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entitled 'Combating Nuclear Terrorism: Federal Efforts to Respond to 
Nuclear and Radiological Threats and to Protect Emergency Response 
Capabilities Could Be Strengthened' which was released on September 21, 
2006. 

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Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging 
Threats and International Relations, Committee on Government Reform, 
House of Representatives: 

September 2006: 

Combating Nuclear Terrorism: 

Federal Efforts to Respond to Nuclear and Radiological Threats and to 
Protect Emergency Response Capabilities Could Be Strengthened: 

GAO-06-1015: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-06-1015, a report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on 
National Security, Emerging Threats and International Relations, 
Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

The Department of Energy (DOE) maintains an emergency response 
capability to quickly respond to potential nuclear and radiological 
threats in the United States. This capability has taken on increased 
significance after the attacks of September 11, 2001, because there is 
heightened concern that terrorists may try to detonate a nuclear or 
radiological device in a major U.S. city. This report discusses (1) the 
capabilities and assets DOE has to prevent and respond to potential 
nuclear and radiological attacks in the United States, (2) the physical 
security measures in place at DOE’s two key emergency response 
facilities and whether they are consistent with DOE guidance, and (3) 
the benefits of using DOE’s aerial background radiation surveys to 
enhance emergency response capabilities. 

What GAO Found: 

DOE has unique capabilities and assets to prevent and respond to a 
nuclear or radiological attack in the United States. These include 
specialized teams to search for, locate, and deactivate nuclear or 
radiological devices and to help manage the consequences of a nuclear 
or radiological attack. These capabilities are primarily found at DOE’s 
two key emergency response facilities—the Remote Sensing Laboratories 
at Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada, and Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland. 

DOE’s two Remote Sensing Laboratories are protected at the lowest level 
of physical security allowed by DOE guidance because, according to DOE, 
capabilities and assets to prevent and respond to nuclear and 
radiological emergencies have been dispersed across the country and are 
not concentrated at the laboratories. However, we found a number of 
critical capabilities and assets that exist only at the Remote Sensing 
Laboratories and whose loss would significantly hamper DOE’s ability to 
quickly prevent and respond to a nuclear or radiological emergency. 
These capabilities include the most highly trained teams for minimizing 
the consequences of a nuclear or radiological attack and the only 
helicopters and planes that can readily help locate nuclear or 
radiological devices or measure contamination levels after a 
radiological attack. Because these capabilities and assets have not 
been fully dispersed, current physical security measures may not be 
sufficient for protecting the facilities against a terrorist attack. 

There are significant benefits to conducting aerial background 
radiation surveys of U.S. cities. Specifically, the surveys can be used 
to compare changes in radiation levels to (1) help detect radiological 
threats in U.S. cities more quickly and (2) measure contamination 
levels after a radiological attack to assist in and reduce the costs of 
cleanup efforts. Despite the benefits, only one major city has been 
surveyed. Neither DOE nor DHS has mission responsibility for conducting 
these surveys, and there are no plans to conduct additional surveys. 

Figure: DOE Helicopter Conducting an Aerial Background Radiation 
Survey: 

[See PDF for Image] 

Source: DOE. 

[End of Figure] 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends, among other things, that (1) DOE review the physical 
security measures at its two key emergency response facilities to 
determine whether additional measures should be taken to protect the 
facilities and (2) DOE and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
evaluate the costs, benefits, and limitations of making greater use of 
aerial background radiation surveys of U.S. cities. DHS agreed and DOE 
neither agreed nor disagreed with our recommendations. DOE raised 
concerns about our finding on security measures. 

[Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-1015]. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
the link above. For more information, contact Gene Aloise at (202) 512-
3841 or aloisee@gao.gov. 

[End of Section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Results in Brief: 

Background: 

DOE Has Unique Capabilities and Assets to Prevent and Respond to a 
Nuclear or Radiological Attack in the United States: 

DOE's Current Physical Security Measures May Not Be Sufficient to 
Protect Its Key Emergency Response Facilities: 

Despite the Benefits of Conducting Aerial Background Radiation Surveys, 
They Remain Underutilized Because Neither DOE Nor DHS Has Mission 
Responsibility for Funding and Conducting Them: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendixes: 

Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Energy: 

Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Table : 

Table 1: DOE Capabilities and Assets to Prevent and Respond to a 
Nuclear or Radiological Attack: 

Figure: 

Figure 1: Illustration of a Helicopter Conducting an Aerial Background 
Radiation Survey: 

Abbreviations: 

AEC: Atomic Energy Commission: 

DHS: Department of Homeland Security: 

DNDO: Domestic Nuclear Detection Office: 

DOE: Department of Energy: 

FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation: 

NEST: Nuclear Emergency Search Team: 

NNSA: National Nuclear Security Administration : 

NYPD: New York City Police Department : 

RAP: Radiological Assistance Program : 

September 21, 2006: 

The Honorable Christopher Shays: 
Chairman: 
Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats and International 
Relations: 
Committee on Government Reform: 
House of Representatives: 

Dear Mr. Chairman: 

The Department of Energy (DOE) has maintained an emergency response 
capability to quickly respond to potential nuclear and radiological 
threats in the United States. This capability has taken on increased 
significance after the attacks of September 11, 2001, because there is 
heightened concern that terrorists may try to smuggle nuclear or 
radiological materials into the United States and detonate a nuclear or 
a radiological dispersal device, otherwise known as a dirty bomb, in a 
major U.S. city. Detonating either type of device would have serious 
consequences for our national and economic interests, including 
potentially causing numerous deaths and undermining citizens' 
confidence in the government's ability to protect the homeland. 

To respond to such threats, DOE has developed the technical expertise 
to search for and locate potential nuclear and radiological threats in 
U.S. cities and also to help minimize the consequences of a 
radiological incident by, among other things, measuring the extent of 
contamination. After September 11, 2001, DOE began dispersing its 
emergency response capabilities across the country. However, a number 
of critical capabilities and assets are primarily concentrated at two 
key facilities, known as Remote Sensing Laboratories, located at Nellis 
Air Force Base, Nevada, and Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland. These two 
facilities house, among other things, specialized search teams that 
locate and identify nuclear and radiological devices; planes and 
helicopters used to measure contamination; and research and development 
laboratories that design specialized equipment. DOE requires that these 
facilities be adequately protected with security measures to defend 
against potential terrorist attacks.[Footnote 1] 

One of DOE's unique capabilities is the ability to conduct aerial 
background radiation surveys. These surveys are conducted by using 
helicopters or planes equipped with radiation detectors to fly over an 
area and collect information on existing background radiation sources, 
such as granite statues in a city or medical isotopes located at 
hospitals. This can help DOE establish baseline radiation levels 
against which future radiation levels can be compared in order to more 
easily detect new radiation sources that may pose a security or public 
health threat. 

DOE is not the only federal agency responsible for detecting nuclear 
and radiological materials. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
has a Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) that is responsible for 
developing, testing, and deploying radiation detection equipment to 
detect and prevent the smuggling of nuclear and radiological materials 
at U.S. points of entry, such as seaports and border crossings. DNDO is 
also responsible for helping state and local governments improve their 
capability to detect and identify illicit nuclear and radiological 
materials. If DHS cannot prevent the smuggling of nuclear or 
radiological materials into the United States, it relies on DOE's 
emergency response capabilities to search for and locate the materials. 

In this context, this report discusses (1) the capabilities and assets 
DOE has to prevent and respond to potential nuclear and radiological 
attacks in the United States, (2) the physical security measures in 
place at DOE's two key emergency response facilities and whether they 
are consistent with DOE guidance, and (3) the benefits of using DOE's 
aerial background radiation surveys to enhance emergency response 
capabilities. 

To address these objectives, we collected and analyzed documentation 
related to DOE's emergency response capabilities and assets and the 
physical security guidelines and plans for its two key emergency 
response facilities. We interviewed officials from DOE's Office of 
Emergency Response and the Office of Independent Oversight. We also 
interviewed program managers and security officials from the Remote 
Sensing Laboratories at Nellis and Andrews Air Force Bases, and we 
received a tour of these facilities to view the physical security 
measures and obtain a demonstration of their radiation detection 
equipment. In addition, we analyzed documents and interviewed officials 
from DOE's national laboratories at Brookhaven (in New York), Sandia 
(in New Mexico), and Savannah River (in South Carolina), where 
emergency response assets have been dispersed. To obtain information on 
aerial surveys, we analyzed documents and interviewed officials from 
the Counter Terrorism Bureau of the New York City Police Department who 
requested an aerial background radiation survey of New York City. We 
also collected documentation and interviewed officials from DHS's 
Domestic Nuclear Detection Office and Office of Grants and Training to 
obtain information on DHS's role in conducting and funding aerial 
background radiation surveys. We conducted our work from January to 
August 2006 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 
standards. 

Results in Brief: 

DOE has unique capabilities and assets to prevent and respond to a 
nuclear or radiological attack in the United States. These include 
specialized teams to search for, locate, and deactivate nuclear or 
radiological devices and to help minimize the consequences of a nuclear 
or radiological attack. These capabilities are primarily found at DOE's 
two key emergency response facilities--the Remote Sensing Laboratories 
at Nellis Air Force Base, Nevada, and Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland. 
DOE also draws upon the technical expertise of scientists, engineers, 
and technicians from the national laboratories, including Los Alamos, 
Sandia, and Lawrence Livermore. To prevent an attack, search teams use 
a variety of clandestine and discreet methods, including the use of 
radiation sensors carried in backpacks and mounted on vehicles and 
helicopters, to detect and locate radiological sources. In fiscal year 
2005, DOE conducted about 30 search missions to address potential 
radiological threats or to assist local and state officials in 
monitoring large public events such as the Super Bowl and the State of 
the Union address. DOE officials cautioned, however, that it may be 
difficult to detect certain nuclear or well-shielded radiological 
materials. In order to deploy teams more quickly, since the attacks of 
September 11, 2001, DOE has expanded its search capability beyond the 
Remote Sensing Laboratories to include eight other emergency response 
sites across the country. In the event of a nuclear or radiological 
attack, DOE also maintains capabilities to minimize the consequences. 
DOE can deploy teams that use radiation-monitoring equipment, including 
sensors mounted on aircraft and vehicles, to detect and measure 
radiation contamination levels and provide information to state and 
local officials on what areas need to be evacuated. DOE can also 
coordinate federal activities related to monitoring contamination 
levels and mobilize medical personnel to treat injuries resulting from 
radiation exposure. 

DOE's two Remote Sensing Laboratories are protected at the lowest level 
of physical security allowed by DOE guidance because, according to DOE, 
emergency response capabilities and assets have been dispersed across 
the country and are not concentrated at the laboratories. Under DOE 
policy guidance for safeguarding and securing facilities issued in 
November 2005, DOE facilities can be protected at the lowest level of 
physical security if their capabilities and assets exist at other 
locations and can be easily and quickly reconstituted. However, we 
found that there are a number of critical capabilities and assets that 
exist only at the Remote Sensing Laboratories and their loss would 
significantly hamper DOE's ability to quickly prevent or respond to a 
nuclear or radiological emergency. Specifically, the capabilities and 
assets that are located only at the laboratories include, among other 
things, the most highly trained teams that help manage and minimize the 
consequences of a nuclear or radiological attack and the only 
helicopters and planes that can readily help locate nuclear or 
radiological devices and measure contamination levels after a 
radiological attack. Since these capabilities and assets have not been 
fully dispersed, current physical security measures may not be 
sufficient to protect the facilities against a terrorist attack. Under 
DOE's physical security guidance, a facility in the lowest level of 
physical security can meet the requirements by having walls and doors 
but no other physical security measures. For example, the Remote 
Sensing Laboratory at Andrews Air Force Base does not have a fence, 
vehicle barriers, or any other protective measures around the building, 
but DOE has determined that it meets physical security requirements. 
Furthermore, while the laboratories' location on Air Force bases may 
appear to provide an additional level of security, access onto Nellis 
and Andrews Air Force Bases is not strictly limited, and anyone with 
federal government identification may gain entry. In fact, GAO staff 
gained access to the bases multiple times with little or no scrutiny of 
their identification. Security officials told us that the laboratories 
are not designed to withstand certain types of terrorist attacks. 
However, officials have not taken any steps to strengthen security 
because of DOE's assumption that their capabilities and assets are 
fully dispersed. Furthermore, DOE has not developed contingency plans 
that would identify capabilities and assets that would be used in the 
event that one or both Remote Sensing Laboratories were attacked. 

There are significant benefits to conducting aerial background 
radiation surveys of U.S. cities. Specifically, the surveys can be used 
to compare changes in radiation levels to (1) help detect radiological 
threats in U.S. cities more quickly and (2) measure contamination 
levels after a radiological attack to assist in and reduce the costs of 
cleanup efforts. Despite the benefits, there has been only one survey 
of a major U.S. city because neither DOE nor DHS has mission 
responsibility for conducting the surveys. In the event of a dirty-bomb 
threat, if a city had a completed survey, DOE could then conduct a new 
survey and compare baseline radiation data from the previous survey to 
identify locations with new sources of radiation. Focusing their 
attention on these new locations, law enforcement officials may be able 
to locate a nuclear or radiological device more quickly. In addition, 
using baseline information from a prior survey, DOE could assess 
contamination levels after a radiological attack to assist cleanup 
efforts. DOE officials estimated that information from the surveys 
could save millions of dollars in cleanup costs because cleanup efforts 
could be targeted to decontaminating buildings and other areas up to 
pre-existing levels of radiation rather than fully removing all traces 
of radiation. Without baseline information from the surveys, law 
enforcement officials may lose valuable time investigating pre-existing 
sources of radiation that do not pose a threat, and the time and cost 
of cleanup after an attack may increase significantly. DOE officials 
explained that surveys do have some limitations, noting that it is 
difficult to detect certain nuclear or well-shielded radiological 
materials. Weather conditions and the type of building being surveyed 
may also limit the ability to detect nuclear and radiological devices. 

Nevertheless, in 2005, the New York City Police Department (NYPD) asked 
DOE to conduct a survey of the New York City metro area. The cost of 
the survey--about $800,000--was funded through DHS grants. NYPD 
officials indicated that the survey was tremendously valuable because 
it identified more than 80 locations with radiological sources that 
required further investigation to determine their risk. In addition to 
identifying potential terrorist threats, NYPD officials told us that a 
secondary benefit of the survey was identifying threats to public 
health. While investigating the 80 locations, they found an old 
industrial site contaminated with radium--a radiological material 
linked to diseases such as bone cancer--and used this information to 
close the area and protect the public. Despite these benefits, neither 
DOE nor DHS have embraced mission responsibility for funding and 
conducting surveys or notifying city officials that such a capability 
exists. DOE officials told us they are reluctant to conduct additional 
surveys because they have a limited number of helicopters that are 
needed for emergency response functions, and told us that it is DHS's 
mission to protect cities from potential terrorist attacks. DHS 
officials disagreed with DOE, stating they do not have the expertise or 
capability to conduct surveys. However, DHS does have a program to help 
state and local governments detect illicit nuclear and radiological 
materials, and in fiscal year 2006, approximately $2.5 billion was 
available in grant funding to state and local governments for terrorism 
preparedness. In the absence of clear mission responsibility, there are 
no plans to conduct additional surveys, in part, because DOE and DHS 
are not informing cities about the benefits of these surveys. 

We provided a draft of this report to DOE and DHS for comment. DHS 
agreed with our recommendations and provided technical comments, which 
we incorporated, as appropriate. DOE neither agreed nor disagreed with 
the report's recommendations, but raised concerns about one of our 
findings. In its written comments, DOE disagreed with our finding that 
physical security at the Remote Sensing Laboratories may not be 
sufficient to protect them against terrorist attacks. While we 
recognize that DOE is complying with physical security requirements, 
the Remote Sensing Laboratories are protected at the lowest level of 
physical security, even though the laboratories have unique 
capabilities and assets that exist at no other location and cannot be 
easily and quickly reconstituted. DOE also provided technical comments, 
which we incorporated, as appropriate. 

Background: 

DOE's predecessor, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), established a 
program to prevent and respond to nuclear or radiological emergencies 
in 1974 after an extortionist threatened to detonate a nuclear device 
in Boston unless he received $200,000.[Footnote 2] Even though the 
threat turned out to be a hoax, AEC recognized that it lacked the 
capability to quickly respond to a nuclear or radiological incident. To 
address this deficiency, AEC established the Nuclear Emergency Search 
Team (NEST) to provide technical assistance to the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) and the Department of State, which is the lead 
federal agency for terrorism response outside the United States. Under 
the Atomic Energy Act, the FBI is responsible for investigating illegal 
activities involving the use of nuclear materials within the United 
States, including terrorist threats. The NEST program was designed to 
assist the FBI in searching, identifying, and deactivating nuclear and 
radiological devices. However, the deployments of search teams were 
large scale and often slow because they were designed to respond to 
threats, such as extortion, when there was time to find the device. 

With the threat of nuclear terrorism and the events of September 11, 
2001, DOE's capabilities have evolved to more rapidly respond to 
nuclear and radiological threats. While NEST activities to prevent 
terrorists from detonating a nuclear or radiological device remain the 
core mission, DOE's emergency response activities have expanded to 
include actions to minimize the consequences of a nuclear or 
radiological incident. For example, DOE maintains an aerial capability 
to detect, measure, and track radioactive material to determine 
contamination levels at the site of an emergency. DOE has used this 
capability to conduct background radiation surveys of most nuclear 
power plants in the country for the Environmental Protection Agency and 
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. In the event of an accident at a 
nuclear power plant, a new radiation survey could be performed to help 
determine the location and amount of contamination. 

There are currently about 950 scientists, engineers, and technicians 
from the national laboratories and the Remote Sensing Laboratories 
dedicated to preventing and responding to a nuclear or radiological 
threat. In fiscal year 2005, DOE had a budget of about $90 million for 
emergency response activities. Under the National Nuclear Security 
Administration (NNSA), the Office of Emergency Response manages DOE's 
efforts to prevent and respond to nuclear or radiological emergencies. 

In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, there is heightened concern 
that terrorists may try to smuggle nuclear or radiological materials 
into the United States. These materials could be used to produce either 
an improvised nuclear device or a radiological dispersal device, known 
as a dirty bomb. An improvised nuclear device is a crude nuclear bomb 
made with highly enriched uranium or plutonium. Nonproliferation 
experts estimate that a successful improvised nuclear device could have 
yields in the 10 to 20 kiloton range (the equivalent to 10,000 to 
20,000 tons of TNT). A 20-kiloton yield would be the equivalent of the 
yield of the bomb that destroyed Nagasaki and could devastate the heart 
of a medium-size U.S. city and result in thousands of casualties and 
radiation contamination over a wider area. 

A dirty bomb combines conventional explosives, such as dynamite, with 
radioactive material,[Footnote 3] using explosive force to disperse the 
radioactive material over a large area, such as multiple city blocks. 
The extent of contamination would depend on a number of factors, 
including the size of the explosive, the amount and type of radioactive 
material used, and weather conditions. While much less destructive than 
an improvised nuclear device, the dispersed radioactive material could 
cause radiation sickness for people nearby and produce serious economic 
costs and psychological and social disruption associated with the 
evacuation and subsequent cleanup of the contaminated areas. While no 
terrorists have detonated a dirty bomb in a city, Chechen separatists 
placed a canister containing cesium-137 in a Moscow park in the mid- 
1990s. Although the device was not detonated and no radioactive 
material was dispersed, the incident demonstrated that terrorists have 
the capability and willingness to use radiological materials as weapons 
of terror. 

DOE Has Unique Capabilities and Assets to Prevent and Respond to a 
Nuclear or Radiological Attack in the United States: 

DOE has unique capabilities and assets to prevent and respond to a 
nuclear or radiological attack in the United States. These include 
specialized teams and equipment to search for, locate, and deactivate 
nuclear or radiological devices and to help manage the consequences of 
a nuclear or radiological attack. To prevent an attack, search teams 
use a variety of clandestine and discreet methods, including the use of 
radiation sensors carried in backpacks and mounted on vehicles and 
helicopters, to detect and locate radiological sources. In the event of 
a nuclear or radiological attack, DOE would, among other things, use 
radiation-monitoring equipment, including sensors mounted on aircraft 
and vehicles, to detect and measure radiation contamination levels and 
provide information to state and local officials on what areas need to 
be evacuated. Table 1 summarizes DOE's capabilities and assets to 
prevent and respond to a nuclear or radiological attack. 

Table 1: DOE Capabilities and Assets to Prevent and Respond to a 
Nuclear or Radiological Attack: 

Capabilities: Search; 
Mission: Search for and identify nuclear or radiological devices with 
radiation detectors mounted in backpacks, vehicles, and helicopters; 
Purpose: Prevent a nuclear or radiological attack or detonation: X; 
Purpose: Respond to and manage the consequences of an attack: [Empty]. 

Capabilities: Deactivation; 
Mission: Deactivate and dispose of nuclear or radiological devices by 
viewing the components of a bomb with specialized equipment, 
deactivating booby traps, and packaging the devices for safe transport; 
Purpose: Prevent a nuclear or radiological attack or detonation: X; 
Purpose: Respond to and manage the consequences of an attack: [Empty]. 

Capabilities: Recovery of U.S. nuclear weapons; 
Mission: In the event of an accident involving a U.S. nuclear weapon, 
assess the damage, stabilize internal components, and package the 
weapon for safe transport; 
Purpose: Prevent a nuclear or radiological attack or detonation: X; 
Purpose: Respond to and manage the consequences of an attack: [Empty]. 

Capabilities: Radiological Assistance Program; 
Mission: First responders to search for devices with radiation 
detectors mounted in backpacks and on vehicles or to measure 
contamination levels after an attack or accident with environmental 
sampling and specialized devices; 
Purpose: Prevent a nuclear or radiological attack or detonation: X; 
Purpose: Respond to and manage the consequences of an attack: X. 

Capabilities: Aerial detection; 
Mission: Planes and helicopters with radiation detection equipment and 
sophisticated onboard computers to search for devices, conduct 
background radiation surveys, or measure contamination after a nuclear 
or radiological incident; 
Purpose: Prevent a nuclear or radiological attack or detonation: X; 
Purpose: Respond to and manage the consequences of an attack: X. 

Capabilities: Computer modeling of radiation release; 
Mission: Prediction of the extent of contamination with advanced 
computer modeling of wind, topography, and atmospheric conditions; 
Purpose: Prevent a nuclear or radiological attack or detonation: 
[Empty]; 
Purpose: Respond to and manage the consequences of an attack: X. 

Capabilities: Consequence management; 
Mission: Monitor and assess contamination from a large-scale nuclear or 
radiological attack and set up an operations center to coordinate 
response activities in the field; 
Purpose: Prevent a nuclear or radiological attack or detonation: 
[Empty]; 
Purpose: Respond to and manage the consequences of an attack: X. 

Capabilities: Medical support; 
Mission: Quickly mobilize medical personnel to provide advice and 
assistance for treating injuries resulting from radiation exposure; 
Purpose: Prevent a nuclear or radiological attack or detonation: 
[Empty]; 
Purpose: Respond to and manage the consequences of an attack: X. 

Source: GAO analysis of DOE information. 

[End of table] 

DOE Has Specialized Teams That Use a Variety of Methods and Equipment 
to Prevent a Nuclear or Radiological Attack: 

To prevent a nuclear or radiological attack, DOE has specialized teams 
to search for and deactivate nuclear or radiological devices. These 
teams are manned by full-time professionals and are ready to deploy on 
either civilian or military aircraft from the Remote Sensing 
Laboratories within 4 hours of notification from the FBI. To detect and 
locate nuclear or radiological devices, the teams use a variety of 
clandestine and discreet methods, including the use of radiation 
detectors carried in backpacks that silently transmit information to 
the searcher's earphone and radiation detectors mounted in vehicles and 
helicopters. 

While backpacks and other hand-held equipment can detect and identify 
devices with greater accuracy, vehicle and helicopter-mounted radiation 
detectors allow DOE to cover a greater area in a shorter amount of 
time--which is particularly important when the exact location of a 
device is unknown and the teams need to search a large area. Once 
deployed, the searchers can also send information they are collecting 
from radiation detectors via a secure Internet line to scientists and 
technicians at the national laboratories to help them identify nuclear 
or radiological material and determine whether the material poses a 
threat. If the search teams need additional support to cover a large 
area, they can train and equip local responders, such as law 
enforcement and firefighters, to conduct search missions. Up to 16 
people can become proficient in basic search techniques in less than an 
hour. 

Should a device be located, a team composed of nuclear weapons 
scientists, technicians, and engineers from the national laboratories 
as well as the FBI and military ordnance disposal experts would be 
deployed to deactivate the device and prepare it for safe transport 
away from populated areas to the Nevada Test Site.[Footnote 4] This 
would involve, among other things, clearing booby traps and separating 
the high explosives from the nuclear material. It also would involve 
the use of specialized equipment, such as a portable X-ray machine, to 
peer under a bomb's outer shell and view the bomb's components, 
identify the device, and determine the best way of deactivating it. 
This team maintains a comprehensive computer database of nuclear and 
radiological weapon design information for identifying and properly 
deactivating devices. Once a device is ready to be safely transported, 
scientists in an underground tunnel at the Nevada Test Site would 
disassemble and dispose of the device. Under certain circumstances, the 
team may not be able to safely transport the device and it may be 
necessary to destroy the bomb in place and mitigate the potential 
spread of radioactive material by, among other things, constructing a 
nylon tent around the device and filling it with thick foam. 

Since September 11, 2001, DOE has expanded its search capability beyond 
the Remote Sensing Laboratories to include teams at eight other 
emergency response sites, allowing for more rapid deployment across the 
country.[Footnote 5] These Radiological Assistance Program (RAP) teams 
traditionally have assisted state and local governments with responding 
to facility or transportation accidents involving radioactive material 
that may cause contamination and affect public health. Since these 
teams have experience and expertise in responding to nuclear 
emergencies--and are located in different regions across the country-- 
their mission was expanded to include searching for nuclear or 
radiological devices. The RAP teams can drive to most cities in their 
geographic area and do not have to rely on air transport. In addition, 
since the two Remote Sensing Laboratories are located on the East and 
West coasts, the RAP teams can provide faster response to cities 
located in the center of the country. 

In fiscal year 2005, the specialized search teams from the Remote 
Sensing Laboratories and the RAP teams conducted about 30 search 
missions. Most of these missions involved assisting local and state 
officials in monitoring large public events, such as the Super Bowl and 
the State of the Union address, to provide assurance that no devices 
were hidden in the stands or inside the building before the event. A 
number of these missions also involved intelligence-driven searches to 
address potential radiological threats in U.S. cities. Despite the 
teams' expertise and specialized equipment, DOE officials cautioned 
that it may still be difficult to detect nuclear or radiological 
devices. Radiation detection equipment may not detect nuclear materials 
with relatively low levels of radioactivity or radiological materials 
that are well-shielded. In addition, without good intelligence on the 
location of the device, search teams may not have time to find the 
device. 

In addition to preventing a nuclear or radiological attack, DOE is also 
responsible for responding to an accident involving a U.S. nuclear 
weapon. A DOE team made up of scientists, engineers, technicians, 
health physicists, and safety professionals from the national 
laboratories and nuclear weapons production facilities are ready to 
respond within 4 hours of notification of an accident, such as the 
crash of a military airplane transporting a nuclear weapon. In such a 
scenario, the team would assess the damage, if any, to the weapon by 
using, among other things, radiography to examine the weapon's internal 
structure, and how best to recover it safely. Since nuclear weapons 
contain chemically reactive materials and radioactive elements, great 
care must be taken in gaining access to them. For damaged weapons, the 
team has special techniques to stabilize the internal components. After 
weapons are safe to move, they can be packaged and prepared for 
transport. 

DOE Has a Critical Role to Play in Minimizing the Consequences of a 
Nuclear or Radiological Attack: 

DOE maintains capabilities to minimize the impact of a nuclear or 
radiological attack. An RAP team likely would be the first DOE team to 
respond to a nuclear or radiological emergency, whether resulting from 
a terrorist attack or an accident. The RAP teams, located in nine 
different parts of the country, would be responsible for assessing the 
situation and determining what additional resources would be necessary 
to manage the emergency. These teams are expected to arrive at the site 
of an emergency within 4 to 6 hours and conduct an initial radiological 
assessment of the area. RAP team members are trained to provide initial 
assistance to minimize immediate radiation risks to people, property, 
and the environment. In responding to an emergency, they would use 
radiation detectors and air-sampling equipment to measure contamination 
and help state and local officials reduce the spread of contamination. 

Large-scale contamination from a dirty bomb or nuclear device would 
require the deployment of consequence management teams from the Remote 
Sensing Laboratory at Nellis Air Force Base. These teams are 
responsible for setting up an operations center near the site of the 
emergency to coordinate environmental monitoring and assessment 
activities, conduct monitoring and assessment activities with 
specialized equipment, and collect and analyze data from the field on 
the type, amount, and extent of radiological release. This information 
would be used by state and local governments to determine what areas 
should be evacuated and how to properly respond to the emergency and by 
other federal agencies involved in decontamination and other cleanup 
activities. These teams would monitor the area where radioactivity was 
released until the area was fully evaluated and the effects known. 

In addition to the RAP and consequence management teams, DOE would 
collect information on the extent of contamination, using not only 
planes and helicopters fitted with radiation detectors but also 
sophisticated computer models. DOE has a limited number of planes and 
helicopters at the Remote Sensing Laboratories that detect, measure, 
and track radioactive materials to determine contamination levels. The 
aircraft can provide real-time measurement of low levels of ground 
contamination. They can also provide detailed imagery analysis of an 
accident site. The planes are deployed first to determine the location 
and extent of ground contamination. The helicopters are then used to 
perform detailed surveys of any ground contamination.[Footnote 6] This 
information is used to decide where to send ground monitoring teams. 
Based on information from the aircraft, scientists are able to develop 
maps of the ground hazards. In addition to their ability to track 
radiation from a dirty bomb or nuclear device, the aircraft have also 
been used to search for lost or stolen nuclear material and to locate 
medical isotopes left behind after natural disasters, as occurred in 
the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, to ensure they do not endanger the 
public. 

Emergency response teams can also use computer models developed by the 
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory to predict the consequences of a 
radiological release by modeling the movement of hazardous plumes. 
Based on the time, location, type of accident, and weather conditions, 
the model can predict the extent to which the material can spread and 
estimate the amount of the release. As technicians receive information 
from field teams, they can update the model. 

Lastly, DOE can mobilize medical personnel to treat injuries resulting 
from radiation exposure. Medical radiation experts are on call 24 hours 
a day and can provide medical and radiological advice to state and 
local governments or deploy directly to an accident site. These experts 
also track the treatment of radiation accident patients and conduct 
medical follow-ups. 

DOE's Current Physical Security Measures May Not Be Sufficient to 
Protect Its Key Emergency Response Facilities: 

DOE's two Remote Sensing Laboratories are protected at the lowest level 
of physical security allowed by DOE guidance because, according to DOE, 
their emergency response capabilities and assets have been dispersed 
across the country and are not concentrated at the laboratories. 
However, we found a number of critical emergency response capabilities 
and assets that exist only at the Remote Sensing Laboratories and whose 
loss would significantly hamper DOE's ability to quickly respond to a 
nuclear or radiological threat. Because these capabilities and assets 
have not been fully dispersed, current physical security measures may 
not be sufficient for protecting the facilities against a terrorist 
attack. 

DOE Is Protecting Its Key Emergency Response Facilities with the Lowest 
Level of Physical Security Measures Allowed under DOE Guidance Because 
Some Capabilities and Assets Have Been Dispersed: 

DOE is protecting its two Remote Sensing Laboratories at the lowest 
level of physical security allowed under DOE guidance. According to DOE 
officials, the lowest level of security is adequate because emergency 
response assets and capabilities have been dispersed across the country 
and are no longer concentrated at these facilities. DOE policy guidance 
for safeguarding and securing facilities issued in November 2005 
required a review of facilities protected at the lowest level of 
physical security to determine whether they were "mission critical." 
Mission critical facilities have capabilities and assets that are not 
available at any other location and cannot be easily and quickly 
reconstituted. Under DOE guidance, facilities designated as mission 
critical must be protected at a higher level of physical security. For 
example, DOE Headquarters was designated as mission critical because 
the loss of decision makers during an emergency would impair the 
deployment and coordination of DOE resources. As a result, DOE 
strengthened the physical security measures around DOE Headquarters by, 
among other things, adding vehicle barriers around the facility. 

In April 2006, the Office of Emergency Response reviewed the 
capabilities and assets at the Remote Sensing Laboratories and found 
that they were not mission critical because if either one or both 
laboratories were attacked and destroyed, DOE would be able to easily 
reconstitute their capabilities and assets to meet mission 
requirements. Since September 11, 2001, DOE has dispersed some of the 
assets and capabilities once found exclusively at the Remote Sensing 
Laboratories. Specifically, DOE has expanded its search mission to 
include the RAP teams that are located at eight sites across the 
country. These teams receive training and equipment similar to the 
search teams at the Remote Sensing Laboratories, such as radiation 
detectors mounted in backpacks and vehicles. They have also 
participated in a number of search missions, including addressing 
potential threats at sporting events and national political 
conventions, or assisting customs officials with investigating cargo 
entering ports and border crossings. 

DOE Has Not Fully Dispersed the Capabilities and Assets at These 
Facilities, and Their Loss Would Significantly Hamper DOE's Ability to 
Respond to Nuclear and Radiological Threats: 

Contrary to DOE's assessment that the Remote Sensing Laboratories' 
capabilities and assets have been fully dispersed to other parts of the 
country, we found that the laboratories housed a number of unique 
emergency response capabilities and assets whose loss would 
significantly undermine DOE's ability to respond to a nuclear or 
radiological threat. The critical capabilities and assets that exist 
only at the laboratories include (1) the teams that help minimize the 
consequences of a nuclear or radiological attack, (2) the planes and 
helicopters designed to measure contamination levels and assist search 
teams in locating nuclear or radiological devices, and (3) a 
sophisticated mapping system that tracks contamination and the location 
of radiological sources in U.S. cities. Furthermore, while the RAP 
teams have assumed a greater role in searching for nuclear or 
radiological devices, the teams at the Remote Sensing Laboratories 
remain the most highly trained and experienced search teams. 

The consequence management teams that would respond within the first 24 
hours of a nuclear or radiological attack are located at the Remote 
Sensing Lab at Nellis Air Force Base. These teams have specialized 
equipment for monitoring and assessing the type, amount, and extent of 
contamination. They are responsible for establishing an operations 
center near the site of contamination to coordinate all of DOE's 
radiological monitoring and assessment activities and to analyze 
information coming from the field, including aerial survey data 
provided by helicopters, planes, and ground teams monitoring radiation 
levels. Without this capability, state and local governments would not 
receive information quickly about the extent of contamination to assess 
the impact on public health and private property and how best to reduce 
further contamination. 

DOE's emergency response planes and helicopters are designed to detect, 
measure, and track radioactive material at the site of a nuclear or 
radiological release to determine contamination levels. DOE has a 
limited number of planes and helicopters designed for this mission at 
the Remote Sensing Laboratories. These planes and helicopters use a 
sophisticated radiation detection system to gather radiological 
information and produce maps of radiation exposure and concentrations. 
It is anticipated that the planes would arrive at an emergency scene 
first and be used to determine the location and extent of ground 
contamination. The helicopters would then be used to perform more 
detailed surveys of any contamination. According to DOE officials, the 
planes and helicopters can gather information on a wide area without 
placing ground teams at risk. Without this capability, DOE would not be 
able to quickly obtain comprehensive information about the extent of 
contamination. The helicopters can also be used by search teams to 
locate nuclear or radiological devices in U.S. cities. The helicopters 
can cover a larger area in a shorter amount of time than teams on foot 
or in vehicles. The ground search teams can conduct secondary 
inspections of locations with unusual radiation levels identified by 
the helicopter. 

The Remote Sensing Laboratory at Nellis Air Force Base also maintains a 
sophisticated mapping system that can be used by consequence management 
teams to track contamination in U.S. cities after a nuclear or 
radiological attack. DOE collects information from its planes and 
helicopters, ground monitoring teams, and computer modeling and uses 
this system to provide detailed maps of the extent and level of 
contamination in a city. Without this system, DOE would not be able to 
quickly analyze the information collected by various emergency response 
capabilities and determine how to respond most effectively to a nuclear 
or radiological attack. This mapping system can also be used to help 
find nuclear or radiological devices more quickly before they are 
detonated. 

DOE officials told us the loss of these capabilities and assets that 
are unique to the Remote Sensing Laboratories would devastate DOE's 
ability to respond to a nuclear or radiological attack. State and local 
governments would not receive information--such as the location and 
extent of contamination--that they need in a timely manner in order to 
manage the consequences of an attack and reduce the harm to public 
health and property. Despite the importance of these capabilities and 
assets, DOE has not developed contingency plans identifying 
capabilities and assets at other locations that could be used in the 
event that one or both Remote Sensing Laboratories were attacked. 
Specifically, DOE has not identified which RAP team would assume 
responsibility for coordinating contamination monitoring and assessment 
activities in the place of the consequence management teams from 
Nellis. During an emergency, the lack of clearly defined roles may 
hamper emergency response efforts. 

DOE officials told us that in the event that the capabilities and 
assets of both Remote Sensing Laboratories were destroyed, they could 
mobilize and deploy personnel and equipment from the RAP teams or 
national laboratories. The RAP teams and some national laboratories, 
such as Sandia, have similar equipment that could be used to measure 
contamination in a limited area. However, if both Remote Sensing 
Laboratories were destroyed, the RAP teams and the national 
laboratories would not have planes and helicopters to conduct large- 
scale contamination monitoring and assessment. The RAP teams also do 
not have the equipment or expertise to set up an operations center and 
analyze data that field teams would collect on contamination levels. In 
April 2006, DOE's Office of Independent Oversight, which is responsible 
for independently evaluating, among other things, the effectiveness of 
DOE's programs, reported that the RAP teams, during performance tests, 
could not quickly provide state and local governments with 
recommendations on what actions to take to avoid or reduce the public's 
exposure to radiation and whether to evacuate contaminated 
areas.[Footnote 7] In addition, DOE officials told us that, based on 
training exercises, the demands of responding to two simultaneous 
nuclear or radiological events strained all of DOE's capabilities to 
manage the consequences. According to DOE officials, if the consequence 
management teams at Nellis could not respond and there were multiple, 
simultaneous attacks, DOE's capabilities to minimize the impact of a 
nuclear or radiological attack would be significantly hampered. 

DOE officials also told us that if Nellis Air Force Base were attacked, 
their aerial contamination measuring assets would not be lost unless 
the aircraft at Andrews Air Force Base were also destroyed. However, 
DOE policy generally requires that some of its aerial assets stationed 
at Andrews remain in the Washington, D.C., area to protect top 
government decision makers and other key government assets. During a 
nuclear or radiological emergency, DOE would need to rely on a limited 
airborne capability to measure contamination levels. In addition, if 
there were multiple simultaneous events, there would be considerable 
delay in providing information to state and local governments about the 
extent of contamination because DOE could assist only one city at a 
time. 

Some DOE officials suggested that if DOE helicopters were not available 
to provide assistance, DOE could request another helicopter and fit it 
with radiation detectors. However, during an emergency, we found that 
DOE would face a number of challenges in equipping a helicopter not 
designed for measuring contamination. DOE officials told us that DOE 
has a memorandum of understanding with the Department of Defense and 
other federal and state agencies to use their helicopters and planes 
for transport and other mission requirements, but that it is unlikely 
that DOD or any other agency would provide them with aircraft during an 
emergency because those agencies' priority would be to carry out their 
own missions, not to assist DOE. Even if DOE were provided with 
helicopters, DOE does not have spare radiation detectors like those 
found on its own helicopters, and even if it did have spares, it would 
not have time to mount radiation detectors on the exterior of the 
aircraft. DOE officials told us that radiation detectors, like those 
found on their vehicles, could be placed inside an airplane or 
helicopter, but the ability to measure contamination would be 
significantly reduced compared with an exterior-mounted detector. 

Furthermore, DOE does not conduct training exercises to simulate the 
actions necessary to reconstitute the capabilities and assets unique to 
the Remote Sensing Laboratories, such as placing radiation detectors on 
helicopters or testing the ability of RAP teams to conduct large-scale 
contamination monitoring and assessment without the assistance of the 
consequence management teams from Nellis. DOE officials told us that 
all of their training scenarios and exercises involve the use of 
consequence management teams and the planes and helicopters from the 
Remote Sensing Laboratories. As a result, DOE does not know whether it 
would be able to accomplish mission objectives without the capabilities 
and assets of the Remote Sensing Laboratories. 

Lastly, while the RAP teams have assumed a greater role in searching 
for nuclear or radiological devices, Remote Sensing Laboratories have 
the most highly trained and experienced search teams. For example, the 
search teams at the Remote Sensing Laboratories are the only teams 
trained to conduct physically demanding maritime searches to locate 
potential nuclear or radiological devices at sea before they arrive at 
a U.S. port. The search teams can also repair radiation equipment for 
search missions in the field. Furthermore, these search teams are more 
prepared than the RAP teams to enter environments where there is a 
threat of hazards other than those associated with radiological 
materials, such as explosives. If there is a threat of explosives in an 
area where a search mission would be conducted, these teams have 
specialized equipment to detect explosives and can more quickly request 
FBI ordnance disposal assistance in order to complete their search 
mission. In April 2006, the Office of Independent Oversight reported 
that the RAP teams did not always complete their search missions when 
there was a high level of risk to the lives of the RAP team members 
from explosives. The report found that some RAP teams refused to 
perform the mission unless all risk from explosives around a device was 
removed and others completed the mission only after certain safety 
criteria were met. According to this study, leaders of the RAP teams 
had to make on-the-spot judgments weighing the safety of RAP team 
members against their ability to complete the search mission because 
there was a lack of guidance on how to respond. 

Current Physical Security Measures May Not Be Sufficient to Protect the 
Facilities against Terrorist Attack: 

Under DOE guidance, the physical security measures for facilities in 
the lowest level of security may include barriers such as fences, 
walls, and doors.[Footnote 8] According to DOE officials, a facility 
can have, at a minimum, walls and doors and be in compliance with the 
guidance. Adding additional measures, such as fences and vehicle 
barriers, are under the discretion of the security officer in charge of 
the facilities. According to DOE security officials, the Remote Sensing 
Laboratory at Nellis Air Force Base exceeds current physical security 
requirements because DOE placed a fence around the facility and a 
vehicle barrier at the front entrance. These additional measures were 
taken because, at the time the Remote Sensing Laboratory was built, 
these measures were required. 

In contrast, the Remote Sensing Laboratory at Andrews Air Force Base 
does not have a fence or any vehicle barriers because it is located 
along the executive route used by the President and foreign dignitaries 
when they land at Andrews and exit the base. The buildings along this 
route must meet specific aesthetic standards, which prohibit the use of 
certain physical security measures, such as fences. Despite these 
limitations, DOE security officials told us that the laboratory still 
meets the minimum security requirements. According to these officials, 
the Office of Emergency Response, which is responsible for managing 
DOE's emergency response capabilities, would have to classify the 
facilities as mission critical before more stringent measures would be 
required. 

While current physical security measures are consistent with DOE 
guidance and may protect the facilities against trespass and theft of 
classified government documents, these measures may not be sufficient 
to protect the facilities against a terrorist attack. Security 
officials told us that current physical security measures at the Remote 
Sensing Laboratories have not been hardened or designed to withstand 
certain types of terrorist attacks. Security officials told us that the 
physical security measures protecting these facilities have not been 
strengthened because, if there were credible intelligence that the 
facilities faced the risk of terrorist attack, DOE could take 
additional measures to protect the facility, such as deploying 
protective forces around the laboratories and limiting access to the 
parking areas near the facilities. However, security officials would 
have to rely on good intelligence to prevent such an attack. In 
addition, under DOE guidance, facilities that house nuclear weapons or 
substantial quantities of special nuclear material that could be used 
in nuclear weapons are required to have vehicle barriers and other 
protective measures. Since the Remote Sensing Laboratories do not have 
nuclear weapons or special nuclear material, additional security 
measures are not required unless the facilities are classified as 
mission critical. 

While the laboratories' location on Air Force bases may appear to 
provide an additional level of security, access onto Nellis and Andrews 
Air Force Bases is not strictly limited, and any person with a federal 
government identification may gain entry. In addition, Air Force guards 
do not inspect every vehicle. Vehicles are randomly inspected, and Air 
Force security guards can use their judgment as to whether a car should 
be searched. In fact, GAO staff gained access to the bases multiple 
times with little or no scrutiny of their identification, and their 
vehicles were never searched. 

Despite the Benefits of Conducting Aerial Background Radiation Surveys, 
They Remain Underutilized Because Neither DOE Nor DHS Has Mission 
Responsibility for Funding and Conducting Them: 

There are significant benefits to conducting aerial background 
radiation surveys of U.S. cities. Once surveys are complete, they can 
later be used to compare changes in radiation levels to (1) help detect 
radiological threats in U.S. cities more quickly and (2) measure 
radiation levels after a radiological attack to assist in and reduce 
the costs of cleanup efforts. Despite the benefits, there has been a 
survey of only one major U.S. city. Since neither DOE nor DHS has 
mission responsibility for funding and conducting surveys, there are no 
plans to conduct additional surveys or to inform cities about their 
benefits. 

Completing Baseline Aerial Surveys Can Later Help to Detect 
Radiological Threats in U.S. Cities and Measure Radiation Levels in the 
Event of a Radiological Attack: 

DOE can conduct aerial background radiation surveys to record the 
location of radiation sources and produce maps showing existing 
radiation levels within U.S. cities. Background radiation can come from 
a variety of sources, such as rock quarries; granite found in 
buildings, statues, or cemeteries; medical isotopes used at hospitals; 
and areas treated with high amounts of fertilizer, such as golf 
courses. DOE uses helicopters mounted with external radiation detectors 
and equipped with a global position system to fly over an area and 
gather data in a systematic grid pattern. Figure 1 illustrates a 
helicopter conducting an aerial survey and collecting information on 
radiation sources in a city. 

Figure 1: Illustration of a Helicopter Conducting an Aerial Background 
Radiation Survey: 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: GAO. 

[End of figure] 

Onboard computers record radiation levels and the position of the 
helicopter. This initial, or baseline, survey allows DOE technicians 
and scientists to produce maps of a city showing the locations of high 
radiation concentrations, also known as "hot spots." DOE uses 
helicopters rather than airplanes because their lower altitude and 
lower speed permits a more precise reading. While conducting the 
baseline survey, DOE ground teams and law enforcement officials can 
investigate these hot spots to determine whether the source of 
radiation is used for industrial, medical, or other routine purposes. 
DOE officials told us that this baseline information would be 
beneficial for all major cities because law enforcement officials could 
immediately investigate any potentially dangerous nuclear or 
radiological source and DOE could later use the data in the event of an 
emergency to find a device more quickly or assist in cleanup efforts. 
For example, in 2002, DOE conducted a survey of the National Mall in 
Washington, D.C., just prior to July Fourth celebrations. Law 
enforcement officials used the survey to investigate unusual radiation 
sources and ensure the Mall area was safe for the public. 

Data from the baseline survey would help DOE and law enforcement detect 
new radiological threats more quickly. In the event of a dirty-bomb 
threat, DOE could conduct a new, or follow-up, survey and compare that 
radiation data to the baseline survey data to identify locations with 
new sources of radiation. Law enforcement officials looking for a 
nuclear or radiological device would focus their attention on these new 
locations and might be able to distinguish between pre-existing sources 
and potential threats in order to locate a dirty bomb or nuclear device 
more quickly. Conducting baseline surveys also provides a training 
opportunity for DOE personnel. DOE officials told us that regular 
deployments helped to keep job performance standards high for pilots, 
field detection specialists, and the technicians who analyze the data. 

DOE can also use a baseline radiation survey to assess changes in 
radiation levels after a radiological attack to assist with cleanup 
efforts. A follow-up survey could be taken afterward to compare changes 
against the baseline radiation levels. This information can be used to 
determine which areas need to be cleaned and to what levels. In 2004, 
DOD funded a survey of the area around the Pentagon in Northern 
Virginia in order to assist with cleanup efforts in case of nuclear or 
radiological attack. While no study has reliably determined the cleanup 
costs of a dirty-bomb explosion in an urban area, DOE estimates that 
cleaning up after the detonation of a small to medium-size radiological 
device may cost tens or even hundreds of millions of dollars. DOE 
officials estimated that information from background radiation surveys 
could save several million dollars in cleanup costs because cleanup 
efforts could be focused on decontaminating buildings and other areas 
to pre-existing levels of radiation. Without a baseline radiation 
survey, cleanup crews would not know the extent to which they would 
have to decontaminate the area. Efforts to completely clean areas with 
levels of pre-existing radiation, such as granite buildings or 
hospitals, would be wasteful and expensive. 

DOE officials cautioned that background radiation surveys have 
limitations and cannot be relied upon to detect all nuclear or 
radiological devices. Aerial surveys may not be able to detect certain 
nuclear or well-shielded radiological materials. Weather conditions and 
the type of building being surveyed may also reduce the effectiveness 
of detection systems. Furthermore, DOE may have to rely on good 
intelligence to find a device. Law enforcement officials would need 
intelligence information to narrow the search to a specific part of a 
city. Lastly, according to DOE officials, baseline background radiation 
surveys may need to be conducted on a periodic basis because radiation 
sources may change over time, especially in urban areas. For example, 
new construction using granite, the installation of medical equipment, 
or the heavy use of fertilizer all could change a city's radiation 
background. Despite these limitations, without baseline survey 
information, law enforcement officials may lose valuable time when 
searching for nuclear or radiological threats by investigating pre- 
existing sources of radiation that are not harmful. In addition, if 
there were a nuclear or radiological attack, a lack of baseline 
radiological data would likely make the cleanup more costly and time 
consuming. 

DOE Has Conducted a Survey of Only One Major City: 

In 2005, the New York City Police Department (NYPD) asked DOE to 
conduct a survey of the New York City metro area. NYPD officials were 
aware that DOE had the capability to measure background radiation and 
locate hot spots by helicopter because DOE used this capability at the 
World Trade Center site in the days following September 11, 2001. DHS 
provided the city with about $30 million in grant money to develop a 
regional radiological detection and monitoring system. NYPD decided to 
spend part of this money on a complete aerial survey of all five 
boroughs. DOE conducted the survey in about 4 weeks in the summer of 
2005, requiring over 100 flight hours to complete at a cost of about 
$800,000. 

According to NYPD officials, the aerial background radiation survey 
exceeded their expectations, and they cited a number of significant 
benefits that may help them better respond to a radiological incident. 
First, NYPD officials said that in the course of conducting the survey, 
they identified over 80 locations with unexplained radiological 
sources. Teams of NYPD officers accompanied by DOE scientists and 
technicians investigated each of these hot spots and determined whether 
they posed a danger to the public. While most of these were medical 
isotopes located at medical facilities and hospitals, according to NYPD 
officials, awareness of these locations will allow them to distinguish 
false alarms from real radiological threats and locate a radiological 
device more quickly. Second, NYPD officers are now trained in 
investigating hot spots and they have real-life experience in locating 
radiological sources. Third, NYPD officials now have a baseline 
radiological survey of the city to assist with cleanup efforts in the 
event of a radiological release. 

In addition to identifying potential terrorist threats, a secondary 
benefit of the survey was identifying threats to public health. One of 
the over 80 locations with a radiological signature was a local park 
that was once the site of an industrial plant. According to NYPD 
officials, the survey disclosed that the soil there was contaminated by 
large quantities of radium.[Footnote 9] Brush fires in the area posed 
an imminent threat to public health because traditional fire mitigation 
tactics of pushing flammable debris into the middle of the park could 
release radiological contamination into the air. Investigating 
locations with unexplained radiological sources identified by the 
aerial background radiation survey alerted NYPD officials to this 
threat, and they were able to prevent public exposure to the material. 

Because the extent to which the background radiation of a city changes 
over time is not clear, NYPD officials have requested that DHS provide 
money to fund a survey every year. With periodic surveys, NYPD hope to 
get a better understanding of how and to what extent background 
radiation changes over time. NYPD officials also want to continue 
identifying radiological sources in the city and to provide relevant 
training to their officers. 

Despite the Benefits, Neither DOE Nor DHS Has Mission Responsibility 
for Aerial Background Radiation Surveys, Which Has Discouraged Both 
Agencies from Informing Cities about the Surveys: 

Despite the benefits of aerial background radiation surveys, neither 
DOE nor DHS has embraced mission responsibility for funding and 
conducting surveys. In addition, neither agency is notifying city 
officials of the potential benefits of aerial surveys or that such a 
capability exists. According to DOE and DHS officials, New York City is 
the only city where a background radiation survey has been completed. 

DOE officials told us that DOE is reluctant to conduct large numbers of 
additional surveys because they have a limited number of helicopters 
that are needed to prevent and respond to nuclear and radiological 
emergencies. Furthermore, they assert that DOE does not have sufficient 
funding to conduct aerial background radiation surveys. In fiscal year 
2006, the emergency response budget for aerial radiation detection was 
approximately $11 million to cover costs for items such as aircraft 
maintenance, personnel, fuel, and detection equipment. DOE relies on 
federal agencies and cities to reimburse them for the costs of surveys. 
However, even if DHS funded cities to pay for surveys, as it did in New 
York's case, DOE officials stated that payment would need to include 
costs associated with the wear and tear on the helicopters. 
Furthermore, the extra costs could not be completely recovered by 
increasing the charges to the city because, according to DOE officials, 
DOE cannot accumulate money from year to year to pay for future lump- 
sum repairs. In addition, DOE officials view background radiation 
surveys as part of the homeland security mission to prepare state and 
local officials against terrorist attacks, not as part of their 
emergency response mission. However, DOE officials told us that because 
they possess the assets and expertise, they would be willing to conduct 
additional surveys if DHS funded the full cost of the surveys and 
covered the wear and tear on DOE's equipment. 

DHS officials told us that it is not DHS's responsibility to conduct 
aerial background radiation surveys or to develop such a capability. 
DHS's Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) told us it does not have 
the expertise or capability to conduct surveys and that surveys are 
DOE's responsibility. However, DNDO is responsible for assisting state 
and local governments' efforts to detect and identify illicit nuclear 
and radiological materials and to develop mobile detection systems. 
DNDO has not evaluated the benefits and limitations of background 
surveys and does not plan to conduct background surveys as part of this 
effort. DHS officials also told us that it is DHS's responsibility to 
advise cities about different radiation detection technology and to 
help state and local officials decide which technologies would be most 
beneficial. However, DNDO does not currently advise cities and states 
on the potential benefits of background surveys. 

DHS also has a grant program to improve the capacity of state and local 
governments to prevent and respond to terrorist and catastrophic 
events, including nuclear and radiological attacks. In fiscal year 
2006, there was about $2.5 billion available in grant funding for state 
and local governments. DHS officials told us that this grant funding 
could be used for radiation surveys if cities requested them. However, 
according to DHS officials, the agency has not received any requests 
for funding other than the 2005 request by New York City. While it is 
DHS's responsibility to inform state and local governments about 
radiation detection technology, it has neither an outreach effort nor 
does it maintain a central database for informing cities and states 
about background radiation surveys. DHS maintains a lessons-learned 
information-sharing database, which is a national online network of 
best practices and lessons learned to help plan and prepare for a 
terrorist attack. However, it is the responsibility of state and local 
governments to enter information into this database, and DHS officials 
told us they were not aware if New York City officials had added any 
information to the database about the surveys. According to DHS 
officials, it is DOE's responsibility to inform cities and states about 
the surveys, since DOE maintains the capability for conducting them. 

In the absence of clear mission responsibility, there are no plans to 
conduct additional surveys, and no other city has requested one, in 
part, because DOE and DHS are not informing cities about the benefits 
of these surveys. 

Conclusions: 

Preventing a nuclear or radiological explosion that could kill or 
injure many people and severely disrupt the nation's economy depends, 
in part, on DOE's ability to search for and deactivate a device with 
little or no warning. Reducing the loss of life from radiation exposure 
and the spread of contamination in the event of a nuclear or 
radiological explosion also depends, in part, on DOE's capability to 
determine what parts of a U.S. city have been contaminated and provide 
this information to local and state governments to help evacuate 
citizens that are at risk of exposure and to administer medical aid. A 
number of critical capabilities and assets for preventing and 
responding to nuclear and radiological attacks reside at DOE's two 
Remote Sensing Laboratories. Despite efforts to disperse emergency 
response capabilities and assets to other regions, the Remote Sensing 
Laboratories still play a prominent role in DOE's ability to search for 
and locate nuclear or radiological devices and to minimize the 
consequences of a nuclear or radiological attack. The capabilities and 
assets that are unique to the laboratories include consequence 
management teams that provide information to state and local 
governments about the extent of contamination; the planes and 
helicopters used to locate lost or stolen nuclear or radiological 
materials and measure contamination levels; and a sophisticated mapping 
system that contains information on the locations of radiological 
sources in U.S. cities. In addition, the Remote Sensing Laboratories 
house specialized teams that are highly trained in clandestine search 
techniques and can conduct physically demanding search missions, such 
as maritime boarding. Despite the importance of the assets and 
capabilities located at these facilities, the Remote Sensing 
Laboratories are protected at DOE's lowest level of physical security. 
If DOE's emergency response capabilities were fully dispersed, then 
providing only minimal security may be sufficient. However, since 
several DOE emergency response capabilities remain unique to the Remote 
Sensing Laboratories, we believe that the physical security measures 
around those facilities may not be sufficient to protect their 
capabilities. We recognize that physical protection measures may be 
costly and that DOE security officials must prioritize where to spend 
limited resources in a fiscally constrained environment. However, in 
our view, a modest improvement in security at the Remote Sensing 
Laboratories, such as installing vehicle barriers, would significantly 
enhance the protection of highly valuable assets against a terrorist 
attack. 

In responding to a nuclear or radiological emergency, DOE must rely on 
all of the capabilities and assets at its disposal. One capability that 
remains underutilized is aerial background radiation surveys. These 
surveys establish baseline radiological data that can later be used to 
more quickly detect radiological threats in U.S. cities and to measure 
changes in contamination levels after a radiological attack in order to 
better focus and reduce cleanup costs. Despite their benefits and 
relatively low cost, there has been a survey of only one major 
metropolitan area. Since neither DOE nor DHS has embraced mission 
responsibility for performing the surveys, they have not evaluated the 
costs, benefits, and limitations of conducting the surveys for 
metropolitan areas that may be most at risk from a terrorist attack. 
While DOE has the expertise to conduct the surveys, the department is 
reluctant to encourage cities to request the surveys because it has a 
limited number of helicopters at its disposal, and they are generally 
reserved for emergency response missions. DHS, which is responsible for 
assisting state and local governments in preparing for a nuclear or 
radiological attack and has a $2.5 billion grant program to improve 
state and local governments' capacity to do so, has not considered 
aerial surveys to be part of its efforts to protect cities against such 
an attack. With no agency assuming responsibility for informing cities 
about the benefits of these surveys, U.S. cities are missing an 
opportunity to be better prepared for a terrorist attack. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

To better ensure that all capabilities and assets are available and 
used to prevent or minimize the consequence of a nuclear or 
radiological attack, we are making the following three recommendations: 

* The Administrator of NNSA, who implements the emergency response 
program within DOE, should review the physical security measures at the 
Remote Sensing Laboratories and determine whether additional measures 
should be taken to protect the facilities against a loss of critical 
emergency response capabilities or whether it is more cost-effective to 
fully disperse its capabilities and assets to multiple areas of the 
country. 

* The Administrator of NNSA and the Secretary of Homeland Security 
should evaluate the costs, benefits, and limitations of conducting 
aerial background radiation surveys of metropolitan areas, especially 
those that are considered to be most at risk of a terrorist attack; 
determine whether they would help prevent and respond to a nuclear or 
radiological attack; and report the results to the Congress. 

* If the Administrator of NNSA and the Secretary of Homeland Security 
determine that the surveys would help prevent and respond to a nuclear 
or radiological attack, the Secretaries should work together to develop 
a strategy for making greater use of the aerial surveys. In developing 
this strategy, the Secretary of Homeland Security should consider (1) 
the costs and benefits of funding these surveys through its existing 
grant program for state and local governments or through other means 
and (2) ways to inform state and local government officials about the 
benefits and limitations of aerial background radiation surveys so that 
these government officials can make their own decision about whether 
they would benefit from the surveys. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

We provided DOE and DHS with draft copies of this report for their 
review and comment. DHS agreed with our recommendations. DOE neither 
agreed nor disagreed with our recommendations, but raised concerns 
about one of our findings. In its written comments, DOE disagreed with 
our finding that the physical security of the Remote Sensing 
Laboratories may not be sufficient to protect them against terrorist 
attacks. According to DOE, physical security measures at these two 
facilities are sufficient because (1) two senior-level managers 
diligently reviewed the physical security measures around the 
facilities and believe that they are sufficient and (2) the 
laboratories are located on Air Force bases. We disagree with these 
rationales and stand behind our finding. First, while we acknowledge 
that current physical security measures for the two Remote Sensing 
Laboratories are consistent with DOE guidance, the laboratories are 
protected at the lowest level of physical security. This means that a 
facility can meet the requirements by having walls and doors but no 
other physical security measures. For example, the Remote Sensing 
Laboratory at Andrews Air Force Base does not have a fence or any 
vehicle barriers, but security officials told us that it still meets 
the minimum security requirements. Further, DOE's justification for 
protecting the laboratories at the lowest level of physical security is 
that their emergency response capabilities and assets have been 
dispersed across the country and are not concentrated at the 
laboratories. However, although we found that DOE had dispersed some of 
its emergency response capabilities and assets, a number of critical 
emergency response capabilities and assets still exist only at the 
laboratories. Because these capabilities and assets have not been fully 
dispersed, current physical security measures may not be sufficient for 
protecting the facilities against a terrorist attack. 

Second, the security officials responsible for developing security 
plans for the laboratories told us that they do not rely on Air Force 
personnel to protect the facility against a terrorist attack. As we 
reported, while the laboratories' location on Air Force bases may 
appear to provide an additional level of security, access onto Nellis 
and Andrews Air Force Bases is not strictly limited, and any person 
with a federal government identification may gain entry. Furthermore, 
guards at these installations do not inspect every vehicle. In fact, as 
discussed in our report, GAO staff gained access to the bases multiple 
times with little or no scrutiny of their identification, and their 
vehicles were never searched. 

In its written comments, DOE agreed that there may be value in 
performing additional aerial background radiation surveys. However, DOE 
was concerned that existing mission requirements may limit DOE's 
ability to conduct aerial surveys. While we recognize that DOE has 
limited resources to conduct aerial surveys, we note that the agency 
does have the expertise and that there is funding potentially available 
under DHS's grant program for state and local governments. If neither 
DOE nor DHS assume mission responsibility for conducting the aerial 
surveys and do not inform cities about the benefits of these surveys, 
U.S. cities will miss an important opportunity to be better prepared 
for a terrorist attack. 

DOE also noted that aerial background radiation surveys have 
limitations. For example, aerial surveys may not be able to detect well-
shielded radiological materials. We acknowledged these limitations in 
our report. However, despite the limitations, without baseline survey 
information from an aerial survey, law enforcement officials may lose 
valuable time when searching for nuclear or radiological threats by 
investigating pre-existing sources of radiation that are not harmful. 
In addition, if there were a nuclear or radiological attack, the lack 
of baseline radiological data would likely make the cleanup more costly 
and time consuming. 

DHS provided comments via e-mail. Comments from DOE's NNSA are 
reprinted in appendix I. DOE and DHS also provided technical comments, 
which we incorporated, as appropriate. 

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Energy, the 
Administrator of NNSA, the Secretary of Homeland Security, and 
interested congressional committees. We will also make copies available 
to others upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no 
charge on the GAO Web site at [Hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please 
contact me at (202) 512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov. Contact points for our 
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on 
the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to 
this report are listed in appendix II. 

Sincerely yours, 

Signed by:  

Gene Aloise: 
Director, Natural Resources and Environment: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Comments from the Department of Energy : 

Department of Energy: 
National Nuclear Security Administration: 
Washington; DC 20585: 

August 31, 2006: 

Mr. Gene Aloise: 
Director, 
Natural Resources and Environment: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, D.C. 20548: 

Dear Mr. Aloise: 

The National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) appreciates the 
opportunity to review the Government Accountability Office's (GAO) 
draft report, "Combating Nuclear Terrorism: Federal Efforts to Respond 
to Nuclear and Radiological Threats and to Protect Emergency Response 
Capabilities Could be Strengthened." We understand that this work was 
done at the request of the House's Chairman, Subcommittee on National 
Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations, Committee on 
Government Reform to determine our capabilities to prevent potential 
nuclear attacks, the physical security measures at two of our 
facilities, and the benefits of conducting background radiation 
surveys. 

While NNSA appreciates the work performed by GAO, we categorically 
reject the contention that physical security at two of our facilities 
may not be sufficient for protecting against terrorist attacks. The 
reason for this rejection is twofold. (1) The physical security posture 
for the two facilities (and everything related to that posture) was 
reviewed and approved by two senior level managers-the Associate 
Administrator for Emergency Operations, the overseer of one of only two 
mission operational elements within NNSA, and the Chief, Defense 
Nuclear Security/Associate Administrator for Defense Nuclear Security. 
Both of these senior managers and their respective staffs performed all 
due diligence related to the current security posture of the facilities 
in question and believe that both have sufficient physical security. 
(2) The facilities are tenant organizations aboard major military 
installations that have significant security arrangements of their own. 

Regarding the discussion related to background surveys, NNSA agrees 
that there may be value in performing background surveys. However, the 
tempo of our operational requirements may preclude us from developing 
an effective schedule of such services. Additionally, with or without a 
background survey, the probability of finding a low activity 
radiological source or highly shielded source from the air is very low. 
Equally, with or without a background survey, the probability of 
finding a high activity source from the air is high. 

We appreciate GAO's acknowledgment that NNSA has a unique capability. 
We recognize that capability and take special care to manage and 
protect our assets judiciously. 

NNSA recommends to GAO that since NNSA is a separately organized 
agency, albeit within the Department of Energy, the report and 
corresponding recommendations be directed to the Administrator, 
National Nuclear Security Administration. Should you have any questions 
related to this response, please contact Richard Speidel, Director, 
Policy and Internal Controls Management. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Michael C. Kane: 
Associate Administrator for Management and Administration: 

cc: Tom D'Agostino, Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs Joe Krol, 
Associate Administrator for Emergency Response William Desmond, 
Associate Administrator for Defense Nuclear Security Karen Boardman, 
Director, Service Center: 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Gene Aloise, (202) 512-3841 or a [Hyperlink, aloisee@gao.gov] 
loisee@gao.gov: 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the contact named above, Leland Cogliani, John Delicath, 
Mattias Fenton, Glen Levis, Greg Marchand, Keith Rhodes, Rebecca Shea, 
and Ned Woodward made significant contributions to this report. 

(360657): 

FOOTNOTES 

[1] DOE uses different levels of physical protection to secure its 
facilities. The levels of protection are specific to the type of 
security interests and the significance of the targets. They are 
provided in a graded fashion in accordance with potential risks. 

[2] DOE was established in 1977. 

[3] Different types of radioactive material that could be used by 
terrorists for a dirty bomb include cesium-137, cobalt-60, plutonium- 
238, plutonium-239, and strontium-90. 

[4] The Nevada Test Site is approximately 1,375 square miles--larger 
than the state of Rhode Island. Since it is isolated and far from 
populated areas, DOE uses the site for, among other things, hazardous 
chemical spill testing, emergency response training, conventional 
weapons testing, and waste management and environmental studies. 

[5] The Radiological Assistance Program (RAP) teams are located in nine 
different parts of the country, including one at the Remote Sensing 
Laboratory at Andrews and eight additional emergency response sites. 

[6] These helicopters are the same ones used by the search teams to 
find nuclear or radiological devices in urban areas. 

[7] Department of Energy, Office of Security and Safety Performance 
Assurance, Independent Oversight Inspection of the Radiological 
Assistance Program (Washington, D.C., April 2006). 

[8] DOE Order 470.4-2, Physical Protection (Aug. 26, 2005). 

[9] According to the Environmental Protection Agency, long-term 
exposure to radium increases the risk of developing diseases such as 
lymphoma, bone cancer, and leukemia. 

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