This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-08-285T 
entitled 'Combating Nuclear Terrorism: Federal Efforts to Respond to 
Nuclear and Radiological Threats and to Protect Key Emergency Response 
Facilities Could be Strengthened' which was released on November 16, 
2007. 

This text file was formatted by the U.S. Government Accountability 
Office (GAO) to be accessible to users with visual impairments, as part 
of a longer term project to improve GAO products' accessibility. Every 
attempt has been made to maintain the structural and data integrity of 
the original printed product. Accessibility features, such as text 
descriptions of tables, consecutively numbered footnotes placed at the 
end of the file, and the text of agency comment letters, are provided 
but may not exactly duplicate the presentation or format of the printed 
version. The portable document format (PDF) file is an exact electronic 
replica of the printed version. We welcome your feedback. Please E-mail 
your comments regarding the contents or accessibility features of this 
document to Webmaster@gao.gov. 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright 
protection in the United States. It may be reproduced and distributed 
in its entirety without further permission from GAO. Because this work 
may contain copyrighted images or other material, permission from the 
copyright holder may be necessary if you wish to reproduce this 
material separately. 

Testimony: 

Before the Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the 
Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia, Committee on Homeland 
Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 

GAO: 

For Release on Delivery Expected at 10:00 a.m. EST: 

Thursday, November 15, 2007: 

Combating Nuclear Terrorism: 

Federal Efforts to Respond to Nuclear and Radiological Threats and to 
Protect Key Emergency Response Facilities Could Be Strengthened: 

Statement of Gene Aloise, Director Natural Resources and Environment: 

GAO-08-285T: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-08-285T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on 
Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the 
District of Columbia, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 
Affairs, U.S. Senate. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

The Department of Energy (DOE) maintains emergency response 
capabilities and assets to quickly respond to potential nuclear and 
radiological threats in the United States. These capabilities are 
primarily found at DOE’s two key emergency response facilities—the 
Remote Sensing Laboratories at Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada, and 
Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland. These capabilities took on increased 
significance after the attacks of September 11, 2001, because of 
heightened concern that terrorists may try to detonate a nuclear or 
radiological device in a major U.S. city. DOE is not the only federal 
agency responsible for addressing nuclear and radiological threats. The 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is responsible for preparing the 
country to prevent and respond to a potential nuclear or radiological 
attack. 

This testimony discusses (1) the benefits of using DOE’s aerial 
background radiation surveys to enhance emergency response capabilities 
and (2) the physical security measures in place at DOE’s two key 
emergency response facilities and whether they are consistent with DOE 
guidance. It is based on GAO’s report on DOE’s nuclear and radiological 
emergency response capabilities, issued in September 2006 (Combating 
Nuclear Terrorism: Federal Efforts to Respond to Nuclear and 
Radiological Threats and to Protect Emergency Response Capabilities 
Could be Strengthened [Washington, D.C.: Sept. 21, 2006]). 

What GAO Found: 

DOE has unique capabilities and assets to prevent and respond to a 
nuclear or radiological attack in the United States. One of these 
unique capabilities is the ability to conduct aerial background 
radiation surveys. These surveys can be used to compare changes in 
radiation levels to (1) help detect radiological threats in U.S. cities 
more quickly and (2) measure contamination levels after a radiological 
attack to assist in and reduce the costs of cleanup efforts. Despite 
the benefits, only one major city has been surveyed. Neither DOE nor 
DHS has mission responsibility for conducting these surveys. DOE and 
DHS disagree about which department is responsible for informing cities 
about the surveys, and funding and conducting surveys if cities request 
them. In the absence of clear mission responsibility, DOE and DHS have 
not informed cities about the surveys and have not conducted any 
additional surveys. 

DOE’s two Remote Sensing Laboratories are protected at the lowest level 
of physical security allowed by DOE guidance because, according to DOE, 
capabilities and assets to prevent and respond to nuclear and 
radiological emergencies have been dispersed across the country and are 
not concentrated at the laboratories. However, we found a number of 
critical capabilities and assets that exist only at the Remote Sensing 
Laboratories and whose loss would significantly hamper DOE’s ability to 
quickly prevent and respond to a nuclear or radiological emergency. 
These capabilities include the most highly trained teams for minimizing 
the consequences of a nuclear or radiological attack and the only 
helicopters and planes than can readily help locate nuclear or 
radiological devices or measure contamination levels after a 
radiological attack. Because these capabilities and assets have not 
been fully dispersed, current physical security measures may not be 
sufficient for protecting the facilities against a terrorist attack. 

Figure: DOE Helicopter Conducting an Aerial Background Radiation 
Survey: 

This figure is a picture of a DOE helicopter flying over the US 
Capitol. 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: DOE. 

[End of figure] 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
[hyperlink, http://www.GAO-08-285T]. For more information, contact Gene 
Aloise at (202) 512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

I am pleased to be here today to discuss the Department of Energy's 
(DOE) use of aerial background radiation surveys, and physical security 
measures at DOE's two key emergency response facilities. DOE has long 
maintained an emergency response capability to quickly respond to 
potential nuclear and radiological threats in the United States. This 
capability took on increased significance after the attacks of 
September 11, 2001, because of heightened concern that terrorists may 
try to smuggle nuclear or radiological materials into the United States 
and detonate a nuclear or a radiological dispersal device, otherwise 
known as a dirty bomb, in a major U.S. city. Detonating either type of 
device would have serious consequences for our national and economic 
interests, including potentially causing numerous deaths and 
undermining citizens' confidence in the government's ability to protect 
the homeland. 

To respond to such threats, DOE has developed the technical expertise 
to search for and locate potential nuclear and radiological threats in 
U.S. cities and also to help minimize the consequences of a 
radiological incident by, among other things, measuring the extent of 
contamination. One of DOE's unique capabilities is the ability to 
conduct aerial background radiation surveys. Helicopters or planes 
equipped with radiation detectors fly over an area and collect 
information on existing background radiation sources, such as granite 
statues in a city or medical isotopes located at hospitals. This 
exercise can help DOE establish baseline radiation levels against which 
future radiation levels can be compared in order to more easily detect 
new radiation sources that may pose a security or public health threat. 

After September 11, 2001, DOE began dispersing its emergency response 
capabilities across the country. However, a number of critical 
capabilities and assets are primarily concentrated at two key 
facilities, known as Remote Sensing Laboratories, located at Nellis Air 
Force Base, Nevada, and Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland. These two 
facilities house, among other things, specialized search teams that 
locate and identify nuclear and radiological devices; planes and 
helicopters used to measure contamination; and research and development 
laboratories that design specialized equipment. DOE requires that these 
facilities be adequately protected with security measures to defend 
against potential terrorist attacks.[Footnote 1] 

DOE is not the only federal agency responsible for detecting nuclear 
and radiological materials. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
has a Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) that is responsible for 
developing, testing, and deploying radiation detection equipment to 
detect and prevent the smuggling of nuclear and radiological materials 
at U.S. points of entry, such as seaports and border crossings. DNDO is 
also responsible for helping state and local governments improve their 
capability to detect and identify illicit nuclear and radiological 
materials. DHS also provides grants to state and local governments to 
help them better prepare and respond to a potential terrorist attack. 
DHS has provided $11.6 billion in grants to state and local governments 
in the last 6 fiscal years--from fiscal years 2002 to 2007. If DHS 
cannot prevent the smuggling of nuclear or radiological materials into 
the United States, it relies on DOE's emergency response capabilities 
to search for and locate the materials. 

For this testimony, you asked us to discuss (1) the benefits of using 
DOE's two key emergency response facilities and whether they are 
consistent with DOE guidance and (2) the physical security measures in 
place at DOE's two key emergency response facilities and whether they 
are consistent with DOE guidance. My remarks will focus on our 
September 2006 report on DOE's nuclear and radiological emergency 
response efforts.[Footnote 2] To update this information, we also 
collected documentation and interviewed officials from DOE's Office of 
Emergency Response, DHS's Domestic Nuclear Detection Office, DOE's 
Remote Sensing Laboratory at Nellis Air Force Base, and the Counter 
Terrorism Bureau of the New York City Police Department. We conducted 
our work in November 2007 in accordance with generally accepted 
government auditing standards. 

Summary: 

There are significant benefits to conducting aerial background 
radiation surveys of U.S. cities. Specifically, the surveys can be used 
to compare changes in radiation levels to (1) help detect radiological 
threats in U.S. cities more quickly and (2) measure contamination 
levels after a radiological attack to assist in and reduce the costs of 
cleanup efforts. Despite the benefits, there has been only one survey 
of a major U.S. city because neither DOE nor DHS has mission 
responsibility for conducting the surveys. In the event of a dirty-bomb 
threat, if a city had a completed survey, DOE could then conduct a new 
survey and compare baseline radiation data from the previous survey to 
identify locations with new sources of radiation. Focusing their 
attention on these new locations, law enforcement officials may be able 
to locate a nuclear or radiological device more quickly. In addition, 
using baseline information from a prior survey, DOE could assess 
contamination levels after a radiological attack to assist cleanup 
efforts. DOE officials estimated that information from the surveys 
could save millions of dollars in cleanup costs because cleanup efforts 
could be targeted to decontaminating buildings and other areas up to 
pre-existing levels of radiation rather than fully removing all traces 
of radiation. Without baseline information from the surveys, law 
enforcement officials may lose valuable time investigating pre-existing 
sources of radiation that do not pose a threat, and the time and cost 
of cleanup after an attack may increase significantly. DOE officials 
explained that surveys do have some limitations, noting that it is 
difficult to detect certain nuclear or well-shielded radiological 
materials. Weather conditions and the type of building being surveyed 
may also limit the ability to detect nuclear and radiological devices. 

Nevertheless, in 2005, the New York City Police Department (NYPD) asked 
DOE to conduct a survey of the New York City metro area. The cost of 
the survey--about $800,000--was funded through DHS grants. NYPD 
officials indicated that the survey was tremendously valuable because 
it identified more than 80 locations with radiological sources that 
required further investigation to determine their risk. In addition to 
identifying potential terrorist threats, NYPD officials told us a 
secondary benefit of the survey was identifying threats to public 
health. While investigating the 80 locations, they found an old 
industrial site contaminated with radium--a radiological material 
linked to diseases such as bone cancer--and used this information to 
close the area and protect the public. Despite these benefits, neither 
DOE nor DHS has embraced mission responsibility for funding and 
conducting surveys or notifying city officials that such a capability 
exists. DOE officials told us they are reluctant to conduct additional 
surveys because they have a limited number of helicopters, and these 
are needed for emergency response functions, and because it is DHS's 
mission to protect cities from potential terrorist attacks. DHS 
officials disagreed with DOE, stating they do not have the expertise or 
capability to conduct surveys. However, DHS does have a program to help 
state and local governments detect illicit nuclear and radiological 
materials, and in fiscal year 2007, made available approximately $1.7 
billion in grant funding to state and local governments for terrorism 
preparedness. In the absence of clear mission responsibility, DOE and 
DHS have not conducted additional surveys, in part, because DOE and DHS 
are not informing cities about the benefits of these surveys. 

DOE's two Remote Sensing Laboratories, which house a number of unique 
emergency response capabilities and assets, are protected at the lowest 
level of physical security allowed by DOE guidance because, according 
to DOE, emergency response capabilities and assets have been dispersed 
across the country and are not concentrated at the laboratories. Under 
DOE policy guidance for safeguarding and securing facilities issued in 
November 2005, DOE facilities can be protected at the lowest level of 
physical security if their capabilities and assets exist at other 
locations and can be easily and quickly reconstituted. However, we 
found that there are a number of critical capabilities and assets that 
are available only at the Remote Sensing Laboratories and their loss 
would significantly hamper DOE's ability to quickly prevent or respond 
to a nuclear or radiological emergency. These capabilities and assets 
include the most highly trained teams to help manage and minimize the 
consequences of a nuclear or radiological attack and the only 
helicopters and planes that can readily help locate nuclear or 
radiological devices and measure contamination levels after a 
radiological attack. Since these capabilities and assets have not been 
fully dispersed, current physical security measures may not be 
sufficient to protect the facilities against a terrorist attack. Under 
DOE's physical security guidance, a facility in the lowest level of 
physical security can meet the requirements by having walls and doors 
but no other physical security measures. For example, the Remote 
Sensing Laboratory at Andrews Air Force Base does not have a fence, 
vehicle barriers, or any other protective measures around the building, 
but DOE has determined that it meets physical security requirements. 
Furthermore, while the laboratories' location on Air Force bases may 
appear to provide an additional level of security, access onto Nellis 
and Andrews Air Force Bases is not strictly limited, and anyone with 
federal government identification may gain entry. In fact, GAO staff 
gained access to the bases multiple times with little or no scrutiny of 
their identification. Security officials told us that the laboratories 
are not designed to withstand certain types of terrorist attacks. 
However, officials have not taken any steps to strengthen security 
because of DOE's assumption that their capabilities and assets are 
fully dispersed. Furthermore, DOE has not developed contingency plans 
that would identify capabilities and assets that would be used in the 
event that one or both Remote Sensing Laboratories were attacked. 

Background: 

DOE's predecessor, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), established a 
program to prevent and respond to nuclear or radiological emergencies 
in 1974 after an extortionist threatened to detonate a nuclear device 
in Boston unless he received $200,000.[Footnote 3] Even though the 
threat turned out to be a hoax, AEC recognized that it lacked the 
capability to quickly respond to a nuclear or radiological incident. To 
address this deficiency, AEC established the Nuclear Emergency Search 
Team (NEST) to provide technical assistance to the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) and the Department of State, which is the lead 
federal agency for terrorism response outside the United States. Under 
the Atomic Energy Act, the FBI is responsible for investigating illegal 
activities involving the use of nuclear materials within the United 
States, including terrorist threats. The NEST program was designed to 
assist the FBI in searching for, identifying, and deactivating nuclear 
and radiological devices. However, the deployments of search teams were 
large scale and often slow because they were designed to respond to 
threats, such as extortion, when there was time to find the device. 

With the threat of nuclear terrorism and the events of September 11, 
2001, DOE's capabilities have evolved to more rapidly respond to 
nuclear and radiological threats. While NEST activities to prevent 
terrorists from detonating a nuclear or radiological device remain the 
core mission, DOE's emergency response activities have expanded to 
include actions to minimize the consequences of a nuclear or 
radiological incident. For example, DOE maintains an aerial capability 
to detect, measure, and track radioactive material to determine 
contamination levels at the site of an emergency. DOE has used this 
capability to conduct background radiation surveys of most nuclear 
power plants in the country for the Environmental Protection Agency and 
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. In the event of an accident at a 
nuclear power plant, a new radiation survey could be performed to help 
determine the location and amount of contamination. 

Currently, about 950 scientists, engineers, and technicians from the 
national laboratories and the Remote Sensing Laboratories are dedicated 
to preventing and responding to a nuclear or radiological threat. In 
fiscal year 2006, DOE had a budget of about $100 million for emergency 
response activities. Under the National Nuclear Security Administration 
(NNSA), the Office of Emergency Response manages DOE's efforts to 
prevent and respond to nuclear or radiological emergencies. 

In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, there is heightened concern 
that terrorists may try to smuggle nuclear or radiological materials 
into the United States. These materials could be used to produce either 
an improvised nuclear device or a radiological dispersal device, known 
as a dirty bomb. An improvised nuclear device is a crude nuclear bomb 
made with highly enriched uranium or plutonium. Nonproliferation 
experts estimate that a successful improvised nuclear device could have 
yields in the 10 to 20 kiloton range (the equivalent to 10,000 to 
20,000 tons of TNT). A 20-kiloton yield would be the equivalent of the 
yield of the bomb that destroyed Nagasaki and could devastate the heart 
of a medium-size U.S. city and result in thousands of casualties and 
radiation contamination over a wider area. 

A dirty bomb combines conventional explosives, such as dynamite, with 
radioactive material,[Footnote 4] using explosive force to disperse the 
radioactive material over a large area, such as multiple city blocks. 
The extent of contamination would depend on a number of factors, 
including the size of the explosive, the amount and type of radioactive 
material used, and weather conditions. While much less destructive than 
an improvised nuclear device, the dispersed radioactive material could 
cause radiation sickness for people nearby and produce serious economic 
costs and psychological and social disruption associated with the 
evacuation and subsequent cleanup of the contaminated areas. While no 
terrorists have detonated a dirty bomb in a city, Chechen separatists 
placed a canister containing cesium-137 in a Moscow park in the mid- 
1990s. Although the device was not detonated and no radioactive 
material was dispersed, the incident demonstrated that terrorists have 
the capability and willingness to use radiological materials as weapons 
of terrorism. 

Despite the Benefits of Conducting Aerial Background Radiation Surveys, 
They Remain Underutilized Because Neither DOE nor DHS Has Mission 
Responsibility for Funding and Conducting Them: 

There are significant benefits to conducting aerial background 
radiation surveys of U.S. cities. Once surveys are complete, they can 
later be used to compare changes in radiation levels to (1) help detect 
radiological threats in U.S. cities more quickly and (2) measure 
radiation levels after a radiological attack to assist in and reduce 
the costs of cleanup efforts. Despite the benefits, only one major U.S. 
city has been surveyed. Since neither DOE nor DHS has mission 
responsibility for funding and conducting surveys, they have not 
conducted additional surveys nor informed cities about their benefits. 

Completing Baseline Aerial Surveys Can Later Help to Detect 
Radiological Threats in U.S. Cities and Measure Radiation Levels in the 
Event of a Radiological Attack: 

DOE can conduct aerial background radiation surveys to record the 
location of radiation sources and produce maps showing existing 
radiation levels within U.S. cities. Background radiation can come from 
a variety of sources, such as rock quarries, granite found in 
buildings, statues, or cemeteries; medical isotopes used at hospitals; 
and areas treated with high amounts of fertilizer, such as golf 
courses. DOE uses helicopters mounted with external radiation detectors 
and equipped with a global position system to fly over an area and 
gather data in a systematic grid pattern. Figure 1 illustrates a 
helicopter conducting an aerial survey and collecting information on 
radiation sources in a city. 

Figure 1: Illustration of a Helicopter Conducting an Aerial Background 
Radiation Survey: 

This figure is an illustration of a helicopter conducting an aerial 
background radiation survey. 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO. 

[End of figure] 

Onboard computers record radiation levels and the position of the 
helicopter. This initial, or baseline, survey allows DOE technicians 
and scientists to produce maps of a city showing the locations of high 
radiation concentrations, also known as "hot spots." DOE uses 
helicopters rather than airplanes because their lower altitude and 
lower speed permit a more precise reading. While conducting the 
baseline survey, DOE ground teams and law enforcement officials can 
investigate these hot spots to determine whether the source of 
radiation is used for industrial, medical or other routine purposes. 
DOE officials told us that this baseline information would be 
beneficial for all major cities because law enforcement officials could 
immediately investigate any potentially dangerous nuclear or 
radiological source and DOE could later use the data in the event of an 
emergency to find a device more quickly or assist in cleanup efforts. 
For example, in 2002, DOE conducted a survey of the National Mall in 
Washington, D.C., just prior to July Fourth celebrations. Law 
enforcement officials used the survey to investigate unusual radiation 
sources and ensure the Mall area was safe for the public. 

Data from the baseline survey would help DOE and law enforcement detect 
new radiological threats more quickly. In the event of a dirty-bomb 
threat, DOE could conduct a new, or follow-up, survey and compare that 
radiation data to the baseline survey data to identify locations with 
new sources of radiation. Law enforcement officials looking for a 
nuclear or radiological device would focus their attention on these new 
locations and might be able to distinguish between pre-existing sources 
and potential threats in order to locate a dirty bomb or nuclear device 
more quickly. Conducting baseline surveys also provides a training 
opportunity for DOE personnel. DOE officials told us that regular 
deployments helped to keep job performance standards high for pilots, 
field detection specialists, and the technicians who analyze the data. 

DOE can also use a baseline radiation survey to assess changes in 
radiation levels after a radiological attack to assist with cleanup 
efforts. A follow-up survey could be taken afterward to compare changes 
against the baseline radiation levels. This information can be used to 
determine which areas need to be cleaned and to what levels. In 2004, 
DOD funded a survey of the area around the Pentagon in Northern 
Virginia in order to assist with cleanup efforts in case of nuclear or 
radiological attack. While no study has reliably determined the cleanup 
costs of a dirty-bomb explosion in an urban area, DOE estimates that 
cleaning up after the detonation of a small to medium-size radiological 
device may cost tens or even hundreds of millions of dollars. DOE 
officials estimated that information from background radiation surveys 
could save several million dollars in cleanup costs because cleanup 
efforts could be focused on decontaminating buildings and other areas 
to pre-existing levels of radiation. Without a baseline radiation 
survey, cleanup crews would not know the extent to which they would 
have to decontaminate the area. Efforts to completely clean areas with 
levels of pre-existing radiation, such as granite buildings or 
hospitals, would be wasteful and expensive. 

DOE officials cautioned that background radiation surveys have 
limitations and cannot be relied upon to detect all nuclear or 
radiological devices. Aerial surveys may not be able to detect certain 
nuclear or well-shielded radiological materials. Weather conditions and 
the type of building being surveyed may also reduce the effectiveness 
of detection systems. Furthermore, DOE may have to rely on good 
intelligence to find a device. Law enforcement officials would need 
intelligence information to narrow the search to a specific part of a 
city. Lastly, according to DOE officials, baseline background radiation 
surveys may need to be conducted periodically because radiation sources 
may change over time, especially in urban areas. For example, new 
construction using granite, the installation of medical equipment, or 
the heavy use of fertilizer all could change a city's radiation 
background. Despite these limitations, without baseline survey 
information, law enforcement officials may lose valuable time when 
searching for nuclear or radiological threats by investigating pre- 
existing sources of radiation that are not harmful. In addition, if 
there were a nuclear or radiological attack, a lack of baseline 
radiological data would likely make the cleanup more costly and time 
consuming. 

DOE Has Conducted a Survey of Only One Major City: 

In 2005, the New York City Police Department (NYPD) asked DOE to survey 
the New York City metro area. NYPD officials were aware that DOE had 
the capability to measure background radiation and locate hot spots by 
helicopter because DOE had used this capability at the World Trade 
Center site in the days following September 11, 2001. DHS provided the 
city with about $30 million in grant money to develop a regional 
radiological detection and monitoring system. NYPD decided to spend 
part of this money on a complete aerial survey of all five boroughs. 
DOE conducted the survey in about 4 weeks in the summer of 2005, 
requiring over 100 flight hours to complete at a cost of about 
$800,000. 

According to NYPD officials, the aerial background radiation survey 
exceeded their expectations, and they cited a number of significant 
benefits that may help them better respond to a radiological incident. 
First, NYPD officials said that in the course of conducting the survey, 
they identified over 80 locations with unexplained radiological 
sources. Teams of NYPD officers accompanied by DOE scientists and 
technicians investigated each of these hot spots and determined whether 
they posed a danger to the public. While most of these hot spots were 
medical isotopes located at medical facilities and hospitals, according 
to NYPD officials, awareness of these locations will allow them to 
distinguish false alarms from real radiological threats and locate a 
radiological device more quickly. Second, NYPD officers are now trained 
in investigating hot spots and they have real-life experience in 
locating radiological sources. Third, NYPD officials now have a 
baseline radiological survey of the city to assist with cleanup efforts 
in the event of a radiological release. 

In addition to identifying potential terrorist threats, a secondary 
benefit of the survey was identifying threats to public health. One of 
the over 80 locations with a radiological signature was a local park 
that was once the site of an industrial plant. According to NYPD 
officials, the survey disclosed that the soil there was contaminated by 
large quantities of radium.[Footnote 5] Brush fires in the area posed 
an imminent threat to public health because traditional fire mitigation 
tactics of pushing flammable debris into the middle of the park could 
release radiological contamination into the air. Investigating 
locations with unexplained radiological sources identified by the 
aerial background radiation survey alerted NYPD officials to this 
threat, and they were able to prevent public exposure to the material. 

Because the extent to which the background radiation of a city changes 
over time is not clear, NYPD officials have requested that DHS provide 
money to fund a survey every year. With periodic surveys, NYPD hopes to 
get a better understanding of how and to what extent background 
radiation changes over time. NYPD officials also want to continue 
identifying radiological sources in the city and to provide relevant 
training to their officers. 

Despite the Benefits, Neither DOE nor DHS Has Mission Responsibility 
for Aerial Background Radiation Surveys, Which Has Discouraged Both 
Agencies from Developing a Strategy to Inform Cities about the Surveys: 

Despite the benefits of aerial background radiation surveys, neither 
DOE nor DHS has embraced mission responsibility for funding and 
conducting surveys. While DOE and DHS have taken some steps toward 
making greater use of aerial surveys, they still have not developed a 
strategy to notify city officials that such a capability exists, 
explained the benefits and limitations of aerial surveys, and 
determined how to pay for the surveys. According to DOE and DHS 
officials, New York City is the only city where a background radiation 
survey has been completed. 

As we reported in September 2006, we found that neither DOE nor DHS was 
notifying city officials of the potential benefits of aerial surveys or 
of the availability of such a capability. In addition, neither 
department had evaluated the costs, benefits, or limitations of the 
aerial surveys to help cities decide whether to request a survey. As a 
result, we recommended that DOE and DHS conduct such an evaluation. 
After completing this evaluation, we then recommended that DOE and DHS 
develop a strategy to notify state and local government officials about 
the benefits and limitations of the surveys so government officials 
could decide whether they would benefit from the surveys. According to 
DOE officials, in April 2007, DOE began meeting with DHS to conduct the 
evaluation and the departments are drafting a document that would 
describe the benefits and limitations. They plan to distribute this 
document to state and local governments to inform them about the 
surveys. However, the departments have no specific timeframe for 
completing this document. In addition, DOE and DHS notified one city-- 
Chicago--about the benefits of the surveys since we issued our report. 
DOE and DHS are working with the Chicago Police Department to install 
radiation detection equipment on planes or helicopters owned by the 
Chicago Police Department to conduct aerial background radiation 
surveys. DOE officials told us that this approach may be less costly 
and state and local governments may be able respond more quickly to an 
emergency by using their own aircraft. If this approach is successful, 
DOE officials told us they would recommend that other cities also 
purchase and install radiation detection equipment on their own 
aircraft. However, DOE officials did not provide a timeframe for 
completing this project. 

DOE officials told us that the department is reluctant to conduct large 
numbers of additional surveys if cities request them because they have 
a limited number of helicopters, and these are needed to prevent and 
respond to nuclear and radiological emergencies. Furthermore, they 
assert that DOE does not have sufficient funding to conduct aerial 
background radiation surveys. In fiscal year 2006, the emergency 
response budget for aerial radiation detection was approximately $11 
million for costs such as aircraft maintenance, personnel, fuel, and 
detection equipment. DOE relies on federal agencies and cities to 
reimburse them for the costs of surveys. However, even if DHS funded 
cities to pay for surveys, as it did in New York's case, DOE officials 
stated that payment would need to include costs associated with the 
wear and tear on the helicopters. Furthermore, the extra costs could 
not be completely recovered by increasing the charges to the city 
because, according to DOE officials, DOE cannot accumulate money from 
year to year to pay for future lump-sum repairs. In addition, DOE 
officials view background radiation surveys as part of the homeland 
security mission to prepare state and local officials against terrorist 
attacks, not as part of DOE's emergency response mission. However, DOE 
officials told us that because they possess the assets and expertise, 
they would be willing to conduct additional surveys if DHS funded the 
full cost of the surveys and covered the wear and tear on DOE's 
equipment. 

DHS officials told us that it is not DHS's responsibility to conduct 
aerial background radiation surveys or to develop such a capability. 
According to DNDO, it does not have the expertise or capability to 
conduct surveys, which are DOE's responsibility. However, DNDO is 
responsible for assisting state and local governments' efforts to 
detect and identify illicit nuclear and radiological materials, develop 
mobile detection systems, and advise cities about different radiation 
detection technology to help state and local officials decide which 
technologies would be most beneficial. DNDO does not plan to conduct 
background surveys as part of this effort, but it plans to work with 
DOE to advise cities and states on the potential benefits of background 
surveys. 

DHS also has a grant program to improve the capacity of state and local 
governments to prevent and respond to terrorist and catastrophic 
events, including nuclear and radiological attacks. In fiscal year 
2007, about $1.7 billion was available in grant funding for state and 
local governments. DHS officials told us that this grant funding could 
be used for radiation surveys if cities requested them. However, 
according to DHS officials, the agency has not received any requests 
for funding other than the 2005 request by New York City. While it is 
DHS's responsibility to inform state and local governments about 
radiation detection technology, it has neither an outreach effort nor 
does it maintain a central database for informing cities and states 
about background radiation surveys. Instead, DHS maintains a lessons- 
learned information-sharing database, which is a national online 
network of best practices and lessons learned to help plan and prepare 
for a terrorist attack. State and local governments can enter 
information into this database, and DHS officials told us they were not 
aware if New York City officials had done so. 

More than a year after we issued our report, the status on background 
radiation surveys remains largely unchanged. In short, in the absence 
of clear mission responsibility, neither DOE nor DHS has any plans to 
conduct additional surveys. In addition, no other city has requested 
one, in part, because DOE and DHS have informed only one city--Chicago-
-about the benefits of these surveys. 

DOE's Current Physical Security Measures May Not Be Sufficient to 
Protect Its Key Emergency Response Facilities: 

DOE's two Remote Sensing Laboratories are protected at the lowest level 
of physical security allowed by DOE guidance because, according to DOE, 
their emergency response capabilities and assets have been dispersed 
across the country and are not concentrated at the laboratories. 
However, we found a number of critical emergency response capabilities 
and assets are available only at the Remote Sensing Laboratories and 
whose loss would significantly hamper DOE's ability to quickly respond 
to a nuclear or radiological threat. Because these capabilities and 
assets have not been fully dispersed, current physical security 
measures may not be sufficient for protecting the facilities against a 
terrorist attack. 

DOE Is Protecting Its Key Emergency Response Facilities with the Lowest 
Level of Physical Security Measures Allowed under Its Guidance Because 
Some Capabilities and Assets Have Been Dispersed: 

DOE is protecting its two Remote Sensing Laboratories at the lowest 
level of physical security allowed under DOE guidance. According to DOE 
officials, the lowest level of security is adequate because emergency 
response assets and capabilities have been dispersed across the country 
and are no longer concentrated at these facilities. DOE's November 2005 
policy guidance for safeguarding and securing facilities required a 
review of facilities protected at the lowest level of physical security 
to determine whether they were "mission critical." Mission-critical 
facilities have capabilities and assets that are not available at any 
other location and cannot be easily and quickly reconstituted. Under 
DOE guidance, facilities designated as mission critical must be 
protected at a higher level of physical security. For example, DOE 
headquarters was designated as mission critical because the loss of 
decision makers during an emergency would impair the deployment and 
coordination of DOE resources. As a result, DOE strengthened the 
physical security measures around DOE headquarters by, among other 
things, adding vehicle barriers around the facility. 

In April 2006, the Office of Emergency Response reviewed the 
capabilities and assets at the Remote Sensing Laboratories and 
determined that they were not mission critical because if either one or 
both laboratories were attacked and destroyed, DOE would be able to 
easily reconstitute their capabilities and assets to meet mission 
requirements. Since September 11, 2001, DOE has dispersed some of the 
assets and capabilities once found exclusively at the Remote Sensing 
Laboratories. Specifically, DOE has expanded its search mission to 
include Radiological Assistance Program (RAP) teams that are located at 
eight sites across the country. These teams receive training and 
equipment similar to the search teams at the Remote Sensing 
Laboratories, such as radiation detectors mounted in backpacks and 
vehicles. They have also participated in a number of search missions, 
including addressing potential threats at sporting events and national 
political conventions, or assisting customs officials with 
investigating cargo entering ports and border crossings. 

DOE Has Not Fully Dispersed the Capabilities and Assets at The Two 
Facilities, and Their Loss Would Significantly Hamper DOE's Ability to 
Respond to Nuclear and Radiological Threats: 

Contrary to DOE's assessment that the Remote Sensing Laboratories' 
capabilities and assets have been fully dispersed to other parts of the 
country, we found that the laboratories housed a number of unique 
emergency response capabilities and assets whose loss would 
significantly undermine DOE's ability to respond to a nuclear or 
radiological threat. The critical capabilities and assets that exist 
only at the laboratories include (1) teams that help minimize the 
consequences of a nuclear or radiological attack, (2) planes and 
helicopters designed to measure contamination levels and assist search 
teams in locating nuclear or radiological devices, and (3) a 
sophisticated mapping system that tracks contamination and the location 
of radiological sources in U.S. cities. Furthermore, while the RAP 
teams have assumed a greater role in searching for nuclear or 
radiological devices, the teams at the Remote Sensing Laboratories 
remain the most highly trained and experienced search teams. 

The consequence management teams that would respond within the first 24 
hours of a nuclear or radiological attack are located at the Remote 
Sensing Laboratory at Nellis Air Force Base. These teams have 
specialized equipment for monitoring and assessing the type, amount, 
and extent of contamination. These teams are responsible for 
establishing an operations center near the site of contamination to 
coordinate all of DOE's radiological monitoring and assessment 
activities and to analyze information coming from the field, including 
aerial survey data provided by helicopters, planes, and ground teams 
monitoring radiation levels. 

At these two laboratories, the teams also have specialized equipment-- 
emergency response planes and helicopters--that are designed to detect, 
measure, and track radioactive material at the site of a nuclear or 
radiological release to determine contamination levels. DOE has a 
limited number of planes and helicopters designed for this mission at 
the Remote Sensing Laboratories. The planes and helicopters use a 
sophisticated radiation detection system to gather radiological 
information and produce maps of radiation exposure and concentrations. 
It is anticipated that the planes would arrive at an emergency scene 
first and be used to determine the location and extent of ground 
contamination. The helicopters would then be used to perform more 
detailed surveys of any contamination. According to DOE officials, the 
planes and helicopters can gather information on a wide area, in a 
shorter amount of time, without placing ground teams at risk. Without 
this capability, DOE could not quickly obtain comprehensive information 
about the extent of contamination. The helicopters can also be used by 
search teams to locate nuclear or radiological devices in U.S. cities. 
The helicopters can cover a larger area in a shorter amount of time 
than teams on foot or in vehicles. The ground search teams can conduct 
secondary inspections of locations with unusual radiation levels 
identified by the helicopters. 

The Remote Sensing Laboratory at Nellis Air Force Base also maintains a 
sophisticated mapping system that can be used by consequence management 
teams to track contamination in U.S. cities after a nuclear or 
radiological attack. DOE collects information from its planes and 
helicopters, ground monitoring teams, and computer modeling and uses 
this system to provide detailed maps of the extent and level of 
contamination in a city. Without this system, DOE would not be able to 
quickly analyze the information collected by various emergency response 
capabilities and determine how to respond most effectively to a nuclear 
or radiological attack. This mapping system can also be used to help 
find nuclear or radiological devices more quickly before they are 
detonated. 

DOE officials told us the loss of these capabilities and assets that 
are unique to the Remote Sensing Laboratories would devastate DOE's 
ability to respond to a nuclear or radiological attack. State and local 
governments would not receive information--such as the location and 
extent of contamination--that they need in a timely manner in order to 
manage the consequences of an attack and reduce the harm to public 
health and property. Despite the importance of these capabilities and 
assets, DOE has not developed contingency plans identifying 
capabilities and assets at other locations that could be used in the 
event that one or both Remote Sensing Laboratories were attacked. 
Specifically, DOE has not identified which RAP team would assume 
responsibility for coordinating contamination monitoring and assessment 
activities in the place of the consequence management teams from 
Nellis. During an emergency, the lack of clearly defined roles may 
hamper emergency response efforts. 

DOE officials told us that in the event that the capabilities and 
assets of both Remote Sensing Laboratories were destroyed, they could 
mobilize and deploy personnel and equipment from the RAP teams or 
national laboratories. The RAP teams and some national laboratories, 
such as Sandia, have similar equipment that could be used to measure 
contamination in a limited area. However, if both Remote Sensing 
Laboratories were destroyed, the RAP teams and the national 
laboratories would not have planes and helicopters to conduct large- 
scale contamination monitoring and assessment. The RAP teams also do 
not have the equipment or expertise to set up an operations center and 
analyze data that field teams would collect on contamination levels. In 
April 2006, DOE's Office of Independent Oversight, which is responsible 
for independently evaluating, among other things, the effectiveness of 
DOE's programs, reported that during performance tests, the RAP teams 
could not quickly provide state and local governments with 
recommendations on what actions to take to avoid or reduce the public's 
exposure to radiation and whether to evacuate contaminated 
areas.[Footnote 6] In addition, DOE officials told us, based on 
training exercises, the demands of responding to two simultaneous 
nuclear or radiological events strained all of DOE's capabilities to 
manage the consequences. According to DOE officials, if the consequence 
management teams at Nellis could not respond and there were multiple, 
simultaneous attacks, DOE's capabilities to minimize the impact of a 
nuclear or radiological attack would be significantly hampered. 

DOE officials also told us that if Nellis Air Force Base were attacked, 
their aerial contamination measuring assets would not be lost unless 
the aircraft at Andrews Air Force Base were also destroyed. However, 
DOE policy generally requires that some of its aerial assets stationed 
at Andrews remain in the Washington, D.C., area to protect top 
government decision makers and other key government assets. During a 
nuclear or radiological emergency, DOE would need to rely on a limited 
airborne capability to measure contamination levels. In addition, if 
there were multiple simultaneous events, there would be considerable 
delay in providing information to state and local governments about the 
extent of contamination because DOE could assist only one city at a 
time. 

Some DOE officials suggested that if DOE helicopters were not available 
to provide assistance, DOE could request another helicopter and fit it 
with radiation detectors. However, during an emergency, we found that 
DOE would face a number of challenges in equipping a helicopter not 
designed for measuring contamination. DOE officials told us that DOE 
has a memorandum of understanding with the Department of Defense and 
other federal and state agencies to use their helicopters and planes 
for transport and other mission requirements, but that it is unlikely 
that DOD or any other agency would provide them with aircraft during an 
emergency because those agencies' priority would be to carry out their 
own missions, not to assist DOE. Even if DOE were provided with 
helicopters, it does not have spare radiation detectors like those 
found on its own helicopters, and even if it did have spares, it would 
not have time to mount radiation detectors on the exterior of the 
aircraft. DOE officials told us that radiation detectors, like those 
found on their vehicles, could be placed inside an airplane or 
helicopter, but the ability to measure contamination would be 
significantly reduced compared with an exterior-mounted detector. 

Furthermore, DOE does not conduct training exercises to simulate the 
actions necessary to reconstitute the capabilities and assets unique to 
the Remote Sensing Laboratories, such as placing radiation detectors on 
helicopters or testing the ability of RAP teams to conduct large-scale 
contamination monitoring and assessment without the assistance of the 
consequence management teams from Nellis. DOE officials told us that 
all of their training scenarios and exercises involve the use of 
consequence management teams and the planes and helicopters from the 
Remote Sensing Laboratories. As a result, DOE does not know whether it 
would be able to accomplish mission objectives without the capabilities 
and assets of the Remote Sensing Laboratories. 

Lastly, while the RAP teams have assumed a greater role in searching 
for nuclear or radiological devices, Remote Sensing Laboratories have 
the most highly trained and experienced search teams. For example, the 
search teams at the Remote Sensing Laboratories are the only teams 
trained to conduct physically demanding maritime searches to locate 
potential nuclear or radiological devices at sea before they arrive at 
a U.S. port. The search teams can also repair radiation equipment for 
search missions in the field. Furthermore, these search teams are more 
prepared than the RAP teams to enter environments where there is a 
threat of hazards other than those associated with radiological 
materials, such as explosives. If there is a threat of explosives in an 
area where a search mission would be conducted, these teams have 
specialized equipment to detect explosives and can more quickly request 
FBI ordnance disposal assistance in order to complete their search 
mission. In April 2006, the Office of Independent Oversight reported 
that the RAP teams did not always complete their search missions when 
there was a high level of risk to the lives of the RAP team members 
from explosives. The Office also reported that some RAP teams refused 
to perform the mission unless all risk from explosives around a device 
was removed and others completed the mission only after certain safety 
criteria were met. According to this study, leaders of the RAP teams 
had to make on-the-spot judgments weighing the safety of RAP team 
members against their ability to complete the search mission because 
there was a lack of guidance on how to respond. 

Because of these concerns, we recommended in September 2006 that DOE 
review the physical security measures at the Remote Sensing 
Laboratories and determine whether additional measures should be taken 
to protect the facilities against a loss of critical emergency response 
capabilities or whether it was more cost-effective to fully disperse 
its capabilities and assets to multiple areas of the country. Since we 
issued our report, DOE has not made any upgrades or other changes to 
security at the Remote Sensing Laboratories. In written comments 
responding to our recommendations, DOE concluded that it was not cost- 
effective to further disperse emergency response capabilities. In 
addition, DOE noted that it would not be making any changes to the 
security of the Remote Sensing Laboratories because the security 
measures were reviewed separately by the Associate Administrator for 
Emergency Response and the Associate Administrator for Defense Nuclear 
Security and they agreed that security measures were adequate. While 
DOE may have reviewed the physical security measures at the Remote 
Sensing Laboratories, it did not specifically address the security 
issues we raised. We continue to believe that these measures may not be 
sufficient to protect unique and critical emergency response 
capabilities at these facilities. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be pleased 
to respond to any questions you or other Members of the Subcommittee 
may have at this time. 

Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments: 

For future contacts regarding this testimony, please contact Gene 
Aloise at (202) 512-3841. Leland Cogliani, Omari Norman, Carol 
Herrnstadt Shulman, and Ned Woodward made key contributions to this 
testimony. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] DOE uses different levels of physical protection to secure its 
facilities. The levels of protection are specific to the type of 
security interests and the significance of the targets. They are 
provided in a graded fashion in accordance with potential risks. 

[2] GAO, Combating Nuclear Terrorism: Federal Efforts to Respond to 
Nuclear and Radiological Threats and to Protect Emergency Response 
Capabilities Could be Strengthened, GAO-06-1015 (Washington, D.C.: 
Sept. 21, 2006). 

[3] DOE was established in 1977. 

[4] Different types of radioactive material that could be used by 
terrorists for a dirty bomb include cesium-137, cobalt-60, plutonium- 
238, plutonium-239, and strontium-90. 

[5] According to the Environmental Protection Agency, long-term 
exposure to radium increases the risk of developing diseases such as 
lymphoma, bone cancer, and leukemia. 

[6] Department of Energy, Office of Security and Safety Performance 
Assurance, Independent Oversight Inspection of the Radiological 
Assistance Program (Washington, D.C., April 2006).

GAO's Mission: 

The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation, and 
investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting 
its constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance 
and accountability of the federal government for the American people. 
GAO examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and 
policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance 
to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding 
decisions. GAO's commitment to good government is reflected in its core 
values of accountability, integrity, and reliability. 

Obtaining Copies of GAO Reports and Testimony: 

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no 
cost is through GAO's Web site [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. Each 
weekday, GAO posts newly released reports, testimony, and 
correspondence on its Web site. To have GAO e-mail you a list of newly 
posted products every afternoon, go to [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov] 
and select "E-mail Updates." 

Order by Mail or Phone: 

The first copy of each printed report is free. Additional copies are $2 
each. A check or money order should be made out to the Superintendent 
of Documents. GAO also accepts VISA and Mastercard. Orders for 100 or 
more copies mailed to a single address are discounted 25 percent. 
Orders should be sent to: 

U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street NW, Room LM: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

To order by Phone: 
Voice: (202) 512-6000: 
TDD: (202) 512-2537: 
Fax: (202) 512-6061: 

To Report Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Federal Programs: 

Contact: 

Web site: [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm]: 
E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov: 
Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470: 

Congressional Relations: 

Gloria Jarmon, Managing Director, jarmong@gao.gov: 
(202) 512-4400: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street NW, Room 7125: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Public Affairs: 

Chuck Young, Managing Director, youngc1@gao.gov: 
(202) 512-4800: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street NW, Room 7149: 
Washington, DC 20548: