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and Better Management Controls Needed If Air Carriers Resume Interest 
in Deploying Less-than-Lethal Weapons' which was released on June 13, 
2006. 

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Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Aviation, Committee on 
Transportation and Infrastructure, House of Representatives: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 

GAO: 

May 2006: 

Aviation Security: 

Further Study of Safety and Effectiveness and Better Management 
Controls Needed If Air Carriers Resume Interest in Deploying Less-than- 
Lethal Weapons: 

GAO-06-475: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-06-475, a report to the Honorable John L. Mica, 
Chairman, Subcommittee on Aviation, Committee on Transportation and 
Infrastructure, House of Representatives. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has authority to 
approve air carrier requests to deploy less-than-lethal weapons, 
including electric stun devices, onboard commercial aircraft to thwart 
an attack. Since the terrorist attacks of 2001, one air carrier 
received approval to deploy electric stun devices. To address concerns 
regarding reports of injuries after the use of these devices and to 
ensure that the impacts of these devices onboard aircraft have been 
fully evaluated, this report answers the following: (1) What analyses 
has the federal government conducted to assess the safety and 
effectiveness of these devices onboard commercial aircraft? (2) What 
controls does TSA have in place to help ensure uniform and timely 
review of air carrier requests to deploy these devices onboard 
commercial aircraft? 

What GAO Found: 

The Transportation Security Administration and the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) have conducted reviews addressing the effect of 
electric stun devices on aircraft. Plus, various federal as well as 
other organizations examined the health effects that electric stun 
devices have on individuals. But, no studies of health effects have 
been conducted in an in-flight environment. Moreover, according to 
National Institute of Justice (NIJ), although electric stun devices 
have been used successfully many times to subdue suspects, certain 
susceptible populations, such as the elderly and those with a history 
drug and alcohol abuse, may be at risk for negative outcomes. In April 
2002, NIJ concluded that the use of electric stun devices in accordance 
with appropriate policies and training may be an effective means for 
flight deck crews to thwart an attack but should not be deployed 
without further testing. Similarly, in a 2003 report to Congress, TSA 
generally concurred with NIJ’s conclusions. But, neither review 
included in-flight testing or empirical testing of these devices that 
would demonstrate that they would enhance security. TSA’s position is 
that empirical data, particularly in an aircraft environment, is 
necessary to determine if these devices can be used safely and 
effectively. 

TSA lacks key internal controls, to help ensure uniformity in decision 
making and a transparent process to review requests to deploy electric 
stun devices onboard commercial aircraft. Specifically, TSA (1) lacks a 
well-defined organizational area with responsibility to receive and 
review requests, (2) has not established formal criteria for decision 
making to approve requests and has not communicated criteria to 
external stakeholders, and (3) maintained little documentation of its 
decision making and activities to account for its handling of past 
requests. Without clearly defined approval criteria and a point of 
contact, TSA cannot reasonably assure that its decision making is 
uniform and consistent, nor can it provide a transparent request and 
approval process for air carriers. 

Figure: Example of an Electro-Muscular Disruption Device (EMDD): 

[See PDF for Image] 

[End of Figure] 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO is recommending that should air carrier interest in deploying these 
devices resume, TSA should ensure that there is reliable research 
supporting their use in an aircraft environment and that the agency 
implement internal controls to govern receipt and review of air carrier 
requests. The Department of Homeland Security agreed with our 
recommendations. 

[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-475]. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
the link above. For more information, contact Cathleen Berrick at 202-
512-8777 or berrickc@gao.gov. 

[End of Section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Scope and Methodology: 

Results in Brief: 

Background: 

Existing Reviews and Studies Do Not Provide Definitive Evidence of the 
Safety and Security Effectiveness of Electric Stun Devices on board 
Commercial Aircraft: 

TSA Has Not Established Internal Controls to Help Ensure Uniform and 
Timely Review Regarding Requests for Use of Electric Stun Devices: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments: 

Appendix I: TSA's Proposed List of Criteria for Evaluating Less-than- 
Lethal Weapons requests: 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security: 

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Figure: 

Figure 1: Example of an Electro-Muscular Disruption Device (EMDD): 

Abbreviations: 

ATSA: Aviation and Transportation Security Act: 

DHS: Department of Homeland Security: 

DOJ: Department of Justice: 

EMDD: electro-muscular disruption device: 

FAA: Federal Aviation Administration: 

FFDO: Federal Flight Deck Officer: 

LTL: less-than-lethal: 

NIJ: National Institute of Justice: 

TSA: Transportation Security Administration: 

TSL: Transportation Security Laboratory: 

TSNM: Transportation Sector Network Management: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 

Washington, DC 20548: 

May 26, 2006: 

The Honorable John L. Mica: 
Chairman: 
Subcommittee on Aviation: 
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure: 
House of Representatives: 

Dear Mr. Chairman: 

The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has authority to 
approve air carrier requests to deploy less-than-lethal weapons, 
including electric stun devices[Footnote 1] on board commercial 
aircraft for the purposes of thwarting an attack.[Footnote 2] Shortly 
after the terrorist attacks of September 2001, two domestic and one 
foreign air carrier requested approval to deploy electric stun devices 
on board their commercial aircraft. The two domestic air carriers 
sought approval to deploy these devices for flight deck crew (the pilot 
and others within the cockpit) but after approximately 18 months 
without a disposition from TSA, primarily citing confusion with the 
review process chose to no longer pursue their requests. The foreign 
air carrier, which sought approval to deploy the devices on 
international flights to the United States for use by government law 
enforcement officers and specially trained flight attendants, also 
experienced extended delays before ultimately receiving approval in 
December 2004 to deploy electric stun devices in its passenger 
cabins.[Footnote 3] According to air carrier officials we spoke to, 
since the establishment of additional security measures such as an 
expansion of the Federal Air Marshal Service,[Footnote 4] hardened 
cockpit doors, 100 percent passenger and baggage screening, and 
particularly initiation of the Federal Flight Deck Officer (FFDO) 
program,[Footnote 5] air carrier interest in deploying electric stun 
devices to enhance security has diminished. Notwithstanding the current 
lack of demonstrated interest, it is possible that demand among air 
carriers to deploy these devices could resume in the future. 

Due in part to recent reports regarding injuries after the use of 
electric stun devices and the lack of regulations governing their 
general use, the House Subcommittee on Aviation wants to ensure that 
the impacts of using electric stun devices on board commercial aircraft 
have been fully evaluated. Given this concern, this report addresses 
the following questions: 

* What analysis has the federal government conducted to assess the 
safety and effectiveness of electric stun devices on board commercial 
aircraft? 

* What controls does TSA have in place to help ensure uniform and 
timely review of air carrier requests to deploy electric stun devices 
on board commercial aircraft? 

Scope and Methodology: 

To determine what analysis the federal government had conducted to 
assess the safety and effectiveness of electric stun devices on board 
commercial aircraft, we conducted a literature search to identify the 
extent of past research that had been done by various federal agencies 
on the safety and effectiveness of deploying these devices on board 
commercial aircraft. We also conducted a literature search of existing 
studies addressing the health effects of these devices. We currently 
have a separate ongoing engagement that is evaluating the extent to 
which claims regarding the safety and effectiveness of electric stun 
devices are supported by currently available scientific data. The 
results of our literature searches were limited because no federal 
studies or reviews examining the use of electric stun devices on board 
commercial aircraft have been published since May 2003, and no studies 
have been published examining the potential health effects of these 
devices on individuals who are on board commercial aircraft. We 
examined reviews produced by the Department of Justice's National 
Institute of Justice (NIJ) and by Department of Homeland Security's 
(DHS) Transportation Security Laboratory (TSL)[Footnote 6] as well as a 
TSA report to Congress regarding the use of less-than-lethal weapons, 
including electric stun devices, on board commercial aircraft and 
reviewed the methodologies employed and the conclusions drawn. We also 
examined Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) reviews of test data 
submitted by a commercial air carrier and spoke to the individual at 
FAA who produced those reviews. 

To assess what controls TSA put in place to help ensure uniform and 
timely review of air carrier requests to deploy electric stun devices 
on board commercial aircraft, we reviewed TSA's handling of these 
requests and compared this process to our Standards for Internal 
Control in the Federal Government.[Footnote 7] Specifically, to 
determine how TSA ensures uniform and timely review of air carrier 
requests, we interviewed cognizant TSA officials regarding their 
processing of past requests and reviewed related documentation. Our 
ability to obtain complete information at TSA was limited because, 
according to TSA officials, individuals involved in reviewing past 
requests from air carriers were no longer with the agency and only 
limited documentation of the review process or supporting materials was 
retained by TSA. However, we were able to obtain copies of some TSA 
correspondence and other documents regarding the review process from 
private sector officials involved in the requests. We interviewed 
officials from FAA regarding their role and activities in reviewing 
requests from commercial air carriers wishing to deploy less-than- 
lethal weapons. We also interviewed officials from a nonprobability 
sample of eight domestic air carriers selected based on number of 
flights per year,[Footnote 8] two of which had requested permission 
from TSA to deploy electric stun devices on board their aircraft. 
Because this is a nonprobability sample, results of these interviews 
cannot be generalized to the universe of air carriers. We also 
interviewed officials from the one foreign air carrier that had 
requested and received permission to deploy these devices on their 
aircraft. In instances where air carriers had requested approval to 
deploy these devices, we asked them to assess their experience with TSA 
regarding any guidance provided and responsiveness to their requests. 
We also interviewed officials from five domestic air industry 
associations and obtained the views of two foreign air carrier 
associations to determine their views on the general efficacy of using 
electric stun devices on commercial aircraft.[Footnote 9] 

We conducted our work between June 2005 and April 2006 in accordance 
with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Results in Brief: 

The Transportation Security Administration, DHS Transportation Security 
Laboratory, Federal Aviation Administration, and the National Institute 
of Justice have conducted reviews addressing the effect of electric 
stun devices on aircraft avionics. The TSA and TSL reviews also 
addressed the potential security effectiveness of these devices. In 
addition, various federal and other organizations have conducted 
reviews addressing the health effects of electric stun devices on 
individuals. However, no studies of health effects have been conducted 
in an in-flight environment. Moreover, according to an NIJ official, 
although electric stun devices have been used successfully many times 
to subdue suspects, including individuals who may fall into certain 
potentially susceptible populations, there is no independent research 
to indicate whether these electric stun devices would be either safe or 
unsafe. However, some susceptible populations such as the elderly and 
those who have a sustained history of alcohol and illicit drug use may 
be at greater risk for negative outcomes. NIJ recommended that study of 
these issues be conducted and has initiated several projects in this 
area. The TSL and the FAA each reviewed a study conducted in February 
2002 by an air carrier regarding the effect of one model of electric 
stun device on aircraft avionics and concurred with the carrier's 
conclusion that the 50,000 volt device tested would be unlikely to harm 
aircraft avionics. The TSL review cautioned, however, that the results 
for the one type of device tested do not necessarily reflect how other 
brands and models of electric stun devices may perform under similar 
circumstances. For example, according to the TSL review, it is likely 
that devices exceeding 100,000 volts would not be suitable for use on 
aircraft. In April 2002, the NIJ concluded that the use of electric 
stun devices in accordance with appropriate policies and training may 
be an effective means for flight deck crews to thwart an 
attack.[Footnote 10] Similarly, in a report to Congress issued in May 
2003, which TSA officials told us consisted primarily of the results of 
a literature search, TSA generally concurred with NIJ's conclusion but 
further concluded that commercial aviation security may be enhanced 
through deployment of these devices. Although both the TSA and the NIJ 
reports provided a conceptual framework for determining the suitability 
of electric stun devices in an aircraft environment, neither review 
included in-flight testing or other empirical analysis to conclude that 
electric stun devices offered additional security. In its report, NIJ 
also concluded that electric stun devices should not be deployed in 
aircraft until extensive testing had been completed in realistic 
settings and on various types of aircraft. TSA's current position is 
that empirical data, particularly in an aircraft environment, is 
necessary to determine if these devices can be used safely and 
effectively. 

TSA lacks key internal controls, prescribed in our Standards for 
Internal Control in the Federal Government, to help ensure uniformity 
in decision making and a clear and transparent process for reviewing 
requests to deploy electric stun devices on board commercial aircraft. 
Specifically, TSA: 

* lacks a well-defined organizational area or individual with 
responsibility for receiving and reviewing requests, 

* has not established formal criteria for decision making to approve 
requests and has not clearly communicated criteria to external 
stakeholders, and: 

* maintains little or no documentation of its decision making and 
activities to account for its handling of past requests to deploy 
electric stun devices. 

Without clearly defined and communicated approval criteria and 
organizational point of contact, TSA cannot have reasonable assurance 
that its decision making is uniform and consistent, nor can it provide 
a clear and transparent request and approval process for air carriers. 
The lack of a formal system of record keeping also prevents TSA 
management from ensuring consistency in decision making and diminishes 
TSA's ability to be accountable to Congress and other stakeholders. TSA 
officials were not able to tell us specifically why these controls were 
not in place when prior applications were being reviewed. According to 
TSA, air carriers have not expressed an interest in deploying electric 
stun devices on board their aircraft since October 2004, and TSA does 
not currently anticipate additional air carrier requests. However, TSA 
stated that it would implement these internal controls for future 
requests that may come in from air carriers. 

In order to help ensure that TSA's review and approval process for the 
use of less-than-lethal weapons, including electric stun devices, is 
responsive, uniform, accountable, and serves the public interest, we 
are recommending that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the 
Assistant Secretary, TSA, to ensure that there are reliable studies and 
research supporting the use of less-than-lethal devices on commercial 
aircraft should air carrier interest in deploying these devices resume. 
Also, in order to help ensure consistency in decision making and 
responsiveness to air carriers, we are recommending that the Secretary 
of Homeland Security direct the Assistant Secretary, TSA, to implement 
key internal controls related to TSA's handling of requests for the use 
of less-than-lethal weapons, including electric stun devices, on board 
commercial aircraft. In commenting on this report, TSA agreed with our 
findings and recommendations and has begun to establish the framework 
for a review process that will implement internal controls to more 
effectively govern the receipt and review of any future requests by air 
carriers to deploy LTL weapons on board their aircraft. 

Background: 

According to NIJ--the research, development, and evaluation agency 
within DOJ--less-than-lethal weapons, including electric stun devices, 
are designed to incapacitate, confuse, delay, or restrain an adversary 
in a variety of situations. Less-than-lethal weapons can be grouped 
into six general categories: electric stun, chemical, impact 
projectile, physical restraint, light, and acoustic. Preliminary 
reviews conducted by NIJ and TSL identified that of the six different 
less-than-lethal weapon categories, electric stun devices showed the 
most promise for use on board commercial aircraft. 

There are two types of electric stun devices that have potential use in 
commercial aircraft according to a May 2003 TSA report. The first is a 
handheld device with two probes that, when pressed against the skin or 
clothing of an attacker and activated by the operator, produces a high 
(50,000) voltage but low current discharge. When contact is made 
between the attacker and the activated device, a circuit is completed, 
and the subject receives a debilitating shock. The second type of 
electric stun device is technically referred to as an electro-muscular 
disruption device (EMDD). An EMDD fires two barbs connected to trailing 
wires that lead back to the operator. When the barbs penetrate the 
subject's skin or clothing, an electrical circuit is completed, and an 
electrical discharge, similar to the direct contact device discharge, 
automatically results causing an immediate loss of the person's 
neuromuscular control and the ability to perform coordinated action for 
the duration of the impulse. This barb type EMDD device, shown in 
figure 1, is similar to the type considered for use by air carriers and 
is hereafter referred to in this report as an electric stun device. 

Figure 1: Example of an Electro-Muscular Disruption Device (EMDD): 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

TSA may provide air carriers operating to, from, or within the United 
States with authorization to use less-than-lethal weapons, including 
electric stun devices, on board their aircraft subject to legal and 
regulatory considerations. For example, TSA must follow the 
requirements of 49 U.S.C. § 44903(i) before granting an air carrier 
request to arm members of the flight deck crew with electric stun 
devices.[Footnote 11] Similarly, air carriers that request permission 
to allow the use of such devices by persons other than flight deck crew 
(such as government law enforcement officers and flight attendants-- 
persons situated outside of the cockpit), as was the case with the 
foreign air carrier, must seek an amendment to its TSA-approved 
security program.[Footnote 12] In the case of a foreign air carrier, 
TSA may approve such an amendment if it finds that the security 
program, as amended, continues to provide a level of protection similar 
to the level provided by U.S. air carriers servicing the same 
airports.[Footnote 13] 

FAA also plays a collateral role in the determination of whether 
electric stun devices can be deployed on board commercial 
aircraft.[Footnote 14] FAA has the ultimate responsibility for ensuring 
the safe operation of aircraft within the United States.[Footnote 15] 
According to FAA officials, FAA certifies the airworthiness of all 
domestic aircraft before they are put into service and performs 
periodic safety inspections as part of FAA's safety oversight 
responsibilities. FAA's airworthiness certifications, however, would 
not address the use of electric stun devices because, according to FAA, 
such devices fall within the category of portable electronic devices 
that are not considered part of the aircraft itself. FAA's regulations 
generally require the operator of the aircraft to determine whether a 
portable electronic device will interfere with the safe operation of 
the aircraft before allowing its operation on board.[Footnote 16] 
Consequently, FAA does not formally approve the use of portable 
electronic devices and would not for electric stun devices.[Footnote 
17] According to FAA officials, if asked by an air carrier and 
resources permitting, the agency could render a technical opinion on 
the safety of such devices, but it is up to the air carrier to prove 
that the device will not interfere, disturb, interrupt, or cause 
catastrophic failure to the avionics of the aircraft. If FAA's review 
of the air carrier's testing indicates that these devices may have some 
adverse affect on aircraft avionics, FAA would bring it to the air 
carrier's attention. According to FAA officials, the FAA does not issue 
any documentation of approval or certification regarding the use of 
portable electronic devices on aircraft. In particular, FAA officials 
told us that it would not be appropriate for the agency to provide TSA 
written approval for the use of any type of portable electric devices, 
including less-than-lethal devices. Further, according to FAA 
officials, the agency has no specific safety standard for less-than- 
lethal devices. Officials added that for any electric stun devices 
actually deployed on commercial aircraft, FAA would consider any safety 
issues as part of its normal oversight inspections. 

Officials from each of the eight domestic air carriers we interviewed 
stated that after the terrorist attacks of September 2001, they 
reassessed their security procedures in an effort to upgrade their 
security posture. Among the security initiatives each air carrier 
considered, was arming pilots with electric stun devices. 
Representatives from the air carriers had mixed views on whether 
electric stun devices or firearms would be their preferred security 
measure within the cockpit. However, none of the domestic air carrier 
officials we interviewed said their airlines had considered having 
electric stun devices available for use by flight attendants in the 
cabin, primarily because they believed carrying these devices is 
incompatible with flight attendants' customer-service role. Shortly 
after the terrorist attacks of September 2001, two domestic air 
carriers sought TSA approval to allow flight-deck crews to use these 
devices. In addition, one foreign air carrier made two separate 
requests and ultimately received TSA approval in 2004 to deploy 
electric stun devices to government law enforcement officers and 
specially trained flight attendants situated in the passenger cabin of 
its aircraft. 

Domestic air carrier trade associations we interviewed generally 
favored the use of firearms over electric stun devices on the flight 
deck due to perceived vulnerabilities of the electric stun devices 
against multiple attackers as well as the temporary effect that the 
device may have. Similarly, the associations we interviewed expressed 
concerns about possible failures of the devices at critical times and 
simple countermeasures that could be used to limit their effectiveness. 
Since the establishment of additional security measures after the 
terrorist attacks of September 2001, such as an expanded Federal Air 
Marshal Service, hardened cockpit doors, 100 percent passenger and 
baggage screening, and particularly the voluntary arming of pilots 
through the FFDO program, air carrier interest in deploying electric 
stun devices to enhance security has diminished. Officials from some 
air carriers we spoke to stated that the high cost of deployment of 
electric stun devices as well as liability concerns, compared to the 
liability relief afforded through the FFDO program, made the use of 
electric stun devices relatively less attractive.[Footnote 18] 
According to the Association of European Airlines, it is its general 
position that the presence of weapons on board aircraft, be they lethal 
or nonlethal, be they on the flight deck or in the passenger cabin, 
should be prohibited. Similarly, the Association of Asian Pacific 
Airlines said its member airlines are generally adamant about not 
arming the cabin crew with any weapon on board an aircraft and are more 
in favor of ground-based security approaches. 

Existing Reviews and Studies Do Not Provide Definitive Evidence of the 
Safety and Security Effectiveness of Electric Stun Devices on board 
Commercial Aircraft: 

The federal government has conducted limited reviews addressing the 
effect of electric stun devices on individuals or aircraft avionics and 
on their security effectiveness, none of which was supported by 
empirical analysis or testing in an aircraft environment. Although 
various federal and other organizations have reviewed the health 
effects that electric stun devices have on individuals, studies have 
not been conducted in an in-flight environment. Moreover, according to 
an NIJ official, there is no independent research to indicate whether 
these electric stun devices would be either safe or unsafe regarding 
certain potentially susceptible populations. TSL and FAA each reviewed 
a study conducted by an air carrier regarding the effect of one model 
of electric stun device on aircraft avionics and concurred with its 
conclusion that the device tested would be unlikely to harm aircraft 
avionics. The TSL review cautioned, however, that the results for the 
one type of device tested do not necessarily reflect how other brands 
and models of electric stun devices may perform under similar 
circumstances. NIJ concluded that the use of these devices in 
accordance with appropriate policies and training may be an effective 
means for flight deck crews to thwart an attack. Similarly, in a report 
to Congress issued in May 2003, TSA generally concurred with NIJ's 
conclusion and further concluded that commercial aviation security may 
be enhanced through deployment of these devices. However, it concluded 
that electric stun devices should not be deployed in aircraft until 
extensive testing has been completed in realistic settings and on 
various types of aircraft. 

Federal and Other Organizations Have Reviewed Health Effects of 
Electric Stun Devices, but NIJ Officials Recommended More Study: 

Federal agencies and other organizations have conducted reviews 
addressing the health effects of electric stun devices on individuals. 
Moreover, according to an NIJ official, although electric stun devices 
have been used successfully many times to subdue suspects, including 
individuals who may fall into certain potentially susceptible 
populations, there is no independent research to indicate whether these 
electric stun devices would be either safe or unsafe. However, some 
susceptible populations such as the elderly and those who have a 
sustained history of alcohol and illicit drug use may be at greater 
risk for negative outcomes. NIJ recommended that study of these issues 
be conducted and has initiated several projects in this area. 

The Federal Government Has Conducted Limited Analysis on the Effects of 
Electric Stun Devices on Critical Aircraft Avionics: 

The federal government has conducted limited analysis to determine if 
electric stun devices would adversely affect aircraft avionics. In 
April 2002, FAA, in its role of ensuring the safe operation of 
aircraft, within the United States, reviewed test data submitted by a 
domestic air carrier, regarding one specific electric stun device and 
its potential effect on aircraft avionic systems.[Footnote 19] FAA 
officials told us that they did not publish any results of this 
preliminary review but did communicate to TSA that based on the air 
carriers' test results; it did not believe the particular device tested 
would have an adverse affect on aircraft avionics. FAA officials added 
that if electric stun devices were actually deployed on commercial 
aircraft, FAA would consider any safety issues as part of its normal 
oversight inspections. Similarly, TSL published a review of the same 
test data in September 2002. TSL's review focused on technical and 
airworthiness factors including potential levels of electromagnetic 
interference from discharging the electric stun device. Although FAA 
and TSL have not performed any in-flight testing of their own, both 
concurred with the conclusion of the air carrier study that the one 
type of 50,000 volt electric stun device tested would be unlikely to 
harm aircraft avionics. The TSL review cautioned, however, that the 
results for the one type of device tested do not necessarily reflect 
how other brands and models of electric stun devices may perform under 
similar circumstances. For example, according to the TSL review, it is 
likely that devices exceeding 100,000 volts would be unsuitable for use 
on aircraft. 

Federal Reviews Conclude Electric Stun Devices May Enhance Commercial 
Aviation Security, but Supporting Analysis Is Limited: 

In its April 2002 report, NIJ concluded that electric stun devices, 
used in accordance with appropriate policies and training, may have the 
potential to allow flight deck crews to thwart an attack while an 
aircraft is in flight--i.e. interrupt an attack, control an aggressor, 
or delay an attack while the flight crew safely lands the aircraft. 
However, the report did not include any empirical testing of electric 
stun devices in an aircraft setting to demonstrate how they would 
enhance security. Rather, information for its report was derived by 
reviewing existing information on electric stun devices as well as 
meeting with experts from the aviation industry and persons experienced 
in the design and use of less-than-lethal technology in settings other 
than aircraft. To determine whether electric stun devices have the 
potential to enhance aviation security, NIJ first identified certain 
desirable characteristics in less-than-lethal weapons given the 
environment that exists in an aircraft. Specifically, in commercial 
aircraft (1) sensitive critical flight instruments are in continual 
use; and (2) passenger and crew spaces are crowded and confined. 
According to NIJ, given this environment, less-than-lethal weapons that 
would be used to thwart attacks on board commercial aircraft should 
exhibit the following characteristics: 

* immediately incapacitate an aggressor; 

* have quickly reversible and controllable effects; 

* be usable in a confined space; 

* be simple to operate; 

* have multishot capability; and: 

* not damage critical avionics (navigational, etc.) 

Next, NIJ compared various categories of less-than-lethal weapons, 
including electric stun devices, against these criteria. It concluded 
that electric stun devices showed the most promise for use by flight 
deck crews. 

TSL, in a report issued in September 2002, concurred with NIJ's earlier 
findings and similarly concluded that less-than-lethal weapons may 
provide an additional layer of security and deterrence in the aviation 
environment. However, the report focused primarily on the effects on 
airworthiness and technical issues associated with electric stun 
devices. References in the TSL report regarding the security benefits 
associated with these weapons were based primarily on work previously 
conducted by NIJ. 

In a separate report to Congress issued in May 2003, TSA concluded that 
commercial aviation security could be enhanced through the deployment 
of electric stun devices. Although this report provided a conceptual 
framework for evaluating the suitability of different categories of 
less-than-lethal weapons for use in an aircraft environment, like the 
NIJ study, no weapons were tested against various threat scenarios 
including air piracy threats. TSA officials told us that this report 
was hurriedly put together to meet a congressional mandate and that it 
relied primarily on the earlier NIJ study and a review of other 
literature. When asked about their current position regarding the use 
of electric stun devices on board aircraft, TSA officials told us that 
empirical data and operational case studies, particularly in the 
aircraft environment, would be necessary to determine whether these 
devices can be deployed safely, effectively, and in a tactically 
reasonable manner. 

Similar to NIJ, TSA, to conduct its review, assessed the 
characteristics of various categories of less-than-lethal weapons-- 
including electric stun devices, chemical (conventional), chemical 
(sedative), impact projectile, physical restraint, light, and acoustic 
and malodorous weapons--against a predetermined set of criteria to 
determine their suitability for use in a commercial aircraft 
environment. These criteria covered the following aspects related to 
the devices: 

* currently used in law enforcement; 

* potential to cause collateral damage; 

* potential to cause catastrophic aircraft failure; 

* how quickly effects occur; 

* reversibility of effects; 

* potential for unintended consequences or other deployment concerns; 
and: 

* relative effectiveness to deter or defeat threats. 

After comparing each category of less-than-lethal weapon to the 
criteria, like NIJ, TSA concluded that only electric stun devices may 
be suitable for aircraft deployment. 

The National Institute of Justice Identified Areas for Further Research 
Regarding Electric Stun Devices: 

In its April 2002 report, NIJ concluded that each type of less-than- 
lethal weapon poses either safety or effectiveness issues that should 
be tested further in multiple aircraft settings before any deployment. 
It also concluded that systematic testing of the weapons' effects on 
critical aircraft avionics is essential to ensure they will not damage 
or disable flight systems. Further, the report noted that the most 
important unknown with these devices is the potential effect of a high- 
voltage electrical discharge on aircraft avionics. Therefore, NIJ 
concluded that electric stun devices should not be deployed in aircraft 
until extensive testing has been completed in realistic settings and on 
various types of aircraft. 

TSA Has Not Established Internal Controls to Help Ensure Uniform and 
Timely Review Regarding Requests for Use of Electric Stun Devices: 

TSA has not established processes and procedures for reviewing requests 
from air carriers to deploy electric stun devices on board their 
aircraft that include (1) well defined key areas of authority and 
responsibility, (2) clearly communicated information regarding decision-
making criteria to TSA decision makers and their external stakeholders, 
and (3) a records system to account for handling of requests and 
supporting documentation--three key internal controls called for by the 
Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government. TSA officials 
were not able to tell us specifically why these controls were not in 
place when prior applications were being reviewed. TSA officials stated 
that they currently do not plan to establish these controls because air 
carriers have not expressed an interest to TSA in deploying these 
devices since October 2004, and officials do not anticipate additional 
air carrier requests. 

A Lack of Well-Defined Areas of Responsibility Led to Air Carriers' 
Confusion Regarding the Status of Their Requests: 

TSA does not have a well-defined organizational area or individual with 
responsibility for receiving and reviewing requests from air carriers 
interested in requesting approval to deploy electric stun devices on 
board their aircraft to enhance security. Internal control standards in 
the federal government state that to have an effective control 
environment it is important for agencies to clearly define key areas of 
authority and responsibility. Officials from all three air carriers 
that had submitted requests to TSA to deploy electric stun devices on 
board commercial aircraft told us that they had experienced confusion 
regarding the status and disposition of their requests and were unaware 
to whom they should have directed inquiries. For example, an official 
from one domestic air carrier stated that it was in contact with 
multiple TSA personnel but were not sure which individual was in charge 
of reviewing electric stun device requests or whether the information 
it received from TSA was accurate and authoritative. We also noted 
during our review of TSA documentation that in at least one instance, a 
TSA official requested information from an air carrier that had 
previously been received by the agency. 

As the National Strategy for Homeland Security indicates and as we have 
reported in previous work, securing the nation requires effective 
partnerships with the private sector.[Footnote 20] Air carriers that 
seek to enhance security measures on board their aircraft offer an 
opportunity for such partnership. However, without a clearly defined 
organizational area or individual within TSA to review requests and 
communicate effectively with the requesting air carrier officials, TSA 
cannot be a responsive and effective partner. 

According to TSA officials, there is currently no organizational area 
or individual responsible for receipt or review of requests from air 
carriers that may wish to deploy electric stun devices on board their 
aircraft because of the lack of demonstrated interest from air 
carriers. 

TSA Has Not Established and Clearly Communicated Formal Criteria or 
Guidelines for Decision Making to Internal or External Stakeholders: 

TSA has not established and communicated a formalized set of criteria 
to evaluate air carriers' requests to deploy electric stun devices as a 
security measure on board their aircraft. Internal control standards in 
the federal government state that for a federal agency or private 
sector entity to run and control its operations effectively, it must 
have relevant, reliable, and timely communications relating to internal 
as well as external events. Although TSA received requests from three 
air carriers to deploy these devices, it did not have criteria 
established within the agency and communicated to air carriers that 
would (1) help ensure uniform decision making and (2) make requirements 
for approval clear to all parties. 

The lack of established and well-communicated criteria resulted in 
inefficient handling of requests that made the process more difficult 
for the air carriers. In particular, TSA made multiple requests for 
nearly a year and a half for information from the two domestic air 
carriers that requested permission to deploy electric stun devices, 
without clearly communicating what would be required for approving 
their requests or clearly explaining why additional information was 
being requested. Ultimately, one domestic air carrier withdrew its 
request to use electric stun devices in June 2003, primarily citing 
confusion over TSA's protracted approval process. The other domestic 
air carrier that had requested permission to deploy the devices did not 
formally withdraw its request, but also made the decision in June 2003 
not to further pursue the initiative. One of these air carriers also 
cited mitigating security measures such as the FFDO program and 
reinforced cockpit doors that had been implemented as an additional 
reason why it did not continue pursuing the deployment of electric stun 
devices and also the additional costs of implementing a less-than- 
lethal weapons program. 

In its May 2003 report to Congress, TSA proposed a number of key 
criteria for evaluating requests from air carriers to deploy less-than- 
lethal devices on board their aircraft. Among these criteria was the 
need for (1) an appropriate training regimen, (2) procedures of use, 
and (3) assurance from the air carriers that the devices would provide 
passenger safety. However, these criteria were not formally established 
for use by TSA decision makers when evaluating air carrier requests nor 
communicated to air carriers interested in requesting permission to use 
these devices. We have included a list of these proposed criteria in 
appendix I of this report. In addition to making the request process 
consistent and clear, establishing criteria can help the agency ensure 
that any approvals for the use of electric stun devices on board 
commercial aircraft are compatible with TSA's mission to ensure the 
security of the nation's transportation system and the traveling 
public. For example, in the case of criteria governing training, we 
have previously reported that any civilian electric-stun-device 
training curriculum should have a very explicit use-of-force policy. 
Unlike police officers, civilians are not generally experienced in 
deciding whether the use of force is justified and, if so, to what 
extent. Therefore, it should be the goal of any training curricula for 
persons authorized to utilize electric stun devices, such as aircraft 
flight deck or cabin crew members, to involve as many scenarios as 
possible so that the trainee understands what level of force is 
appropriate.[Footnote 21] 

Although TSA has no supporting documentation of having applied the 
criteria proposed in its 2003 report to requests submitted by 
commercial air carriers, according to agency officials, TSA took into 
account these considerations when ultimately approving the foreign air 
carrier request in December 2004. TSA officials further told us that 
any additional requests would be evaluated on a case-by-case basis 
using similar considerations. However, without establishing and clearly 
communicating criteria and information needs both internally and 
externally, TSA cannot have reasonable assurance that its decision 
making will be uniform, consistent, compatible with its mission and 
clear and transparent for air carriers seeking approval to deploy these 
devices. TSA officials stated that they still consider the criteria 
contained in the May 2003 report to the Congress appropriate and 
current for use in handling any requests by air carriers to implement a 
less-than-lethal weapons program. 

TSA officials said that they could not fully explain the delays in 
addressing the early requests from the air carriers because the persons 
involved with the initial request reviews are no longer with the 
agency. Officials stated that at the time of the initial requests, 
there was a high rate of turnover and a rapid rate of change associated 
with the formation of TSA as a new agency. Officials further stated 
that the agency was not fully ready to address requests to deploy 
electric stun devices before the time the foreign air carrier request 
was reviewed in 2004. Even at that point, TSA officials said that they 
planned to review each application that was received on a case-by-case 
basis since they did not expect a high demand from air carriers to 
deploy these devices. According to TSA officials, since 2004, no other 
carriers have expressed an interest in electric stun devices as a 
security measure. TSA officials told us that because of this lack of 
interest, no program requirements or criteria were ever formalized 
regarding the use of electric stun devices on commercial aircraft; 
however, if future requests are received, TSA would take steps to 
formalize these criteria into specific guidelines for the application 
review process. 

We asked TSA officials how they planned to address any potential future 
requests from air carriers to deploy less-than-lethal weapons including 
electric stun devices on board their aircraft. They stated that the TSA 
Transportation Sector Network Management (TSNM) Airlines office would 
take the lead for any requests from domestic air carriers. For foreign 
air carriers, TSNM's International Division will take the lead. 
Further, a working evaluation group, consisting of the Federal Air 
Marshal Service, Office of Chief Counsel, and other program offices at 
the discretion of the administrator will be involved in the review 
process. According to TSA, this group will provide their respective 
expertise and recommendations to the lead office. Each lead office will 
be responsible for resolving differences, keeping diligent records of 
the review process, the ultimate approval or disapproval decision, and 
responding to the requesting air carriers in a timely manner. 

TSA Has Not Maintained Documentation of Its Activities and Key 
Decisions Related to Electric Stun Device Requests: 

For the three requests submitted, TSA did not record (1) the rationale 
for and outcome of its decision making regarding requests to deploy 
electric stun devices or (2) the information and documentation 
exchanged between the agency and air carriers. According to the 
Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, agency 
activities should be promptly recorded to maintain their relevance and 
value to management in controlling operations and making decisions. 
This applies to the entire process, from initiation and authorization 
through final classification. Moreover, to help ensure accountability 
and internal oversight, this documentation should be readily available 
for examination by TSA management, Congress, and other appropriate 
external parties. Although, in its 2003 report to Congress, TSA stated 
that its Office of Aviation Operations would maintain a system of 
records for requests to deploy electric stun devices, few records were 
kept. Agency officials told us that they maintained only limited 
documentation regarding the foreign air carrier's request and 
maintained no documentation regarding the receipt and review of request 
materials submitted by the two domestic air carriers. Without a system 
of documentation, TSA management will not be able to review decisions 
to help ensure consistency and responsiveness to air carriers making 
requests, nor will TSA be able to readily make documentation available 
for examination by Congress and other appropriate external parties. As 
we noted above, TSA told us that, in the future, it plans to keep 
diligent records of the review process and ultimate approval or 
disapproval decisions for all requests from air carriers. 

Conclusions: 

Due primarily to other enhancements in aviation security since 2001, 
there appears to be no demonstrated interest on the part of air 
carriers to introduce less-than-lethal weapons, including electric stun 
devices, on their aircraft. However, should interest in such measures 
resume, federal government reviews to date have identified areas in 
need of further study before these devices are deployed on board 
commercial aircraft. In particular, it would be important for TSA to 
know the appropriateness of the devices in an aircraft environment, 
effects on the safe operation of the aircraft, effects on passenger 
safety, and how such devices would enhance security. 

Also, should interest in using less-than-lethal devices on aircraft 
resume, TSA would not be in the best position to address new requests 
in an efficient and effective manner. Without internal controls to 
govern its process for receiving and reviewing requests from air 
carriers, TSA would lack assurance that its decision making is 
appropriate and necessary and serves the public interest. Specifically, 
without a well-defined organizational area or individual with 
responsibility for receiving and reviewing requests, TSA cannot be a 
responsive and effective partner with private sector air carriers. In 
addition, it will not be able to provide a clear and transparent 
request process for air carriers. Without established and clearly 
communicated information regarding decision-making criteria, within TSA 
and for its external stakeholders, TSA lacks reasonable assurance that 
its decision making will be uniform, consistent, and compatible with 
its mission. Although TSA outlined criteria in a 2003 Report to 
Congress for use in examining requests from air carriers, the agency 
never formalized any criteria for use by decision makers, nor did it 
communicate clear criteria to air carriers making requests for 
approval. Finally, without documentation of key activities and 
decisions related to less-than-lethal device requests, TSA cannot 
ensure accountability in handling such requests and the availability of 
documentation for examination by Congress and other external parties. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

In order to help ensure TSA's review and approval process for the use 
of any less-than-lethal weapons, including electric stun devices, is 
responsive, uniform, accountable, consistently applied and serves the 
public interest, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security 
direct the Assistant Secretary, Transportation Security Administration, 
to take the following two actions, should commercial air carrier 
interest in deploying these devices resume: 

* Ensure that there is sufficiently reliable research supporting the 
use of less-than-lethal devices being requested that, at a minimum, 
address the appropriateness of their usage in the unique aircraft 
environment, including passenger safety, how the use of these devices 
would enhance security, and the effects of these devices on the safe 
operation of the aircraft. 

* Establish appropriate internal controls to govern air carriers' 
requests to deploy less-than-lethal weapons including electric stun 
devices on board their aircraft, including (1) clearly defining the 
organizational area or individual within TSA with the authority and 
responsibility for receiving and reviewing requests; (2) establishing a 
records system to help ensure accountability; and (3) formalizing and 
clearly communicating criteria for approving requests both within the 
responsible area of TSA and to interested air carriers. 

Agency Comments: 

We requested comments on a draft of this report from DHS, FAA and NIJ. 
FAA and NIJ provided technical comments, which have been incorporated 
in this report where appropriate. We received written comments from DHS 
on May 5, 2006. DHS agreed with our report and recommendations stating 
that our findings and recommendations will aid in the development of a 
more effective and efficient review process if interest by air carriers 
in less-than-lethal (LTL) weapons resumes at a future date. According 
to DHS, since our review, TSA has begun to establish the framework for 
a review process if additional applications for LTL weapons are 
received. For future LTL weapons applications, the Transportation 
Sector Network Management (TSNM) Airlines Division or the TSNM 
International Division will take the lead for domestic and 
international applications respectively. An evaluation working group, 
consisting of the Federal Air Marshal Service, Office of Chief Counsel, 
and other program offices, at the discretion of the administrator, will 
be involved in the review process. This group will provide their 
respective expertise and recommendations, with the lead office 
responsible for ensuring progress, resolving differences, and keeping 
diligent records of the review and ultimate approval or disapproval. 
The full text of DHS's comments is included as appendix II. 

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce its contents 
earlier, we plan no further distribution of this report until 18 days 
from the date of this report. At that time, we will send copies of this 
report to the Secretary of Homeland Security; the Director, Office 
Management and Budget; and any other interested parties. We will also 
make copies available to others upon request. In addition, the report 
will be available at no charge on GAO's Web site at [Hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you have any questions about this report or wish to discuss it 
further, please contact me at (202) 512-8777 or at berrickc@gao.gov. 
Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public 
Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. See appendix III 
for a list of major contributors to this report. 

Sincerely yours, 

Signed by: 

Cathleen A. Berrick: 
Director, Homeland Security and Justice: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: TSA's Proposed List of Criteria for Evaluating Less-than- 
Lethal Weapons requests: 

* Separate requests--There must be a separate request (application) for 
each type of LTL device that is proposed for use. 

* Method of deployment must be articulated--Where and how will the LTL 
device be transported, utilized, and stored aboard aircraft. 

* Aircrew selection--What are the air carrier's procedures to ensure 
that an unqualified crew member does not obtain access to the LTL 
devices? This would include crew members identified in need of anger 
management assistance. 

* Well-documented incoming information--Incoming correspondence must be 
well documented and articulate clearly why a device that is being 
submitted for approval. The information contained must, at the very 
least, provide evidence that the product is known to the industry, with 
viable and recent studies and research supporting its use in the 
aircraft environment and that the product meets safety standards set by 
the Federal Aviation Administration. 

* Threshold of protection--The correspondence must contain language 
that enumerates how an LTL device meets the threshold of protection for 
the cockpit, aircraft and passenger safety. It must include any 
completed studies on LTL devices and their use in the cockpit and cabin 
of the aircraft, the appropriateness for their usage in this unique 
environment and how it would not produce catastrophic failure of the 
aircraft. 

* Enumerate procedures--The air carrier must clearly state its policy 
and the procedures it will employ, including legal considerations and 
similar issues. The air carrier would articulate the escalation/de- 
escalation for the use of force (Common Strategy and DOJ Use of Force 
Policy). This could include awareness of problem, deterrence, 
avoidance, verbalization, empty hand control, intermediate device (LTL 
device) and any other self-defense techniques. 

* Procedures for the LTL device--The procedures for the use of an LTL 
device must accompany any written request explaining the process for 
use of a product. Details of procedures to ensure that any LTL device 
is not deployed on aircraft destined for international venues must be 
included. 

* Training regimen--The air carrier must be able to articulate its 
training regimen and the manner in which pilots and/or flight 
attendants have been educated and trained on the requested device to be 
used and re-certification protocols. TSA's Office of Training and 
Quality Performance will review any proposal, make recommendations, and 
in conjunction with Office of Aviation Operations, approve training 
manuals and processes associated with initial and re-certification 
training as a part of the carrier's request to employ LTL devices. 

* Provide documented evidence--The requesting air carrier must provide 
documentary evidence, including testimony about the devices by subject 
matter experts. These should be attached to the carrier's proposal. 

* Provide documentation of FAA approval--A letter from the FAA 
approving the use of an less-than-lethal device based on its meeting 
safety standards imposed by the FAA demonstrating that the device will 
not interfere, disturb, interrupt, or cause catastrophic failure to the 
avionics of the aircraft. 

(Foregoing is TSA text.) 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security: 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security: 
Washington, DC 20528: 

Homeland Security: 

May 8, 2006: 

Ms. Cathleen A. Berrick: 
Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, NW Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Ms. Berrick: 

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on draft report GAO-06-475, 
Aviation Security: Further Study of Safety and Effectiveness and Better 
Management Controls Needed If Air Carriers Resume Interest in Deploying 
Less-than-Lethal Weapons. Technical comments have been provided under 
separate cover. 

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) concurs with the 
recommendations and appreciates the time and resources that the 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) has devoted to this important 
review. The recommendations and findings of this report will aid in the 
development of a more effective and efficient review process if 
interest by air carriers in Less-than-Lethal (LTL) weapons regenerates 
at a future date. 

Since GAO's review, TSA has begun to establish the framework for a 
review process if additional applications for LTL weapons are received. 
For future LTL weapons applications, Transportation Security 
Administration's (TSA's) Office of Transportation Sector Network 
Management (TSNM) Airlines Division or the TSNM International Division 
will take the lead for domestic and international applications, 
respectively. An evaluation working group, consisting of the Federal 
Air Marshal Service, Office of Chief Counsel, and other program 
offices, at the discretion of the Assistant Secretary, will be involved 
in the review process. This group will provide their respective 
expertise and recommendations, with the lead office responsible for 
ensuring progress to meet the congressionally required 90-day response 
time, resolving differences, and keeping diligent records of the review 
and ultimate approval/disapproval. 

For the past application, TSA used the ten guidelines listed on pages 
22-23 of the Report to Congress on Less-than-Lethal Weapons dated May 
25, 2003. These guidelines are still appropriate and current. Were 
future LTL weapons applications to be received, TSA would take steps to 
formalize these guidelines into specific criteria for the LTL weapons 
application review process. 

As you are well aware, TSA currently has no applications from any air 
carrier, domestic or foreign, for an LTL weapons program. With recent 
organizational changes across the agency, TSA is now better prepared to 
work with its industry stakeholders and to utilize the GAO 
recommendations to more efficiently respond to and document any future 
LTL weapons program requests. TSA appreciates these findings, and will 
stand ready to implement them if air carriers resume interest in LTL 
weapons programs at a future date. 

With regard to the draft report's specific recommendations, we submit 
the following: 

Should commercial air carrier interest in deploying these devices 
resume, we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the 
Assistant Secretary, Transportation Security Administration to take the 
following two actions: 

Recommendation 1: Ensure that there is sufficiently reliable research 
supporting the use of less-than-lethal devices being requested that, at 
a minimum, address the appropriateness of their usage in the unique 
aircraft environment, including passenger safety, how the use of these 
devices would enhance security, and the effects of these devices on the 
safe operation of the aircraft. 

TSA Concurs. TSA agrees that sufficient reliable research supporting 
the use of less-than-lethal devices should be conducted. TSA is not 
responsible for certification of aircraft and aircraft systems. Future 
Less-than-Lethal (LTL) weapon applications would have to include 
appropriate documentation, research, etc., to support the air carrier's 
request and to demonstrate that the weapon would not have an adverse 
impact on the aircraft or aircraft systems. TSA will formally request 
the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) expert analysis and 
conclusions on any possible effects of LTL weapons or any other weapons 
deemed intrinsically dangerous, (specific weapons on the specific types 
of aircraft operated by the applicant carrier), and will approve or 
disapprove an application accordingly to ensure the safety and security 
of airline passengers. 

Recommendation 2: Establish appropriate internal controls to govern 
receipt and review of air carrier requests, including: (1) clearly 
defining the organizational area or individual within TSA with the 
authority and responsibility for; (2) establishing a records system to 
help ensure accountability; and (3) formalizing and clearly 
communicating criteria for approving requests to employ less-than- 
lethal weapons including electric stun devices both within the 
responsible area of TSA and to interested air carriers. 

TSA Concurs. For future LTL applications, TSA's Office of 
Transportation Sector Network Management (TSNM) Airlines Division or 
the TSNM International Division will take the lead for domestic and 
international applications, respectively. An evaluation working group, 
consisting of the Federal Air Marshal Service, Office of Chief Counsel, 
and other program offices, at the discretion of the Assistant 
Secretary, will be involved in the review process. This group will 
provide their respective expertise and recommendations, with the lead 
office responsible for ensuring progress to meet the congressionally 
required 90-day response time, resolving differences, and keeping 
diligent records of the review and ultimate approval/ disapproval. 

For the past application, TSA used the ten guidelines listed on pages 
22-23 of the Report to Congress on Less-than-Lethal Weapons dated May 
25, 2003. These guidelines are still appropriate and current. Were 
future LTL weapons applications to be received, TSA would take steps to 
formalize these guidelines into specific criteria for the LTL weapons 
application review process. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to comment on this draft report and 
we look forward to working with you on future homeland security issues. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Steven J. Pecinovsky: 
Director, Departmental GAO/OIG Liaison Office: 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Cathleen A. Berrick (202) 512-8777: 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

The following teams and individuals contributed to this report: William 
W. Crocker III, Assistant Director; Robert J. Rivas, J. Michael 
Bollinger, John P. Stradling, and Kathryn E. Godfrey, Homeland Security 
and Justice; David P. Alexander, Applied Research & Methodology; and 
Thomas F. Lombardi, Office of General Counsel: 

FOOTNOTES 

[1] Less-than-lethal weapons have been developed to provide law 
enforcement, corrections, and military personnel with an alternative to 
lethal force. Weapons of this type include, among others, chemical, 
electromuscular inhibitor devices (more commonly known as electric stun 
devices), and impact projectiles. They are designed to temporarily 
incapacitate, confuse, delay, and restrain an adversary in a variety of 
situations. Less-than-lethal weapons are most often used when, (1) 
lethal force is not appropriate; (2) lethal force is justified but less 
force may subdue an aggressor; or (3) lethal force is justified but its 
use could cause collateral effects, such as injury to bystanders or 
life threatening damage to property and environment. By comparing the 
environment on board an aircraft with the attributes of various less- 
than-lethal weapons, the National Institute of Justice and TSA 
concluded that electric stun devices showed the most promise and were 
the only acceptable less-than-lethal weapon for use on commercial 
aircraft. Therefore, this report focuses on the use of electric stun 
devices. 

[2] See, e.g., Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Pub. L. No. 
107-71, § 126(b), 115 Stat. 597, 632 (2001) (codified as amended at 49 
U.S.C. § 44903(i)). See also, e.g., 49 C.F.R. Pt. 1546. 

[3] The foreign air carrier initially requested to deploy these devices 
on international flights to the U.S. in March 2002. It subsequently 
renewed its request in May 2004. Obtaining TSA authorization to deploy 
such devices required the foreign air carrier to amend, and TSA to 
approve, its security program. See 49 C.F.R. § 1546.105. 

[4] The Federal Air Marshal Service consists of trained and armed civil 
aviation security specialists that are deployed on board aircraft to 
protect passengers, crew, and aircraft from terrorist activities on 
both domestic and international fights. 

[5] Commercial pilots who volunteer to participate in the Federal 
Flight Deck Officers Program are trained and equipped with firearms to 
protect the aircraft cockpit. The pilots are deputized as federal 
flight deck officers. See 49 U.S.C. § 44921. 

[6] The Transportation Security Laboratory was within the 
Transportation Security Administration until October 2005 when it was 
transferred to the Science and Technology Directorate of the Department 
of Homeland Security. 

[7] GAO, Internal Control: Standards for Internal Control in the 
Federal Government, GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1 (Washington, D.C.: November 
1999). 

[8] Nonprobability sampling is a method of sampling where observations 
are selected in a manner that is not completely random, usually using 
specific characteristics of the population as criteria. Results from 
nonprobability samples cannot be used to make inferences about a 
population because in a nonprobability sample some elements of the 
population being studied have no chance or an unknown chance of being 
selected as part of the sample. 

[9] The domestic trade associations were the Air Line Pilots 
Association, Air Transport Association, Association of Flight 
Attendants, Coalition of Airline Pilots Associations, and Regional 
Airline Association. The foreign airline associations we contacted were 
Association of European Airlines and the Association of Asian Pacific 
Airlines. 

[10] Section 126(a) of Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA) 
required the National Institute of Justice to assess the range of less- 
than-lethal weaponry available for use by a flight deck crew member to 
temporarily incapacitate an individual who presents a clear and present 
danger to the safety of the aircraft, its passengers, or individuals on 
the ground and report its findings and recommendations to the Secretary 
of Transportation within 90 days after the date of enactment of the 
act. See National Institute of Justice, Less-than-lethal Weaponry for 
Aircraft Security (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 19, 2002). 

[11] Pursuant to 49 U.S.C. § 44903(i), TSA may authorize members of a 
flight deck crew to carry less-than-lethal weapons if, in accordance 
with recommendations of the NIJ, it determines, with approval of the 
Attorney General and Secretary of State, that deploying such weapons is 
appropriate, necessary, and would effectively serve the public interest 
in avoiding air piracy. Upon granting such authority TSA must prescribe 
rules for training such crew members in the proper use of the weapons 
and guidelines setting forth circumstances under which the weapons may 
be used. 

[12] For example, the foreign air carrier sought to amend its TSA- 
approved security program to allow for the use of electric stun devices 
by armed law enforcement officers and specially trained flight 
attendants in accordance with 49 C.F.R. § 1546.105. 

[13] See 49 C.F.R. § 1546.103(a)(1) (providing that a foreign air 
carrier security program is only acceptable to TSA if it provides 
passengers a similar level of protection); but see 49 U.S.C. § 44906 
(requiring that the foreign air carrier security program adhere to 
identical measures (emphasis added)). 

[14] For example, 49 U.S.C. § 114(f) (13) imposes upon TSA a duty to 
work in conjunction with FAA regarding any actions or activities that 
may affect aviation safety or air carrier operations. In addition, § 
114(l)(4) prohibits TSA from taking an aviation security action if the 
FAA Administrator notifies TSA that the action could adversely affect 
the airworthiness of an aircraft. TSA may then only proceed with such 
action if the Secretary of Transportation subsequently approves the 
action. 

[15] FAA is responsible for ensuring the safe flight of domestic air 
carriers, but also has responsibilities, though more limited in scope, 
for the safety of foreign air carriers operating to, from, or within 
the United States. See, e.g., 14 C.F.R. pt. 129.

[16] See, e.g., 14 C.F.R. § 91.21 (governing the use of portable 
electronic devices on board aircraft). FAA regulations do not require 
air carriers to submit findings to FAA or obtain the agency's approval 
before authorizing the use of a portable electronic device on board the 
aircraft. 

[17] Regardless, air carriers must obtain TSA authorization before 
deploying or allowing electric stun devices on board aircraft flying 
to, from, or within the U.S. See, e.g., 49 C.F.R. § 1544.201(d). 

[18] 49 U.S.C. § 44921(h) provides liability protections to air 
carriers and FFDO's from liability arising out of an FFDO's use or 
failure to use a firearm. 

[19] The domestic air carrier tested one model of electric stun device 
in a number of aircraft models within its fleet and on the ground. 

[20] GAO, Homeland Security: Agency Plans, Implementation, and 
Challenges Regarding the National Strategy for Homeland Security, GAO-
05-33 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 14, 2005). 

[21] GAO, Taser Weapons: Use of Tasers by Selected Law Enforcement 
Agencies, GAO-05-464 (Washington, D.C.: May 26, 2005). For example, 
pursuant to any authorization granted by TSA for an air carrier's 
flight deck crew members to carry a less-than-lethal weapon under § 
44903(i), TSA must prescribe rules requiring that any such crew member 
be trained in the proper use of the weapon and guidelines setting forth 
the circumstances under which such weapons may be used. 

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