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Prepare for and Respond to Major and Catastrophic Disasters and Address 
Related Recommendations and Legislation' which was released on May 15, 
2007. 

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Testimony: 

Before the Committee on Homeland Security, House of Representatives: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 

GAO: 

For Release on Delivery Expected at 1:00 p.m. EDT: 

Tuesday, May 15, 2007: 

Homeland Security: 

Observations on DHS and FEMA Efforts to Prepare for and Respond to 
Major and Catastrophic Disasters and Address Related Recommendations 
and Legislation: 

Statement of William O. Jenkins, Jr. 
Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues: 

GAO-07-835T: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-07-835T, a testimony before the Committee on Homeland 
Security, House of Representatives 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

As a new hurricane season approaches, the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA) within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) faces 
the simultaneous challenges of preparing for the season and 
implementing the reorganization and other provisions of the Post-
Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006. The Act stipulates 
major changes to FEMA intended to enhance its preparedness for and 
response to catastrophic and major disasters. As GAO has reported, FEMA 
and DHS face continued challenges, including clearly defining 
leadership roles and responsibilities, developing necessary disaster 
response capabilities, and establishing accountability systems to 
provide effective services while protecting against waste, fraud, and 
abuse. This testimony (1) summarizes GAO's findings on these challenges 
and FEMA's and DHS's efforts to address them; and (2) discusses several 
disaster management issues for continued congressional attention. 

What GAO Found: 

Effective disaster preparedness and response require defining what 
needs to be done, where and by whom, how it needs to be done, and how 
well it should be done. GAO analysis following Hurricane Katrina showed 
that improvements were needed in leadership roles and responsibilities, 
development of the necessary disaster capabilities, and accountability 
systems that balance the need for fast, flexible response against the 
need to prevent waste, fraud, and abuse. To facilitate rapid and 
effective decision making, legal authorities, roles and 
responsibilities, and lines of authority at all government levels must 
be clearly defined, effectively communicated, and well understood. 
Adequacy of capabilities in the context of a catastrophic or major 
disaster are needed—particularly in the areas of (1) situational 
assessment and awareness; (2) emergency communications; (3) 
evacuations; (4) search and rescue; (5) logistics; and (6) mass care 
and shelter. Implementing controls and accountability mechanisms helps 
to ensure the proper use of resources. FEMA has initiated reviews and 
some actions in each of these areas, but their operational impact in a 
catastrophic or major disaster has not yet been tested. Some of the 
targeted improvements, such as a completely revamped logistics system, 
are multiyear efforts. Others, such as the ability to field mobile 
communications and registration-assistance vehicles, are expected to be 
ready for the coming hurricane season. 

The Comptroller General has suggested one area for fundamental reform 
and oversight is ensuring a strategic and integrated approach to 
prepare for, respond to, recover, and rebuild after catastrophic 
events. FEMA enters the 2007 hurricane season as an organization in 
transition working simultaneously to implement the reorganization 
required by the Post-Katrina Reform Act and moving forward on 
initiatives to address the deficiencies identified by the post-Katrina 
reviews. This is an enormous challenge. In the short-term, Congress may 
wish to consider several specific areas for immediate oversight. These 
include (1) evaluating the development and implementation of the 
National Preparedness System, including preparedness for natural 
disasters, terrorist incidents, and an influenza pandemic; (2) 
assessing state and local capabilities and the use of federal grants to 
enhance those capabilities; (3) examining regional and multi-state 
planning and preparation; (4) determining the status and use of 
preparedness exercises; and (5) examining DHS polices regarding 
oversight assistance. 

What GAO Recommends: 

This testimony includes no new recommendations, but identifies issues 
to which Congress, FEMA, and DHS may wish to give continued attention 
so that FEMA may fulfill the requirements of the Post-Katrina Reform 
Act. These issues are based on the findings and recommendations of more 
than 30 Katrina-related GAO reports. 

[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-835T]. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
the link above. For more information, contact William Jenkins, Jr. at 
(202) 512-8777 or jenkinswo@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

Thank you for the opportunity to discuss issues associated with the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) efforts to address the 
shortcomings of the preparation and response to Hurricane Katrina and 
enhance its capabilities for responding to major disasters, including 
hurricanes. The 2007 hurricane season begins in just a few weeks. 
Hurricane Katrina severely tested disaster management at the federal, 
state, and local levels and revealed weaknesses in the basic elements 
of preparing for, responding, to and recovering from any catastrophic 
disaster. The goal of disaster preparedness and response is easy to 
state but difficult to achieve and can be stated as follows: 

To prevent where possible, prepare for, mitigate, and respond to 
disasters of any size or cause with well-planned, well-coordinated, and 
effective actions that minimize the loss of life and property and set 
the stage for a quick recovery. 

Achieving this goal for major disasters, and catastrophic disasters in 
particular, is difficult because success requires effective pre-and 
post-disaster coordination and cooperation among different levels of 
government, nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector. 
Individuals can also contribute to success through such things as 
knowing evacuation routes, complying with evacuation orders, and having 
a family and individual disaster preparation plan and supplies. 

As the Comptroller General testified in February 2007 on DHS's high- 
risk status and specifically disaster preparedness and response, DHS 
must overcome continuing challenges, including those related to clearly 
defining leadership roles and responsibilities, developing necessary 
disaster response capabilities, and establishing accountability systems 
to provide effective services while protecting against waste, fraud, 
and abuse.[Footnote 1] These issues are enormously complex and 
challenging for all levels of government. It is important to view 
preparedness for and response to major disasters as a national system 
with linked responsibilities and capabilities. This is because 
effective preparedness for and response to major disasters requires the 
coordinated planning and actions of multiple actors from multiple first 
responder disciplines, jurisdictions, and levels of government as well 
as nongovernmental entities. Parochialism must be put aside and 
cooperation must prevail before and after an emergency event. The 
experience of Hurricane Katrina illustrated why it is important to 
tackle these difficult issues. 

My testimony today (1) summarizes our key findings on leadership, 
response capabilities, and accountability controls and the efforts made 
by DHS and FEMA in their implementation of the Post-Katrina Reform 
Act[Footnote 2] and other recommendations made in the aftermath of 
Hurricane Katrina, and (2) highlights several disaster management 
issues for continued congressional attention. My comments today are 
based on our body of work on disaster and emergency management 
including more than 30 reports on the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, 
our review of recent emergency management reform legislative changes, 
and materials and statements provided by FEMA. We conducted our audit 
work in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 
standards. 

Summary: 

Our analysis of the preparation for and response to Hurricane Katrina 
showed the need for (1) clearly defined and understood leadership roles 
and responsibilities; (2) development of the necessary disaster 
capabilities; and (3) accountability systems that effectively balance 
the need for fast and flexible response against the need to prevent 
waste, fraud, and abuse. 

A key issue in the response to Hurricane Katrina was the lack of 
clearly understood roles and responsibilities. One aspect of this issue 
that continues to be a subject of discussion is the roles and 
responsibilities of the Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO), who has the 
authority to make mission assignments to federal agencies for response 
and recovery, and the Principal Federal Official (PFO), whose role was 
to provide situational awareness to the Secretary of Homeland Security. 
DHS has designated a FCO for each region that includes states at risks 
of hurricanes and a supporting FCO for each of these states. It has 
also designated a PFO for each of three regions--the Gulf Coast, the 
Northeast Region, and the Mid-Atlantic Region--plus a separate PFO for 
the state of Florida and Texas. It is critically important that the 
authorities, roles, and responsibilities of these designated FCOs and 
PFOs be clear and clearly understood by all. There is still some 
question among state and local first responders about the need for both 
positions and how they will work together in disaster response. One 
potential benefit of naming the FCOs and PFOs in advance is that they 
have an opportunity meet and discuss expectations, roles and 
responsibilities with state, local, and nongovernmental officials 
before an actual disaster, possibly setting the groundwork for improved 
coordination and communication in an actual disaster. 

As we have previously reported, developing the ability to prepare for, 
respond to, and recover from major and catastrophic disasters requires 
an overall national preparedness effort that is designed to integrate 
and define what needs to be done, where, and by whom (roles and 
responsibilities); how it should be done; and how well it should be 
done--that is, according to what standards. The principal national 
documents designed to address each of these are, respectively, the 
National Response Plan (NRP), the National Incident Management System 
(NIMS), and the National Preparedness Goal (NPG). The NRP, NIMS and the 
NPG are undergoing extensive review and revision by federal, state, and 
local government officials, tribal authorities, non-governmental and 
private sector officials. This effort is intended to assess the 
effectiveness of the doctrine embodied in these documents, identify 
modifications and improvements, and reissue the documents. The results 
of the review for the NRP, for example, was initially scheduled for 
release in June 2007. However, in April 2007 DHS officials notified 
stakeholders that some important issues were more complex and require 
national-level policy decisions, and stated that additional time than 
was expected was needed to complete a comprehensive draft. DHS noted 
that the underlying operational principles of the NRP remain intact and 
that the current document, as revised in May 2006, still applies. FEMA 
officials have told us that the final version of the NPG and its 
corresponding documents are currently receiving final reviews by the 
White House and will be due out shortly. We are concerned, however, 
that if the revisions are not completed prior to the beginning of the 
2007 hurricane season, it is unlikely that the changes resulting from 
these revisions could be effectively implemented for the 2007 hurricane 
season. 

In addition to roles and responsibilities, the nation's experience with 
hurricanes Katrina and Rita reinforced some questions about the 
adequacy of the nation's disaster response capabilities in the context 
of a catastrophic disaster--particularly in the areas of (1) 
situational assessment and awareness, (2) emergency communications, (3) 
evacuations, (4) search and rescue, (5) logistics, and (6) mass care 
and sheltering. Overall, capabilities are built upon the appropriate 
combination of people, skills, processes, and assets. Ensuring that 
needed capabilities are available requires effective planning and 
coordination in conjunction with training and exercises in which the 
capabilities are realistically tested and problems identified and 
subsequently addressed in partnership with other federal, state, and 
local stakeholders. In various meetings with GAO, in congressional 
testimonies, and in some documents FEMA has described a number of 
initiatives to address identified deficiencies in each of these areas 
and progress is being made on these multiyear efforts. However, a 
number of FEMA programs are ongoing and it is too early to evaluate 
their effectiveness. In addition, none of these initiatives appear to 
have been tested on a scale that reasonably simulates the conditions 
and demand they would face following a major or catastrophic disaster. 
Thus, it is difficult to assess the probable results of these 
initiatives in improving response to a major or catastrophic disaster, 
such as a category 4 or 5 hurricane.[Footnote 3] Additional information 
on FEMA's efforts can be found in Appendix I. 

The National Guard has traditionally been an important component of 
response to major disasters. States and governors rely on their 
National Guard personnel and equipment for disaster response, and 
National Guard personnel are frequently deployed to disaster areas, 
including those outside their home states. However, as we reported in 
January 2007, the types and quantities of equipment the National Guard 
needs to respond to large-scale disasters have not been fully 
identified because the multiple federal and state agencies that would 
have roles in responding to such events have not completed and 
integrated their plans. 

With regard to balancing speed and flexibility with accountability, 
FEMA has stated it can register up to 200,000 applicants per day for 
individual assistance while including safeguards for preventing 
fraudulent and duplicate applications. The inability to reliably and 
efficiently identify fraudulent and duplicate applications was a major 
problem following Katrina that resulted in millions of dollars in 
improper payments. FEMA has also taken actions to revise its debris 
removal and contracting policies and to increase the use of advanced 
contracting for goods and services. Again, we have no basis to 
determine the effectiveness of these systems as they have yet to be 
tested on a large scale basis. 

As FEMA enters the 2007 hurricane season, it is an organization in 
transition that is working to implement the reorganization mandated by 
the Post-Katrina Reform Act as it moves forward on initiatives to 
implement a comprehensive, risk-based national emergency management 
system as required by the act. In November 2006, the Comptroller 
General wrote to the congressional leadership suggesting that one area 
needing fundamental reform and oversight was preparing for, responding 
to, and rebuilding after catastrophic disasters. Among the topics that 
Congress might consider for oversight are: 

* the development and implementation of the National Preparedness 
System, including preparedness for natural disasters, terrorist 
incidents, and an influenza pandemic; 

* the assessment of state and local capabilities and the use of federal 
grants in building and sustaining those capabilities; 

* regional and multistate planning and preparedness; 

* the status and use of preparedness exercises; and: 

* DHS policies that affect the transparency of its efforts to improve 
the nation's preparedness for and response to major and catastrophic 
disasters. 

Background: 

Several federal legislative and executive provisions support 
preparation for and response to emergency situations. The Robert T. 
Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (the Stafford 
Act)[Footnote 4] primarily establishes the programs and processes for 
the federal government to provide major disaster and emergency 
assistance to state, local, and tribal governments, individuals, and 
qualified private nonprofit organizations. FEMA, within DHS, has 
responsibility for administering the provisions of the Stafford Act. 

Besides using these federal resources, states affected by a 
catastrophic disaster can also turn to other states for assistance in 
obtaining surge capacity--the ability to draw on additional resources, 
such as personnel and equipment, needed to respond to and recover from 
the incident. One way of sharing personnel and equipment across state 
lines is through the use of the Emergency Management Assistance 
Compact, an interstate compact that provides a legal and administrative 
framework for managing such emergency requests. The compact includes 49 
states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin 
Islands.[Footnote 5] We have ongoing work examining how the Emergency 
Management Assistance Compact has been used in disasters and how its 
effectiveness could be enhanced and expect to report by this summer. 

As the committee is aware, a number of specific recommendations have 
been made to improve the nation's ability to effectively prepare for 
and respond to catastrophic disasters following the aftermath of 
Hurricane Katrina. Beginning in February 2006, reports by the House 
Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and 
Response to Hurricane Katrina,[Footnote 6] the Senate Homeland Security 
and Governmental Affairs Committee,[Footnote 7] the White House 
Homeland Security Council,[Footnote 8] the DHS Inspector 
General,[Footnote 9] and DHS and FEMA[Footnote 10] all identified a 
variety of failures and some strengths in the preparations for, 
response to, and initial recovery from Hurricane Katrina. In addition 
to these reviews, a report from the American National Standards 
Institute Homeland Security Standards Panel (ANSI-HSSP) contains 
recommendations aimed at bolstering national preparedness, response, 
and recovery efforts in the event of a natural disaster. A key resource 
identified in the document is the American National Standard for 
Disaster/Emergency Management and Business Continuity Programs (ANSI/ 
NFPA 1600), which was developed by the National Fire Protection 
Association (NFPA). The standard defines a common set of criteria for 
preparedness, disaster management, emergency management, and business 
continuity programs. 

Hurricane Katrina severely tested disaster management at the federal, 
state, and local levels and revealed weaknesses in the basic elements 
of preparing for, responding to, and recovering from any catastrophic 
disaster. Based on our work done during the aftermath of Hurricane 
Katrina, we previously reported that DHS needs to more effectively 
coordinate disaster preparedness, response, and recovery efforts, 
particularly for catastrophic disasters in which the response 
capabilities of state and local governments are almost immediately 
overwhelmed.[Footnote 11] Our analysis showed the need for (1) clearly 
defined and understood leadership roles and responsibilities; (2) the 
development of the necessary disaster capabilities; and (3) 
accountability systems that effectively balance the need for fast and 
flexible response against the need to prevent waste, fraud, and abuse. 
In line with a recommendation we made following Hurricane Andrew, the 
nation's most destructive hurricane until Katrina, we recommended that 
Congress give federal agencies explicit authority to take actions to 
prepare for all types of catastrophic disasters when there is warning. 
We also recommended that DHS: 

1. rigorously retest, train, and exercise its recent clarification of 
the roles, responsibilities, and lines of authority for all levels of 
leadership, implementing changes needed to remedy identified 
coordination problems; 

2. direct that the NRP base plan and its supporting Catastrophic 
Incident Annex be supported by more robust and detailed operational 
implementation plans; 

3. provide guidance and direction for federal, state, and local 
planning, training, and exercises to ensure such activities fully 
support preparedness, response, and recovery responsibilities at a 
jurisdictional and regional basis; 

4. take a lead in monitoring federal agencies' efforts to prepare to 
meet their responsibilities under the NRP and the interim National 
Preparedness Goal; and: 

5. use a risk management approach in deciding whether and how to invest 
finite resources in specific capabilities for a catastrophic disaster. 

The Post-Katrina Reform Act responded to the findings and 
recommendations in the various reports examining the preparation for 
and response to Hurricane Katrina. While keeping FEMA within DHS, the 
act enhances FEMA's responsibilities and its autonomy within DHS. FEMA 
is to lead and support the nation in a risk-based, comprehensive 
emergency management system of preparedness, protection, response, 
recovery, and mitigation. Under the Act, the FEMA Administrator reports 
directly to the Secretary of DHS; FEMA is now a distinct entity within 
DHS; and the Secretary of DHS can no longer substantially or 
significantly reduce the authorities, responsibilities, or functions of 
FEMA or the capability to perform them unless authorized by subsequent 
legislation. FEMA has absorbed many of the functions of DHS's 
Preparedness Directorate (with some exceptions). The statute 
establishes 10 regional offices with specified responsibilities. The 
statute also establishes a National Integration Center responsible for 
the ongoing management and maintenance of the NIMS and NRP. The Post- 
Katrina Reform Act also included provisions for other areas, such as 
evacuation plans and exercises and addressing the needs of individuals 
with disabilities, In addition, the act includes several provisions to 
strengthen the management and capability of FEMA's workforce. For 
example, the statute called for a strategic human capital plan to shape 
and improve FEMA's workforce, authorized recruitment and retention 
bonuses, and established a Surge Capacity Force. Most of the 
organizational changes became effective as of March 31, 2007. Others, 
such as the increase in organizational autonomy for FEMA and 
establishment of the National Integration Center, became effective upon 
enactment of the Post-Katrina Reform Act on October 4, 2006. 

FEMA Reviewing Its Responsibilities, Capabilities as It Implements 
Recommendations and Post-Katrina Reform Act: 

After FEMA became part of DHS in March 2003, its responsibilities were 
over time dispersed and redefined. FEMA continues to evolve within DHS 
as it implements the changes required by the Post-Katrina Reform Act, 
whose details are discussed later. Hurricane Katrina severely tested 
disaster management at the federal, state, and local levels and 
revealed weaknesses in the basic elements of preparing for, responding 
to, and recovering from any catastrophic disaster. According to DHS, 
the department completed a thorough assessment of FEMA's internal 
structure to incorporate lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina and 
integrate systematically new and existing assets and responsibilities 
within FEMA. 

As I stated in March 2007 testimony, the effective implementation of 
recent recommendations and the Post-Katrina Reform Act's organizational 
changes and related roles and responsibilities should address many of 
our emergency management observations and recommendations. In addition, 
we previously reported that DHS needs to more effectively coordinate 
disaster preparedness, response, and recovery efforts, particularly for 
catastrophic disasters in which the response capabilities of state and 
local governments are almost immediately overwhelmed. Our analysis 
showed the need for (1) clearly defined and understood leadership roles 
and responsibilities; (2) the development of the necessary disaster 
capabilities; and (3) accountability systems that effectively balance 
the need for fast and flexible response against the need to prevent 
waste, fraud, and abuse. 

Leadership Is Critical to Prepare for, Respond to, and Recover from 
Catastrophic Disasters: 

In preparing for, responding to, and recovering from any catastrophic 
disaster, the legal authorities, roles and responsibilities, and lines 
of authority at all levels of government must be clearly defined, 
effectively communicated, and well understood to facilitate rapid and 
effective decision making. Hurricane Katrina showed the need to improve 
leadership at all levels of government to better respond to a 
catastrophic disaster. As we have previously reported, developing the 
capabilities needed for catastrophic disasters requires an overall 
national preparedness effort that is designed to integrate and define 
what needs to be done, where, and by whom (roles and responsibilities), 
how it should be done, and how well it should be done--that is, 
according to what standards. The principal national documents designed 
to address each of these are, respectively, the NRP, NIMS, and the NPG. 

All three documents are undergoing extensive review and revision by 
federal, state, and local government officials, tribal authorities, non-
governmental and private sector officials.[Footnote 12] For example, 
the review of the NRP is intended to assess the effectiveness of the 
NRP, identify modifications and improvements and reissue the document. 
This review includes all major components of the NRP including the base 
plan, Emergency Support Functions (ESF), annexes such as the 
Catastrophic Incident Annex and Supplement; as well as the role of the 
PFO, FCO, and the Joint Field Office structure. Also during the current 
NRP review period, FEMA has revised the organizational structure of 
Emergency Support Function 6 (ESF-6), Mass Care, Housing, and Human 
Services, and places FEMA as the lead agency for this emergency support 
function. The Red Cross will remain as a supporting agency in the 
responsibilities and activities of ESF-6. According to a February 2007 
letter by the Red Cross, this change will not take place until the NRP 
review process is complete and all changes are approved. 

The revised NRP and NIMS were originally scheduled for release in June 
2007. In April 2007, however, DHS officials notified stakeholders that 
some important issues were more complex and require national-level 
policy decisions, and additional time was needed to complete a 
comprehensive draft. DHS noted that the underlying operational 
principles of the NRP remain intact and the current document, as 
revised in May 2006, still applies. FEMA officials have told us that 
the final version of the National Preparedness Goal and its 
corresponding documents like the Target Capabilities List, are 
currently receiving final reviews by the White House and are expected 
to be out shortly. 

A key issue in the response to Hurricane Katrina was the lack of 
clearly understood roles and responsibilities. One that continues to be 
a subject of discussion is the roles and responsibilities of the FCO, 
who has the authority to make mission assignments to federal agencies 
for response and recovery under the Stafford Act, and the PFO, whose 
role was to provide situational awareness to the Secretary of Homeland 
Security. The May 2006 revisions to the NRP made changes designed to 
address this issue. However, as we noted in March 2007, the changes may 
not have fully resolved the leadership issues regarding the roles of 
the PFO and the FCO. While the Secretary of Homeland Security may avoid 
conflicts by appointing a single individual to serve in both positions 
in non-terrorist incidents, confusion may persist if the Secretary of 
Homeland Security does not exercise this discretion to do so. 
Furthermore, this discretion does not exist for terrorist incidents, 
and the revised NRP does not specifically provide a rationale for this 
limitation. 

FEMA has pre-designated five teams of FCOs and PFOs in the Gulf Coast 
and eastern seaboard states at risk of hurricanes. This includes FCOs 
and PFOs for the Gulf Coast Region,[Footnote 13] Northeast 
Region,[Footnote 14] and the Mid-Atlantic Region,[Footnote 15] and 
separate FCOs and PFOs for the states of Florida and Texas. It is 
critically important that the authorities, roles, and responsibilities 
of these pre-designated FCOs and PFOs be clear and clearly understood 
by all. There is still some question among state and local first 
responders about the need for both positions and how they will work 
together in disaster response. One potential benefit of naming the FCOs 
and PFOs in advance is that they have an opportunity meet and discuss 
expectations, roles and responsibilities with state, local, and 
nongovernmental officials before an actual disaster, possibly setting 
the groundwork for improved coordination and communication in an actual 
disaster. 

Enhanced Capabilities Are Needed to Adequately Prepare for and Respond 
to Major Disasters: 

Numerous reports, including those by the House, Senate, and the White 
House, and our own work suggest that the substantial resources and 
capabilities marshaled by state, local, and federal governments and 
nongovernmental organizations were insufficient to meet the immediate 
challenges posed by the unprecedented degree of damage and the number 
of victims caused by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Developing the 
ability to prepare for, respond to, and recover from major and 
catastrophic disasters requires an overall national preparedness effort 
that is designed to integrate and define what needs to be done and 
where, how it should be done, and how well it should be done--that is, 
according to what standards. As previously discussed, the principal 
national documents designed to address each of these are, respectively, 
the NRP, NIMS, and the NPG, and each document is undergoing revision. 

Overall, capabilities are built upon the appropriate combination of 
people, skills, processes, and assets. Ensuring that needed 
capabilities are available requires effective planning and coordination 
in conjunction with training and exercises in which the capabilities 
are realistically tested and problems identified and subsequently 
addressed in partnership with other federal, state, and local 
stakeholders. In recent work on FEMA management of day-to-day 
operations, we found that although shifting resources caused by its 
transition to DHS created challenges for FEMA, the agency's management 
of existing resources compounded these problems.[Footnote 16] FEMA 
lacks some of the basic management tools that help an agency respond to 
changing circumstances. Most notably, our January 2007 report found 
that FEMA lacks a strategic workforce plan and related human capital 
strategies--such as succession planning or a coordinated training 
effort. Such tools are integral to managing resources, as they enable 
an agency to define staffing levels, identify the critical skills 
needed to achieve its mission, and eliminate or mitigate gaps between 
current and future skills and competencies. FEMA officials have said 
they are beginning to address these and other basic organizational 
management issues. To this end, FEMA has commissioned studies of 18 
areas, whose final reports and recommendations are due later this 
spring.[Footnote 17] 

An important element of effective emergency response is the ability to 
identify and deploy where needed a variety of resources from a variety 
of sources--federal, state, local or tribal governments; military 
assets of the National Guard or active military; nongovernmental 
entities; and the private sector. One key method of tapping resources 
in areas not affected by the disaster is the Emergency Management 
Assistance Compact (EMAC). Through EMAC about 46,000 National Guard and 
19,000 civilian responders were deployed to areas directly affected by 
the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes. We have ongoing work examining how EMAC 
has been used in disasters and how its effectiveness could be enhanced 
and expect to report by this summer. 

One of the resources accessed through EMAC is the National Guard. 
States and governors rely on their National Guard personnel and 
equipment for disaster response, and National Guard personnel are 
frequently deployed to disaster areas outside their home states. 
However, as we reported in January 2007, the types and quantities of 
equipment the National Guard needs to respond to large-scale disasters 
have not been fully identified because the multiple federal and state 
agencies that would have roles in responding to such events have not 
completed and integrated their plans.[Footnote 18] As a liaison between 
the Army, the Air Force, and the states, the National Guard Bureau is 
well positioned to facilitate state planning for National Guard forces. 
However, until the bureau's charter and its civil support regulation 
are revised to define its role in facilitating state planning for 
multistate events, such planning may remain incomplete, and the 
National Guard may not be prepared to respond as effectively and 
efficiently as possible. In addition, questions have arisen about the 
level of resources the National Guard has available for domestic 
emergency response. DOD does not routinely measure the equipment 
readiness of nondeployed National Guard forces for domestic civil 
support missions or report this information to Congress. Thus, although 
the deployment of National Guard units overseas has decreased the 
supply of equipment available to nondeployed National Guard units in 
the U.S., there has been no established, formal method of assessing the 
impact on the Guard's ability to perform its domestic missions. 
Although DOD has begun to collect data on units' preparedness, these 
efforts are not yet fully mature. 

The nation's experience with hurricanes Katrina and Rita reinforces 
some of the questions surrounding the adequacy of capabilities in the 
context of a catastrophic disaster--particularly in the areas of (1) 
situational assessment and awareness, (2) emergency communications, (3) 
evacuations, (4) search and rescue, (5) logistics, and (6) mass care 
and sheltering. According to FEMA, the agency has described a number of 
actions it has taken or has underway to address identified deficiencies 
in each of these areas. Examples include designating national and 
regional situational awareness teams; acquiring and deploying mobile 
satellite communications trucks; developing an electronic system for 
receiving and tracking the status of requests for assistance and 
supplies; acquiring GPS equipment for tracking the location of supplies 
on route to areas of need; and working with the Red Cross and others to 
clarify roles and responsibilities for mass care, housing, and human 
services. However, a number of FEMA programs are ongoing and it is too 
early to evaluate their effectiveness. In addition, none of these 
initiatives appear to have been tested on a scale that reasonably 
simulates the conditions and demand they would face following a major 
or catastrophic disaster. Thus, it is difficult to assess the probable 
results of these initiatives in improving response to a major or 
catastrophic disaster, such as a category 4 or 5 hurricane. The section 
below briefly discusses actions taken or underway to make improvements 
in each of these areas. Additional details can be found in appendix I. 

Situational Awareness. FEMA is developing a concept for rapidly 
deployable interagency incident management teams, at this time called 
National Incident Management Team, to provide a forward federal 
presence on site within 12 hours of notification to facilitate managing 
the national response for catastrophic incidents. These teams will 
support efforts to meet the emergent needs during disasters such as the 
capability to provide initial situational awareness for decision-makers 
and support the initial establishment of a unified command. 

Emergency Communications. Agencies' communications systems during a 
catastrophic disaster must first be operable, with sufficient 
communications to meet everyday internal and emergency communication 
requirements. Once operable, systems should have communications 
interoperability whereby public safety agencies (e.g., police, fire, 
emergency medical services, etc.) and service agencies (e.g., public 
works, transportation, and hospitals) can communicate within and across 
agencies and jurisdictions in real time as needed. DHS officials have 
identified a number of programs and activities they have implemented to 
improve interoperable communications nationally, and FEMA has taken 
action to design, staff, and maintain a rapidly deployable, responsive, 
interoperable, and reliable emergency communications capability, which 
we discuss further in appendix I. 

Logistics. FEMA's inability to effectively manage and track requests 
for and the distribution of water, ice, food, and other supplies came 
under harsh criticism in the wake of Hurricane Katrina. Within days, 
FEMA became overwhelmed and essentially asked the military to take over 
much of the logistics mission.[Footnote 19] In the Post-Katrina Reform 
Act, Congress required FEMA to make its logistics system more flexible 
and responsive. FEMA's ongoing improvements to its logistics strategy 
and efforts are designed to initially lean forward and provide 
immediate support to a disaster site mainly through FEMA-owned goods 
and assets, and later on to establish sustained supply chains with the 
private vendors whose resources are needed for ongoing response and 
recovery activities, according to FEMA officials. In addition, we 
recently examined FEMA logistics issues, taking a broad approach, 
identifying five areas necessary for an effective logistics system, 
which are discussed in appendix I. In short, FEMA is taking action to 
transition its logistics program to be more proactive, flexible, and 
responsive. While these and other initiatives hold promise for 
improving FEMA's logistics capabilities, it will be several years 
before they are fully implemented and operational. 

Mass Care and Shelter. In GAO's work examining the nation's ability to 
evacuate, care for, and shelter disaster victims, we found that FEMA 
needs to identify and assess the capabilities that exist across the 
federal government and outside the federal government. In an April 
testimony, FEMA's Deputy Administrator for Operations said that 
emergency evacuation, shelter and housing is FEMA's most pressing 
priority for planning for recovery from a catastrophic disaster. He 
said that FEMA is undertaking more detailed mass evacuee support 
planning; the Department of Justice and Red Cross are developing 
methods for more quickly identifying and uniting missing family 
members; and FEMA and the Red Cross have developed a web-based data 
system to support shelter management, reporting, and facility 
identification activities. 

Balance Needed between Quick Provision of Assistance and Ensuring 
Accountability to Protect against Waste, Fraud, and Abuse: 

Controls and accountability mechanisms help to ensure that resources 
are used appropriately. Nevertheless, during a catastrophic disaster, 
decision makers struggle with the tension between implementing controls 
and accountability mechanisms and the demand for rapid response and 
recovery assistance. On one hand, our work uncovered many examples 
where quick action could not occur due to procedures that required 
extensive, time-consuming processes, delaying the delivery of vital 
supplies and other assistance. On the other hand, we also found 
examples where FEMA's processes assisting disaster victims left the 
federal government vulnerable to fraud and the abuse of expedited 
assistance payments. 

We estimated that through February 2006, FEMA made about $600 million 
to $1.4 billion in improper and potentially fraudulent payments to 
applicants who used invalid information to apply for expedited cash 
assistance. DHS and FEMA have reported a number of actions that are to 
be in effect for the 2007 hurricane season so that federal recovery 
programs will have more capacity to rapidly handle a catastrophic 
incident but also provide accountability. Examples include 
significantly increasing the quantity of prepositioned supplies, such 
as food, ice, and water; placing global positioning systems on supply 
trucks to track their location and better manage the delivery of 
supplies; creating an enhanced phone system for victim assistance 
applications that can handle up to 200,000 calls per day; and improving 
computer systems and processes for verifying the eligibility of those 
applying for assistance. Effective implementation of these and other 
planned improvements will be critical to achieving their intended 
outcomes.[Footnote 20] 

Finally, catastrophic disasters not only require a different magnitude 
of capabilities and resources for effective response, they may also 
require more flexible policies and operating procedures. In a 
catastrophe, streamlining, simplifying, and expediting decision making 
should quickly replace "business as usual" and unquestioned adherence 
to long-standing policies and operating procedures used in normal 
situations for providing relief to disaster victims. At the same time, 
controls and accountability mechanisms must be sufficient to provide 
the documentation needed for expense reimbursement and reasonable 
assurance that resources have been used legally and for the purposes 
intended. 

We have recommended that DHS create accountability systems that 
effectively balance the need for fast and flexible response against the 
need to prevent waste, fraud, and abuse. Doing so would enable DHS to 
provide assistance quickly following a catastrophe and keep up with the 
magnitude of needs to confirm the eligibility of victims for disaster 
assistance, or assure that there were provisions in contracts for 
response and recovery services to ensure fair and reasonable prices in 
all cases. We also recommended that DHS provide guidance on advance 
procurement practices and procedures (precontracting) for those federal 
agencies with roles and responsibilities under the NRP. These federal 
agencies could then better manage disaster-related procurement and 
establish an assessment process to monitor agencies' continuous 
planning efforts for their disaster-related procurement needs and the 
maintenance of capabilities. For example, we identified a number of 
emergency response practices in the public and private sectors that 
provide insight into how the federal government can better manage its 
disaster-related procurements. These practices include developing 
knowledge of contractor capabilities and prices, and establishing 
vendor relationships prior to the disaster and establishing a scalable 
operations plan to adjust the level of capacity to match the response 
with the need.[Footnote 21] 

In my March 2007 testimony I noted that recent statutory changes have 
established more controls and accountability mechanisms. For example, 
The Secretary of DHS is required to promulgate regulations designed to 
limit the excessive use of subcontractors and subcontracting tiers. The 
Secretary of DHS is also required to promulgate regulations that limit 
certain noncompetitive contracts to 150 days, unless exceptional 
circumstances apply. Oversight funding is specified. FEMA may dedicate 
up to one percent of funding for agency mission assignments as 
oversight funds. The FEMA Administrator must develop and maintain 
internal management controls of FEMA disaster assistance programs and 
develop and implement a training program to prevent fraud, waste, and 
abuse of federal funds in response to or recovery from a disaster. 
Verification measures must be developed to identify eligible recipients 
of disaster relief assistance. 

Several Disaster Management Issues Should Have Continued Congressional 
Attention: 

In November 2006, the Comptroller General wrote to the congressional 
leadership suggesting areas for congressional oversight.[Footnote 22] 
He suggested that one area needing fundamental reform and oversight was 
preparing for, responding to, recovering from, and rebuilding after 
catastrophic events. Recent events--notably Hurricane Katrina and the 
threat of an influenza pandemic--have illustrated the importance of 
ensuring a strategic and integrated approach to catastrophic disaster 
management. Disaster preparation and response that is well planned and 
coordinated can save lives and mitigate damage, and an effectively 
functioning insurance market can substantially reduce the government's 
exposure to post-catastrophe payouts. 

Lessons learned from past national emergencies provide an opportunity 
for Congress to look at actions that could mitigate the effects of 
potential catastrophic events. On January 18, 2007, DHS provided 
Congress a notice of implementation of the Post-Katrina Reform Act 
reorganization requirements and additional organizational changes made 
under the Homeland Security Act of 2002. All of the changes, according 
to DHS, were to become effective on March 31, 2007. As stated in our 
March 2007 testimony, the effective implementation of the Post-Katrina 
Reform Act's organizational changes and related roles and 
responsibilities--in addition to those changes already undertaken by 
DHS--should address many of our emergency management observations and 
recommendations. 

The Comptroller General also suggested in November 2006 that Congress 
could also consider how the federal government can work with other 
nations, other levels of government, and nonprofit and private sector 
organizations, such as the Red Cross and private insurers, to help 
ensure the nation is well prepared and recovers effectively. Given the 
billions of dollars dedicated to preparing for, responding to, 
recovering from, and rebuilding after catastrophic disasters, 
congressional oversight is critical. 

A comprehensive and in-depth oversight agenda would require long-term 
efforts. Congress might consider starting with several specific areas 
for immediate oversight, such as (1) evaluating development and 
implementation of the National Preparedness System, including 
preparedness for an influenza pandemic, (2) assessing state and local 
capabilities and the use of federal grants in building and sustaining 
those capabilities, (3) examining regional and multistate planning and 
preparation, (4) determining the status of preparedness exercises, and 
(5) examining DHS policies regarding oversight assistance. 

DHS Has Reorganized Pursuant to the Post-Katrina Reform Act: 

On January 18, 2007, DHS provided Congress a notice of implementation 
of the Post-Katrina Reform Act reorganization requirements and 
additional organizational changes made under the Homeland Security Act 
of 2002. All of the changes, according to DHS, were to become effective 
on March 31, 2007. According to DHS, the department completed a 
thorough assessment of FEMA's internal structure to incorporate lessons 
learned from Hurricane Katrina and integrate systematically new and 
existing assets and responsibilities within FEMA. DHS transferred the 
following DHS offices and divisions to FEMA: 

* United States Fire Administration, 

* Office of Grants and Training, 

* Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Division, 

* Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program, 

* Office of National Capital Region Coordination, and, 

* Office of State and Local Government Coordination. 

DHS officials stated that they have established several organizational 
elements, such as a logistics management division, a disaster 
assistance division, and a disaster operations division. In addition, 
FEMA expanded its regional office structure with each region in part by 
establishing a Regional Advisory Council and at least one Regional 
Strike Team. With the recent appointment of the director for region 
III, FEMA officials noted that for the first time in recent memory 
there will be no acting regional directors and all 10 FEMA regional 
offices will be headed by experienced professionals. 

Further, FEMA will include a new national preparedness directorate 
intended to consolidate FEMA's strategic preparedness assets from 
existing FEMA programs and certain legacy Preparedness Directorate 
programs. The National Preparedness Directorate will contain functions 
related to preparedness doctrine, policy, and contingency planning. It 
also will include the National Integration Center that will maintain 
the NRP and NIMS and ensure that training and exercise activities 
reflect these documents. 

Effective Implementation of the Post-Katrina Reform Act's Provisions 
Should Respond to Many Concerns: 

As I have previously stated in my March 2007 testimony, the effective 
implementation of the Post-Katrina Reform Act's organizational changes 
and related roles and responsibilities--in addition to those changes 
already undertaken by DHS--should address many of our emergency 
management observations and recommendations. 

As noted earlier, our analysis in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina 
showed the need for (1) clearly defined and understood leadership roles 
and responsibilities; (2) the development of the necessary disaster 
capabilities; and (3) accountability systems that effectively balance 
the need for fast and flexible response against the need to prevent 
waste, fraud, and abuse. The statute appears to strengthen leadership 
roles and responsibilities. For example, the statute clarifies that the 
FEMA Administrator is to act as the principal emergency management 
adviser to the President, the Homeland Security Council, and the 
Secretary of DHS and to provide recommendations directly to Congress 
after informing the Secretary of DHS. The incident management 
responsibilities and roles of the National Integration Center are now 
clear. The Secretary of DHS must ensure that the NRP provides for a 
clear chain of command to lead and coordinate the federal response to 
any natural disaster, act of terrorism, or other man-made disaster. The 
law also establishes qualifications that appointees must meet. For 
example, the FEMA Administrator must have a demonstrated ability in and 
knowledge of emergency management and homeland security and 5 years of 
executive leadership and management experience. 

Many provisions are designed to enhance preparedness and response. For 
example, the statute requires the President to establish a national 
preparedness goal and national preparedness system. The national 
preparedness system includes a broad range of preparedness activities, 
including utilizing target capabilities and preparedness priorities, 
training and exercises, comprehensive assessment systems, and reporting 
requirements. To illustrate, the FEMA Administrator is to carry out a 
national training program to implement, and a national exercise program 
to test and evaluate the NPG, NIMS, NRP, and other related plans and 
strategies. 

In addition, FEMA is to partner with nonfederal entities to build a 
national emergency management system. States must develop plans that 
include catastrophic incident annexes modeled after the NRP annex in 
order to be eligible for FEMA emergency preparedness grants. The state 
annexes must be developed in consultation with local officials, 
including regional commissions. FEMA regional administrators are to 
foster the development of mutual aid agreements between states. FEMA 
must enter into a memorandum of understanding with certain non-federal 
entities to collaborate on developing standards for deployment 
capabilities, including credentialing of personnel and typing of 
resources. In addition, FEMA must implement several other capabilities, 
such as (1) developing a logistics system providing real-time 
visibility of items at each point throughout the logistics system, (2) 
establishing a prepositioned equipment program, and (3) establishing 
emergency support and response teams. 

The National Preparedness System Is Key to Developing Disaster 
Capabilities: 

More immediate congressional attention might focus on evaluating the 
construction and effectiveness of the National Preparedness System, 
which is mandated under the Post-Katrina Reform Act. Under Homeland 
Security Presidential Directive-8, issued in December 2003, DHS was to 
coordinate the development of a national domestic all-hazards 
preparedness goal "to establish measurable readiness priorities and 
targets that appropriately balance the potential threat and magnitude 
of terrorist attacks and large scale natural or accidental disasters 
with the resources required to prevent, respond to, and recover from 
them." The goal was also to include readiness metrics and standards for 
preparedness assessments and strategies and a system for assessing the 
nation's overall preparedness to respond to major events. 

To implement the directive, DHS developed the National Preparedness 
Goal using 15 emergency event scenarios, 12 of which were terrorist 
related, with the remaining 3 addressing a major hurricane, major 
earthquake, and an influenza pandemic. According to DHS's National 
Preparedness Guidance, the planning scenarios are intended to 
illustrate the scope and magnitude of large-scale, catastrophic 
emergency events for which the nation needs to be prepared and to form 
the basis for identifying the capabilities needed to respond to a wide 
range of large scale emergency events. The scenarios focused on the 
consequences that first responders would have to address. Some state 
and local officials and experts have questioned whether the scenarios 
were appropriate inputs for preparedness planning, particularly in 
terms of their plausibility and the emphasis on terrorist scenarios. 

Using the scenarios, and in consultation with federal, state, and local 
emergency response stakeholders, DHS developed a list of over 1,600 
discrete tasks, of which 300 were identified as critical. DHS then 
identified 36 target capabilities to provide guidance to federal, 
state, and local first responders on the capabilities they need to 
develop and maintain. That list has since been refined, and DHS 
released a revised draft list of 37 capabilities in December 2005. 
Because no single jurisdiction or agency would be expected to perform 
every task, possession of a target capability could involve enhancing 
and maintaining local resources, ensuring access to regional and 
federal resources, or some combination of the two. However, DHS is 
still in the process of developing goals, requirements, and metrics for 
these capabilities and the National Preparedness Goal in light of the 
Hurricane Katrina experience. 

Several key components of the National Preparedness System defined in 
the Post-Katrina Reform Act--the NPG, target capabilities and 
preparedness priorities, and comprehensive assessment systems--should 
be closely examined. Prior to Hurricane Katrina, DHS had established 
seven priorities for enhancing national first responder preparedness, 
including, for example, implementing the NRP and NIMS; strengthening 
capabilities in information sharing and collaboration; and 
strengthening capabilities in medical surge and mass prophylaxis. Those 
seven priorities were incorporated into DHS's fiscal year 2006 homeland 
security grant program (HSGP) guidance, which added an eighth priority 
that emphasized emergency operations and catastrophic planning. 

In the fiscal year 2007 HSGP program guidance, DHS set two overarching 
priorities. DHS has focused the bulk of its available grant dollars on 
risk-based investment. In addition, the department has prioritized 
regional coordination and investment strategies that institutionalize 
regional security strategy integration. In addition to the two 
overarching priorities, the guidance also identified several others. 
These include (1) measuring progress in achieving the NPG, (2) 
integrating and synchronizing preparedness programs and activities, (3) 
developing and sustaining a statewide critical infrastructure/key 
resource protection program, (4) enabling information/intelligence 
fusion, (5) enhancing statewide communications interoperability, (6) 
strengthening preventative radiological/nuclear detection capabilities, 
and (7) enhancing catastrophic planning to address nationwide plan 
review results. Under the guidance, all fiscal year 2007 HSGP 
applicants will be required to submit an investment justification that 
provides background information, strategic objectives and priorities 
addressed, their funding/implementation plan, and the impact that each 
proposed investment (project) is anticipated to have. 

The Particular Challenge of Preparing for an Influenza Pandemic: 

The possibility of an influenza pandemic is a real and significant 
threat to the nation. There is widespread agreement that it is not a 
question of if but when such a pandemic will occur. The issues 
associated with the preparation for and response to a pandemic flu are 
similar to those for any other type of disaster: clear leadership roles 
and responsibilities, authority, and coordination; risk management; 
realistic planning, training, and exercises; assessing and building the 
capacity needed to effectively respond and recover; effective 
information sharing and communication; and accountability for the 
effective use of resources. 

However, a pandemic poses some unique challenges. Hurricanes, 
earthquakes, explosions, or bioterrorist incidents occur within a short 
period of time, perhaps a period of minutes, although such events can 
have long-term effects, as we have seen in the Gulf region following 
Hurricane Katrina. The immediate effects of such disasters are likely 
to affect specific locations or areas within the nation; the immediate 
damage is not nationwide. In contrast, an influenza pandemic is likely 
to continue in waves of 6 to 8 weeks for a number of weeks or months 
and affect wide areas of the nation, perhaps the entire nation. 
Depending upon the severity of the pandemic, the number of deaths could 
be from 200,000 to 2 million. Seasonal influenza in the United States 
results in about 36,000 deaths annually. Successfully addressing the 
pandemic is also likely to require international coordination of 
detection and response. 

The Department of Health and Human Services estimates that during a 
severe pandemic, absenteeism may reach as much as 40 percent in an 
affected community because individuals are ill, caring for family 
members, or fear infection. Such absenteeism could affect our nation's 
economy, as businesses and governments face the challenge of continuing 
to provide essential services with reduced numbers of healthy workers. 
In addition, our nation's ability to respond effectively to hurricanes 
or other major disasters during a pandemic may also be diminished as 
first responders, health care workers, and others are infected or 
otherwise unable to perform their normal duties. Thus, the consequences 
of a pandemic are potentially widespread and effective planning and 
response for such a disaster will require particularly close 
cooperation among all levels of government, the private sector, 
individuals within the United States, as well as international 
cooperation. 

We have engagements under way examining such issues as barriers to 
implementing the Department of Health and Human Services' National 
Pandemic Influenza Plan, the national strategy and framework for 
pandemic influenza, the Department of Defense and Department of 
Agriculture's preparedness efforts and plans, public health and 
hospital preparedness, and U.S. efforts to improve global disease 
surveillance. We expect most of these reports to be issued by late 
summer 2007. 

Knowledge of the Effects of State and Local Efforts to Improve Their 
Capabilities Is Limited: 

Possible congressional oversight in the short term also might focus on 
state and local capabilities. As I testified in February on applying 
risk management principles to guide federal investments, over the past 
4 years DHS has provided about $14 billion in federal funding to 
states, localities, and territories through its HSGP grants. 
Remarkably, however, we know little about how states and localities 
finance their efforts in this area, have used their federal funds, and 
are assessing the effectiveness with which they spend those funds. 

Essentially, all levels of government are still struggling to define 
and act on the answers to basic, but hardly simple, questions about 
emergency preparedness and response: What is important (that is, what 
are our priorities)? How do we know what is important (e.g., risk 
assessments, performance standards)? How do we measure, attain, and 
sustain success? On what basis do we make necessary trade-offs, given 
finite resources? 

There are no simple, easy answers to these questions. The data 
available for answering them are incomplete and imperfect. We have 
better information and a better sense of what needs to be done for some 
types of major emergency events than for others. For some natural 
disasters, such as regional wildfires and flooding, there is more 
experience and therefore a better basis on which to assess preparation 
and response efforts and identify gaps that need to be addressed. 
California has experience with earthquakes; Florida, with hurricanes. 
However, no one in the nation has experience with such potential 
catastrophes as a dirty bomb detonated in a major city. Although both 
the AIDS epidemic and SARS provide some related experience, there have 
been no recent pandemics that rapidly spread to thousands of people 
across the nation. 

A new feature in the fiscal year 2006 DHS homeland security grant 
guidance for the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) grants was that 
eligible recipients must provide an "investment justification" with 
their grant application. States were to use this justification to 
outline the implementation approaches for specific investments that 
will be used to achieve the initiatives outlined in their state Program 
and Capability Enhancement Plan. These plans were multiyear global 
program management plans for the entire state homeland security program 
that look beyond federal homeland security grant programs and funding. 
The justifications must justify all funding requested through the DHS 
homeland security grant program. In the guidance DHS noted that it 
would use a peer review process to evaluate grant applications on the 
basis of the effectiveness of a state's plan to address the priorities 
it has outlined and thereby reduce its overall risk. 

For fiscal year 2006, DHS implemented a competitive process to evaluate 
the anticipated effectiveness of proposed homeland security 
investments. For fiscal year 2007, DHS will continue to use the risk 
and effectiveness assessments to inform final funding decisions, 
although changes have been made to make the grant allocation process 
more transparent and more easily understood. DHS officials have said 
that they cannot yet assess how effective the actual investments from 
grant funds are in enhancing preparedness and mitigating risk because 
they do not yet have the metrics to do so. 

Regional and Multistate Planning and Preparation Should Be Robust: 

Through its grant guidance, DHS has encouraged regional and multistate 
planning and preparation. Planning and assistance have largely been 
focused on single jurisdictions and their immediately adjacent 
neighbors. However, well-documented problems with the abilities of 
first responders from multiple jurisdictions to communicate at the site 
of an incident and the potential for large-scale natural and terrorist 
disasters have generated a debate on the extent to which first 
responders should be focusing their planning and preparation on a 
regional and multigovernmental basis. 

As I mentioned earlier, an overarching national priority for the 
National Preparedness Goal is embracing regional approaches to 
building, sustaining, and sharing capabilities at all levels of 
government. All HSGP applications are to reflect regional coordination 
and show an investment strategy that institutionalizes regional 
security strategy integration. However, it is not known to what extent 
regional and multistate planning has progressed and is effective. 

Our limited regional work indicated there are challenges in planning. 
Our early work addressing the Office of National Capital Region 
Coordination (ONCRC) and National Capital Region (NCR) strategic 
planning reported that the ONCRC and the NCR faced interrelated 
challenges in managing federal funds in a way that maximizes the 
increase in first responder capacities and preparedness while 
minimizing inefficiency and unnecessary duplication of 
expenditures.[Footnote 23] One of these challenges included a 
coordinated regionwide plan for establishing first responder 
performance goals, needs, and priorities, and assessing the benefits of 
expenditures in enhancing first responder capabilities. In subsequent 
work on National Capital Region strategic planning, we highlighted 
areas that needed strengthening in the Region's planning, specifically 
improving the substance of the strategic plan to guide decision 
makers.[Footnote 24] For example, additional information could have 
been provided regarding the type, nature, scope, or timing of planned 
goals, objectives, and initiatives; performance expectations and 
measures; designation of priority initiatives to meet regional risk and 
needed capabilities; lead organizations for initiative implementation; 
resources and investments; and operational commitment. 

Exercises Must Be Carefully Planned and Deployed and Capture Lessons 
Learned: 

Our work examining the preparation for and response to Hurricane 
Katrina highlighted the importance of realistic exercises to test and 
refine assumptions, capabilities, and operational procedures; build on 
the strengths; and shore up the limitations revealed by objective 
assessments of the exercises. The Post-Katrina Reform Act mandates a 
national exercise program, and training and exercises are also included 
as a component of the National Preparedness System. With almost any 
skill and capability, experience and practice enhance proficiency. For 
first responders, exercises--especially of the type or magnitude of 
events for which there is little actual experience--are essential for 
developing skills and identifying what works well and what needs 
further improvement. Major emergency incidents, particularly 
catastrophic ones, by definition require the coordinated actions of 
personnel from many first responder disciplines and all levels of 
government, nonprofit organizations, and the private sector. It is 
difficult to overemphasize the importance of effective 
interdisciplinary, intergovernmental planning, training, and exercises 
in developing the coordination and skills needed for effective 
response. 

For exercises to be effective in identifying both strengths and areas 
needing attention, it is important that they be realistic, designed to 
test and stress the system, involve all key persons who would be 
involved in responding to an actual event, and be followed by honest 
and realistic assessments that result in action plans that are 
implemented. In addition to relevant first responders, exercise 
participants should include, depending upon the scope and nature of the 
exercise, mayors, governors, and state and local emergency managers who 
would be responsible for such things as determining if and when to 
declare a mandatory evacuation or ask for federal assistance. 

DHS Has Provided Limited Transparency for Its Management or Operational 
Decisions: 

Congressional oversight in the short term might include DHS's policies 
regarding oversight assistance. The Comptroller General has testified 
that DHS has not been transparent in its efforts to strengthen its 
management areas and mission functions. While much of its sensitive 
work needs to be guarded from improper disclosure, DHS has not been 
receptive toward oversight. Delays in providing Congress and us with 
access to various documents and officials have impeded our work. 

We need to be able to independently assure ourselves and Congress that 
DHS has implemented many of our past recommendations or has taken other 
corrective actions to address the challenges we identified. However, 
DHS has not made its management or operational decisions transparent 
enough so that Congress can be sure it is effectively, efficiently, and 
economically using the billions of dollars in funding it receives 
annually, and is providing the levels of security called for in 
numerous legislative requirements and presidential directives. 

Concluding Observations: 

Since September 11, 2001, the federal government has awarded billions 
of dollars in grants and assistance to state and local governments to 
assist in strengthening emergency management capabilities. DHS has 
developed several key national policy documents, including the NRP, 
NIMS, and the NPG to guide federal, state, and local efforts. The 
aftermath of the 2005 hurricane season resulted in a reassessment of 
the federal role in preparing for and responding to catastrophic 
events. The studies and reports of the past year--by Congress, the 
White House Homeland Security Council, the DHS IG, DHS and FEMA, GAO, 
and others--have provided a number of insights into the strengths and 
limitations of the nation's capacity to respond to catastrophic 
disasters and resulted in a number of recommendations for strengthening 
that capacity. Collectively, these studies and reports paint a complex 
mosaic of the challenges that the nation--federal, state, local, and 
tribal governments; nongovernmental entities; the private sector; and 
individual citizens--faces in preparing for, responding to, and 
recovering from catastrophic disasters. The Post-Katrina Reform Act 
directs many organizational, mission, and policy changes to respond to 
these findings and challenges. 

Assessing, developing, attaining, and sustaining needed emergency 
preparedness, response, and recovery capabilities is a difficult task 
that requires sustained leadership, the coordinated efforts of many 
stakeholders from a variety of first responder disciplines, levels of 
government, and nongovernmental entities. There is a no "silver 
bullet," no easy formula. It is also a task that is never done, but 
requires continuing commitment and leadership and trade-offs because 
circumstances change and we will never have the funds to do everything 
we might like to do. 

That concludes my statement, and I would be pleased to respond to any 
questions you and subcommittee members may have. 

Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments: 

For further information about this statement, please contact William O. 
Jenkins Jr., Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues, on (202) 
512-8777 or jenkinswo@gao.gov. 

In addition to the contact named above the following individuals from 
GAO's Homeland Security and Justice Team also made major contributors 
to this testimony: Sharon Caudle, Assistant Director; John Vocino, 
Analyst-in-Charge; Flavio Martinez, Analyst; and Amy Bernstein, 
Communications Analyst. 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Enhanced Capabilities for Catastrophic Response and 
Recovery: 

Numerous reports and our own work suggest that the substantial 
resources and capabilities marshaled by state, local, and federal 
governments and nongovernmental organizations were insufficient to meet 
the immediate challenges posed by the unprecedented degree of damage 
and the number of victims caused by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. 
Developing the capabilities needed for catastrophic disasters should be 
part of an overall national preparedness effort that is designed to 
integrate and define what needs to be done and where, how, and how well 
it should be done--that is, according to what standards. The principal 
national documents designed to address each of these are, respectively, 
the NRP, NIMS, and the NPG. The nation's experience with Hurricanes 
Katrina and Rita reinforces some of the questions surrounding the 
adequacy of capabilities in the context of a catastrophic disaster-- 
particularly in the areas of (1) situational assessment and awareness, 
(2) emergency communications, (3) evacuations, (4) search and rescue, 
(5) logistics, and (6) mass care and sheltering. 

FEMA is taking actions to address identified deficiencies in each of 
these areas. Examples include designating national and regional 
situational awareness teams; acquiring and deploying mobile satellite 
communications trucks; developing an electronic system for receiving 
and tracking the status of requests for assistance and supplies; 
acquiring GPS equipment for tracking the location of supplies on route 
to areas of need; and working with the Red Cross and others to clarify 
roles and responsibilities for mass care, housing, and human services. 
This appendix provides additional details of FEMA's actions in each of 
these areas. 

FEMA Taking Steps to Improve Situational Assessment Capabilities: 

One of the critical capabilities that FEMA is working to improve is 
their situational assessment and awareness. FEMA is developing a 
concept for rapidly deployable interagency incident management teams, 
at this time called National Incident Management Team, to provide a 
forward federal presence to facilitate managing the national response 
for catastrophic incidents. FEMA is planning to establish three 
national-level teams and ten regional-level teams, one in each of the 
ten FEMA regions. These teams will support efforts to meet the emergent 
needs during disasters such as the capability to provide initial 
situational awareness for decision-makers and support the initial 
establishment of a unified command. According to FEMA's plans, these 
teams will have a multi-agency composition to ensure that the multi- 
disciplinary requirements of emergency management are met. The teams 
are envisioned to have the capability to establish an effective federal 
presence within 12-hours of notification, to support the state, to 
coordinate federal activities, and to be self sufficient for a minimum 
of 48-hours so as not to be a drain on potentially scarce local 
resources. National-level and regional-level teams will be staffed with 
permanent full-time employees, unlike the ERTs, which are staffed on a 
collateral duty basis. Team composition will include representatives 
from other DHS components, interagency and homeland security partners. 
When not deployed, the teams will team-train with federal partners and 
provide a training capability to elevate state and local emergency 
management capabilities. The teams will also engage in consistent and 
coordinated operational planning and relationship-building with state, 
local, tribal, and other stakeholders. 

According to FEMA officials, these teams are still being designed and 
decisions on team assets, equipment, and expected capabilities have not 
yet been finalized. The new teams are envisioned to eventually subsume 
the existing FIRST (Federal Incident Response Teams) and ERTs (FEMA's 
Emergency Response Teams), and their mission and capabilities will 
incorporate similar concepts involving leadership, emergency management 
doctrine, and operational competence in communications. FEMA plans to 
implement one National Incident Management Team and one Regional 
Incident Management Team by May 25, 2007. 

Some Progress Has Been Made on Interoperable Communications: 

As our past work has noted, emergency communications is a critical 
capability common across all phases of an incident. Agencies' 
communications systems during a catastrophic disaster must first be 
operable, with sufficient communications to meet everyday internal and 
emergency communication requirements. Once operable, they then should 
have communications interoperability whereby public safety agencies 
(e.g., police, fire, emergency medical services, etc.) and service 
agencies (e.g., public works, transportation, and hospitals) can 
communicate within and across agencies and jurisdictions in real time 
as needed. 

DHS officials have identified a number of programs and activities they 
have implemented to improve interoperable communications nationally. 
DHS's Office for Interoperability and Compatibility (OIC) was 
established to strengthen and integrate interoperability and 
compatibility efforts to improve local, tribal, state, and federal 
emergency preparedness and response. SAFECOM, a program of OIC which is 
transitioning to the Office of Emergency Communications (OEC)--in 
response to the Post-Katrina Reform Act--is developing tools, 
templates, and guidance documents, including field tested statewide 
planning methodologies, online collaboration tools, coordinated grant 
guidance, communications requirements, and a comprehensive online 
library of lessons learned and best practices to improve 
interoperability and compatibility across the nation. DHS officials 
cited the development of the following examples in their efforts to 
improve interoperable communications: 

* Statement of Requirements (SoR) to define operational and functional 
requirements for emergency response communications. 

* Public Safety Architecture Framework (PSAF) to help emergency 
response agencies map interoperable communications system requirements 
and identify system gaps. 

* Project 25 (P25) suite of standards and a Compliance Assessment 
Program. This project is in conjunction with the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST) to support the efforts of the emergency 
response community and industry; 

* Statewide Communications Interoperability Planning Methodology to 
offer states a tangible approach as they initiate statewide 
interoperability planning efforts. SAFECOM also collaborated in DHS 
grant guidance to help states develop statewide interoperability plans 
by the end of 2007. 

According to FEMA officials, the agency is taking actions to design, 
staff, and maintain a rapidly deployable, responsive, interoperable, 
and highly reliable emergency communications capability using the 
latest commercial off-the-shelf voice, video, and data technology. 
FEMA's Response Division is the designated lead for tactical 
communications, along with situational awareness information technology 
enablers that are provided by FEMA's Chief Information Officer. Mobile 
Emergency Response Support (MERS) detachments provide robust, 
deployable, command, control, and incident communications capabilities 
to DHS/FEMA elements for catastrophic Incidents of National 
Significance. The MERS mission supports Emergency Support Function 
partners at the federal, state, and local levels of government. The 
plan is to utilize enhanced MERS capabilities and leverage commercial 
technology to provide real-time connectivity between communications 
platforms in a manner consistent with emergency communication 
deployment doctrine being developed by DHS and FEMA. According to FEMA 
officials, emergency managers at the federal, state, and local levels 
of government will benefit from an integrated interoperable emergency 
communications architecture that includes the Department of Defense, 
United States Northern Command and the National Guard Bureau. 

Our recent work noted that $2.15 billion in grant funding has been 
awarded to states and localities from fiscal year 2003 through fiscal 
year 2005 for communications interoperability enhancements helped to 
make improvements on a variety of interoperability projects.[Footnote 
25] However this work noted that the SAFECOM program has made limited 
progress in improving communications interoperability at all levels of 
government. For example, the program has not addressed interoperability 
with federal agencies, a critical element to interoperable 
communications required by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
Prevention Act of 2004.[Footnote 26] The SAFECOM program has focused on 
helping states and localities improve interoperable communications by 
developing tools and guidance for their use. However, based on our 
review of four states and selected localities, SAFECOM's progress in 
achieving its goals of helping these states and localities improve 
interoperable communications has been limited. Officials from the 
states and localities we reviewed often found that the tools and 
planning assistance provided by the program were not helpful, or they 
were unaware of what assistance the program had to offer. The program's 
limited effectiveness can be linked to poor program management 
practices, including the lack of a plan for improving interoperability 
across all levels of government and inadequate performance measures 
that would provide feedback to better attune tools and assistance with 
public safety needs. Until SAFECOM adopts these key management 
practices, its progress is likely to remain limited. 

Further, little progress had been made in developing Project 25 
standards--a suite of national standards that are intended to enable 
interoperability among the communications products of different 
vendors. For example, although one of the eight major subsets of 
standards was defined in the project's first 4 years (from 1989 to 
1993), from 1993 through 2005, no additional standards were completed 
that could be used by a vendor to develop elements of a Project 25 
system. The private-sector coordinating body responsible for Project 25 
has defined specifications for three additional subsets of standards. 
However, ambiguities in the published standards have led to 
incompatibilities among products made by different vendors, and no 
compliance testing has been conducted to ensure vendors' products are 
interoperable. Nevertheless, DHS has strongly encouraged state and 
local agencies to use grant funding to purchase Project 25 radios, 
which are substantially more expensive than non-Project 25 radios. As a 
result, states and local agencies have purchased fewer, more expensive 
radios, which still may not be interoperable and thus may provide them 
with minimal additional benefits. Thus, until DHS takes a more 
strategic approach here, progress by states and localities in improving 
interoperability is likely to be impeded. 

FEMA Taking Steps to Address Logistics Problems: 

In the wake of Hurricane Katrina, FEMA's performance in the logistics 
area came under harsh criticism. Within days, FEMA became overwhelmed 
and essentially asked the military to take over much of the logistics 
mission.[Footnote 27] In the Post-Katrina Reform Act, Congress required 
FEMA to make its logistics system more flexible and responsive. FEMA's 
improvements to their logistics strategy and efforts are designed to 
initially lean forward and provide immediate support to a disaster site 
mainly through FEMA-owned goods and assets, and later on to establish 
sustained supply chains with the private vendors whose resources are 
needed for ongoing response and recovery activities, according to FEMA 
officials. 

According to FEMA officials, the agency is building forward-leaning 
capabilities that include, for example, its MERS resources designed to 
support a variety of communications requirements--satellite, land 
mobile radio, computer and telephone systems--with the ability to 
operate from one or more locations (mobile and stationary) within the 
response area of operations. FEMA has also developed a Pre-Positioned 
Disaster Supply (PPDS) program to position containers of life-saving 
and life-sustaining disaster equipment and supplies as close to a 
potential disaster site as possible, in order to substantially reduce 
the initial response time to incidents.[Footnote 28] Further, FEMA is 
developing a Pre-positioned Equipment Program (PEP) that also consists 
of standardized containers of equipment to provide state and local 
governments responding to a range of major disasters such equipment as 
personal protective supplies, decontamination, detection, technical 
search and rescue, law enforcement, medical, interoperable 
communications and other emergency response equipment. According to 
FEMA officials, currently FEMA has established 8 of the 11 PEP 
locations, as mandated by the Post-Katrina Reform Act, and FEMA is 
currently conducting an analysis to determine where the additional PEP 
sites should be located. FEMA has also stated that it has enhanced its 
relationships with the public sector with its disaster logistics 
partners and has worked to utilize the public sector's expertise 
through Inter-Agency Agreements with the Defense Logistics Agency, the 
Department of Transportation and Marine Corps Systems Command. 

According to FEMA officials, another critical component of creating an 
effective logistics system is based upon FEMA's ability to work 
collaboratively with and leverage the capabilities of its public and 
private partners. FEMA's logistics efforts have identified private 
sector expertise to improve and develop software systems to increase 
logistics program efficiency and effectiveness. For example, the 
Logistics Information Management System (LIMS) is FEMA's formal 
accountability database system for all property managed within FEMA 
nation-wide or at disaster field locations. At the same time, FEMA is 
also developing a multi-phased Total Asset Visibility (TAV) program 
with the assistance of the private sector to leverage the collective 
resources of the private and public sector to improve emergency 
response logistics in the areas of transportation, warehousing, and 
distribution. The current phase of the program, which is operational at 
two FEMA logistics centers (Atlanta, Georgia, and Fort Worth, Texas), 
encompasses two software management packages designed to provide FEMA 
the ability to inventory disaster response commodities upon arrival at 
a warehouse, place the commodities in storage, and track the 
commodities while stored in the warehouse. FEMA plans to expand the 
capabilities of this first phase of the system to all FEMA Regions 
during 2007. This will provide FEMA with sufficient logistics 
management and tracking capabilities until an expanded phase two can be 
implemented. For the second phase, FEMA is currently conducting market 
research to solicit input from the private sector and other sources to 
facilitate final design of the program's second phase. According to 
FEMA officials, initial operational capabilities for this phase are 
scheduled to be in place by June 2008, and fully-operational in June 
2009. According to FEMA, the completed product will provide a more 
comprehensive approach to producing real-time, reliable reporting and 
incorporate FEMA's financial resource tracking requirements. It will 
also be able to support other federal departments and agencies, non- 
government organizations, and state, local and tribal organizations 
under the guidelines of the NRP. 

While FEMA has been working to address its logistics capabilities, it 
is too early to evaluate these efforts. We recently examined FEMA 
logistics issues, taking a broad approach, identifying five areas 
necessary for an effective logistics system. Below, we describe these 
five areas along with FEMA's ongoing actions to address each. 

Requirements: FEMA does not yet have operational plans in place to 
address disaster scenarios, nor does it have detailed information on 
states' capabilities and resources. As a result, FEMA does not have 
information from these sources to define what and how much it needs to 
stock. However, FEMA is developing a concept of operations to underpin 
its logistics program and told us that it is working to develop 
detailed plans and the associated stockage requirements. However, until 
FEMA has solid requirements based on detailed plans, the agency will be 
unable to assess its true preparedness. 

Inventory management: FEMA's system accounts for the location, 
quantity, and types of supplies, but the ability to track supplies in- 
transit is limited. FEMA has several efforts under way to improve 
transportation and tracking of supplies and equipment, such as 
expanding its new system for in-transit visibility from the two test 
regions to all FEMA regions. 

Facilities: FEMA maintains nine logistics centers and dozens of smaller 
storage facilities across the country. However, it has little assurance 
that these are the right number of facilities located in the right 
places. FEMA officials told us they are in the process of determining 
the number of storage facilities it needs and where they should be 
located. 

Distribution: Problems persist with FEMA's distribution system, 
including poor transportation planning, unreliable contractors, and 
lack of distribution sites. FEMA officials described initiatives under 
way that should mitigate some of the problems with contractors, and has 
been working with Department of Defense and Department of 
Transportation to improve the access to transportation when needed. 

People: Human capital issues are pervasive in FEMA, including the 
logistics area. The agency has a small core of permanent staff, 
supplemented with contract and temporary disaster assistance staff. 
However, FEMA's recent retirements and losses of staff, and its 
difficulty in hiring permanent staff and contractors, have created 
staffing shortfalls and a lack of capability. According to a January 
2007 study commissioned by FEMA, there are significant shortfalls in 
staffing and skill sets of full-time employees, particularly in the 
planning, advanced contracting, and relationship management skills 
needed to fulfill the disaster logistics mission. FEMA has recently 
hired a logistics coordinator and is making a concerted effort to hire 
qualified staff for the entire agency, including logistics. 

In short, FEMA is taking many actions to transition its logistics 
program to be more proactive, flexible, and responsive. While these and 
other initiatives hold promise for improving FEMA's logistics 
capabilities, it will be years before they are fully implemented and 
operational. 

Revisions Made to Evacuation Planning, Mass Care, Housing and Human 
Services: 

In an April 2007 testimony, FEMA's Deputy Administrator for Operations 
said that emergency evacuation, shelter and housing is FEMA's most 
pressing priority for planning for recovery from a catastrophic 
disaster. He said that FEMA is undertaking more detailed mass evacuee 
support planning; the Department of Justice and Red Cross are 
developing methods for more quickly identifying and uniting missing 
family members; and FEMA and the Red Cross have developed a web-based 
data system to support shelter management, reporting, and facility 
identification activities. 

Evacuation. Recent GAO work found that actions are needed to clarify 
the responsibilities and increase preparedness for evacuations, 
especially for those transportation-disadvantaged populations. We found 
that state and local governments are generally not well prepared to 
evacuate transportation-disadvantaged populations (i.e. planning, 
training, and conducting exercises), but some states and localities 
have begun to address challenges and barriers. For example, in June 
2006, DHS reported that only about 10 percent of the state and about 12 
percent of the urban area emergency plans it reviewed adequately 
addressed evacuating these populations. Steps being taken by some such 
governments include collaboration with social service and 
transportation providers and transportation planning organizations-- 
some of which are Department of Transportation (DOT) grantees and 
stakeholders--to determine transportation needs and develop agreements 
for emergency use of drivers and vehicles. The federal government 
provides evacuation assistance to state and local governments, but gaps 
in this assistance have hindered many of these governments' ability to 
sufficiently prepare for evacuations. This includes the lack of any 
specific requirement to plan, train, and conduct exercises for the 
evacuation of transportation-disadvantaged populations as well as gaps 
in the usefulness of DHS's guidance. We recommended that DHS should 
clarify federal agencies' roles and responsibilities for providing 
evacuation assistance when state and local governments are overwhelmed. 
DHS should require state and local evacuation preparedness for 
transportation-disadvantaged populations and improve information to 
assist these governments. DOT should encourage its grant recipients to 
share information to assist in evacuation preparedness for these 
populations. DOT and DHS agreed to consider our recommendations, and 
DHS stated it has partly implemented some of them. 

In his April 26, 2007 testimony statement for the House Transportation 
and Infrastructure Committee, FEMA's Deputy Administrator stated that 
FEMA is undertaking more detailed mass evacuation support planning to 
help State and local government plan and prepare for hosting large 
displaced populations. The project is to include the development of an 
evacuee registration and tracking capability and implementation plans 
for federal evacuation support to states. 

Mass Care and Shelter. During the current NRP review period, FEMA has 
revised the organizational structure of ESF-6, Mass Care, Housing, and 
Human Services, and places FEMA as the primary agency responsible for 
this emergency support function. The Red Cross will remain as a 
supporting agency in the responsibilities and activities of ESF-6. FEMA 
continues to maintain a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with Red 
Cross that articulates agency roles and responsibilities for mass care. 
The MOU and addendum were recently revised in May 2006 and December 
2006, respectively. FEMA is currently working with Red Cross and other 
support agencies to revise ESF-6 standard operating procedures. 
According to a February 2007 letter by the Red Cross, this change will 
not take place until the NRP review process is complete and all changes 
are approved. According to FEMA's Deputy Administrator, FEMA and the 
Red Cross have developed the first phase of a web-based data system to 
support shelter management, reporting, and facility identification 
activities. The system is intended for all agencies that provide 
shelter service during disasters to ensure a comprehensive 
understanding of the shelter populations and available shelter 
capacity. 

Temporary housing. Other recent GAO work noted that FEMA needs to 
identify and assess the capabilities that exist across the federal 
government and outside the federal government, including temporary 
housing. In a recent report on housing assistance we found that the 
National Response Plan's annex covering temporary shelter and housing 
in ESF 6 clearly described the overall responsibilities of the two 
primary responsible agencies--FEMA and the Red Cross.[Footnote 29] 
However, the responsibilities described for the support agencies--the 
Departments of Agriculture, Defense, Housing and Urban Development 
(HUD), and Veterans Affairs--did not, and still do not, fully reflect 
their capabilities. Further, these support agencies had not, at the 
time of our work, developed fact sheets describing their roles and 
responsibilities, notification and activation procedures, and agency- 
specific authorities, as called for by ESF-6 operating procedures. Our 
February 2007 report recommended that the support agencies propose 
revisions to the NRP that fully reflect each respective support 
agency's capabilities for providing temporary housing under ESF-6, 
develop the needed fact sheets, and develop operational plans that 
provide details on how their respective agencies will meet their 
temporary housing responsibilities. The Departments of Defense, HUD, 
Treasury, and the Veterans Administration, and Agriculture, concurred 
with our recommendations. The Red Cross did not comment on our report 
or recommendations. As part of a housing task force, FEMA is currently 
exploring ways of incorporating housing assistance offered by private 
sector organizations. FEMA says it has also developed a housing portal 
to consolidate available rental resources for evacuees from Federal 
agencies, private organizations, and individuals. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Related GAO Products: 

Homeland Security: Management and Programmatic Challenges Facing the 
Department of Homeland Security. GAO-07-833T. Washington, D.C.: May 10, 
2007: 

First Responders: Much Work Remains to Improve Communications 
Interoperability. GAO-07-301. Washington, D.C.: April 2, 2007. 

Emergency Preparedness: Current Emergency Alert System Has Limitations, 
and Development of a New Integrated System Will be Challenging. GAO-07- 
411. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2007: 

Disaster Preparedness: Better Planning Would Improve OSHA's Efforts to 
Protect Workers' Safety and Health in Disasters. GAO-07-193. 
Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2007. 

Public Health and Hospital Emergency Preparedness Programs: Evolution 
of Performance Measurement Systems to Measure Progress. GAO-07-485R. 
Washington, D.C.: March 23, 2007. 

Coastal Barrier Resources System: Status of Development That Has 
Occurred and Financial Assistance Provided by Federal Agencies. GAO-07- 
356. Washington, D.C.: March 19, 2007. 

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita Disaster Relief: Continued Findings of 
Fraud, Waste, and Abuse. GAO-07-300. Washington, D.C.: March 15, 2007. 

Homeland Security: Preparing for and Responding to Disasters. GAO-07- 
395T. Washington, D.C.: March 9, 2007. 

Hurricane Katrina: Agency Contracting Data Should Be More Complete 
Regarding Subcontracting Opportunities for Small Businesses. GAO-07- 
205. Washington, D.C.: March 1, 2007. 

Hurricane Katrina: Allocation and Use of $2 Billion for Medicaid and 
Other Health Care Needs. GAO-07-67. Washington, D.C.: February 28, 
2007. 

Disaster Assistance: Better Planning Needed for Housing Victims of 
Catastrophic Disasters. GAO-07-88. Washington, D.C.: February 28, 2007: 

Highway Emergency Relief: Reexamination Needed to Address Fiscal 
Imbalance and Long-term Sustainability. GAO-07-245. Washington, D.C.: 
February 23, 2007. 

Small Business Administration: Additional Steps Needed to Enhance 
Agency Preparedness for Future Disasters. GAO-07-114. Washington, D.C.: 
February 14, 2007. 

Small Business Administration: Response to the Gulf Coast Hurricanes 
Highlights Need for Enhanced Disaster Preparedness. GAO-07-484T. 
Washington, D.C.: February 14, 2007. 

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Federal Actions Could Enhance Preparedness 
of Certain State-Administered Federal Support Programs. GAO-07-219. 
Washington, D.C.: February 7, 2007. 

Homeland Security Grants: Observations on Process DHS Used to Allocate 
Funds to Selected Urban Areas. GAO-07-381R. Washington, D.C.: February 
7, 2007. 

Homeland Security: Management and Programmatic Challenges Facing the 
Department of Homeland Security. GAO-07-452T. Washington, D.C.: 
February 7, 2007. 

Homeland Security: Applying Risk Management Principles to Guide Federal 
Investments. GAO-07-386T. Washington, D.C.: February 7, 2007. 

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita Disaster Relief: Prevention Is the Key to 
Minimizing Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Recovery Efforts. GAO-07-418T. 
Washington, D.C.: January 29, 2007: 

GAO, Reserve Forces: Actions needed to Identify National Guard Domestic 
Equipment Requirements and Readiness, GAO-07-60 Washington, D.C.: 
January 26, 2007: 

Budget Issues: FEMA Needs Adequate Data, Plans, and Systems to 
Effectively Manage Resources for Day-to-Day Operations, GAO-07-139. 
Washington, D.C.: January 19, 2007. 

Transportation-Disadvantaged Populations: Actions Needed to Clarify 
Responsibilities and Increase Preparedness for Evacuations. GAO-07-44. 
Washington, D.C.: December 22, 2006. 

Suggested Areas for Oversight for the 110th Congress. GAO-07-235R. 
Washington, D.C.: November 17, 2006. 

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Continued Findings of Fraud, Waste, and 
Abuse. GAO-07-252T. Washington, D.C.: December 6, 2006. 

Capital Financing: Department Management Improvements Could Enhance 
Education's Loan Program for Historically Black Colleges and 
Universities. GAO-07-64. Washington, D.C.: October 18, 2006. 

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Unprecedented Challenges Exposed the 
Individuals and Households Program to Fraud and Abuse; Actions Needed 
to Reduce Such Problems in Future. GAO-06-1013. Washington, D.C.: 
September 27, 2006. 

Catastrophic Disasters: Enhanced Leadership, Capabilities, and 
Accountability Controls Will Improve the Effectiveness of the Nation's 
Preparedness, Response, and Recovery System. GAO-06-618. Washington, 
D.C.: September 6, 2006. 

Disaster Relief: Governmentwide Framework Needed to Collect and 
Consolidate Information to Report on Billions in Federal Funding for 
the 2005 Gulf Coast Hurricanes. GAO-06-834. Washington, D.C.: September 
6, 2006. 

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Coordination between FEMA and the Red 
Cross Should Be Improved for the 2006 Hurricane Season. GAO-06-712. 
Washington, D.C.: June 8, 2006. 

Federal Emergency Management Agency: Factors for Future Success and 
Issues to Consider for Organizational Placement. GAO-06-746T. 
Washington, D.C.: May 9, 2006. 

Hurricane Katrina: GAO's Preliminary Observations Regarding 
Preparedness, Response, and Recovery. GAO-06-442T. Washington, D.C.: 
March 8, 2006. 

Emergency Preparedness and Response: Some Issues and Challenges 
Associated with Major Emergency Incidents. GAO-06-467T. Washington, 
D.C.: February 23, 2006. 

Homeland Security: DHS' Efforts to Enhance First Responders' All- 
Hazards Capabilities Continue to Evolve. GAO-05-652. Washington, D.C.: 
July 11, 2005. 

Continuity of Operations: Agency Plans Have Improved, but Better 
Oversight Could Assist Agencies in Preparing for Emergencies. GAO-05- 
577. Washington, D.C.: April 28, 2005. 

FOOTNOTES 

[1] GAO, Homeland Security: Management and Programmatic Challenges 
Facing the Department of Homeland Security, GAO-07-452T (Washington, 
D.C.: Feb. 7, 2007). 

[2] The Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 was 
enacted as Title VI of the Department of Homeland Security 
Appropriations Act, 2007, Pub. L. No. 109-295, 120 Stat. 1355, 1394 
(2006). 

[3] Section 602 of the Post-Katrina Reform Act defines "catastrophic 
incident'' as any natural disaster, act of terrorism, or other man-made 
disaster that results in extraordinary levels of casualties or damage 
or disruption severely affecting the population (including mass 
evacuations), infrastructure, environment, economy, national morale, or 
government functions in an area. 

[4] The Stafford Act is codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 5121 et seq. 

[5] California is currently not a member of EMAC as the state's 
legislation approving its membership in the compact had expired. 

[6] House of Representatives, House Select Bipartisan Committee to 
Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina. A 
Failure of Initiative: Final Report of the House Select Bipartisan 
Committee to Investigate the Preparation for And Response to Hurricane 
Katrina (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 15, 2006). 

[7] U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 
Affairs. Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared (Washington, 
D.C.: May 2006). 

[8] White House Homeland Security Council. The Federal Response to 
Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 23, 2006). 

[9] Department of Homeland Security's Office of Inspector General. A 
Performance Review of FEMA's Disaster Management Activities in Response 
to Hurricane Katrina, OIG-06-32 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 2006). 

[10] Federal Emergency Management Agency. DHS/FEMA Initial Response 
Hotwash: Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana, DR-1603-LA (Baton Rouge, 
Louisiana. Feb. 13, 2006). 

[11] GAO, Catastrophic Disasters: Enhanced Leadership, Capabilities, 
and Accountability Controls Will Improve the Effectiveness of the 
Nation's Preparedness, Response, and Recovery System, GAO-06-618 
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 6, 2006). 

[12] On May 25, 2006, DHS released changes to the NRP regarding 
leadership issues, such as which situations require secretarial 
leadership; the process for declaring incidents of national 
significance; and the scope of the NRP and its Catastrophic Incident 
Annex. The revised NRP clearly states that the Secretary of Homeland 
Security, who reports directly to the President, is responsible for 
declaring and managing incidents of national significance, including 
catastrophic ones. At the time of Hurricane Katrina, the supplement to 
the catastrophic incident annex, which provides more detail on 
implementing the annex, was still in draft. Subsequent to Hurricane 
Katrina, DHS published the final supplement to the Catastrophic 
Incident Annex, dated August 2006. 

[13] Includes Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana. 

[14] Includes New York, New Jersey, New England, Puerto Rico, and the 
U.S. Virgin Islands. 

[15] Includes Georgia, South Carolina, North Carolina, Virginia, 
District of Columbia, Maryland, Delaware, Pennsylvania, and Rhode 
Island. 

[16] GAO, Budget Issues: FEMA Needs Adequate Data, Plans, and Systems 
to Effectively Manage Resources for Day-to-Day Operations, GAO-07-139 
(Washington, D.C.: Jan. 19, 2007). 

[17] The areas are (1) individual assistance technical assistance 
contract, (2) contractor management program, (3) facilities; (4) 
payment process for contractors, (5) finance center operations, (6) 
capital planning and investment control, (7) security, (8) human 
resources, (9) logistics, (10) acquisition, (11) disaster emergency 
communications, (12) decision support systems (data resource 
management), (13) disaster workforce, (14) information technology, (15) 
federal coordinating officer cadre, (16) financial systems, (17) budget 
process, and (18) disaster relief fund. 

[18] GAO, Reserve Forces: Actions Needed to Identify National Guard 
Domestic Equipment Requirements and Readiness, GAO-07-60 (Washington, 
D.C.: Jan. 26, 2007). 

[19] GAO, Hurricane Katrina: Better Plans and Exercises Needed to Guide 
the Military's Response to Catastrophic Natural Disasters.GAO-06-643 
(Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2006). 

[20] GAO, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita Disaster Relief: Prevention Is 
the Key to Minimizing Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Recovery Efforts. GAO-
07-418T. Washington, D.C.: January 29, 2007. 

[21] GAO, Homeland Security: Management and Programmatic Challenges 
Facing the Department of Homeland Security, GAO-07-452T (Washington, 
D.C.: Feb. 7, 2007). 

[22] GAO, Suggested Areas for Oversight for the 110th Congress. GAO-07- 
235R (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 17, 2006. 

[23] GAO, Homeland Security: Management of First Responder Grants in 
the National Capital Region Reflects the Need for Coordinated Planning 
and Performance Goals, GAO-04-433 (Washington, D.C.: May 28, 2004); 
Homeland Security: Coordinated Planning and Standards Needed to Better 
Manage First Responder Grants in the National Capital Region, GAO-04- 
904T (Washington, D.C.: June 24, 2004); Homeland Security: Effective 
Regional Coordination Can Enhance Emergency Preparedness, GAO-04-1009 
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 15, 2004); Homeland Security: Managing First 
Responder Grants to Enhance Emergency Preparedness in the National 
Capital Region, GAO-05-889T (Washington, D.C.: July 14, 2005); and 
Homeland Security: The Status of Strategic Planning in the National 
Capital Region, GAO-06-559T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 29, 2006). 

[24] GAO, Homeland Security: Assessment of the National Capital Region 
Strategic Plan, GAO-06-1096T (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 28, 2006). 

[25] GAO, First Responders: Much Work Remains to Improve Communications 
Interoperability. GAO-07-301 (Washington, D.C.: April 2, 2007). 

[26] See 6 U.S.C. § 194(a). 

[27] GAO, Hurricane Katrina: Better Plans and Exercises Needed to Guide 
the Military's Response to Catastrophic Natural Disasters.GAO-06-643 
(Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2006). 

[28] States participating in the PPDS program sign a Memorandum of 
Agreement with FEMA for the use of the containers. 

[29] GAO, Disaster Assistance: Better Planning Needed for Housing 
Victims of Catastrophic Disasters, GAO-07-88 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 
28, 2007).

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