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Report to Congressional Committees: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 

GAO: 

March 2007: 

Port Risk Management: 

Additional Federal Guidance Would Aid Ports in Disaster Planning and 
Recovery: 

GAO-07-412: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-07-412, a report to congressional committees 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

U.S ports are significant to the U.S. economy, handling more than 2 
billion tons of domestic and import/export cargo annually. Since Sept. 
11, 2001, much of the national focus on ports’ preparedness has been on 
preventing potential acts of terror, the 2005 hurricane season renewed 
focus on how to protect ports from a diversity of threats, including 
natural disasters. This report was prepared under the authority of the 
Comptroller General to examine (1) challenges port authorities have 
experienced as a result of recent natural disasters, (2) efforts under 
way to address these challenges, and (3) the manner in which port 
authorities plan for natural disasters. GAO reviewed documents and 
interviewed various port stakeholders from 17 major U.S. ports. 

What GAO Found: 

Ports, particularly those impacted by the 2005 hurricane season, 
experienced many different kinds of challenges during recent natural 
disasters. Of the 17 U.S. ports that GAO reviewed, port officials 
identified communications, personnel, and interagency coordination as 
their biggest challenges. 

Many port authorities have taken steps to address these challenges. 
Individually, ports have created redundancy in communications systems 
and other backup equipment and updated their emergency plans. 
Collectively, the American Association of Port Authorities developed a 
best practices manual focused on port planning and recovery efforts, as 
well as lessons learned from recent natural disasters. Even ports that 
have not experienced problems as a result of recent disasters, but are 
nonetheless susceptible to disaster threats, have responded to lessons 
learned by other ports. Additionally, federal maritime agencies, such 
as the U.S. Coast Guard, the Maritime Administration, and the U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers have increased their coordination and communication 
with ports to strengthen ports’ ability to recover from future natural 
disasters and to build stakeholders’ knowledge about federal resources 
for port recovery efforts. Most port authorities GAO reviewed conduct 
planning for natural disasters separately from planning for homeland 
security threats. Unlike security efforts, natural disaster planning is 
not subject to the same type of specific federal requirements and, 
therefore, varies from port to port. As a result of this divided 
approach, GAO found a wide variance in ports’ natural disaster planning 
efforts including:

* the level of participation in disaster forums, and
* the level of information sharing among port stakeholders 

In the absence of appropriate forums and information sharing 
opportunities among ports, some ports GAO contacted were limited in 
their understanding of federal resources available for predisaster 
mitigation and postdisaster recovery. Other ports have begun using 
existing forums, such as their federally mandated Area Maritime 
Security Committee, to coordinate disaster planning efforts. Port and 
industry experts, as well as recent federal actions, are now 
encouraging an all-hazards approach to disaster planning and recovery. 
That is, disaster preparedness planning requires that all of the 
threats faced by the port, both natural (such as hurricanes) and man-
made (such as terror events), be considered together. The Department of 
Homeland Security, which through the Coast Guard oversees the Area 
Maritime Security Committees, provides an example of how to incorporate 
a wider scope of activity for ports across the country. Additionally, 
the Maritime Administration should develop a communication strategy to 
inform ports of the maritime resources available for recovery efforts. 

What GAO Recommends: 

To ensure that ports achieve adequate planning for natural disasters, 
GAO recommends that the Secretary of Homeland Security encourage port 
stakeholders to use existing forums for discussing all-hazards 
planning. DHS, DOT and DOD generally agreed with the facts presented in 
the report. However, DHS expressed concern about using existing forums 
for planning. Our work showed that these forums are already being used 
for planning in several cases which should be further encouraged. 

[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-412]. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
the link above. For more information, contact Katherine Siggerud at 
(202) 512-6570 or siggerudk@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Results in Brief: 

Background: 

Recent Natural Disasters Created a Variety of Challenges; Some Recovery 
Efforts Were More Difficult Than Expected: 

Port Authorities Have Various Efforts Under Way to Mitigate Challenges: 

Current Planning Approach Lessens Effective Coordination among All Port 
Stakeholders: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security: 

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Port Stakeholder Roles: 

Table 2: Federal Agency Role at Ports: 

Table 3: Natural Disaster Planning Forums at Ports GAO Visited: 

Table 4: Key FEMA Disaster Assistance Programs: 

Figures: 

Figure 1: Ports Selected for Case Studies and Phone Interviews: 

Figure 2: Port Experiences with Natural Disasters Since 1998: 

Figure 3: Port Elements: 

Figure 4: GAO Risk Management Framework: 

Abbreviations: 

AAPA: American Association of Port Authorities: 
AMSC: Area Maritime Security Committee: 
COTP: Captain of the Port: 
DHS: Department of Homeland Security: 
DOD: Department of Defense: 
DOT: Department of Transportation: 
FEMA: Federal Emergency Management Agency: 
GICA: Gulf Intracoastal Canal Association: 
LEA: Local Emergency Management Agency: 
MIRP: Maritime Infrastructure Recovery Plan: 
MSRAM: Maritime Security Risk Assessment Model: 
MTSA: Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002: 
NIMS: National Incident Management System: 
NRP: National Response Plan: 
SAFE Port Act: Security and Accountability for Every Port Act of 2006: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

March 28, 2007: 

Congressional Committees: 

U.S. ports and waterways handle more than 2 billion tons of domestic 
and import/export cargo annually, and more than 95 percent of U.S. 
international trade moves by water. As such, ports are a global gateway 
to world markets and significant engines in the U.S. economy. As 
important as they are, virtually every major U.S. port faces one or 
more types of natural disasters with potentially devastating 
consequences. Ports throughout the eastern seaboard and the Gulf Coast 
face the possibility of hurricanes, and ports on the West Coast are in 
areas that are highly susceptible to earthquakes. Losing a major port, 
even for a few weeks or months, could have a national economic impact, 
making effective recovery a concern not only for the local area but for 
the federal government as well. 

Ports' complexities exacerbate the difficulty of taking adequate steps 
to deal with possible natural disasters. Ports are often sprawling 
enterprises, and each port is unique. Further, a "port" is seldom a 
single entity. Rather, a port is usually a collection of varied 
maritime stakeholders. Ports usually include a public entity, such as a 
port authority. The role of port authorities varies from port to port. 
For example, the Port of Mobile operates a coal plant in the port, but 
it also has tenants that lease and operate their own facilities in the 
port area. Other ports, such as the Port of Miami, are owned and 
managed by county government,[Footnote 1] but terminal operators are 
responsible for the day-to-day maintenance and repair of the terminal 
area. Besides port authorities, port stakeholders include shipping 
companies and other tenants that may be leasing port authority 
facilities, factories and other industries located in the area, and 
local and state law enforcement and emergency management agencies. 
Terminals or facilities may also be privately owned. Federal agencies 
also have a role at ports including the U.S. Coast Guard (Coast Guard), 
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and the Maritime Administration.[Footnote 
2] Despite these complexities, ports have various forums in which these 
maritime stakeholders can coordinate on issues that affect the port as 
a whole. For terrorism concerns, for example, major U.S. ports have a 
Area Maritime Security Committee (AMSC)[Footnote 3] that provides a 
venue for discussing security concerns. For disaster relief concerns, 
U.S. ports would work with the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA) regarding disaster assistance. 

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, much of the focus on 
emergency preparedness has been on preparedness for preventing, 
mitigating the effects of, and responding to terrorist attacks. Through 
legislation and presidential directives, the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) is the primary federal organization responsible for 
preparing the nation both for terrorist attacks and for major 
disasters. Homeland Security Presidential Directives 5 and 8 require 
that DHS establish a single, comprehensive approach to and plans for 
the management of emergency events whether the result of terrorist 
attacks or large-scale natural or accidental disasters.[Footnote 4] As 
we have previously reported, the capabilities needed to respond to 
major disasters, whether the result of a terrorist attack or nature, 
are similar in many ways. The devastating hurricane season of 2005, 
which included Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma, focused renewed 
attention on the potential effects that natural disasters could pose to 
port operations. The numerous vulnerabilities port operations face, 
together with the limited resources available to deal with them, have 
also initiated a renewed look at how to protect ports from a variety of 
threats. 

In light of the continued attention both to port security and to 
federal natural disaster response, we are providing a comprehensive 
view of steps ports have taken to prepare and mitigate the impacts of 
natural disasters. Consequently, we conducted this review, initiated 
under the Comptroller General's authority, to examine port disaster 
preparedness measures and to examine the federal role in helping ports 
plan and recover from natural disaster impacts. More specifically, this 
report examines (1) the challenges port authorities have experienced as 
a result of recent natural disasters, (2) the efforts under way to 
address challenges from these disasters, and (3) the manner in which 
port authorities plan for natural disasters and the effect of this 
approach on their ability to share information with port stakeholders 
and access federal resources. 

To address the challenges port authorities experience as a result of 
recent disasters and the efforts to address these challenges, we 
selected 17 U.S. ports for review (see fig. 1). We focused primarily on 
commercial ports and various commercial aspects of these ports. The 
criteria we used included selecting ports that (1) varied in size 
(based on cargo value) and (2) varied in the degree to which they had 
experienced some type of natural disaster since 1998.[Footnote 5] Based 
on guidance from DHS regarding the most significant natural disaster 
threats to ports, we limited the natural disasters we considered to 
earthquakes and hurricanes. In particular, we focused on ports impacted 
by the 2005 hurricane season; in all, 11 of the 17 ports we selected 
were affected by hurricanes that year. We conducted site visits at 7 of 
the 17 ports, where we interviewed various maritime stakeholders, 
including officials from the port authorities, emergency management 
agencies, and federal agencies such as the Coast Guard, U.S. Army Corps 
of Engineers, Maritime Administration, and FEMA. We contacted the 
remaining 10 ports by telephone and conducted a more limited range of 
interviews. For all 17 ports, we reviewed numerous planning documents, 
including emergency operations plans, business continuity plans, and 
hurricane plans. 

Figure 1: Ports Selected for Case Studies and Phone Interviews: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO, Map Resources (map). 

[End of figure] 

To determine the manner in which port authorities prepare for disasters 
and its effect on information sharing and access to federal resources, 
we relied primarily on information obtained from our 17 case studies 
and phone interviews, supplementing it as necessary with other 
information related to risk management and disaster planning. For 
perspective on risk management, we used our body of work related to 
risk management throughout the federal government[Footnote 6] and 
supplemented it with additional risk management models and tools from a 
wide range of federal, professional, and academic stakeholders, as well 
as interviews and documents from the Coast Guard and offices within 
DHS. We did not include any separate planning efforts conducted by 
private operators, for two key reasons: their roles and 
responsibilities vary greatly from port to port and; unlike their 
planning efforts for homeland security, their efforts for natural 
disasters are not subject to the same type of federal requirements or 
guidelines. We performed our work from December 2005 through March 
2007, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 
standards. See appendix I for more detail regarding our objectives, 
scope, and methodology. 

Results in Brief: 

Port authorities reported experiencing many different kinds of 
challenges during recent natural disasters, with communication, 
personnel, and interagency coordination reported as the most 
problematic challenges. This was particularly true for ports that were 
impacted by the 2005 hurricane season. Twelve of the 17 ports we 
reviewed had experienced at least one hurricane or earthquake since 
1998, and of these, 8 reported one or more types of challenges in 
responding (see fig. 2). The most visibly apparent challenge port 
authorities experienced was dealing with damaged infrastructure, 
including structural damage to buildings and piers, and silting and 
debris clogging key waterways. Port authorities also reported 
difficulties restoring power, water, and other utilities. However, the 
greatest challenges port officials said they experienced--and in many 
cases did not anticipate--were in the following other areas: 

* Communications. Many ports experienced difficulties in communicating 
both outside the port and with port personnel and other port 
stakeholders. Phone outages were extensive and cell phone reception was 
limited. For example, one port was without services for 2 to 4 weeks 
following Hurricane Katrina. 

* Personnel. When many port personnel around the Gulf area were 
evacuated from their homes, the evacuation caused problems both in 
locating personnel and also in letting them know they should return to 
work. 

* Coordination. Officials reported difficulties coordinating with 
local, state, and federal stakeholders, especially for planning and 
recovery efforts. For example, in some cases, port officials had 
difficulty re-entering the port because they lacked the credentials 
required by local police and other emergency management officials. Some 
ports also reported difficulty accessing federal resources for recovery 
efforts. For example, officials at some ports said they had problems 
understanding the process in filing for disaster assistance and 
coordinating damage assessments with FEMA or were unaware of resources 
available through the Maritime Administration, such as ships that could 
be used for housing or for conveying supplies. 

Figure 2: Port Experiences with Natural Disasters Since 1998: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO. 

[End of figure] 

Port authorities and other stakeholders reported taking a variety of 
steps to address these challenges. Port authorities have replaced, 
repaired, and created redundancies for a variety of communications 
systems and physical infrastructure--for example, purchasing backup 
phone systems and power generators, creating alternative administrative 
sites, and developing alternative storage for computer information. 
Though the 2005 hurricane season primarily affected Gulf ports, port 
authority officials elsewhere said the results of that season prompted 
them to improve their preparation as well. One key effort was 
undertaken by the American Association of Port Authorities (AAPA), an 
industry group. It convened work groups to discuss lessons learned and, 
based on the input, issued a manual with guidance for ports on such 
issues as developing alternative communications, setting up an 
emergency operations center, and identifying federal resources for 
recovery efforts. Port authorities reported their changes often 
extended to improving coordination with other stakeholders. Some ports 
adapted forums intended for security planning, such as their AMSC, 
while others with existing natural disaster forums took steps to 
strengthen them. Some port authorities also established plans for 
coordinating with neighboring ports. Actions have also been taken at 
the federal level. For example, the Maritime Administration, 
contributed to a one-time plan developed by FEMA--the Federal Support 
Plan. This plan was specifically cited for the 2006 Hurricane Season 
and was specific to the federal government's response to support the 
State of Louisiana. The Maritime Administration contributed to this 
plan by identifying government and commercial maritime capabilities 
that could be employed in response to a disaster. To date, while the 
Maritime Administration plans to provide a directive regarding 
capabilities to all of their regional offices in June 2007, no plan 
exists for communicating this information to ports. 

Port authorities we reviewed generally conducted their natural disaster 
planning separately from planning for homeland security threats, and 
this approach has reduced their ability to facilitate sharing natural 
disaster planning information among key stakeholders and to access 
federal resources. Planning for homeland security, an activity that is 
governed by federal law, tends to be consistent from port to port. By 
contrast, natural disaster planning, which is not subject to the same 
type of specific federal requirements, varied considerably at the ports 
we reviewed in its extent and thoroughness. Separate planning for these 
two threats means that ports are not able to effectively estimate the 
impact of mitigation alternatives and optimize their investments in 
these alternatives based on costs and benefits. Industry experts and 
port stakeholders, such as the Coast Guard, are now encouraging unified 
consideration of all risks faced by ports, but we found few port 
authorities were taking a unified approach. One consequence of divided 
planning is that key stakeholders were not necessarily participating in 
natural disaster planning. Unlike security planning, where the 
Secretary of Homeland Security can establish an AMSC with broad 
representation across port stakeholders, natural disaster planning 
carries no such requirement. During our review, we found substantial 
variation in the maturity of, and participation in, natural disaster 
planning forums at ports. In particular, one port had no forum that 
brought together the port authority and the local disaster planning 
agency, which had knowledge of available federal resources, such as 
FEMA grant programs, as well as the expertise to deal with grant 
requirements. In the absence of such a forum, it is not surprising that 
some ports were limited in their understanding of federal resources 
available for predisaster mitigation and postdisaster recovery. To help 
improve information sharing, some ports have begun using their 
federally authorized AMSC, or some other similar forum with wide 
representation, in disaster planning efforts. DHS, which through the 
Coast Guard coordinates the AMSCs, provides an example of how to 
incorporate a wider scope of committee activity for ports across the 
country. 

To help ensure that ports achieve adequate planning for natural 
disasters and effectively manage risk to a variety of threats, we are 
recommending that the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security 
encourage port stakeholders to use existing forums for discussing their 
all-hazards planning efforts and include appropriate representatives 
from DHS, the port authority, representatives from the local emergency 
management office, the Maritime Administration, and vessel and facility 
owner/operators. To help ensure that ports have adequate understanding 
of maritime disaster recovery resources, we recommend that the 
Secretary of the Department of Transportation direct the Administrator 
of the Maritime Administration to develop a communication strategy to 
inform ports of the maritime resources available for recovery efforts. 

In commenting on a draft of this report, DHS, the Department of 
Transportation (DOT), and the Department of Defense (DOD) generally 
agreed with the facts presented. In its letter, DHS did not endorse 
placing responsibility for disaster contingency planning on existing 
committees in ports and said these responsibilities should remain with 
state and local emergency management planners. Our recommendation was 
not to place responsibility for such planning within port committees, 
but rather to use these existing forums as a way to engage all relevant 
parties in discussing natural disaster planning for ports. DOT 
officials provided a number of comments and clarifications, which we 
incorporated as appropriate to ensure the accuracy of our report. The 
DOT generally concurred with GAO's recommendation. The DOD provided 
technical comments and clarifications. 

Background: 

Port Activities Involve Many Different Entities: 

Ports comprise many different stakeholders, both public and private. 
Port authorities also may have jurisdiction over some or all of the 
geographical area of a port. The port authority can be an agency of the 
state, county, or city in which the port is located. In most ports in 
North America, the actual task of loading and unloading goods is 
carried out by private operators who lease space or equipment from the 
port authority. (In some ports, the port authority also manages some of 
these stevedoring activities.) The percentage of the port area over 
which the port authority has jurisdiction, and the level of involvement 
of the port authority in the port's operations, is different from port 
to port. This variability in port authority jurisdiction and 
operational involvement has direct consequences for portwide disaster 
preparedness. Even though a port authority may have a thorough disaster 
plan in place, that plan may not be binding on any of the private 
operators in the port. 

The stakeholders involved at any given port can vary but, in general, 
they include port authorities, private-sector operators doing business 
within the port, government agencies, and information-sharing forums. 
Table 1 summarizes these basic participants and their roles.[Footnote 
7] 

Table 1: Port Stakeholder Roles: 

Quasi-governmental. 

Port stakeholder: Port authority; 
Stakeholder role: 
* Provides a limited governance structure for the port; 
* Sometimes owns port assets such as cranes and pier space; 
* The role of the port authority varies from port to port. Some ports 
own and operate cargo terminals, while others lease their equipment and 
pier space to private operators. Others engage in a combination of both 
activities. 

Private sector. 

Port stakeholder: Facility/service operators; 
Stakeholder role: 
* Ship owners and operators; 
* Stevedoring companies; 
* Rail carriers/ operators; 
* Trucking and shipping companies; 
* Other operators to support the day-to-day activities of the port. 

State and local governments. 

Port stakeholder: State or local emergency management agency; 
Stakeholder role: 
* May assist port in planning for natural disasters and security 
threats. May also help to coordinate disaster response services such as 
police, fire, and medical teams for the port. 

Information sharing forums. 

Port stakeholder: Area Maritime Security Committee; 
Stakeholder role: 
* Federally established forum at all ports for all stakeholders to 
share information on security issues through regularly scheduled 
meetings, electronic bulletins on suspicious activities around seaport 
facilities, and sharing of key documents.[A]; 
* The U.S. Coast Guard Captain of the Port (COTP)[B] is authorized to 
establish and coordinate the AMSC and appoint members along with other 
duties as prescribed by regulation. 

Port stakeholder: Harbor Safety Committee; 
Stakeholder role: 
* Forum at many ports for all stakeholders to advise on regulatory and 
nonregulatory safety-related issues, including disaster preparedness. 
Only two Harbor Safety Committees, at the Ports of Houston, Texas, and 
New Orleans, Louisiana, are federally mandated.[C]. 

Port stakeholder: Gulf Intracoastal Canal Association; 
Stakeholder role: 
* The Gulf Intracoastal Canal Association (GICA) is maritime trade 
association that is an advocate for issues regarding the Gulf 
Intracoastal Waterway, which is an inland navigable waterway located 
along the Gulf Coast. One of GICA's missions is to work with it 
members, as well as the Coast Guard and Corps, to identify 
opportunities to improve the safety and efficiency of the Gulf 
Intracoastal Waterway. 

Port stakeholder: American Association of Port Authorities; 
Stakeholder role: 
* A trade association that represents more than 150 public port 
authorities in the United States, Canada, the Caribbean, and Latin 
America; 
* Coordinated a series of working groups to develop best practices for 
disaster preparation and recovery. 

Source: GAO. 

[A] Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (MTSA), Pub. L. No. 
107-295, 116 Stat. 2064, contains many of the homeland security 
requirements related specifically to port security. The Area Maritime 
Security Committees are authorized by section 102 of MTSA, as codified 
at 46 U.S.C. § 70112(a)(2). 

[B] A Coast Guard officer designated as the lead official to facilitate 
execution of Coast Guard duties in that area. 14 U.S.C. § 634. 

[C] Coast Guard Authorization Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-241, § 18 
and § 19, 105 Stat. 2208. 

[End of table] 

These various stakeholders interact in a variety of ways. The port 
authority provides a limited governance structure for the port. Many 
port authorities lease piers, or "terminals," and equipment to 
stevedoring companies and shipping lines that are responsible for the 
actual loading and transport of cargo. Some port authorities also 
operate cargo terminals alongside the private operators. Figure 3 
depicts the main elements of a typical port. Individual ports may not 
include all of these elements, or may include some not depicted here. 

Figure 3: Port Elements: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO. 

[End of figure] 

Federal Role in Port Activities Is Extensive: 

Several federal agencies provide support to ports in natural disaster 
planning, response, and recovery (see table 2). These agencies have 
different missions that relate to port operations, including natural 
disaster planning and response. For example, the Coast Guard is the 
agency responsible for most federal oversight related to portwide 
safety and security. It plays the primary role in coordinating efforts 
for homeland security efforts. FEMA plays a role in homeland security 
planning and also administers several assistance programs for disaster 
preparation and recovery. The Maritime Administration plays a general 
role in coordinating efforts to strengthen the maritime system and also 
has the ability to provide maritime assets that could be used to 
support homeland security interests. These vessels are part of the 
country's National Defense Ready Reserve Fleet, including ships and 
barges, which could be used for housing, power generation, or the 
movement of water and other supplies. 

Table 2: Federal Agency Role at Ports: 

Department of Homeland Security. 

Stakeholders: U.S. Coast Guard; 
Selected mission-related activities: Promotes and carries out five 
operating goals at every U.S. port: Maritime Safety, Protection of 
Natural Resources, Mobility (i.e., facilitation of the movement of 
people and goods), Maritime Security, and National Defense; Coordinates 
the AMSC where they have been created; Responsible for closing the port 
to vessel traffic before or during a disaster and reopening the port to 
traffic following the incident; Reviews facility security plans and 
oversees compliance with these plans. 

Stakeholders: FEMA; 
Selected mission-related activities: Administers the Public Assistance 
Grant Program that provides funds for the repair, replacement, or 
restoration of disaster-damaged, publicly owned facilities. Few ports 
have received funding for post-disaster recovery under this program; 
Administers the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program that provides funds to 
state and local governments to implement long- term hazard mitigation 
measures after a major disaster declaration. Ports may be included as 
sub-applicants on a state or local government application. Very few 
ports have applied for and received hazard mitigation grants; 
Administers the Predisaster Mitigation Program that provides technical 
and financial assistance for hazard mitigation planning and the 
implementation of mitigation projects prior to a disaster event. 

Stakeholders: Preparedness Directorate-Office of Grants and Training; 
Selected mission-related activities: Administers the Port Security 
Grant Program that provides funds each year to mitigate security 
threats to ports. Both port authorities and private operators may 
apply. The program has distributed $876,394,146 since its inception, 
and $168,052,500 in the fiscal year 2006 program. 

Department of Transportation. 

Stakeholders: Maritime Administration; 
Selected mission-related activities: 
* Seeks to improve and strengthen the U.S. marine transportation 
system--including infrastructure, industry and labor-- to meet the 
economic and security needs of the nation; 
* Provides ready reserve vessels that could be used to support vital 
homeland and national security interests.[B]; 
* Publishes a Port Risk Management and Insurance Guidebook that is 
currently being revised to include disaster preparedness guidance for 
ports. 

Department of Defense. 

Stakeholders: U.S. Army Corps of Engineers; 
Selected mission-related activities: 
* Maintains any federal channels leading to a port. Following 
disasters, surveys the channel, removes debris, and oversees any 
necessary dredging. 

Source: GAO. 

[A] The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers maintains more than 12,000 miles 
(19,200 km) of inland waterways and operates 235 locks. 

[B] The Maritime Administration manages this inactive inventory for the 
Department of Defense. 

[End of table] 

Federal Disaster Planning Guidance: 

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, prompted additional 
federal efforts to address a broad spectrum of emergencies. The 
Homeland Security Act of 2002[Footnote 8] required DHS to develop a 
comprehensive National Incident Management System (NIMS). NIMS is 
intended to provide a consistent framework for incident management at 
all jurisdictional levels regardless of the cause, size, or complexity 
of the situation and to define the roles and responsibilities of 
federal, state, and local governments, and various first responder 
disciplines at each level during an emergency event. To manage all 
major incidents, NIMS has a standard incident management system, called 
the Incident Command System, with five functional areas--command, 
operations, planning, logistics, and finance and administration. NIMS 
also prescribes interoperable communications systems and preparedness 
before an incident happens, including planning, training, and 
exercises. 

In December 2004, DHS issued the National Response Plan (NRP), intended 
to be an all-discipline, all-hazards plan establishing a single, 
comprehensive framework for the management of domestic incidents where 
federal involvement is necessary. The NRP includes planning 
assumptions, roles and responsibilities, concept of operations, and 
incident management actions. The NRP also includes a Catastrophic 
Incident Annex, which provides an accelerated, proactive national 
response to a "catastrophic incident," defined as any natural or man- 
made incident, including terrorism, resulting in extraordinary levels 
of mass casualties, damage, or disruption severely affecting the 
population, infrastructure, environment, economy, national morale, or 
government functions. 

Developing the capabilities needed to deal with large-scale disasters 
is part of an overall national preparedness effort that should 
integrate and define what needs to be done, where, based on what 
standards, how it should be done, and how well it should be done. Along 
with the NRP and NIMS, DHS has developed the National Preparedness 
Goal. Considered as a group, these three documents are intended to 
guide investments in emergency preparedness and response capabilities. 
The NRP describes what needs to be done in response to an emergency 
incident, either natural or man-made, the NIMS describes how to manage 
what needs to be done, and the National Preparedness Goal describes how 
well it should be done. The National Preparedness Goal is particularly 
useful for determining what capabilities are needed, especially for a 
catastrophic disaster. The interim goal addresses both natural 
disasters and terrorist attacks. It defines both the 37 major 
capabilities that first responders should possess to prevent, protect 
from, respond to, and recover from disaster incidents and the most 
critical tasks associated with these capabilities.[Footnote 9] An 
inability to effectively perform these critical tasks would, by 
definition, have a detrimental impact on effective protection, 
prevention, response, and recovery capabilities. 

The Maritime Infrastructure Recovery Plan (MIRP), released by DHS in 
April 2006, applies these disaster preparedness documents to the 
maritime sector. The MIRP is intended to facilitate the restoration of 
maritime commerce after a terrorist attack or natural disaster and 
reflects the disaster management framework outlined in the National 
Response Plan. The MIRP addresses issues that should be considered by 
ports when planning for natural disasters. However, it does not set 
forth particular actions that should be taken at the port level, 
leaving those determinations to be made by the port operators 
themselves. 

The 9/11 Commission pointed out that no amount of money or effort can 
fully protect against every type of threat. As a result, what is needed 
is an approach that considers the relative risks these various threats 
pose and determines how best to use limited resources to prevent 
threats, where possible, and to respond effectively if they occur. 
While the Homeland Security Act of 2002 and Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive 7 call for the use of risk management in 
homeland security, little specific federal guidance or direction exists 
as to how risk management should be implemented. In previous work 
examining risk management efforts for homeland security and other 
functions, we developed a framework summarizing the findings of 
industry experts and best practices.[Footnote 10] This framework, shown 
in figure 4, divides risk management into five major phases: (1) 
setting strategic goals and objectives, and determining constraints; 
(2) assessing the risks; (3) evaluating alternatives for addressing 
these risks; (4) selecting the appropriate alternatives; and (5) 
implementing the alternatives and monitoring the progress made and 
results achieved. 

Figure 4: GAO Risk Management Framework: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO. 

[End of figure] 

Recent Natural Disasters Created a Variety of Challenges; Some Recovery 
Efforts Were More Difficult Than Expected: 

Recent natural disasters--particularly Hurricanes Katrina, Wilma, and 
Rita in 2005--challenged affected ports on several fronts, according to 
port authority officials. Since 1998, hurricanes have damaged 
buildings, cranes, and other equipment owned by seven of the port 
authorities we interviewed. Ports also reported damage to utility 
systems and experienced delays in water, sewer, and power restoration. 
Port authorities cited clearing waterways and debris removal as another 
difficulty. In the case of Hurricane Katrina, some ports, such as 
Gulfport and New Orleans, have not yet returned or took about 6 months 
to return to predisaster operational levels, respectively. Separate 
from the physical impact of the disasters, challenges occurred with 
personnel, communications and coordination issues and, according to 
port authority officials, these challenges proved more difficult than 
anticipated. In some cases, personnel had evacuated the area, and port 
officials were unsure when staff would be able to return to work. Given 
that many phone lines were down, there were delays in restoring phone 
service and, in most cases, ports did not have communications 
alternatives in place. Some port authorities also reported difficulties 
in working with local, state, and federal entities during the recovery 
process, including coordinating re-entry to the port of port personnel 
and filing for FEMA disaster recovery assistance. 

Damage to Infrastructure Affected Operations at Most Ports Experiencing 
Recent Natural Disasters: 

Even though most ports anticipated and had plans in place to mitigate 
infrastructure damage from natural disasters, over half of the port 
authorities we contacted reported that the disasters created 
infrastructure challenges. Twelve of the 17 ports we reviewed had 
experienced a hurricane or earthquake since 1998, and among those 12 
port authorities, 7 reported challenges in restoring infrastructure 
(see fig.2). While we were unable to review a complete list of disaster 
assistance estimates, some port authorities were able to provide 
specific dollar amounts for repair damage to buildings, cranes, or 
other equipment. For instance, the Port of Miami reported spending more 
than $6 million on repairs as a result of Hurricanes Katrina, Wilma, 
and Rita, including damage to facilities, signage, sea wall and storm 
drainage system. Likewise, The Port of Houston reported spending 
$200,000 for facility repairs following Hurricane Rita. Ports were 
still faced with these repair costs even though a majority of the port 
plans we reviewed included infrastructure damage mitigation. As a way 
to work around the damaged structures, ports also utilized temporary 
trailers for administrative and operational functions. For example, 
this occurred at the Port of Port Arthur, where the strategy of 
reserving backup equipment with appropriate vendors was included in 
that port's Hurricane Readiness Plan. 

Besides the repair costs involved, another indication of the 
significance of damage to infrastructure was the effect on port 
operations. In several cases, tenants left the port and moved 
elsewhere. For example, Port of New Orleans officials said that because 
they are unsure if departed tenants at the port will return, they have 
been reluctant to replace three severely damaged container cranes. 
Operations have been even more curtailed at the Port of Gulfport, also 
because of Hurricane Katrina. Port authority officials report that they 
have been able to repair only 3 of their 12 warehouses, which limited 
their ability to accommodate storage for some of their major operators. 
These operators have since moved their operations to other nearby 
ports, such as Pascagoula, Mississippi, or Mobile, Alabama. 

Besides damage to buildings, cranes, and other equipment involved 
specifically in moving cargoes, port authorities also reported damages 
to their utility systems, including water, sewer, and power. For 
example, following Hurricane Katrina, the Port of Port Arthur was 
without power for approximately 2 weeks. Because of a lack of on-site 
generators, port officials limited port operations to daylight hours 
only. The power outage also limited operation of certain hangar doors 
that required electrical power to be opened. Ports with damage to water 
and sewer included Gulfport, where 2 months were needed to restore its 
sewer and water capacity. Similarly, the Port of Pascagoula had three 
damaged water wells as a result of Hurricane Katrina. Port officials 
told us one of those wells was still not operational almost a year 
later. While some ports included backup water and power resources in 
their contingency utility plans, officials at one port said their 
backup resources may not be adequate to address long-term or extensive 
outages. In fact, 10 of the 17 ports we reviewed did not have plans for 
utility system restoration. The lack of anticipation of these 
vulnerabilities was particularly apparent for ports affected by 
Hurricanes Katrina, Wilma, and Rita; only 4 of the 10 ports impacted by 
those storms had planned for utility challenges. For example, Port of 
New Orleans officials said their supply of 5 to 10 days of water and 3 
to 5 days of power through generators was not enough to sustain them 
through the outages caused by Hurricane Katrina. 

While many ports indicated that several federal agencies were 
eventually able to effectively aid in clearing the waterways and 
restoring aids to navigation, ports' experiences varied. Their 
experiences also demonstrated that rapid clearing of waterways is key 
to reestablishing port operations and emphasizes the need for ports to 
coordinate and arrange for debris removal and restoring aids to 
navigation ahead of time. Following are some examples: 

* Following Hurricane Katrina, the Port of Gulfport had to remove large 
amounts of debris, such as tree limbs that were hanging and leaning 
over roads, as well as containers, cargo, and other equipment that 
winds had scattered into the roadways. Port officials said that 
clearing these obstructions was essential to re-establishing port 
operations. Immediately after the hurricane, the local Navy 
construction battalion (called Seabees) volunteered to assist the port 
by clearing roads with their large bulldozers, which enabled supplies 
and cargo to move in and out of the port. The Seabees also cleared boat 
ramps so that Coast Guard search and rescue vessels could safely enter 
the waterway. Port officials estimated that, over a period of 3 weeks, 
the Seabees cleared about 30 percent of the debris in the port area. 
After the Seabees were called to other duties, Port of Gulfport 
officials hired a contractor to remove the remaining debris at a cost 
of about $5 million. Port of Gulfport officials said that they applied 
for FEMA reimbursement of these costs. Further, they explained that the 
use of and planning for existing federal resources for debris removal, 
such as the Navy Seabees, could have saved even more time and possibly 
federal dollars that would later be paid to the port in the FEMA 
reimbursement process. 

* Inside the port area, the Port of Mobile experienced challenges with 
debris removal that federal agencies such as the Corps or the Coast 
Guard were not responsible for removing. These challenges may have 
caused additional delays in restoring port operations. For instance, 
port officials explained that storm surge waters from Katrina loosened 
several oil rigs in the Gulf, one of which made its way into the port's 
pier area and damaged several piers. They said the port is currently in 
litigation to resolve who will pay for the damages. Port of Mobile 
officials also estimated that dredging expenses, including the removal 
of branches, sand, and silt from pier areas will be more than $7.5 
million. Because the rig obstruction and other pier damages were not in 
the federal waterway or jurisdiction, Port of Mobile officials said 
they were only able to receive limited assistance from federal agencies 
in resolving their internal damage issues. 

Difficulties with Personnel, Communication, and Coordination Issues 
Were Greater Than Expected during Recovery Efforts: 

Officials of eight port authorities we contacted reported challenges 
related to personnel, communications, or coordination with port 
stakeholders as a result of hurricanes since 1998 and, in conversations 
with us, they indicated that these challenges were more difficult than 
anticipated. Port plans we reviewed addressed some of these types of 
vulnerabilities to natural disasters. However, ports still identified 
such vulnerabilities as a significant obstacle to their ability to 
return to predisaster operational levels. Several ports cited examples 
about how their personnel had evacuated and, for numerous reasons, were 
unable to return to work. For example, several Port of Gulfport 
employees lost their homes during Hurricane Katrina and had no local 
living arrangements for themselves or their families. Likewise, the 
Port of New Orleans said its operations were stifled by the lack of 
personnel and labor in both Hurricane Katrina and Hurricane Rita. At 
the Port of Port Arthur, lack of power for area homes kept employees 
from retuning immediately, causing temporary delays in port operations. 

Port authorities also did not anticipate the extent to which their 
communications systems would be impacted. High winds and flooding from 
the hurricanes rendered phone lines out of service. With phones lines 
down, port authorities were unable to get in touch with their staff or 
other port stakeholders to share information. For instance, we learned 
that approximately 50 percent of phones at the Port of Mobile were out 
of service for about 2 to 4 weeks. Other ports, including New Orleans, 
Pascagoula, and Port Arthur, also experienced phone outages and 
reported limitations in cell phone reception. 

Ports also identified coordination challenges with local, state, and 
federal stakeholders while planning for and recovering from natural 
disasters. At the local level, one coordination problem port officials 
experienced was in re-entering the port after the storm. For example, 
in Gulfport, port officials were denied entry to port property for the 
first 2 weeks following Hurricane Katrina. Similarly in Houston, law 
enforcement agencies blocked roads for access back into Houston after 
the Hurricane Rita evacuation. In some cases, port officials did not 
have the proper credentials required by local police and other 
emergency management officials to be allowed roadway access through the 
city to their port. 

In other instances, we found that ports experienced varied levels of 
coordination with local emergency management agencies, especially 
regarding planning efforts. For example, Mobile County Emergency 
Management officials affirmed that they have a close working 
relationship with the Port of Mobile, where they have helped the port 
conduct risk assessments and emergency planning activities, and where 
they coordinate with port officials on other plans involving safety, 
security, and the environment. Conversely, Port of Gulfport and 
Harrison County Emergency Management officials in Mississippi said they 
had limited contact and coordination regarding emergency recovery. One 
county emergency management official said that although the agency has 
made efforts to share planning documents with the port, the agency is 
required to work through the Mississippi Emergency Management Agency 
and follow any guidance in the state emergency plan to request 
resources from or provide assistance to the port. 

At the federal level, one coordination issue reported by port 
stakeholders involved difficulties in coordinating with FEMA for 
recovery resources. Some local emergency management officials and port 
officials that we interviewed expressed concerns about the level of 
interaction with FEMA officials before an incident occurs. For example, 
Port of Jacksonville officials said they would like to see FEMA take a 
more active role in the disaster planning process, such as 
participation on the AMSC at the local level or coordinating with the 
Florida State Department of Community Affairs at the state 
level.[Footnote 11] Similarly, Port of Los Angeles officials said 
effective communication with FEMA is essential and that they would like 
to communicate more clearly with FEMA about reimbursement policies 
before a disaster takes place. In fact, in November 2006, port 
officials from Los Angeles and Oakland held a joint meeting with FEMA 
and the California Office of Emergency Services to discuss the current 
federal and state regulations and practices regarding disaster relief 
fund and reimbursement policy. 

Port stakeholders also expressed concerns about coordinating with FEMA 
after an incident occurred, including inconsistencies in information 
and difficulty in appropriately completing FEMA forms and other 
documents required for reimbursement. At the county emergency 
management level, one agency official cited an inconsistency of the 
interpretation of FEMA policies and changing personnel as some of the 
challenges in working with FEMA. This official suggested that 
interacting with FEMA officials more frequently before a disaster would 
help the port authority better understand which personnel to contact in 
an emergency situation. The official said this coordination problem 
became obvious during the Hurricane Katrina recovery effort when, after 
the port had made several requests, FEMA did not send a representative 
to the area. Port officials in Gulfport also found it difficult to 
reconcile their damages using FEMA's cost estimate process. To resolve 
the paperwork confusion, the Port of Gulfport hired an outside company 
to deal with FEMA directly and to handle all reimbursement-related 
issues on their behalf. While Port of Gulfport officials recognized 
that FEMA's attention to detail was an effort to prevent fraud and 
abuse, they also said FEMA staff could have done a better job in 
providing guidance about the reimbursement process. 

Besides having coordination challenges with FEMA, we learned that 
several ports were unclear about resources that were available for 
recovery from the Maritime Administration. Immediately following 
Hurricane Katrina, the Gulf area was in need of critical resources such 
as power, water, and personnel. However, due to infrastructure damages 
around the area, it was difficult to get these resources into ports. As 
such, The Maritime Administration provided, with the concurrence of the 
Department of Defense, ready reserve vessels for FEMA's use. These 
ready reserve vessels are strategic sealift assets usually used for 
defense purposes that could be used for command and control, housing, 
power generation, or the movement of water and other supplies. We found 
that ports' knowledge about these assets and how to request them was 
limited. For example, port authority officials at one port turned down 
the Maritime Administration's offer for a housing vessel. The port 
determined that the deep draft and large size of the vessel might 
impede commercial traffic and block other vessels from entering their 
port. Port officials reached this determination without the knowledge 
that smaller vessels for the same purpose could have been provided by 
the Maritime Administration. The vessel offered by the Maritime 
Administration, however, was instead deployed to the Port of New 
Orleans area to house first responders. 

Port Authorities Have Various Efforts Under Way to Mitigate Challenges: 

Many port authorities have taken steps to address the challenges 
resulting from recent natural disasters. Individually, they have taken 
such steps as upgrading communications equipment, adding backup 
communications approaches and power equipment, and creating alternative 
sites for administrative operations and storage of computer data. 
Collectively, they have shared best practices for disaster planning and 
response, most notably through an industry-wide publication with 
detailed planning steps and guidelines. Port authorities that were not 
directly impacted by recent disaster events have also taken steps to 
revise their planning efforts, including greater coordination with 
other port stakeholders. Many port authorities have adapted or improved 
existing stakeholder forums to assist in facilitating port planning for 
natural disasters. At the federal level, agencies such as the Maritime 
Administration have taken steps to assist ports in identifying federal 
resources available for disaster response and recovery. 

Steps Taken Include Port-Specific and Industry-Wide Actions: 

As a result of the lessons learned from recent natural disasters, port 
authorities report taking many steps to mitigate vulnerabilities. One 
mitigation tactic reported by many port authorities is to add equipment 
and develop redundant systems to help during any recovery efforts. The 
most frequent redundancy added was in creating communications 
alternatives. Various port authorities reported purchasing 
communications equipment that does not necessarily rely on traditional 
land lines for calling, such as analog pagers, wireless handheld 
devices, CB radios, and satellite phones. They also integrated more 
sophisticated communications hardware and software programs. Some 
ports, such as Houston and San Diego, implemented 1-800 phone numbers 
to receive calls from port personnel. As an additional precaution, the 
Port of Houston utilizes call centers located out of state in areas 
that are less likely to have been impacted by the same storm. In 
another effort to route calls out of the impacted area, the Port of New 
Orleans has also been assigned phone numbers with alternative area 
codes. 

Besides making improvements to communications systems, many port 
authorities took steps related to power and administrative operations. 
Seven port authorities reported purchasing or arranging for alternative 
power supplies that could be used during an outage. For example, the 
Port of New Orleans purchased generators after the 2005 hurricane 
season. Ports also recognized the need for administrative and 
information technology location alternatives. Four port authorities 
reported changing their alternative administrative sites since recent 
storms. Port authorities also told us that they have changed the way 
they back up and store their electronic data and equipment. For 
example, the Port of New Orleans previously had its alternative work 
site only 3 miles away from its regular operations location. Since both 
operations sites could be susceptible to the same disaster event, Port 
of New Orleans officials have partnered with the Port of Shreveport, 
Louisiana, almost 200 miles away, to use Shreveport's facilities as an 
alternate operations site if the Port of New Orleans is out of business 
for more than 5 days. Further, the two ports have prepared a mutual 
agreement, which includes cost sharing efforts for information 
technology infrastructure upgrades at the Port of Shreveport, to better 
accommodate New Orleans' needs in a disaster. 

Another mitigation tactic by ports has been the sharing of best 
practices and lessons learned from recent natural disasters. Through 
efforts by the AAPA, a nationwide industry group, ports from across the 
U.S. and Canada participated in the development of an industry best 
practices document.[Footnote 12] In developing this document, AAPA 
organized various working groups, which included port officials from 
ports that had been affected by recent natural disasters, as well as 
ports that had not been affected. Acting as a forum for port officials 
to share their experiences with natural disasters, these working groups 
were able to develop a manual focused on port planning and recovery 
efforts. Vetted by AAPA members, the manual includes planning for 
emergency operations, communications, damage assessments, insurance and 
FEMA claims processes, coordinating with federal agencies, and overall 
emergency planning objectives. 

Another industry group, the GICA,[Footnote 13] has worked closely with 
the Corps, Coast Guard and other maritime agencies to implement new 
practices for a more efficient response to maritime related incidents. 
Many of these efforts have been implemented as result of recent 
hurricanes. For example, a special Logistics Support Center is set up 
during response times for the sole purpose of assisting the Corps and 
Coast Guard with contracting special equipment, including water, fuel 
and crane barges, towing vessels, pumps, and generators. Regarding 
clearing the waterways, GICA barge members have provided knowledgeable 
waterway operators and state-of-the-art boats to assist Coast Guard 
personnel in conducting channel assessments immediately following a 
storm. In an effort to restore aids to navigation, GICA contacts also 
towed 50 temporary buoys and supplied aircraft for aerial surveillance 
of the waterways. Moreover, the Corps, Coast Guard, and GICA formed the 
Gulf Coast Inland Waterways Joint Hurricane Team to develop a protocol 
for storm response. Finalized in July 2006, the Joint Hurricane 
Response Protocol[Footnote 14] is an effort to more fully develop 
lessons learned from previous hurricane seasons and waterways 
management practices, with the goal of implementing an effective 
restoration of Gulf Coast maritime commerce following future storms. 

Ports that have not experienced problems as a result of recent 
disasters but that are nonetheless susceptible to disaster threats have 
also responded to these lessons learned by other ports. For example, 
the Port of Tacoma hired a consultant to assist in developing a 
business continuity plan. The Port of Jacksonville has also undertaken 
a comprehensive enhancement to its continuity of operations plan. 
Likewise, as a result of lessons learned from the Loma Prieta 
Earthquake in Oakland, the Port of Los Angeles developed more stringent 
seismic building codes. Additionally, Port of Savannah officials told 
us that they, too, have changed their prehurricane crane operations 
based on lessons learned from hurricanes in the Gulf region. 

Ports Have Taken Steps to Improve Stakeholder Coordination: 

We found several examples of port efforts to improve stakeholder 
coordination, including utilizing existing forums to coordinate 
disaster planning, as well as realigning and enhancing their current 
plans. Regarding the use of existing forums, port authorities in both 
New Orleans and Mobile said they were using their AMSC to coordinate 
response and recovery efforts. Moreover, GAO has previously reported 
that in the wake of Hurricane Katrina, information was shared 
collaboratively through AMSCs to determine when it was appropriate to 
close and then reopen the port.[Footnote 15] Port-specific coordination 
teams, such as those at the Port of Houston, have also used their 
lessons learned to improve coordination for natural disaster planning. 
Houston's port coordination teams are an outgrowth of the port's 
relationships with other maritime stakeholders in the Houston-Galveston 
Navigation Safety Committee,[Footnote 16] which includes a wide variety 
of waterway users and operators. In another example, the Port of 
Oakland works closely with the City Disaster Council on emergency 
planning and participates in various exercises with city, county, and 
state officials. 

We also found several examples of how ports have aligned their local 
planning with the national planning structure and have identified 
various ways to enhance their current coordination plans. The national 
structure, which includes NIMS and NRP, is designed to provide a 
consistent framework and approach for emergency management. Port plans 
that we reviewed, in particular those from ports in hurricane impacted 
areas, have identified the importance of adapting to this national 
structure and emergency response system. For example, the Port of 
Mobile's emergency operations plan explains that the complexity of 
incident management and the growing need for stakeholder coordination 
has increased its need for a standard incident management system. 
Therefore, the Port of Mobile's emergency operations plan outlines the 
use of an incident management framework from which all agencies can 
work together in an efficient and effective manner. Some port 
authorities making changes have not experienced any significant impact 
from recent disasters. For instance, Port of Jacksonville officials 
reported that Hurricane Katrina impacts in the Gulf region prompted 
them to revise their disaster preparedness plans, including 
reorganizing the plans to reflect NIMS language and alignment with NRP 
guidelines. Similarly, Port of San Diego officials said they hired a 
consultant to assist them with drafting their emergency response and 
business continuity plan. San Diego's plan prioritized risks, clarified 
roles and responsibilities of key departments, and laid out directions 
on how to better coordinate with local emergency management officials 
during a disaster event. 

Federal Agencies Have Attempted to Help Ports Strengthen Recovery 
Efforts: 

Since the 2005 hurricane season, federal agencies have also taken steps 
to help port authorities strengthen ports' ability to recover from 
future natural disasters. These efforts have focused on increased 
coordination and communication with stakeholders and also on building 
stakeholders' knowledge about federal resources for port recovery 
efforts. The efforts primarily involve four federal agencies that in 
some fashion work directly with ports--the Maritime Administration, the 
Coast Guard, FEMA and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Efforts for 
those four agencies are as follows: 

Maritime Administration Efforts: The Maritime Administration has taken 
two main steps: developing an approach for activating maritime assets 
in disaster recovery, and updating a risk management guidebook. During 
the 2005 hurricane season, the Maritime Administration emerged as a 
critical resource for the Gulf area by providing vessels from the 
nation's National Defense Ready Reserve Fleet to enable recovery 
operations and provide shelter for displaced citizens. Since that time, 
FEMA developed a one-time plan--the Federal Support Plan, which was 
cited specifically for the 2006 Hurricane Season and specific to the 
federal government's response efforts in the State of Louisiana. The 
Maritime Administration contributed to this plan by identifying 
government and commercial maritime capabilities that could be employed 
in response to a disaster.[Footnote 17] According to Maritime 
Administration officials, while the information is focused on the Gulf 
area, it could be easily adapted to other areas in the United States if 
a disaster occurred. To date, the Maritime Administration is completing 
the process of identifying needs and capabilities and plans to provide 
a directive regarding capabilities to its regional offices in June 
2007. However, no strategy exists for communicating this information to 
ports. 

The Maritime Administration is also currently updating its publication 
titled Port Risk Management and Insurance Guidebook (2001). This 
publication is the Maritime Administration's "best practices" guide for 
port risk management. Developed primarily to assist smaller ports in 
conducting risk management, it includes information on how ports can 
obtain insurance coverage, facilitate emergency management and port 
security, and apply risk management. The Maritime Administration began 
updating the guidebook after the 2005 hurricane season. According to 
officials from the Maritime Administration, ports are actively using 
this guidebook, especially since many of the contributors are port 
directors and risk managers at the ports. 

While these efforts demonstrate the Maritime Administration's increased 
involvement in assisting ports in planning for future disasters, we 
also observed that Maritime Administration regions vary in their level 
of communication and coordination with ports. According to a Maritime 
Administration official, the Gulf and East Coast regions have been 
working with FEMA regional offices to quickly activate needed assets in 
case of a disaster. However, while the Gulf and East Coast regions have 
been strengthening these relationships, other regions may not have the 
same level of coordination. We found, in general, port authorities' 
interaction with the Maritime Administration was limited for natural 
disaster planning, and the ports we spoke to said they usually did not 
work directly with the agency in disaster planning.[Footnote 18] This 
view was echoed by Maritime Administration officials who said that the 
relationship between the agency's regional offices and the ports in 
their respective areas varied across the country. 

Coast Guard efforts: Coast Guard efforts in natural disaster planning 
varied considerably from port to port and were most extensive in the 
Gulf. While in general, the Coast Guard was considered successful in 
its missions during the 2005 hurricane season, its officials said they 
were taking additional steps in improving planning for recovery efforts 
with port stakeholders based on their experiences with recent natural 
disasters. For example, at the Port of Mobile, Coast Guard officials 
said that participating in an actual Incident Command System[Footnote 
19]emergency centers has been as helpful as exercises and, since the 
2005 hurricane season, they have utilized such a unified command at 
least 10 times in preparation for potential hurricane landfalls in the 
region. At other ports, the Coast Guard had a more limited role in 
assisting ports in planning for natural disasters. 

Even at ports that had not experienced substantial damage from a recent 
natural disaster, however, Coast Guard units were applying lessons 
learned from other ports' experiences and increasing their level of 
involvement. For example, the Port of Houston sustained minimal damage 
from Hurricane Rita; however, Coast Guard officials said that they 
identified areas where they could make improvements. The Coast Guard at 
the Port of Houston leads a recovery planning effort through port 
coordination teams, which include stakeholders such as the port 
authority, Coast Guard, and private operators, working together during 
disaster recovery efforts. These teams are all-hazards focused and are 
activated differently for terrorist incidents or natural disasters. 
Coast Guard officials said that although the teams were successful in 
planning for Hurricane Rita, there were areas for improvement, 
including outreach and training with port stakeholders and 
communication. Further, Coast Guard officials at the Port of Tacoma 
said that other ports' experiences with recent natural disasters has 
generated interest in them becoming more involved in the planning and 
coordination of natural disasters. They also indicated they were 
interested in adapting, in some form, a planning forum similar to the 
Port of Houston's port coordination teams. 

FEMA efforts: While state and local emergency management agencies 
assist in facilitating FEMA disaster planning at the port level, FEMA 
has several efforts under way to improve its assistance to ports for 
disaster recovery. For instance, FEMA officials said that through the 
Public Assistance Program, FEMA is able to provide assistance to ports 
that are eligible applicants after a major disaster or emergency. Based 
on lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina, FEMA is also reviewing and 
updating its policies and guidance documents associated with this 
program. To administer the program, FEMA will coordinate closely with 
federal, state, and local authorities (including emergency management 
agencies) through its regional offices. Officials also said that 
through planning, training, and exercise activities sponsored by DHS, 
they hope to have greater opportunities to interact and coordinate with 
port authorities and other local agencies before disasters occur. 
Further, officials agree that coordination with their local 
counterparts is an important part of emergency management and disaster 
recovery efforts. 

U.S. Army Corps of Engineers efforts: Although the U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers generally does not conduct natural disaster planning with 
ports, staff at the district level have made some efforts to increase 
their level of involvement in this process, particularly in the Gulf 
region. For example, district U.S. Army Corps of Engineers staff have 
(1) organized and chaired yearly hurricane planning forums to which all 
ports in the region are invited; (2) organized prestorm teleconferences 
for port stakeholders, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 
U.S. Navy, and in some instances, the media; (3) participated in the 
Coast Guard's Partner Emergency Action Team, which specifically address 
disaster preparedness; (4) geographically aligned with the Coast Guard 
to better facilitate coordination during an emergency; and (5) 
implemented informational training on planning for hurricanes to ports 
and other maritime stakeholders. Many of these improvements were 
implemented as a result of Hurricane Ivan (2001) and the hurricanes 
from the 2005 season. However, the extent of the U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers participation in natural disaster planning with ports varies. 
For instance, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers representatives in Savannah 
said they do not play a significant role in the port's natural disaster 
planning for recovery efforts. Similarly in Jacksonville, U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers officials explained that their primary natural 
disaster recovery duty at the Port of Miami is to repair the federal 
channel and they do not participate in the port authority's disaster 
planning efforts. However, the Jacksonville U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers does cooperate with the Coast Guard's Marine Safety Office in 
Jacksonville in the development of their hurricane preparedness plan. 
For this effort, it assisted in determining what vessels could remain 
in port during a hurricane and what vessels would be required to leave. 

Current Planning Approach Lessens Effective Coordination among All Port 
Stakeholders: 

Most port authorities we reviewed conduct planning for natural 
disasters separately from planning for homeland security threats. 
Federal law established security planning requirements that apply to 
ports. Similar requirements do not exist with regard to natural 
disaster planning. The ports we contacted used markedly different 
approaches to natural disaster planning, and the extent and 
thoroughness of their plans varied widely. A few ports have integrated 
homeland security and natural disaster planning in what is called an 
all-hazards approach, and this approach appeared to be generating 
benefits and is in keeping with experts' recommendations and with the 
newest developments in federal risk management policy. A consequence of 
the divided approach was a wide variance in the degree to which port 
stakeholders were involved in natural disaster planning and the degree 
to which port authorities were aware of federal resources available for 
disaster recovery. For homeland security planning, federal law provides 
for the establishment of AMSCs with wide stakeholder representation, 
and some ports are using these committees or another similar forum with 
wide representation in their disaster planning efforts. DHS, which 
through the Coast Guard oversees the AMSCs, provides an example of how 
to incorporate a wider of scope of committee activity. 

Port-Level Natural Disaster Planning Is Primarily Conducted Separately 
from Other Threats: 

Of the ports we visited, more than half developed plans for natural 
disasters separately from plans that address security threats. This is 
likely due to the requirement that port authorities carry out their 
planning for homeland security under the federal framework created by 
the Congress in the Maritime Transportation Security Act 
(MTSA),[Footnote 20] under which all port operators are required to 
draft individual security plans identifying security vulnerabilities 
and approaches to mitigate them. Under the Coast Guard's implementing 
regulations, these plans are to include such items as measures for 
access control, responses to security threats, and drills and exercises 
to train staff and test the plan.[Footnote 21] The plans are 
"performance-based"; that is, the security outcomes are specified, but 
the stakeholders are free to identify and implement appropriate 
solutions as long as these solutions achieve the specified outcomes. 
Because of the similarities in security and natural hazard planning 
these plans can be useful for guiding natural disaster response. 

MTSA also provided the Secretary of Homeland Security with the 
authority to create AMSCs at the port level. These committees--with 
representatives from the federal, state, local, and private sectors-- 
offer a venue to identify and deal with vulnerabilities in and around 
ports, as well as a forum for sharing information on issues related to 
port security. The committee assists the Coast Guard's COTP in 
developing an area maritime security plan, which complements the 
facility security plans developed by individual port operators. The 
plan provides a framework for communication and coordination among port 
stakeholders and law enforcement officials and identifies and reduces 
vulnerabilities to security threats throughout the port area. 

In contrast, port authority and operator natural disaster planning 
documents are generally not required by law and vary widely. According 
to one member from the AAPA, ports will have various interrelated 
plans, such as hurricane readiness plans, emergency operations plans, 
engineering plans, and community awareness and emergency response 
plans. Taken as a whole, the distinct plans for a particular port may 
represent the port's risk management approach to disaster planning. 

In addition, port natural disaster plans are not reviewed by the Coast 
Guard. Representatives of the Coast Guard at locations we visited 
confirmed they do not review port authority or port operator planning 
documents pertaining to natural disaster planning. For example, 
officials at the Port of Oakland and the Port of Tacoma said they do 
not review the port or port stakeholders planning documents for natural 
disaster planning. Coast Guard officials at the Port of Savannah also 
noted that they do not review the hurricane plans for port operators. 
They contended that they do not have the expertise to advise the 
operators on how to protect or restart their particular operations. 
Moreover, natural disaster plans developed by port authorities 
generally do not apply to the port's private operators. Only in one 
case did a port authority state that it required its private operators 
to draft a natural disaster plan. 

Under the Separate Approach, Disaster Plans Show Wide Variation: 

We found that the thoroughness of natural disaster plans varied 
considerably from port to port. For instance, the Port of Mobile had a 
relatively thorough plan. The Port of Mobile was affected by three 
major hurricanes in 2005-2006. Roughly a year after Hurricane Katrina, 
the Alabama State Port Authority completed an extensive emergency 
operations plan, based on an analysis that considered natural, man- 
made, and security-related hazards. The operations plan describes 
preparedness, response, recovery, and mitigation procedures for each 
identified threat, establishes requirements for conducting exercises, 
and establishes a schedule for regular plan reviews and 
updates.[Footnote 22] In contrast, the Port of Morgan City does not 
have a written plan for preparing for natural disaster threats but 
instead relies on port personnel to assess disaster risk and prepare 
appropriately. Following a disaster, the port authority relies on 
senior personnel to direct recovery efforts as needed. 

In the absence of uniform federal guidance for port disaster planning, 
some local governments have instituted local planning requirements. The 
differences in these local guidelines account for some of the variation 
in the content and thoroughness of port disaster plans. For example, 
the Miami-Dade County Emergency Management Office helps to coordinate 
disaster preparedness for all county agencies, including the Port of 
Miami. As such, the port submits its hurricane plans and continuity of 
operations plan to the office each year for review, which provides a 
certain level of quality assurance. By comparison, the Port of Los 
Angeles found local seismic building codes were insufficient to reach 
the desired level of preparedness, so the port developed its own 
seismic codes to guide infrastructure construction and repair. 

Combined All-Hazards Approach Shows Promise for Improved Planning: 

In contrast to the disjunctional planning for both natural disasters 
and security at ports, industry experts encourage the unified 
consideration of all risks faced by the port. Unified disaster 
preparedness planning requires that all of the threats faced by the 
port, both natural and man-made, be considered together. This is 
referred to as an all-hazards approach. Experts consider it to offer 
several advantages: 

* Application of planning resources to both security and natural 
disaster preparedness. Because of the similarities between the effects 
of terrorist attacks and natural or accidental disasters, much of the 
planning, personnel, training, and equipment that form the basis of 
protection, response, and recovery capabilities are similar across all 
emergency events. As we have previously reported, the capabilities 
needed to respond to major disasters, whether the result of terrorist 
attack or nature, are similar in many ways.[Footnote 23] Unified risk 
management can enhance the efficiency of port planning efforts because 
of the similarity in recovery plans for both natural and security- 
related disasters. One expert noted that responding to a disaster would 
likely be the same for a security incident and a natural disaster 
incident from an operational standpoint. 

* Efficient allocation of disaster-preparation resources. An all- 
hazards approach allows the port to estimate the relative impact of 
mitigation alternatives and identify the optimal mix of investments in 
these alternatives based on the costs and benefits of each. The 
exclusion of certain risks from consideration, or the separate 
consideration of a particular type of risk, gives rise to the 
possibility that risks will not be accurately assessed or compared, and 
that too many or too few resources will be allocated toward mitigation 
of a particular risk. Port risk management experts noted that, in the 
absence of an all-hazards risk management process, it is difficult to 
accurately assess and address the full spectrum of threats faced by a 
port. 

Federal Actions Reflect Movement Toward All-Hazards Approach: 

At the federal level, the Congress has introduced various elements of 
an all-hazards approach to risk management and assistance to ports. 
Examples are as follows: 

* Single response approach to all types of emergency events. NIMS and 
NRP, which were implemented by DHS, provide a unified framework for 
responding to security and natural disaster events. NIMS is a policy 
document that defines roles and responsibilities of federal, state, and 
local first responders during all types of emergency events. The NRP is 
designed to integrate federal government domestic prevention, 
protection, response, and recovery plans into a single operational plan 
for all-hazards and all-emergency response disciplines. Using the 
framework provided by NIMS, the NRP describes operational procedures 
for federal support to emergency managers and organizes capabilities, 
staffing, and equipment resources in terms of functions that are most 
likely to be needed during emergency events. In addition, along with 
the NRP and NIMS, DHS has developed the National Preparedness Goal, as 
required by Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8. Considered as a 
group, these three documents are intended to guide investments in 
emergency preparedness and response capabilities for all hazards. An 
inability to effectively perform these critical tasks would, by 
definition, have a detrimental impact on effective protection, 
prevention, response, and recovery capabilities. 

* Broadened focus for risk mitigation efforts. Security and 
Accountability for Every Port Act, passed in October 2006, contains 
language mandating that the Coast Guard institute Port Security 
Training and Exercise Programs to evaluate response capabilities of 
port facilities to respond to acts of terrorism, natural disasters, and 
other emergencies.[Footnote 24] Officials from the DHS Preparedness 
Directorate's Grants and Training Office also noted that the criteria 
for the Port Security Grant Program is beginning to reflect the 
movement toward all-hazards planning in the future. DHS officials 
stated that the program may evolve to focus more on portwide risk 
management, rather than on risk mitigation for particular assets. 
Furthermore, grant applications that demonstrate mitigation of natural 
hazard risks in addition to security risks may be more competitive. 
Other officials noted that while the program may focus more on all 
hazards in the future, it will remain focused on security priorities 
for now. 

Another agency-level movement toward the all-hazards approach is 
occurring in the Coast Guard's improvement of a computer tool it uses 
to compare security risks for targets throughout a port, including 
areas not under the jurisdiction of a local port authority. This tool, 
called the Maritime Security Risk Assessment Model (MSRAM), provides 
information for the U.S. Coast Guard COPT to use in deciding the most 
efficient allocation of resources to reduce security risks at a port. 
The Coast Guard is developing an all-hazards risk assessment and 
management system, partially fed by MSRAM, which will allow comparison 
of risks and risk-mitigation activities across all goals and hazards. 
The Coast Guard directs the Area Maritime Security Committee to use 
MSRAM in the development of the Area Maritime Security Plan. Given that 
the Coast Guard is enhancing the MSRAM with a tool that will 
incorporate natural hazards, the risks addressed in the Area Maritime 
Security Plan could likely include both natural and security threats in 
the future. 

An all-hazards approach is in many ways a logical maturation of port 
security planning, which saw an aggressive homeland security expansion 
in the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. One expert 
in seismic risk management we spoke with said port officials he 
contacted indicated that they were not focused on natural disaster risk 
because, in their view, the federal government wanted them to focus on 
security risks instead. At some ports, hurricanes or earthquakes may be 
a greater threat than terrorism, and a case can be made that overall 
risk to a port might be more effectively reduced through greater 
investment in mitigating these risks. While federal law provides 
guidance on addressing security risks through MTSA[Footnote 25] and its 
implementing regulations, it does not provide similar guidance 
pertaining to mitigation of natural disaster threats. 

Our previous work on risk management has examined the challenges 
involved in comparing risk across broader threat categories.[Footnote 
26] A risk management framework that analyzes risks based on the 
likelihood that they will occur and the consequences of their 
occurrence is a useful tool for ensuring that program expenditures are 
prioritized and properly focused. In light of the competition for 
scarce resources available to deal with the threats ports face, a clear 
understanding of the relative significance of these threats is an 
important step. 

Port Authorities Using an All-Hazards Approach Indicate Benefits 
Resulted: 

Two port authorities we reviewed have begun to take an all-hazards 
approach to disaster planning by developing planning documents and 
structures that address both security risks and natural disasters, and 
officials at both ports said this approach yielded benefits.[Footnote 
27] At the Port of Houston, the Coast Guard used its authority to 
mandate the creation of port coordination teams by creating teams that 
include all port stakeholders and combine planning and response efforts 
for both security and natural disaster threats. This unified approach 
to risk management has allowed the port to respond efficiently to 
disasters when they occur, according to port officials. In particular, 
they said, the organization of the team changes to match the nature of 
the threat. For security threats, the teams are organized 
geographically and do not require that the entire port close down, 
thereby appropriately matching resources to the threat being faced. For 
natural disasters, the teams are organized functionally because of the 
more dispersed nature of the threat. 

Following the 2005 hurricane season, the Port of Mobile convened a task 
force to reorganize its disaster planning to address both security 
incidents and natural disasters. The task force, which recently 
completed its emergency operations plan, included the Port Authority 
Police Chief; Harbormaster; Environmental, Health and Safety Manager; 
and representatives of the port's rail, cargo, intermodal and 
development divisions. A member of the county emergency management 
agency also served on the task force to provide expert guidance on 
emergency response planning. 

Port stakeholders in other ports that had not moved to an all-hazards 
approach also said preparedness and response practices for security 
incidents and natural disasters are sufficiently similar to merit 
combined planning. Officials in several ports said that although they 
are required to allocate certain resources to security risk mitigation, 
overall risk to the port would be more effectively reduced if they had 
the flexibility to allocate some of those resources to mitigating 
natural disaster risk. 

Under the Separate Approach, Gaps Exist in Coordinating Maritime 
Stakeholders and Obtaining Information about Federal Resources: 

We have previously reported that, for homeland security planning, the 
AMSCs established under federal law have been an effective coordination 
tool.[Footnote 28] These committees have provided a structure to 
improve the timeliness, completeness, and usefulness of information 
sharing between federal and nonfederal stakeholders. Port stakeholders 
said that the committees were an improvement over previous information- 
sharing efforts because they established a formal structure for 
communicating information and new procedures for sharing information. 
Stakeholders stated that, among other things, the committees have been 
used as a forum for sharing assessments of vulnerabilities, providing 
information on illegal or suspicious activities, and providing input on 
Area Maritime Security Plans. Stakeholders, including private 
operators, said the information sharing had increased their awareness 
of security issues around the port and allowed them to identify and 
address security issues at their facilities. Likewise, Coast Guard 
officials said the information they received from nonfederal 
participants had helped in mitigating and reducing risks. 

In contrast to the regulatory requirements for the establishment of 
AMSCs, there are no nationwide federal mandates for all-hazards 
planning forums that involve a broad spectrum of stakeholders in 
disaster planning. In the absence of any consistent requirement or 
approach, we found substantial variation in the maturity of, and 
participation in, natural disaster planning forums at ports. As table 3 
shows, the level of activity and the participants varied considerably. 
Some ports utilized their AMSC for both types of planning, while others 
conducted natural disaster planning efforts primarily within the local 
area's broader emergency management forums, and still others conducted 
their planning piecemeal, with various entities meeting separately and 
not in one coordinated forum. 

Table 3: Natural Disaster Planning Forums at Ports GAO Visited: 

Port: Tacoma; 
Description of forum: The port does not have a central forum for 
coordinating stakeholder natural disaster planning efforts. Instead, 
occasional disaster preparedness exercises with the county emergency 
management agency and the Coast Guard provide stakeholders with 
opportunities to share lessons learned. However, the Port of Tacoma 
conducts planning activities with the county emergency management 
department. 

Port: Oakland; 
Description of forum: The port is an active member of the City's 
Emergency Management Board (Disaster Council) which works closely with 
the Port of Oakland on emergency planning and testing of 
plans/exercises. The port is also involved in a number of city, county, 
and statewide exercises. 

Port: Houston; 
Description of forum: The port has an all-hazards forum through the 
Port Coordination Team and its constituent Port Coordination Centers. 
These centers and team include representatives from the port authority 
and the Coast Guard and a range of stakeholders from private entities. 
The forum plans for natural disasters and security threats and is 
activated differently depending on the type of event. However, the 
forum does not include representatives from the local emergency 
management office.[A]. 

Port: Mobile; 
Description of forum: The port's AMSC is the most significant forum for 
disaster planning. Following the 2005 hurricane season, the port 
authority convened a task force to reorganize its disaster planning to 
address both security incidents and natural disasters. The task force 
included stakeholders from across the port area. The port also works 
with the county emergency management agency. 

Port: Gulfport; 
Description of forum: The port authority meets once a year with 
customers and tenants to discuss hurricane preparedness and review the 
hurricane plan. The port provides training on transporting cargo during 
hurricanes and participates in separate response and recovery planning 
meetings with other maritime stakeholders, such as the U.S. Army Corps 
of Engineers. 

Port: Miami; 
Description of forum: The primary forum used to discuss natural 
disaster planning is the Safety First Committee, which discusses a 
variety of safety issues. The committee is led by the Port of Miami and 
meets monthly. To address individual private sector stakeholders, a 
subcommittee meets with individuals as needed. 

Port: Savannah; 
Description of forum: The port authority is involved in several port 
forums that discuss a variety of issues; emergency issues may be 
addressed in these forums if they are imminent. Externally, the port 
authority's primary interactions are with the state for hazard 
mitigation programming and with the local emergency management office 
for response and evacuation. Until recently, interaction with the local 
emergency management office was limited. 

Source: GAO. 

[A] According to port officials, the Port of Houston does coordinate 
with the local emergency management agency during a disaster event. 

[End of table] 

The Port of Savannah provides an example of how separate planning for 
natural disasters and security can lead to a lack of coordination and 
information-sharing. While officials from the local emergency 
management agency said they reviewed and provided comments on the 
Georgia Port Authority's most recent Hurricane Plan and Draft Emergency 
Operations Plan, this had not traditionally been the case over the past 
several years. According to a representative from the emergency 
management agency, if the port is not sharing its emergency operations 
plans, it makes it difficult for responders in the local area to 
understand what is happening within the port in terms of planning for 
natural disasters. Additionally, while the local EMA is enjoying an 
ongoing productive dialogue with port representatives in developing the 
Emergency Operations Plan and working on port safety and security 
issues, they are not having the same level of success with port 
representatives responsible for hurricane planning. Even so, officials 
said that they had seen marked improvement in the area of portwide 
cooperation and involvement among stakeholders. 

Port authorities' lack of familiarity with FEMA's programs is another 
example of the gaps that exist. We found that port authorities' 
understanding of FEMA's assistance was dependent on their relationship 
with the local or state emergency management office--a stakeholder that 
is not necessarily involved in the forums where the port's natural 
disaster planning occurs. We discussed three FEMA programs with 
officials from our seven case study ports: the Public Assistance 
Program, Hazard Mitigation Grant Program and the Predisaster Mitigation 
Grant Program (see table 4 for brief descriptions). These programs 
provide ports with funds for disaster mitigation efforts before and 
after disaster events and assist ports in avoiding costly damages. Of 
the three programs, port authorities were most knowledgeable about, and 
most involved with, the Public Assistance Program, although even with 
this program, some port authorities reported encountering challenges 
with the process during the 2005 hurricane season. Their knowledge and 
participation in the two hazard mitigation grant programs was dependent 
on their involvement with the emergency planning office. FEMA officials 
told us that no ports have applied as an applicant or subapplicant for 
the Predisaster Mitigation Program,[Footnote 29] and only a few had 
received assistance through the Hazard Mitigation Grant Program since 
1998. AAPA officials made the same point--that many ports are unaware, 
unsure how to navigate or do not understand the resources that are 
available to them for disasters. In its new best practices manual for 
natural disaster planning, AAPA included a section regarding various 
federal resources available, including FEMA. 

Table 4: Key FEMA Disaster Assistance Programs: 

Public Assistance Program[A]; 
Provides grants for the repair, replacement, or restoration of disaster-
damaged, publicly owned facilities and the facilities of certain 
private nonprofit organizations. The federal share is not less than 75 
percent of the eligible cost for emergency measures and permanent 
restoration. The state determines who pays the nonfederal share. 

Hazard Mitigation Grant Program[B]; 
Provides grants to states and local governments to implement long-term 
hazard mitigation measures after a major disaster declaration. The 
purpose of program is to reduce the loss of life and property due to 
natural disasters and to enable mitigation measures to be implemented 
during the immediate recovery from a disaster. Provides up to 75% of 
the cost of hazard mitigation measures. The State or grantee must 
provide a 25% match. 

Predisaster Hazard Mitigation Program[C]; 
The program provides funds on a competitive basis to states, 
territories, Indian tribal governments, and communities for hazard 
mitigation planning and the implementation of mitigation projects prior 
to a disaster event. Funding these plans and projects reduces overall 
risks to the population and structures, while also reducing reliance on 
funding from actual disaster declarations. The nonfederal share of the 
grant is at least 25%. Eligibility for a project grant is dependent on 
the applicant and sub- applicant having a FEMA approved hazard 
mitigation plan. States are eligible as applicants for grants and ports 
are eligible as a subgrantee of the state. 

Source: GAO. 

[A] Established by Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency 
Assistance Act Pub. L. No. 93-288, 88 Stat.143 (1974), codified in 42 
U.S.C. ch. 68. 

[B] Authorized in 42 U.S.C. § 5170c. 

[C] Authorized in 42 U.S.C. § 5133. 

[End of table] 

Conclusions: 

The 2005 hurricane season emphasized the need for ports to plan for 
other threats in addition to security. Since the terrorist attacks of 
September 11, 2001, the country has focused on enhancing its security 
measures, and ports in particular have been targeted due to their 
vulnerability and their criticality to the U.S. economy. While ports 
have long prepared to some degree for hurricanes and earthquakes, the 
hurricanes of 2005 highlighted key areas in which natural disaster 
planning was often inadequate. Even ports that were not directly 
impacted by the hurricanes recognized their own vulnerabilities and 
took additional actions. As ports continue to revise and improve their 
planning efforts, available evidence indicates that, if ports take a 
system-wide approach, thinking strategically about using resources to 
mitigate and recover from all forms of disaster, they will be able to 
achieve the most effective results. The federally established framework 
for ports' homeland security planning appears to provide useful 
elements for establishing an all-hazards approach and adopting these 
elements appears to be a logical starting point for an all-hazards 
approach for port authorities. In particular, greater coordination 
between stakeholders appears important to ensure that available federal 
resources can be most effectively applied. A forum for sharing 
information and developing plans across a wide range of stakeholders, 
as occurs with a port's AMSC, is critical for ensuring that local 
stakeholders can use federal resources effectively. This is especially 
the case for mitigation grants administered by the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency and the Maritime Administration's communication of 
information regarding making ships and other maritime resources 
available for disaster recovery. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

To help ensure that ports achieve adequate planning for natural 
disasters and effectively manage risk to a variety of threats, we are 
recommending that the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security 
encourage port stakeholders to use existing forums for discussing all- 
hazards planning efforts and include appropriate representatives from 
DHS, the port authority, representatives from the local emergency 
management office, the Maritime Administration, and vessel and facility 
owner/operators. 

To help ensure that ports have adequate understanding of maritime 
disaster recovery resources, we recommend that the Secretary of the 
Department of Transportation direct the Administrator of the Maritime 
Administration to develop a communication strategy to inform ports of 
the maritime resources available for recovery efforts. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

We provided a draft of this report to DHS, DOT, and DOD for their 
review and comment. 

In DHS's letter, the department generally agreed existing forums 
provide a good opportunity to conduct outreach to and participation by 
stakeholders from various federal, state, and local agencies and, as 
appropriate, industry and nongovernmental organizations. However, the 
department said it did not endorse placing responsibility for disaster 
contingency planning on existing committees in ports and said these 
responsibilities should remain with state and local emergency 
management planners. Our recommendation was not to place responsibility 
for such planning within port committees, but rather to use these 
existing forums as a way to engage all relevant parties in discussing 
natural disaster planning for ports. The problem we found at various 
locations we visited was that all parties have not been involved in 
these efforts. In our view, these committees represent a ready way to 
accomplish this task. While we understand Coast Guard's concern with 
diluting existing statutorily mandated port-related committees, we 
found during the course of our fieldwork that some ports were already 
using existing port committees effectively to plan for all hazards. 
Further, we believe that the unique nature of ports and their 
criticality to goods movement warrants that all ports be encouraged to 
have a specific forum for all-hazard planning. DHS's letter is 
reprinted in appendix II. DHS officials provided technical comments and 
clarifications, which we incorporated as appropriate to ensure the 
accuracy of our report. 

In general, DOT agreed with the facts presented in the report. 
Department officials provided a number of comments and clarifications, 
which we incorporated as appropriate to ensure the accuracy of our 
report. The department generally concurred with GAO's recommendation. 

Additionally, DOD generally agreed with the facts presented in the 
report. Department officials provided some technical comments and 
clarifications, which we incorporated as appropriate to ensure the 
accuracy of our report. 

We will send copies of this report to the interested congressional 
committees, the Secretary of Transportation, and other interested 
parties. We also will make copies available to others upon request. In 
addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site 
at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff has any questions about this report, please 
contact me at (202) 512-6570 or sigerrudk@gao.gov. Contact points for 
our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found 
on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions 
to this report are listed in appendix III. 

Signed by: 

Katherine Siggerud: 
Director, Physical Infrastructure: 

List of Committees: 

The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye: 
Chairman: 
Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Susan M. Collins: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Robert C. Byrd: 
Chairman: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable James Oberstar: 
Chairman: 
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson: 
Chairman: 
Committee on Homeland Security: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable David E. Price: 
Chairman: 
Subcommittee on Homeland Security: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
House of Representatives: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

This report, initiated under the Comptroller General's authority to 
examine government operations, examines (1) the challenges port 
authorities have experienced as a result of recent natural disasters, 
(2) the efforts under way to address challenges from these disasters, 
and (3) the manner in which port authorities prepare for disasters and 
the effect of this approach on their ability to share information with 
port stakeholders and access federal resources. 

To address these objectives, we focused much of our work on 17 U.S. 
ports. We focused primarily on commercial ports and various commercial 
aspects of these ports. The main criteria we used to select ports for 
study were as follows: 

* Size of port, based on the value of imported cargo. To ensure a 
varied size of ports, we selected ports that were among the top 50 in 
size, but within these 50, we chose ports whose total cargo values were 
greater than and less than the average cargo value for all 50 top 
ports. 

* Experience with recent natural disasters. We focused our efforts 
primarily--but not exclusively--on ports that had some degree of 
experience with a natural disaster since 1998. Based on Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) guidance about the most significant disaster 
threats and potential hazards, we limited our focus to ports that have 
hurricane or seismic threats. In particular, we included a number of 
ports affected by the 2005 hurricane season--primarily hurricanes 
Katrina, Wilma, and Rita. In all, 10 of the 17 ports we selected were 
affected by hurricanes that year. 

* Operational type. We chose ports that reflected a range of operating 
types, including those that (1) manage port operations and provide all 
services, (2) act as a landlord and lease operations and facilities to 
tenants, and (3) conduct limited operations in the port and lease 
facilities to others. 

* Region of the United States. We selected ports from the East, Gulf, 
and West Coasts. There is an overrepresentation of Gulf region ports to 
ensure adequate coverage of hurricane affected ports. 

In making our selections, we used information from the Maritime 
Administration, including port demographics operational, legal type, 
and region from the Public Port Finance Survey Report and Maritime 
Administration waterborne statistics which report the top 50 ports in 
terms of total cargo value. We determined that what we found at those 
ports is not generalizable to all U.S. ports. We used disaster data 
from Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to assess how many 
natural disasters had affected the counties in which each port was 
located. Based on our review of data documentation, we determined that 
the data we used in applying our criteria for port selection were 
sufficiently reliable for our purposes. 

We took two approaches to reviewing these ports--site visits and 
telephone interviews. We conducted site visits at seven ports, as 
follows: 

* Tacoma, Washington: 

* Houston, Texas: 

* Oakland, California: 

* Gulfport, Mississippi: 

* Mobile, Alabama: 

* Miami, Florida: 

* Savannah, Georgia: 

During these visits, we gathered information from various maritime 
stakeholders, including officials from port authorities, emergency 
management agencies, the U.S. Coast Guard, the U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers, and the Maritime Administration. Although we talked to four 
private operators, we excluded interviewing other private operators 
because their roles and responsibilities vary greatly from port to port 
and because their efforts for natural disasters, unlike their efforts 
for homeland security, are not subject to federal requirements or 
guidelines. We designed our case study interview questions to provide 
insight on (1) general governance and operations of the port, (2) 
impacts from recent natural disasters, (3) lessons learned from 
previous natural disasters, (4) risk management procedures, and (5) 
stakeholder collaboration. 

We conducted telephone interviews with officials at 10 ports, as 
follows: 

* Freeport, Texas: 

* Jacksonville, Florida: 

* Los Angeles, California: 

* Morgan City, Louisiana: 

* New Orleans, Louisiana: 

* Pascagoula, Mississippi: 

* Port Arthur, Texas: 

* Richmond, Virginia: 

* San Diego, California: 

* Wilmington, North Carolina: 

At these ports, we limited our telephone interviews to port authorities 
only. These semi-structured interviews addressed the same topics as the 
case study but focused more on damages and lessons learned as a result 
of recent natural disasters. For both sets of ports, we also reviewed 
numerous planning documents from port stakeholders including emergency 
preparedness plans, disaster recovery plans, hurricane operations, 
hurricane manuals, seismic guidelines, and business continuity plans. 

To assess the challenges port authorities experienced as a result of 
recent natural disasters, we used the interviews we conducted and the 
documents we obtained from officials at the 17 ports. To determine the 
efforts under way to address these challenges, we reviewed information 
from our interviews with and documents from American Association of 
Port Authorities (AAPA) officials and various federal agencies. In 
particular, we reviewed the Emergency Preparedness and Continuity of 
Operations Planning: Manual for Best Practices that was developed 
through several working groups coordinated by the AAPA. The working 
groups provided a forum for port officials across the United States and 
Canada to share their experience in planning for the impacts of recent 
natural disasters and to share their best practices. We conducted 
interviews with the Chair of the working groups and other AAPA 
officials to gather more information about the working group's 
procedures and vetting process. Additionally, we interviewed various 
regional and headquarter officials of the Maritime Administration, U.S. 
Coast Guard (Coast Guard), Department of Transportation, U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers, FEMA, and DHS. We reviewed the following federal 
risk management plans: 

* The draft appendix for maritime resources for the Federal Support 
Plan. The appendix is part of a one-time joint planning document 
between the Department of Transportation and FEMA for the state of 
Louisiana (2006 Hurricane Season). The Maritime Administration, an 
agency within the Department of Transportation, developed this appendix 
to assist in future recovery efforts by identifying resources, 
protocols, and organizations for maritime resources. 

* The Port Risk Management and Insurance Guidebook, developed by the 
Maritime Administration. This publication is a best practices guide for 
port risk management, including information on how ports obtain 
insurance coverage and facilitate emergency management. 

To determine how port authorities plan for natural disasters and the 
effects of that approach on information-sharing among port stakeholders 
and access to federal resources, we reviewed port and federal disaster 
planning documents collected from various port stakeholders at each of 
the seven ports we visited in person. In order to gain an understanding 
of best practices for such planning efforts, we interviewed academic, 
industry, and government experts.[Footnote 30] In particular, we 
interviewed risk management experts from the following organizations: 

* Georgia Institute of Technology's Port Seismic Risk Management Team 
conducted damage assessments at seven ports in south Louisiana in 
October 2005 immediately following Hurricane Katrina. 

* ABS Consulting has worked with a variety of clients including the 
Coast Guard, Maritime Administration, and FEMA and thus helped develop 
several port risk management tools. 

* The Office of Grants and Training at DHS administers both Port 
Security and Homeland Security Grants. 

* The Coast Guard has expertise in utilizing the Maritime Security Risk 
Assessment Model (MSRAM) to assess security risk and has plans to 
incorporate natural disaster risks into the model. 

We also reviewed related laws and mandates that provide federal 
oversight to ports--namely the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 
2002 [Footnote 31] and its implementing regulations and other 
applicable law. We also reviewed the Puget Sound area maritime security 
plan and attended an Area Maritime Security Committee meeting at the 
Port of Houston-Galveston. To determine steps that federal agencies 
were taking with regard to all-hazards risk management, we reviewed (1) 
the Security and Accountability for Every Port Act (SAFE Port 
Act),[Footnote 32] which addresses risk mitigation of transportation 
disruptions, including disruptions caused natural disasters and (2) 
policy documents including the National Response Plan and the National 
Incident Management System. We also reviewed a presentation on the 
Coast Guard's MSRAM. 

Our work, which we conducted from December 2005 through February 2007, 
was conducted in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 
standards. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security: 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security: 
Washington, DC 20528: 

March 13, 2007: 

Ms. Katherine Siggerud: 
Director, Physical Infrastructure: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, NW: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Ms. Siggerud: 

RE: Draft Report GAO-07-412, Port Risk Management: Additional Federal 
Guidance Would Aid Ports in Disaster Planning and Recovery (GAO Job 
Code 542083): 

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) appreciates the opportunity 
to review and comment on the draft report referenced above. The 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) recommends that the Secretary 
encourage port stakeholders to use existing forums for discussing all 
hazards planning efforts and include appropriate representatives from 
DHS, the port authority, representatives from the local emergency 
management office, the Maritime Administration, and vessel and facility 
owner/operators. The intent of the recommendation is to ensure or 
otherwise encourage ports to adequately plan for natural disasters and 
effectively manage risk associated with a variety of threats. 

Across the nation, the U.S. Coast Guard serves a leadership role in a 
wide variety of port level committees. Some of these committees 
specifically address contingency planning such as Area Committees and 
Area Maritime Security Committees (AMSC), which focus on oil/hazardous 
material preparedness and response, and port security respectively. 
Additionally, where applicable, the Coast Guard is formally involved in 
Harbor Safety Committees that primarily focus on ports and waterways 
management issues. Each of these committees involves extensive outreach 
to and participation by stakeholders, including various federal, state, 
and local agencies, and, as appropriate, industry and non-governmental 
organizations to address their specific focus areas. At the national 
level, the Coast Guard provides forums such as the Towing Safety 
Advisory Committee so that specific maritime stakeholder groups can 
communicate with the Coast Guard. The National Response Plan 
establishes a comprehensive all-hazards approach to enhance the ability 
of the United States to manage domestic incidents. Collectively these 
various committees and organizations may provide extensive 
opportunities for stakeholder involvement in contingency planning. 

We agree that existing forums provide a good opportunity for the 
agency/agencies responsible for disaster planning to engage an 
appropriate array of port stakeholders to ensure the ports are 
adequately represented. DHS does not, however, endorse placing the 
responsibility for disaster contingency planning on existing committees 
as those responsibilities should properly remain with state and local 
emergency management planners and other responsible government 
agencies. Additionally, many of the existing port-related committees 
were statutorily mandated to fulfill specific responsibilities and we 
must caution against diluting their ability to effectively carry out 
those missions. 

GAO's recommendation does align well with DHS Preparedness 
Directorate's Office of Grants and Training initiative to, in 
conjunction with the United States Coast Guard, reach out to 
appropriate port stakeholders to foster the concept of Port Wide Risk 
Management. This concept, based on the risk management framework 
identified in the National Infrastructure Protection Plan, will assist 
the ports in the management of resources (including federal grant 
funds) to address all risks encountered in their ports. 

A port-wide risk management program will also be fully integrated into 
the broader regional planning construct that forms the core of the 
Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI), as well as applicable statewide 
initiatives. Adoption of a deliberate risk management planning process, 
consistent with that employed in the UASI and state programs, is also a 
key focus of the recently signed Security and Accountability For Every 
Port (SAFE Port) Act. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by:  

Steven J. Pecinovsky: 
Director: 
Departmental GAO/OIG Liaison Office: 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Katherine Siggerud, (202) 512-6570, siggerudk@gao.gov: 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the individual named above, Sally Moino, Assistant 
Director; Casey Hanewall; Lindsey Hemly; Christoph Hoashi-Erhardt; Bert 
Japikse; Erica Miles; Sara Ann Moessbauer; Jamilah Moon; Sharon Silas; 
Stan Stenerson; and Randall Williamson made key contributions to this 
report. 

FOOTNOTES 

[1] The Dante B. Fascell Port of Miami-Dade is owned and managed by the 
local government, Miami-Dade County. 

[2] In this report, "port" usually refers to one of two things: (1) the 
port authority or (2) the collective group of stakeholders. We have 
taken care to ensure that the reference intended is clear. Where 
necessary, we have inserted clarifying language (such as "port 
authority") to help ensure clarity. 

[3] Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-295, 
116 Stat. 2064. 

[4] GAO, Homeland Security: DHS' Efforts to Enhance First Responders' 
All-Hazards Capabilities Continue to Evolve, GAO-05-652 (Washington, 
D.C.: July, 11, 2005). 

[5] We chose 1998 as the cutoff date for recent disasters based on the 
available data from FEMA. 

[6] See, for example, GAO, Risk Management: Further Refinements Needed 
to Assess Risks and Prioritize Protective Measures at Ports and Other 
Critical Infrastructure, GAO-06-91 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 15, 2005). 

[7] See table 2 for federal agencies involved. 

[8] Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (2002). 

[9] Homeland Security Presidential Directive 8 (HSPD-8). 

[10] GAO-06-91. 

[11] The Florida State Department of Community Affairs is the 
department that houses the state emergency management agency. 

[12] Emergency Preparedness and Continuity of Operations Planning: 
Manual for Best Practices, American Association of Port Authorities, 
Prepared by: Phyllis Saathoff, Managing Director, Port Freeport. 
September 2006. 

[13] GICA is maritime trade association that is an advocate for issues 
regarding the Gulf Intracoastal Waterway, which is an inland navigable 
waterway located along the Gulf Coast. One of GICA's missions is to 
work with it members, as well as the Coast Guard and Corps, to identify 
opportunities to improve the safety and efficiency of the Gulf 
Intracoastal Waterway. 

[14] Gulf Coast Inland Waterways Joint Hurricane Response Protocol: 
Prepared by the Gulf Coast Joint Hurricane Team. July 2006. 

[15] GAO, Maritime Security: Information Sharing Efforts are Improving, 
GAO-06-933T (Washington, D.C.: July 10, 2006). 

[16] Also known as HOGANSAC, this committee's 19 members include pilots 
associations, operators, and environmental and academic interests. The 
committee addresses a wide range of topics affecting navigation in the 
area. Other individuals with experience and interest in navigation 
safety issues serve on working groups established by the committee to 
examine other issues of local interest. 

[17] The primary planning instrument for DOT remains the Emergency 
Support Function #1 Annex to the National Response Plan; however, the 
annex does not detail site specific information as was done for this 
plan. 

[18] According to officials from MARAD, the DOT Regional Emergency 
Transportation Coordinator and Representatives may play a supporting 
role with regards to communicating and coordinating department response 
processes and building relationships with local authorities. 

[19] The Incident Command System, established under NIMS, is a system 
for managing all types of major incidents. It defines the operating 
characteristics, interactive management components and structure of 
incident management and emergency response organizations engaged 
throughout the life cycle of an incident. 

[20] The Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 (MTSA), Pub. L. 
No. 107-295, 116 Stat. 2064 contains many of the homeland security 
requirements related specifically to port security. The Area Maritime 
Security Committees are authorized by section 102 of MTSA, (46 U.S.C. § 
70112(a)(2)). 

[21] The requirements for security plans are found in 33 C.F.R. Part 
104, Subpart D for vessels, and 33 C.F.R. Part 105, Subpart D for 
facilities. 

[22] Mobile's plan, while relatively thorough, still has gaps in 
coordination with port stakeholders. Port authority officials noted 
that they do not share their emergency plans with tenants or outside 
partners. While many tenants develop their own emergency plans, the 
port authority does not require them. 

[23] GAO-05-652. 

[24] Security and Accountability for Every Port Act of 2006, Pub. L. 
No. 109-347, §113(a) 114(a) 120 Stat. 1884 (SAFE Port Act). 

[25] Pub. L. No. 107-295, 116 Stat. 2064 (2002). 

[26] GAO-06-91. 

[27] A third port, the Port of Oakland has taken a step toward 
employing an all-hazards approach. The Area AMSC elected to add natural 
disaster planning information to their Area Maritime Security Plan as a 
set of appendixes. 

[28] GAO-06-933T. 

[29] Recently, the Port of Tacoma began participating in the 
Predisaster Hazard Mitigation Program as a subgrantee of the county. 

[30] For risk management, which is a central component of best 
practices, we limited our investigation to the context of emergency 
planning and did not address insurance-related risk management. 

[31] Pub. L. No. 107-295, 116 Stat. 2064 (2002). 

[32] Security and Accountability for Every Port Act of 2006 (SAFE Port 
Act), Pub. L. No. 109-347, 120 Stat. 1884. We also reviewed the SAFE 
Port Act Conference Report-House Report 109-711. 

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