and 
8 local jurisdictions. While we did contact officials in all state 
fusion centers, we did not contact officials in all local fusion 
centers; therefore our results are not generalizable to the universe of 
fusion centers. Data were not available to determine the total number 
of local fusion centers. 

We also obtained and summarized descriptive information from the fusion 
centers including structure, organization, personnel, and information 
technology systems used. We provided the summaries to the fusion 
centers for a review of accuracy. However, we did not independently 
verify all of the information provided to us. We also interviewed 
officials from 11 agencies conducting research on state and local 
information sharing, including RAND, the Police Executive Research 
Forum, the International Association of Chiefs of Police, and the 
Congressional Research Service (CRS), which released a report in July 
2007 on fusion centers.[Footnote 47] Finally, to obtain detailed 
information about centers' operations, we conducted site visits to 
fusion centers in Atlanta, Georgia; Phoenix, Arizona; Richmond, 
Virginia; Baltimore, Maryland; West Trenton, New Jersey; and New York, 
New York. Our selection criteria for these centers included their 
stages of development, extent of federal partnerships, and geographic 
representation. 

To identify to what extent efforts under way by the PM-ISE, DHS, and 
DOJ help to address some of the challenges identified by fusion 
centers, we analyzed fusion center responses to our semistructured 
telephone interviews, reviewed applicable documents, and interviewed 
officials at the PM-ISE, DHS, and DOJ, as well as several organizations 
conducting research about fusion centers. Specifically, to describe the 
challenges fusion centers encountered in establishing themselves and 
operating, we asked officials during our semistructured telephone 
interviews whether they had encountered challenges in 10 different 
categories and, if so, the extent to which the category was a challenge 
both at establishment and, for operational centers, in day-to-day 
operations. These categories included federal partnerships, personnel, 
guidance, training, funding, access to information, and security 
clearances. Fusion center officials provided open-ended, descriptive 
responses of challenges faced by their centers. On the basis of a 
content analysis of fusion center officials' responses, we identified, 
categorized, and counted similar challenges. Fusion center officials 
may not have indicated that they encountered all the challenges 
discussed in the report. In addition, individual fusion center 
officials may have identified multiple challenges in a given category, 
for example funding. We also reviewed CRS's July 2007 report to obtain 
information on fusion center challenges. 

In addition, to determine to what extent efforts under way by the PM- 
ISE, DHS, and DOJ help to address some of the challenges identified by 
fusion centers, we reviewed applicable federal laws, executive orders, 
directives, briefings, testimonies, plans, reports, and documents to 
identify efforts of the PM-ISE, DHS, and DOJ to address challenges 
identified by fusion centers. We interviewed officials at the PM-ISE's 
office, DHS's Office of Intelligence and Analysis, the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency National Preparedness Directorate,[Footnote 
48] the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and DOJ's Bureau of 
Justice Assistance and discussed efforts under way to address 
challenges identified by fusion centers. We also asked fusion center 
officials in our semistructured telephone interviews to describe the 
support they had received and were interested in receiving from DHS and 
the FBI. 

We performed our work from August 2006 through September 2007 in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Operational Fusion Centers: 

Table 4 presents information about operational fusion centers as 
reported to us by fusion center officials during semistructured 
interviews, as of September 2007. During these interviews, we asked 
officials to characterize their fusion centers as being in one of the 
following stages: planning, early development, intermediate (limited 
operations and functionality), or developed (fully operational and 
fully functional). 

Table 4: Selected Characteristics of Operational Fusion Centers We 
Contacted, as of September 2007: 

State: Arizona; 
Name of fusion center: Arizona Counter Terrorism Information Center 
(AcTIC); 
Stage of development: Intermediate; 
Lead agency: Arizona Department of Public Safety and the FBI; 
Scope of operations: All crimes; 
Start date: October 2004. 

State: California; 
Name of fusion center: State Terrorism Threat Assessment Center 
(STTAC); 
Stage of development: Developed; 
Lead agency: Partnership of the California Governor's Office of 
Homeland Security, California Department of Justice, and the California 
Highway Patrol; 
Scope of operations: All crimes and counterterrorism; 
Start date: December 2005. 

State: California; 
Name of fusion center: Los Angeles, Joint Regional Intelligence Center 
(JRIC); 
Stage of development: Intermediate; 
Lead agency: Joint effort of the Los Angeles Police Department, the Los 
Angeles County Sheriff's Department, and the FBI; 
Scope of operations: All crimes and counterterrorism; 
Start date: July 2006. 

State: California; 
Name of fusion center: Sacramento, Regional Terrorism Threat Assessment 
Center (RTTAC); 
Stage of development: Developed; 
Lead agency: Sacramento County Sheriff's Department; 
Scope of operations: All crimes and counterterrorism; 
Start date: November 2004. 

State: Colorado; 
Name of fusion center: Colorado Information Analysis Center (CIAC); 
Stage of development: Developed; 
Lead agency: Colorado State Patrol; 
Scope of operations: All crimes and all hazards; 
Start date: October 2004. 

State: Connecticut; 
Name of fusion center: Connecticut Intelligence Center (CTIC); 
Stage of development: Intermediate; 
Lead agency: Connecticut State Police and the FBI; 
Scope of operations: All crimes; 
Start date: April 2005. 

State: Delaware; 
Name of fusion center: Delaware Information Analysis Center (DIAC); 
Stage of development: Intermediate; 
Lead agency: Delaware State Police; 
Scope of operations: All crimes and all hazards; 
Start date: December 2005. 

State: Florida; 
Name of fusion center: Florida Fusion Center; 
Stage of development: Developed; 
Lead agency: Florida Department of Law Enforcement; 
Scope of operations: All crimes and all hazards; 
Start date: January 2007. 

State: Georgia; 
Name of fusion center: Georgia Information Sharing and Analysis Center 
(GISAC); 
Stage of development: Between intermediate and developed; 
Lead agency: Component of the Georgia Office of Homeland Security; 
Scope of operations: All hazards and counterterrorism; 
Start date: October 2001. 

State: Illinois; 
Name of fusion center: Chicago Crime Prevention and Information Center 
(CPIC); 
Stage of development: Developed; 
Lead agency: Chicago Police Department; 
Scope of operations: All crimes and counterterrorism; 
Start date: April 2007. 

State: Illinois; 
Name of fusion center: Statewide Terrorism and Intelligence Center 
(STIC); 
Stage of development: Developed; 
Lead agency: Illinois State Police; 
Scope of operations: All crimes; 
Start date: May 2003. 

State: Indiana; 
Name of fusion center: Indiana Intelligence Fusion Center (IIFC); 
Stage of development: Developed; 
Lead agency: Indiana Department of Homeland Security; 
Scope of operations: All crimes; 
Start date: December 2006. 

State: Iowa; 
Name of fusion center: Iowa Intelligence Fusion Center; 
Stage of development: Between intermediate and developed; 
Lead agency: Iowa Department of Public Safety; 
Scope of operations: All crimes; 
Start date: December 2004. 

State: Kansas; 
Name of fusion center: Kansas Threat Integration Center (KSTIC); 
Stage of development: Between intermediate and developed; 
Lead agency: Joint operation of the Kansas Bureau of Investigation, 
Kansas National Guard, and the Kansas Highway Patrol; 
Scope of operations: Counterterrorism; 
Start date: June 2004. 

State: Kentucky; 
Name of fusion center: Kentucky Intelligence Fusion Center (KIFC); 
Stage of development: Developed; 
Lead agency: Kentucky Office of Homeland Security; 
Scope of operations: All crimes; 
Start date: December 2005. 

State: Louisiana; 
Name of fusion center: Louisiana State Analysis and Fusion Exchange (La-
SAFE); 
Stage of development: Intermediate; 
Lead agency: Louisiana State Police; 
Scope of operations: All crimes and all hazards; 
Start date: October 2004. 

State: Maryland; 
Name of fusion center: Maryland Coordination and Analysis Center 
(MCAC); 
Stage of development: Developed; 
Lead agency: Overseen by the Anti-Terrorism Advisory Council Executive 
Committee; 
Scope of operations: All crimes and counterterrorism; 
Start date: November 2003. 

State: Massachusetts; 
Name of fusion center: Commonwealth Fusion Center (CFC); 
Stage of development: Intermediate; 
Lead agency: Massachusetts State Police; 
Scope of operations: All crimes and counterterrorism; 
Start date: October 2004. 

State: Michigan; 
Name of fusion center: Michigan Intelligence and Operations Center 
(MIOC); 
Stage of development: Intermediate; 
Lead agency: Michigan State Police; 
Scope of operations: All crimes; 
Start date: December 2006. 

State: Minnesota; 
Name of fusion center: Minnesota Joint Analysis Center (MN-JAC); 
Stage of development: Intermediate; 
Lead agency: Partnership of FBI, Department of Public Safety, and local 
police departments; 
Scope of operations: All crimes and all hazards; 
Start date: May 2005. 

State: Missouri; 
Name of fusion center: Missouri Information Analysis Center; 
Stage of development: Between intermediate and developed; 
Lead agency: Missouri State Highway Patrol; 
Scope of operations: All crimes and all hazards; 
Start date: December 2005. 

State: Montana; 
Name of fusion center: Montana All-Threat Intelligence Center (MATIC); 
Stage of development: Developed; 
Lead agency: Administered by the Montana Department of Justice Division 
of Criminal Investigation; 
Scope of operations: All crimes; 
Start date: Spring of 2003. 

State: New Jersey; 
Name of fusion center: Regional Operations Intelligence Center (ROIC); 
Stage of development: Developed; 
Lead agency: New Jersey State Police; 
Scope of operations: All crimes and all hazards; 
Start date: January 2005. 

State: New Mexico; 
Intermediate; 
New Mexico Department of Homeland Security and Emergency Management; 
All crimes, all hazards, and counterterrorism; 
September 2007; 
New Mexico All Source Intelligence Center (NMASIC). 

State: New York; 
Name of fusion center: New York Police Department (NYPD) Intelligence 
Division; 
Stage of development: Developed; 
Lead agency: NYPD; 
Scope of operations: All crimes and counterterrorism; 
Start date: March 2002. 

State: New York; 
Name of fusion center: Rockland County Intelligence Center; 
Stage of development: Developed; 
Lead agency: Rockland County law enforcement; 
Scope of operations: All crimes; 
Start date: 1995, however focus shifted after 9/11. 

State: New York; 
Name of fusion center: New York State Intelligence Center (NYSIC); 
Stage of development: Developed; 
Lead agency: New York State Police; 
Scope of operations: All crimes; 
Start date: August 2003. 

State: North Carolina; 
Name of fusion center: North Carolina Information Sharing and Analysis 
Center (ISAAC); 
Stage of development: Developed; 
Lead agency: North Carolina State Bureau of Investigation; 
Scope of operations: Homeland security, gangs, drugs; 
Start date: May 2006. 

State: North Dakota; 
Name of fusion center: North Dakota Fusion Center; 
Stage of development: Intermediate; 
Lead agency: Joint effort of the North Dakota Bureau of Criminal 
Investigation, North Dakota Highway Patrol, North Dakota Division of 
Homeland Security, and North Dakota National Guard; 
Scope of operations: All crimes, all hazards, and counterterrorism; 
Start date: September 2003. 

State: Ohio; 
Name of fusion center: Strategic Analysis and Information Center 
(SAIC); 
Stage of development: Developed; 
Lead agency: Ohio Division of Homeland Security; 
Scope of operations: All crimes and counterterrorism; 
Start date: January 2005. 

State: Oregon; 
Developed; 
Oregon Department of Justice; 
All crimes (all threats); 
June 2007; 
Terrorism Intelligence and Threat Assessment Network (TITAN) Fusion 
Center. 

State: Rhode Island; 
Name of fusion center: Rhode Island Fusion Center; 
Stage of development: Intermediate; 
Lead agency: Rhode Island State Police; 
Scope of operations: Counterterrorism; 
Start date: March 2006. 

State: South Carolina; 
Name of fusion center: South Carolina Information Exchange (SCIEx); 
Stage of development: Developed; 
Lead agency: South Carolina Law Enforcement Division; 
Scope of operations: All crimes and all hazards; 
Start date: March 2005. 

State: South Dakota; 
Name of fusion center: South Dakota Fusion Center; 
Stage of development: Intermediate; 
Lead agency: South Dakota Office of Homeland Security and the South 
Dakota Highway Patrol; 
Scope of operations: All crimes and all hazards; 
Start date: June 2006. 

State: Tennessee; 
Between intermediate and developed; 
Tennessee Bureau of Investigation and Tennessee Department of 
Safety/Office of Homeland Security; 
All crimes; 
May 2007; 
Tennessee Regional Information Center (TRIC). 

State: Texas; 
Name of fusion center: North Central Texas Fusion Center (NTFC); 
Stage of development: Between intermediate and developed; 
Lead agency: Collin County Department of Homeland Security; 
Scope of operations: All crimes and all hazards; 
Start date: February 2006. 

State: Texas; 
Name of fusion center: Texas Fusion Center; 
Stage of development: Intermediate; 
Lead agency: Criminal Law Enforcement Division and the Governor's 
Office of Homeland Security in the Texas Department of Public Safety; 
Scope of operations: All crimes and all hazards; 
Start date: July 2005. 

State: Vermont; 
Name of fusion center: Vermont Fusion Center; 
Stage of development: Developed; 
Lead agency: Vermont State Police; 
Scope of operations: All crimes; 
Start date: August 2005. 

State: Virginia; 
Name of fusion center: Virginia Fusion Center; 
Stage of development: Developed; 
Lead agency: Virginia State Police and Virginia Department of Emergency 
Management; 
Scope of operations: All hazards and counterterrorism; 
Start date: February 2005. 

State: Washington; 
Name of fusion center: Washington Joint Analytical Center (WAJAC); 
Stage of development: Intermediate; 
Lead agency: Joint effort between the Washington State Patrol and the 
FBI; 
Scope of operations: All crimes, all hazards, and counterterrorism; 
Start date: 2003. 

State: Washington, D.C; 
Name of fusion center: Metropolitan Washington Fusion Center (MWFC); 
Stage of development: Intermediate; 
Lead agency: Washington, D.C., Metropolitan Police Department; 
Scope of operations: All crimes and all hazards; 
Start date: Spring of 2006. 

State: Wisconsin; 
Name of fusion center: Southeastern Wisconsin Terrorism Alert Center 
(STAC); 
Stage of development: Intermediate; 
Lead agency: Milwaukee Police Department; 
Scope of operations: All crimes, all hazards, and counterterrorism; 
Start date: October 2006. 

State: Wisconsin; 
Name of fusion center: Wisconsin Statewide Intelligence Center (WSIC); 
Stage of development: Developed; 
Lead agency: Wisconsin Department of Justice, Division of Criminal 
Investigation; 
Scope of operations: All crimes, all hazards, all events; 
Start date: March 2006. 

Source: Fusion center officials. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: Fusion Centers in the Planning and Early Stages of 
Development: 

Table 5 presents information about fusion centers in the planning and 
early stages of development, as reported to us by fusion center 
officials during semistructured interviews as of September 2007. During 
these interviews, we asked officials to characterize their fusion 
centers as being in one of the following stages: planning, early 
development, intermediate (limited operations and functionality), or 
developed (fully operational and fully functional). 

Table 5: Selected Characteristics of Fusion Centers in the Planning and 
Early Stages of Development We Contacted, as of September 2007: 

State: Alabama; 
Name of fusion center: Alabama Information Fusion Center; 
Stage of development: Planning stage; 
Lead agency: Alabama Department of Homeland Security; 
Scope of operations: All crimes; 
Planned opening: The officials said that the center is expected to open 
in the fall of 2007. 

State: Alaska; 
Name of fusion center: Alaska Fusion Center; 
Stage of development: Planning stage; 
Lead agency: Alaska Department of Public Safety and Alaska Division of 
Homeland Security and Emergency Management; 
Scope of operations: All crimes, all hazards, all source; 
Planned opening: The officials did not provide a specific date. 

State: Arkansas; 
Name of fusion center: Arkansas Fusion Center; 
Stage of development: Early stage of development; 
Lead agency: Arkansas State Police; 
Scope of operations: All crimes (all threats); 
Planned opening: The officials said that the center may be able to 
begin limited operations by the winter of 2007. 

State: Hawaii; 
Name of fusion center: Hawaii Fusion Center; 
Stage of development: Planning stage; 
Lead agency: To be determined; 
Scope of operations: All hazards; 
Planned opening: The officials did not provide a specific date. 

State: Maine; 
Name of fusion center: Maine Intelligence and Analysis Center; 
Stage of development: Early stage of development; 
Lead agency: Maine Emergency Management Agency and the Maine State 
Police; 
Scope of operations: Counterterrorism; 
Planned opening: The officials said that the center opened in December 
2006. 

State: Michigan; 
Name of fusion center: Detroit and Southeastern Michigan Regional 
Fusion Center; 
Stage of development: Early stage of development; 
Lead agency: City of Detroit Homeland Security and Emergency 
Management; 
Scope of operations: All crimes, all hazards, and counterterrorism; 
Planned opening: The officials said that the center will be fully 
operational in January 2008. 

State: Mississippi; 
Name of fusion center: Mississippi Analysis & Information Center; 
Stage of development: Early stage of development; 
Lead agency: Mississippi Office of Homeland Security and Mississippi 
Department of Public Safety; 
Scope of operations: All crimes, all hazards, and all threats; 
Planned opening: The official said that the fusion center is expected 
to open at the end of September 2007. 

State: Nebraska; 
Name of fusion center: Nebraska Fusion Center; 
Stage of development: Planning stage; 
Lead agency: Nebraska State Patrol; 
Scope of operations: All crimes and all hazards, including terrorism; 
Planned opening: The officials said that the fusion center is expected 
to open in the fall of 2007. 

State: Nevada; 
Name of fusion center: Nevada Analytical and Information Center; 
Stage of development: Planning stage; 
Lead agency: Nevada Department of Public Safety; 
Scope of operations: All crimes (all threats); 
Planned opening: The official did not provide a specific date. 

State: New Hampshire; 
Name of fusion center: New Hampshire Fusion Center; 
Stage of development: Early stage of development; 
Lead agency: New Hampshire Department of Safety Division of State 
Police; 
Scope of operations: All crimes and all hazards; 
Planned opening: The official said the fusion center is planning to 
open in 2008. 

State: Oklahoma; 
Name of fusion center: Oklahoma Information Fusion Center; 
Stage of development: Early stage of development; 
Lead agency: Oklahoma State Bureau of Investigation; 
Scope of operations: All crimes and all hazards; 
Planned opening: The official said the fusion center is expected to 
open in early 2008. 

State: Pennsylvania; 
Name of fusion center: Pennsylvania Criminal Intelligence Center; 
Stage of development: Early stage of development; 
Lead agency: Pennsylvania State Police; 
Scope of operations: All crimes; 
Planned opening: The official said the center opened in July 2003. 
However, the official said he considers the center in the early stage 
of development as a fusion center but developed as a criminal 
intelligence center. 

State: Utah; 
Name of fusion center: Utah Fusion Center; 
Stage of development: Planning stage; 
Lead agency: Utah Department of Public Safety; 
Scope of operations: All crimes and all hazards; 
Planned opening: The official did not provide a specific date. 

State: West Virginia; 
Name of fusion center: West Virginia Fusion Center; 
Stage of development: Planning stage; 
Lead agency: Department of Military Affairs and Public Safety, Division 
of Homeland Security; 
Scope of operations: All crimes, all hazards, and counterterrorism; 
Planned opening: The official did not provide a specific date. 

State: Wyoming; 
Name of fusion center: [Empty]; 
Stage of development: Partnership is between planning and early stage 
of development; 
Lead agency: Wyoming Office of Homeland Security; 
Scope of operations: Counterterrorism; 
Planned opening: The officials said that Wyoming is planning to partner 
with Colorado. 

Source: Fusion center officials. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: Summary of State and Local Fusion Centers GAO Contacted: 

Following is a summary of the status and selected characteristics of 
the state and local fusion centers we contacted between February and 
May 2007.[Footnote 49] The summaries are primarily based on documents 
provided to us by fusion centers and interviews we conducted with 
fusion center officials.[Footnote 50] Specifically, we obtained and 
summarized documentation about the centers that covered a variety of 
topics including mission; lead agency; staffing; federal, state, and 
local entities represented; and types of services performed and 
products disseminated. During semistructured interviews with officials, 
we asked about the stage of development of the fusion center, reasons 
for establishing the center, and the scope of operations (e.g., 
counterterrorism). In some instances we augmented the information 
provided to us by fusion center officials with publicly available 
information about the fusion center or information provided to us by 
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) or the FBI. We sent the 
summaries to the fusion centers for a review of accuracy as of 
September 2007. However, we did not independently verify all of the 
information provided to us. 

Alabama: 

The Alabama Department of Homeland Security is in the final planning 
stage of establishing the Alabama Information Fusion Center. The center 
intends to use information not normally considered crime-related to 
prevent terrorist activity, but it will also adopt an all-crimes scope 
of operations. The fusion center has appointed an officer in charge and 
is in the process of acquiring additional staff members. However, the 
center is not yet fully operational. The executive order that will 
establish the office has been submitted to the Governor for approval, 
and it is expected that the fusion center will open for business in the 
fall of 2007. 

Alaska: 

The Alaska Fusion Center is in the advanced planning stage with the 
major concentration being on defining the missions, developing the 
governance, and outlining potential products and services. The fusion 
center will be a combined effort of the Alaska Department of Public 
Safety and the Alaska Division of Homeland Security and Emergency 
Management. While they do not have a physical fusion center, planning 
officials have partnerships established with the FBI, other federal and 
state law enforcement, the U.S. Attorney's Office, the U.S. Coast 
Guard, the military, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA). Through these partnerships, the member agencies already share 
information and coordinate activities. The officials said that they are 
considering the advantages of a joint, permanently staffed facility. If 
feasible and advantageous, they will plan to build or move into an 
available facility in the future. 

The Alaska Fusion Center will have an all-crimes, all-hazards, and all- 
source scope of operations. As a result of Public Safety and Homeland 
Security and Emergency Management involvement in developing the fusion 
center, the center will have both law enforcement and emergency 
management components. All-source includes law enforcement as well as 
economic information and infrastructure issues. The center will have 
three focus areas: day-to-day compilation, distillation, and 
distribution of information products; analyses and assessments of 
patterns and trends in the risks, threats, and hazards facing Alaska; 
and serving as an operational planning group serving all agencies when 
a threat emerges or a disaster occurs. The center has access to DHS's 
Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN), Department of Justice's 
Law Enforcement Online (LEO), and the Department of Defense's Secret 
Internet Protocol Router Network (SIPRNet). 

Arizona: 

The Arizona Counter Terrorism Information Center (AcTIC) opened in 
October 2004 as a cross-jurisdictional partnership among local, state, 
and federal law enforcement; first responders; and emergency 
management. Mandated by the Governor's Arizona Homeland Security plan, 
AcTIC's mission is to protect the citizens and critical infrastructures 
of Arizona by enhancing intelligence and domestic preparedness 
operations for all local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies. 
Mission execution will be guided by the understanding that the key to 
effectiveness is the development of information among participants to 
the fullest extent permitted by law or agency policy. AcTIC has an all- 
crimes focus and both an analytical and investigative scope of 
operations. 

AcTIC is run jointly by the FBI and the Arizona Department of Public 
Safety. There are 24 state, local, and federal agencies represented in 
the center. Among them are the Arizona Department of Public Safety; 
Arizona Department of Homeland Security; Arizona National Guard; 
Arizona Motor Vehicle Department; Arizona Department of Liquor License 
& Control; a number of county and city fire and law enforcement 
departments; the Rocky Mountain Information Network; the Bureau of 
Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF); U.S. Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (ICE); the Department of State; DHS's Office of 
Intelligence and Analysis (I&A); and the FBI. AcTIC is colocated in the 
same building with the FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) and 
Field Intelligence Group (FIG). These FBI groups are located in a 
separate suite and operate at the Top Secret/Sensitive Compartmented 
Information (TS/SCI) level. In addition, AcTIC has collaborated with 
Arizona State University-West Campus to create an internship program. 
Overall, there are about 240 personnel in AcTIC, including 
investigators, analysts, and support personnel. Most AcTIC personnel 
receive Secret clearances from the FBI. AcTIC is overseen by a 
Management Board that consists of the leader of every agency 
represented in the center and a governor-appointed Oversight Committee 
that provides guidance to the center. 

Within AcTIC, there is a Watch Center that is the central location for 
all information coming into the AcTIC. In addition, the facility houses 
the Terrorism Liaison Officer (TLO) squad, the HAZMAT/Weapons of Mass 
Destruction unit, a computer forensics laboratory, the Criminal 
Investigations Research Unit, Geographical Information Systems, and the 
Violent Criminal Apprehension Program. 

AcTIC concentrates on an all-crimes focus for gathering information, 
which is collected from a variety of Web sites; federal, state, and 
local databases and networks; the media; and unclassified intelligence 
bulletins. DHS and DOJ information systems or networks accessible to 
the center include LEO Special Interest Groups, HSIN-Intel, HSIN-Intel 
Arizona, and HSDN. AcTIC has direct connectivity to FBI classified 
systems and networks. However, those AcTIC personnel with Top Secret 
clearances must enter the JTTF suite and access an FBI system. AcTIC 
has access to, among others, Regional Information Sharing System (RISS) 
Automated Trusted Information Exchange (ATIX), SIPRNet, the National 
Criminal Information Center (NCIC), International Criminal Police 
Organization (INTERPOL), Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN), 
and El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC). In total AcTIC has over 100 law 
enforcement and public source databases available to it. AcTIC produces 
biweekly intelligence briefings, advisories, citizens' bulletins, 
information collection requirement bulletins, information bulletins, 
intelligence bulletins, and threat assessments. These products are 
primarily created for law enforcement entities and specific community 
partners, but some are for the public (e.g., advisories and citizens' 
bulletins). The products are typically disseminated via e-mail, Web 
site postings to LEO or HSIN, or faxes on occasion. 

Arkansas: 

The Arkansas State Police is in the early stage of development of the 
Arkansas Fusion Center. The focus of the Arkansas Fusion Center will 
initially be all crimes and all threats, although the intent is to 
incorporate an all-hazards element in the future. Currently, the center 
has commitments from the following federal, state, and local agencies 
to assign between 12 to 13 full-time personnel to the center: FBI, 
Arkansas Highway Police, Arkansas Crime Information Center, Arkansas 
National Guard, Arkansas Department of Corrections, Arkansas Department 
of Health, Arkansas State Police, Arkansas Game and Fish Commission, 
the Arkansas Association of Chiefs of Police, and the Arkansas 
Sheriff's Association. The officials said that they expect to receive 
funding in the fall of 2007, and that the center may be able to begin 
limited operations by the winter of 2007. 

California: 

In addition to the State Terrorism Threat Assessment Center (STTAC), 
California has established four regional fusion centers known as 
Regional Terrorism Threat Analysis Centers (RTTACs) that are located in 
San Diego, San Francisco, Los Angeles, and Sacramento and correspond to 
the FBI's four field office regions. The mission of the RTTACs is to 
collect, fuse, and analyze information related to terrorism from local 
law enforcement, fire departments, and public health and private sector 
entities. Each RTTAC is uniquely organized, but each is closely linked 
with local sheriffs. We contacted the STTAC, the Los Angeles RTTAC, 
known as the Joint Regional Intelligence Center (JRIC), and the 
Sacramento RTTAC. 

State Terrorism Threat Assessment Center: 

Former Governor Gray Davis and Attorney General Bill Lockyer created 
the California Anti-Terrorism Information Center on September 25, 2001, 
and in December 2005 the center was transformed into the State 
Terrorism Threat Assessment Center. STTAC is a joint partnership of the 
Governor's Office of Homeland Security, California Department of 
Justice, and the California Highway Patrol. The mission of STTAC is to 
serve as a joint operation among the parties with the function of 
receiving, analyzing, and maintaining relevant intelligence information 
obtained from various federal, state, local, and tribal sources, and 
disseminating counterterrorism intelligence information in appropriate 
formats to individuals and entities in California for the purpose of 
protecting California's citizens, property, and infrastructure from 
terrorist acts. STTAC's core mission is serving as California's central 
all-crimes and counterterrorism criminal intelligence center. STTAC is 
also to perform warning functions with the California State Warning 
Center in the Office of Emergency Services. 

STTAC operates in close cooperation with the Office of Homeland 
Security, California Highway Patrol, Office of Emergency Services, the 
four RTTACs, and federal agencies including DHS and FBI. STTAC's 
authorized staff level is 44, and the staff is composed primarily of 
California Department of Justice and Office of Homeland Security 
analysts and investigators. There are also representatives from the 
California Highway Patrol and the state National Guard. STTAC does not 
have DHS or FBI staff assigned directly to it. However, DHS has 
provided one senior intelligence officer who resides at the Sacramento 
RTTAC and supports STTAC and another officer who resides at the Los 
Angeles JRIC. The FBI provides support to STTAC upon request and has 
assigned personnel to all of the California RTTACs. An Executive 
Management Board consisting of leaders from the partner agencies 
provides strategic oversight of STTAC. 

DHS and DOJ information systems or networks accessible to the fusion 
center include HSIN (e.g., the Law Enforcement, Counterterrorism, and 
Intel portals), LEO, the Federal Protective Service (FPS) portal, and 
the Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force portal,[Footnote 51] as well 
as several California law enforcement and justice information and 
intelligence systems and commercially available databases. 

STTAC provides intelligence support to all state agencies and 
disseminates situational awareness products. For instance, it supports 
regional intelligence analysis and criminal investigations by supplying 
the RTTACs analytical support, field investigations, and intelligence 
assessments and reports, among other things. STTAC produces a variety 
of intelligence products including, but not limited to, the following: 
advisories that provide a brief description of a local tactical issue, 
suspect, event, or situation that may be of immediate concern to law 
enforcement or key policy makers; intelligence bulletins that provide a 
strategic in-depth review of a particular terrorist group, event, or 
public safety issue affecting the state; alerts that are issued when 
there is a specific, validated, and verified threat; special reports 
that provide extensive overviews of a particular group or issue and 
contain background information, methods and geographical areas of 
operation, violence potential, conclusions, and recommendations for 
interdicting the activity; and threat assessments. 

Los Angeles Joint Regional Intelligence Center: 

The Los Angeles Joint Regional Intelligence Center (JRIC) opened in 
July 2006. However, according to Los Angeles County Sheriff's 
Department and FBI officials, the three founding agencies of JRIC--the 
Los Angeles Sheriff's Department, FBI Los Angeles, and the Los Angeles 
Police Department (LAPD)--came together and realized that the region 
needed a center to address counterterrorism and critical infrastructure 
protection missions after the events of 9/11. The County Sheriff, the 
Chief of LAPD, and the Assistant Director in Charge of the FBI Los 
Angeles Field Office jointly decided to develop the center to cover the 
seven counties in the Los Angeles/southern California area. JRIC 
brought together the FBI's FIG, LAPD's Major Crimes Division, and the 
Sheriff Department's Terrorism Early Warning (TEW) group.[Footnote 52] 

JRIC has an all-crimes and counterterrorism scope of operations. 
Specifically, JRIC collects information using an all-crimes approach, 
converts the information into operational and strategic intelligence, 
and disseminates the intelligence to prevent terrorist attacks and 
combat crime in the Central District of California. Its mission is 
intelligence intake, fusion, and analysis, with an emphasis on 
terrorist threat intelligence; providing timely, regionally focused, 
and actionable information to consumers and producing assessments; and 
identifying trends, patterns and terrorist tactics, techniques and 
procedures; and sponsoring training opportunities. 

In addition to JRIC's founding agencies, cooperating agencies in JRIC 
include DHS I&A, the U.S. Attorney's Office, Governor's Office of 
Homeland Security, and California Department of Justice. DHS I&A has 
assigned an intelligence officer to JRIC, and the center includes about 
30 full-time personnel representing 14 agencies. JRIC personnel receive 
Secret or Top Secret clearances from the FBI. TLOs connect law 
enforcement and public safety partners in the seven-county region to 
JRIC by collecting, assessing, and passing on information, 
intelligence, tips, and leads to the center and then distributing 
advisories, bulletins, assessments, and requests for information to 
their home agencies. 

JRIC collects information from national reporting; leads and tips from 
the FBI, LAPD, the Sheriff's Department and the TLOs; and from private 
sector outreach. DHS and DOJ information systems or networks accessible 
to JRIC include LEO; every HSIN portal (e.g., Intelligence, Law 
Enforcement, Emergency Management); the classified Homeland Security 
Data Network (HSDN); and all of the system and databases available in 
the FBI's FBINet/Trilogy system. The center also has access to the 
FBI's Top Secret network, the Sensitive Compartmental Information 
Operational Network (SCION) through a facility located on the same 
floor as JRIC.[Footnote 53] JRIC disseminates information to, among 
others, JTTFs, California Office of Homeland Security, DHS and LEO 
portals, law enforcement and public safety partners, affected 
municipality and critical infrastructure owners, and the originator of 
the information (in the form of feedback). JRIC also produces daily and 
weekly reports. 

Sacramento Regional Terrorism Threat Assessment Center: 

The Sacramento RTTAC was established primarily to bring analysts from 
different state, local, and federal agencies together to work on 
terrorism-related issues. The center has been located in its current 
building, which has a Sensitive Compartmented Information Facility 
(SCIF), and operating at its current level of functionality, at the TS/ 
SCI level, since November 2006. Prior to that, the center operated at a 
Law Enforcement Sensitive level for about 2 years in a different 
facility. RTTAC has an all-crimes and counterterrorism scope of 
operations and handles all of the critical asset management and threat 
assessment capabilities in its area of responsibility. 

Participating agencies include the National Guard, FBI, U.S. Attorney's 
Office, ICE, and representatives from fire, law enforcement, and public 
health disciplines. DHS I&A has assigned an intelligence officer, and 
the FBI has assigned two analysts and one intelligence research 
specialist, and recently added a JTTF threat squad to the RTTAC team to 
vet tips and leads. In addition, there are other state and local 
analysts in the center. The FBI also provides RTTAC personnel with TS/ 
SCI security clearances. DHS and DOJ information systems or networks 
accessible to the fusion center include LEO, HSIN, HSIN- 
Counterterrorism portal, HSDN, as well as FBI systems, such as the 
Automated Case Support (ACS) system and SCION. The RTTAC also has 
access to SIPRNet, among other federal and state systems and networks. 

Colorado: 

The Colorado Information Analysis Center (CIAC) became operational in 
October 2004 under the direction of the Colorado Bureau of 
Investigation. The Colorado State Patrol took over operation and 
management of CIAC in March 2005, and it moved into its new facility in 
April 2005. CIAC was originally opened to support and respond to 
credible threats during the elections in 2004, but has since evolved to 
have an all-crimes and all-hazards scope of operation. Its mission is 
to provide an integrated, multidiscipline information-sharing network 
to collect, analyze, and disseminate information to stakeholders in a 
timely manner in order to protect the citizens and critical 
infrastructure of Colorado. CIAC has no investigative power but does 
have the ability to collect, analyze, and vet information for 
authenticity. When additional investigation is necessary, CIAC sends 
information to the DHS, the FBI's FIG, and to local law enforcement. 

CIAC is staffed full-time by the Colorado State Patrol, the National 
Guard, the Department of Revenue, and the FBI. There are part-time 
participants in CIAC from the Colorado Departments of Agriculture, 
Public Health, Corrections, Education, and the Colorado Springs Police 
Department, as well as from the U.S. Marshals Service. The University 
of Denver also provides interns to CIAC. DHS I&A has conducted a needs 
assessment of CIAC. However, at the time of our review, it had not 
placed an intelligence analyst in the center. CIAC has access to a 
regional DHS protective security advisor.[Footnote 54] 

DHS and DOJ information systems or networks accessible to CIAC include 
HSIN, LEO, and the FPS portal. In addition, the center has access to, 
among others, Rocky Mountain Information Network, U.S. Northern 
Command, and SIPRNET, which is accessed through the FBI. CIAC produces 
several types of bulletins and summaries, including For Official Use 
Only and Law Enforcement Sensitive versions of a monthly summary of 
reported incidents, daily reports, officer safety bulletins, and early 
warning and special reports. These products are e-mailed to a number of 
recipients, including members of the critical infrastructure sectors. 
Products are also distributed directly to law enforcement officers via 
in-car mobile data computers. The monthly summaries are produced with 
the FBI FIG and also cover incidents in Wyoming, and some of the 
special reports are produced jointly with the FBI and the U.S. Northern 
Command. 

Connecticut: 

The Connecticut Intelligence Center (CTIC) opened in April 2005 as the 
centralized point of information sharing for the state. CTIC is a multi-
agency operation representing various jurisdictions that serves to 
collect, analyze, and disseminate criminal and terrorism-related 
intelligence to all law enforcement agencies in the state. CTIC has an 
all-crimes scope of operations and endeavors to identify emerging 
threats or crime trends. 

Colocated with an FBI field office and jointly led by the FBI and the 
Connecticut State Police, CTIC's 12-member staff includes 
representatives from the FBI, the U.S. Coast Guard, the state 
department of corrections, State Police, and local law enforcement 
agencies. DHS I&A placed an intelligence officer in the center in 
September 2007. FBI personnel serve in both supervisory and analytical 
roles in CTIC. For example, CTIC Operations Supervisor is also the FBI 
FIG supervisor. Day-to-day operations are managed by an FBI Supervisory 
Special Agent and supported by two Intelligence Coordinators, one from 
the state police and one from the FBI. The FBI also provides Top Secret 
clearances to CTIC personnel. 

The state is divided into five regions, each of which is represented in 
CTIC by a Regional Intelligence Liaison Officers. The officers are 
appointed by the corresponding Connecticut Police Chiefs Association 
and represent local law enforcement agencies in the center. The 
officers maintain full-time positions at CTIC and serve a recommended 
minimum of 2 years after obtaining a Top Secret clearance. CTIC offers 
a stipend for each municipality that places an officer in the center. 
The officers serve as the communication link between CTIC and a network 
of Intelligence Liaison Officers who are specially trained officers who 
represent local departments within each region. The Intelligence 
Liaison Officers are responsible for providing information to CTIC and 
for providing statewide and jurisdictional-specific information from 
CTIC to their respective agencies. CTIC has an Advisory Board that 
meets quarterly and defines strategy and policy for the center. CTIC 
also has partnerships with the private sector through Connecticut 
Infragard.[Footnote 55] 

CTIC takes an all-crimes approach to information collection and has 
access to a number of state and federal systems and networks. DHS and 
DOJ information systems or networks accessible to CTIC include HSIN, 
LEO, and ACS, Guardian, and Investigative Data Warehouse (IDW) through 
the FBI. In addition, CTIC has access to the New England State Police 
Information Network, which is part of RISSNet, and SIPRNet. CTIC 
produces a variety of intelligence products, including weekly bulletins 
on criminal activities; weekly intelligence bulletins; intelligence 
assessments, which provide in-depth reporting on an emerging threat, 
group, or crime; and intelligence information reports. Their primary 
customers are the law enforcement officers, emergency managers, and the 
private sector in the state and Northeast region. 

Delaware: 

After the September 11, 2001, attacks, Delaware officials identified a 
need to establish a conduit for information flow, both to and from the 
federal government and local entities and in and out of Delaware. Led 
by the Delaware State Police, the Delaware Information Analysis Center 
(DIAC) was subsequently opened in December 2005. DIAC, through a 
multijurisdictional and multidiscipline effort, is committed to 
providing a coordinated, professional, and all-hazards approach in 
preventing, disrupting, and defeating criminal and terrorist activity 
while safeguarding individuals' constitutional guarantees. 
Specifically, using an all-crimes and all-hazards approach, DIAC will 
collect, analyze, and disseminate criminal intelligence; conduct crime 
analysis; provide officer and public safety alerts to all disciplines; 
and disseminate critical infrastructure information to those persons in 
law enforcement, government, and the private sector who have both a 
right and need to know, with the objective of protecting the citizens, 
infrastructure, and key assets of the state. 

Partners from other state agencies include Public Health, Department of 
Technology and Information, Department of Corrections, Transportation, 
Division of Revenue, and Natural Resources, as well as the Delaware 
Volunteer Firemen's Association and all other law enforcement entities 
in the state, including local and federal agencies. At the time of our 
review, DIAC staff included six full-time analysts and two Delaware 
National Guard analysts, as well as three personnel assigned to 
critical infrastructure protection. DIAC also has two Delaware State 
Police commissioned officers assigned in administrative roles. Two of 
the six state police analysts have Top Secret clearances that were 
granted by the FBI. At the time of our review, there were no DHS or FBI 
personnel represented in DIAC. 

Analysts produce a variety of products, including a weekly intelligence 
report for law enforcement and a weekly infrastructure bulletin for 
private sector partners as well as situational reports and homeland 
security and situational alerts. Tactical alerts and reports on 
multijurisdictional criminal activity are supplied to Delaware law 
enforcement agencies in many forms such as officer safety warnings, 
warnings and indicators of terrorist events, site-specific critical 
infrastructure and asset alerts, and informational bulletins and 
assessments. DHS and DOJ information systems or networks accessible to 
the fusion center include HSIN, LEO, and FPS portal. In addition, DIAC 
has access to information from High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area 
(HIDTA) and the Information Sharing and Analysis Centers, which are 
private sector critical infrastructure protection sharing centers. Both 
information and intelligence are collected from and disseminated to 
other state fusion centers, DHS, the FBI, the U.S. Coast Guard, local 
law enforcement, the private sector, the Delaware National Guard, Dover 
Air Force Base, other state agencies, and the Information Sharing and 
Analysis Centers. 

District of Columbia: 

After a planning stage that began in 2005, the Metropolitan Washington 
Fusion Center (MWFC) opened in the spring of 2006 to provide local 
governments and agencies with an approach and capability for networked 
information sharing. Led by the Metropolitan Police Department, MWFC 
has multiple agencies and disciplines represented and serves the 
National Capital Region. 

MWFC has a 24/7 command center that provides a constant flow of 
information and looks at that information for patterns of activity 
alongside the crime analysis unit. MWFC is an all-crimes center, but 
also has an all-hazards function as it follows the National 
Infrastructure Protection Plan, in particular focusing on the large 
number of national monuments located within the Washington metropolitan 
area. The all-hazards function is supported by partnerships with the 
Department of Health, which helps with responding to health issues such 
as pandemics and natural disasters, and the Washington, D.C., National 
Guard, which helps with the analysis of patterns and response to 
events. It is also coordinated with the MWFC's Emergency Management 
Agency functions. An official said that MWFC did not want to focus only 
on crime because important threat information and information that 
leads analysts to detect suspicious patterns occurs in many other areas 
as well. In addition, it was also important to MWFC to adopt the dual 
all-crimes, all-hazards focus because the fusion center wanted to give 
a number of partner agencies "a seat at the table" to increase support 
of the center. An official also noted that the MWFC has created a 
Fusion Center Regional Programmatic Workgroup to develop a regional 
strategy, product development, and charter, and to form a solid, 
cohesive, common operating picture for the region. 

The FBI and DHS I&A have assigned personnel to MWFC. At the time of our 
review, the fusion center was located in secure space provided by the 
FBI. However, according to the official, the center is planning to move 
into D.C. government space within 30 months. DHS and DOJ information 
systems or networks accessible to the fusion center include LEO and 
FBINet. The center will be a RISS node through the Middle Atlantic- 
Great Lakes Organized Crime Law Enforcement Network and is in the 
review process with DHS to receive HSDN. 

Florida: 

The Florida Fusion Center is a component of the Florida Department of 
Law Enforcement's (FDLE) Office of Statewide Intelligence. According to 
FDLE officials, the Office of Statewide Intelligence was created in 
1996 with the primary mission "to provide FDLE leadership with 
sufficient information so that they (sic) may make informed decisions 
on the deployment of resources." The office is responsible for the 
coordination of FDLE's intelligence efforts and analysis and 
dissemination of intelligence and crime data information. The office 
has always had an all-crimes approach that was reflective of FDLE's 
investigative strategy and focus areas. This approach was enhanced with 
the addition of a domestic security mission after 9/11. Under the 
coordination of FDLE, seven regional domestic security task forces were 
created, along with an analytical unit within the Office of Statewide 
Intelligence to enhance domestic security and counterterrorism 
investigative efforts. Each task force is cochaired by an FDLE Special 
Agent in Charge and a sheriff from the region. The task forces include 
multidisciplinary partners from education, fire rescue, health, 
communications, law enforcement, and emergency management. These 
disciplines are also reflected in the composition of the fusion center. 

The Florida Fusion Center was established in January 2007 with a 
mission to protect the citizens, visitors, resources, and critical 
infrastructure of Florida by enhancing information sharing, 
intelligence capabilities, and preparedness operations for all local, 
state, and federal agencies in accordance with Florida's Domestic 
Security Strategy. The fusion center will serve as the state node and 
will provide connectivity and intelligence sharing amongst Florida's 
regional fusion centers. The center consists of approximately 45 FDLE 
members, federal agencies, state multidisciplinary partners, and 
includes outreach to private sector entities. FDLE members who are part 
of the fusion center have assignments to various squads within the 
Office of Statewide Intelligence, to include counterterrorism 
intelligence, financial crime analysis, critical infrastructure, and a 
24/7 situational awareness unit, the Florida investigative support 
squad. FFC also has full-time analysts from DHS I&A and the FBI working 
at the center, as well as representation from the U.S. Attorney's 
Office. The center will add a full-time analyst from the Florida 
National Guard in October 2007. 

State agencies and departments that have committed to participate as 
members of the Fusion Center Executive Policy Board and have designated 
an intelligence liaison officer or analyst to the fusion center 
include: Agriculture; Business and Professional Regulation; 
Corrections; Education; Emergency Management; Environmental Protection; 
Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission; Financial Services; Health; 
Highway Safety; FDLE; Transportation; and the National Guard. 

DHS and DOJ systems and networks the center has access to include LEO, 
HSIN, HSIN-Intel, HSIN-Florida, and HSDN. 

Georgia: 

The Georgia Information Sharing and Analysis Center (GISAC) was 
established in October 2001 and falls under the responsibility and 
management of the Georgia Office of Homeland Security. The initial 
focus of GISAC was to address terrorism and the information gap among 
federal, state, and local law enforcement in providing homeland 
security intelligence. Its mission is to serve as the focal point for 
collection, analysis, and dissemination of information on threats or 
attacks of a terrorist nature within and against the State of Georgia, 
its citizens, or infrastructure. 

GISAC is one of the three components of the Georgia Office of Homeland 
Security and is divided into four sections--law enforcement, criminal 
intelligence, fire services/hazmat, and emergency management. GISAC has 
a staff of 27, the majority of whom are personnel from the Georgia 
Bureau of Investigation. Other state agencies with assigned personnel 
at the center include the Georgia Emergency Management Agency, Georgia 
State Patrol, Georgia Department of Corrections, and Georgia National 
Guard. The Georgia Sheriffs' Association, Georgia Fire Chiefs 
Association, and Georgia Association of Chiefs of Police have each 
assigned one person to the center. DHS I&A has assigned two staff to 
GISAC; one Southeast region representative and one intelligence 
officer. There are no FBI personnel assigned directly to GISAC. 
However, there are two GISAC personnel assigned to the JTTF, and all 
analysts have access to the FBI FIG, whereby they have access to FBI 
systems. GISAC is also located in the same building as the FBI field 
office with its JTTF and FIG. 

GISAC produces a variety of products, including an open source report 
weekly, which is posted on the Office of Homeland Security-Georgia 
Emergency Management Agency Web site and distributed electronically; a 
monthly intelligence report that is For Official Use Only and 
distributed electronically; alerts and notices, which are produced on 
an as-needed basis; a monthly outbreak and surveillance report from the 
Georgia Department of Health; and an Georgia Bureau of Investigation- 
produced joint GISAC/FBI multipage monthly bulletin that contains GISAC 
statistics combined with FBI information. DHS and DOJ systems and 
networks to which GISAC has access include HSIN, HSDN, and LEO. In 
addition, GISAC analysts are able to access FBI systems, such as E- 
Guardian, IDW, and ACS. 

Hawaii: 

According to a State of Hawaii Department of Defense official, for the 
past 2 years officials from civil defense and state law enforcement 
have discussed the possibility of establishing a fusion center in 
Hawaii. Specifically, they have discussed establishing an intelligence 
unit under state and local law enforcement control to complement the 
FBI's JTTF in Honolulu. A state fusion center would provide 
intelligence and analysis to all disciplines, especially law 
enforcement. Planning officials are not seeking a center that is only 
focused on the prevention and disruption of terrorism, but one that 
would complement other departments, agencies, and task forces within 
the context of all hazards. The official noted that the establishment 
of a fusion center in Hawaii depends on the adequacy and allocation of 
Homeland Security grant funds in fiscal years 2007 and 2008. According 
to the official, Hawaii's fiscal year 2007 allocation will not support 
the current investment strategy for a fusion center. The official said 
that they will have to wait until fiscal year 2008 or find an 
alternative funding strategy. 

Idaho: 

Idaho does not have and is not planning to establish a physical fusion 
center. However, according to the directors of the Bureau of Homeland 
Security and Idaho State Police, the state has a "virtual fusion 
process." The fusion process grew out of monthly information-sharing 
meetings prior to September 11 that were held by the Idaho Bureau of 
Hazardous Materials with other federal, state, and local officials in 
Idaho. In October 2001, the U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of 
Idaho offered to serve as the cornerstone of an information-sharing 
effort. A member of the U.S. Attorney's Office, who is also a member of 
the Anti-Terrorism Advisory Council,[Footnote 56] provides the 
overarching structure for the fusion process by facilitating 
connections between federal sources of intelligence in Idaho and state 
and local law enforcement. This individual holds meetings several times 
a year, provides information and analyses to consumers by way of the 
Internet and coordinates with the two JTTFs in the area. Participants 
in the fusion process also use HSIN. 

The officials articulated several reasons why they are not planning to 
establish a fusion center, including the state's commitment to support 
the efforts of the U.S. Attorney's Office to conduct threat analyses 
and share information, political concerns about the role of the 
government in information sharing, local agencies' lack of interest in 
participating in a fusion center because they perceive the centers to 
be intelligence-gathering entities, and local communities do not want 
law enforcement to be involved in gathering intelligence, the state's 
low risk for international terrorism, and difficulties staffing a 
center because state and local agencies would not have the capacity to 
provide personnel to work in a fusion center. 

Illinois: 

There are two fusion centers in Illinois, the Statewide Terrorism and 
Intelligence Center (STIC) and the Chicago Crime Prevention and 
Information Center (CPIC). 

Statewide Terrorism and Intelligence Center: 

Led by the Illinois State Police, the Statewide Terrorism and 
Intelligence Center (STIC) was established in May 2003 with the mission 
to provide timely, effective, and actionable intelligence information 
to local, state, and federal law enforcement and private sector 
partners in order to enhance public safety, facilitate communication 
between agencies, and provide support in the fight against terrorism 
and criminal activity. STIC is an all-crimes fusion center that is 
colocated with the Illinois Emergency Management Agency, with which it 
works closely during disasters. When STIC was established, it absorbed 
the state police intelligence unit, which focused on general crimes 
(e.g., violent crimes, narcotics, sex offenders), because, in part, the 
planners wanted to combine all of the silos of information needed to 
prevent criminal and terrorist activity. 

STIC is organized into two sections: a terrorism section, which staffs 
the 24/7 watch, and the field support section, which has a criminal 
intelligence unit with specialists working on drugs, violent crimes, 
motor vehicle theft, and sex offenses. The Illinois State Police and 
the Illinois National Guard provide nearly all of the personnel, 
including 7 sworn officers, 18 terrorism research specialists, 4 
narcotics analysts, 3 other crime/violent crime analysts, 1 senior 
terrorism lead analyst, 1 firearms analyst, 2 motor vehicle theft 
analysts, 6 Internet crime analysts, 1 America's Missing: Broadcast 
Emergency Response (AMBER) Alert analyst, and 2 office assistants. The 
FBI has assigned two analysts to work terrorism-related cases, the Drug 
Enforcement Administration (DEA) has assigned one analyst to work 
narcotics cases, and DHS I&A has assigned one analyst to work on 
homeland security issues. The Illinois Terrorism Task Force, which is 
composed of representatives from state and local agencies involved in 
emergency planning in the event of a critical incident, provides 
support to the Illinois State Police and approves the funding for STIC. 

STIC also has partnerships with the private sector. For example, the 
Illinois Association of Chiefs of Police and its Public-Private Liaison 
Committee, along with STIC, initiated the Infrastructure Security 
Awareness program in September 2004. The program was designed to share 
critical and sensitive non-law-enforcement information in a timely 
manner with corporate security executives as well as provide a forum 
for information exchange among private security professionals. This 
program enables STIC to provide threat information to major 
corporations and to receive reports of suspicious activity. STIC 
provides information to private security partners by using HSIN, which 
allows for the exchange of data, text messages, meeting dates, and the 
building of specialized tools to meet various applications through a 
secure Internet connection. 

STIC's terrorism research specialists collect, analyze, and disseminate 
terrorism-related intelligence data; complete in-depth threat 
assessments; and identify predictive, incident-based indicators of 
potential terrorist activities within the state. The specialists have 
access to various state and federal law enforcement intelligence 
databases, public records databases, and financial databases. DHS and 
DOJ information systems or networks accessible to STIC include HSIN, 
JRIES, LEO, RISSNET, R-DEX, and the FPS portal as well as FinCEN and 
HIDTA. The officials said that they will have access to FBI and DHS 
classified systems when their SCIF, for which the FBI is funding the 
construction, is completed. 

STIC provides a variety of services to support officers in the field, 
including a 20-minute workup on requests from officers conducting 
traffic stops and responding to major crime scenes, lead management and 
development, on-scene analytical services, and statewide deconfliction 
to all law enforcement agencies by using the HIDTA nationwide network. 
STIC recently adopted the Internet Crimes Analysis Unit, which takes 
calls from the public regarding fraud, sexual predators, terrorism, and 
other issues and also administers the AMBER Alert program. 

Chicago Crime Prevention and Information Center: 

The Chicago Crime Prevention and Information Center (CPIC), led by the 
Chicago Police Department, opened in April 2007 with the mission "to 
enhance partnerships which foster a connection between every facet of 
the law enforcement community. CPIC will afford the men and women, who 
are dedicated to protecting the public and addressing violence, with 
all available intelligence resources, and communications capabilities." 
CPIC's goal is to be the clearinghouse of information that is fused and 
delivered to stakeholders. CPIC has an all-crimes and counterterrorism 
focus. The Chicago Police Department is involved in the fusion process 
as it relates to violent crime, and the department has an in-house 
counterterrorism section. 

In addition to Chicago Police Department officers, the FBI has assigned 
three analysts to the CPIC. The center also has personnel from ICE, 
ATF, HIDTA (5 days a week), Chicago's Metrarail, the Cook County 
Sheriff's Department, the Illinois State Police, and 35 suburban police 
departments. CPIC is in the process of establishing a transportation 
"desk" staffed with Transportation Security Administration (TSA), 
Amtrak, Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS), and local agency personnel. 
DHS I&A has conducted a needs assessment. However, at the time of our 
review, it had not placed an intelligence analyst in the center. 

CPIC is tactically oriented and designed to provide direct, near-real- 
time support to law enforcement personnel on the street. It provides, 
among other things, real-time violent crime detection monitoring and 
response, continual assessment of available resources for the purpose 
of possible redeployment of manpower, instantaneous major incident 
notification, analysis and identification of retaliatory violence and 
automated construction of enforcement missions to thwart retaliatory 
violence, crime pattern identification, and immediate access to in- 
depth background data on persons of investigative interest. DHS and DOJ 
systems and networks accessible to CPIC include HSIN, HSDN, FPS Portal, 
LEO, FBI's ACS and IDW, as well as NCIC, FinCEN, RISSNET, RISS ATIX, 
INTERPOL, International Justice and Public Safety Information Sharing 
Network (NLETS), EPIC, National Drug Intelligence Center (NDIC), 
Treasury Enforcement Communications System, and numerous other state 
and local systems and data sources. CPIC also recently added a 
satellite tracking system that traces stolen bank funds and the 
offender. 

CPIC focuses on producing products to assist police officers on the 
street. A primary product is the District Intelligence Bulletin System, 
which is a Web-based application that uses multiple data sources to 
provide officers with a law enforcement road map. It provides officers 
with calls for service, wanted persons, most recent shootings/ 
homicides, and additional intelligence in a succinct format. All of 
this information is automatically updated on a continuous basis 
throughout the day and is accessible by deployed patrol officers. It 
allows an officer to review information by district and deployment 
area. CPIC also publishes a daily intelligence briefing, which is 
designed to give officers a more detailed overview of potential threats 
based on international, national, and local events, and a weekly 
version for the private sector. 

Indiana: 

The Indiana Intelligence Fusion Center (IIFC), which opened in December 
2006, was established with the mission to collect, evaluate, analyze, 
and disseminate information and intelligence data regarding criminal 
and terrorist activity in the State of Indiana while following Fair 
Information Practices to ensure the rights and privacy of citizens. In 
addition to collecting information on all crimes, IIFC will 
specifically collect information as it relates to terrorism and its 
impact on Indiana. IIFC has an all-crimes approach, acting as an 
intelligence group for the state. However, there is a terrorism nexus 
to the fusion center's work. 

IIFC is operated by the Indiana Department of Homeland Security and has 
been staffed as a task force entity with federal and state partners. 
Indiana state agency, department, and association partners in IIFC are: 
Homeland Security, National Guard, State Excise Police, Natural 
Resources, Association of Chiefs of Police, Gaming Commission Division 
of Gaming Agents, Indiana State Police, Corrections, Sheriff's 
Association, Marion County Sheriff's Department, and the Indiana Campus 
Law Enforcement Association. Federal partners in IIFC include the FBI, 
and the U.S. Attorneys for the Northern and Southern Districts of 
Indiana. The FBI has assigned two FIG analysts to IIFC. DHS I&A has 
conducted a needs assessment of IIFC. However, at the time of our 
review, it had not yet placed an intelligence analyst in the center. A 
12-member executive committee oversees IIFC's activities. 

The center is a 24/7 intelligence operations center that works in 
conjunction with statewide law enforcement liaisons, providing for 
intelligence-led policing throughout the state. IIFC operates a 1-800 
tip line and an IIFC e-mail box and produces a bulletin three times a 
week. DHS and DOJ systems and networks that IIFC has access to include 
HSIN-Intel, HSDN, RISS, FPS portal, LEO, as well as SIPRNet, RISS, 
NCIC, and EPIC. The FBI has built a Top Secret secure room within IIFC, 
and also provided access to the ACS and Guardian systems in the secure 
space. 

Iowa: 

The Iowa Intelligence Fusion Center was established in December 2004 
with the mission to enable the State of Iowa to proactively direct core 
resources with its partners to avert or meet current, emerging, and 
future public safety and homeland security threats. Following the 
attacks of September 11, Iowa established a Homeland Security Advisory 
Council to enhance the state's capability to implement the Iowa 
Homeland Security Initiative. In the spring of 2002, the council's 
Information and Intelligence Sharing Task force was formed to make 
recommendations for sharing intelligence and information, and among 
other things, it recommended the establishment of a fusion center. 

Built on the backbone of the Iowa Law Enforcement Intelligence Network, 
the Intelligence Fusion System consists of the fusion center, six 
regional fusion offices, and a number of partner agencies and 
organizations. The fusion center is led by the Iowa Department of 
Public Safety and serves as a centralized information collection, 
analysis, and dissemination point. It is staffed with 18 full-time 
analysts (16 of whom are state funded), 11 investigator/collectors, and 
5 support staff. Nearly all are Iowa Department of Public Safety 
personnel. However, there is an Iowa National Guard analyst assigned to 
the center, and the Midwest HIDTA provides funding for one intelligence 
analyst in the center. Although no federal agencies have assigned 
personnel to the fusion center yet, the center conducts regular 
meetings with the FBI's FIG and JTTF, the U.S. Attorney's Office, and 
the DHS Protective Security Advisor. The fusion center has placed one 
Department of Public Safety agent full-time at the JTTF and conducts 
regular and as-needed coordination and information-sharing meetings 
with the state Homeland Security Advisor, the Iowa Homeland Security 
and Emergency Management Division, the Iowa Department of Agriculture 
and Land Stewardship, and the Iowa Department of Public Health, among 
others. The six regional fusion offices are strategically located 
across the state. A fusion center agent is assigned to each regional 
office and is partnered with two to four local officials at each site. 
Fusion system personnel also regularly participate in meetings of the 
local InfraGard chapter. In addition, the Department of Public Safety 
is part of the Safeguard Iowa Partnership, which is a voluntary 
coalition of business and government leaders who combine their efforts 
to prevent, protect from, respond to, and recover from catastrophic 
events. The Safeguard Iowa Partnership was formally launched in January 
2007. 

DHS and DOJ information systems or networks accessible to the fusion 
center include LEO and HSIN (law enforcement and counterterrorism 
portals), as well as RISSNET. HSIN-Secret has been deployed to the 
State Emergency Operations Center, but DHS has not deployed the system 
to the fusion center. Fusion center personnel who are JTTF members are 
granted Top Secret clearances and can access FBI systems at the JTTF 
office. 

Kansas: 

The Adjutant General of Kansas, Kansas Bureau of Investigation, and 
Kansas Highway Patrol formed the Kansas Threat Integration Center 
(KSTIC) in June 2004 with the mission to assist Kansas law enforcement 
and other related agencies in their mission to protect the citizens and 
critical infrastructures within Kansas through enhanced gathering, 
analysis, and dissemination of criminal and terrorist intelligence 
information. KSTIC focuses on the development, gathering, analyzing, 
and dissemination of criminal and terrorist threat information in order 
to protect citizens, property, and infrastructure in Kansas. 
Additionally, KSTIC works to increase threat awareness among law 
enforcement, other governmental agencies, and private infrastructure 
providers in the state. KSTIC's scope of operations is primarily 
focused on terrorist/extremist activities with a secondary all-crimes 
scope of operations that comes into play when criminal acts serve as a 
prelude to terrorist or extremist activities. It is not an all-hazards 
facility, but KSTIC is colocated with the Kansas Division of Emergency 
Management and therefore has access to its resources. 

KSTIC is a joint operation of the Kansas Bureau of Investigation, 
National Guard, and Highway Patrol. An Executive Board, consisting of 
one member from each agency, provides oversight and the KBI 
representative is responsible for the day-to-day operations of KSTIC. 
There are three full-time staff--a Kansas Bureau of Investigation 
senior special agent, an investigator from the Highway Patrol, and a 
National Guard Captain--however, KSTIC can use Kansas Bureau of 
Investigation analysts for assistance as needed. Personnel hold TS/SCI 
clearances. KSTIC is in the process of hiring two to four analysts 
depending on funding availability. While KSTIC has no federal partners, 
it interfaces with state FBI JTTFs on a regular basis and is discussing 
the possibility of colocating with the JTTF. 

KSTIC accesses sensitive but unclassified bulletins and reports and 
open source information to report on terrorist/extremist threats to 
Kansas in particular and the Midwest in general. Additionally, KSTIC 
receives tip and other information directly from citizens and state law 
enforcement. KSTIC uses access to classified systems to identify and 
monitor potential threats to Kansas. DHS and DOJ information systems or 
networks accessible to KSTIC include HSIN, HSIN-Secret, LEO, FPS 
portal, as well as SIPRNet and FinCEN. KSTIC personnel also have full 
access to the FBI's various databases (i.e., Guardian and IDW) at an 
FBI field office or JTTF location. Through the National Guard, the 
KSTIC is planning to construct a SCIF, which when completed will 
provide space for approximately 15 personnel as well as secure 
connectivity to a variety of Top Secret and other systems. 

KSTIC produces intelligence/information bulletins for state and 
regional law enforcement. All information disseminated is sensitive but 
unclassified, with the exception of the periodic open source bulletins 
published for dissemination to a public/infrastructure distribution 
list. Bulletins are posted on several secure sites, such as LEO and FPS 
Web sites, as well as distributed via statewide teletype and e-mail. 
The distribution list includes state, local, and federal agencies in 
Kansas as well as other agencies around the country. 

Kentucky: 

The Kentucky Intelligence Fusion Center (KIFC) opened in December 2005 
as an all-crimes fusion center. The fusion center focuses on all 
crimes, rather than those with a nexus to terrorism, primarily to 
obtain buy-in from local agencies. KIFC was established with support 
from the Kentucky Office of Homeland Security; the Kentucky State 
Police, which transferred its intelligence center to KIFC; and the 
Kentucky Transportation Cabinet, which provides KIFC its facility. 
Other agencies in the fusion center include ATF, the Kentucky 
Department of Corrections, Kentucky Department of Military Affairs, 
Kentucky Vehicle Enforcement, and the Lexington Metro Police. The FBI 
has assigned one full-time FIG analyst to the center. KIFC does not 
have any DHS personnel assigned to the center. 

The fusion center provides all-crimes and terrorism intelligence 
analytical services; supports the JTTF with counterterrorism 
investigators; assists all federal, state, and local law enforcement 
with requests for information on suspects; assists law enforcement in 
the location of subjects, suspect vehicle registration, and suspect 
driver's license photo and data; provides link analysis charts such as 
association links, communication links, and event flow; serves as the 
conduit for law enforcement's request for information from other state 
fusion centers; provides access to HSIN-KY, the state Web site for law 
enforcement information sharing; and serves as a repository for the 
state's identified critical infrastructures. Some KIFC components are 
operational 24/7, such as the law enforcement communication and the 
transportation component. 

KIFC receives statewide all-crimes tips through a toll-free hotline and 
through Web site submission and has law enforcement radio and data 
communications capability through Kentucky State Police Communications, 
which is located in the fusion center. DHS and DOJ information systems 
or networks accessible to the fusion center include HSIN and LEO, as 
well as RISS/Regional Organized Crime Information Center. The official 
said that KIFC does not have the capacity to receive classified 
information because the facility has no secure room or SCIF. 

Louisiana: 

Established in October 2004, the Louisiana State Analysis & Fusion 
Exchange (La-SAFE), which is led by the Louisiana State Police, evolved 
from existing state police analytical units. The state police 
Investigative Support Section has been in place since the late 1960s 
and early 1970s, with an intelligence collection and analysis unit that 
was developed primarily to handle organized crime. As the investigative 
and intelligence needs of the police shifted over time, so too did the 
mission of the intelligence component, expanding from organized crime 
to gangs, drug trafficking, and, post-September 11, homeland security. 
The police intelligence unit was engaged in all-crimes collection of 
intelligence to support all criminal investigations. La-SAFE has 
adopted an all-crimes/all-hazards scope of operations. 

The mission of La-SAFE is to (1) promote a collaborative environment 
for governmental and corporate partners to work together in providing 
timely information for use in providing public safety and promoting 
national security against terrorist and other criminal threats; (2) 
actively work to collect and analyze information from various sources 
to provide those responsible for protecting state resources with 
information that is pertinent in decision-making processes, allows for 
the maximizing of resources, and improves the ability to efficiently 
protect the citizens of Louisiana in matters of infrastructure 
protection and against organized criminal activity; and (3) evaluate 
all information provided and ensure that the information La-SAFE 
retains and utilizes is directly related to legitimate law enforcement 
purposes and has been legally obtained. La-SAFE will not interfere with 
the exercise of constitutionally guaranteed rights and privileges of 
individuals. 

La-SAFE is staffed by 3 commissioned personnel and 20 analysts with 
experience in case support, information production, and information 
sharing in the areas of organized crime and terrorism. Louisiana State 
Police, the Louisiana Governor's Office of Homeland Security and 
Emergency Preparedness, Louisiana National Guard, East Baton Rouge 
Parish Sheriff's Office, DHS I&A, and FBI have assigned full-time 
analysts to La-SAFE. The center recently established a relationship 
with the U.S. Coast Guard. 

La-SAFE produces a variety of information and intelligence products, 
including general information bulletins (e.g., notices on general 
crimes or intelligence); daily incident briefs (i.e., daily reports of 
incidents reported to the center from a variety of sources); a weekly 
homeland defense bulletin covering homeland security issues around the 
world; and a summary of monthly regional crime information called the 
Intelligator. 

DHS and DOJ systems and networks accessible to La-SAFE include HSIN, 
LEO, and the U.S. Coast Guard's Homeport. Louisiana has a state HSIN 
portal, HSIN-LA, that provides a secure capability to share information 
and collaborate with public and private sector partners. It allows 
users to report suspicious activities to the fusion center for review 
and action. There are currently over 800 participants representing law 
enforcement, first responders, and critical infrastructure with access 
to HSIN-LA. Information currently being shared within HSIN-LA includes 
safety bulletins, intelligence reports, training opportunities, 
information-sharing meetings, and requests for information. 

Maine: 

The Maine Intelligence and Analysis Center is a collaborative effort 
between the Maine State Police and the Maine Emergency Management 
Agency to share resources, expertise, and information to maximize 
homeland security efforts and to detect and assist in the deterrence of 
terrorist activity. Maine has had a traditional state police criminal 
intelligence unit for 30 years, but the state's background in 
counterintelligence was limited to traditional criminal enterprises. 
The Governor decided after September 11 that the state needed a 
counterintelligence unit that was homeland-security driven to deliver 
information to the Governor. The center was formally established by an 
executive order that was effective December 2006. The Maine 
Intelligence and Analysis Center is in the early stages of development 
and at the time of our review was not yet fully functional. For 
example, the center has physical space and personnel, has developed 
standard operating procedures, and is in the process of conducting 
outreach with state and local entities. 

The center's mission is to support the Maine State Police and the Maine 
Emergency Management Agency in their respective roles of public safety 
protector and homeland security incident manager for the citizens of 
the State of Maine. The center is to be a clearinghouse of and central 
repository for intelligence and information related to Maine's homeland 
security and any terrorist-related activity that may threaten the lives 
and safety of the citizens of the United States and the State of Maine. 
Its scope of operations is counterterrorism. However, the center plans 
to expand its focus in the future to include an all-crimes approach. 

The Maine Intelligence and Analysis Center has one intelligence analyst 
and one homeland security specialist, along with a backbone of four 
analysts from the Maine State Patrol Criminal Intelligence Unit. An 
official indicated that the center will absorb the Criminal 
Intelligence Unit in the near future forming a single unit. While there 
are no federal personnel assigned to the center, it has partnered with 
FBI's JTTF, the U.S. Attorney's Office Anti-Terror Section, U.S. 
Customs and Border Protection (CBP), TSA, U.S. Coast Guard, ICE, Maine 
National Guard, other state and local law enforcement agencies with 
intelligence sections, and the Maine Anti-Terror Intelligence Network, 
which is organized by the U.S. Attorney's Office to facilitate 
interaction between partner agencies' analysts. The center is overseen 
by an Advisory Board consisting of three members who meet at least 
twice annually. 

The center conducts research and analysis to provide actionable 
intelligence for field units and policy makers, and provides quick 
(i.e., within 15 minutes) response to queries from the field to allow 
officers to take action within constitutionally reasonable time frames. 
DHS and DOJ information systems or networks accessible to the fusion 
center include LEO and HSIN, as well as RISS ATIX, RISS, FinCEN, 
INTERPOL, EPIC, and NLETS. The center also has access to a variety of 
state and commercial information systems and databases. Products 
include notices, bulletins, briefing information, reports, and 
assessments that cover day-to-day events, warnings, and officer safety 
issues. First responders, law enforcement, emergency managers, 
civilians, and the private sector (e.g., utilities, chemicals, food 
supply, and technology) are among the center's customers. 

Maryland: 

The Maryland Coordination and Analysis Center (MCAC) is operated by the 
Anti-Terrorism Advisory Council Executive Committee and is governed by 
a charter that was developed with input from the FBI and approved by 
the Executive Committee. MCAC began operations in November 2003 in 
response to the events of September 11 and the need for ways for the 
FBI and local agencies to disseminate terrorist-related information. 
MCAC has an all-crimes and counterterrorism scope of operations and 
consists of representatives of 24 agencies who staff the center, 
including the FBI, DHS, U.S. Army, U.S. Coast Guard, and Maryland state 
and local organizations. DHS I&A has assigned one analyst, and the FBI 
has seven analysts, one special agent, and one supervisory special 
agent assigned to MCAC. 

MCAC, which operates 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, is organized into 
two sections, the Watch Section and the Strategic Analysis Section. The 
Watch Section provides support to federal, state, and local agencies by 
receiving and processing information, monitoring intelligence 
resources, coordinating with Maryland law enforcement, and 
disseminating intelligence information. The Watch Section primarily 
consists of representatives from Maryland police and sheriffs, along 
with representation from the U.S. Army and the Maryland National Guard. 
As information enters MCAC, it is passed through the Watch Section, 
which either passes that information on to federal or state entities or 
the Strategic Analysis Section or enters it into federal and state 
databases, such as the FBI's Guardian. The Strategic Analysis Section 
receives, processes, analyzes, and disseminates information. MCAC has 
12 analysts, and the section is staffed by representatives from various 
organizations, including the Maryland State Police, FBI, U.S. Coast 
Guard, and the Maryland National Guard. 

Information enters MCAC through a variety of ways, including tips from 
the general public or law enforcement, as well as from the National 
Guard or emergency response personnel. Information is received via a 
tip line or e-mail. DHS and DOJ systems and networks accessible to MCAC 
include HSIN, HSDN, LEO, FBINet, SCION, as well as RISS/Middle Atlantic-
Great Lakes Organized Crime Law Enforcement Network, SIPRNET, NCIC, 
INTERPOL, EPIC, and NLETS, among others. MCAC provides a daily report 
to every police chief in the state as well as other state fusion 
centers and any other organization that is on its distribution list. 
Entities such as the Maryland JTTF, Terrorism Screening Center, and 
National Counterterrorism Center receive information from MCAC. 
Terrorism-related law enforcement information is also shared and 
entered into the FBI's Guardian database. Products include a daily 
watch report, which is a brief summary of tips and requests for 
information received by the Watch Section over the previous 24-hour 
period, and intelligence bulletins, which are intelligence/law 
enforcement-related information disseminated to law enforcement and 
homeland security personnel by fax, teletype, or e-mail, and may also 
be posted to LEO or RISS. Other products include threat assessments, 
covering, for example, threats to military-recruiting stations, propane 
cylinders, agroterrorism, or gang activity. 

Massachusetts: 

The Commonwealth Fusion Center (CFC) was established in October 2004 on 
the foundations of the State Homeland Security Strategy and an 
executive order designating it the state's principal center for 
information collection and dissemination. Its mission is to collect and 
analyze information from all available sources to produce and 
disseminate actionable intelligence to stakeholders for strategic and 
tactical decision making in order to identify, disrupt, or deter 
domestic and international terrorism as well as criminal activity. CFC 
takes an all-threats, all-crimes approach and has both criminal and 
counterterrorism analytical support roles. The center focuses on 
precursor crimes--such as organized crimes, which can be indicators of 
terrorism. CFC also supports the state's Emergency Management Agency, 
which is responsible for handling all hazards. 

CFC works with various federal and state and agencies including FBI, 
ICE, U.S. Coast Guard, HIDTA, Secret Service, TSA, ATF, the United 
States Marshals Service, U.S. Attorney's Office, the Massachusetts 
Emergency Management Agency, Massachusetts Department of Fire Services, 
Department of Public Health, Department of Corrections, and the 
National Guard. There are 15 analysts assigned to CFC, the majority of 
who are Massachusetts State Police employees. However, officials said 
that four of these analysts are assigned to other duties, such as the 
Crime Reporting Unit or security officer, or are otherwise engaged. The 
Department of Corrections and the Army National Guard have also each 
assigned an analyst to CFC. All analysts and most sworn members of CFC 
have Secret clearances, and a few sworn members have Top Secret 
clearances. The FBI has assigned both an intelligence analyst and 
special agent to CFC. DHS has assigned an intelligence officer to the 
center. 

CFC also possesses an investigative component through the Massachusetts 
State Police Criminal Intelligence Section that provides 5 state 
troopers and the Massachusetts JTTF, which has 11 state troopers in 
Boston and Springfield, for a total of 16 investigators assigned to 
CFC. CFC also has a railroad representative and is involved in public/ 
private outreach through Project Sentinel, which is a program targeting 
businesses likely to identify precursor terrorist activity. CFC also 
has personnel assigned to the Boston Regional Intelligence Center, 
which is the regional intelligence center for the Boston/Cambridge 
Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI) region and is led by the Boston 
Police Department. 

CFC analysts produce information and intelligence briefings and 
assessments and provide support to the statewide assessment of critical 
infrastructure. Past products include an overview of gang activity in 
the state, an assessment on prison radicalization in the state, a 
report on trafficking and possible links to terrorism, a report on the 
stock market and possible indicators of terrorism, and an overview of 
white supremacist activity in the state. CFC also uses Geographic 
Information Systems to develop products and provide data to law 
enforcement and critical infrastructure stakeholders. DHS and DOJ 
unclassified systems and networks accessible to CFC include HSIN and 
LEO, and CFC also has access to FBI and DHS classified systems on site. 
Briefings and assessments are posted on CFC secure Web site, HSIN-MA, 
which also provides a document library and information-sharing 
capability to Massachusetts' law enforcement, public safety, and 
critical infrastructure sectors. CFC has developed e-mail lists and 
extensive contact lists for state, local, and federal law enforcement 
partners, military stakeholders, fire services, transportation, and 
other critical infrastructure sectors. 

Michigan: 

There are two fusion centers in Michigan, the statewide Michigan 
Intelligence and Operations Center (MIOC) and the Detroit and 
Southeastern Michigan Regional (Detroit UASI) Fusion Center. 

Michigan Intelligence and Operations Center: 

Led by the Michigan State Police, MIOC opened in December 2006 and went 
to a 24/7 operation in January 2007. The center was built on the 
preexisting foundation of the Michigan State Police Intelligence and 
Operations sections. MIOC's mission is to collect, evaluate, collate, 
and analyze criminal justice-related information and intelligence and, 
as appropriate, disseminate this information and intelligence to the 
proper public safety agencies so that any threat of terrorism will be 
successfully identified and addressed. Additionally, MIOC will provide 
criminal justice information to appropriate law enforcement agencies to 
aid in the successful prosecution of individuals involved in criminal 
behavior. MIOC has an all-crimes, all-threats scope of operations with 
a focus on the prevention of terrorism. 

MIOC is divided into two components: (1) the operational, 24/7 portion 
where all tips, requests for information, and initial information flow 
into MIOC, and (2) the intelligence portion, where information is 
processed, analyzed, disseminated, and reviewed. MIOC's 45-person staff 
includes operational, intelligence, and administrative personnel, most 
of whom are Michigan State Police personnel. There are 26 intelligence 
personnel (detectives and analysts) and 13 operational personnel 
(officers and dispatchers). Included in the intelligence personnel are 
five analysts assigned by the National Guard, one responsible for 
narcotics and four responsible for HSIN-Intel and critical 
infrastructure protection at a statewide level. The state Department of 
Corrections has assigned a person 2 days per week, and the Michigan 
State University Police Department has assigned a full-time inspector. 

The FBI has assigned one analyst and one special agent to MIOC. Three 
Michigan State Police detectives are also assigned to the JTTF. DHS I&A 
has conducted a needs assessment of MIOC and posted the position for an 
analyst. However, at the time of our review an analyst an analyst had 
not yet been assigned to the center. Additionally, MIOC is expecting 
the assignment of a U.S. Coast Guard intelligence lieutenant and a DEA 
analyst. MIOC has established an internship program with the Michigan 
State University Criminal Justice Program. MIOC's 14-member advisory 
board, which includes representatives from state and federal entities, 
civil rights groups, the Detroit UASI Fusion Center, and state law 
enforcement associations, provides advice and counsel to MIOC. 

MIOC collects and disseminates information regarding criminal 
investigations of all natures and serves as a direct case support for 
various investigations. Its personnel are divided into the four 
priority areas of international terrorism, domestic terrorism, 
organized crime, and smuggling. DHS and DOJ information systems or 
networks accessible to MIOC include HSIN, LEO, and HSDN, as well as 
RISS/MAGLOCLEN. MIOC is planning to have access to SIPRNET, ACS, and 
Guardian, for members of those agencies residing at MIOC. MIOC 
disseminates information via briefings and bulletins (weekly and 
special) to law enforcement, responds to requests for information, 
prepares intelligence analysis reports, provides case support, operates 
a Tip Line, provides support services (such as K-9, underwater 
recovery, hazmat, forensic artists, and emergency support team), and 
posts its products on sites such as LEO, HSIN-Law Enforcement, and 
MAGLOCLEN. Non-law-enforcement homeland security and critical 
infrastructure protection partners receive information through postings 
on HSIN-Michigan. 

Detroit and Southeastern Michigan Regional Fusion Center: 

The Detroit and Southeastern Michigan Regional (Detroit UASI) Fusion 
Center is in the early stages of development. Led by the Detroit 
Homeland Security and Emergency Management, there are seven regional 
partners in the urban area that are planning the center, including 
Wayne County, the City of Detroit, and five other surrounding counties. 
The vision for the fusion center is to identify, monitor, and provide 
analysis on all terrorism, all crimes, and all hazards in the Southeast 
Michigan Region in support of law enforcement, public safety, and the 
private sector's prevention, preparedness, and response activities. The 
center will focus on prevention and protection by serving as a conduit 
to local police officers and emergency managers in the field and will 
follow up on tips, conduct a watch function, and provide "foresight on 
emerging situations." 

The fusion center is in the first phase of planning, which is expected 
to culminate in the center being fully operational in January 2008. At 
the time of our review, planning officials were in the process of 
establishing partnerships, selecting and training analysts, and 
planning to move into the center's new facility, which will be 
colocated with the Michigan HIDTA. Federal partners identified include 
ICE, CBP, TSA, Secret Service, U.S. Coast Guard, FBI, Federal Bureau of 
Prisons, U.S. Attorney's Office, and HIDTA. The center did not have 
access to DHS and DOJ systems, but would obtain access to FBI systems 
once it was colocated with the HIDTA. Additionally, the fusion center 
plans to work with MIOC to leverage technology purchases and utilize 
similar policies and standard operating procedures. 

Minnesota: 

The Minnesota Joint Analysis Center (MN-JAC) opened in May 2005 as a 
partnership of the Department of Public Safety, the FBI, and several 
local police departments. Its mission is the collection, management, 
and distribution of strategic and tactical information and the 
development and implementation of useful and meaningful information 
products and training, focusing on all crimes and all hazards within 
and affecting Minnesota. MN-JAC has an all-crimes and all-hazards scope 
of operations. However, the center is not a law enforcement or 
investigative agency because of restrictions imposed by state 
law.[Footnote 57] As the center works to determine its position 
relative to the existing laws, it serves primarily to coordinate among 
FBI and DHS and state and local agencies. One of the ways MN-JAC 
accomplishes its information-sharing function is through the 
development and maintenance of its information-sharing Web portal, the 
Intelligence Communications Enterprise for Information Sharing and 
Exchange (ICEFISHX).[Footnote 58] 

MN-JAC has 10 employees, 2 of whom are provided by the state, and the 
remainder from local law enforcement agencies and the National Guard. 
MN-JAC does not have an FBI analyst staffed to its center. However, MN- 
JAC and the FBI's field office are colocated in the same building, and 
MN-JAC personnel have access to the FBI's systems and networks. DHS I&A 
has conducted a needs assessment of MN-JAC. However, at the time of our 
review, it had not yet placed an intelligence analyst in the center. 

DHS and DOJ systems and networks accessible to MN-JAC include HSIN, 
HSIN-Law Enforcement, FPS portal, LEO, ACS, the FBI Intelligence 
Information Reports Dissemination System,[Footnote 59] as well as 
SIPRNet. The center also has access to HSIN-Secret. However, the system 
is accessible only at the state's Emergency Operations Center. MN-JAC 
produces two weekly briefs, one for all subscribers that covers 
critical infrastructure and one for law enforcement agencies that is 
law enforcement sensitive, as well as situation analyses of incidents 
and threats and special threat assessments. 

Mississippi: 

The Mississippi Office of Homeland Security and Mississippi Department 
of Public Safety are in the early stages of developing a state fusion 
center. The Mississippi Analysis & Information Center (MSAIC) is 
expected to open its door at the end of September 2007 and become 
operational at that time. Currently, planning officials are developing 
memorandums of understanding for agency representation at and support 
of the center, certifying the center's secure space, and placing 
equipment and furniture. 

The fusion center will have a broad scope of operations--focusing on 
all crimes, all hazards, and all threats--in order to support the needs 
of the state and to help with the sustainability of the center. For 
instance, the official said that with an all-crimes scope of 
operations, the fusion center could give something back to local law 
enforcement entities, many of which have limited resources and access 
to information. In terms of all hazards, the fusion center is to 
support the state strategy to aid in prevention and deterrence and will 
be colocated with the state emergency management agency. 

Missouri: 

The Missouri Information Analysis Center was established in December 
2005 with the mission to provide a public safety partnership, 
consisting of local, state, and federal agencies, as well as the public 
sector and private entities, that will collect, evaluate, analyze, and 
disseminate information and intelligence to the agencies tasked with 
homeland security responsibilities in a timely, effective, and secure 
manner. The main goal of the center is to serve as the fastest means 
for sharing information during hazards, along with the ability to 
acquire and disseminate information throughout the state. The center 
was initially established with analysts who were transferred from the 
Missouri Highway Patrol Criminal Intelligence and Analysis Unit. The 
center, which is led by the Missouri Highway Patrol, has an all-crimes 
and all-hazards focus, which was established in part as a result of the 
center's partnerships. The center is a member of the RISS project and 
is partners with the Missouri Department of Public Safety, the Missouri 
Emergency Management Administration, and the Missouri National Guard, 
the latter two with which it is colocated. 

In addition to its director, the Missouri Information Analysis Center 
has 21 other personnel, including an assistant director and an 
intelligence network manager, 8 full-time criminal intelligence 
analysts, and 10 part-time intelligence intake analysts. The Missouri 
Gaming Commission has also dedicated a full-time intelligence analyst 
to the center. Investigators are assigned to cases out of the Highway 
Patrol's Division of Drug and Crime Control as needed. The center also 
provides local law enforcement the opportunity to assign analysts and 
officers to it for internships. The center works closely with the JTTFs 
and FIGs in the state and, according to officials, is close to 
completing its secure room for two FBI special agents currently working 
in the center. The center also works with the Business Executives for 
National Security, which has representation from the majority of the 
private corporations within the state as well as individuals interested 
in assisting homeland security, and has a 13-member oversight board 
that is composed of state, local, and federal representatives. 

The Missouri Information Analysis Center collects and disseminates 
information involving all crimes, all threats, and all hazards. The 
information can be tips, leads, law enforcement reports, and open 
source reports as well as information provided from the federal level. 
DHS and DOJ information systems or networks accessible to the fusion 
center include HSIN, HSIN-Secret, JRIES, RISSNet, RDEx, and LEO, as 
well as the Midwest HIDTA Safety Net. Analysts conduct numerous 
services, including, but not limited to, responding to intelligence and 
criminal activity inquiries from local, state, and federal law 
enforcement agencies and prosecuting attorneys; performing various 
analyses to evaluate patterns of criminal activity; compiling and 
disseminating intelligence booklets containing data on subjects in 
question for criminal activity to case investigation officers and 
prosecutors; developing reports, threat assessments, bulletins, 
summaries, and other publications on relevant criminal activity trends; 
serving as liaison for the statewide intelligence database; providing 
strategic analytical services, development, and training at the state 
level to support the Midwest HIDTA; maintaining close liaison with the 
Midwest HIDTA; and developing various standardized statistical reports 
involving criminal and terrorist threat assessments. 

Montana: 

The Montana All-Threat Intelligence Center (MATIC) developed from the 
intelligence unit of the Montana Department of Justice, Division of 
Criminal Investigation. After the attacks of September 11, the unit 
relocated to a Department of Military Affairs facility and colocated 
with the JTTF. The unit opened its fusion center incarnation, MATIC, in 
the spring of 2003 with the mission to collect, store, analyze, and 
disseminate information on crimes, both real and suspected, to the law 
enforcement community and government officials concerning dangerous 
drugs, fraud, organized crime, terrorism and other criminal activity 
for the purposes of decision making, public safety, and proactive law 
enforcement. The center has an all-crimes scope of operations. 

MATIC, administered by the Division of Criminal Investigation, is a 
joint venture of the division and the Department of Corrections, 
Department of Military Affairs, and the Rocky Mountain Information 
Network. There are eight full-time employees, five of whom are Division 
of Criminal Investigation employees. The Department of Corrections, 
Department of Military Affairs, and the Rocky Mountain Information 
Network each provide one full-time employee. The FBI has assigned one 
analyst to MATIC, and all MATIC analysts are also considered assigned 
to the JTTF. 

DHS and DOJ systems and networks accessible to MATIC analysts include 
HSIN, LEO, NCIC, and FBI classified systems located in the JTTF, as 
well as the RISS/Rocky Mountain Information Network, FinCEN, and 
INTERPOL. MATIC analysts provide case support to all Montana law 
enforcement and assist investigators in identifying evidence, suspects, 
and trends in their investigation. Each analyst assigned to MATIC has 
one or more portfolios for which he or she is responsible; the 
portfolios include drugs, outlaw motorcycle gangs, corrections, general 
crime, left wing, right wing, northern border, critical infrastructure, 
and international terrorism. Analysts review new organizations active 
within the state, ongoing or potential criminal activity, trends or 
activity around the country that could affect Montana, and trends or 
activity in Montana that could affect other parts of the United States 
or Canada. MATIC produces a daily brief for Montana that covers three 
topic areas--international terrorism/border issues, domestic terrorism, 
and general crime--and is disseminated on RISS and on the MATIC Web 
portal. MATIC also responds to specific requests for information, 
manages the critical infrastructure program, conducts training sessions 
for law enforcement, and maintains a Web portal to assist in the secure 
sharing of information among law enforcement. About 180 local, state, 
tribal, and federal agencies access MATIC information on its Web 
portal. 

Nebraska: 

The Nebraska State Patrol is in the planning stage of establishing the 
Nebraska Fusion Center. The Nebraska State Patrol is setting up the 
command structure for the center, has reorganized and placed staff into 
positions, and, according to an official, is awaiting DHS funding to 
hire a consultant to help develop a blueprint for the center. The 
official also noted that funding will allow purchase of software 
necessary to fuse their intelligence databases together. The center's 
timeline has the center scheduled to open in the fall of 2007. The 
fusion center is to be all-crimes, all-hazards, including terrorism. 
Nebraska State Patrol officials said that the center will collect as 
much intelligence information as it can, whether related to crime, 
drugs, threats, terrorism, or other hazards, and then combine it and 
share it with the necessary agencies. The fusion center will be the 
lead intelligence-sharing component in the state and provide a seamless 
flow of information to assess potential risks to the state. 

The fusion center is planning to initially invite FBI, DEA, and ICE at 
the federal level; the Nebraska Emergency Management Agency, Department 
of Health and Human Services, and Department of Roads at the state 
level; and the Omaha Police Department, the TEW in the Omaha area, and 
the Lincoln Police Department at the local level. The center also plans 
to partner with key elements of the private sector since the center 
plans to develop infrastructure protection plans. The officials expect 
that many information systems will be in place, including LEO and RISS/ 
Mid-States Organized Crime Information Center, and the center is 
planning to disseminate an intelligence update either daily or weekly. 

Nevada: 

The Nevada Department of Public Safety is in the planning stages of 
establishing the Nevada Analytical and Information Center. The center 
is planning to have an all-crimes and all-threats focus, which would 
include major crimes (such as burglary rings, fraud, rape, or 
homicides) and terrorism. The state fusion center will look at crimes 
at the state level and will share information with federal and local 
law enforcement agencies to identify crime trends and patterns. The 
center will also have an all-hazards mission and plans to include fire 
departments and public health entities as stakeholders. 

The center will be responsible for 15 of the 17 counties in the state, 
excluding Clark and Washoe Counties, which will be covered by separate 
centers operated by the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department and 
the Washoe County Sheriff's Office. 

New Hampshire: 

The New Hampshire Department of Safety Division of State Police is in 
the early stages of establishing the New Hampshire Fusion Center. They 
are in the process of developing the fusion center as a separate entity 
from several existing intelligence units within the state. For example, 
after the events of September 11 the State Police created a terrorism 
intelligence unit, in addition to a criminal intelligence unit that 
focuses on narcotics and organized crime. The fusion center is planning 
to open in 2008. 

The New Hampshire Fusion Center will focus on all crimes and all 
hazards. The state chose to adopt an all-crimes focus both because 
terrorism is funded by and associated with many other crimes (such as 
drug trafficking, credit card fraud, and identity theft). The New 
Hampshire State Police intelligence unit has a full-time member 
assigned to it and coordinates with the FBI JTTF. Also, the State 
Police sustain interoperability with the FBI because four of its 
members have FBI clearances. The fusion center will be housed within 
the New Hampshire Department of Safety, which includes the State 
Police, the Division of Motor Vehicles, and the Bureau of Emergency 
Communication (911), and the Office of Homeland Security and Emergency 
Management. The fusion center has access to LEO and RISS systems. 

New Jersey: 

The Regional Operations Intelligence Center (ROIC) was established in 
January 2005 and moved into its current facility in October 2006. ROIC 
is a 24-hour a day all-crimes, all-hazards, all-threats, all-the-time 
watch command and analysis center. The New Jersey State Police is the 
executive agency of ROIC and administers the general personnel, policy, 
and management functions. The center's mission is to collect, analyze, 
and disseminate intelligence to participating law enforcement entities; 
evaluate intelligence for reliability and validity; provide 
intelligence support to tactical and strategic planning; evaluate 
intelligence in the Statewide Intelligence Management System; and 
disseminate terrorism-related activity and information to the FBI, 
among others. ROIC is also the home of the State Emergency Operations 
Center, the State Office of Emergency Management, and the State Police 
Emergency Management Section Offices. 

ROIC has personnel assigned (including 13 analysts) from the FBI, DHS, 
ATF, ICE, FAMS, and the U.S. Coast Guard, in addition to personnel from 
the State Police, New Jersey Office of Homeland Security and 
Preparedness, and the Department of Transportation. ROIC is seeking 
representation from the departments of Corrections, Parole, Health and 
Senior Services; Environmental Protection; and Military and Veteran 
Affairs. ROIC is overseen by a Governance Committee, chaired by the 
director of ROIC, that consists of representatives from state and 
federal entities and law enforcement associations who meet quarterly to 
discuss ROIC policies and other related matters. ROIC is seeking to 
develop additional relationships with private sector organizations-- 
such as the American Society of Industrial Security, the Princeton Area 
Security Group, the Bankers and Brokers Group, and the All Hazards 
Consortium--to further the mission of the intelligence analysis element 
of ROIC. 

ROIC consists of three components: (1) an analysis component, 
responsible for collecting, analyzing, and disseminating intelligence 
information entered into the Statewide Intelligence Management System 
by local, county, state, and federal law enforcement; (2) the 
operations component, which will control the actions of State Police 
operational and support personnel and serve as a liaison to federal 
agencies, other state entities, and county or municipal agencies on 
operational matters; and (3) a call center component, which will 
provide the center with situational awareness intelligence about 
emergency situations. 

DHS and DOJ systems and networks to which ROIC has access include LEO, 
HSIN, HSIN-Secret, and ACS, as well as SIPRNet. ROIC is scheduled to 
have HSDN installed in late September 2007. ROIC disseminates officer 
safety information, bulletins, and any other information deemed to be 
of value to the law enforcement or homeland security community. The 
State Police provide operational support to the law enforcement 
community on canine support for bomb and drug detection, bomb 
technicians, medevac helicopter support, and marine services. 

New Mexico: 

The New Mexico All Source Intelligence Center (NMASIC) will serve as 
New Mexico's primary intelligence collection, analysis, and 
dissemination point for all homeland security intelligence matters, 
which will include intelligence support for counterterrorism 
operations, intelligence support for counter-human smuggling 
operations, critical infrastructure threat assessments, intelligence 
training, and terrorism and counterterrorism awareness training. 
According to officials in the New Mexico Governor's Office of Homeland 
Security and Emergency Management, NMASIC was established to provide 
the Governor and State Homeland Security Advisor with the capability to 
receive information and intelligence from a number of sources and fuse 
that information and intelligence together to create a common 
intelligence and threat picture, upon which they, and other senior 
officials, can make long-term policy decisions. NMASIC was also 
established to provide tactical intelligence support to local, tribal, 
and state agencies in New Mexico. 

NMASIC will accomplish this mission by developing and sustaining five 
key projects and programs: a statewide integrated intelligence program, 
a statewide information sharing environment, intelligence product 
development and production management, collection requirements and 
collection management, and a state law enforcement operational 
component. 

NMASIC's analytical functions will include a collection management 
analyst, an international terrorism/Islamic extremist analyst, a single-
issue extremist analyst, a militia/white supremacists analyst, a border 
security analyst, and a critical infrastructure analyst. Once fully 
staffed, NMASIC will provide tactical and strategic intelligence 
support to agencies in New Mexico. Participating agencies and 
disciplines include the Governor's Office of Homeland Security, 
Department of Public Safety/New Mexico State Police, local law 
enforcement, local fire departments, local emergency management, Pueblo 
Public Safety Organizations, FPS, TSA, DHS I&A, Department of Energy, 
Department of State, the FBI, HIDTA, the U.S. Attorney's Office, and 
the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation. 

New York: 

In addition to the state fusion center--the New York State Intelligence 
Center (NYSIC)--there are other local area centers in New York, 
including those operated by the New York City Police Department 
Intelligence Division and Rockland County. 

New York State Intelligence Center: 

The New York State Intelligence Center (NYSIC) was established in 
August 2003 as a multijurisdictional intelligence and investigative 
center composed of representatives from state, federal, and local law 
enforcement, criminal justice, and intelligence agencies. Its mission 
is to advance the effectiveness and efficiency of New York State law 
enforcement operations and services by acting as a centralized and 
comprehensive criminal intelligence resource. NYSIC, which is led by 
the New York State Police, operates 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. 
NYSIC combines the duties of an intelligence center and fusion center 
to enhance collaboration among New York state law enforcement agencies 
and law enforcement agencies nationwide. Using an all-crimes approach, 
the NYSIC collects, analyzes, evaluates, and disseminates information 
and intelligence to identify emerging patterns and trends, investigate 
current criminal activities, and prevent future criminal acts. 

NYSIC opened the Counterterrorism Center (CTC) in May 2004, and this 
component is responsible for intelligence and information sharing in 
all areas outside New York City. The mission of NYSIC-CTC is to provide 
law enforcement agencies throughout New York state with timely and 
useful intelligence to assist in the prevention, detection, and 
deterrence of terrorism. NYSIC-CTC provides a centralized contact point 
for the reporting of suspicious activity from both civilians and law 
enforcement. NYSIC-CTC vets information and directs it to the 
appropriate federal, state, or local law enforcement agency for 
investigation. 

NYSIC has 18 agencies represented in the facility, with over 80 people 
in the center. Federal entities with personnel in NYSIC include the FBI 
(three intelligence analysts and one special agent); DEA (one 
intelligence analyst); the U.S Attorney's Office (one part-time 
intelligence research specialist); DHS I &A (one senior intelligence 
analyst); ICE (one senior special agent); CBP (one special agent 
expected); and the Social Security Administration (one special agent). 
The New York State Police provides the majority of NYSIC's personnel, 
with 44 investigators and 20 analysts assigned. In addition, the New 
York State Department of Motor Vehicles, Division of Parole, Department 
of Correctional Services, Department of Insurance, Office of Homeland 
Security, and National Guard have provided personnel and services to 
NYSIC. Among the local entities providing personnel, liaison, and 
services to NYSIC are the New York City Police Department, New York 
City Metropolitan Transit Authority Police Department, Rensselaer 
County Sheriff's Office, and the Town of Colonie Police Department. The 
Executive Committee on Counter Terrorism, consisting of state police 
executives, the Director of the State Office of Homeland Security, 
commissioners of various state agencies, representatives from police 
chiefs and sheriffs, and the Office of the Governor, serves as an 
Advisory Board to NYSIC. 

NYSIC collects information including tips from law enforcement, the 
private sectors, and the public via crime and terrorism tip hotlines. 
NYSIC also receives reports from federal, state, local, and tribal law 
enforcement entities. Federal information includes threat assessments, 
CBP reporting, and DHS daily reporting. DHS and DOJ information systems 
or networks accessible to the fusion center include HSIN (Unclassified 
and Secret), HSDN, FPS portal, LEO, as well as FinCEN and Treasury 
Enforcement Communications System. Some NYSIC personnel--CTC personnel 
with Top Secret clearances--have full access to FBI systems (e.g., ACS, 
IDW, and Guardian). Reporting from state, local, and tribal agencies 
includes investigative and intelligence submissions, suspicious 
incidents, public safety and public health information, and 
infrastructure information. NYSIC also collects information from open 
sources. The types of services performed and products disseminated 
include counterterrorism and criminal intelligence analysis and 
reporting, situational awareness reporting, situation reports on 
emerging incidents, investigative support, and outreach and training. 
NYSIC conducts critical infrastructure and outreach and awareness in 
conjunction with New York Office of Homeland Security. 

NYPD Intelligence Division: 

The NYPD Intelligence Division opened its Intelligence Center in March 
2002. The center has both an all-crimes and counterterrorism focus, for 
example, focusing on traditional crimes (e.g., guns, gangs, and drugs) 
as well as having one group of intelligence analysts who analyze 
information for ties to terrorism. Analysts look at global trends and 
patterns for applicability to New York City. Personnel have access to 
among others, all FBI systems, LEO, and HSIN. 

Rockland County Intelligence Center: 

The Rockland County Intelligence Center has been in existence since 
1995. However, according to its director, the center changed focus 
after September 2001. The mission of the center is to provide 
intelligence to law enforcement agencies based upon the collection, 
evaluation, and analysis of information that can identify criminal 
activity. The center takes an all-crimes approach and is involved in 
any crime that occurs within the county. 

The center is composed of sworn officers from Rockland County law 
enforcement agencies who are assigned specialized desks, such as street 
gangs, burglary/robbery, terrorism, and traditional organized crime. In 
addition, the FBI assigned a special agent on a full-time basis to the 
center. DHS and DOJ networks and systems to which the center has access 
include HSIN and LEO, as well as HIDTA and RISS/Mid-Atlantic Great 
Lakes Organized Crime Law Enforcement Network. 

North Carolina: 

The North Carolina Information Sharing and Analysis Center (ISAAC) 
opened in May 2006 and is overseen by the North Carolina State Bureau 
of Investigation's (SBI) Intelligence and Technical Services Section 
within the state Department of Justice. The mission of ISAAC is to 
serve as the focal point for the collection, analysis, and 
dissemination of terrorism and criminal information relating to threats 
and attacks within North Carolina. ISAAC will enhance and facilitate 
the collection of information from local, state, and federal resources 
and analyze that information so that it will benefit homeland security 
and criminal interdiction programs at all levels. Specifically, ISAAC 
develops and evaluates information about persons or organizations 
engaged in criminal activity, including homeland security, gang 
activity, and drug activity. 

ISAAC partners include the U.S. Attorney's Office, the FBI, SBI, the 
State Highway Patrol, National Guard, Association of Chiefs of Police, 
Sheriff's Association, Division of Public Health, Department of 
Agriculture, Department of Corrections, Alcohol Law Enforcement, 
Emergency Management, and the Governor's Crime Commission. Partners 
take what ISAAC refers to as "a global approach to a state response." 
The ISAAC team consists of investigators and analysts from SBI, the 
Raleigh Police Department, Wake County Sheriff's Office, State Highway 
Patrol, state Alcohol Law Enforcement, National Guard, U.S. Attorney's 
Office, and the FBI. Specifically, the FBI assigned a full-time analyst 
and a part-time special agent to ISAAC. ISAAC investigators actively 
investigate leads and tips and work jointly with the JTTFs throughout 
the state. DHS I&A has conducted a needs assessment of the ISAAC. 
However, at the time of our review, it had not yet placed an 
intelligence officer in the center. 

DHS and DOJ information systems or networks accessible to the fusion 
center include HSIN, LEO, as well as FinCEN, Regional Organized Crime 
Information Center, RISSNET, EPIC, INTERPOL, as well as a variety of 
state information. The FBI analyst has access to FBI classified 
systems, and the FBI has cleared all sworn and analytical personnel 
assigned to the fusion center. ISAAC produces a variety of products, 
including an open source report; Suspicious Activity Reports; and a 
monthly information bulletin with articles of interest, a special 
events calendar, tips and leads summary, and products and services of 
ISAAC. ISAAC also supports special events, maintains a tips and leads 
database, and conducts community outreach. For instance, ISAAC has 
developed relationships with several Muslim organizations. 

North Dakota: 

The North Dakota Fusion Center was established in September 2003 with 
support from the North Dakota Division of Homeland Security and the 
North Dakota National Guard. In January 2004, the North Dakota Bureau 
of Criminal Investigation and the North Dakota Highway Patrol assigned 
a special agent and a captain, respectively, to the center. The fusion 
center takes an all-crimes and all-hazards approach to terrorism. As 
such, it collects and disseminates all-hazard and all-crime information 
with possible links to terrorism. The fusion center is staffed with 
personnel from the Bureau of Criminal Investigation, North Dakota 
Division of Homeland Security, North Dakota National Guard, and North 
Dakota Highway Patrol. The fusion center consists of law enforcement, 
intelligence analysts (both domestic and international), operations and 
planning, and critical infrastructure personnel and is divided into 
three sections--law enforcement, operations, and intelligence--that 
work together. While there are no FBI personnel assigned to the center, 
fusion center law enforcement personnel are JTTF members. 

The North Dakota Fusion Center provides training and terrorism 
investigative support; conducts critical infrastructure assessments; 
and disseminates products including a monthly newsletter to law 
enforcement and homeland security stakeholders, and summaries to 
military stakeholders. DHS and DOJ information systems or networks 
accessible to the fusion center include HSIN, HSIN-Secret, and FBI's 
ACS, as well as RISS, RISS ATIX, INTERPOL, FinCEN, and INFRAGARD. The 
fusion center is located in a secure National Guard facility. 

Ohio: 

After the September 11 attacks, Ohio established the Ohio Strategic 
Task Force, a working group of state cabinet-level positions, to 
develop a strategic plan that included the formation of a fusion 
center. In January 2005, the Ohio Homeland Security Division's 
Strategic Analysis and Information Center (SAIC) began initial 
operations with a base group composed of state National Guard, State 
Highway Patrol, Emergency Management, and Homeland Security personnel. 
According to an SAIC official, legislation subsequently widened the 
foundation and basis for the center. In December 2005, SAIC moved to 
its second phase of development and implemented a work-week-style 
operation, acquired personnel, conducted additional training in 
intelligence analysis, and bought additional software to handle 
information acquisition. SAIC's third phase of development is projected 
to begin in the fall/winter of 2007 and will include an evening second 
shift. SAIC maintains a 10-hour-a-day, 5-day-a-week schedule with 24- 
hour radio and telephone coverage through the Highway Patrol. The 
center serves as a secure one-stop shop that collects, filters, 
analyzes, and disseminates terrorism-related information. SAIC has a 
counterterrorism and all-crimes scope of operations. 

The center has seven full-time employees with a number of agencies 
represented on a part-time rotational basis. State entities represented 
include the Department of Agriculture, Attorney General's Office, 
Bureau of Criminal Identification and Investigation, Emergency Medical 
Services, Environmental Protection Agency, Fire Marshal, Department of 
Health, Highway Patrol, Homeland Security, National Guard, Department 
of Public Safety, Department of Transportation, the Ohio Association of 
Chiefs of Police, and the Fire Chief's Association. There are also a 
number of city and county agencies represented on a part-time basis. 
The FBI has assigned a full-time analyst and a special agent to the 
center. DHS has assigned a full-time intelligence analyst to the 
center. Other federal partners in SAIC include ATF, TSA, U.S. Coast 
Guard, and the U.S. Attorney's Office. 

SAIC's Investigation Unit is composed of law enforcement personnel from 
multiple agencies and includes commissioned officers from local, state, 
and federal agencies as well as intelligence analysts. The unit's 
primary mission is the detection of persons engaged in terrorist 
activities. This unit receives information from law enforcement 
agencies, crime reports, and field interrogation contacts as well as 
direct reports from both the public and law enforcement via a telephone 
tip line and Internet Web applications. DHS and DOJ systems and 
networks accessible to SAIC include HSIN and LEO. SAIC has HSDN 
installed in its secure room, but the system is not currently 
operational pending certification of the secure space. The FBI's 
classified systems are accessible by the FBI analyst assigned to SAIC, 
and preparations are underway to build a secure room to house FBINet. 
The Investigation Unit conducts preliminary investigations of 
information and either processes the complaint, lead, or tip internally 
or forwards the complaint, lead, or tip to the JTTF or law enforcement 
agency with primary jurisdiction. 

Oklahoma: 

The Oklahoma State Bureau of Investigation, in collaboration with other 
state and local entities, is in the early stages of developing the 
Oklahoma Information Fusion Center.[Footnote 60] Specifically, it has 
obtained funding, developed an implementation plan, and identified 10 
positions for which it will be hiring. The official opening of the 
center is expected in early 2008. 

There were two primary reasons for the establishment of the center. 
First was to help in the prevention of future attacks, and second was 
to serve as a hub to facilitate information and intelligence sharing 
with law enforcement officers in the field. The purpose of the fusion 
center will be to screen the information, determine whether it is 
pertinent to Oklahoma, and consolidate the information. As such, the 
proposed mission statement for the center is to serve as the focal 
point for the collection, assessment, analysis, and dissemination of 
terrorism intelligence and other criminal activity information relating 
to Oklahoma. The scope of operations for the center will be both all- 
crimes and all-hazards. 

The Oklahoma State Bureau of Investigation is to act as the host agency 
for the fusion center, serving as the focal point for all fusion center 
activities, housing the fusion center within its headquarters, and 
providing most of the center's analysts and agents. The fusion center 
will include nine Oklahoma State Bureau of Investigation analysts. In 
addition, the center plans to include analysts from the Oklahoma Office 
of Homeland Security, the FBI FIG, and the Oklahoma National Guard. 
There are also six Oklahoma State Bureau of Investigation agents who 
will play a support role to the center. 

The Oklahoma Information Fusion Center will collect information on all 
crimes in accordance with 28 CFR, part 23. Fusion center personnel are 
expected to perform intelligence analysis on all investigative reports 
and informational reports provided to the center. Personnel can provide 
investigative support through the use of intelligence products such as 
charts, timelines, intelligence summary reports, and many other 
products. Center personnel also have direct access to numerous 
databases that can be used to support investigative activities as well 
as intelligence investigations. DHS and DOJ systems to which the fusion 
center has access include LEO, HSIN, as well as RISSNet, FinCEN, and 
VICAP. 

Oregon: 

Oregon's Terrorism Intelligence and Threat Assessment Network (TITAN) 
Fusion Center opened in June 2007. Its primary mission is information 
sharing and coordination of terrorism intelligence among Oregon's 220 
law enforcement entities. In addition, the coordination and passing of 
terrorism-related information to the FBI is a primary function for the 
center. The center will also support an all-crimes approach to 
identifying terrorism-related activity, including criminal activities 
in areas such as money laundering, counterfeiting and piracy, and human 
and weapons smuggling. 

The center is administered by the Oregon Department of Justice and has 
representatives from the FBI, ATF, Internal Revenue Service, the Oregon 
HIDTA program, Oregon State Police, and the Oregon Military Department. 
TITAN Fusion Center is located in the same building as an FBI's 
resident agency. 

The Terrorism Intelligence and Threat Assessment Network is Oregon's 
terrorism liaison officer program. This program began in May 2004 and 
has since grown to include 53 members who represent 35 agencies. The 
primary mission of the program is information sharing between the 
fusion center and first responders. The fusion center is the 
clearinghouse and information hub within the state. Intelligence is 
collected, collated, analyzed, and then disseminated as briefings, 
intelligence, and officer safety bulletins and alerts. 

Pennsylvania: 

The Pennsylvania Criminal Intelligence Center (PaCIC) was established 
in July of 2003 to serve as the primary conduit through which law 
enforcement officers in Pennsylvania can submit information and receive 
actionable intelligence for the benefit of their decision makers. 
PaCIC, which is a component of the Pennsylvania State Police, is an all-
crimes analysis center. However, the center is planning to diversify 
and focus on all hazards in the future. According to its director, 
PaCIC is a developed criminal intelligence center. However, in terms of 
a fusion center, it is still in the early stages of development. 

PaCIC is staffed 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. PaCIC's 32-member staff 
includes Pennsylvania State Police intelligence analysts, research 
analysts, officers, and an information technology specialist. PaCIC 
also contains a watch-center component of enlisted supervisors designed 
to maintain situational awareness. A representative of the state 
Department of Corrections works in the center on a part-time basis and 
provides direct access to corrections intelligence. There are currently 
no federal entities represented in PaCIC. However, DHS representation 
is being planned with the eventual expansion into an all-crimes and all-
hazards fusion center. FBI security modifications to the center are 
under way, and FBI representation is anticipated by November 2007. 
PaCIC has access to HSIN and disseminates products including daily 
reports, strategic assessments, intelligence alerts, information 
briefs, and threat assessments. The center also operates a drug tip 
line and a terrorism tip line. 

Rhode Island: 

The Rhode Island Fusion Center was established in March 2006 and is a 
component of the Rhode Island State Police. In establishing the center, 
the state recognized the importance of the fusion center concept for 
state and local information sharing. The fusion center is colocated 
with an FBI field office and thus focuses primarily on 
counterterrorism. However, the center also serves as a resource for the 
local police agencies in the state. 

The fusion center has three personnel--one investigator and two 
analysts. The FBI is the fusion center's only federal partner, although 
the director said that he works with ICE on a regular basis. The fusion 
center works closely with the JTTF, to which there are also State 
Police officers assigned. DHS and DOJ information systems or networks 
accessible to the fusion center include HSIN, LEO, FPS portal, and 
FBI's ACS system and Guardian. The FBI also facilitates all of the 
center's security clearances and provides the center's facility, which 
is colocated with the JTTF, free of charge. 

South Carolina: 

In South Carolina, the Chief of the State Law Enforcement Division is 
the state Director of Homeland Security and the state representative to 
DHS. In July 2004, the Chief of the Division approved the development 
of a fusion center and the South Carolina Information Exchange (SCIEx) 
was established in March 2005. SCIEx has an all-crimes scope of 
operations and has devoted its resources to combating all nature of 
criminal activity. Its mission is to prevent and deter acts of 
terrorism and criminal activity, and to promote homeland security and 
public safety through intelligence fusion and information sharing with 
all sectors of South Carolina society. SCIEx also handles reports of 
suspicious activity and includes a component that deals with 
"situations as they develop," including a response to emergent hazards. 
Further, SCIEx goals focus on providing real-time response and timely 
assistance to local law enforcement agencies, developing actionable 
intelligence and analysis to predict and prevent homeland security 
threats, and using intelligence-led policing and other products to 
facilitate the prevention and interdiction of criminal and terrorist 
activities. 

SCIEx's 14-person staff includes agents and analysts from the State Law 
Enforcement Division; the National Guard; Department of Heath and 
Environmental Control; Department of Corrections; Department of 
Probation, Pardon, and Parole; and the FBI, which assigned one FIG 
analyst. DHS I&A has conducted a needs assessment of SCIEx. However, at 
the time of our review, it had not yet placed an intelligence analyst 
in the center. The center is organized into an 8/5 watch (with a 24/7 
on-call duty roster); a collection, analysis, and production unit; 
AMBER alert and missing persons coordinators; and liaisons to JTTF and 
Project SeaHawk.[Footnote 61] 

SCIEx analysts collect information from a variety of sources including 
federal intelligence and law enforcement agency reports, incident 
reports, and other first responder reports and graphics to produce 
daily bulletins, targeted advisories, and intelligence assessments. DHS 
and DOJ information systems or networks accessible to the fusion center 
include HSIN/JRIES, LEO, EPIC, and VICAP, as well as RISSNET, Interpol, 
and FinCEN. HSIN-Secret is available to personnel if they travel to the 
Emergency Operations Center, which is located in a different facility 
than SCIEx. Additionally, the FBI funded the development of a secure 
room at SCIEx, and once the room is completed, SCIEx will also gain 
access to FBI systems. SCIEx also uses a variety of analytical tools 
such as Geographic Information System and crime mapping to enhance its 
analytic products. 

South Dakota: 

The South Dakota Fusion Center was established in June 2006 with the 
mission to protect the citizens by ensuring the resiliency of critical 
infrastructure operations throughout South Dakota by enhancing and 
coordinating counterterrorism intelligence and other investigative 
support efforts among private sector and local, state, tribal, and 
federal stakeholders. The principal role of the fusion center is to 
compile, analyze, and disseminate criminal and terrorist information 
and intelligence and other information to support efforts to 
anticipate, identify, prevent, and/or monitor criminal and terrorist 
activity. The center has an all-hazards and all-crimes scope of 
operations and focuses on all criminal activity, not just those with a 
nexus to terrorism. The all-hazards focus comes from the center's 
coordination with the state Office of Emergency Management. 

The center is staffed by the South Dakota Office of Homeland Security 
and the South Dakota Highway Patrol and receives oversight from the 
State Homeland Security Senior Advisory Committee. The center has one 
full-time staff person and two part-time personnel from the Office of 
Homeland Security. There were no federal entities represented in the 
fusion center. However, officials said that they coordinate with the 
local JTTF, the HIDTA, and other drug and fugitive task forces. 

The fusion center gathers information about all-hazard, all-crimes 
incidents and disseminates it to first responders, surrounding states, 
and the federal government. DHS and DOJ information systems or networks 
accessible to the fusion center include HSIN, LEO, as well as RISS/Mid- 
States Organized Crime Information Center, ICEFISHX, and Law 
Enforcement Intelligence Network, which are operated by fusion centers 
in Minnesota and Iowa. 

Tennessee: 

The state center for Tennessee, the Tennessee Regional Information 
Center (TRIC), opened in May 2007, with the mission to lead a team 
effort of local, state, and federal law enforcement in cooperation with 
the citizens of the state of Tennessee for the timely receipt, 
analysis, and dissemination of terrorism and criminal activity 
information relating to Tennessee. TRIC provides a central location for 
the collection and analysis of classified, law enforcement sensitive, 
and open source information; provides a continuous flow of information 
and intelligence to the law enforcement community; and provides 
assistance to law enforcement agencies in criminal investigation 
matters. TRIC has an all-crimes scope of operations that includes 
crimes such as traditional organized crime, narcotics, gangs, 
fugitives, missing children, sex offenders, and Medicaid/Medicare 
fraud. TRIC also has a terrorism/national security focus that includes 
international and domestic terrorism, foreign counterintelligence, and 
other national security issues (such as Avian Flu). 

Led by the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation and the Tennessee 
Department of Safety/Office of Homeland Security, TRIC's 31-person 
staff includes analysts from these two entities, as well as the 
Department of Corrections, the National Guard, and the FBI FIG. Other 
partner agencies include the Highway Patrol, the Oak Ridge National 
Laboratory, HIDTA, the U.S. Attorney's Office, ATF, and the Regional 
Organized Crime Information Center, as well as a growing connectivity 
to the state's local law enforcement agencies. TRIC provides support to 
all agencies within the state, reviews and analyzes data for crime 
trend patterns and criminal activity with a potential nexus to 
terrorism, disseminates information through regular bulletins and 
special advisories, develops threat assessments and executive news 
briefs, performs requests for information as needed, and produces 
suspicious incident report analysis. The public can provide tips and 
information to TRIC through its Web site and via a toll-free telephone 
number. DHS and DOJ information systems or networks accessible to TRIC 
include HSIN and LEO, as well as RISS and the Regional Organized Crime 
Information Center. Fusion center operations work in concert with other 
ongoing Tennessee Bureau of Investigation programs, including AMBER 
Alerts, sex offender registry, and the aviation unit. 

Texas: 

In addition to the statewide Texas Fusion Center, there are regional 
fusion centers including the North Central Texas Fusion Center. 

Texas Fusion Center: 

After September 11, Governor Rick Perry created a task force to study 
homeland security matters, and the task force identified communication 
and coordination as predominant themes. Subsequently, the Texas 
Legislature passed a bill that created a communications center to serve 
as the focal point for planning, coordinating, and integrating 
government communications regarding the state's homeland defense 
strategy. This center, then known as the Texas Security Alert and 
Analysis Center, opened in July 2003. The center functioned as a call 
center to allow the public and law enforcement to report suspicious 
activities. In July 2005, the center was expanded and renamed the Texas 
Fusion Center, which acts as a tactical intelligence center for law 
enforcement that is open 24 hours a day, 7 days a week and helps 
coordinate multi-agency border control activities. The fusion center 
has an all-crimes and all-hazards scope of operations in order to 
disrupt organizations that are using criminal activities to further 
terrorist activities. The center gathers information from the public 
and law enforcement, analyzes it, and provides it to JTTFs. The fusion 
center also focuses on border security, narcoterrorism, and criminal 
gangs. The all-hazards scope of operations was adopted in the aftermath 
of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. The center works in conjunction with, 
and is located in, the State Operation Center, in order to create an 
all-hazards response capability. 

The Texas Fusion Center has dual oversight by the Criminal Law 
Enforcement Division and the Governor's Office of Homeland Security at 
the Texas Department of Public Safety. It is staffed by Department of 
Public Safety officers and analysts. The FBI assigned a part-time 
analyst to the center. 

The Texas Fusion Center is the central facility for collecting, 
analyzing, and disseminating intelligence information related to 
terrorist activities. The center is designed to handle and respond to 
telephone inquiries from law enforcement and the general public, in 
addition to having access to several information systems. The Texas 
Fusion Center monitors HSIN, LEO, and JRIES and has access to FBI 
systems, though only through the part-time analyst assigned to the 
center. The center also uses a variety of state systems and databases, 
including the Texas Data Exchange, which is a comprehensive information-
sharing portal that allows criminal justice agencies to exchange jail 
and records management systems data, and provides system access to a 
variety of state databases. 

North Central Texas Fusion Center: 

The North Central Texas Fusion Center (NTFC) became operational in 
February 2006, after a 2½-year planning process. The planners 
recognized the fusion center needed a different mission from those 
already being conducted by the North Texas HIDTA and FBI FIG, so NTFC 
adopted an all-crimes and all-hazards scope of operations. 
Specifically, NTFC works to prevent or minimize the impacts of natural, 
intentional, and accidental hazards/disasters through information 
sharing across jurisdictions and across disciplines. The center also 
supports emergency response, field personnel, and investigations. 

Stakeholders include those in homeland security, law enforcement, 
public health, fire, emergency management, and state and federal 
government such as the Texas Fusion Center, Texas National Guard, and 
DHS. DHS I&A has assigned an intelligence analyst to the center. 

The center provides intelligence support to regional task forces, State 
of Texas initiatives, and local police department homicide and criminal 
investigations and also assesses regional threats. Users from 42 
regional jurisdictions and agencies covering five major disciplines, 
including law enforcement, health, fire, emergency management, and 
intelligence, receive bulletins and alert information. Reports and 
alerts are also distributed via e-mail to the stakeholders. Most of the 
reports are all-hazard and all-discipline focused and look at trends, 
observations, and predictive elements primarily in support of 
prevention and preparedness. DHS and DOJ systems and networks 
accessible to NTFC include HSIN, LEO, and HSDN, in addition to a 
variety of other state and open source information databases. 

Utah: 

The Utah Fusion Center is in the planning stage and is transitioning 
from an intelligence center--the Utah Criminal Intelligence Center-- 
which was established prior to the 2002 Winter Olympics. Led by the 
Utah Department of Public Safety, the fusion center is in the process 
of developing operations guidelines and memorandums of understanding 
and consulting with DHS's Office of Grants and Training. The Utah 
Fusion Center will adopt an all-crimes and all-hazards scope of 
operations to move beyond law enforcement and broaden the center's 
focus to include homeland security and public safety. 

The fusion center was established to enhance the ability to share 
information across disciplines beyond law enforcement and levels of 
government. The fusion center, as was the criminal intelligence center, 
is colocated with the local FBI JTTF and will employ criminal 
researchers and investigators. The center works closely with the FBI 
JTTF and the local DHS representative, partnerships that were developed 
with the establishment of the precursor intelligence center in 2002. 
The FBI provides Top Secret clearances, and most of the staff members 
have had Top Secret security clearances since the 2002 Winter Olympics. 
DHS and DOJ information systems or networks accessible to the fusion 
center include HSIN, LEO, FBI classified systems, as well as RISS/Rocky 
Mountain Information Network. 

Vermont: 

The Vermont Fusion Center, which is managed by the Vermont State 
Police, was established in August 2005 in order to further the national 
homeland security mission in response to the terrorist attacks on 
September 11. The fusion center, which is colocated with ICE's Law 
Enforcement Support Center (LESC),[Footnote 62] is a partnership of the 
Vermont Department of Homeland Security, Vermont State Police Criminal 
Intelligence Unit, ICE, Vermont National Guard Counter Drug Program, 
and the U.S. Coast Guard. Each entity provides personnel to the center. 

The fusion center serves as Vermont's clearinghouse to analyze and 
assess information received from law enforcement and disseminate 
information from a single location. The goals of the Vermont Fusion 
Center include providing timely, accurate, and actionable information 
to the state, national, and international law enforcement communities; 
identifying parallel investigations, reducing duplication, and 
increasing officer safety (deconfliction); and providing strategic 
analysis, to include crime mapping for all types of criminal activity, 
particularly related to illegal narcotics, money laundering crimes, 
identity theft, crimes that support terrorism, and other major crimes. 
The center has an all-crimes scope of operations reflecting the 
multiple sectors, including public safety and law enforcement, that 
have come together to form the fusion center. 

The center provides major criminal case assistance, such as fugitive 
tracking, phone searches, liaison with federal and Canadian agencies, 
analytical reports, and utilization of federal capabilities such as 
cellular telephone triangulation, mail covers, passport information, 
and border lookouts. The center also disseminates notifications, 
alerts, indicators, and warnings to Vermont law enforcement. DHS and 
DOJ information systems or networks accessible to the fusion center 
include HSIN, Student and Exchange Visitor Information System, U.S. 
Visitor and Immigration Status Indicator Technology System, National 
Security Entry-Exit Registration System, FPS portal, U.S. Coast Guard 
Homeport, LEO, VICAP, EPIC, NCIC, as well as RISS/New England Police 
Information Network, NLETS, INTERPOL, HIDTA, FinCEN, and Treasury 
Enforcement Communications System. The center also has access to a 
number of state and commercial systems and databases, and to the 
Canadian Border Information / Intel Center. 

Virginia: 

The Virginia Fusion Center was established in February 2005 after being 
mandated by legislation[Footnote 63] and moved into a new facility in 
November 2005. Operated by the Virginia State Police, in cooperation 
with the Virginia Department of Emergency Management, the primary 
mission of the center is to fuse together resources from local, state, 
and federal agencies and private industries to facilitate information 
collection, analysis, and sharing in order to deter and prevent 
criminal and terrorist attacks. The secondary mission of the center is, 
in support of the Virginia Emergency Operations Center (with which it 
is colocated), to centralize information and resources to provide 
coordinated and effective response in the event of an attack. The 
center has an all-hazards and counterterrorism scope of operations. 

The Virginia Fusion Center has partnerships established with state, 
local, and federal law enforcement agencies, including ATF and the U.S. 
Secret Service; DHS's Homeland Security Operation Center; FBI JTTFs in 
the state of Virginia; the private sector; Fire and Emergency Medical 
Services; the military, including the Army and the U.S. Coast Guard; 
the National Capitol Regional Intelligence Center; other state 
intelligence centers; as well as the public. There are over 20 people 
in the center--17 analysts, 5 special agents, and other management and 
administrative personnel. The analysts are primarily from the Virginia 
State Police and the Department of Emergency Management. The National 
Guard has also assigned an analyst. DHS has detailed one intelligence 
analyst, and the FBI has assigned one reports officer to the center. 
The DHS Protective Security Advisor has a desk in the center as well. 
Several center employees are detailed to other organizations; for 
example, the Virginia State Police have five agents assigned to JTTFs 
in the state. 

DHS and DOJ information systems or networks accessible to the fusion 
center include HSIN, HSIN-Intel, HSDN, LEO, and JRIES, as well as the 
RISS/Regional Organized Crime Information Center. The FBI reports 
officer in the center can access FBI classified systems. The fusion 
center shares all-hazards information and intelligence, tactical 
information, raw information, and finished intelligence products with a 
variety of clients. These products include daily terrorism intelligence 
briefings that could be produced at Law Enforcement Sensitive, For 
Official Use Only, and open source levels and are e-mailed to all law 
enforcement and military contacts and posted to a bulletin; 
intelligence bulletins that describe emerging trends or upcoming 
events; threat assessments for events; and information reports on 
pertinent information that has not been fully analyzed. Virginia Fusion 
Center analysts also produce special projects or reports, provide case 
support, follow up on calls, and respond to requests for information. 
The center has established a variety of performance measures, including 
quarterly surveys disseminated to its users and activity reports (e.g., 
daily, weekly, quarterly, and yearly). All personnel also have core 
responsibilities and competencies. 

Washington: 

The Washington Joint Analytical Center (WAJAC) started as a small 
project in 2003 to facilitate information sharing within the state and 
with the federal government and has gradually evolved. WAJAC, which is 
a joint effort between the Washington State Patrol and the FBI, has an 
all-crimes, all-hazards, and counterterrorism scope of operations to 
support the state and local law enforcement community. This approach 
allows WAJAC intelligence analysts and investigators the ability to 
fully evaluate information for trends, emerging crime problems, and 
their possible connections to terrorism. WAJAC has recently included an 
all-hazards focus and has started looking at natural disasters and 
public health epidemics. 

WAJAC personnel include representatives from the Washington State 
Patrol, King County Sheriff's Office, Bellevue Police Department, 
Seattle Police Department, the Washington Military Department (National 
Guard), ICE, and TSA. There are no FBI personnel assigned directly to 
WAJAC; however, WAJAC is colocated in an FBI field office and WAJAC 
analysts work side by side with the FIG in the field office. DHS I&A 
has conducted a needs assessment of WAJAC, and, according to DHS, had 
assigned an intelligence analyst to the center. 

DHS and DOJ information systems or networks accessible to the fusion 
center include HSIN, LEO, ICE and TSA systems; all FBI systems; as well 
as access to systems of each partner agency in WAJAC. WAJAC personnel 
receive all of their clearances, at the Top Secret level through the 
FBI. WAJAC produces a variety of weekly intelligence briefings, 
bulletins, and assessments in conjunction with the FIG. These products 
are e-mailed to law enforcement agencies, other government agencies, 
private sector security officers, and military units. 

West Virginia: 

The Department of Military Affairs and Public Safety's Homeland 
Security Division is in the planning stage of establishing the West 
Virginia Fusion Center. The planning team for the development of the 
fusion center consists of multiple agencies and stakeholders with 
leadership from the Homeland Security Advisor. The West Virginia Fusion 
Center is to operate under the direct control of the Homeland Security 
Advisor and the State Administrative Agency. A governance committee, to 
be chaired by the State Administrative Agency with representatives from 
the Northern and Southern Anti-Terrorism Advisory Councils, state 
police, National Guard, health care, higher education, the private 
sector, and the interoperability coordinator will be responsible for 
providing guidance and policy. At the time of our review, the West 
Virginia Fusion Center was beginning its phased opening and bringing in 
personnel from the National Guard and the state police. 

The vision for the fusion center is to prevent, deter, and disrupt 
terrorism and criminal activity, enabling a safe and secure environment 
for the citizens of West Virginia. The fusion center will adopt an all- 
crimes, all-hazards, and counterterrorism scope of operations but plans 
to tailor each depending on the stakeholders in the center. For 
example, the West Virginia Public Broadcasting System will be 
represented in the fusion center to help gather and manage information. 
However, if there is an evacuation event, it will also disseminate the 
information directly to the public as public service announcements 
through television and radio stations. 

Wisconsin: 

There are two fusion centers in Wisconsin: the Wisconsin Statewide 
Intelligence Center (WSIC) and the Milwaukee-based Southeastern 
Terrorism Alert Center (STAC). 

Wisconsin Statewide Intelligence Center: 

Led by the Wisconsin Department of Justice Division of Criminal 
Investigation, the Wisconsin Statewide Intelligence Center (WSIC) 
became operational in March 2006 as the central information and 
intelligence-gathering entity for the state of Wisconsin and acts as 
the clearinghouse for information and intelligence coming from local 
and county agencies. WSIC's mission includes managing intelligence 
gathering efforts and passing information to appropriate agencies and 
the JTTF; interfacing with the Emergency Operations Center and Joint 
Operations Center during critical incidents or as requested; producing 
general weekly law enforcement bulletins and daily intelligence 
briefings for the Governor, top law enforcement officials, and partner 
agency heads, among others; supporting the Division of Criminal 
Investigation technology assets in the field; and providing statewide 
major case support and analytical services. Though counterterrorism is 
the primary concern of WSIC, the center operates with an all-crimes, 
all-hazards, all-events approach directed by the state Homeland 
Security Council, which wanted the center to be the intelligence voice 
for the state and to help the state in a comprehensive way. 

WSIC is staffed by eight full-time personnel, five of whom are Division 
of Criminal Investigation personnel. There are also two National Guard 
analysts, a special investigator from the Wisconsin Department of 
Natural Resources, and one FBI analyst at the center. DHS I&A has 
conducted a needs assessment of WSIC. However, at the time of our 
review it had not yet placed an intelligence analyst in the center. 
WSIC also supports the STAC by providing three Division of Criminal 
Investigation personnel to the center. WSIC is overseen by a Governance 
Board made up of federal, state, and local representatives. 

WSIC analysts provide short-or long-term assistance to agencies by 
using analytical tools and systems to clarify and visualize case 
investigations, tailoring the analytical support to the requesting 
agency's needs. WSIC analysts work in a variety of areas and 
initiatives, including counterterrorism and domestic security, gang 
intelligence, identity theft, and the Highway Drug Interdiction Program 
with the Wisconsin State Patrol. DHS and DOJ networks and systems 
accessible to WSIC include HSIN, LEO, and NCIC, as well as RISSNET and 
a statewide law enforcement network that enables law enforcement 
officers to submit intelligence or requests for assistance to WSIC, and 
it provides law enforcement with WSIC bulletins and alerts, staff 
contact information, officer safety information, and resource links. 
WSIC provides a variety of products and services that include weekly 
law enforcement bulletins for every agency in the state containing 
sections on domestic and international terrorism, cold case 
investigations, missing persons, officer safety, and items of interest 
to law enforcement. Additionally, WSIC prepares a daily Command Staff 
Intelligence Briefing for the Governor, the Attorney General, the 
Adjutant General, and top law enforcement officials across the state 
that is primarily focused on issues within the previous 24 hours. WSIC 
also broadcasts statewide Alert Bulletins when it receives time- 
sensitive information, handles major criminal case analytical support, 
provides assistance on electronic surveillance, and conducts training 
events across the state and region. 

Southeastern Wisconsin Terrorism Alert Center: 

The Southeastern Wisconsin Terrorism Alert Center (STAC) is a 
counterterrorism, all-crimes, all-hazards intelligence organization 
made up of law enforcement, fire service, homeland security, military, 
DOJ, FBI, emergency management, and health department members. STAC 
officials said they were exposed to the TEW concept from Los Angeles 
and saw a need for establishing a TEW in their urban area in 2005 to 
improve information sharing. STAC was built on the TEW foundation as a 
satellite of WSIC. STAC began operating when its analysts were hired in 
October 2006. However, the officials said that they are still getting 
the physical location established and are in the final stages of 
reconstruction and establishing the facility. 

The mission of STAC is to protect the citizens, critical 
infrastructure, and key resources of southeastern Wisconsin by 
promoting intelligence-led policing, supporting criminal investigative 
efforts, and enhancing the domestic preparedness of first responders, 
all levels of government, and its partners in the private sector. 

STAC staff will eventually include 10 full-and part-time officers, 
detectives, and analysts from the Milwaukee Police Department, Office 
of the Sheriff of Milwaukee County, one DCI analyst, and one Milwaukee 
Fire Department analyst. The FBI has assigned a full-time intelligence 
analyst and a part-time special agent. A governance board provides 
oversight for the center. STAC is in the process of developing a TLO 
program, which is a network of police, fire department, public health, 
and private sector partners that collect and share information related 
to terrorism threats. STAC TLO coordinators will be responsible for 
analyzing available sources of terrorist threat information and 
preparing versions for distribution to the first responder agencies 
within their regions. 

STAC has also conducted some initial critical infrastructure 
assessments and published alerts, threat assessments, and intelligence 
information bulletins with information for first responders about local 
threats, terrorism trends, and counterterrorism training and offers 
training information for critical incident preparation. DHS and DOJ 
systems or networks accessible to STAC include LEO, HSIN, and RISS. 
STAC does not have classified FBI systems in its facility. However, the 
FBI analyst at STAC has access to them. The FBI also provides STAC 
personnel with their security clearances, most at the Secret level, and 
one at the Top Secret level. 

Wyoming: 

Wyoming does not have and is not planning to establish a physical 
fusion center. However, the Office of Homeland Security is working with 
Colorado officials to develop a plan for Wyoming to become an "adjunct" 
to CIAC. The officials stated that Wyoming, which has a population of 
only around 400,000 people and operates its law enforcement agencies 
with a total of only 1,600 officers, does not have the threat or the 
necessity for a full-fledged fusion center, much less the funding or 
personnel to support such a center. In addition, the Wyoming Office of 
Homeland Security is supported by the FBI's JTTF in Wyoming that 
provides assistance such as helping with analytical review of 
information. 

Wyoming officials said that they have taken several steps to facilitate 
the development of a partnership with Colorado's CIAC, including 
putting in place a technical system to augment the communications 
capability of Wyoming's law enforcement agencies to transmit 
intelligence and information with CIAC. Wyoming officials intend to 
develop memorandums of understanding with CIAC to cover a regional area 
including both Colorado and Wyoming. In addition, Wyoming will furnish 
personnel for CIAC. The officials characterized the development of the 
partnership as between the planning and early stages of development and 
said that Wyoming and CIAC will have their partnership operational 
approximately in the fall of 2007. However, a Wyoming official noted 
that the state's fiscal year 2007 funding did not designate any funding 
to continue with the fusion initiative. The official said that the 
fusion center initiative is critical to efforts to thwart terrorism, 
and the state intends to continue its partnership with CIAC and attempt 
to obtain future grant funding. 

[End of section] 

Appendix V: GAO Contacts and Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Eileen R. Larence (202) 512-8777 or larencee@gao.gov: 

Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the contact named above, Susan H. Quinlan, Assistant 
Director; Michael Blinde; Katherine Davis; George Erhart; Jill Evancho; 
Mary Catherine Hult; Julian King; Tom Lombardi; and Jay Smale made key 
contributions to this report. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] See Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative, Fusion Center 
Guidelines, Developing and Sharing Information and Intelligence in a 
New Era, Guidelines for Establishing and Operating Fusion Centers at 
the Local, State, and Federal Levels--Law Enforcement Intelligence, 
Public Safety, and the Private Sector (August 2006). 

[2] See Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 892, 116 Stat. 2135, 2253-55 (2002). 

[3] See Pub. L. No. 108-458, § 1016, 118 Stat. 3638, 3664-70 (2004), 
amended by Pub. L. No. 110-53, § 504, 121 Stat. 266, 313-17 (2007). 

[4] On June 2, 2005, the President issued a memorandum placing the PM- 
ISE and its staff within the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence. 

[5] See Pub. L. No. 110-53, § 511, 121 Stat. at 317-24 (adding section 
210A to subtitle A, title II of the Homeland Security Act, Pub. L. No. 
107-296, 116 Stat. 2135). 

[6] See Congressional Research Service, Fusion Centers: Issues and 
Options for Congress, RL34070 (Washington, D.C.: July 6, 2007). 

[7] For purposes of this report, we use "local fusion center" to refer 
to centers established by major urban areas, counties, cities, and 
intrastate regions. 

[8] We contacted all 50 states, the District of Columbia, and 8 local 
areas; however, one state did not plan a fusion center. For that 
reason, we have responses from 58 fusion centers--43 operational and 15 
in the planning or early stages of development. 

[9] HSIN serves as DHS's primary nationwide information-sharing tool 
for communicating sensitive but unclassified homeland security 
information. LEO serves as a real-time on-line controlled-access 
communications and information-sharing data repository for sensitive 
but unclassified information about, among other things, antiterrorism, 
intelligence, law enforcement, and criminal justice. 

[10] National Security Directive 63, issued by President Bush in 1991, 
provides that investigations satisfying the scope and standards 
specified in the directive are transferable between agencies and shall 
be deemed to meet the investigative standards for access to collateral 
Top Secret and Sensitive Compartmented Information. Executive Order 
12968, issued by President Clinton in 1995, provides that background 
investigation determinations of access to classified information are to 
be mutually and reciprocally accepted by all agencies. Additionally, 
section 3001 of the Intelligence Reform Act, enacted in December 2004, 
requires that all security clearance background investigations and 
determinations completed by an authorized agency be accepted by all 
agencies. 

[11] Effective April 2007, the functions performed by the former DHS 
Office of Grants and Training were transferred to FEMA as part of a 
realignment of major national preparedness functions required by the 
Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006. See Pub. L. No. 
109-295, §§ 611, 614, 120 Stat. 1355, 1395-1411. 

[12] GAO, Information Technology: Numerous Federal Networks Used to 
Support Homeland Security Need to Be Better Coordinated with Key State 
and Local Information-Sharing Initiatives, GAO-07-455 (Washington, 
D.C.: Apr. 16, 2007). 

[13] A SCIF is a facility providing formal access controls and is used 
to hold information concerning or derived from intelligence sources, 
methods, or analytical processes. A SCIF is different from a secure 
room, which is a room or office that is secured to control the flow of 
personnel into the area that is not built to the same structural 
specifications as a SCIF. 

[14] CRS, RL34070, July 2007. 

[15] Overseen by the National Guard Bureau, a joint bureau of the 
departments of the Army and Air Force, the National Guard has a dual 
federal and state mission. When National Guard units are not under 
federal control, the governor can activate National Guard personnel to 
"state active duty" in response to a natural or man-made disaster or 
for homeland defense missions. 

[16] This network, the Sensitive Compartmental Information Operational 
Network, is used to transport top secret counterterrorism data, 
including intelligence and warning information. 

[17] SIPRNet is the Department of Defense's largest interoperable 
command and control data network. 

[18] FinCEN is operated by the U.S. Department of the Treasury and 
concentrates on suspicious financial activities and currency 
transaction amounts over $10,000; the program covers both domestic and 
international financial activity. 

[19] EPIC concentrates on drug movements and immigration violations and 
provides access to a wide range of intelligence including information 
from DEA and ICE. 

[20] SEVIS, operated by ICE, includes information to track and monitor 
schools and programs, students, exchange visitors and their dependents 
throughout the duration of approved participation within the U.S. 
education system. 

[21] We present information about challenges encountered by 58 fusion 
centers--those in all stages of development--as they were establishing 
and operating their centers. Fusion centers may have encountered more 
than one challenge related to a particular area, for example, related 
to guidance and training. 

[22] CRS, RL34070, July 2007. 

[23] GAO-07-455. 

[24] The Information Sharing Council was established pursuant to 
section 1016 of the Intelligence Reform Act to advise the President and 
the PM-ISE on developing policies, procedures, guidelines, roles, and 
standards necessary to establish, implement, and maintain the ISE, as 
well as to ensure coordination among federal departments and agencies 
participating in the ISE. 

[25] During the conference, fusion center officials attended regionally 
based workshops, during which they made recommendations to the federal 
government on a variety of information sharing issues. 

[26] The National Counterterrorism Center is a partnership of 
intelligence agencies that analyze and disseminate national 
intelligence data, among other things. 

[27] See Pub. L. No. 110-53, § 521, 121 Stat. at 328-32 (adding section 
210D to subtitle A, title II of the Homeland Security Act, Pub. L. No. 
107-296, 116 Stat. 2135). 

[28] To obtain security clearances from DHS and the FBI, applicants 
must, among other things, undergo a mandatory background investigation, 
the scope of which varies with the level of clearance being sought, and 
be determined eligible for the clearance. 

[29] These are all clearance requests coming from the state Homeland 
Security Advisor. 

[30] Additionally, according to the FBI, there are 110 security 
clearances in a pending status which means that the personnel have been 
processed by the FBI for security clearances and are in varying stages 
of the clearance process but have not yet reached final adjudication. 
The estimated cost to the FBI associated with obtaining a Top Secret 
clearance for state and local fusion center personnel is about $7,200 
per person. 

[31] CRS, RL34070, July 2007. 

[32] In April 2004, we reported on the timeliness of the FBI clearance 
process and found that about 92 percent of the applications the FBI 
received for Top Secret security clearances since September 11, 2001, 
were processed within the FBI's stated time frame goals. In contrast, 
the majority of Secret applications (about 74 percent) were not 
processed within the FBI's time frame goals. However, during the last 
half of 2003, the FBI nearly doubled its success rate for completing 
Secret security clearance applications within its time frame goals. See 
GAO, Security Clearances: FBI Has Enhanced Its Process for State and 
Local Law Enforcement Officials, GAO-04-596 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 30, 
2004). Amendments to the Homeland Security Act provide that the DHS 
Undersecretary for Intelligence and Analysis shall ensure that each 
official or intelligence analyst assigned to a fusion center under § 
210A of the Act has the appropriate security clearance to contribute 
effectively to the mission of the fusion center and may request that 
security clearance processing be expedited for each such officer or 
intelligence analyst (and may use available funds for such purpose). 
See Pub. L. No. 110-53 § 511, 121 Stat. at 320. 

[33] Several federal agencies conduct background investigations 
necessary to grant clearances for individuals with a need to know 
classified information. For example, the Office of Personnel Management 
(OPM) conducts the clearance process for most federal agencies, while 
the FBI conducts its own security clearance process. 

[34] CRS, RL34070, July 2007. 

[35] According to the fiscal year 2007 DHS HSGP Guidance, UASI and 
LETPP funds could be used to hire new staff or contractor positions to 
serve as intelligence analysts to enable information and intelligence 
sharing capabilities. Costs associated with hiring new intelligence 
analysts are allowable only for 2 years, after which states and urban 
areas may be responsible for supporting the costs to sustain those 
intelligence analysts. 

[36] The grant guidance says that in order to be hired as an 
intelligence analyst personnel must either (1) successfully complete 
training to ensure baseline proficiency in intelligence analysis and 
production within 6 months of being hired or (2) have previously served 
as an intelligence analyst for a minimum of 2 years either in a federal 
intelligence agency, the military, or state or local law enforcement 
intelligence unit. 

[37] According to the fiscal year 2007 DHS HSGP Guidance, DHS HSGP 
funds may be used to develop a state homeland security training 
program, including training provided by DHS's FEMA/NPD, as well as 
training not it does not provide, such as state or federal sponsored 
courses coordinated and approved by the State Administering Agency or 
their designated training point of contact that fall within DHS's 
mission to prepare state and local personnel to prevent, protect 
against, respond to, and recover from acts of terrorism or catastrophic 
events. 

[38] According to the fiscal year 2007 DHS HSGP Guidance, use of HSGP 
funds for construction and renovation is generally prohibited. However, 
project construction and renovation not exceeding $1 million is 
allowable, as deemed necessary by a DHS Assistant Secretary, under the 
SHSP, UASI, and LETPP programs. These program funds may be used for 
construction and renovation projects only when those projects 
specifically address enhanced security at critical infrastructure 
facilities. Construction or renovation to guard facilities, and any 
other construction or renovation efforts that change or expand the 
footprint of a facility or structure, including security enhancements 
to improve perimeter security, are considered to constitute 
construction or renovation, and must follow an approval process and be 
approved by DHS prior to the use of any funds for construction or 
renovation. 

[39] According to the fiscal year 2007 DHS HSGP Guidance, this pass- 
through requirement applies to funding received through the SHSP, the 
UASI, and LETPP. 

[40] CRS, RL34070, July 2007. 

[41] Project types identified by DHS as "fusion center funded 
activities" included: establishment/enhancement of a terrorism 
intelligence/early warning system, center, or task force; 
establishment/enhancement of a public-private emergency preparedness 
program; development/enhancement of homeland security/emergency 
management organization and structure; enhancement of capability to 
support international border and waterway security; enhancement of 
capabilities to respond to chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, 
and explosive events; establishment/enhancement of regional response 
teams; assessment of the vulnerability of and/or harden/protect 
critical infrastructure and key assets; Transit Security Grant Programs 
for bus, ferry, and rail; and enhancement of citizen awareness of 
emergency preparedness, prevention, and response measures. 

[42] Fiscal year 2007 HSGP funding also focuses on establishing a 
baseline level of capability in all state and urban area fusion centers 
and establishes some requirements for fusion centers receiving DHS 
funds to achieve that goal. DHS requires that fusion centers already 
possess or prioritize their efforts and expenditures to a variety of 
baseline capabilities in areas such as management and governance, 
collection, analysis, and dissemination. 

[43] The Fusion Center Guidelines, developed as a collaborative effort 
between DOJ's Global Justice Information Sharing Initiative (Global) 
and DHS's Homeland Security Advisory Council (HSAC), were first issued 
in 2005 to help resolve interoperability and communication issues with 
centers at the state, regional, and federal levels and to provide 
guidance in relation to the collection, analysis, and dissemination of 
terrorism-related intelligence. In 2006, the Guidelines were expanded 
to integrate public safety and private sector entities. Both Global and 
the HSAC include state, local, tribal, and private sector officials 
that provide advice and counsel to the Attorney General and the 
Secretary of Homeland Security. HSAC also includes members of academia 
and Global also includes federal and international representatives. 

[44] Fusion centers may be required to manage information in accordance 
with 28 C.F.R. part 23, which contains implementing standards for 
operating federally funded multijurisdictional intelligence systems 
operating under Title I of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Street 
Act of 1968, as amended. Under this regulation, all multi- 
jurisdictional law enforcement information management systems funded in 
part by federal grants must follow guidelines for the collection, 
storage, and purging of information. Furthermore, information stored in 
such systems must be "reviewed and validated for continuing compliance 
with system submission criteria before the expiration of its retention 
period, which in no event shall be longer than five (5) years." Receipt 
and dissemination of such information is based on a "need to know" and 
"right to know," which under the regulation are standards to be defined 
by the organizational unit operating the particular system. 

[45] BJA is a DOJ component responsible for supporting local, state, 
and tribal efforts to achieve safer communities. In fulfilling its 
mission, BJA provides grants for programs and for training and 
technical assistance to combat violent and drug-related crime and help 
improve the criminal justice system. 

[46] DHS's FEMA/NPD and BJA coordinated with I&A, the Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence, FBI, and the state and local 
community, including Global, in this effort and provide these technical 
assistance services to fusion centers at no cost. In addition, the 
technical assistance program provides online resources, such as the 
National Criminal Intelligence Resource Center, which contains a 
resource information databank used to share policies, techniques, and 
lessons learned, and the Fusion Process Technical Assistance Program 
Resource Center, which contains existing fusion center templates, 
manuals, policy documents, memoranda of understanding, and concept of 
operations documents. 

[47] See CRS, Fusion Centers: Issues and Options for Congress, RL34070 
(Washington, D.C.: July 6, 2007). 

[48] Effective April 2007, the functions performed by the former DHS 
Office of Grants and Training were transferred to FEMA as part of a 
realignment of major national preparedness functions required by the 
Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006. 

[49] We relied on the centers' own definitions of themselves as fusion 
centers and did not evaluate their status, characteristics, or 
operations. 

[50] For purposes of this report, "fusion center officials" includes 
the directors, commanders, or special agents in charge of the centers 
(or their designees). In states where a fusion center is not 
operational, we spoke with officials who were responsible for the 
planning or establishment of the fusion center. 

[51] A Web portal is generally a site that offers several resources or 
services, such as search engines, news articles, forums, or other 
tools. HSIN contains a series of Web-based portals that are organized 
in various community groups, for example, law enforcement, emergency 
management, or users from a specific state. 

[52] TEWs are multilateral, multidisciplinary groups designed to 
provide local responders information on current threats and offer 
decision-making information to community leaders. 

[53] SCION is used to transport Top Secret counterterrorism data, 
including intelligence and warning information. 

[54] DHS protective security advisors have experience related to 
vulnerability reduction and physical security and many have law 
enforcement or military backgrounds. The advisors have responsibility 
for assisting in identifying high-priority facilities, providing the 
local community with information on threats and best practices, and 
coordinating training and facility visits. 

[55] InfraGard is an information-sharing and analysis effort between, 
at a minimum, the FBI and the private sector that serves the interests 
and combines the knowledge base of a wide range of members. It is an 
association of businesses, academic institutions, state and local law 
enforcement agencies, and other participants dedicated to sharing 
information and intelligence to prevent hostile acts on the nation and 
its interests. InfraGard chapters are geographically linked with FBI 
field office territories, and each chapter has an FBI special agent 
coordinator assigned to it who works closely with program managers in 
FBI headquarters. 

[56] The Anti-Terrorism Advisory Council in the U.S. Attorney's Office 
for the District of Idaho was created after September 11 and is 
composed of representatives from federal, state, and local law 
enforcement agencies. The Idaho ATAC coordinates antiterrorism 
initiatives, initiates training programs, and facilitates information 
sharing. 

[57] In Minnesota, all government data collected, created, received, 
maintained, or disseminated by a government entity shall be public 
unless classified by statute or temporary classification pursuant to 
state or federal law. 

[58] ICEFISHX is a partnership among Minnesota, North Dakota, and South 
Dakota law enforcement agencies. It is an internet-based intelligence- 
sharing initiative and alert network designed to collect and 
disseminate information relating to terrorist operations and other 
criminal activities to law enforcement, government agencies, and the 
private sector within the tristate area. ICEFISHX collects suspicious 
activities reports. There are close to 1,700 subscribers from law 
enforcement and non-law enforcement organizations on ICEFISHX. Private 
sector security officers are also subscribers to the network. There is 
also a Resource Library on the Web site, with documents posted for 
subscriber use. The FBI supports ICEFISHX. 

[59] The FBI Intelligence Information Reports Dissemination System is a 
Web-based software application that allows access to the FBI's intranet 
to create and disseminate standardized intelligence information 
reports. 

[60] A Fusion Center Working Group consisting of representatives of the 
Oklahoma Office of Homeland Security, State Bureau of Investigation, 
Military Department, Department of Public Safety, FBI, Oklahoma City 
Police Department, and the Tulsa Police Department is coordinating to 
design the Fusion Center. 

[61] The Charleston Harbor Operations Center, better known as Project 
SeaHawk, was created as a unique benchmark project to enhance the 
protection, security, and infrastructure of seaports nationally. 
Administered by the U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of South 
Carolina, Project SeaHawk is focused on the Port of Charleston, South 
Carolina. It has created a unified intelligence operations center that 
includes all federal, state, and local agencies having responsibility 
for any aspect of port security and protection. 

[62] LESC provides information to local, state, and federal law 
enforcement agencies on the immigrant status and identity information 
on aliens suspected, arrested, or convicted of criminal activity. LESC 
is a 24-hour-a-day/ 7-day-a-week/365-days-a-year center operated by 
ICE. 

[63] According to Virginia State Police officials, prior to the events 
of September 11, they had a criminal intelligence center. But, after 
that, they realized that the state and local law enforcement officials 
needed an avenue to get timely and accurate information from the 
federal government, and so the concept of a fusion center was 
initiated. 

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