This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-08-110
entitled 'Terrorist Watch List Screening: Opportunities Exist to
Enhance Management Oversight, Reduce Vulnerabilities in Agency
Screening Processes, and Expand Use of the List' which was released on
October 24, 2007.
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Report to Congressional Requesters:
United States Government Accountability Office:
GAO:
October 2007:
Terrorist Watch List Screening:
Opportunities Exist to Enhance Management Oversight, Reduce
Vulnerabilities in Agency Screening Processes, and Expand Use of the
List:
Terrorist Watch List Encounter Management:
GAO-08-110:
GAO Highlights:
Highlights of GAO-08-110, a report to congressional requesters.
Why GAO Did This Study:
The Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) Terrorist Screening Center
(TSC) maintains a consolidated watch list of known or appropriately
suspected terrorists and sends records from the list to agencies to
support terrorism-related screening. Because the list is an important
tool for combating terrorism, GAO examined (1) standards for including
individuals on the list, (2) the outcomes of encounters with
individuals on the list, (3) potential vulnerabilities and efforts to
address them, and (4) actions taken to promote effective terrorism-
related screening.
To conduct this work, GAO reviewed documentation obtained from and
interviewed officials at TSC, the FBI, the National Counterterrorism
Center, the Department of Homeland Security, and other agencies that
perform terrorism-related screening.
What GAO Found:
The FBI and the intelligence community use standards of reasonableness
to evaluate individuals for nomination to the consolidated watch list.
In general, individuals who are reasonably suspected of having possible
links to terrorism—in addition to individuals with known links—are to
be nominated. As such, being on the list does not automatically
prohibit, for example, the issuance of a visa or entry into the United
States. Rather, when an individual on the list is encountered, agency
officials are to assess the threat the person poses to determine what
action to take, if any. As of May 2007, the consolidated watch list
contained approximately 755,000 records.
From December 2003 through May 2007, screening and law enforcement
agencies encountered individuals who were positively matched to watch
list records approximately 53,000 times. Many individuals were matched
multiple times. The outcomes of these encounters reflect an array of
actions, such as arrests; denials of entry into the United States; and,
most often, questioning and release. Within the federal community,
there is general agreement that the watch list has helped to combat
terrorism by (1) providing screening and law enforcement agencies with
information to help them respond appropriately during encounters and
(2) helping law enforcement and intelligence agencies track individuals
on the watch list and collect information about them for use in
conducting investigations and in assessing threats.
Regarding potential vulnerabilities, TSC sends records daily from the
watch list to screening agencies. However, some records are not sent,
partly because screening against them may not be needed to support the
respective agency’s mission or may not be possible due to the
requirements of computer programs used to check individuals against
watch list records. Also, some subjects of watch list records have
passed undetected through agency screening processes and were not
identified, for example, until after they had boarded and flew on an
aircraft or were processed at a port of entry and admitted into the
United States. TSC and other federal agencies have ongoing initiatives
to help reduce these potential vulnerabilities, including efforts to
improve computerized name-matching programs and the quality of watch
list data.
Although the federal government has made progress in promoting
effective terrorism-related screening, additional screening
opportunities remain untapped—within the federal sector, as well as
within critical infrastructure components of the private sector. This
situation exists partly because the government lacks an up-to-date
strategy and implementation plan for optimizing use of the terrorist
watch list. Also lacking are clear lines of authority and
responsibility. An up-to-date strategy and implementation plan,
supported by a clearly defined leadership or governance structure,
would provide a platform to establish governmentwide screening
priorities, assess progress toward policy goals and intended outcomes,
consider factors related to privacy and civil liberties, ensure that
any needed changes are implemented, and respond to issues that hinder
effectiveness.
What GAO Recommends:
GAO is making recommendations to promote a comprehensive and
coordinated approach to terrorist-related screening. Among them are
actions to monitor and respond to vulnerabilities and to establish up-
to-date guidelines, strategies, and plans to facilitate expanded and
enhanced use of the list.
GAO provided a draft copy of this report to relevant departments and
agencies. The departments that provided comments generally agreed with
GAO’s findings and recommendations.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on
[hyperlink, http://www.GAO-08-110]. For more information, contact
Eileen Larence at (202) 512-8777 or larencee@gao.gov.
[End of section]
Contents:
Letter:
Results in Brief:
Background:
In Assessing Individuals for Inclusion on TSC's Watch List, Officials
Rely upon Standards of Reasonableness That Inherently Involve Some
Subjectivity:
Agencies Have Had Approximately 53,000 Encounters with Individuals on
the Watch List, and Outcomes Indicate the List Has Helped to Combat
Terrorism:
TSC Exports Applicable Watch List Records to Screening Agency
Databases, Depending on Agency Mission and Technical Capacity; but Some
Technical Requirements May Present Security Vulnerabilities:
DHS Agencies Are Addressing Incidents of Persons on the Watch List
Passing Undetected through Screening; TSC Has Ongoing Initiatives That
Could Help Reduce This Vulnerability:
The U.S. Government Has Made Progress in Using the Watch List but a
Strategy and Plan Supported by a Governance Structure with Clear Lines
of Authority Would Enhance Use and Effectiveness:
Conclusions:
Recommendations for Executive Action:
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Appendix II: Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-6 (Sept. 16,
2003):
Appendix III: Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-11 (Aug.
27, 2004):
Appendix IV: Outcomes of Screening Agency Encounters with Individuals
on the Terrorist Watch List:
Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
Table:
Table 1: Distribution List for TSC's Daily Summary of Positive Matches:
Figures:
Figure 1: General Overview of the Process Used to Resolve Encounters
with Individuals on the Terrorist Watch List:
Figure 2: General Overview of the Process Used to Nominate Individuals
for Inclusion on TSC's Watch List:
Figure 3: Increase in Terrorist Watch List Records, June 2004 through
May 2007:
Figure 4: General Overview of the Process Used to Export Records from
TSC's Consolidated Watch List to Screening Agency Databases:
Abbreviations:
CB: U.S. Customs and Border Protection:
DHS: Department of Homeland Security:
FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation:
HSPD: Homeland Security Presidential Directive:
NCTC: National Counterterrorism Center:
TSA: Transportation Security Administration:
TSC: Terrorist Screening Center:
United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548:
October 11, 2007:
The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman:
Chairman:
The Honorable Susan M. Collins:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Carl Levin:
Chairman:
The Honorable Norm Coleman:
Ranking Member:
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations:
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs:
United States Senate:
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson:
Chairman:
The Honorable Peter T. King:
Ranking Member:
Committee on Homeland Security:
House of Representatives:
Since the events of September 11, 2001, agencies within the Departments
of Homeland Security, Justice, and State, as well as state and local
law enforcement organizations and the intelligence community, have
implemented enhanced procedures to collect and share information about
known or suspected terrorists who pose a threat to homeland security
and to track their movements. One important tool used by these agencies
is the terrorist watch list, which contains records with identifying or
biographical information--such as name and date of birth--of foreign
and U.S. citizens with known or appropriately suspected links to
terrorism.[Footnote 1]
Pursuant to Homeland Security Presidential Directive 6, the Terrorist
Screening Center--an entity that has been operational since December
2003 under the administration of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI)--was established to develop and maintain the U.S. government's
consolidated terrorist screening database (the watch list) and to
provide for the use of watch list records during security-related
screening processes.[Footnote 2] To build upon and provide additional
guidance related to this directive, in August 2004, the President
signed Homeland Security Presidential Directive 11.[Footnote 3] Among
other things, this directive required the Secretary of Homeland
Security--in coordination with the heads of appropriate federal
departments and agencies--to outline a strategy to enhance the
effectiveness of terrorist-related screening activities and develop a
prioritized investment and implementation plan for detecting and
interdicting suspected terrorists and terrorist activities.
The Terrorist Screening Center receives the vast majority of its
information about known or appropriately suspected terrorists from the
National Counterterrorism Center, which compiles information on
international terrorists from a wide range of executive branch
departments and agencies, such as the Department of State, the Central
Intelligence Agency, and the FBI. In general, international terrorists
engage in terrorist activities that occur primarily outside the
territorial jurisdiction of the United States or that transcend
national boundaries and include individuals in the United States with
connections to terrorist activities outside the United States. In
addition to providing information on international terrorists to the
National Counterterrorism Center, the FBI directly provides the
Terrorist Screening Center with information about known or suspected
domestic terrorists, that is, individuals who operate primarily within
the United States, such as Ted Kaczynski (the "Unabomber"). The center
consolidates this information into a sensitive but unclassified watch
list and makes records available as appropriate for a variety of
screening purposes. For instance, the Transportation Security
Administration directs airlines to use portions of the Terrorist
Screening Center's watch list--the No Fly and Selectee lists--to screen
the names of passengers to identify those who may pose threats to
aviation.[Footnote 4] Also, to help ensure that known or appropriately
suspected terrorists are tracked, and denied entry into the United
States, as appropriate, applicable watch list records are to be checked
by Department of State consular officers before issuing U.S. visas and
passports, and by U.S. Customs and Border Protection officers before
admitting persons--including U.S. citizens--at air, land, and sea ports
of entry. Further, screening against applicable watch list records can
occur anywhere in the nation when, for example, state or local law
enforcement officers stop individuals for traffic violations or other
offenses.
When an individual on the terrorist watch list is identified or
encountered during screening, several entities--the Terrorist Screening
Center, the screening agency, investigative agencies, and the
intelligence community--can be involved in deciding what action to
take.[Footnote 5] Regarding a foreign citizen seeking to immigrate to
the United States permanently or temporarily for business or pleasure
purposes, screening agencies rely on immigration laws that specify
criteria and rules for deciding whether or not to admit the
individual.[Footnote 6] In general, foreign citizens that have engaged
in or are likely to engage in terrorist-related activities are
ineligible to receive visas and ineligible to enter the United States.
If a foreign citizen is legally admitted into the United States--either
permanently or temporarily--and subsequently engages in or is likely to
engage in a terrorist activity, the individual may be removed to that
person's country of citizenship. U.S. citizens returning to the United
States from abroad are not subject to the admissibility requirements
applicable to foreign citizens, regardless of whether or not they are
subjects of watch list records. These individuals only need to
establish their U.S. citizenship to the satisfaction of the examining
officer--by, for example, presenting a U.S. passport--to obtain entry
into the United States.[Footnote 7] These individuals, however, can be
subjected to additional screening by U.S. Customs and Border Protection
before being admitted to determine the potential threat they pose, with
related actions taken, if needed.
This report is a public version of the restricted report that we also
provided to you on October 11, 2007. The various departments and
agencies we reviewed deemed some of the information in the restricted
report as Sensitive Security Information or Law Enforcement Sensitive
information, which must be protected from public disclosures.
Therefore, this report omits certain information associated with
vulnerabilities we identified in existing screening processes and
measures that could be taken to address those vulnerabilities. This
report also omits key details regarding (1) certain policies and
procedures associated with the development and use of the terrorist
watch list and (2) specific outcomes of encounters with individuals who
were positively matched to the watch list. In the context of agency
efforts to screen for known or appropriately suspected terrorists, the
restricted report addressed the following questions:
* In general, what standards do the National Counterterrorism Center
and the FBI use in determining which individuals are appropriate for
inclusion on the Terrorist Screening Center's consolidated watch list?
* Since the Terrorist Screening Center became operational in December
2003, how many times have screening and law enforcement agencies
positively matched individuals to terrorist watch list records, and
what do the results or outcomes of these encounters indicate about the
role of the watch list as a counterterrorism tool?
* To what extent do the principal screening agencies whose missions
most frequently and directly involve interactions with travelers check
against all records in the Terrorist Screening Center's consolidated
watch list? If the entire watch list is not being checked, why not,
what potential vulnerabilities exist, and what actions are being
planned to address these vulnerabilities?
* To what extent are Department of Homeland Security component agencies
monitoring known incidents in which subjects of watch list records pass
undetected through screening processes, and what corrective actions
have been implemented or are being planned to address these
vulnerabilities?
* What actions has the U.S. government taken to ensure that the
terrorist watch list is used as effectively as possible, governmentwide
and in other appropriate venues?
Although the information provided in this version of the report is more
limited in scope, it covers the same general questions as the
restricted report. Also, the overall methodology used for our
restricted report is relevant to this report because the information
contained in this report was derived from the restricted report. To
address the questions in our restricted report, we reviewed the
Terrorist Screening Center's standard operating procedures, statistics
on encounters with individuals on the terrorist watch list, and other
relevant documentation; and we interviewed Terrorist Screening Center
officials, including the director and the principal deputy director. To
identify standards used to nominate individuals for inclusion on the
watch list, we reviewed documentation and interviewed senior officials
from the National Counterterrorism Center and the FBI.
Also, to assess the outcomes of encounters and the extent to which
screening agencies check against the entire watch list, we reviewed
documentation and interviewed senior officials from the FBI's
Counterterrorism Division and the principal screening agencies whose
missions most frequently and directly involve interactions with
travelers. Specifically, at the Transportation Security Administration,
we examined the prescreening of air passengers prior to their boarding
a flight; at U.S. Customs and Border Protection, we examined the
screening of travelers entering the United States through ports of
entry; and, at the Department of State, we examined the screening of
nonimmigrant visa applicants. We did not review the Department of
State's use of the watch list to screen passport applicants. We also
visited a nonprobability sample of screening agencies and investigative
agencies in geographic areas of four states (California, Michigan, New
York, and Texas).[Footnote 8] We chose these locations on the basis of
geographic variation and other factors. Further, to determine the
extent to which agencies monitor known incidents in which subjects of
watch list records pass undetected through screening processes and
efforts to address these vulnerabilities, we reviewed documentation and
interviewed senior officials from U.S. Customs and Border Protection,
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services--which screens individuals
who apply for immigration benefits or U.S. citizenship--and the
Transportation Security Administration. Finally, to assess the actions
the U.S. government has taken to ensure that the terrorist watch list
is used as effectively as possible, we compared the status of watch
list-related strategies, planning, and initiatives with the
expectations set forth in Homeland Security Presidential Directives 6
and 11. We considered federal plans to identify screening
opportunities, the private sector's use of watch list records, and the
Department of State's progress in sharing watch list information with
foreign governments.
Regarding statistical information we obtained from the Terrorist
Screening Center and screening agencies--such as the number of positive
matches and actions taken--we discussed the sources of the data with
agency officials and reviewed documentation regarding the compilation
of the statistics. We determined that the statistics were sufficiently
reliable for the purposes of this review. We did not review or assess
the derogatory information available on individuals nominated to the
terrorist watch list, partly because such information involved ongoing
counterterrorism investigations. Also, a primary agency that collects
information on known or suspected terrorists--the Central Intelligence
Agency--declined to meet with us or provide us documentation on its
watch list-related activities. The Homeland Security Council--which is
chaired by the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and
Counterterrorism--also denied our request for an interview.[Footnote 9]
We performed our work on the restricted version of this report from
April 2005 through September 2007 in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards. Appendix I presents more details about
our objectives, scope, and methodology.
Results in Brief:
The National Counterterrorism Center and the FBI rely upon standards of
reasonableness in determining which individuals are appropriate for
inclusion on the Terrorist Screening Center's consolidated watch list.
In general, individuals who are reasonably suspected of having possible
links to terrorism--in addition to individuals with known links--are to
be nominated. To determine if the suspicions are reasonable, the
National Counterterrorism Center and the FBI are to assess all
available information on the individual. According to the National
Counterterrorism Center, determining whether to nominate an individual
can involve some level of subjectivity. Nonetheless, any individual
reasonably suspected of having links to terrorist activities is to be
nominated to the list and remain on it until the FBI or the agency that
supplied the information supporting the nomination, such as one of the
intelligence agencies, determines the person is not a threat and should
be removed from the list. Moreover, according to the FBI, individuals
who are subjects of ongoing FBI counterterrorism investigations are
generally nominated to the list. If an investigation finds no nexus to
terrorism, the FBI generally is to close the investigation and request
that the Terrorist Screening Center remove the person from the watch
list. Because individuals can be added to the list based on reasonable
suspicion, inclusion on the list does not automatically prohibit an
individual from, for example, obtaining a visa or entering the United
States. Rather, when an individual on the list is encountered, agency
officials are to assess the threat the person poses to determine what
action to take, if any. Based on these standards, the number of records
in the Terrorist Screening Center's consolidated watch list has
increased from about 158,000 records in June 2004 to about 755,000
records as of May 2007.[Footnote 10]
From December 2003 (when the Terrorist Screening Center began
operations) through May 2007, screening and law enforcement agencies
encountered individuals who were positively matched to watch list
records approximately 53,000 times, according to Terrorist Screening
Center data.[Footnote 11] Many individuals were positively matched to
watch list records multiple times. Agencies took a range of actions in
response to these encounters, such as arresting individuals and denying
others entry into the United States. Most often, however, the agencies
questioned and then released the individuals because there was not
sufficient evidence of criminal or terrorist activity to warrant
further legal action. Our analysis of data on outcomes and our
interviews with screening agency, law enforcement, and intelligence
community officials indicate that the use of the watch list has
enhanced the government's counterterrorism efforts in two ways:
* Use of the watch list has helped federal, state, and local screening
and law enforcement officials obtain information to make better-
informed decisions when they encounter an individual on the list as to
the threat posed and the appropriate response or action to take, if
any.
* Information collected from watch list encounters is shared with
agents conducting counterterrorism investigations and with the
intelligence community for use in analyzing threats. Such coordinated
collection of information for use in investigations and threat analyses
is one of the stated policy objectives for the watch list.
The principal screening agencies whose missions most frequently and
directly involve interactions with travelers do not check against all
records in the Terrorist Screening Center's consolidated watch list
because screening against certain records (1) may not be needed to
support the respective agency's mission, (2) may not be possible due to
the requirements of computer programs used to check individuals against
watch list records, or (3) may not be operationally feasible.[Footnote
12] Rather, each day, the center exports applicable records from the
consolidated watch list to federal government databases that agencies
use to screen individuals for mission-related concerns. For example,
the database that U.S. Customs and Border Protection uses to check
incoming travelers for immigration violations, criminal histories, and
other matters contained the highest percentage of watch list records as
of May 2007. This is because its mission is to screen all travelers,
including U.S. citizens, entering the United States at ports of entry.
The database that the Department of State uses to screen applicants for
visas contained the second highest percentage of all watch list
records. This database does not include U.S. citizens and lawful
permanent residents because these individuals would not apply for U.S.
visas. Also, the FBI database that state and local law enforcement
agencies use for screening contained the third highest percentage of
the records. According to the FBI, the remaining records were not
included in this database primarily because they did not contain
sufficient identifying information, which is required to minimize
instances of individuals being misidentified as being subjects of watch
list records. Further, the No Fly and Selectee lists disseminated by
the Transportation Security Administration to airlines for use in
prescreening passengers contained the lowest percentage of watch list
records. The lists did not contain the remaining records either because
they (1) did not meet criteria for the No Fly or Selectee lists
established by the Homeland Security Council or (2) did not contain
sufficient identifying information, which is required to help airlines
verify identities and minimize instances of individuals being falsely
identified as being on the No Fly or Selectee lists. According to the
Department of Homeland Security, increasing the number of records used
to prescreen passengers would expand the number of misidentifications
to unjustifiable proportions without a measurable increase in security.
Department of Homeland Security component agencies are separately
taking steps to address certain aspects of screening processes that
occasionally have resulted in subjects of watch list records passing
undetected through screening processes. For example, U.S. Customs and
Border Protection has encountered situations where it identified the
subject of a watch list record after the individual had been processed
at a port of entry and admitted into the United States. The agency did
not maintain aggregated, national data on the number of these incidents
or the specific causes, but noted several possible reasons. In response
to our inquiries, U.S. Customs and Border Protection created an
interdisciplinary working group within the agency to study the causes
of this vulnerability. The working group held its first meeting in
early 2007 and subsequently has begun to implement corrective actions.
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services--the agency responsible for
screening persons who apply for U.S. citizenship or immigration
benefits--has also acknowledged areas that need improvement in the
processes used to detect subjects of watch list records. According to
agency representatives, each instance of an individual on the watch
list getting through agency screening is reviewed on a case-by-case
basis to determine the cause, with appropriate follow-up and corrective
action taken, if needed. The agency is working with the Terrorist
Screening Center to enhance screening effectiveness. Further,
Transportation Security Administration data show that in the past, a
number of individuals who were on the government's No Fly list passed
undetected through airlines' prescreening of passengers and flew on
international flights bound to or from the United States. The
individuals were subsequently identified in-flight by U.S. Customs and
Border Protection, which used information that was collected from air
carriers' passenger manifests to check passengers against watch list
records to help the agency prepare for the passengers' arrival in the
United States. However, the potential onboard security threats posed by
the undetected individuals required an immediate counterterrorism
response, which in some instances resulted in diverting the aircraft to
a new location.[Footnote 13] According to the Transportation Security
Administration, such incidents were subsequently investigated and, if
needed, corrective action was taken with the respective air carrier. In
addition, U.S. Customs and Border Protection has issued a final rule
that should better position the government to identify individuals on
the No Fly list before an international flight is airborne.[Footnote
14] For domestic flights within the United States, there is no second
screening opportunity--like the one U.S. Customs and Border Protection
conducts for international flights--and, consequently, the
Transportation Security Administration generally does not know whether
individuals on the No Fly list have passed undetected through airlines'
prescreening. Because such instances have occurred on international
flights, it is possible they have also occurred but have not been
detected on domestic flights. The government plans to take over from
air carriers the function of prescreening passengers prior to departure
against watch list records for both international and domestic flights.
Although the federal government has made progress in using the
consolidated watch list for screening purposes, additional
opportunities exist for using the list. Internationally, the Department
of State has made progress in making bilateral arrangements to share
terrorist screening information with certain foreign governments. The
department had two such arrangements in place before September 11,
2001. More recently, the department has made four new arrangements and
is in negotiations with several other countries. Also, the Department
of Homeland Security has made progress in using watch list records to
screen employees in some critical infrastructure components of the
private sector, including certain individuals who have access to vital
areas of nuclear power plants, work in airports, or transport hazardous
materials. However, many critical infrastructure components are not
using watch list records. The Department of Homeland Security has not,
consistent with Homeland Security Presidential Directive 6, finalized
guidelines to support private sector screening processes that have a
substantial bearing on homeland security--such as screening certain
employees against the list--which is an important action to ensure that
watch list records are used by the private sector where appropriate.
Further, federal departments and agencies have not identified all
appropriate opportunities for which terrorist-related screening should
be applied, in accordance with presidential directives.
A primary reason why screening opportunities remain untapped is because
the government lacks an up-to-date strategy and implementation plan--
supported by a clearly defined leadership or governance structure--for
enhancing the effectiveness of terrorist-related screening, consistent
with presidential directive. Currently, numerous existing entities have
roles in watch list-related activities, including the Terrorist
Screening Center, screening agencies, law enforcement agencies, and the
intelligence community. However, clear lines of responsibility and
authority are important to provide monitoring and analysis of watch
list-related screening efforts governmentwide, promote information
sharing, and address interagency issues. Without an up-to-date strategy
and implementation plan and clearly defined leadership, it is difficult
to establish governmentwide priorities for screening, assess progress
toward intended outcomes, ensure that any needed changes are
implemented, and respond to issues that hinder effectiveness, such as
the potential vulnerabilities discussed in this report.
To promote more comprehensive and coordinated use of terrorist
screening information to detect, identify, track, and interdict known
or appropriately suspected terrorists, the restricted version of this
report makes several recommendations to the heads of relevant
departments and agencies intended to help (1) mitigate security
vulnerabilities in terrorist watch list screening processes and (2)
optimize the use and effectiveness of the watch list as a
counterterrorism tool, including development of an up-to-date strategy
and implementation plan for using terrorist-related information. Also,
to help ensure that governmentwide terrorist-related screening efforts
are effectively coordinated, we recommended in the restricted version
of this report that the Assistant to the President for Homeland
Security and Counterterrorism ensure that the leadership or governance
structure proposed by the implementation plan identifies clear lines of
responsibility and authority.
The Department of Homeland Security and the FBI, which provided the
Department of Justice's comments on a draft of the restricted version
of this report, generally agreed with our findings and recommendations.
The Department of Homeland Security noted, among other things, that it
had already begun work to correct issues identified in the report,
including ongoing efforts with other federal entities to ensure that
potential watch list vulnerabilities are identified and addressed and
that watch list records and screening programs are appropriate. The
FBI's comments focused primarily on two issues. First, the FBI noted
that the extent of vulnerabilities in current screening processes that
arise when the FBI database that state and local law enforcement
agencies use for screening does not contain certain watch list records
has been determined to be low or nonexistent. However, the FBI's
assessment was based on operational concerns and did not specifically
address the extent to which security risks are raised by not using
these records. Second, the FBI commented that it believes the Terrorist
Screening Center's governance board is the appropriate forum for
obtaining a commitment from all of the entities involved in the watch
listing process. However, as discussed in this report, while the
governance board could be suited to assume more of a leadership role,
its current authority is limited to issues specific to the Terrorist
Screening Center, and it would need additional authority to provide
effective coordination of terrorist-related screening activities and
interagency issues governmentwide. The Homeland Security Council was
provided a draft of the restricted version of this report but did not
provide comments. The Office of the Director of National Intelligence,
the Department of State, and the Social Security Administration
provided technical comments only on a draft of the restricted version
of this report, which we incorporated where appropriate.
Background:
In April 2003, we reported that watch lists were maintained by numerous
federal agencies and that the agencies did not have a consistent and
uniform approach to sharing information on individuals with possible
links to terrorism.[Footnote 15] Our report recommended that the
Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), in
collaboration with the heads of departments and agencies that have and
use watch lists, lead an effort to consolidate and standardize the
federal government's watch list structures and policies. Subsequently,
pursuant to Homeland Security Presidential Directive 6 (HSPD-6), dated
September 16, 2003, the Attorney General established the Terrorist
Screening Center (TSC) to consolidate the government's approach to
terrorism screening and provide for the appropriate and lawful use of
terrorist information in screening processes.[Footnote 16] TSC's
consolidated watch list is the U.S. government's master repository for
all known or appropriately suspected international and domestic
terrorist records used for watch list-related screening. TSC records
contain sensitive but unclassified information on terrorist identities-
-such as name and date of birth--that can be shared with screening
agencies, whereas the classified derogatory information that supports
the watch list records is maintained in other law enforcement and
intelligence agency databases. Records for inclusion on the
consolidated watch list are nominated to TSC from the following two
sources:
* Identifying information on individuals with ties to international
terrorism is provided to TSC through the National Counterterrorism
Center (NCTC), which is managed by the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence.
* Identifying information on individuals with ties to purely domestic
terrorism is provided to TSC by the FBI.[Footnote 17]
HSPD-6 required the Attorney General--in coordination with the
Secretary of State, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and the
Director of Central Intelligence--to implement appropriate procedures
and safeguards with respect to all terrorist information related to
U.S. persons (i.e., U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents) that
is provided to NCTC (formerly the Terrorist Threat Integration Center).
According to TSC, agencies within the intelligence community that
collect and maintain terrorist information and nominate individuals for
inclusion on TSC's consolidated watch list are to do so in accordance
with Executive Order 12333.[Footnote 18] With respect to U.S. persons,
this order addresses the nature or type of information that may be
collected and the allowable methods for collecting such information. It
provides that agencies within the intelligence community are authorized
to collect, retain, or disseminate information concerning U.S. persons
only in accordance with procedures established by the head of the
agency concerned and approved by the Attorney General, consistent with
the authorities set out earlier in the order. The order further
provides that agencies within the intelligence community are to use the
least intrusive collection techniques feasible when such collection is
conducted within the United States or when directed against U.S.
persons abroad. Also, according to TSC officials, the center requires
annual training for all personnel concerning the Privacy Act of 1974 to
ensure that information collected on U.S. persons is handled in
accordance with applicable law.[Footnote 19]
To facilitate operational or mission-related screening, TSC sends
applicable records from its terrorist watch list to screening agency
systems for use in efforts to deter or detect the movements of known or
suspected terrorists. For instance, applicable TSC records are provided
to the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) for use by airlines
in prescreening passengers;[Footnote 20] to a U.S. Customs and Border
Protection (CBP) system for use in screening travelers entering the
United States;[Footnote 21] to a Department of State system for use in
screening visa applicants;[Footnote 22] and to an FBI system for use by
state and local law enforcement agencies pursuant to arrests,
detentions, and other criminal justice purposes.
When an individual makes an airline reservation, arrives at a U.S. port
of entry, or applies for a U.S. visa, or is stopped by state or local
police within the United States, the frontline screening agency or
airline conducts a name-based search of the individual against
applicable terrorist watch list records. In general, when the
computerized name-matching system of an airline or screening agency
generates a "hit" (a potential name match) against a watch list record,
the airline or agency is to review each potential match. Any obvious
mismatches (negative matches) are to be resolved by the airline or
agency, if possible, as discussed in our September 2006
report.[Footnote 23] However, clearly positive or exact matches and
matches that are inconclusive (uncertain or difficult-to-verify)
generally are to be referred to the applicable screening agency's
intelligence or operations center and TSC for closer examination.
Specifically, airlines are to contact TSA's Office of Intelligence; CBP
officers at U.S. ports of entry are to contact CBP's National Targeting
Center; and Department of State consular officers who process visa
applications are to submit a request for a security advisory opinion to
Department of State headquarters.[Footnote 24] The intelligence or
operations center is to refer exact matches and inconclusive matches to
TSC. State and local law enforcement officials generally are to refer
exact matches and inconclusive matches directly to TSC. In turn, TSC is
to check its databases and other sources--including classified
databases maintained by NCTC and the FBI--and confirm whether the
individual is a positive, negative, or inconclusive match to the watch
list record.
TSC is to refer positive and inconclusive matches to the FBI's
Counterterrorism Division to provide an opportunity for a
counterterrorism response. Deciding what law enforcement or screening
agency action to take, if any, can involve collaboration among the
frontline screening agency, NCTC or other intelligence community
members, and the FBI or other investigative agencies. If the encounter
arises in the context of an application for a visa or admission into
the United States, the screening agency's adjudicating official
determines whether the circumstances trigger a statutory basis for
inadmissibility. Generally, NCTC and the FBI are involved because they
maintain the underlying derogatory information that supports terrorist
watch list records, which is needed to help determine the appropriate
counterterrorism response. If necessary, a member of an FBI Joint
Terrorism Task Force can respond in person to interview and obtain
additional information about the person encountered.[Footnote 25] In
other cases, the FBI will rely on the screening agency and other law
enforcement agencies--such as U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement-
-to respond and collect information. Figure 1 presents a general
overview of the process used to resolve encounters with individuals on
the terrorist watch list.
Figure 1: General Overview of the Process Used to Resolve Encounters
with Individuals on the Terrorist Watch List:
This figure a chart with illustrations to show the process used to
resolve encounters with individuals on the terrorist watch list.
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of TSC information.
[End of figure]
To build upon and provide additional guidance related to HSPD-6, in
August 2004, the President signed Homeland Security Presidential
Directive 11 (HSPD-11).[Footnote 26] Among other things, this directive
required the Secretary of Homeland Security--in coordination with the
heads of appropriate federal departments and agencies--to submit two
reports to the President (through the Assistant to the President for
Homeland Security) related to the government's approach to terrorist-
related screening.[Footnote 27] The first report was to outline a
strategy to enhance the effectiveness of terrorist-related screening
activities by developing comprehensive and coordinated procedures and
capabilities. The second report was to provide a prioritized investment
and implementation plan for detecting and interdicting suspected
terrorists and terrorist activities. Specifically, the plan was to
describe the "scope, governance, principles, outcomes, milestones,
training objectives, metrics, costs, and schedule of activities" to
implement the U.S. government's terrorism-related screening policies.
According to DHS officials, the department submitted the required
strategy and the investment and implementation plan to the President in
November 2004. Additional information on the status of the strategy and
implementation plan is presented later in this report.
In Assessing Individuals for Inclusion on TSC's Watch List, Officials
Rely upon Standards of Reasonableness That Inherently Involve Some
Subjectivity:
NCTC and FBI officials rely upon standards of reasonableness in
determining which individuals are appropriate for inclusion on TSC's
watch list, but determining whether individuals meet these minimum
standards can involve some level of subjectivity.[Footnote 28] In
accordance with HSPD-6, TSC's watch list is to contain information
about individuals "known or appropriately suspected to be or have been
engaged in conduct constituting, in preparation for, in aid of, or
related to terrorism." In implementing this directive, NCTC and the FBI
strive to ensure that individuals who are reasonably suspected of
having possible links to terrorism--in addition to individuals with
known links--are nominated for inclusion on the watch list. Thus, as
TSC adds nominated records to its watch list, the list may include
individuals with possible ties to terrorism, establishing a broad
spectrum of individuals that meet the "known or appropriately
suspected" standard specified in HSPD-6. As such, inclusion on the list
does not automatically cause an alien to be, for example, denied a visa
or deemed inadmissible to enter the United States when the person is
identified by a screening agency. Rather, in these cases, screening
agency and law enforcement personnel may use the encounter with the
individual as an opportunity to collect information for assessing the
potential threat the person poses, tracking the person's movements or
activities, and determining what actions to take, if any.[Footnote 29]
The National Counterterrorism Center Uses a "Reasonable Suspicion"
Standard in Determining Which Individuals Are Appropriate for Inclusion
on the Watch List:
NCTC receives international terrorist-related information from
executive branch departments and agencies--such as the Department of
State, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the FBI--and enters this
information into its terrorist database.[Footnote 30] On a formal
basis, Department of State embassies around the world--in collaboration
with applicable federal agencies involved in security, law enforcement,
and intelligence activities--are expected to participate in the "Visas
Viper" terrorist reporting program. This congressionally mandated
program is primarily administered through a Visas Viper Committee at
each overseas post.[Footnote 31] The committee is to meet at least
monthly to share information on known or suspected terrorists and
determine whether such information should be sent to NCTC for inclusion
in its terrorist database.[Footnote 32] NCTC's database, known as the
Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment, contains highly classified
information and serves as the U.S. government's central classified
database with information on known or suspected international
terrorists. According to NCTC's fact sheet on the Terrorist Identities
Datamart Environment, examples of conduct that will warrant an entry
into NCTC's database includes persons who:
* commit international terrorist activity;
* prepare or plan international terrorist activity;
* gather information on potential targets for international terrorist
activity;
* solicit funds or other things of value for international terrorist
activity or a terrorist organization;
* solicit membership in an international terrorist organization;
* provide material support, such as a safe house, transportation,
communications, funds, transfer of funds or other material financial
benefit, false documentation or identification, weapons, explosives, or
training; or:
* are members of or represent a foreign terrorist
organization.[Footnote 33]
If NCTC determines that an individual meets the "known or appropriately
suspected" standard of HSPD-6, NCTC is to extract sensitive but
unclassified information on the individual's identity from its
classified database--such as name and date of birth--and send forward a
record to TSC for inclusion on the watch list. According to NCTC
procedures, NCTC analysts are to review all information involving
international terrorists using a "reasonable suspicion" standard to
determine whether an individual is appropriate for nomination to TSC
for inclusion on the watch list. NCTC defines reasonable suspicion as
information--both facts, as well as rational inferences from those
facts and the experience of the reviewer--that is sufficient to cause
an ordinarily prudent person to believe that the individual under
review may be a known or appropriately suspected terrorist. According
to NCTC, this information can include past conduct, current actions,
and credible intelligence concerning future conduct. In making this
determination, NCTC generally relies upon the originating agency's
designation that there is reasonable suspicion to believe a person is
engaged in terrorist or terrorist-related activities as being
presumptively valid. For example, NCTC will rely on the FBI's
designation of an individual as a known or suspected international
terrorist unless NCTC has specific and credible information that such a
designation is not appropriate.
Also, NCTC officials noted that an individual is to remain on the watch
list until the respective department or agency that provided the
terrorist-related information that supports a nomination determines the
individual should be removed from the list. According to TSC, if the
FBI conducts a threat assessment on an individual that reveals no nexus
to international terrorism, then NCTC will initiate the process for
deleting the record from its database and the watch list. If NCTC
receives information that it determines is insufficient to nominate an
individual to TSC for inclusion on the watch list, the available
information may remain in the NCTC database until additional
information is obtained to warrant nomination to TSC or be deleted from
the NCTC database.
Individuals Who Are Subjects of FBI Counterterrorism Investigations Are
Generally Nominated to the Watch List:
In general, individuals who are subjects of ongoing FBI
counterterrorism investigations are nominated to TSC for inclusion on
the watch list, including persons who are being preliminarily
investigated to determine if they have links to terrorism. If an
investigation does not establish a terrorism link, the FBI generally is
to close the investigation and request that TSC remove the person from
the watch list.
In determining whether to open an investigation, the FBI uses
guidelines established by the Attorney General. These guidelines
contain specific standards for opening investigations. According to FBI
officials, there must be a "reasonable indication" of involvement in
terrorism before opening an investigation. The FBI noted, for example,
that it is not sufficient to open an investigation based solely on a
neighbor's complaint or an anonymous tip or phone call. In such cases,
however, the FBI could use techniques short of opening an investigation
to assess the potential threat the person poses, which would not result
in adding the individual to the watch list at that time.
The FBI has established formal review and approval processes for
nominating individuals for inclusion on the watch list. In general, FBI
case agents are to send nominations to a unit at FBI headquarters for
review and approval. If approved, information on domestic terrorists is
sent to TSC for inclusion on the watch list. For approved international
terrorist nominations, the FBI sends the information to NCTC, who then
sends forward the nomination to TSC.
TSC's Watch List Is the Master Repository for Watch List Records:
For each nomination, NCTC and the FBI provide TSC with biographic or
other identifying data, such as name and date of birth. This
identifying information on known or suspected terrorists is deemed
sensitive but unclassified by the intelligence and law enforcement
communities.[Footnote 34] Then, TSC is to review the identifying
information and the underlying derogatory information--by directly
accessing databases maintained by NCTC, the FBI, and other agencies--to
validate the requirements for including the nomination on the watch
list.[Footnote 35] On the basis of the results of its review, TSC is to
either input the nomination into the watch list--which is the U.S.
government's master repository for all known or appropriately suspected
international and domestic terrorist records that are used for watch
list-related screening--or reject the nomination and send it back to
NCTC or the FBI for further investigation. TSC relies predominantly on
the nominating agency to determine whether or not an individual is a
known or appropriately suspected terrorist. According to TSC, on the
basis of its review of relevant identifying and derogatory information,
the center rejects approximately 1 percent of all nominations. Figure 2
presents a general overview of the process used to nominate individuals
for inclusion on TSC's watch list.
Figure 2: General Overview of the Process Used to Nominate Individuals
for Inclusion on TSC's Watch List:
This figure is a chart with illustrations showing the general overview
of the process used to nominate individuals for inclusion on TSC's
watch list.
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of TSC information.
[End of figure]
TSC's watch list of individuals with known or appropriately suspected
links to terrorism has increased from 158,374 records in June 2004 to
754,960 records in May 2007 (see fig. 3).[Footnote 36] It is important
to note that the total number of records on TSC's watch list does not
represent the total number of individuals on the watch list. Rather, if
an individual has one or more known aliases, the watch list will
contain multiple records for the same individual. For example, if an
individual on the watch list has 50 known aliases, there could be 50
distinct records related to that individual in the watch list.
Figure 3: Increase in Terrorist Watch List Records, June 2004 through
May 2007:
This figure is a line chart showing the increase in terrorist watch
list records, between June of 2004 and May of 2007.
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of TSC data.
[End of figure]
TSC's database is updated daily with new nominations, modifications to
existing records, and deletions. According to TSC data, as of May 2007,
a high percentage of watch list records were international terrorist
records nominated through NCTC, and a small percentage were domestic
terrorist records nominated through the FBI. TSC data also show that
more than 100,000 records have been removed from the watch list since
TSC's inception. As discussed later in this report, agencies that
conduct terrorism screening do not check against all records in the
watch list. Rather, TSC exports applicable records to federal
government databases used by agencies that conduct terrorism screening
based on the screening agency's mission responsibilities and other
factors.
Agencies Have Had Approximately 53,000 Encounters with Individuals on
the Watch List, and Outcomes Indicate the List Has Helped to Combat
Terrorism:
For the 42-month period of December 2003 (when TSC began operations)
through May 2007, screening and law enforcement agencies encountered
individuals who were positively matched to watch list records 53,218
times, according to our analysis of TSC data. These encounters include
many individuals who were positively matched to watch list records
multiple times. Agencies took a range of actions, such as arresting
individuals, denying other individuals entry into the United States,
and most commonly, releasing the individuals following questioning and
information gathering. Our analysis of data on the outcomes of these
encounters and interviews with screening agency, law enforcement, and
intelligence community officials indicate that the watch list has
enhanced the U.S. government's counterterrorism efforts by (1) helping
frontline screening agencies obtain information to determine the level
of threat a person poses and the appropriate action to take, if any,
and (2) providing the opportunity to collect and share information on
known or appropriately suspected terrorists with law enforcement
agencies and the intelligence community.
The Number of Positive Matches to the Watch List Has Increased Each
Year, and Many Individuals Have Been Encountered Multiple Times:
A breakdown of encounters with positive matches to the terrorist watch
list shows that the number of matches has increased each year--from
4,876 during the first 10-month period of TSC's operations (December
2003 through September 2004) to 14,938 during fiscal year 2005, to
19,887 during fiscal year 2006. This increase can be attributed partly
to the growth in the number of records in the consolidated terrorist
watch list and partly to the increase in the number of agencies that
use the list for screening purposes. Since its inception, TSC has
worked to educate federal departments and agencies, state and local law
enforcement, and foreign governments about appropriate screening
opportunities. Our analysis of TSC data also indicates that many
individuals who were positively matched to the terrorist watch list
were encountered multiple times. For example, a truck driver who
regularly crossed the U.S.-Canada border or an individual who
frequently took international flights could each account for multiple
encounters.
Further, TSC data show that the highest percentage of encounters with
individuals who were positively matched to the watch list involved
screening within the United States by a state or local law enforcement
agency, U.S. government investigative agency, or other governmental
entity. Examples of these encounters include screening by police
departments, correctional facilities, FBI agents, and courts. The next
highest percentage of encounters with positive matches to the watch
list involved border-related encounters, such as passengers on airline
flights inbound from outside the United States or individuals screened
at land ports of entry.[Footnote 37] Examples include (1) a passenger
flying from London (Heathrow), England, to New York (JFK), New York,
and (2) a person attempting to cross the border from Canada into the
United States at the Rainbow Bridge port of entry in Niagara Falls, New
York. The smallest percentage of encounters with positive matches
occurred outside of the United States.
State and local law enforcement agencies historically have had access
to an FBI system that contains watch list records produced by the FBI.
However, pursuant to HSPD-6 (Sept. 16, 2003), state and local law
enforcement agencies were, for the first time, given access to watch
list records produced by the intelligence community, which are also
included in the FBI system. This access has enabled state and local
agencies to better assist the U.S. government's efforts to track and
collect information on known or appropriately suspected terrorists.
These agencies accounted for a significant percentage of the total
encounters with positive matches to the watch list that occurred within
the United States.
The Watch List Has Helped Screening Agencies Assess the Potential
Threat a Person Poses and Take a Wide Range of Counterterrorism
Responses:
The watch list has enhanced the U.S. government's counterterrorism
efforts by allowing federal, state, and local screening and law
enforcement officials to obtain information to help them make better-
informed decisions during encounters regarding the level of threat a
person poses and the appropriate response to take, if any. The specific
outcomes of encounters with individuals on the watch list are based on
the government's overall assessment of the intelligence and
investigative information that supports the watch list record and any
additional information that may be obtained during the encounter. Our
analysis of data of the outcomes of encounters revealed that agencies
took a range of actions, such as arresting individuals, denying others
entry into the United States, and most commonly, releasing the
individuals following questioning and information gathering. The
following provides additional information on arrests, as well as the
outcomes of encounters involving the Department of State, TSA, CBP, and
state or local law enforcement, respectively.
* TSC data show that agencies reported arresting many subjects of watch
list records for various reasons, such as the individual having an
outstanding arrest warrant or the individual's behavior or actions
during the encounter. TSC data also indicated that some of the arrests
were based on terrorism grounds.
* TSC data show that when visa applicants were positively matched to
terrorist watch list records, the outcomes included visas denied, visas
issued (because the consular officer did not find any statutory basis
for inadmissibility), and visa ineligibility waived.[Footnote 38]
* TSA data show that when airline passengers were positively matched to
the No Fly or Selectee lists, the vast majority of matches were to the
Selectee list. Other outcomes included individuals matched to the No
Fly list and denied boarding (did not fly) and individuals matched to
the No Fly list after the aircraft was in-flight, which required an
immediate counterterrorism response. Additional information on
individuals on the No Fly list passing undetected through airline
prescreening and being identified in-flight is presented later in this
report.
* CBP data show that a number of nonimmigrant aliens encountered at
U.S. ports of entry were positively matched to terrorist watch list
records. For many of the encounters, CBP determined there was
sufficient derogatory information related to watch list records to
preclude admission under terrorism grounds. However, for most of the
encounters, CBP determined that there was not sufficient derogatory
information related to the records to preclude admission.
* TSC data show that state or local law enforcement officials have
encountered individuals who were positively matched to terrorist watch
list records thousands of times. Although data on the actual outcomes
of these encounters were not available, the vast majority involved
watch list records that indicated that the individuals were released,
unless there were reasons other than terrorism-related grounds for
arresting or detaining the individual.
Appendix IV presents more details on the outcomes of screening agency
encounters with individuals on the terrorist watch list.
The Watch List Has Helped Support Law Enforcement Investigations and
the Intelligence Community by Tracking the Movements of Known or
Appropriately Suspected Terrorists and Collecting Information about
Them:
According to federal officials, encounters with individuals who were
positively matched to the watch list assisted government efforts in
tracking the respective person's movements or activities and provided
the opportunity to collect additional information about the individual
that was shared with agents conducting counterterrorism investigations
and with the intelligence community for use in analyzing threats. Such
coordinated collection of information for use in investigations and
threat analyses is one of the stated policy objectives for the watch
list. Most of the individuals encountered were questioned and released
because the intelligence and investigative information on these persons
that supported the watch list records and the information obtained
during the encounter did not support taking further actions, such as
denying an individual entry into the United States.
Specifically, as discussed previously, for most Department of State,
TSA (via air carriers), CBP, and state and local encounters with
individuals who were positively matched to the terrorist watch list,
the counterterrorism response consisted of questioning the individuals
and gathering information. That is, the encounters provided screening
agency and law enforcement personnel the opportunity to conduct in-
depth questioning and inspect travel documents and belongings to
collect information for use in supporting investigations and assessing
threats. TSC plays a central role in the real-time sharing of this
information, creating a bridge among screening agencies, the law
enforcement community, and the intelligence community. For example, in
addition to facilitating interagency communication and coordination
during encounters, TSC creates a daily report of encounters involving
positive matches to the terrorist watch list. This report contains a
summary of all positive encounters for the prior day. TSC summarizes
the type of encounter, what occurred, and what action was taken. The
report notes the person's affiliation with any groups and provides a
summary of derogatory information available on the individual. Overview
maps depicting the encounters and locations are also included in the
report. The daily reports are distributed to numerous federal entities,
as shown in table 1.
Table 1: Distribution List for TSC's Daily Summary of Positive Matches:
White House: FBI;
Homeland Security Council: Director.
White House: FBI;
Homeland Security Council: Counterterrorism Division.
White House: FBI;
Homeland Security Council: National Joint Terrorism Task Force.
White House: FBI;
Homeland Security Council: Office of Intelligence.
White House: Departments;
Homeland Security Council: Department of Homeland Security (Secretary
and other units).
White House: Departments;
Homeland Security Council: Department of State.
White House: Agencies;
Homeland Security Council: Federal Air Marshal Service.
White House: Agencies;
Homeland Security Council: Transportation Security Administration
(Administrator and intelligence staff).
White House: Agencies;
Homeland Security Council: U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement.
White House: Agencies;
Homeland Security Council: U.S. Customs and Border Protection.
White House: Agencies;
Homeland Security Council: United States Secret Service.
White House: Intelligence community;
Homeland Security Council: Central Intelligence Agency.
White House: Intelligence community;
Homeland Security Council: Defense Intelligence Agency.
White House: Intelligence community;
Homeland Security Council: Department of Defense Counterintelligence
Field Activity.
White House: Intelligence community;
Homeland Security Council: FBI Field Intelligence Group members[A].
White House: Intelligence community;
Homeland Security Council: National Counterterrorism Center.
White House: Intelligence community;
Homeland Security Council: National Security Agency.
White House: Intelligence community;
Homeland Security Council: Office of the Director of National
Intelligence.
Source: GAO summary of TSC information.
[A] According to the FBI, Field Intelligence Groups consist of FBI
intelligence analysts, special agents, language analysts, and
surveillance specialists who take raw information from local cases and
make big-picture sense out of it; fill gaps in national cases with
local information; and share their findings, assessments, and reports
with other Field Intelligence Groups across the country and with other
law enforcement and intelligence agencies. There is one Field
Intelligence Group in each of the FBI's 56 field offices.
[End of table]
According to federal law enforcement officials, the information
collected during encounters with individuals on the terrorist watch
list helps to develop cases by, among other means, tracking the
movement of known or appropriately suspected terrorists and determining
relationships among people, activities, and events. According to NCTC
officials, information obtained from encounters is added to NCTC's
Terrorist Identities Datamart Environment database, which serves as the
U.S. government's central classified database on known or suspected
international terrorists.[Footnote 39] This information can be
electronically accessed by approximately 5,000 U.S. counterterrorism
personnel around the world.
TSC Exports Applicable Watch List Records to Screening Agency
Databases, Depending on Agency Mission and Technical Capacity; but Some
Technical Requirements May Present Security Vulnerabilities:
Each day, TSC exports applicable records from the watch list--
containing biographic or other identifying data, such as name and date
of birth--to federal government databases used by agencies that conduct
terrorism screening. Specifically, applicable watch list records are
exported to the following federal agency databases, which are described
later in this report:
* DHS's Interagency Border Inspection System.
* The Department of State's Consular Lookout and Support
System.[Footnote 40]
* The FBI's Violent Gang and Terrorist Organization File.
* TSA's No Fly and Selectee lists.
The applicable records that TSC exports to each of these databases vary
based on the screening agency's mission responsibilities, the technical
capabilities of the agency's computer system, and operational
considerations.[Footnote 41] For example, records on U.S. citizens and
lawful permanent residents are not exported to the Department of
State's system used to screen visa applicants for immigration
violations, criminal histories, and other matters, because these
individuals would not apply for a U.S. visa. Also, to facilitate the
automated process of checking an individual against watch list records,
all of these databases require certain minimum biographic or
identifying data in order to accept records from TSC's consolidated
watch list. The identifying information required depends on the
policies and needs of the screening agency and the technical capacity
of the respective agency's computerized name-matching program. Also,
certain records may not be exported to screening agency systems based
on operational considerations, such as the amount of time available to
conduct related screening. In general, the agency governing a
particular screening database establishes the criteria for which
records from the consolidated watch list will be accepted into its own
system. Figure 4 presents a general overview of the process used to
export records from TSC's consolidated watch list to screening agency
databases.
Figure 4: General Overview of the Process Used to Export Records from
TSC's Consolidated Watch List to Screening Agency Databases:
This figure is a chart with illustrations showing the process used by
export records from TSC's consolidated watch list to screening agency
databases.
[See PDF for image]
Source: GAO analysis of TSC information.
Note: In addition to sending applicable watch list records to these
federal government databases, TSC shares applicable records with
certain foreign governments on a reciprocal basis, which is discussed
later in this report.
[End of figure]
According to TSC, in addition to agency mission, technical, and
operational considerations, an individual's record may be excluded from
an agency's database in rare cases when there is a reasonable and
detailed justification for doing so and the request for exclusion has
been reviewed and approved by the FBI's Counterterrorism Division and
TSC. The following sections provide additional information on the
databases of the screening processes we reviewed, the percentage of
records accepted as of May 2007, and potential security
vulnerabilities.
Interagency Border Inspection System (CBP):
The Interagency Border Inspection System is DHS's primary lookout
system available at U.S. ports of entry and other locations. CBP
officers use the system to screen travelers entering the United States
at ports of entry, which include land border crossings along the
Canadian and Mexican borders, sea ports, and U.S. airports for
international flight arrivals.[Footnote 42] This system includes not
only the applicable records exported by TSC, but also additional
information on people with prior criminal histories, immigration
violations, or other activities of concern that CBP wants to identify
and screen at ports of entry. The system is also used to assist law
enforcement and other personnel at approximately 20 other federal
agencies, including the following: U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement; U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services; the FBI; the
Drug Enforcement Administration; the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
Firearms and Explosives; the Internal Revenue Service; the U.S. Coast
Guard; the Federal Aviation Administration; and the U.S. Secret
Service.
Of all the screening agency databases discussed in this report, the
Interagency Border Inspection System has the least restrictive
acceptance criteria and therefore contained the highest percentage of
records from TSC's consolidated watch list as of May 2007. This is
because CBP's mission is to screen all travelers, including U.S.
citizens, entering the United States at ports of entry.
Consular Lookout and Support System (Department of State):
The Consular Lookout and Support System is the Department of State's
name-check system for visa applicants. Consular officers abroad use the
system to screen the names of visa applicants to identify terrorists
and other aliens who are potentially ineligible for visas based on
criminal histories or other reasons specified by federal statute.
According to the Department of State, all visa-issuing posts have
direct access to the system and must use it to check each applicant's
name before issuing a visa.
Records on U.S. citizens and lawful permanent residents are not to be
included in the part of the Consular Lookout and Support System that is
used to screen visa applicants--because these individuals would not
apply for U.S. visas--but may be included in another part of the system
that is used to screen passport applicants. According to TSC officials,
the part of the system that is used to screen visa applicants generally
contains the same information as is contained in the Interagency Border
Inspection System, except for records on U.S. citizens and lawful
permanent residents. As of May 2007, the Consular Lookout and Support
System contained the second highest percentage of all watch list
records.
Violent Gang and Terrorist Organization File (FBI):
The Violent Gang and Terrorist Organization File is the FBI's lookout
system for known or appropriately suspected terrorists, as well as gang
groups and members. The file is part of the FBI's National Crime
Information Center database, which is accessible by federal, state, and
local law enforcement officers and other criminal justice agencies for
screening in conjunction with arrests, detentions, and other criminal
justice purposes.[Footnote 43] A subset of the Violent Gang and
Terrorist Organization file consists of TSC's records to be used to
screen for possible terrorist links.[Footnote 44] As of May 2007, the
FBI database contained the third highest percentage of watch list
records.
According to TSC officials, if the remaining watch list records were
included in the Violent Gang and Terrorist Organization File, the
system would identify an unmanageable number of records of individuals
as potentially being matches to the National Crime Information Center
database. The officials explained that name checks against the National
Crime Information Center database return not only potential matches to
terrorist watch list records in the Violent Gang and Terrorist
Organization File, but also potential matches to the millions of other
records in the database. TSC officials noted, however, that not
including these records has resulted in a potential vulnerability in
screening processes--or at least a missed opportunity to track the
movements of individuals who are the subjects of watch list records and
collect additional relevant information. According to the FBI, the
remaining records are not included to ensure the protection of civil
rights and prevent law enforcement officials from taking invasive
enforcement action on individuals misidentified as being on the watch
list. The FBI also noted that while law enforcement encounters of
individuals on the watch list provide significant information,
unnecessary detentions or queries of misidentified persons would be
counterproductive and potentially damaging to the efforts of the FBI to
investigate and combat terrorism. Because of these operational
concerns, the FBI noted that the extent of vulnerabilities in current
screening processes that arise when the Violent Gang and Terrorist
Organization File cannot accept certain watch list records has been
determined to be low or nonexistent. We note, however, that the FBI did
not specifically address the extent to which security risks are raised
by not using these records.
No Fly and Selectee Lists (TSA):
The No Fly and Selectee lists are compiled by TSC and forwarded to TSA,
which distributes the lists to air carriers for use in identifying
individuals who either should be precluded from boarding an aircraft or
should receive additional physical screening prior to boarding a
flight. TSA requires that U.S. aircraft operators use these lists to
screen passengers on all of their flights and that foreign air carriers
use these lists to screen passengers on all flights to and from the
United States. Of all of the screening agency databases that accept
watch list records, only the No Fly and Selectee lists require certain
nomination criteria or inclusion standards that are narrower than the
"known or appropriately suspected" standard of HSPD-6. Specifically,
the lists are to contain any individual, regardless of citizenship, who
meets certain nomination criteria established by the Homeland Security
Council.[Footnote 45]
* Persons on the No Fly list are deemed to be a threat to civil
aviation or national security and therefore should be precluded from
boarding an aircraft. Passengers who are a match to the No Fly list are
to be denied boarding unless subsequently cleared by law enforcement
personnel in accordance with TSA procedures. The Homeland Security
Council criteria contain specific examples of the types of terrorism-
related conduct that may make an individual appropriate for inclusion
on the No Fly list.
* Persons on the Selectee list are also deemed to be a threat to civil
aviation or national security but do not meet the criteria of the No
Fly list. Being on the Selectee list does not mean that the person will
not be allowed to board an aircraft or enter the United States.
Instead, persons on this list are to receive additional security
screening prior to being permitted to board an aircraft, which may
involve a physical inspection of the person and a hand-search of the
passenger's luggage. The Homeland Security Council criteria contain
specific examples of the types of terrorism-related conduct that may
make an individual appropriate for inclusion on the Selectee list, as
well as the types of activities that generally would not be considered
appropriate for inclusion on the list.
According to the Homeland Security Council criteria, the No Fly and
Selectee lists are not intended as investigative or information-
gathering tools, or tracking mechanisms. Rather, the lists are intended
to help ensure the safe transport of passengers and their property and
to facilitate the flow of commerce. An individual must meet the
specific nomination criteria to be placed on one of the lists, and the
watch list record must contain a full name and date of birth to be
added to either of the lists.
As of May 2007, the No Fly list and the Selectee list collectively
contained the lowest percentage of watch list records. The remaining
records in TSC's watch list either did not meet the specific Homeland
Security Council nomination criteria or did not meet technical
requirements that the records contain a full name and date of birth.
TSC could not readily determine how many records fell into each of
these two categories. Nonetheless, these records are not provided to
TSA for use in prescreening passengers. According to TSA officials,
without a full name and date of birth, the current name-matching
programs used by airlines would falsely identify an unacceptable number
of individuals as potentially being on the watch list.
According to DHS, the amount or specific types of biographical
information available on the population to be screened should also be
considered when determining what portion of the watch list should be
used. For example, DHS noted that screening international airline
passengers who have provided passport information is very different
from screening domestic airline passengers for whom the government has
little biographical information. Further, DHS noted that for airline
passengers, there is not much time to resolve false positives or
determine whether someone on the watch list should be subjected to
additional screening prior to departure of a flight, whereas for
individuals arriving at U.S. ports of entry from international
locations, CBP has more time to interview individuals and resolve
issues upon their arrival.
For international flights bound to or departing from the United States,
two separate screening processes occur. Specifically, in addition to
TSA requiring that air carriers prescreen passengers prior to boarding
against the No Fly and Selectee lists, CBP screens all passengers on
international flights--for border security purposes--against watch list
records in the Interagency Border Inspection System.[Footnote 46] CBP's
screening generally occurs after the aircraft is in flight.[Footnote
47] This layered or secondary screening opportunity does not exist for
passengers traveling domestically within the United States.
In 2006, the conference report accompanying the Department of Homeland
Security Appropriations Act, 2007, directed TSA to provide a detailed
plan describing key milestones and a schedule for checking names
against the full terrorist watch list in its planned Secure Flight
passenger prescreening program if the administration believes a
security vulnerability exists under the current process of checking
names against only the No Fly and Selectee lists.[Footnote 48]
According to TSA, the administration has concluded that non-use of the
full watch list does not constitute a security vulnerability; however,
TSA did not explain the basis for this determination. Also, DHS's
Office for Civil Rights and Civil Liberties emphasized that there is a
strong argument against increasing the number of watch list records TSA
uses to prescreen passengers. Specifically, the office noted that if
more records were used, the number of misidentifications would expand
to unjustifiable proportions, increasing administrative costs within
DHS, without a measurable increase in security. The office also noted
that an expansion of the No Fly and Selectee lists could even alert a
greater number of individuals to their watch list status, compromising
security rather than advancing it. Further, according to the office, as
the number of U.S. citizens denied and delayed boarding on domestic
flights increases, so does the interest in maintaining watch list
records that are as accurate as possible. Also, the office noted that
an increase in denied and delayed boarding of flights could generate
volumes of complaints or queries that exceed the current capabilities
of the watch list redress process.
DHS Agencies Are Addressing Incidents of Persons on the Watch List
Passing Undetected through Screening; TSC Has Ongoing Initiatives That
Could Help Reduce This Vulnerability:
Key frontline screening agencies within DHS--CBP, U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services, and TSA--are separately taking actions to address
potential vulnerabilities in terrorist watch list-related screening. A
particular concern is that individuals on the watch list not pass
undetected through agency screening. According to the screening
agencies, some of these incidents--commonly referred to as false
negatives--have occurred. Irrespective of whether such incidents are
isolated aberrations or not, any individual on the watch list who
passes undetected through agency screening constitutes a vulnerability.
Regarding other ameliorative efforts, TSC has ongoing initiatives that
could help reduce false negatives, such as improving the quality of
watch list data.
Key Frontline Screening Agencies in DHS Are Separately Addressing
Screening Vulnerabilities:
CBP, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, and TSA have begun to
take actions to address incidents of subjects of watch list records
passing undetected through agency screening. The efforts of each of
these three DHS component agencies are discussed in the following
sections, respectively. Generally, as indicated, positive steps have
been initiated by each agency. Given the potential consequences of any
given incident, it is particularly important that relevant component
agencies have mechanisms in place to systematically monitor such
incidents, determine causes, and implement appropriate corrective
actions as expeditiously as possible.
U.S. Customs and Border Protection Is Studying Cases Where Some
Subjects of Watch List Records Were Not Detected by Screening at Ports
of Entry:
During our field visits in spring 2006 to selected ports of entry, CBP
officers informed us of several incidents involving individuals on the
watch list who were not detected until after they had been processed
and admitted into the United States.[Footnote 49] In response to our
inquiry at CBP headquarters in May 2006, agency officials acknowledged
that there have been such incidents. CBP did not maintain aggregated
data on the number of these incidents nationwide or the specific
causes, but it did identify possible reasons for failing to detect
someone on the watch list. Subsequently, in further response to our
inquiries, CBP created a working group to study the causes of incidents
involving individuals on the watch list who were not detected by port-
of-entry screening. The working group, coordinated by the National
Targeting Center, is composed of subject matter experts representing
the policy, technical, and operations facets within CBP. According to
headquarters officials, the group is responsible for (1) identifying
and recommending policy solutions within CBP and (2) coordinating any
corrective technical changes within CBP and with TSC and NCTC, as
appropriate. The working group held its first meeting in early 2007.
According to CBP, some corrective actions and measures have already
been identified and are in the process of being implemented.
Agencies Are Working on Solutions to Prevent Unauthorized Applicants
for Citizenship and Other Immigration Benefits from Getting through
Agency Screening:
Agencies are working to eliminate shortcomings in screening processes
that have resulted in unauthorized applicants for citizenship and other
immigration benefits getting through agency screening. The cognizant
agency, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, is to screen all
individuals who apply for U.S. citizenship or other immigration
benefits--such as work authorization--for information relevant to their
eligibility for these benefits. According to U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services officials, the agency does not maintain aggregated
data on the number of times the initial screening has failed to
identify individuals who are subjects of watch list records or the
specific causes. The officials noted, however, that for certain
applicants--including individuals seeking long-term benefits such as
permanent citizenship, lawful permanent residence, or asylum--
additional screening against watch list records is conducted. This
additional screening has generated some positive matches to watch list
records, whereas these matches were not detected during the initial
checks.[Footnote 50]
According to U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, each instance
of individuals on the watch list getting through agency screening is
reviewed on a case-by-case basis to determine the cause, with
appropriate follow-up and corrective action taken, if needed. As a
prospective enhancement, in April 2007, U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services entered into a memorandum of understanding with
TSC. If implemented, this enhancement could allow U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Services to conduct more thorough and efficient searches of
watch list records during the screening of benefit applicants.
A Final Rule and a Planned Prescreening Program Could Help Address the
Issue of Individuals on the No Fly List Being Inadvertently Allowed to
Fly:
In the past, there have been a number of known cases in which
individuals who were on the No Fly list passed undetected through
airlines' prescreening of passengers and flew on international flights
bound to or from the United States, according to TSA data. These
individuals were subsequently identified in-flight by other means--
specifically, screening of passenger manifests conducted by CBP's
National Targeting Center. However, the onboard security threats
required an immediate counterterrorism response, which in some
instances resulted in diverting the aircraft to a location other than
its original destination. TSA provided various reasons why an
individual who is on the No Fly list may not be detected by air
carriers during their comparisons with the No Fly list. However, TSA
had not analyzed the extent to which each cause contributed to such
incidents. According to TSA, the agency's regulatory office is
responsible for initiating investigative and corrective actions with
the respective air carrier, if needed.
For international flights bound to or from the United States, two
separate screening processes occur. In addition to the initial
prescreening conducted by the airlines in accordance with TSA
requirements, CBP's National Targeting Center screens passengers
against watch list records in the Interagency Border Inspection System
using information that is collected from air carriers' passenger
manifests, which contain information obtained directly from government-
issued passports. Specifically, for passengers flying internationally,
airlines are required to provide passenger manifest data obtained at
check-in from all passengers to CBP.[Footnote 51] Presently, CBP
requires airlines to transmit the passenger data no later than 15
minutes prior to departure for outbound flights and no later than 15
minutes after departure for inbound flights.[Footnote 52] Because the
transmission of this information occurs so close to the aircraft's
departure, the National Targeting Center's screening of the information
against watch list records in the Interagency Border Inspection System-
-which includes a check of records in the No Fly list--often is not
completed until after the aircraft is already in the air. If this
screening produces a positive match to the No Fly list, the National
Targeting Center is to coordinate with other federal agencies to
determine what actions to take.
Procedures described in the final rule issued by CBP and published in
the Federal Register on August 23, 2007, could help mitigate instances
of individuals on the No Fly list boarding international flights bound
to or from the United States. Specifically, the rule will require air
carriers to either transmit complete passenger manifests to CBP no
later than 30 minutes prior to the securing of the aircraft doors, or
transmit manifest information on an individual basis as each passenger
checks in for the flight up to but no later than the securing of the
aircraft. When implemented (the rule is to take effect on February 19,
2008), CBP should be better positioned to identify individuals on the
No Fly list before an international flight is airborne.[Footnote 53]
Regarding domestic flights within the United States, there is no second
screening opportunity using watch list-related information. Rather, the
airlines are responsible for prescreening passengers prior to boarding
in accordance with TSA requirements and using the No Fly and Selectee
lists provided by TSA. Although TSA has been mandated to assume
responsibility for conducting the watch list screening function from
the airline industry, the agency's proposed prescreening program, known
as Secure Flight, has not yet been implemented.[Footnote 54] Under the
Secure Flight program, TSA plans to take over from aircraft operators
the responsibility for comparing identifying information on airline
passengers against watch list records. We have reported and TSA has
acknowledged significant challenges in developing and implementing the
Secure Flight program.[Footnote 55] Last year, TSA suspended Secure
Flight's development to reassess, or rebaseline, the program. The
rebaselining effort included reassessing the program goals, the
expected benefits and capabilities, and the estimated schedules and
costs. According to TSC officials who have been working with TSA to
support implementation of Secure Flight, the program could help to
reduce potential vulnerabilities in the prescreening of airline
passengers on domestic flights.
The Terrorist Screening Center Has Various Ongoing or Planned
Initiatives That Could Help Reduce Vulnerabilities in Watch List-
Related Screening:
To help reduce vulnerabilities in watch list-related screening, TSC has
ongoing initiatives to improve the effectiveness of screening and
ensure the accuracy of data. Also, prospectively, TSC anticipates
developing a capability to link biometric data to supplement name-based
screening.
Improving the Effectiveness of Screening: Search Engine Technology and
Direct-Query Capability:
Generally, to handle the large volumes of travelers and others who must
be screened, federal agencies and most airlines use computer-driven
algorithms to rapidly compare the names of individuals against
applicable terrorist watch list records.[Footnote 56] In the name-
matching process, the number of likely matching records returned for
manual review depends partly upon the sensitivity thresholds of the
algorithms to variations in name spelling or representations of names
from other languages. Screening agencies, and airlines in accordance
with TSA requirements, have discretion in setting these thresholds,
which can have operational implications. If a threshold is set
relatively high, for example, more names may be cleared and fewer
flagged as possible matches, increasing the risk of false negatives--
that is, failing to identify an individual whose name is on the
terrorist watch list. Conversely, if a threshold is set relatively low,
more individuals who do not warrant additional scrutiny may be flagged
(false positives), with fewer cleared through an automated process. A
primary factor in designing a computerized name-matching process is the
need to balance minimizing the possibility of generating false
negatives, while not generating an unacceptable number of false
positives (misidentifications).
To help ensure awareness of best practices among agencies, TSC has
formed and chairs an interagency working group--the Federal Identity
Match Search Engine Performance Standards Working Group--that met
initially in December 2005.[Footnote 57] An objective of the working
group is to provide voluntary guidance for federal agencies that use
identity matching search engine technology. Essentially, the
prospective guidance is intended to improve the effectiveness of
identity matching across agencies by, among other means, assessing
which algorithms or search engines are the most effective for screening
specific types or categories of names. According to TSC, three agencies
have volunteered to participate in pilot programs in the summer of
2007, after which a target date for completing the initiative to
develop and provide voluntary guidance to screening agencies will be
set. If effectively implemented, this initiative could help reduce
potential vulnerabilities in screening processes that are based on
limitations in agencies' computerized name-matching programs.
TSC is also developing a process whereby screening agencies can
directly "query" the center's consolidated terrorist screening
database. TSC noted that a direct-query capability will ensure that all
possible hits against the database will be directed automatically into
the center's resolution process to determine if they are positive
matches, thereby ensuring consistency in the government's approach to
screening. Currently, TSC must rely upon the screening agencies to
contact the center--generally by telephone or fax--when they have
possible hits. As of May 2007, TSC had not developed specific time
frames for implementing this initiative. According to TSC, the
technology for a direct-query capability is in place, but related
agreements with screening agencies were still being negotiated.
Improving Data Quality:
Preventing incidents of individuals on the watch list passing
undetected through agency screening is dependent partly on the quality
and accuracy of data in TSC's consolidated terrorist watch list. In
June 2005, the Department of Justice's Office of the Inspector General
reported that its review of TSC's consolidated watch list found several
problems--such as inconsistent record counts and duplicate records,
lack of data fields for some records, and unclear sources for some
records.[Footnote 58] Among other things, the Inspector General
recommended that TSC develop procedures to regularly review and test
the information contained in the consolidated terrorist watch list to
ensure that the data are complete, accurate, and nonduplicative. In its
September 2007 follow-up report, the Inspector General noted that TSC
has enhanced its efforts to ensure the quality of watch list data and
has increased the number of staff assigned to data quality management.
However, the Inspector General also determined that TSC's management of
the watch list continues to have weaknesses.[Footnote 59]
TSC has ongoing quality-assurance initiatives to identify and correct
incomplete or inaccurate records that could contribute to either false
negatives or false positives. The center's director and principal
deputy director stressed to us that quality of data is a high priority
and also is a continuing challenge, particularly given that the
database is dynamic, changing frequently with additions, deletions, and
modifications. The officials noted the equal importance of ensuring
that (1) the names of known and appropriately suspected terrorists are
included on the watch list and (2) the names of any individuals who are
mistakenly listed or are cleared of any nexus to terrorism are removed.
In this regard, the officials explained that the TSC's standard
operating practices include at least three opportunities to review
records. First, TSC staff--including subject matter experts detailed to
the center from other agencies--review each incoming record submitted
(nominated) to the center for inclusion on the consolidated watch list.
Second, every time there is a screening encounter--for example, a port-
of-entry screening of an individual that generates an actual or a
potential match with a watch list record--that record is reviewed
again. And third, records are reviewed when individuals express their
concerns or seek correction of any inaccurate data--a process often
referred to as redress.[Footnote 60]
Future Enhancement: Linking to Biometric Data:
Conceptually, biometric technologies based on fingerprint recognition,
facial recognition, or other physiological characteristics can be used
to screen travelers against a consolidated database, such as the
terrorist watch list.[Footnote 61] However, TSC presently does not have
this capability, although use of biometric information to supplement
name-based screening is planned as a future enhancement. Specifically,
TSC's strategy is not to replicate existing biometric data systems.
Rather, the strategy, according to TSC's director and principal deputy
director, is to develop a "pointer" capability to facilitate the online
linking of name-based searches to relevant biometric systems, such as
the FBI's Integrated Automated Fingerprint Identification System--a
computerized system for storing, comparing, and exchanging fingerprint
data in a digital format that contains the largest criminal biometric
database in the world. TSC officials recognize that even biometric
systems have screening limitations, such as relevant federal agencies
may have no fingerprints or other biometrics to correlate with many of
the biographical records in the TSC's watch list. For instance, watch
list records may be based on intelligence gathered by electronic wire
taps or other methods that involve no opportunity to obtain biometric
data. Nonetheless, TSC officials anticipate that biometric information,
when available, can be especially useful for confirming matches to
watch list records when individuals use false identities or aliases.
The U.S. Government Has Made Progress in Using the Watch List but a
Strategy and Plan Supported by a Governance Structure with Clear Lines
of Authority Would Enhance Use and Effectiveness:
Although the U.S. government has made progress in using watch list
records to support terrorism-related screening, there are additional
opportunities for using the list. Internationally, the Department of
State has made arrangements with six foreign governments to exchange
terrorist watch list information and is in negotiations with several
other countries. Within the private sector, some critical
infrastructure components are presently using watch list records to
screen current or prospective employees, but many components are not.
DHS has not established guidelines to govern the use of watch list
records for appropriate screening opportunities in the private sector
that have a substantial bearing on homeland security. Further, all
federal departments and agencies have not taken action in accordance
with HSPD-6 and HSPD-11 to identify and describe all appropriate
screening opportunities that should use watch list records. According
to TSC, determining whether new screening opportunities are appropriate
requires evaluation of multiple factors, including operational and
legal issues--particularly related to privacy and civil liberties. To
date, appropriate opportunities have not been systematically identified
or evaluated, in part because the federal government lacks an up-to-
date strategy and a prioritized investment and implementation plan for
optimizing the use and effectiveness of terrorist-related screening.
Moreover, the lines of authority and responsibility to provide
governmentwide coordination and oversight of such screening are not
clear, and existing entities with watch list responsibilities may not
have the necessary authority, structure, or resources to assume this
role.
The Department of State Has Made Progress in Efforts to Exchange
Terrorist Watch List Information with Foreign Governments:
According to the 9/11 Commission, the U.S. government cannot meet its
obligations to the American people to prevent the entry of terrorists
into the United States without a major effort to collaborate with other
governments.[Footnote 62] The commission noted that the U.S. government
should do more to exchange terrorist information with trusted allies
and raise U.S. and global border security standards for travel and
border crossing over the medium and longterm through extensive
international cooperation. HSPD-6 required the Secretary of State to
develop a proposal for the President's approval for enhancing
cooperation with certain foreign governments--beginning with those
countries for which the United States has waived visa requirements--to
establish appropriate access to terrorism screening information of the
participating governments.[Footnote 63] This information would be used
to enhance existing U.S. government screening processes.
The Department of State determined that the most effective way to
obtain this information was to seek bilateral arrangements to share
information on a reciprocal basis. The Department of State's Bureau of
Consular Affairs and the Homeland Security Council co-chair an
interagency working group to implement the international cooperation
provisions of HSPD-6.[Footnote 64] According to the Department of
State, there is no single document or proposal that sets forth the
working group's approach or plan. Rather, a series of consensus
decisions specify how to proceed, often on a country-by-country basis
in order to accommodate each country's laws and political
sensitivities. The working group met six times from September 2005
through December 2006 to discuss operational and procedural issues
related to sharing terrorism information and to update working group
members on the status of bilateral negotiations with foreign
governments.
According to the Department of State, the department's Bureau of
Consular Affairs has approached all countries for which the United
States has waived visa requirements and two non-visa waiver program
countries with a proposal to exchange terrorist screening information.
From October through December 2006, interagency teams visited six
countries to brief government officials and also met in Washington,
D.C., with representatives of a number of other countries. According to
the Department of State, interagency working groups at U.S. embassies
around the world remain actively engaged with foreign counterparts and
coordinate discussions on international sharing of terrorist screening
information with a Department of State team in Washington, D.C.
Two countries have been sharing terrorist screening information with
the United States since before September 11, 2001, and that information
has been integrated into TSC's consolidated watch list and, as
applicable, into screening agencies' databases. According to the
Department of State, since 2006, the United States has made
arrangements to share terrorist screening information with four new
foreign government partners and is in negotiations with several other
countries. The department noted that it had also received indications
of interest from governments of non-visa waiver countries.
DHS Has Not Finalized Guidelines for Using Watch List Records to
Support Private Sector Screening:
Although federal departments and agencies have made progress in using
terrorist watch list records to support private sector screening
processes, there are additional opportunities for using records in the
private sector. However, DHS has not yet finalized guidelines to govern
such use. Specifically, HSPD-6 required the Secretary of Homeland
Security to develop guidelines to govern the use of terrorist
information, as defined by the directive, to support various screening
processes, including private sector screening processes that have a
substantial bearing on homeland security. The interagency memorandum of
understanding that implements HSPD-6 also required the Secretary of
Homeland Security to establish necessary guidelines and criteria to (a)
govern the mechanisms by which private sector entities can access the
watch list and (b) initiate appropriate law enforcement or other
governmental action, if any, when a person submitted for query by a
private sector entity is identified as a person on the watch list.
According to the Associate Director of the Screening Coordination
Office within DHS, in developing guidelines to govern private sector
screening against watch list records, the department planned to partner
with the National Infrastructure Advisory Council.[Footnote 65] The
council had previously reported that the private sector wants to be
informed about threats and potential terrorists. Specifically, in its
July 2006 report on public and private sector intelligence
coordination, the National Infrastructure Advisory Council noted that
chief executive officers of private sector corporations expect to be
informed when the government is aware of a specific, credible threat to
their employees, physical plants, or cyber assets.[Footnote 66] The
report also noted that chief executive officers expect to be informed
if the government knows that their respective company has inadvertently
employed a terrorist.
According to DHS's Office of Infrastructure Protection and
Infrastructure Partnerships Division, employees in parts of some
components of the private sector are being screened against watch list
records, including certain individuals who have access to the protected
or vital areas of nuclear power plants, work in airports, and transport
hazardous materials. However, many critical infrastructure components
are not using watch list records. The office also indicated that
several components of the private sector are interested in screening
employees against watch list records or expanding current screening. In
its June 2007 comments on a draft of this report (see app. V), DHS
noted that the Screening Coordination Office has drafted initial
guidelines to govern the use of watch list records to support private
sector screening processes and was in the process of working with
federal stakeholders to finalize this document. However, DHS did not
provide specific plans and time frames for finalizing the guidelines.
Establishing guidelines to govern the private sector's use of watch
list records, in accordance with HSPD-6, would help in identifying and
implementing appropriate screening opportunities.
Federal Departments and Agencies Have Not Identified All Appropriate
Opportunities for Using Watch List Records to Detect and Deter
Terrorists:
Although required to do so by presidential directives, federal
departments and agencies have not identified all appropriate screening
opportunities that should use terrorist watch list records.
Specifically, HSPD-6 required the heads of executive departments and
agencies to conduct screening using the terrorist watch list at all
appropriate opportunities, and to report the opportunities at which
such screening shall and shall not be conducted to the Attorney
General. TSC provided an initial report on screening opportunities to
the Attorney General on December 15, 2003.[Footnote 67] According to
the report, TSC hosted a meeting with representatives of more than 30
agencies in October 2003 to discuss the HSPD-6 requirement. At the
meeting, TSC requested that the agencies identify appropriate screening
opportunities and report them to TSC. However, the report noted that
based on the agency responses TSC received, no meaningful or
comprehensive report on screening opportunities could be produced at
that time. TSC provided additional reports to the Attorney General in
April, July, and December 2004. These reports also did not contain
comprehensive information on all screening opportunities, consistent
with HSPD-6.
According to the Department of Justice, with the issuance of HSPD-11,
which "builds upon" HSPD-6, the Attorney General's responsibilities for
identifying additional screening opportunities were largely overtaken
by DHS which, in coordination with the Department of Justice and other
agencies, was to create a comprehensive strategy to enhance the
effectiveness of terrorist-related screening activities. Among other
things, the strategy was to include a description of the screening
opportunities for which terrorist-related screening would be applied.
DHS has taken some related actions but, as of June 2007, it had not
systematically identified all appropriate screening
opportunities.[Footnote 68] Absent a systematic approach to identifying
appropriate screening opportunities, TSC has been working with
individual agencies to identify such opportunities. According to TSC,
as of May 2007, the center was working on approximately 40 agreements
with various federal departments or agencies to use applicable portions
of the terrorist watch list.
Also, a systematic approach to identifying screening opportunities
would help the government determine if other uses of watch list records
are appropriate and should be implemented, including uses primarily
intended to assist in collecting information to support investigative
activities. Such coordinated collection of information for use in
investigations is one of the stated policy objectives for the watch
list. For example, during our review, TSC noted that screening domestic
airline passengers against watch list records in addition to those in
the No Fly and Selectee lists would have benefits, such as collecting
information on the movements of individuals with potential ties to
terrorism. According to TSC, other factors would need to be considered
in determining whether such screening is appropriate and should be
implemented, including privacy and civil liberties implications.
Moreover, it is not clear whether such screening is operationally
feasible, and if it were, whether TSC or some other agency would
perform the screening.
The U.S. Government Lacks an Updated Strategy and an Investment and
Implementation Plan for Enhancing the Use and Effectiveness of
Terrorist-Related Screening:
Since September 11, 2001, we, as well as the Administration, have
called for a more strategic approach to managing terrorist-related
information and using it for screening purposes. In April 2003, we made
recommendations for improving the information technology architecture
environment needed to support watch list-related screening and called
for short-and long-term strategies that would provide for (1) more
consolidated and standardized watch list information and (2) more
standardized policies and procedures for better sharing watch list data
and for addressing any legal issues or cultural barriers that affect
watch list sharing.[Footnote 69] Subsequently, in August 2004, HSPD-11
outlined the Administration's vision to develop comprehensive terrorist-
related screening procedures. Specifically, HSPD-11 required the
Secretary of Homeland Security--in coordination with the heads of
appropriate federal departments and agencies--to submit two reports to
the President (through the Assistant to the President for Homeland
Security) related to the government's use of the watch list. Among
other things, the first report was to outline a strategy to enhance the
effectiveness of terrorist-related screening activities by developing
comprehensive, coordinated, and systematic procedures and capabilities.
The second report was to provide a prioritized investment and
implementation plan for a systematic approach to terrorist-related
screening that optimizes detection and interdiction of suspected
terrorists and terrorist activities. The plan was to describe the
"scope, governance, principles, outcomes, milestones, training
objectives, metrics, costs, and schedule of activities" to enhance and
implement the U.S. government's terrorism-related screening policies.
According to DHS officials, the department submitted the required
strategy and the investment and implementation plan to the President in
November 2004. However, neither DHS nor the Homeland Security Council
would provide us copies of either report. Instead, officials from DHS's
Screening Coordination Office provided us a document that they said
contained department-specific information from the 2004 strategy and
implementation plan.[Footnote 70] According to DHS officials, because
the strategy and plan were products of an interagency process, the
Screening Coordination Office believed that it needed to redact
information that pertained to other departments' processes, programs,
or activities. The DHS document contains information on the
department's efforts to catalogue its terrorist-related screening
activities and identifies significant issues that inhibit effective
terrorist-related screening. For example, according to the document,
"no one entity within the department is responsible for defining roles
and responsibilities for terrorist-related screening, identifying gaps
and overlaps in screening opportunities, prioritizing investments,
measuring performance, or setting technical and non-technical
standards." Also, the document notes that DHS components may have only
limited knowledge of what screening is currently being performed by
others within the department, because there is no coordination
mechanism to share information on these activities.
DHS acknowledged that it has not updated either the strategy or the
plan since the 2004 reports, despite the fact that some aspects of the
strategy and plan had been overcome by other events, such as results of
the "Second Stage Review" initiated in March 2005 by the Secretary of
Homeland Security.[Footnote 71] Moreover, according to DHS screening
managers, the departmental office responsible for updating these
documents--the Screening Coordination Office--was not established until
July 2006 and has had other screening-related priorities. The officials
noted that the Screening Coordination Office is working on various
aspects of terrorist-related screening, but that work remains in
updating the strategy and the investment and implementation plan.
Without an updated strategy and plan, the federal government lacks
mechanisms to support a comprehensive and coordinated approach to
terrorist-related screening envisioned by the Administration, including
mechanisms for building upon existing systems and best practices. Also,
the federal government has not taken necessary actions to promote the
effective use of watch list records at all appropriate screening
opportunities, including private sector screening processes that have a
substantial bearing on homeland security. An updated strategy and an
investment and implementation plan that address the elements prescribed
by HSPD-11--particularly clearly articulated principles, milestones,
and outcome measures--could also provide a basis for establishing
governmentwide priorities for screening, assessing progress toward
policy goals and intended outcomes, ensuring that any needed changes
are implemented, and responding to issues our work identified, such as
potential screening vulnerabilities and interagency coordination
challenges.
Existing Governance Structures May Not Provide Necessary Oversight and
Coordination:
Recognizing that achievement of a coordinated and comprehensive
approach to terrorist-related screening involves numerous entities
within and outside the federal government, HSPD-11 called for DHS to
address governance in the investment and implementation plan. To date,
however, no governance structure with clear lines of responsibility and
authority has been established to monitor governmentwide screening
activities--such as assessing gaps or vulnerabilities in screening
processes and identifying, prioritizing, and implementing new screening
opportunities. Lacking clear lines of authority and responsibility for
terrorist-related screening activities that transcend the individual
missions and more parochial operations of each department and agency,
it is difficult for the federal government to monitor its efforts and
to identify best practices or common corrective actions that could help
to ensure that watch list records are used as effectively as possible.
More clearly defined responsibility and authority to implement and
monitor crosscutting initiatives could help ensure a more coordinated
and comprehensive approach to terrorist-related screening by providing
applicable departments and agencies important guidance, information,
and mechanisms for addressing screening issues.
Until the governance component of the investment and implementation
plan is clearly articulated and established, it will not be possible to
assess whether its structure is capable of providing the oversight
necessary for optimizing the use and effectiveness of terrorist-related
screening. Our interviews with responsible officials and our analysis
of department and agency missions suggest, however, that existing
organizations with watch list-related responsibilities may lack the
authority, resources, or will to assume this role. Specifically, DHS
screening officials told us that the department is the appropriate
entity for coordinating the development of the watch list strategy and
the related investment and implementation plan, but that it does not
have the authority or resources for providing the governmentwide
oversight needed to implement the strategy and plan or resolve
interagency issues. The Office of the Director of National Intelligence
and its NCTC also have important roles in watch list-related issues and
information-sharing activities, but officials there told us that the
agency is not suited for a governmentwide leadership role either,
primarily because its mission focuses on intelligence and information
sharing in support of screening but not on actual screening operations.
Likewise, since its inception, TSC has played a central role in
coordinating watch list-related activities governmentwide and has
established its own governance board--composed of senior-level agency
representatives from numerous departments and agencies--to provide
guidance concerning issues within TSC's mission and authority. While
this governance board could be suited to assume more of a leadership
role, its current authority is limited to TSC-specific issues, and it
would need additional authority to provide effective coordination of
terrorist-related screening activities and interagency issues
governmentwide.
Conclusions:
Managed by TSC, the terrorist watch list represents a major step
forward from the pre-September 11 environment of multiple,
disconnected, and incomplete watch lists throughout the government.
Today, the watch list is an integral component of the U.S. government's
counterterrorism efforts. However, our work indicates that there are
additional opportunities for reducing potential screening
vulnerabilities. It is important that responsible federal officials
assess the extent to which security vulnerabilities exist in screening
processes when agencies are not able to screen individuals on the watch
list to determine the level of threat the individuals pose because of
technical or operational reasons and--in consultation with TSC and
other agencies--determine whether alternative screening or other
mitigation activities should be considered. Our work also indicates the
need for a more coordinated and comprehensive approach to terrorist-
related screening through expanded use of the list and enhanced
collaboration and coordination within and outside the federal
government.
To further strengthen the ability of the U.S. government to protect
against acts of terrorism, HSPD-6 required the Secretary of Homeland
Security to develop guidelines to govern the use of terrorist
information to support various screening processes, including private
sector screening processes that have a substantial bearing on homeland
security. To date, however, DHS has not developed guidelines for the
private sector's use of watch list records in screening designed to
protect the nation's critical infrastructures. Currently, some but not
all relevant components of the private sector use the watch list to
screen for terrorist-related threats. Establishing clear guidelines to
comply with the presidential directive would help both the private
sector and DHS ensure that private sector entities are using watch list
records consistently, appropriately, and effectively to protect their
workers, visitors, and key critical assets.
HSPD-11 outlined the Administration's vision to implement a coordinated
and comprehensive approach to terrorist-related screening and directed
the Secretary of Homeland Security to coordinate with other federal
departments to develop (1) a strategy for a coordinated and
comprehensive approach to terrorist-related screening and (2) a
prioritized investment and implementation plan that describes the
scope, governance, principles, outcomes, milestones, training
objectives, metrics, costs, and schedule of activities necessary to
achieve the policy objectives of HSPD-11. DHS officials acknowledged
that work remains to update the strategy and the investment and
implementation plan. Without an up-to-date strategy and plan, agencies
and organizations that engage in terrorist-related screening activities
do not have a foundation for a coordinated approach that is driven by
an articulated set of core principles. Furthermore, lacking clearly
articulated principles, milestones, and outcome measures, the federal
government is not easily able to provide accountability and a basis for
monitoring to ensure that (1) the intended goals for, and expected
results of, terrorist screening are being achieved and (2) use of the
list is consistent with privacy and civil liberties. These plan
elements, which were prescribed by HSPD-11, are crucial for coordinated
and comprehensive use of terrorist-related screening data, as they
provide a platform to establish governmentwide priorities for
screening, assess progress toward policy goals and intended outcomes,
ensure that any needed changes are implemented, and respond to issues
that hinder effectiveness, such as the potential vulnerabilities and
interagency coordination challenges discussed in this report.
Although all elements of a strategy and an investment and
implementation plan cited in HSPD-11 are important to guide realization
of the most effective use of watch list data, addressing governance is
particularly vital, as achievement of a coordinated and comprehensive
approach to terrorist-related screening involves numerous entities
within and outside the federal government. Establishing a governance
structure with clearly defined responsibility and authority would help
ensure that agency efforts are coordinated and the federal government
has the means to monitor and analyze the outcomes of interagency
efforts and to address common problems efficiently and effectively. To
date, however, no clear lines of responsibility and authority have been
established to monitor governmentwide screening activities for shared
problems and solutions or best practices. Neither does any existing
entity clearly have the requisite authority for addressing various
governmentwide issues--such as assessing common gaps or vulnerabilities
in screening processes and identifying, prioritizing, and implementing
new screening opportunities. Indeed, current unresolved interagency
issues highlight the need for clearly defined leadership and
accountability for managing and overseeing watch list-related issues
across the individual departments and agencies, each of which has its
own mission and focus.
Recommendations for Executive Action:
To promote more comprehensive and coordinated use of terrorist-related
screening data to detect, identify, track, and interdict suspected
terrorists, we recommended a total of five actions in the restricted
version of this report.
First, in order to mitigate security vulnerabilities in terrorist watch
list screening processes, we recommended that the Secretary of Homeland
Security and the Director of the FBI assess to what extent there are
vulnerabilities in the current screening processes that arise when
screening agencies do not accept relevant records due to the designs of
their computer systems, the extent to which these vulnerabilities pose
a security risk, and what actions, if any, should be taken in response.
Further, we recommended the following three actions to enhance the use
of the consolidated terrorist watch list as a counterterrorism tool and
to help ensure its effectiveness:
* that the Secretary of Homeland Security in consultation with the
heads of other appropriate federal departments and agencies and private
sector entities, develop guidelines to govern the use of watch list
records to support private sector screening processes that have a
substantial bearing on homeland security, as called for in HSPD-6;
* that the Secretary of Homeland Security in consultation with the
heads of other appropriate federal departments, develop and submit to
the President through the Assistant to the President for Homeland
Security and Counterterrorism an updated strategy for a coordinated and
comprehensive approach to terrorist-related screening as called for in
HSPD-11, which among other things, (a) identifies all appropriate
screening opportunities to use watch list records to detect, identify,
track, and interdict individuals who pose a threat to homeland security
and (b) safeguards legal rights, including privacy and civil liberties;
and:
* that the Secretary of Homeland Security in consultation with the
heads of other appropriate federal departments, develop and submit to
the President through the Assistant to the President for Homeland
Security and Counterterrorism an updated investment and implementation
plan that describes the scope, governance, principles, outcomes,
milestones, training objectives, metrics, costs, and schedule of
activities necessary for implementing a terrorist-related screening
strategy, as called for in HSPD-11.
Finally, to help ensure that governmentwide terrorist-related screening
efforts have the oversight, accountability, and guidance necessary to
achieve the Administration's vision of a comprehensive and coordinated
approach, we recommended that the Assistant to the President for
Homeland Security and Counterterrorism ensure that the governance
structure proposed by the plan affords clear and adequate
responsibility and authority to (a) provide monitoring and analysis of
watch list screening efforts governmentwide, (b) respond to issues that
hinder effectiveness, and (c) assess progress toward intended outcomes.
Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:
We provided a draft of the restricted version of this report for
comments to the Homeland Security Council, the Office of the Director
of National Intelligence, and the Departments of Homeland Security,
Justice, and State. We also provided relevant portions of a draft of
the restricted version of this report for comments to the Social
Security Administration. We received written responses from each
entity, except for the Homeland Security Council.
In its response, DHS noted that it agreed with and supported our work
and stated that it had already begun to address issues identified in
our report's findings. The response noted that DHS, working closely
with the FBI and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence,
has ongoing efforts to ensure that potential watch list vulnerabilities
are identified and addressed and that watch list records and screening
programs are appropriate. Also, DHS noted that at the time of our audit
work, the department's Screening Coordination Office was relatively
new--established in July 2006--but had subsequently added key staff and
begun the critical work of advancing DHS screening programs and
opportunities. According to DHS, the office has drafted initial
guidelines to govern the use of watch list records to support private
sector screening processes and is working with federal stakeholders to
finalize this document, but the department did not provide specific
plans and time frames for finalizing the guidelines. The department
also noted that it works closely with all DHS and federal offices
involved in screening initiatives and has begun appropriate outreach to
the private sector. Further, DHS noted that its Screening Coordination
Office is working within the department to advance a comprehensive
approach to terrorist-related screening and that DHS would review and
appropriately update the department's investment and implementation
plans for screening opportunities. However, DHS did not specifically
address our recommendations related to updating the governmentwide
terrorist-related screening strategy and the investment and
implementation plan, which is to include the scope, governance,
principles, outcomes, milestones, training objectives, metrics, costs,
and schedule of activities necessary for implementing the strategy. In
our view, an updated strategy and plan are important for helping to
ensure a coordinated and comprehensive approach to terrorist-related
screening as called for in HSPD-11. The full text of DHS's written
comments is reprinted in appendix V. DHS also provided technical
comments, which we incorporated in this report where appropriate.
The FBI, responding on behalf of the Department of Justice, commented
that the report correctly characterized the FBI's criteria for
nominating individuals for inclusion on the watch list. Also, the FBI
response noted that to ensure the protection of civil rights and
prevent law enforcement officials from taking invasive enforcement
action on individuals misidentified as being on the watch list, the
Violent Gang and Terrorist Organization File is designed to not accept
certain watch list records. The FBI explained that while law
enforcement encounters of individuals on the watch list provide
significant information, unnecessary detentions or queries of
misidentified persons would be counterproductive and potentially
damaging to the efforts of the FBI to investigate and combat terrorism.
Because of these operational concerns, the FBI noted that our
recommendation to assess the extent of vulnerabilities in current
screening processes that arise when the Violent Gang and Terrorist
Organization File cannot accept certain watch list records has been
completed and the vulnerability has been determined to be low or
nonexistent. In our view, however, recognizing operational concerns
does not constitute assessing vulnerabilities. Thus, while we
understand the FBI's operational concerns, we maintain it is still
important that the FBI assess to what extent vulnerabilities or
security risks are raised by not screening against certain watch list
records and what actions, if any, should be taken in response.
With respect to private sector screening, the FBI commented that it has
assigned staff to assist the DHS Screening Coordination Office with
drafting related screening guidelines. Finally, the FBI commented that
the language of our recommendation related to governance of the watch-
listing process may be interpreted to have some overlap with existing
mandates carried out by TSC under HSPD-6. Specifically, the FBI noted
that governance of the watch-listing process is better suited to be a
component of TSC, rather than DHS. The FBI explained that DHS has no
authority or provisions for establishing any watch-listing procedures
for anyone other than DHS component agencies, whereas TSC has
established a governance board composed of senior members from the
nominating and screening agencies, the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence, and the Homeland Security Council to monitor and
update the watch listing process. The FBI further explained that these
members meet regularly and address terrorist watch-listing issues
ranging from nominations and encounters to dissemination of information
and intelligence collected, and that all decisions approved by the
governance board are presented at the Deputies Meeting chaired by the
White House. The FBI believes this is the appropriate forum for
obtaining a commitment from all of the entities involved in the watch-
listing process.
We recognize that TSC and its governance board have played and will
continue to play a central role in coordinating watch list-related
activities governmentwide. However, as discussed in this report, TSC's
governance board is currently responsible for providing guidance
concerning issues within TSC's mission and authority and would need
additional authority to provide effective coordination of terrorist-
related screening activities and interagency issues governmentwide. We
are not recommending that a new governance structure be created that
overlaps with existing mandates or activities currently carried out by
TSC and other entities. Rather, we are recommending that a governance
structure be established that affords clear and adequate responsibility
and authority to (a) provide monitoring and analysis of watch list
screening efforts governmentwide, (b) respond to issues that hinder
effectiveness, and (c) assess progress toward intended outcomes. The
FBI also provided technical comments, which we incorporated in this
report where appropriate.
The Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the Department of
State, and the Social Security Administration provided technical
comments only, which we incorporated in this report where appropriate.
As arranged with your offices, we plan no further distribution of this
report until 30 days after the date of this report. At that time, we
will send copies of the report to interested congressional committees
and subcommittees.
If you or your staff have any questions about this report or wish to
discuss the matter further, please contact me at (202) 512-8777 or
larencee@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional
Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this
report. Other key contributors to this report were Danny R. Burton,
Virginia A. Chanley, R. Eric Erdman, Michele C. Fejfar, Jonathon C.
Fremont, Kathryn E. Godfrey, Richard B. Hung, Thomas F. Lombardi, Donna
L. Miller, Raul Quintero, and Ronald J. Salo.
Signed by:
Eileen Larence:
Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues:
[End of section]
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:
Objectives:
In response to a request from the Chairman and the Ranking Member of
the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, the
Chairman and the Ranking Member of the Permanent Subcommittee on
Investigations, and the Chairman and the Ranking Member of the House
Committee on Homeland Security, we addressed the following questions:
* In general, what standards do the National Counterterrorism Center
(NCTC) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) use in determining
which individuals are appropriate for inclusion on the Terrorist
Screening Center's (TSC) consolidated watch list?
* Since TSC became operational in December 2003, how many times have
screening and law enforcement agencies positively matched individuals
to terrorist watch list records, and what do the results or outcomes of
these encounters indicate about the role of the watch list as a
counterterrorism tool?
* To what extent do the principal screening agencies whose missions
most frequently and directly involve interactions with travelers check
against all records in TSC's consolidated watch list? If the entire
watch list is not being checked, why not, what potential
vulnerabilities exist, and what actions are being planned to address
these vulnerabilities?
* To what extent are Department of Homeland Security component agencies
monitoring known incidents in which subjects of watch list records pass
undetected through screening processes, and what corrective actions
have been implemented or are being planned to address these
vulnerabilities?
* What actions has the U.S. government taken to ensure that the
terrorist watch list is used as effectively as possible, governmentwide
and in other appropriate venues?
Scope and Methodology:
In addressing these questions, we reviewed TSC's standard operating
procedures and other relevant documentation, including statistics on
screening encounters with individuals who were positively matched to
terrorist watch list records, and we interviewed TSC officials,
including the director and the principal deputy director. Further, we
reviewed documentation and interviewed senior officials from the FBI's
Counterterrorism Division and the principal screening agencies whose
missions most frequently and directly involve interactions with
travelers. Specifically, at the Transportation Security Administration
(TSA), we examined the screening of air passengers prior to their
boarding a flight; at U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), we
examined the screening of travelers entering the United States through
ports of entry; and at the Department of State, we examined the
screening of nonimmigrant visa applicants. We also visited a
nonprobability sample of screening agencies and investigative agencies
in geographic areas of four states (California, Michigan, New York, and
Texas).[Footnote 72] We chose these locations on the basis of
geographic variation and other factors. More details about the scope
and methodology of our work regarding each of the objectives are
presented in the following sections, respectively.
Standards Used by NCTC and the FBI in Determining Which Individuals Are
Appropriate for Inclusion on TSC's Consolidated Watch List:
To ascertain the general standards used in determining which
individuals are appropriate for inclusion on TSC's consolidated watch
list, we reviewed available documentation. In particular, we reviewed:
* Homeland Security Presidential Directive 6, which specifies that
TSC's consolidated watch list is to contain information about
individuals "known or appropriately suspected to be or have been
engaged in conduct constituting, in preparation for, in aid of, or
related to terrorism;"[Footnote 73]
* an NCTC document on building a single database of known and suspected
terrorists for the U.S. government, which provides NCTC's standards for
including individuals on the watch list;
* the Attorney General's Guidelines for FBI National Security
Investigations and Foreign Intelligence Collection, which provide
standards for opening FBI international terrorism investigations; and:
* the Attorney General's Guidelines on General Crimes, Racketeering
Enterprise and Terrorist Enterprise Investigations, which provide
standards for opening FBI domestic terrorism investigations.
We discussed implementation of applicable guidance with responsible
NCTC and FBI Counterterrorism Division officials. However, we did not
audit or evaluate agencies' compliance with the guidance. For instance,
we did not review or assess the derogatory information related to
terrorist watch list records, partly because such information involved
ongoing counterterrorism investigations. Also, a primary agency that
collects information on known or suspected terrorists--the Central
Intelligence Agency--declined to meet with us or provide us with
documentation on its watch list-related activities.
Number of Times That Screening and Law Enforcement Agencies Have
Positively Matched Individuals to the Watch List: Results or Outcomes:
From TSC, we obtained statistics on the number of positive encounters,
that is, the number of times that individuals have been positively
matched during screening against terrorist watch list records.
Generally, the statistics cover the period from December 2003 (when TSC
began operations) through May 2007. To the extent possible on the basis
of available information, we worked with the applicable agencies
(particularly the FBI, CBP, TSA, and the Department of State) to
quantify the results or outcomes of these positive encounters--which
included actions ranging from arrests and visa denials to questioning
and releasing individuals. Further, we inquired about the existence and
resolution of any issues regarding interagency collaboration in
managing encounters with individuals on the terrorist watch list.
Moreover, in our interviews with officials at TSC and the frontline
screening agencies and in the law enforcement and intelligence
communities, we obtained perspectives on whether (and how) watch list
screening has enhanced the U.S. government's counterterrorism efforts.
Extent That Screening and Law Enforcement Agencies Check against All
Records in the TSC's Consolidated Watch List:
We determined from TSC what subsets of records from the consolidated
watch list are exported for use by the respective frontline screening
agencies and law enforcement. Each day, TSC exports subsets of the
consolidated watch list to federal government databases used by
agencies that conduct terrorism-related screening. Specifically, we
focused on exports of records to the following agencies' databases:
* Department of Homeland Security's Interagency Border Inspection
System. Among other users, CBP officers use the Interagency Border
Inspection System to screen travelers entering the United States at
international ports of entry, which include land border crossings along
the Canadian and Mexican borders, sea ports, and U.S. airports for
international flight arrivals.
* Department of State's Consular Lookout and Support System. This
system is the primary sensitive but unclassified database used by
consular officers abroad to screen the names of visa applicants to
identify terrorists and other aliens who are potentially ineligible for
visas based on criminal histories or other reasons specified by federal
statute.
* FBI's Violent Gang and Terrorist Organization File. This file, which
is a component of the FBI's National Crime Information Center, is
accessible by federal, state, and local law enforcement officers for
screening in conjunction with arrests, detentions, or other criminal
justice purposes.
* TSA's No Fly and Selectee lists. TSA provides updated No Fly and
Selectee lists to airlines for use in prescreening passengers. Through
the issuance of security directives, the agency requires that airlines
use these lists to screen passengers prior to boarding.
The scope of our work included inquiries regarding why only certain
records are exported for screening rather than use of the entire
consolidated watch list by all agencies. At TSC and the frontline
screening agencies, we interviewed senior officials and we reviewed
mission responsibilities, standard operating procedures, and
documentation regarding the technical capabilities of the respective
agency's database.
Extent That Screening Agencies Monitor Incidents in Which Subjects of
Watch List Records Pass Undetected through Screening Processes;
Corrective Actions Implemented or Planned to Address Vulnerabilities:
We inquired about incidents of subjects of watch list records who were
able to pass undetected through screening conducted by the various
frontline screening agencies or, at TSA direction, airlines. More
specifically, we reviewed available documentation and interviewed
senior officials at the FBI, CBP, TSA, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
Services, and the Department of State regarding the frequency of such
incidents and the causes, as well as what corrective actions have been
implemented or planned to address vulnerabilities.
Actions the U.S. Government Has Taken to Ensure That the Terrorist
Watch List Is Used as Effectively as Possible:
Regarding actions taken by the U.S. government to ensure the effective
use of the watch list, we reviewed Homeland Security Presidential
Directive 6 and Homeland Security Presidential Directive 11, which
address the integration and use of screening information and
comprehensive terrorist-related screening procedures. Generally, these
directives require federal departments and agencies to identify all
appropriate opportunities or processes that should use the terrorist
watch list. We did not do an independent evaluation of whether all
screening opportunities were identified. Rather, to determine the
implementation status of these directives, we reviewed available
documentation and interviewed senior officials at the Departments of
Homeland Security, Justice, and State, as well as TSC and the Social
Security Administration. Our inquiries covered domestic screening
opportunities within the federal community and critical infrastructure
sectors of private industry. Further, our inquiries covered
international opportunities, that is, progress made in efforts to
exchange terrorist watch list information with trusted foreign partners
on a reciprocal basis. Finally, we compared the status of watch list-
related strategies, planning, and initiatives with the expectations set
forth in Homeland Security Presidential Directive 6 and Homeland
Security Presidential Directive 11. The Homeland Security Council--
which is chaired by the Assistant to the President for Homeland
Security and Counterterrorism--denied our request for an
interview.[Footnote 74]
Data Reliability:
Regarding statistical information we obtained from TSC and screening
agencies--such as the number of positive matches and actions taken--we
discussed the sources of the data with agency officials and reviewed
documentation regarding the compilation of the statistics. We
determined that the statistics were sufficiently reliable for the
purposes of this review. We did not review or assess the derogatory
information related to terrorist watch list records, primarily because
such information involved ongoing counterterrorism investigations or
intelligence community activities.
We performed our work on the restricted version of this report from
April 2005 through September 2007 in accordance with generally accepted
government auditing standards.
[End of section]
Appendix II: Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-6 (Sept. 16,
2003):
The White House:
President:
George W. Bush:
For Immediate Release:
Office of the Press Secretary:
September 16, 2003:
Homeland Security Presidential Directive/Hspd-6:
Subject: Integration and Use of Screening Information:
To protect against terrorism it is the policy of the United States to
(1) develop, integrate, and maintain thorough, accurate, and current
information about individuals known or appropriately suspected to be or
have been engaged in conduct constituting, in preparation for, in aid
of, or related to terrorism (Terrorist Information); and (2) use that
information as appropriate and to the full extent permitted by law to
support (a) Federal, State, local, territorial, tribal, foreign-
government, and private-sector screening processes, and (b) diplomatic,
military, intelligence, law enforcement, immigration, visa, and
protective processes.
This directive shall be implemented in a manner consistent with the
provisions of the Constitution and applicable laws, including those
protecting the rights of all Americans.
To further strengthen the ability of the United States Government to
protect the people, property, and territory of the United States
against acts of terrorism, and to the full extent permitted by law and
consistent with the policy set forth above:
(1) The Attorney General shall establish an organization to consolidate
the Government's approach to terrorism screening and provide for the
appropriate and lawful use of Terrorist Information in screening
processes.
(2) The heads of executive departments and agencies shall, to the
extent permitted by law, provide to the Terrorist Threat Integration
Center (TTIC) on an ongoing basis all appropriate Terrorist Information
in their possession, custody, or control. The Attorney General, in
coordination with the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Homeland
Security, and the Director of Central Intelligence shall implement
appropriate procedures and safeguards with respect to all such
information about United States persons. The TTIC will provide the
organization referenced in paragraph (1) with access to all appropriate
information or intelligence in the TTIC's custody, possession, or
control that the organization requires to perform its functions.
(3) The heads of executive departments and agencies shall conduct
screening using such information at all appropriate opportunities, and
shall report to the Attorney General not later than 90 days from the
date of this directive, as to the opportunities at which such screening
shall and shall not be conducted.
(4) The Secretary of Homeland Security shall develop guidelines to
govern the use of such information to support State, local,
territorial, and tribal screening processes, and private sector
screening processes that have a substantial bearing on homeland
security.
(5) The Secretary of State shall develop a proposal for my approval for
enhancing cooperation with certain foreign governments, beginning with
those countries for which the United States has waived visa
requirements, to establish appropriate access to terrorism screening
information of the participating governments.
This directive does not alter existing authorities or responsibilities
of department and agency heads to carry out operational activities or
provide or receive information. This directive is intended only to
improve the internal management of the executive branch and is not
intended to, and does not, create any right or benefit enforceable at
law or in equity by any party against the United States, its
departments, agencies, entities, officers, employees or agents, or any
other person.
The Attorney General, in consultation with the Secretary of State, the
Secretary of Homeland Security, and the Director of Central
Intelligence, shall report to me through the Assistant to the President
for Homeland Security not later than October 31, 2003, on progress made
to implement this directive and shall thereafter report to me on such
progress or any recommended changes from time to time as appropriate.
George W. Bush:
[End of section]
Appendix III: Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-11 (Aug.
27, 2004):
The White House:
President:
George W. Bush:
For Immediate Release:
Office of the Press Secretary:
August 27, 2004:
Homeland Security Presidential Directive/Hspd-11:
Subject: Comprehensive Terrorist-Related Screening Procedures:
(1) In order more effectively to detect and interdict individuals known
or reasonably suspected to be or have been engaged in conduct
constituting, in preparation for, in aid of, or related to terrorism
("suspected terrorists") and terrorist activities, it is the policy of
the United States to:
(a) enhance terrorist-related screening (as defined below) through
comprehensive, coordinated procedures that detect, identify, track, and
interdict people, cargo, conveyances, and other entities and objects
that pose a threat to homeland security, and to do so in a manner that
safeguards legal rights, including freedoms, civil liberties, and
information privacy guaranteed by Federal law, and builds upon existing
risk assess-ment capabilities while facilitating the efficient movement
of people, cargo, conveyances, and other potentially affected
activities in commerce; and:
(b) implement a coordinated and comprehensive approach to terrorist-
related screening -- in immigration, law enforcement, intelligence,
counterintelligence, and protection of the border, transportation
systems, and critical infrastructure -- that supports homeland
security, at home and abroad.
(2) This directive builds upon HSPD-6, "Integration and Use of
Screening Information to Protect Against Terrorism." The Terrorist
Screening Center (TSC), which was established and is administered by
the Attorney General pursuant to HSPD-6, enables Government officials
to check individuals against a consolidated Terrorist Screening Center
Database. Other screening activities underway within the Terrorist
Threat Integration Center (TTIC) and the Department of Homeland
Security further strengthen the ability of the United States Government
to protect the people, property, and territory of the United States
against acts of terrorism.
(3) In this directive, the term "terrorist-related screening" means the
collection, analysis, dissemination, and use of information related to
people, cargo, conveyances, and other entities and objects that pose a
threat to homeland security. Terrorist-related screening also includes
risk assessment, inspection, and credentialing.
(4) Not later than 75 days after the date of this directive, the
Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with the Attorney
General, the Secretaries of State, Defense, Transportation, Energy,
Health and Human Services, Commerce, and Agriculture, the Directors of
Central Intelligence and the Office of Management and Budget, and the
heads of other appropriate Federal departments and agencies, shall
submit to me, through the Assistant to the President for Homeland
Security, a report setting forth plans and progress in the
implementation of this directive, including as further described in
sections 5 and 6 of this directive.
(5) The report shall outline a strategy to enhance the effectiveness of
terrorist-related screening activities, in accordance with the policy
set forth in section 1 of this directive, by developing comprehensive,
coordinated, systematic terrorist-related screening procedures and
capabilities that also take into account the need to:
(a) maintain no less than current levels of security created by
existing screening and protective measures;
(b) encourage innovations that exceed established standards;
(c) ensure sufficient flexibility to respond rapidly to changing
threats and priorities;
(d) permit flexibility to incorporate advancements into screening
applications and technology rapidly;
(e) incorporate security features, including unpredictability, that
resist circumvention to the greatest extent possible;
(f) build upon existing systems and best practices and, where
appropriate, integrate, consolidate, or eliminate duplicative systems
used for terrorist-related screening;
(g) facilitate legitimate trade and travel, both domestically and
internationally;
(h) limit delays caused by screening procedures that adversely impact
foreign relations, or economic, commercial, or scientific interests of
the United States; and:
(i) enhance information flow between various screening programs.
(6) The report shall also include the following:
(a) the purposes for which individuals will undergo terrorist-related
screening;
(b) a description of the screening opportunities to which terrorist-
related screening will be applied;
(c) the information individuals must present, including, as
appropriate, the type of biometric identifier or other form of
identification or identifying information to be presented, at
particular screening opportunities;
(d) mechanisms to protect data, including during transfer of
information;
(e) mechanisms to address data inaccuracies, including names
inaccurately contained in the terrorist screening data consolidated
pursuant to HSPD-6;
(f) the procedures and frequency for screening people, cargo, and
conveyances;
(g) protocols to support consistent risk assessment and inspection
procedures;
(h) the skills and training required for the screeners at screening
opportunities;
(i) the hierarchy of consequences that should occur if a risk indicator
is generated as a result of a screening opportunity;
(j) mechanisms for sharing information among screeners and all relevant
Government agencies, including results of screening and new information
acquired regarding suspected terrorists between screening opportunities;
(k) recommended research and development on technologies designed to
enhance screening effectiveness and further protect privacy interests;
and:
(I) a plan for incorporating known traveler programs into the screening
procedures, where appropriate.
(7) Not later than 90 days after the date of this directive, the
Secretary of Homeland Security, in coordination with the heads of the
Federal departments and agencies listed in section 4 of this directive,
shall also provide to me, through the Assistant to the President for
Homeland Security and the Director of the Office of Management and
Budget, a prioritized investment and imple-menta-tion plan for a
systematic approach to terrorist-related screening that optimizes
detection and interdiction of suspected terrorists and terrorist
activities. The plan shall describe the scope, governance, principles,
outcomes, milestones, training objectives, metrics, costs, and schedule
of activities to implement the policy set forth in section 1 of this
directive. The Secretary of Homeland Security shall further provide a
report on the status of the implementation of the plan to me through
the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security 6 months after the
date of this directive and shall thereafter report to me on such
progress or any recommended changes from time to time as appropriate.
(8) In order to ensure comprehensive and coordinated terrorist-related
screening procedures, the implementation of this directive shall be
consistent with Government-wide efforts to improve information sharing.
Additionally, the reports and plan required under section 4 and 7 of
this directive shall inform development of Government-wide information
sharing improvements.
(9) This directive does not alter existing authorities or
responsibilities of department and agency heads including to carry out
operational activities or provide or receive information. This
directive is intended only to improve the internal management of the
executive branch of the Federal Government, and it is not intended to,
and does not, create any right or benefit enforceable at law or in
equity by any party against the United States, its departments,
agencies, entities, officers, employees, or agents, or any other
person.
George W. Bush:
[End of section]
Appendix IV: Outcomes of Screening Agency Encounters with Individuals
on the Terrorist Watch List:
This appendix presents details on the outcomes of screening agency
encounters with individuals on the terrorist watch list. Specifically,
the following sections provide information on arrests and other
outcomes of encounters involving the Department of State, TSA, CBP, and
state or local law enforcement.
Subjects of Watch List Records Have Been Arrested Hundreds of Times,
with Some Arrests Based on Terrorism Grounds:
According to TSC data, for the period December 2003 through May 2007,
agencies reported arresting subjects of watch list records for various
reasons hundreds of times, such as the individual having an outstanding
arrest warrant or the individual's behavior or actions during the
encounter. For this period, TSC data also indicated that some of the
arrests were based on terrorism grounds. For example, according to TSC,
in November 2004, the subject of a watch list record was encountered at
the El Paso, Texas, border crossing by CBP and U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement agents and subsequently arrested as a result of
their interview with the person. According to TSC, the arrest was done
in conjunction with the FBI on grounds of material support to
terrorism. In January 2007, TSC officials told us that--because of the
difficulty in collecting information on the basis of arrests--the
center has changed its policy on documentation of arrests and no longer
categorizes arrests as terrorism-related. As such, the number of times
individuals on the watch list have been arrested based on terrorism
grounds is no longer being tracked.
Subjects of Watch List Records Were Denied Visas and Also Granted
Visas:
U.S. consulates and embassies around the world are required to screen
the names of all visa applicants against the Department of State's
Consular Lookout and Support System and to notify TSC when the
applicant's identifying information matches or closely matches
information in a terrorist watch list record.[Footnote 75] For positive
matches, officials at Department of State headquarters are to review
available derogatory information and provide advice to the consular
officer, who is responsible for deciding whether to grant or refuse a
visa to the applicant under the immigration laws and regulations of the
United States. According to TSC data, when visa applicants were
positively matched to terrorist watch list records, the outcomes
included visas denied, visas issued (because the consular officer did
not find any statutory basis for inadmissibility), and visa
ineligibility waived.[Footnote 76]
The Department of State described several scenarios under which an
individual on the terrorist watch list might still be granted a visa.
According to the department, visas can be issued following extensive
interagency consultations regarding the individuals who were matched to
watch list records. The department explained that the information that
supports a terrorist watch list record is often sparse or inconclusive.
It noted, however, that having these records exported to the Consular
Lookout and Support System provides an opportunity for a consular
officer to question the alien to obtain additional information
regarding potential inadmissibility. For instance, there might be a
record with supporting information showing that the person attended a
political rally addressed by radical elements. According to the
Department of State, while this activity may raise suspicion about the
individual, it also requires further development and exploration of the
person's potential ability to receive a visa. Thus, using watch list
records allows the department to develop information and pursue a
thorough interagency vetting process before coming to a final
conclusion about any given prospective traveler who is the subject of a
watch list record.
Further, individuals can receive a waiver of inadmissibility from the
Department of Homeland Security. According to the Department of State,
there may be U.S. government interest in issuing a visa to someone who
has a record in the terrorist watch list and who may have already been
found ineligible for a visa or inadmissible to the United States. For
instance, an individual might be a former insurgent who has become a
foreign government official. This person might be invited to the United
States to participate in peace talks under U.S. auspices. According to
the Department of State, in such a case, the visa application would go
through normal processing, which would include a review of the
derogatory information related to the terrorist watch list record. This
information, along with the request for a waiver, would be passed to
the Department of Homeland Security, which normally grants waivers
recommended by the Department of State.
Another scenario under which an individual on the terrorist watch list
might still be granted a visa involves instances where a watch list
record is not exported to the Department of State's Consular Lookout
and Support System. According to the department, originating agencies
that nominate terrorist watch list records occasionally ask TSC to not
export a record to the Department of State's system for operational
reasons, such as to not alert the individuals about an ongoing
investigation. In this case, if a terrorist watch list record is not
exported to the Consular Lookout and Support System database, a
consular officer will not be notified of the record and may otherwise
proceed in adjudicating the visa without consulting Department of State
officials in Washington, D.C.
Passengers Were Matched to the No Fly and Selectee Lists:
TSA requires aircraft operators to screen the names of all passengers
against extracts from TSC's consolidated watch list to help ensure that
individuals who pose a threat to civil aviation are denied boarding or
subjected to additional screening before boarding, as appropriate.
Specifically, TSA provides the No Fly and Selectee lists to airlines
for use in prescreening passengers. According to TSA policy, if a
situation arises in which a person on the No Fly list is erroneously
permitted to board a flight, upon discovery, that flight may be
diverted to a location other than its original destination.
According to TSA data, when airline passengers were positively matched
to the No Fly or Selectee lists, the vast majority of matches were to
the Selectee list. Other outcomes included individuals matched to the
No Fly list and denied boarding (did not fly) and individuals matched
to the No Fly list after the aircraft was in-flight. Regarding the
latter, TSA officials explained that there have been situations in
which individuals on the No Fly list have passed undetected through
airlines' prescreening of passengers and flew on international flights
bound to or from the United States. These individuals were subsequently
identified in-flight by other means--specifically, screening of
passengers conducted by CBP.
Many Nonimmigrant Aliens on the Watch List Were Refused Entry into the
United States, but Most Were Allowed to Enter:
CBP officers at U.S. ports of entry use the Interagency Border
Inspection System to screen the names of individuals entering the
United States against terrorist watch list records.[Footnote 77]
Specifically, all individuals entering the United States at seaports
and U.S. airports for international flight arrivals are to be checked
against watch list records. At land border ports of entry, screening
against watch list records depends on the volume of traffic and other
operational factors.
While U.S. citizens who have left the United States and seek to reenter
may be subjected to additional questioning and physical screening to
determine any potential threat they pose, they may not be excluded and
must be admitted upon verification of citizenship (for example, by
presenting a U.S. passport).[Footnote 78] Alien applicants for
admission are questioned by CBP officers, and their documents are
examined to determine admissibility based on requirements of the
Immigration and Nationality Act.[Footnote 79] For nonimmigrant aliens
who are positively matched to a terrorist watch list record, officials
at CBP are to review available derogatory information related to the
watch list record and advise port officers regarding whether sufficient
information exists to refuse admission under terrorism or other
grounds. CBP officers at ports of entry are ultimately responsible for
making determinations regarding whether an individual should be
admitted or denied entry into the United States.
According to CBP policies, CBP officers at the port of entry are
required to apprise the local FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force and the
local U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement of all watch list
encounters, regardless of the individual's citizenship and whether or
not the person is refused admission into the United States. If the
individual is a U.S. citizen or an admitted non-citizen, CBP officers
at the port are to apprise the local Joint Terrorism Task Force of any
suspicions about the person after questioning, in order to permit post-
entry investigation or surveillance.
According to CBP data, a number of nonimmigrant aliens encountered at
U.S. ports of entry were positively matched to terrorist watch list
records. For many of the encounters, CBP determined there was
sufficient derogatory information related to the watch list records to
preclude admission under terrorism grounds in the Immigration and
Nationality Act, and the individuals were refused entry. However, for
most of the encounters, CBP determined there was not sufficient
derogatory information related to terrorist watch list records to
refuse admission on terrorism-related grounds in the Immigration and
Nationality Act. According to CBP, the center did not know how many
times these encounters ultimately resulted in individuals being
admitted or denied entry into the United States. The officials
explained that after in-depth questioning and inspection of travel
documents and belongings, CBP officers could still have refused
individuals the right to enter the United States based on terrorism-
related or other grounds set forth in the Immigration and Nationality
Act, such as immigration violations.
Watch List Records Related to State and Local Encounters Indicate the
Vast Majority of Subjects Were Released:
To assist state and local officials during encounters, all watch list
records in the FBI's Violent Gang and Terrorist Organization File
contain a specific category or handling code and related instructions
about actions that may be taken in response to a positive watch list
encounter.[Footnote 80] These actions may include--in appropriate and
lawfully authorized circumstances--arresting, detaining, or questioning
and then releasing the individual. State and local officials are to
contact TSC when the names of individuals queried match or closely
match a terrorist watch list record in the Violent Gang and Terrorist
Organization File. For positive or inconclusive matches, TSC is to
refer the matter to the FBI's Counterterrorism Division, which provides
specific instructions to state and local officials about appropriate
actions that may be taken or questions that should be asked.
According to TSC data, state or local law enforcement officials have
encountered individuals who were positively matched to terrorist watch
list records in the Violent Gang and Terrorist Organization File
thousands of times. Although data on the actual outcomes of these
encounters were not available, the vast majority involved watch list
records that indicated that the individuals were released, unless there
were other reasons for arresting or detaining the individual.
[End of section]
Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:
Note: GAO-07-1206 is the previous number for this report.
U.S. Department of Homeland Security:
Washington, DC 20528:
September 4, 2007:
Ms Eileen Larence:
Director:
Homeland Security and Justice Issues:
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, NW:
Washington, DC 20548:
Dear Ms Larence:
Thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on the Government
Accountability Office's (GAO's) draft report GAO-07-1206 entitled
Terrorist Watch List Screening: Opportunities Exist to Enhance
Management Oversight, Reduce Vulnerabilities in Agency Screening
Processes, and Expand Use of the List.
The implementation and use of the Terrorist Watch List has enhanced the
Department of Homeland Security's (DHS's) screening programs. The use
of this single tool across all federal, state and local law enforcement
agencies has become one of our most valuable resources in our
coordinated fight against terrorist activity. The Department agrees
with and supports the work performed by GAO and has already begun work
to correct issues identified in the report findings.
DHS works closely with the FBI and the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence to review watch list opportunities, enhancements,
and potential vulnerabilities. DHS acts as a partner to ensure that
vulnerabilities are identified and addressed and that watch list
records and screening programs are appropriate. This is an on-going
effort.
DHS established the Screening Coordination Office (SCO) in July 2006 to
enhance security measures by integrating the Department's terrorist and
immigration related screening efforts, creating unified screening
standards and policies, and developing a single redress process for
travelers. At the time of the audit work, this office was relatively
new, but it has subsequently added key staff and begun the critical
work of advancing DHS screening programs and opportunities. The SCO has
drafted initial guidelines to govern the use of watch list records to
support private-sector screening processes and is in the process of
working with federal stakeholders to finalize this document. The SCO
also works closely with all DHS and federal offices involved in
screening initiatives and has begun appropriate outreach to the private
sector.
DHS has completed and submitted the HSPD-1 1 required reports
concerning the screening investment plan and implementation plans. The
DHS Screening Coordination Office is working across the Department to
advance a comprehensive approach to terrorist-related screening, as
specified in the HSPD-11 report. As recommended, DHS will review and
appropriately update the DHS investment and implementation plans for
screening opportunities. We will also continue to work closely with our
federal partners to advance screening opportunities and we appreciate
the work done by the GAO audit team.
Thank you again for the opportunity to comment on this draft report and
we look forward to working with you on future homeland security issues.
Sincerely,
Signed by:
Steven J. Pecinovsky:
Director:
Departmental GAO/OIG Liaison Office:
[End of section]
Footnotes:
[1] There is no specific definition of terrorism for purposes of the
watch list, though agencies utilizing watch list records recognize
various definitions of the term. For example, the Federal Bureau of
Investigation defines terrorism to include the unlawful use of force
and violence against persons or property to intimidate or coerce a
government, the civilian population, or any segment thereof, in
furtherance of political or social objectives. See 28 C.F.R. § 0.85(l).
See also, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2331 and 22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d) (providing
definitions of terrorism and international terrorism in criminal and
foreign relations contexts, respectively). Also, terrorist activity has
been more broadly defined in the Immigration and Nationality Act for
purposes of immigration benefits. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B).
Additional information on standards used to determine whether an
individual is a "known or appropriately suspected terrorist"--which for
purposes of this report includes any individual known or appropriately
suspected to be or have been engaged in conduct constituting, in
preparation for, in aid of, or related to terrorism--is discussed later
in this report.
[2] The White House, Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-6,
Subject: Integration and Use of Screening Information (Washington,
D.C.: Sept. 16, 2003).
[3] The White House, Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-11,
Subject: Comprehensive Terrorist-Related Screening Procedures
(Washington, D.C.: Aug. 27, 2004).
[4] In general, individuals on the No Fly list are to be precluded from
boarding an aircraft, and individuals on the Selectee list are to
receive additional physical screening prior to boarding an aircraft.
[5] As used in this report, the term "encounter" refers to any incident
where a screening or law enforcement entity has contact with a person
who is positively matched to a record in the terrorist watch list.
[6] See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (codifying section 212 of the
Immigration and Nationality Act, as amended, and establishing
conditions under which an alien--any person not a citizen or national
of the United States--may be deemed inadmissible to the United States).
[7] See 8 C.F.R. § 235.1. Similarly, lawful permanent residents
generally are not regarded as seeking admission to the United States
and, as with U.S. citizens, are not subject to the grounds for
inadmissibility unless they fall within certain criteria listed at 8
U.S.C. § 1101(a)(13)(C) that describe why an alien lawfully admitted
for permanent residence would be regarded as seeking admission.
[8] In a nonprobability sample, some elements of the population being
studied have no chance or an unknown chance of being selected as part
of the sample. Thus, results from a nonprobability sample cannot be
used to make inferences about the population.
[9] The Homeland Security Council was established to ensure
coordination of all homeland security-related activities among
executive departments and agencies and promote the effective
development and implementation of all homeland security policies. See
The White House, Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-1,
Subject: Organization and Operation of the Homeland Security Council
(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 29, 2001).
[10] The approximately 755,000 records in the Terrorist Screening
Center's watch list as of May 2007 is greater than the total number of
individuals on the list. If an individual has one or more aliases, the
database will contain multiple records for the same individual. The
Terrorist Screening Center did not have data on the number of unique
individuals on the watch list.
[11] The approximately 53,000 total encounters with individuals who
were positively matched to the watch list constitute screening results
from all agencies that use the list, not just the specific screening
agencies and processes we reviewed.
[12] Also, some watch list records can be excluded from screening
agency databases for other reasons, such as the records were pending
deletion or quality assurance resolution.
[13] In July 2007, we issued a report that examined federal
coordination for responding to in-flight security threats. See GAO,
Aviation Security: Federal Coordination for Responding to In-flight
Security Threats Has Matured, but Procedures Can Be Strengthened, GAO-
07-891R (Washington, D.C.: July 31, 2007).
[14] See 72 Fed. Reg. 48,320 (Aug. 23, 2007). The provisions of the
final rule take effect on February 19, 2008.
[15] GAO, Information Technology: Terrorist Watch Lists Should Be
Consolidated to Promote Better Integration and Sharing, GAO-03-322
(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 15, 2003).
[16] The full text of HSPD-6 is reprinted in appendix II.
[17] The FBI also has information on individuals with possible
international terrorism ties, which it provides to NCTC.
[18] Exec. Order No. 12,333 (Dec. 4, 1981).
[19] See 5 U.S.C. § 552a.
[20] TSA is developing a new advanced passenger prescreening program,
known as Secure Flight. Under the program, the agency plans to take
over from aircraft operators the responsibility for comparing
identifying information on airline passengers against watch list
records. See 72 Fed. Reg. 48,356 (Aug. 23, 2007). The agency expects
that Secure Flight will improve passenger prescreening as compared with
the current airline-operated process. In June 2006, we reported that
TSA still faces significant challenges in developing and implementing
the Secure Flight program. See GAO, Aviation Security: Management
Challenges Remain for the Transportation Security Administration's
Secure Flight Program, GAO-06-864T (Washington, D.C.: June 14, 2006).
[21] CBP's system is also used to assist law enforcement and other
personnel at approximately 20 other federal agencies, including the
following: U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement; U.S. Citizenship
and Immigration Services; the FBI; the Drug Enforcement Administration;
the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives; the Internal
Revenue Service; the U.S. Coast Guard; the Federal Aviation
Administration; and the U.S. Secret Service.
[22] The Department of State also uses watch list records in screening
passport applicants, which we did not cover during this review.
[23] Terrorist watch list-related screening can cause travel delays and
other inconveniences, which may be inevitable consequences of enhanced
homeland security. Nonetheless, as we reported in September 2006, it is
important for TSC and screening agencies to provide effective redress
for individuals who are inadvertently and adversely affected by watch
list-related screening. See GAO, Terrorist Watch List Screening:
Efforts to Help Reduce Adverse Effects on the Public, GAO-06-1031
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 29, 2006).
[24] Regarding the process for screening nonimmigrant visa applicants
against applicable watch list records, the Department of State
emphasized that for any positive or inconclusive match, consular
officers are required to ask Department of State headquarters to
initiate a process of requesting that TSC and other relevant agencies
check their respective databases or systems for the existence of any
investigative or intelligence information regarding the individual and
pass the results back to the department for use in recommending a
course of action to the consular officer.
[25] Joint Terrorism Task Forces are teams of state and local law
enforcement officials, FBI agents, and other federal agents and
personnel whose mission is to investigate and prevent acts of
terrorism. There is a Joint Terrorism Task Force in each of the FBI's
56 main field offices, and additional task forces are located in
smaller FBI offices.
[26] The full text of HSPD-11 is reprinted in appendix III.
[27] In HSPD-11, the term "terrorist-related screening" is defined as
the collection, analysis, dissemination, and use of information related
to people, cargo, conveyances, and other entities and objects that pose
a threat to homeland security. Terrorist-related screening also
includes risk assessment, inspection, and credentialing.
[28] In general, and in this context, a standard of reasonableness can
be described as a government agent's particularized and objective basis
for suspecting an individual of engaging in terrorist-related
activities, considering the totality of circumstances known to the
government agent at that time. See, e.g., United States v. Price, 184
F.3d 637, 640-41 (7th Cir. 1999); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).
[29] The purpose of certain screening processes is to address a
specific security concern, such as airlines' prescreening of passengers
wherein the use of watch list records is primarily intended to enhance
aviation security. However, such screening may also support government
efforts to track a person's movements or activities.
[30] According to NCTC data, other sources of information on known or
suspected international terrorists include the National Security
Agency; the military, including the Department of Defense, the Defense
Intelligence Agency, the Air Force Office of Special Investigations,
and the U.S. Navy; DHS, including U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, and the National
Targeting Center; other federal departments and agencies, including the
Department of Justice, the Department of the Treasury, and the Federal
Aviation Administration; foreign sources; and the press, including the
Foreign Broadcast Information System, Reuters, and Associated Press
International.
[31] See 8 U.S.C. § 1733.
[32] See GAO, Border Security: Strengthened Visa Process Would Benefit
from Improvements in Staffing and Information Sharing, GAO-05-859
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 13, 2005).
[33] In general, these types of conduct are related to provisions in
the Immigration and Nationality Act that establish grounds for alien
admissibility on terrorism-related grounds. See 8 U.S.C. §
1182(a)(3)(B) (codifying section 212(a)(3)(B) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act, as amended).
[34] TSC does not receive or maintain the derogatory information that
supports watch list records. Rather, NCTC, the FBI, and other agencies
that originate nominations maintain this information.
[35] In March 2006, TSC implemented a formal process to review each
nomination. Before March 2006, TSC generally accepted nominations
without reviewing the supporting derogatory information, but it had
processes in place to review the identifying information.
[36] TSC completed its initial consolidation of terrorist watch list
records in March 2004 but did not specifically track the number of
records in the database until June 2004.
[37] Passengers on airline flights coming into the United States are
generally to be screened against applicable records in the watch list
two times--first, at TSA's direction, by air carriers against the No
Fly and Selectee lists prior to boarding and then by CBP against watch
list records in its database before being admitted into the United
States. To avoid double counting, TSC generally reports these instances
as one encounter, typically as CBP border-crossing encounters. In
addition, prior to flight, an initial watch list screening is to occur
in cases where a visa is required, which TSC reports as Department of
State encounters.
[38] In this context, ineligibility waived refers to individuals who
were ineligible for a visa based on terrorism grounds, but DHS approved
a waiver for a one-time visit or multiple entries into the United
States. In general, waivers are approved when the U.S. government has
an interest in allowing the individual to enter the United States, such
as an individual on the terrorist watch list who is invited to
participate in peace talks under U.S. auspices.
[39] As discussed previously in this report, sensitive but unclassified
identifying information from NCTC's database is provided to TSC for
inclusion on the consolidated terrorist watch list.
[40] The Department of State's Consular Lookout and Support System is
used to screen (1) citizens of a foreign country who apply for U.S.
visas and (2) U.S. citizens who apply for U.S passports. Our work
covered the use of the terrorist watch list in screening visa
applicants, but we did not review or assess information related to
passports.
[41] In addition to exporting applicable watch list records to federal
government databases, TSC shares watch list records with certain
foreign governments on a reciprocal basis. Additional information on
U.S. government efforts to exchange watch list information with foreign
governments is presented later in this report.
[42] The Interagency Border Inspection System is also part of DHS's
United States Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology
Program--known as US-VISIT--an automated entry-exit system that records
the arrival and departure of aliens. See GAO, Homeland Security:
Planned Expenditures for U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Program Need
to Be Adequately Defined and Justified, GAO-07-278 (Washington, D.C.:
Feb. 14, 2007).
[43] The FBI's National Crime Information Center is a computerized
database of documented criminal justice information. It is available to
federal, state, and local law enforcement and other criminal justice
agencies nationwide and is operational 24 hours a day, 365 days a year.
[44] Also, the FBI and designated state and local criminal justice
agencies access the Violent Gang and Terrorist Organization File in
conducting background checks on individuals seeking to purchase
firearms or obtain permits to possess, acquire, or carry firearms. See
GAO, Gun Control and Terrorism: FBI Could Better Manage Firearm-Related
Background Checks Involving Terrorist Watch List Records, GAO-05-127
(Washington, D.C.: Jan. 19, 2005).
[45] The Homeland Security Council issued revised implementation
guidelines related to the No Fly and Selectee list criteria in July
2006.
[46] As discussed previously, as of May 2007, CBP's system contained
the highest percentage of the records in TSC's watch list.
[47] Pursuant to a final rule published in the Federal Register in
August 2007, this process will take place, in all instances, before an
aircraft is in flight by the end of February 2008. See 72 Fed. Reg.
48,320 (Aug. 23, 2007).
[48] See H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 109-669, at 140 (2006) (accompanying H.R.
5441, enacted into law as the Department of Homeland Security
Appropriations Act, 2007, Pub. L. No. 109-295, 120 Stat. 1355 (2006)).
See also Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2008, H.R.
2638, 110th Cong. (as passed by House of Representatives, June 15,
2007) (containing a similar requirement).
[49] We visited various CBP ports of entry at airports and land border
crossings in California, Michigan, New York, and Texas (see app. I).
[50] In 2005, we reported on U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services'
efforts to manage backlogs of immigration benefit applications. See
GAO, Immigration Benefits: Improvements Needed to Address Backlogs and
Ensure Quality of Adjudications, GAO-06-20 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 21,
2005).
[51] See 19 C.F.R. §§ 122.49a, 122.75a (listing the required passenger
manifest information for international arrivals and departures,
respectively).
[52] CBP defines "departure" as the point at which the wheels are up on
the aircraft and the aircraft is en route directly to its destination.
See 19 C.F.R. § 122.49a(a). CBP, however, issued a final rule that,
among other things, will require the transmission of passenger data no
later than the "securing of the aircraft," defined as the moment the
aircraft's doors are closed and secured for flight. See 72 Fed. Reg.
48,320 (Aug. 23, 2007). The provisions of the final rule take effect on
February 19, 2008.
[53] For additional information on international passenger
prescreening, see GAO, Aviation Security: Efforts to Strengthen
International Passenger Prescreening Are Under Way, but Planning and
Implementation Issues Remain, GAO-07-346 (Washington, D.C.: May 16,
2007).
[54] See 49 U.S.C. § 44903(j)(2)(C). In August 2007, TSA issued its
notice of proposed rulemaking for the Secure Flight program. See 72
Fed. Reg. 48,356 (Aug. 23, 2007).
[55] GAO, Aviation Security: Management Challenges Remain for the
Transportation Security Administration's Secure Flight Program, GAO-06-
864T (Washington, D.C.: June 14, 2006).
[56] An algorithm is a prescribed set of well-defined, unambiguous
rules or processes for the solution of a problem in a finite number of
steps.
[57] The working group's membership includes representatives from the
Departments of Homeland Security (including TSA and CBP), State, and
Defense; FBI; and the intelligence community (including NCTC, Central
Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, and Defense Intelligence
Agency). Also, the National Institute of Standards and Technology acts
as a special advisor to the working group.
[58] Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Review of
the Terrorist Screening Center, Audit Report 05-27 (June 2005).
[59] Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, Follow-up
Audit of the Terrorist Screening Center, Audit Report 07-41 (September
2007).
[60] Redress generally refers to an agency's complaint resolution
process, whereby individuals may seek resolution of their concerns
about an agency action. See GAO, Terrorist Watch List Screening:
Efforts to Help Reduce Adverse Effects on the Public, GAO-06-1031
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 29, 2006).
[61] In an earlier report, we assessed various biometric technologies.
See GAO, Technology Assessment: Using Biometrics for Border Security,
GAO-03-174 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 15, 2002).
[62] National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States,
The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on
Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (July 22, 2004).
[63] Foreign nationals from visa waiver countries are allowed to travel
to the United States under limited conditions and for a limited time
without obtaining a visa. The following 27 countries are currently in
the visa waiver program: Andorra, Austria, Australia, Belgium, Brunei,
Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan,
Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Monaco, the Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Portugal, San Marino, Singapore, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. For additional information on the
visa waiver program, see GAO, Border Security: Stronger Actions Needed
to Assess and Mitigate the Risks of the Visa Waiver Program, GAO-06-854
(Washington, D.C: July 28, 2006).
[64] According to the Department of State, interagency working group
members represent agencies and organizations from the intelligence and
law enforcement communities with an interest in the implementation of
HSPD-6, including the Central Intelligence Agency, the FBI, the Defense
Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, DHS, the Department
of Justice, the Office of Management and Budget, and TSC.
[65] The National Infrastructure Advisory Council is to provide the
President, through the Secretary of Homeland Security, with advice on
the security of critical infrastructure sectors of the economy. It also
is authorized to provide advice directly to the heads of other agencies
that have shared responsibility for critical infrastructure protection,
including the Departments of Health and Human Services, Transportation,
and Energy. The council is charged to improve the cooperation and
partnership between the public and private sectors in securing the
critical infrastructures and advising on related policies and
strategies, such as clarification of the roles and responsibilities
between public and private sectors.
[66] National Infrastructure Advisory Council, Public-Private Sector
Intelligence Coordination: Final Report and Recommendations by the
Council (June 11, 2006).
[67] TSC's initial report and supplemental reports were provided to the
Attorney General via memorandums from the Director of the FBI.
[68] Additional information on DHS's efforts to develop the strategy is
discussed later in the report.
[69] GAO-03-322.
[70] DHS established the Screening Coordination Office in July 2006 to
enhance security measures by integrating the department's terrorist-and
immigration-related screening efforts, creating unified screening
standards and policies, and developing a single redress process for
travelers.
[71] The review's purpose was to systematically evaluate DHS's
operations, policies, and structures. On July 13, 2005, the Secretary
of Homeland Security announced completion of the review.
[72] Results from nonprobability samples cannot be used to make
inferences about a population, because in a nonprobability sample some
elements of the population being studied have no chance or an unknown
chance of being selected as part of the sample.
[73] The White House, Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-6,
Subject: Integration and Use of Screening Information (Washington,
D.C.: Sept. 16, 2003).
[74] The Homeland Security Council was established to ensure
coordination of all homeland security-related activities among
executive departments and agencies and promote the effective
development and implementation of all homeland security policies. See
the White House, Homeland Security Presidential Directive/HSPD-1,
Subject: Organization and Operation of the Homeland Security Council
(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 29, 2001).
[75] Department of State officials assigned to TSC handle all referrals
from consulates and embassies.
[76] In this context, ineligibility waived refers to individuals who
were ineligible for a visa based on terrorism grounds, but DHS approved
a waiver for a one-time visit or multiple entries into the United
States. In general, waivers are approved when the U.S. government has
an interest in allowing the individual to enter the United States, such
as an individual on the terrorist watch list who is invited to
participate in peace talks under U.S. auspices.
[77] U.S. ports of entry include land border crossings along the
Canadian and Mexican borders, seaports, and U.S. airports for
international flight arrivals.
[78] See 8 C.F.R. § 235.1. Similarly, lawful permanent residents are
generally not regarded as seeking admission to the United States and,
like U.S. citizens, are not subject to the grounds for inadmissibility
unless they fall within certain criteria listed at 8 U.S.C. §
1011(a)(13)(C) that describe why an alien lawfully admitted for
permanent residence would be regarded as seeking admission.
[79] See 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (codifying section 212 of the Immigration and
Nationality Act, as amended).
[80] The FBI's Violent Gang and Terrorist Organization File contains
terrorist watch list records and records involving gang-related
activities that do not meet the terrorism-related standard for
inclusion in TSC's consolidated watch list. Screening officials are to
notify TSC only when there is a positive match to a terrorist record in
the file.
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