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entitled 'Aviation Security: Screener Training and Performance 
Measurement Strengthened, but More Work Remains' which was released on 
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Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Aviation, Committee on 
Transportation and Infrastructure, House of Representatives:

United States Government Accountability Office:

GAO:

May 2005:

Aviation Security:

Screener Training and Performance Measurement Strengthened, but More 
Work Remains:

GAO-05-457:

GAO Highlights:

Highlights of GAO-05-457, a report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on 
Aviation, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, House of 
Representatives: 

Why GAO Did This Study:

The screening of airport passengers and their checked baggage is a 
critical component in securing our nation’s commercial aviation system. 
Since May 2003, GAO has issued six products related to screener 
training and performance. This report updates the information presented 
in the prior products and incorporates results from GAO’s survey of 155 
Federal Security Directors—the ranking Transportation Security 
Administration (TSA) authority responsible for the leadership and 
coordination of TSA security activities at the nation’s commercial 
airports. Specifically, this report addresses (1) actions TSA has taken 
to enhance training for passenger and checked baggage screeners and 
screening supervisors, (2) how TSA ensures that screeners complete 
required training, and (3) actions TSA has taken to measure and enhance 
screener performance in detecting threat objects. 

What GAO Found:

TSA has initiated a number of actions designed to enhance screener 
training, such as updating the basic screener training course. TSA also 
established a recurrent training requirement and introduced the Online 
Learning Center, which makes self-guided training courses available 
over TSA’s intranet and the Internet. Even with these efforts, Federal 
Security Directors reported that insufficient screener staffing and a 
lack of high-speed Internet/intranet connectivity at some training 
facilities have made it difficult to fully utilize training programs 
and to meet the recurrent training requirement of 3 hours per week, 
averaged over a quarter year, within regular duty hours. TSA 
acknowledged that challenges exist in recurrent training delivery and 
is taking steps to address these challenges, including factoring 
training into workforce planning efforts and distributing training 
through written materials and CD-ROMs. However, TSA has not established 
a plan prioritizing the deployment of high-speed Internet/intranet 
connectivity to all airport training facilities to facilitate screener 
access to training materials. 

TSA lacks adequate internal controls to provide reasonable assurance 
that screeners receive legislatively mandated basic and remedial 
training, and to monitor its recurrent training program. Specifically, 
TSA policy does not clearly specify the responsibility for ensuring 
that screeners have completed all required training. In addition, TSA 
officials have no formal policies or methods for monitoring the 
completion of required training and were unable to provide 
documentation identifying the completion of remedial training. 

TSA has implemented and strengthened efforts to measure and enhance 
screener performance. For example, TSA has increased the number of 
covert tests it conducts at airports, which test screeners’ ability to 
detect threat objects on passengers, in their carry-on baggage, and in 
checked baggage. These tests identified that overall, weaknesses and 
vulnerabilities continue to exist in passenger and checked baggage 
screening systems at airports of all sizes, at airports with federal 
screeners, and at airports with private-sector screeners. While these 
test results are an indicator of performance, they cannot solely be 
used as a comprehensive measure of any airport’s screening performance 
or any individual screener’s performance. We also found that TSA’s 
efforts to measure and enhance screener performance have primarily 
focused on passenger screening, not checked baggage screening. For 
example, TSA only uses threat image software on passenger screening X-
ray machines, and the recertification testing program does not include 
an image recognition module for checked baggage screeners. TSA is 
taking steps to address the overall imbalance in passenger and checked 
baggage screening performance data. TSA also established performance 
indexes for the passenger and checked baggage screening systems, to 
identify an overall desired level of performance. However, TSA has not 
established performance targets for each of the component indicators 
that make up the performance indexes, including performance targets for 
covert testing. TSA plans to finalize these targets by the end of 
fiscal year 2005. 

What GAO Recommends:

GAO is recommending that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct TSA 
to develop a plan for completing the deployment of high-speed 
connectivity at airport training facilities, and establish and 
communicate appropriate internal controls for monitoring the completion 
of training. 

TSA reviewed a draft of this report and generally agreed with GAO’s 
findings and recommendations. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-457. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
the link above. For more information, contact Cathleen Berrick, 202-512-
8777, berrickc@gao.gov. 

[End of section]

Contents:

Letter:

Results in Brief:

Background:

TSA Has Enhanced and Expanded Training, but Some Screeners Have 
Encountered Difficulty Accessing and Completing Recurrent Training:

TSA Lacks Adequate Controls to Provide Reasonable Assurance That 
Screeners Receive Required Training:

Progress Has Been Made in Implementing Tools to Measure and Enhance 
Screener Performance, but Key Performance Targets Have Not Been 
Finalized:

Conclusions:

Recommendations for Executive Action:

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:

Appendix I: Summary of Previous Findings Related to Screener Training 
and Performance:

Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:

Appendix III: TSA Screener Training Tools Designed to Help Improve 
Screener Performance:

Appendix IV: Summary of TSA's Short-Term Action Items for Strengthening 
Passenger Screener Performance:

Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:

Appendix VI: GAO Contacts and Acknowledgments:

Tables:

Table 1: Categories of Required Training Provided to TSA Screeners:

Table 2: Training Needed to Enhance Screener Supervision, as Reported 
by FSDs:

Table 3: Checkpoint and Checked Baggage Tests Conducted by OIAPR, 
September 10, 2002-September 30, 2004:

Table 4: Modules Included in Recertification Knowledge and Skills 
Assessment:

Table 5: Screener Recertification Module Testing Percentage Pass Rates, 
October 2003--March 2004:

Table 6: Recertification Testing Modules by Screening Function:

Table 7: Components of TSA's Performance Indexes:

Figures:

Figure 1: Commercial Airports by Airport Security Category as of 
December 2003:

Figure 2: Passenger Checkpoint and Checked Baggage Screening 
Operations: 

Figure 3: Description of Screening-Related Positions:

Figure 4: Newly Hired Screeners Trained as Dual-Function Screeners 
between April 1, 2004, and September 1, 2004:

Figure 5: Percentage of Airports Reported to Have High-Speed 
Connectivity for Training Purposes as of October 2004:

Figure 6: Screener Recertification Results, October 2003-March 2004:

Abbreviations:

ATSA: Aviation and Transportation Security Act: 

DHS: Department of Homeland Security:

DOT: Department of Transportation: 

EDS: explosive detection system: 

ETD: electronic trace detection: 

FAA: Federal Aviation Administration: 

FSD: Federal Security Director: 

IED: improvised explosive device: 

MBS: modular bomb set: 

MTAT: Mobile Training Assist Team: 

OIAPR: Office of Internal Affairs and Program Review: 

OIG: Office of the Inspector General:

SIDA: security identification display area: 

TIP: Threat Image Projection: 

TSA: Transportation Security Administration:

United States Government Accountability Office:

Washington, DC 20548:

May 2, 2005:

The Honorable John Mica: 
Chairman, Subcommittee on Aviation: 
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure: 
House of Representatives:

Dear Mr. Chairman:

The screening of airport passengers and their checked baggage is a 
critical component in securing our nation's commercial aviation system. 
In an effort to strengthen the security of commercial aviation, the 
President signed the Aviation and Transportation Security Act on 
November 19, 2001. The act created the Transportation Security 
Administration (TSA) and mandated actions designed to strengthen 
aviation security, including requiring that TSA assume responsibility 
for conducting passenger and checked baggage screening at over 450 
commercial airports in the United States by November 19, 2002. It has 
been over 2 years since TSA assumed this responsibility, and the agency 
has spent billions of dollars and implemented a wide range of 
initiatives to enhance its passenger and checked baggage screening 
operations. Despite the attention to passenger and checked baggage 
screening operations, however, concerns about the effectiveness of the 
screening system remain. For example, covert testing conducted by TSA's 
Office of Internal Affairs and Program Review and the Department of 
Homeland Security's (DHS) Office of Inspector General identified 
weaknesses in the ability of screeners to detect threat objects. (The 
results of our analysis of TSA's covert testing data and test program 
are included in a separate classified GAO report.)

To determine the progress TSA has made in strengthening its passenger 
and checked baggage screening operations, the Subcommittee on Aviation, 
House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, requested that we 
examine TSA efforts to train screeners and to measure and enhance 
screener performance. Since we began our work in May 2003, we have 
issued six products that address issues related to screener training 
and performance, including four to this Subcommittee (see app. I). This 
report updates some of the information presented in our prior products. 
In addition, it incorporates results from our surveys of 155 Federal 
Security Directors (FSD).[Footnote 1] The surveys were designed to 
obtain information related to, among other issues, TSA's efforts to 
train screeners and supervisors and assess screener performance in 
detecting threat objects. Specifically, this report addresses the 
following questions: (1) What actions has TSA taken to enhance training 
for passenger and checked baggage screeners and screening supervisors? 
(2) How does TSA ensure that screeners complete required training? (3) 
What actions has TSA taken to measure and enhance screener performance 
in detecting threat objects?

In conducting our work, we reviewed TSA documentation related to 
screener training requirements and performance testing. We also 
analyzed data from our survey responses from all 155 FSDs about 
screener training, supervision and performance. We also visited 29 
airports of various sizes and geographic locations to obtain a cross-
section of all airports, including the 5 airports with private-sector 
screeners.[Footnote 2] To gain a better understanding of training and 
performance issues, during these visits, we interviewed FSDs, members 
of their management teams, passenger and checked baggage screeners, and 
airport officials. However, information obtained during these visits 
cannot be generalized to all airports across the nation. Additionally, 
we interviewed officials at TSA headquarters and TSA's transportation 
security laboratory about their experiences with training and screener 
performance. We compared TSA practices and procedures for monitoring 
completion of training with the Comptroller General's Standards for 
Internal Control in the Federal Government. We assessed the reliability 
of the data we acquired from TSA regarding screener testing and 
training completion, and found the data to be sufficiently reliable for 
our purposes. A more detailed description of our scope and methodology 
is contained in appendix II. 

We conducted our work from May 2003 through April 2005 in accordance 
with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Results in Brief:

TSA has initiated a number of actions designed to enhance passenger 
screener, checked baggage screener, and screener supervisor training. 
However, at some airports screeners encountered difficulty accessing 
and completing recurrent (refresher) training because of technological 
and staffing constraints. Among the actions TSA has taken to enhance 
training are changes and updates to the basic training program. For 
example, TSA added a modular dual-function course during basic training 
that covers passenger and checked baggage screening functions and 
allows newly hired screeners to perform either function upon completion 
of the training. TSA also established a requirement for recurrent 
screener training and developed and introduced the Online Learning 
Center, which makes self-guided training courses available to employees 
over TSA's intranet and the Internet. In addition, TSA has provided 
Federal Security Directors with hands-on training tools to use for 
local recurrent training and testing. Finally, TSA has taken steps to 
provide leadership and technical training to Screening Supervisors. 
Despite these improvements, some Federal Security Directors, in 
response to open-ended survey questions, identified a desire for more 
training in specific areas, including leadership, communication, and 
supervision. Further in survey responses, Federal Security Directors 
reported that largely because of insufficient screener staffing, 
screeners were not always able to meet the recurrent training 
requirement within regular duty hours. Federal Security Directors at 
some airports also reported ongoing problems with a lack of high-speed 
Internet/intranet connectivity, which severely limited screener access 
to the Online Learning Center and diminished its value as a learning 
tool. As of October 2004, nearly half of the screener workforce did not 
have high-speed access to the Online Learning Center at their training 
facility. TSA has acknowledged that challenges exist in recurrent 
screener training delivery and is taking steps to address these 
challenges, including factoring training requirements into workforce 
planning efforts and distributing training through written materials 
and CD-ROMs until full Internet/intranet connectivity is achieved. 
However, TSA does not have a plan for prioritizing and scheduling the 
deployment of high-speed connectivity to all airport training 
facilities once funding is available. The absence of such a plan limits 
TSA's ability to make prudent decisions about how to move forward with 
deploying connectivity to all airports to provide screeners access to 
online training. 

TSA lacks adequate internal controls to provide reasonable assurance 
that screeners are receiving legislatively mandated basic and remedial 
training, and to monitor the status of its recurrent training program. 
The Comptroller General's Standards for Internal Control call for (1) 
areas of authority and responsibility to be clearly defined and 
appropriate lines of reporting established, (2) transactions and other 
significant events to be documented clearly and documentation to be 
readily available for examination, and (3) controls generally to be 
designed to ensure that ongoing monitoring occurs in the course of 
normal operations.[Footnote 3] In addition, the standards also require 
that information be communicated within an organization to enable 
individuals to carry out their internal control responsibilities. 
However, our review of TSA's training program noted weaknesses in each 
of these control areas. First, TSA policy does not clearly define the 
responsibility for ensuring that screeners have completed all required 
training. Second, TSA officials were unable to produce documentation of 
remedial training completion for our examination. Third, TSA has no 
formal policies for monitoring the completion of required training. 
Moreover, because of the lack of high-speed Internet/intranet 
connectivity at some airports, staff had to manually input training 
data that would otherwise be recorded automatically by the Online 
Learning Center, making it challenging for some airports to keep 
accurate and up-to-date training records. TSA headquarters officials 
acknowledged that it can be difficult for airports to keep the Online 
Learning Center up-to-date with the most recent training records 
without high-speed connectivity. 

TSA has improved its efforts to measure and enhance screener 
performance. In September 2003, we first reported on the need for TSA 
to strengthen its efforts to measure and enhance screener performance. 
At that time, TSA had collected limited data on screener performance. 
Specifically, limited covert testing--unannounced undercover tests in 
which TSA agents attempt to pass threat objects through screening 
checkpoints and in checked baggage--had been performed, the Threat 
Image Projection system was not fully operational,[Footnote 4] and TSA 
had not fully implemented the annual screener recertification 
program.[Footnote 5] Since then, TSA has implemented and strengthened 
efforts to collect screener performance data as part of its overall 
effort to enhance screener performance. For example, TSA has increased 
the number of covert tests it conducts at airports. These tests have 
identified that overall, weaknesses and vulnerabilities continue to 
exist in the passenger and checked baggage screening systems at 
airports of all sizes, at airports with federal screeners, and at 
airports with private-sector screeners. While these test results are an 
indicator of screener performance, they cannot solely be used as a 
comprehensive measure of any airport's screening performance or any 
individual screener's performance. TSA has also implemented other 
efforts to measure and enhance screener performance. However, these 
efforts have primarily focused on passenger screening, not checked 
baggage screening. Specifically, the Threat Image Projection system is 
only available for passenger screening; the recertification testing 
program does not include an image recognition module for checked 
baggage screeners; and the screener performance improvement study 
focused solely on passenger screeners. TSA is taking steps to address 
the overall imbalance in passenger and baggage screening performance 
data, including working toward implementing the Threat Image Projection 
system for checked baggage screening and developing an image 
recognition module for checked baggage screener recertification. TSA 
has also implemented a number of other improvements, which it 
identified in a passenger screener performance improvement study and 
incorporated into a screener performance improvement plan. Furthermore, 
TSA has established two performance indexes for the screening systems-
-one for passenger and one for checked baggage screening.[Footnote 6] 
These indexes measure overall performance through a composite of 
component indicators. However, TSA has not established performance 
targets for each of the component indicators--such as covert testing--
which would allow it to draw more meaningful conclusions about its 
performance and most effectively direct its improvement efforts. 
Although TSA has not yet established performance targets for each of 
the component indicators, TSA plans to finalize performance targets for 
the indicators by the end of fiscal year 2005. 

Certain information we obtained and analyzed regarding screener 
training and performance is classified or is considered by TSA to be 
sensitive security information. Accordingly, the results of our review 
of this information are not included in this report.[Footnote 7]

To help ensure access to and completion of required training, we are 
making recommendations to the Secretary of the Department of Homeland 
Security to direct the Assistant Secretary, Transportation Security 
Administration, to (1) develop a plan for completing the deployment of 
high-speed Internet/intranet connectivity to all TSA's airport training 
facilities and (2) establish appropriate responsibilities and other 
internal controls for monitoring and documenting screener compliance 
with training requirements. 

We provided a draft copy of this report to DHS for review. DHS, in its 
written comments, generally concurred with the findings and 
recommendations in the report and agreed that efforts to implement our 
recommendations are critical to successful passenger and checked 
baggage screening training and performance. DHS described some actions 
TSA had taken or planned to take to implement these recommendations. 
DHS also stated that TSA had already developed a plan for prioritizing 
and scheduling the deployment of high-speed Internet/intranet 
connectivity to all TSA airport training facilities. However, although 
we requested a copy of the plan several times during our review and 
after receiving written comments from DHS, TSA did not provide us with 
a copy of this plan. Therefore, we cannot assess the extent to which 
the plan DHS referenced in its written comments fulfills our 
recommendation. Additionally, DHS stated that it is taking steps to 
define responsibilities for monitoring the completion of required 
training, and to insert this accountability into performance plans of 
all TSA supervisors. The full text of DHS's comments is included in 
appendix V. 

Background:

The performance of passenger and checked baggage screeners in detecting 
threat objects at the nation's airports has been a long-standing 
concern. In 1978, screeners failed to detect 13 percent of the 
potentially dangerous objects that Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA) agents carried through airport screening checkpoints during 
tests. In 1987, screeners did not detect 20 percent of the objects in 
similar tests. In tests conducted during the late 1990s, as the testing 
objects became more realistic, screeners' abilities to detect dangerous 
objects declined further. In April 2004, we, along with the DHS Office 
of the Inspector General (OIG), testified that the performance of 
screeners continued to be a concern. More recent tests conducted by 
TSA's Office of Internal Affairs and Program Review (OIAPR) also 
identified weaknesses in the ability of screeners to detect threat 
objects, and separate DHS OIG tests identified comparable screener 
performance weaknesses. In its July 2004 report, The National 
Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, known widely as 
the 9/11 Commission, also identified the need to improve screener 
performance and to better understand the reasons for performance 
problems.[Footnote 8]

After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the President signed 
the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA) into law on 
November 19, 2001, with the primary goal of strengthening the security 
of the nation's aviation system. ATSA created TSA as an agency with 
responsibility for securing all modes of transportation, including 
aviation.[Footnote 9] As part of this responsibility, TSA oversees 
security operations at the nation's more than 450 commercial airports, 
including passenger and checked baggage screening operations. Prior to 
the passage of ATSA, air carriers were responsible for screening 
passengers and checked baggage, and most used private security firms to 
perform this function. FAA was responsible for ensuring compliance with 
screening regulations. 

Today, TSA security activities at airports are overseen by FSDs. Each 
FSD is responsible for overseeing security activities, including 
passenger and checked baggage screening, at one or more commercial 
airports. TSA classifies the over 450 commercial airports in the United 
States into one of five security risk categories (X, I, II, III, and 
IV) based on various factors, such as the total number of takeoffs and 
landings annually, the extent to which passengers are screened at the 
airport, and other special security considerations. In general, 
category X airports have the largest number of passenger boardings and 
category IV airports have the smallest. TSA periodically reviews 
airports in each category and, if appropriate, updates airport 
categorizations to reflect current operations. Figure 1 shows the 
number of commercial airports by airport security category as of 
December 2003. 

Figure 1: Commercial Airports by Airport Security Category as of 
December 2003:

[See PDF for image]

Note: TSA periodically reviews and updates airport categories to 
reflect current operations. We used the categories in place in December 
2003 to conduct our analyses during this review. 

[End of figure]

In addition to establishing TSA and giving it responsibility for 
passenger and checked baggage screening operations, ATSA set forth 
specific enhancements to screening operations for TSA to implement, 
with deadlines for completing many of them. These requirements included:

* assuming responsibility for screeners and screening operations at 
more than 450 commercial airports by November 19, 2002;

* establishing a basic screener training program composed of a minimum 
of 40 hours of classroom instruction and 60 hours of on-the-job 
training;

* conducting an annual proficiency review of all screeners;

* conducting operational testing of screeners;[Footnote 10]

* requiring remedial training for any screener who fails an operational 
test; and:

* screening all checked baggage for explosives using explosives 
detection systems by December 31, 2002.[Footnote 11]

Passenger screening is a process by which authorized TSA personnel 
inspect individuals and property to deter and prevent the carriage of 
any unauthorized explosive, incendiary, weapon, or other dangerous item 
aboard an aircraft or into a sterile area.[Footnote 12] Passenger 
screeners must inspect individuals for prohibited items at designated 
screening locations.[Footnote 13] The four passenger screening 
functions are:

* X-ray screening of property,

* walk-through metal detector screening of individuals,

* hand-wand or pat-down screening of individuals, and:

* physical search of property and trace detection for explosives. 

Checked baggage screening is a process by which authorized security 
screening personnel inspect checked baggage to deter, detect, and 
prevent the carriage of any unauthorized explosive, incendiary, or 
weapon onboard an aircraft. Checked baggage screening is accomplished 
through the use of explosive detection systems[Footnote 14] (EDS) or 
explosive trace detection (ETD) systems,[Footnote 15] and through the 
use of alternative means, such as manual searches, K-9 teams, and 
positive passenger bag match,[Footnote 16] when EDS and ETD systems are 
unavailable on a temporary basis. Figure 2 provides an illustration of 
passenger and checked baggage screening operations. 

Figure 2: Passenger Checkpoint and Checked Baggage Screening Operations:

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

There are several positions within TSA for employees that perform and 
directly supervise passenger and checked baggage screening functions. 
Figure 3 provides a description of these positions. 

Figure 3: Description of Screening-Related Positions:

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

To prepare screeners to perform screening functions, to keep their 
skills current, and to address performance deficiencies, TSA provides 
three categories of required screener training. Table 1 provides a 
description of the required training. 

Table 1: Categories of Required Training Provided to TSA Screeners:

Category of training: Basic training; 
Description of training requirement: ATSA requires newly hired 
screeners to complete basic training composed of a minimum of 40 hours 
of classroom instruction and 60 hours of on-the-job training before 
they independently perform screening functions. 

Category of training: Recurrent training; 
Description of training requirement: TSA policy requires screeners to 
complete 3 hours of skills refresher training per week averaged over 
each quarter. 

Category of training: Remedial training; 
Description of training requirement: ATSA requires screeners who fail 
any operational test to complete remedial training on the function they 
failed before they resume performing that function. 

Source: ATSA and TSA. 

[End of table]

In September 2003, we reported on our preliminary observations of TSA's 
efforts to ensure that screeners were effectively trained and 
supervised and to measure screener performance.[Footnote 17] We found 
that TSA had established and deployed a basic screener training program 
and required remedial training but had not fully developed or deployed 
a recurrent training program for screeners or supervisors. We also 
reported that TSA had collected limited data to measure screener 
performance. Specifically, TSA had conducted limited covert testing, 
the Threat Image Projection System was not fully operational, and TSA 
had not implemented the annual screener proficiency testing required by 
ATSA. In subsequent products, we reported progress TSA had made in 
these areas and challenges TSA continued to face in making training 
available to screeners and in measuring and enhancing screener 
performance. A summary of our specific findings is included in appendix 
I. 

TSA Has Enhanced and Expanded Training, but Some Screeners Have 
Encountered Difficulty Accessing and Completing Recurrent Training:

TSA has taken a number of actions to enhance the training of screeners 
and Screening Supervisors but has encountered difficulties in providing 
access to recurrent training. TSA has enhanced basic training by, among 
other things, adding a dual-function (passenger and checked baggage) 
screening course for new employees. Furthermore, in response to the 
need for frequent and ongoing training, TSA has implemented an Online 
Learning Center with self-guided training courses available to 
employees over TSA's intranet and the Internet and developed and 
deployed a number of hands-on training tools.[Footnote 18] Moreover, 
TSA now requires screeners to participate in 3 hours of recurrent 
training per week, averaged over each quarter year. TSA has also 
implemented leadership and technical training programs for Screening 
Supervisors. However, some FSDs, in response to open-ended survey 
questions, identified a desire for more training in specific areas, 
including leadership, communication, and supervision. Further, despite 
the progress TSA has made in enhancing and expanding screener and 
supervisory training, TSA has faced challenges in providing access to 
recurrent training. FSDs reported that insufficient staffing and a lack 
of high-speed Internet/intranet connectivity at some training 
facilities have made it difficult to fully utilize these programs and 
to meet training requirements. TSA has acknowledged that challenges 
exist in recurrent screener training delivery and is taking steps to 
address these challenges, including factoring training requirements 
into workforce planning efforts and distributing training through 
written materials and CD-ROMs until full Internet/intranet connectivity 
is achieved. However, TSA does not have a plan for prioritizing and 
scheduling the deployment of high-speed connectivity to all airport 
training facilities once funding is available. The absence of such a 
plan limits TSA's ability to make prudent decisions about how to move 
forward with deploying connectivity to all airports to provide 
screeners access to online training. 

TSA Has Enhanced Basic Screener Training:

TSA has enhanced its basic screener training program by updating the 
training to reflect changes to standard operating procedures, deploying 
a new dual-function (passenger and checked baggage screening) basic 
training curriculum, and allowing the option of training delivery by 
local staff. As required by ATSA, TSA established a basic training 
program for screeners composed of a minimum of 40 hours of classroom 
instruction and 60 hours of on-the-job training. TSA also updated the 
initial basic screener training courses at the end of 2003 to 
incorporate changes to standard operating procedures and directives, 
which contain detailed information on how to perform TSA-approved 
screening methods. However, a recent study by the DHS OIG found that 
while incorporating the standard operating procedures into the 
curricula was a positive step, a number of screener job tasks were 
incompletely addressed in or were absent from the basic training 
courses.[Footnote 19]

In addition to updates to the training curriculum, in April 2004, TSA 
developed and implemented a new basic screener training program, dual-
function screener training that covers the technical aspects of both 
passenger and checked baggage screening. Initially, new hire basic 
training was performed by a contractor and provided a screener with 
training in either passenger or checked baggage screening functions. A 
screener could then receive basic training in the other function later, 
at the discretion of the FSD, but could not be trained in both 
functions immediately upon hire. The new dual-training program is 
modular in design. Thus, FSDs can chose whether newly hired screeners 
will receive instruction in one or both of the screening functions 
during the initial training. In addition, the individual modules can 
also be used to provide recurrent training, such as refreshing checked 
baggage screening skills for a screener who has worked predominately as 
a passenger screener. TSA officials stated that this new approach 
provides the optimum training solution based on the specific needs of 
each airport and reflects the fact that at some airports the FSD does 
not require all screeners to be fully trained in both passenger and 
checked baggage screening functions. 

Some FSDs, particularly those at smaller airports, have made use of the 
flexibility offered by the modular design of the new course to train 
screeners immediately upon hire in both passenger and checked baggage 
screening functions. Such training up front allows FSDs to use 
screeners for either the passenger or the checked baggage screening 
function, immediately upon completion of basic training. Figure 4 shows 
that 58 percent (3,324) of newly hired screeners trained between April 
1, 2004, and September 1, 2004, had completed the dual-function 
training. 

Figure 4: Newly Hired Screeners Trained as Dual-Function Screeners 
between April 1, 2004, and September 1, 2004:

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

In April 2004, TSA also provided FSDs with the flexibility to deliver 
basic screener training using local instructors. TSA's Workforce 
Performance and Training Office developed basic screener training 
internally, and initially, contractors delivered all of the basic 
training. Since then, TSA has provided FSDs with the discretion to 
provide the training using local TSA employees or to use contractors. 
The flexibility to use local employees allows FSDs and members of the 
screener workforce to leverage their first-hand screening knowledge and 
experience and address situations unique to individual 
airports.[Footnote 20] As of December 10, 2004, TSA had trained 1,021 
local FSD staff (representing 218 airports) in how to instruct the dual-
function screener training course. TSA officials stated that they 
expect the use of TSA-approved instructors to increase over time. 

TSA Has Deployed Recurrent Screener Training and Provided Additional 
Training Tools, but Some FSDs Identified the Need for More Courses:

TSA has taken several steps to deploy a recurrent screener training 
program, including implementing the Online Learning Center--which 
includes several recurrent training modules developed by TSA--
implementing a recurrent training requirement, and providing hands-on 
training tools. According to TSA, comprehensive and frequent training 
is key to a screener's ability to detect threat objects. In September 
2003, we reported that TSA had not fully developed or deployed a 
recurrent training program for passenger screeners. At that time, some 
FSDs expressed concern with the lack of training available to the 
screener workforce, and in the absence of headquarters-provided 
training, they were developing and implementing locally based recurrent 
training programs. Similar to our findings, TSA's April 2004 consultant 
study reported that most FSDs and their staffs were generally 
unsatisfied with the training support provided by 
headquarters.[Footnote 21] Specifically, the study found that:

"Numerous interviews revealed concerns with training curriculum, 
communication, and coordination issues that directly affect security 
screening. Unsatisfied with the quantity and breadth of topics, many 
Training Coordinators have developed supplementary lectures on both 
security and non-security related topics. These additional 
lectures…have been very highly received by screeners."

In October 2003, TSA introduced the Online Learning Center to provide 
screeners with remote access to self-guided training courses. As of 
September 14, 2004, TSA had provided access to over 550 training 
courses via the Online Learning Center and made the system available 
via the Internet and its intranet. TSA also developed and deployed a 
number of hands-on training modules and associated training tools for 
screeners at airports nationwide. These training modules cover topics 
including hand-wanding and pat-down techniques, physical bag searches, 
X-ray images, prohibited items, and customer service. Additionally, TSA 
instituted another module for the Online Learning Center called Threat 
in the Spotlight, that, based on intelligence TSA receives, provides 
screeners with the latest in threat information regarding terrorist 
attempts to get threat objects past screening checkpoints. Appendix III 
provides a summary of the recurrent training tools TSA has deployed to 
airports and the modules currently under development. 

In December 2003, TSA issued a directive requiring screeners to receive 
3 hours of recurrent training per week averaged over a quarter year. 
One hour is required to be devoted to X-ray image interpretation and 
the other 2 hours to screening techniques, review of standard operating 
procedures, or other mandatory administrative training, such as ethics 
and privacy act training. 

In January 2004, TSA provided FSDs with additional tools to facilitate 
and enhance screener training. Specifically, TSA provided airports with 
at least one modular bomb set (MBS II) kit--containing components of an 
improvised explosive device--and one weapons training kit, in part 
because screeners had consistently told TSA's OIAPR inspectors that 
they would like more training with objects similar to ones used in 
covert testing.[Footnote 22]

Although TSA has made progress with the implementation of recurrent 
training, some FSDs identified the need for several additional courses, 
including courses that address more realistic threats. TSA acknowledged 
that additional screener training is needed, and officials stated that 
the agency is in the process of developing new and improved screener 
training, including additional recurrent training modules (see app. 
III). 

TSA Provides Leadership and Technical Training for Supervisors, but 
Some FSDs Would Like More Training for Screening Supervisors and Lead 
Screeners:

TSA has arranged for leadership training for screening supervisors 
through the Department of Agriculture Graduate School and has developed 
leadership and technical training courses for screening supervisors. 
However, some FSDs reported the need for more training for Screening 
Supervisors and Lead Screeners. The quality of Screening Supervisors 
has been a long-standing concern. In testifying before the 9/11 
Commission in May 2003, a former FAA Assistant Administrator for Civil 
Aviation Security stated that following a series of covert tests at 
screening checkpoints to determine which were strongest, which were 
weakest, and why, invariably the checkpoint seemed to be as strong or 
as weak as the supervisor who was running it. Similarly, TSA's OIAPR 
identified a lack of supervisory training as a cause for screener 
covert testing failures. Further, in a July 2003 internal study of 
screener performance, TSA identified poor supervision at the screening 
checkpoints as a cause for screener performance problems. In 
particular, TSA acknowledged that many Lead Screeners, Screening 
Supervisors, and Screening Managers did not demonstrate supervisory and 
management skills (i.e., mentoring, coaching, and positive 
reinforcement) and provided little or no timely feedback to guide and 
improve screener performance. In addition, the internal study found 
that because of poor supervision at the checkpoint, supervisors or 
peers were not correcting incorrect procedures, optimal performance 
received little reinforcement, and not enough breaks were provided to 
screeners. A September 2004 report by the DHS OIG supported these 
findings, noting that Screening Supervisors and Screening Managers 
needed to be more attentive in identifying and correcting improper or 
inadequate screener performance.[Footnote 23]

TSA recognizes the importance of Screener Supervisors and has 
established training programs to enhance their performance and 
effectiveness. In September 2003, we reported that TSA had begun 
working with the Department of Agriculture Graduate School to tailor 
the school's off-the-shelf supervisory course to meet the specific 
needs of Screening Supervisors, and had started training the existing 
supervisors at that time through this course until the customized 
course was fielded. According to TSA's training records, as of 
September 2004, about 3,800 Screening Supervisors had completed the 
course--approximately 92 percent of current Screening Supervisors. In 
response to our survey, one FSD noted that the supervisory training was 
long overdue because most of the supervisors had no prior federal 
service or, in some cases, no leadership experience. This FSD also 
noted that "leadership and supervisory skills should be continuously 
honed; thus, the development of our supervisors should be an extended 
and sequential program with numerous opportunities to develop skills--
not just a one-time class."

In addition to the Department of Agriculture Graduate School course, 
TSA's Online Learning Center includes over 60 supervisory courses 
designed to develop leadership and coaching skills. In April 2004, TSA 
included in the Online Learning Center a Web-based technical training 
course--required for all Lead Screeners and Screening Supervisors. This 
course covers technical issues, such as resolving alarms at screening 
checkpoints. TSA introduced this course to the field in March 2004, and 
although the course is a requirement, TSA officials stated that they 
have not set goals for when all Lead Screeners and Screening 
Supervisors should have completed the course. In June 2004, TSA 
training officials stated that a second supervisor technical course was 
planned for development and introduction later in 2004. However, in 
December 2004, the training officials stated that planned funding for 
supervisory training may be used to support other TSA initiatives. The 
officials acknowledged that this would reduce TSA's ability to provide 
the desired type and level of supervisory training to its Lead 
Screener, Screening Supervisor, and Screening Manager staff. TSA plans 
to revise its plans to provide Lead Screener, Screening Supervisor, and 
Screening Manager training based on funding availability. 

Although TSA has developed leadership and technical courses for 
Screening Supervisors, many FSDs, in response to our general survey, 
identified additional types of training needed to enhance screener 
supervision. Table 2 provides a summary of the additional training 
needs that FSDs reported. 

Table 2: Training Needed to Enhance Screener Supervision, as Reported 
by FSDs:

Training topic: Leadership and management; 
Percentage of FSDs indicating this need: 41%. 

Training topic: Public speaking/communications; 
Percentage of FSDs indicating this need: 26%. 

Training topic: Conflict management; 
Percentage of FSDs indicating this need: 24%. 

Training topic: Human resource-related issues (hiring, termination, 
discipline); 
Percentage of FSDs indicating this need: 19%. 

Training topic: Counseling, mentoring, and coaching; 
Percentage of FSDs indicating this need: 18%. 

Training topic: Writing skills; 
Percentage of FSDs indicating this need: 16%. 

Training topic: Additional supervisory training; 
Percentage of FSDs indicating this need: 13%. 

Training topic: Interpersonal skills; 
Percentage of FSDs indicating this need: 13%. 

Training topic: Crisis management and incident response; 
Percentage of FSDs indicating this need: 6%. 

Source: GAO general survey of FSDs. 

[End of table]

TSA training officials stated that the Online Learning Center provides 
several courses that cover these topics. Such courses include:

* Situation Leadership II;

* Communicating with Difficult People: Handling Difficult Co-Workers;

* Team Participation: Resolving Conflict in Teams;

* Employee Performance: Resolving Conflict;

* High Impact Hiring;

* Team Conflict: Overcoming Conflict with Communication;

* Correcting Performance Problems: Disciplining Employees;

* Team Conflict: Working in Diversified Teams;

* Correcting Performance Problems: Identifying Performance Problems;

* Resolving Interpersonal Skills;

* Grammar, Skills, Punctuation, Mechanics and Word Usage; and:

* Crisis in Organizations: Managing Crisis Situations. 

TSA training officials acknowledged that for various reasons FSDs might 
not be aware that the supervisory and leadership training is available. 
For example, FSDs at airports without high-speed Internet/intranet 
access to the Online Learning Center might not have access to all of 
these courses. It is also possible that certain FSDs have not fully 
browsed the contents of the Online Learning Center and therefore are 
not aware that the training is available.[Footnote 24] Furthermore, 
officials stated that online learning is relatively new to government 
and senior field managers, and some of the FSDs may expect traditional 
instructor-led classes rather than online software. 

Some FSDs Reported Impediments to Screeners Receiving Recurrent 
Training:

Some FSDs responded to our general survey that they faced challenges 
with screeners receiving recurrent training, including insufficient 
staffing to allow all screeners to complete training within normal duty 
hours and a lack of high-speed Internet/intranet connectivity at some 
training facilities. According to our guide for assessing training, to 
foster an environment conducive to effective training and development, 
agencies must take actions to provide sufficient time, space, and 
equipment to employees to complete required training.[Footnote 25] TSA 
has set a requirement for 3 hours of recurrent training per week 
averaged over a quarter year, for both full-time and part-time 
screeners. However, FSDs for about 18 percent (48 of 263) of the 
airports in our airport-specific survey reported that screeners 
received less than 9 to 12 hours of recurrent training per 
month.[Footnote 26] Additionally, FSDs for 48 percent (125 of 263) of 
the airports in the survey reported that there was not sufficient time 
for screeners to receive recurrent training within regular work hours. 

At 66 percent of those airports where the FSD reported that there was 
not sufficient time for screeners to receive recurrent training within 
regular work hours, the FSDs cited screener staffing shortages as the 
primary reason. We reported in February 2004 that FSDs at 11 of the 15 
category X airports we visited reported that they were below their 
authorized staffing levels because of attrition and difficulties in 
hiring new staff. In addition, three of these FSDs noted that they had 
never been successful in hiring up to the authorized staffing levels. 
We also reported in February 2004 that FSDs stated that because of 
staffing shortages, they were unable to let screeners participate in 
training because it affected the FSD's ability to provide adequate 
coverage at the checkpoints. In response to our survey, FSDs across all 
categories of airports reported that screeners must work overtime in 
order to participate in training. A September 2004 DHS OIG report 
recommended that TSA examine the workforce implications of the 3-hour 
training requirement and take steps to correct identified imbalances in 
future workforce planning to ensure that all screeners are able to meet 
the recurrent training standard. The 3-hours-per-week training standard 
represents a staff time commitment of 7.5 percent of full-time and 
between 9 and 15 percent of part-time screeners' nonovertime working 
hours. TSA headquarters officials have stated that because the 3-hours-
per-week requirement is averaged over a quarter, it provides 
flexibility to account for the operational constraints that exist at 
airports. However, TSA headquarters officials acknowledged that many 
airports are facing challenges in meeting the 3-hour recurrent training 
requirement. TSA data for the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2004 
reported that 75 percent of airports were averaging less than 3 hours 
of recurrent training per week per screener. The current screener 
staffing model, which is used to determine the screener staffing 
allocations for each airport, does not take the 3-hours-per-week 
recurrent training requirement into account.[Footnote 27] However, TSA 
headquarters officials said that they are factoring this training 
requirement into their workforce planning efforts, including the 
staffing model currently under development.[Footnote 28]

Another barrier to providing recurrent training is the lack of high-
speed Internet/intranet access at some of TSA's training 
locations.[Footnote 29] TSA officials acknowledged that many of the 
features of the Online Learning Center, including some portions of the 
training modules and some Online Learning Center course offerings, are 
difficult or impossible to use in the absence of high-speed 
Internet/intranet connectivity. As one FSD put it, "the delayed 
deployment of the high-speed Internet package limits the connectivity 
to TSA HQ for various online programs that are mandated for passenger 
screening operations including screener training." One FSD for a 
category IV airport noted the lack of a high-speed connection for the 
one computer at an airport he oversees made the Online Learning Center 
"nearly useless."

TSA began deploying high-speed access to its training sites and 
checkpoints in May 2003 and has identified high-speed connectivity as 
necessary in order to deliver continuous training to screeners. TSA's 
July 2003 Performance Improvement Study recommended accelerating high-
speed Internet/intranet access in order to provide quick and systematic 
distribution of information and, thus, reduce uncertainty caused by the 
day-to-day changes in local and national procedures and policy. In 
October 2003, TSA reported plans to have an estimated 350 airports 
online with high-speed connectivity within 6 months. However, in June 
2004, TSA reported that it did not have the resources to reach this 
goal. 

TSA records show that as of October 2004, TSA had provided high-speed 
access for training purposes to just 109 airports, where 1,726 training 
computers were fully connected.[Footnote 30] These 109 airports had an 
authorized staffing level of over 24,900 screeners, meaning that nearly 
20,100 screeners (45 percent of TSA's authorized screening workforce) 
still did not have high-speed Internet/intranet access to the Online 
Learning Center at their training facility. In October 2004, TSA 
officials stated that TSA's Office of Information Technology had 
selected an additional 16 airport training facilities with a total of 
205 training computers to receive high-speed connectivity by the end of 
December 2004. As of January 19, 2005, TSA was unable to confirm that 
these facilities had received high-speed connectivity. Additionally, 
they could not provide a time frame for when they expected to provide 
high-speed connectivity to all airport training facilities because of 
funding uncertainties. Furthermore, TSA does not have a plan for 
prioritizing and scheduling the deployment of high-speed connectivity 
to all airport training facilities once funding is available. Without a 
plan, TSA's strategy and timeline for implementing connectivity to 
airport training facilities is unclear. The absence of such a plan 
limits TSA's ability to make prudent decisions about how to move 
forward with deploying connectivity once funding is available. Figure 5 
shows the percentage of airports reported to have high-speed 
connectivity for their training computers by category of airport as of 
October 2004. 

Figure 5: Percentage of Airports Reported to Have High-Speed 
Connectivity for Training Purposes as of October 2004:

[See PDF for image]

Note: These data show airports with high-speed connectivity on training 
computers. Some airports have high-speed connectivity, but for purposes 
other than training. 

[End of figure]

To mitigate airport connectivity issues in the interim, on April 1, 
2004, TSA made the Online Learning Center courses accessible through 
public Internet connections, which enable screeners to log on to the 
Online Learning Center from home, a public library, or other locations. 
However, TSA officials stated that the vast majority of screeners who 
have used the Online Learning Center have logged in from airports with 
connectivity at their training facilities. TSA also distributes new 
required training products using multiple delivery channels, including 
written materials and CD-ROMs for those locations where access to the 
Online Learning Center is limited. Specifically, TSA officials stated 
that they provided airports without high-speed connectivity with CD-
ROMs for the 50 most commonly used optional commercial courseware 
titles covering topics such as information technology skills, customer 
service, and teamwork. Additionally, officials stated that as technical 
courses are added to the Online Learning Center, they are also 
distributed via CD-ROM and that until full connectivity is achieved, 
TSA will continue to distribute new training products using multiple 
delivery channels. 

TSA Lacks Adequate Controls to Provide Reasonable Assurance That 
Screeners Receive Required Training:

Because of a lack of internal controls, TSA cannot provide reasonable 
assurance that screeners are completing required training. First, TSA 
policy does not clearly define responsibility for ensuring that 
screeners have completed all required training. Additionally, TSA has 
no formally defined policies or procedures for documenting completion 
of remedial training, or a system designed to facilitate review of this 
documentation for purposes of monitoring. Further, TSA headquarters 
does not have formal policies and procedures for monitoring completion 
of basic training and lacks procedures for monitoring recurrent 
training. Finally, at airports without high-speed connectivity, 
training records must be entered manually, making it challenging for 
some airports to keep accurate and up-to-date training records. 

TSA Policy Does Not Clearly Define Responsibility for Ensuring That 
Screeners Are in Compliance with Training Requirements:

TSA's current guidance for FSDs regarding the training of the screener 
workforce does not clearly identify responsibility for tracking and 
ensuring compliance with training requirements. In a good control 
environment, areas of authority and responsibility are clearly defined 
and appropriate lines of reporting are established.[Footnote 31] In 
addition, internal control standards also require that responsibilities 
be communicated within an organization. The Online Learning Center 
provides TSA with a standardized, centralized tool capable of 
maintaining all training records in one system. It replaces an ad hoc 
system previously used during initial rollout of federalized screeners 
in which contractors maintained training records. A February 2004 
management directive states that FSDs are responsible for ensuring the 
completeness, accuracy, and timeliness of training records maintained 
in the Online Learning Center for their employees. For basic and 
recurrent training, information is to be entered into the Online 
Learning Center within 30 days of completion of the training activity. 
However, the directive does not clearly identify who is responsible for 
ensuring that employees comply with training requirements. Likewise, a 
December 2003 directive requiring that screeners complete 3 hours of 
training per week averaged over a quarter states that FSDs are 
responsible for ensuring that training records for each screener are 
maintained in the Online Learning Center. Although both directives 
include language that requires FSDs to ensure training records are 
maintained in the Online Learning Center, neither specifies whether 
FSDs or headquarters officials are responsible for ensuring compliance 
with the basic, recurrent, and remedial training requirements. Even so, 
TSA headquarters officials told us that FSDs are ultimately responsible 
for ensuring screeners receive required training. However, officials 
provided no documentation clearly defining this responsibility. Without 
a clear designation of responsibility for monitoring training 
completion, this function may not receive adequate attention, leaving 
TSA unable to provide reasonable assurance that its screening workforce 
receives required training. In April 2005, TSA officials responsible 
for training stated that they were updating the February 2004 
management directive on training records to include a specific 
requirement for FSDs to ensure that screeners complete required 
training. They expect to release the revised directive in May 2005. 

TSA Lacks Formal Policies and Procedures for Monitoring Completion of 
Required Training:

TSA has not established and documented policies and procedures for 
monitoring completion of basic and recurrent training. Internal control 
standards advise that internal controls should be designed so that 
monitoring is ongoing and ingrained in agency operations.[Footnote 32] 
However, TSA headquarters officials stated that they have no formal 
policy for monitoring screeners' completion of basic training. They 
also stated that they have neither informal nor formal procedures for 
monitoring the completion of screeners' recurrent training 
requirements, and acknowledged that TSA policy does not address what is 
to occur if a screener does not meet the recurrent training 
requirement. Officials further stated that individual FSDs have the 
discretion to determine what action, if any, to take when screeners do 
not meet this requirement. 

In July 2004, TSA training officials stated that headquarters staff 
recently began running a report in the Online Learning Center to review 
training records to ensure that newly hired screeners had completed 
required basic training. In addition, they stated that in June 2004, 
they began generating summary-level quarterly reports from the Online 
Learning Center to quantify and analyze hours expended for recurrent 
screener training. Specifically, TSA training officials stated that 
reports showing airport-level compliance with the 3-hour recurrent 
requirement were generated for the third and fourth quarters of fiscal 
year 2004 and delivered to the Office of Aviation Operations for 
further analysis and sharing with the field. However, Aviation 
Operations officials stated that they did not use these reports to 
monitor the status of screener compliance with the 3-hour recurrent 
training requirement and do not provide them to the field unless 
requested by an FSD. TSA training officials said that while 
headquarters intends to review recurrent training activity on an 
ongoing basis at a national and airport level, they view FSDs and FSD 
training staff as responsible for ensuring that individuals receive all 
required training. Further, they acknowledged that weaknesses existed 
in the reporting capability of the Online Learning Center and stated 
that they plan to upgrade the Online Learning Center with improved 
reporting tools by the end of April 2005. Without clearly defined 
policies and procedures for monitoring the completion of training, TSA 
lacks a structure to support continuous assurance that screeners are 
meeting training requirements. 

TSA Lacks Clearly Defined Policies and Procedures for Documenting 
Completion of Remedial Training:

TSA has not established clear policies and procedures for documenting 
completion of required remedial training. The Standards for Internal 
Control state that agencies should document all transactions and other 
significant events and should be able to make this documentation 
readily available for examination.[Footnote 33] A TSA training bulletin 
dated October 15, 2002, specifies that when remedial training is 
required, FSDs must ensure the training is provided and a remedial 
training reporting form is completed and maintained with the screener's 
local records.[Footnote 34] However, when we asked to review these 
records, we found confusion as to how and where they were to be 
maintained. TSA officials stated that they are waiting for a decision 
regarding how to maintain these records because of their sensitive 
nature. In the meantime, where and by whom the records should be 
maintained remains unclear. 

In September 2004, officials from TSA's OIAPR--responsible for 
conducting covert testing--stated that they maintain oversight to 
ensure screeners requiring remedial training receive required training 
by providing a list of screeners that failed covert testing and 
therefore need remedial training to TSA's Office of Aviation 
Operations. Aviation Operations is then to confirm via memo that each 
of the screeners has received the necessary remedial training and 
report back to OIAPR. Accordingly, we asked TSA for all Aviation 
Operations memos confirming completion of remedial training, but we 
were only able to obtain 1 of the 12 memos.[Footnote 35]

In addition, during our review, we asked to review the remedial 
training reporting forms at five airports to determine whether 
screeners received required training, but we encountered confusion 
about requirements for maintaining training records and inconsistency 
in record keeping on the part of local TSA officials. Because of the 
unclear policies and procedures for recording completion of remedial 
training, TSA does not have adequate assurance that screeners are 
receiving legislatively mandated remedial training. 

Lack of High-Speed Connectivity Limits TSA's Ability to Document and 
Track the Completion of Screener Training:

Although training computers with high-speed Internet/intranet 
connectivity automatically record completion of training in the Online 
Learning Center, airports without high-speed access at their training 
facility must have these records entered manually. The February 2004 
management directive that describes responsibility for entering 
training records into the Online Learning Center also established that 
all TSA employees are required to have an official TSA training record 
in the Online Learning Center that includes information on all official 
training that is funded wholly or in part with government funds. 
Without high-speed access, TSA officials stated that it can be a 
challenge for airports to keep the Online Learning Center up to date 
with the most recent training records. TSA headquarters officials 
further stated that when they want to track compliance with mandatory 
training such as ethics or civil rights training, they provide the 
Training Coordinators with a spreadsheet on which to enter the data 
rather than relying on the Online Learning Center. As one FSD told us, 
without high-speed connectivity at several of the airports he oversees, 
"this is very time consuming and labor intensive and strains my limited 
resources." The difficulty that airports encounter in maintaining 
accurate records when high-speed access is absent could compromise 
TSA's ability to provide reasonable assurance that screeners are 
receiving mandated basic and remedial training. 

Progress Has Been Made in Implementing Tools to Measure and Enhance 
Screener Performance, but Key Performance Targets Have Not Been 
Finalized:

TSA has improved its efforts to measure and enhance screener 
performance. However, these efforts have primarily focused on passenger 
screening rather than checked baggage screening, and TSA has not yet 
finalized performance targets for several key performance measures. For 
example, TSA has increased the amount of covert testing it performs at 
airports. These tests have identified that, overall, weaknesses and 
vulnerabilities continue to exist in the passenger and checked baggage 
screening systems. TSA also enabled FSDs to conduct local covert 
testing, fully deployed the Threat Image Projection (TIP) system to 
passenger screening checkpoints at commercial airports nationwide, and 
completed the 2003/2004 annual screener recertification program for all 
eligible screeners. However, not all of these performance measurement 
and enhancement tools are available for checked baggage screening. 
Specifically, TIP is not currently operational at checked baggage 
screening checkpoints, and the recertification program does not include 
an image recognition component for checked baggage screeners. However, 
TSA is taking steps to address the overall imbalance in passenger and 
checked baggage screening performance data, including working toward 
implementing TIP for checked baggage screening and developing an image 
recognition module for checked baggage screener recertification. To 
enhance screener and screening system performance, TSA has also 
conducted a passenger screener performance improvement study and 
subsequently developed an improvement plan consisting of multiple 
action items, many of which TSA has completed. However, TSA has not 
conducted a similar study for checked baggage screeners. In addition, 
TSA has established over 20 performance measures for the passenger and 
checked baggage screening systems as well as two performance indexes 
(one for passenger and one for checked baggage screening). However, TSA 
has not established performance targets for each of the component 
indicators within the indexes, such as covert testing. According to The 
Office of Management and Budget, performance goals are target levels of 
performance expressed as a measurable objective, against which actual 
achievement can be compared. Performance goals should incorporate 
measures (indicators used to gauge performance); targets 
(characteristics that tell how well a program must accomplish the 
measure), and time frames. Without these targets, TSA's performance 
management system, and these performance indexes, specifically, may not 
provide the agency with the complete information necessary to assess 
achievements and make decisions about where to direct performance 
improvement efforts. Although TSA has not yet established performance 
targets for each of the component indicators, TSA plans to finalize 
performance targets for the indicators by the end of fiscal year 2005. 

TSA Has Increased Its Covert Testing and Allowed Local Covert Testing 
at Passenger Screening Checkpoints:

TSA headquarters has increased the amount of covert testing it performs 
and enabled FSDs to conduct additional local covert testing at 
passenger screening checkpoints. TSA's OIAPR conducts unannounced 
covert tests of screeners to assess their ability to detect threat 
objects and to adhere to TSA-approved procedures. These tests, in which 
undercover OIAPR inspectors attempt to pass threat objects through 
passenger screening checkpoints and in checked baggage, are designed to 
measure vulnerabilities in passenger and checked baggage screening 
systems and to identify systematic problems affecting performance of 
screeners in the areas of training, policy, and technology.[Footnote 
36] TSA considers its covert testing as a "snapshot" of a screener's 
ability to detect threat objects at a particular point in time and as 
one of several indicators of system wide screener performance. 

OIAPR conducts tests at passenger screening checkpoints and checked 
baggage screening checkpoints. According to OIAPR, these tests are 
designed to approximate techniques terrorists might use. These covert 
test results are one source of data on screener performance in 
detecting threat objects as well as an important mechanism for 
identifying areas in passenger and checked baggage screening needing 
improvement. In testimony before the 9/11 Commission, the Department of 
Transportation Inspector General stated that emphasis must be placed on 
implementing an aggressive covert testing program to evaluate 
operational effectiveness of security systems and equipment.[Footnote 
37]

Between September 10, 2002, and September 30, 2004, OIAPR conducted a 
total of 3,238 covert tests at 279 different airports. In September 
2003, we reported that OIAPR had conducted limited covert testing but 
planned to double the amount of tests it conducted during fiscal year 
2004, based on an anticipated increase in its staff from about 100 full-
time equivalents to about 200 full-time equivalents. TSA officials 
stated that based on budget constraints, OIAPR's fiscal year 2004 
staffing authorization was limited to 183 full-time-equivalents, 
[Footnote 38] of which about 60 are located in the field.[Footnote 39] 
Despite a smaller than expected staff increase, by the end of the 
second quarter of fiscal year 2004, OIAPR had already surpassed the 
number of tests it performed during fiscal year 2003, as shown in table 
3. 

Table 3: Checkpoint and Checked Baggage Tests Conducted by OIAPR, 
September 10, 2002-September 30, 2004:

Testing period fiscal year/quarter: 2002 fourth; 
Airports[A]: 2; 
Passenger screening checkpoint tests: 30; 
Checked baggage tests[B]: 3; 
Total tests: 33. 

Testing period fiscal year/quarter: 2003 first; 
Airports[A]: 14; 
Passenger screening checkpoint tests: 120; 
Checked baggage tests[B]: 1; 
Total tests: 121. 

Testing period fiscal year/quarter: 2003 second; 
Airports[A]: 31; 
Passenger screening checkpoint tests: 231; 
Checked baggage tests[B]: 27; 
Total tests: 258. 

Testing period fiscal year/quarter: 2003 third; 
Airports[A]: 28; 
Passenger screening checkpoint tests: 198; 
Checked baggage tests[B]: 19; 
Total tests: 217. 

Testing period fiscal year/quarter: 2003 fourth; 
Airports[A]: 25; 
Passenger screening checkpoint tests: 217; 
Checked baggage tests[B]: 23; 
Total tests: 240. 

Testing period fiscal year/quarter: 2004 first; 
Airports[A]: 41; 
Passenger screening checkpoint tests: 171; 
Checked baggage tests[B]: 110; 
Total tests: 281. 

Testing period fiscal year/quarter: 2004 second; 
Airports[A]: 111; 
Passenger screening checkpoint tests: 770; 
Checked baggage tests[B]: 182; 
Total tests: 952. 

Testing period fiscal year/quarter: 2004 third; 
Airports[A]: 56; 
Passenger screening checkpoint tests: 379; 
Checked baggage tests[B]: 102; 
Total tests: 481. 

Testing period fiscal year/quarter: 2004 fourth; 
Airports[A]: 64; 
Passenger screening checkpoint tests: 527; 
Checked baggage tests[B]: 128; 
Total tests: 655. 

Total; 
Passenger screening checkpoint tests: 2,643; 
Checked baggage tests[B]: 595; 
Total tests: 3,238. 

Source: GAO analysis of OIAPR data. 

Note: Some airports have been tested more than once. 

[A] OIAPR conducted covert testing at three additional airports in 
September and October 2002. However, at the time of the testing, 
federal screeners had not yet been deployed to these airports. We 
excluded these tests from our analysis. 

[B] TSA did not begin reporting the results of checked baggage tests 
until January 2003. However, four of these tests were conducted in 
September and October 2002. 

[End of table]

In October 2003, OIAPR committed to testing between 90 and 150 airports 
by April 2004 as part of TSA's short-term screening performance 
improvement plan. OAIPR officials stated that this was a onetime goal 
to increase testing. This initiative accounts for the spike in testing 
for the second quarter of fiscal year 2004. 

OIAPR has created a testing schedule designed to test all airports at 
least once during a 3-year time frame. Specifically, the schedule calls 
for OIAPR to test all category X airports once a year, category I and 
II airports once every 2 years, and category III and IV airports at 
least once every 3 years. 

In September 2003 and April 2004, we reported that TSA covert testing 
results had identified weaknesses in screeners' ability to detect 
threat objects.[Footnote 40] More recently, in April 2005, we, along 
with the DHS OIG, identified that screener performance continued to be 
a concern. Specifically, our analysis of TSA's covert testing results 
for tests conducted between September 2002 and September 2004 
identified that overall, weaknesses still existed in the ability of 
screeners to detect threat objects on passengers, in their carry-on 
bags, and in checked baggage.[Footnote 41] Covert testing results in 
this analysis cannot be generalized either to the airports where the 
tests were conducted or to airports nationwide.[Footnote 42] These 
weaknesses and vulnerabilities were identified at airports of all 
sizes, at airports with federal screeners, and airports with private-
sector screeners. For the two-year period reviewed, overall failure 
rates for covert tests (passenger and checked baggage) conducted at 
airports using private-sector screeners were somewhat lower than 
failure rates for the same tests conducted at airports using federal 
screeners for the airports tested during this period.[Footnote 43] 
Since these test results cannot be generalized as discussed above, each 
airport's test results should not be considered a comprehensive 
measurement of the airport's performance or any individual screener's 
performance in detecting threat objects, or in determining whether 
airports with private sector screeners performed better than airports 
with federal screeners. 

On the basis of testing data through September 30, 2004, we determined 
that OIAPR had performed covert testing at 61 percent of the nation's 
commercial airports. TSA has until September 30, 2005, to test the 
additional 39 percent of airports and meet its goal of testing all 
airports within 3 years. Although officials stated that they have had 
to divert resources from airport testing to conduct testing of other 
modes and that testing for other modes of transportation may affect 
their ability to conduct airport testing, they still expect to meet the 
goal. 

In February 2004, TSA provided protocols to help FSDs conduct their own 
covert testing of local airport passenger screening activities--a 
practice that TSA had previously prohibited.[Footnote 44] Results of 
local testing using these protocols are to be entered into the Online 
Learning Center. This information, in conjunction with OAIPR covert 
test results and TIP threat detection results, is intended to assist 
TSA in identifying specific training and performance improvement 
efforts. In February 2005, TSA released a general procedures document 
for local covert testing at checked baggage screening locations. 

TSA officials said that they had not yet begun to use data from local 
covert testing to identify training and performance needs because of 
difficulties in ensuring that local covert testing is implemented 
consistently nationwide. These officials said that after a few months 
of collecting and assessing the data, they will have a better idea of 
how the data can be used. 

TSA Has Reinstated the Threat Image Projection System and Plans to Use 
Its Data to Improve the Screening System:

TSA has nearly completed the reactivation of the TIP system at airports 
nationwide and plans to use data it is collecting to improve the 
effectiveness of the passenger screening system.[Footnote 45] TIP is 
designed to test passenger screeners' detection capabilities by 
projecting threat images, including guns, knives, and explosives, onto 
bags as they are screened during actual operations. Screeners are 
responsible for identifying the threat image and calling for the bag to 
be searched. Once prompted, TIP identifies to the screener whether the 
threat is real and then records the screener's performance in a 
database that could be analyzed for performance trends.[Footnote 46] 
TSA is evaluating the possibility of developing an adaptive 
functionality to TIP. Specifically, as individual screeners become 
proficient in identifying certain threat images, such as guns or 
knives, they will receive fewer of those images and more images that 
they are less proficient at detecting, such as improvised explosive 
devices. 

TIP was activated by FAA in 1999 with about 200 threat images, but it 
was shut down immediately following the September 11 terrorist attacks 
because of concerns that it would result in screening delays and panic, 
as screeners might think that they were actually viewing threat 
objects. In October 2003, TSA began reactivating and expanding TIP. In 
April 2004, we reported that TSA was reactivating TIP with an expanded 
library of 2,400 images at all but one of the more than 1,800 
checkpoint lanes nationwide. To further enhance screener training and 
performance, TSA also plans to develop at least an additional 50 images 
each month. 

Despite these improvements, TIP is not yet available for checked 
baggage screening. In April 2004, we reported that TSA officials stated 
that they were working to resolve technical challenges associated with 
using TIP for checked baggage screening on EDS machines and have 
started EDS TIP image development. The DHS OIG reported in September 
2004 that TSA plans to implement TIP on all EDS machines at checked 
baggage stations nationwide in fiscal year 2005. However, in December 
2004, TSA officials stated that because of severe budget reductions, 
TSA will be unable to begin implementing a TIP program for checked 
baggage in fiscal year 2005. They did not specify when such a program 
might begin. 

TSA plans to use TIP data to improve the passenger screening system in 
two ways. First, TIP data can be used to measure screener threat 
detection effectiveness by different threats. Second, TSA plans to use 
TIP results to help identify specific recurrent training needs within 
and across airports and to tailor screeners' recurrent training to 
focus on threat category areas that indicate a need for improvement. 
TSA considers February 2004 as the first full month of TIP reporting 
with the new library of 2,400 images. TSA began collecting these data 
in early March 2004 and is using the data to determine more precisely 
how they can be used to measure screener performance in detecting 
threat objects and to determine what the data identify about screener 
performance. 

TSA does not currently plan to use TIP data as an indicator of 
individual screener performance because TSA does not believe that TIP 
by itself adequately reflects a screener's performance. Nevertheless, 
in April 2004, TSA gave FSDs the capability to query and analyze TIP 
data in a number of ways, including by screener, checkpoint, and 
airport. FSDs for over 60 percent of the airports included in our 
airport-specific survey stated that they use or plan to use TIP data as 
a source of information in their evaluations of individual screener 
performance. Additionally, FSDs for 50 percent of the airports covered 
in our survey reported using data generated by TIP to identify specific 
training needs for individual screeners. 

In September 2004, the DHS OIG reported that TSA is assessing the cost 
and feasibility of modifying TIP so that it recognizes and responds to 
specific threat objects with which individual screeners are most and 
least competent in detecting, over time. This feature would increase 
the utility of TIP as a training tool. The DHS OIG also reported that 
TSA is considering linking TIP over a network, which would facilitate 
TSA's collection, analysis, and information-sharing efforts around TIP 
user results. The report recommended that TSA continue to pursue each 
of these initiatives, and TSA agreed. However, in December 2004, TSA 
officials stated that the availability of funding will determine 
whether or not they pursue these efforts further. 

TSA Has Completed Its First Round of Screener Recertification Testing, 
but Testing for Checked Baggage Screeners Is Not as Comprehensive as 
for Passenger Screeners:

TSA has completed its first round of the screener recertification 
program, and the second round is now under way. However, TSA does not 
currently include an image recognition component in the test for 
checked baggage screener recertification. ATSA requires that each 
screener receive an annual proficiency review to ensure he or she 
continues to meet all qualifications and standards required to perform 
the screening function. In September 2003, we reported that TSA had not 
yet implemented this requirement.[Footnote 47] To meet this 
requirement, TSA established a recertification program, and it began 
recertification testing in October 2003 and completed the testing in 
March 2004.[Footnote 48] The first recertification program was composed 
of two assessment components, one of screeners' performance and the 
other of screeners' knowledge and skills. During the performance 
assessment component of the recertification program, screeners are 
rated on both organizational and individual goals, such as maintaining 
the nation's air security, vigilantly carrying out duties with utmost 
attention to tasks that will prevent security threats, and 
demonstrating the highest levels of courtesy to travelers to maximize 
their levels of satisfaction with screening services. The knowledge and 
skills assessment component consists of three modules: (1) knowledge of 
standard operating procedures, (2) image recognition, and (3) practical 
demonstration of skills. Table 4 provides a summary of these three 
modules. 

Table 4: Modules Included in Recertification Knowledge and Skills 
Assessment:

Testing modules: Knowledge of standard operating procedures; 
Description: Computerized 50-question multiple-choice test. It is 
either passenger-or baggage-specific. 

Testing modules: Image recognition; 
Description: Computerized test that consists of 100 images and is used 
to evaluate a screener's skill and ability in detecting threat or 
prohibited objects within X-ray images. 

Testing modules: Practical demonstration of skills; 
Description: Hands-on simulated work sample to evaluate a screener's 
knowledge, skills, and ability when performing specific screener tasks 
along with ability to provide customer service. 

Source: TSA. 

[End of table]

To be recertified, screeners must have a rating of "met" or "exceeded" 
standards on their annual performance assessments and have passed each 
of the applicable knowledge and skills modules. Screeners that failed 
any of the three modules were to receive study time or remedial 
training as well as a second opportunity to take and pass the modules. 
Screeners who failed on their second attempt were to be removed from 
screening duties and subject to termination. Screeners could also be 
terminated for receiving a rating of below "met" standards. 

TSA completed its analysis of the recertification testing and 
performance evaluations in May 2004. TSA's analysis shows that less 
than 1 percent of screeners subject to recertification failed to 
complete this requirement. Figure 6 shows the recertification results. 

Figure 6: Screener Recertification Results, October 2003-March 2004:

[See PDF for image]

[End of figure]

Across all airports screeners performed well on the recertification 
testing. Over 97 percent of screeners passed the standard operating 
procedures test on their first attempt. Screeners faced the most 
difficulty on the practical demonstration of skills component. However, 
following remediation, 98.6 percent of the screeners who initially 
failed this component passed on their second attempt. Table 5 shows the 
results of the recertification testing by module. 

Table 5: Screener Recertification Module Testing Percentage Pass Rates, 
October 2003--March 2004:

First attempt; 
Standard operating procedures: 97.4%; 
Image recognition: 96.0%; 
Practical skills demonstration: 75.2%.

Retest;
Standard operating procedures: 96.8%; 
Image recognition: 84.3%; 
Practical skills demonstration: 98.6%. 

Overall; 
Standard operating procedures: 99.9%; 
Image recognition: 99.5%; 
Practical skills demonstration: 99.7%. 

Source: TSA. 

[End of table]

As shown in table 6, screeners hired as checked baggage screeners were 
not required to complete the image recognition module in the first 
round of the recertification testing.[Footnote 49]

Table 6: Recertification Testing Modules by Screening Function:

Testing modules: Knowledge of standard operating procedures; 
Passenger: Yes; 
Checked baggage: Yes. 

Testing modules: Image recognition; 
Passenger: Yes; 
Checked baggage: No. 

Testing modules: Practical demonstration of skills; 
Passenger: Yes; 
Checked baggage: Yes. 

Source: TSA. 

[End of table]

In addition, during the first year of recertification testing, which 
took place from October 2003 through May 2004, dual-function screeners 
who were actively working as both passenger and checked baggage 
screeners were required to take only the recertification test for 
passenger screeners. They were therefore not required to take the 
recertification testing modules required for checked baggage, even 
though they worked in that capacity.[Footnote 50]

TSA began implementing the second annual recertification testing in 
October 2004 and plans to complete it no later than June 2005. This 
recertification program includes components for dual-function 
screeners. However, TSA still has not included an image recognition 
module for checked baggage screeners--which would include dual-function 
screeners performing checked baggage screening. TSA officials stated 
that a decision was made to not include an image recognition module for 
checked baggage screeners during this cycle because not all checked 
baggage screeners would have completed training on the onscreen 
resolution protocol by the time recertification testing was conducted 
at their airports.[Footnote 51] In December 2004, TSA officials stated 
that they plan on developing an image recognition module for checked 
baggage and dual-function screeners, and that this test should be 
available for next year's recertification program. The development and 
implementation of the image recognition test will be contingent, they 
stated, upon the availability of funds. 

TSA Has Identified and Implemented Efforts to Enhance Screener 
Performance, but These Efforts Primarily Focused on Passenger 
Screeners: 

TSA has implemented a number of improvements designed to enhance 
screener performance, based on concerns it identified in a July 2003 
Passenger Screener Performance Improvement Study and recommendations 
from OIAPR. To date, however, these efforts have primarily focused on 
the performance of passenger screeners, and TSA has not yet undertaken 
a comparable performance study for checked baggage screeners. The 
Passenger Screener Performance Improvement Study relied in part on the 
findings of OIAPR's covert testing. At the time the study was issued, 
OIAPR had conducted fewer than 50 tests of checked baggage screeners. 
The July 2003 study focused on and included numerous recommendations 
for improving the performance of passenger screeners, but recommended 
waiting to analyze the performance of checked baggage screeners until 
some time after implementation of the recommendations, some of which 
TSA indicated, also applied to checked baggage screeners. TSA officials 
told us that this analysis has been postponed until they have reviewed 
the impact of implementing the recommendations on passenger screening 
performance. 

In October 2003, to address passenger screener performance deficiencies 
identified in the Screener Performance Improvement Study, TSA developed 
a Short-Term Screening Performance Improvement Plan. This plan included 
specific action items in nine broad categories--such as enhance 
training, increase covert testing, finish installing TIP, and expedite 
high-speed connectivity to checkpoints and training computers--that TSA 
planned to pursue to provide tangible improvements in passenger 
screener performance and security (see app. IV for additional 
information on the action items). In June 2004, TSA reported that it 
had completed 57 of the 62 specific actions. As of December 2004, two 
of these actions still had not been implemented--full deployment of 
high-speed connectivity and a time and attendance package--both of 
which continue to be deferred pending the identification of appropriate 
resources.[Footnote 52]

In addition to the Performance Improvement Study and corresponding 
action plans, TSA's OIAPR makes recommendations in its reports on 
covert testing results. These recommendations address deficiencies 
identified during testing and are intended to improve screening 
effectiveness. As of December 2004, OIAPR had issued 18 reports to TSA 
management on the results of its checkpoint and checked baggage covert 
testing.[Footnote 53] These reports include 14 distinct 
recommendations,[Footnote 54] some of which were included in TSA's 
screener improvement action plan. All but two of these reports included 
recommendations on corrective actions needed to enhance the 
effectiveness of passenger and checked baggage screening. 

TSA Has Established Screening Performance Measures and Indexes but Has 
Not Established Key Performance Targets:

TSA has established performance measures, indexes, and targets for the 
passenger and checked baggage screening systems, but has not 
established targets for the various components of the screening 
indexes. The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 provides, 
among other things, that federal agencies establish program performance 
measures, including the assessment of relevant outputs and outcomes of 
each program activity[Footnote 55]. Performance measures are meant to 
cover key aspects of performance and help decision makers to assess 
program accomplishments and improve program performance. A performance 
target is a desired level of performance expressed as a tangible, 
measurable objective, against which actual achievement will be 
compared. By analyzing the gap between target and actual levels of 
performance, management can target those processes that are most in 
need of improvement, set improvement goals, and identify appropriate 
process improvements or other actions. 

An April 2004 consultant study commissioned by TSA found that FSDs and 
FSD staffs generally believed the lack of key performance indicators 
available to monitor passenger and checked baggage screening 
performance represented a significant organizational weakness. Since 
then, TSA has established over 20 performance measures for the 
passenger and checked baggage screening systems. For example, TSA 
measures the percentage of screeners meeting a threshold score on the 
annual recertification testing on their first attempt, the percentage 
of screeners scoring above the national standard level on TIP 
performance, and the number of passengers screened, by airport 
category. 

TSA also has developed two performance indexes to measure the 
effectiveness of the passenger and checked baggage screening 
systems.[Footnote 56] These indexes measure overall performance through 
a composite of indicators and are derived by combining specific 
performance measures relating to passenger and checked baggage 
screening, respectively. Specifically, these indexes measure the 
effectiveness of the screening systems through machine probability of 
detection and covert testing results;[Footnote 57] efficiency through a 
calculation of dollars spent per passenger or bag screened; 
and customer satisfaction through a national poll, customer surveys, 
and customer complaints at both airports and TSA's national call 
center. According to TSA officials, the agency has finalized targets 
for the two overall indexes, but these targets have not yet been 
communicated throughout the agency. Further, TSA plans to provide the 
FSDs with only the performance index score, not the value of each of 
the components, because the probabilities of detection are classified 
as secret and TSA is concerned that by releasing components, those 
probabilities could be deduced.[Footnote 58] Table 7 summarizes the 
components of the performance indexes developed by TSA. 

Table 7: Components of TSA's Performance Indexes:

Performance index: Passenger screening program; 
Components: 
* Machine probability of detection x person probability of detection 
(covert testing); 
Weight (percent): 50. 

Performance index: Passenger screening program; 
Components: 
* Cost per person screened; 
Weight (percent): 25; 
FY 2005-2010 performance target (1-5 scale): 3.3. 

Performance index: Passenger screening program; 
Components: 
* Consumer satisfaction; 
Weight (percent): 25. 

Performance index: Checked baggage screening program; 
Components: 
* Machine probability of detection x person probability of detection 
(covert testing); 
Weight (percent): 50. 

Performance index: Checked baggage screening program; 
Components: 
* Cost per bag screened; 
Weight (percent): 25; 
FY 2005-2010 performance target (1-5 scale): 3.2. 

Performance index: Checked baggage screening program; 
Components: 
* Consumer satisfaction; 
Weight (percent): 25. 

Source: TSA. 

[End of table]

TSA has not yet established performance targets for the various 
components of the screening indexes, including performance targets for 
covert testing (person probability of detection). TSA's strategic plan 
states that the agency will use the performance data it collects to 
make tactical decisions based on performance. The screening performance 
indexes developed by TSA can be a useful analysis tool, but without 
targets for each component of the index, TSA will have difficulty 
performing meaningful analyses of the parts that add up to the index. 
For example, without performance targets for covert testing, TSA will 
not have identified a desired level of performance related to screener 
detection of threat objects. Performance targets for covert testing 
would enable TSA to focus its improvement efforts on areas determined 
to be most critical, as 100 percent detection capability may not be 
attainable. In January 2005, TSA officials stated that the agency plans 
to track the performance of individual index components and establish 
performance targets against which to measure these components. They 
further stated that they are currently collecting and analyzing 
baseline data to establish these targets and plan to finalize them by 
the end of fiscal year 2005. 

Conclusions:

It has been over 2 years since TSA assumed responsibility for passenger 
and checked baggage screening operations at the nation's commercial 
airports. TSA has made significant accomplishments over this period in 
meeting congressional mandates related to establishing these screening 
operations. With the congressional mandates now largely met, TSA has 
turned its attention to assessing and enhancing the effectiveness of 
its passenger and checked baggage screening systems. An important tool 
in enhancing screener performance is ongoing training. As threats and 
technology change, the training and development of screeners to ensure 
they have the competencies--knowledge, skills, abilities, and 
behaviors--needed to successfully perform their screening functions 
become vital to strengthening aviation security. Without addressing the 
challenges to delivering ongoing training, including installing high-
speed connectivity at airport training facilities, TSA may have 
difficulty maintaining a screening workforce that possesses the 
critical skills needed to perform at a desired level. In addition, 
without adequate internal controls designed to help ensure screeners 
receive required training that are also communicated throughout the 
agency, TSA cannot effectively provide reasonable assurances that 
screeners receive all required training. Given the importance of the 
Online Learning Center in both delivering training and serving as the 
means by which the completion of screener training is documented, TSA 
would benefit from having a clearly defined plan for prioritizing the 
deployment of high-speed Internet/intranet connectivity to all airport 
training facilities. Such a plan would help enable TSA to move forward 
quickly and effectively in deploying high-speed connectivity once 
funding is available. 

Additionally, history demonstrates that U.S. commercial aircraft have 
long been a target for terrorist attacks through the use of explosives 
carried in checked baggage, and covert testing conducted by TSA and DHS 
OIG have identified that weaknesses and vulnerabilities continue to 
exist in the passenger and checked baggage screening systems, including 
the ability of screeners to detect threat objects. While covert test 
results provide an indicator of screening performance, they cannot 
solely be used as a comprehensive measure of any airport's screening 
performance or any individual screener's performance, or in determining 
the overall performance of federal versus private-sector screening. 
Rather, these data should be considered in the larger context of 
additional performance data, such as TIP and recertification test 
results, when assessing screener performance. While TSA has undertaken 
efforts to measures and strengthen performance, these efforts have 
primarily focused on passenger screening and not on checked baggage 
screening. TSA's plans for implementing TIP for checked baggage 
screening, and establishing an image recognition component for the 
checked baggage screeners recertification testing--plans made during 
the course of our review--represent significant steps forward in its 
efforts to strengthen checked baggage screening functions. 
Additionally, although TSA has developed passenger and checked baggage 
screening effectiveness measures, the agency has not yet established 
performance targets for the individual components of these measures. 
Until such targets are established, it will be difficult for TSA to 
draw more meaningful conclusions about its performance and how to most 
effectively direct its improvement efforts. For example, performance 
targets for covert testing would enable TSA to focus its improvement 
efforts on areas determined to be most critical, as 100 percent 
detection capability may not be attainable. We are encouraged by TSA's 
recent plan to establish targets for the individual components of the 
performance indexes. This effort, along with the additional performance 
data TSA plans to collect on checked baggage screening operations, 
should assist TSA in measuring and enhancing screening performance and 
provide TSA with more complete information with which to prioritize and 
focus its screening improvement efforts. 

Recommendations for Executive Action:

To help ensure that all screeners have timely and complete access to 
screener training available in the Online Learning Center and to help 
provide TSA management with reasonable assurance that all screeners are 
receiving required passenger and checked baggage screener training, we 
recommend that the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security 
direct the Assistant Secretary, Transportation Security Administration, 
to take the following two actions:

* develop a plan that prioritizes and schedules the deployment of high-
speed Internet/intranet connectivity to all TSA's airport training 
facilities to help facilitate the delivery of screener training and the 
documentation of training completion, and:

* develop internal controls, such as specific directives, clearly 
defining responsibilities for monitoring and documenting the completion 
of required training, and clearly communicate these responsibilities 
throughout the agency. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation:

We provided a draft of this report to DHS for review and comment. On 
February 4, 2005, we received written comments on the draft report, 
which are reproduced in full in appendix V. DHS generally concurred 
with the findings and recommendations in the report, and agreed that 
efforts to implement our recommendations are critical to successful 
passenger and checked baggage screening training and performance. With 
regard to our recommendation that TSA develop a plan that prioritizes 
and schedules the deployment of high-speed Internet/intranet 
connectivity to all TSA's airport training facilities, DHS stated that 
TSA has developed such a plan. However, although we requested a copy of 
the plan several times during our review and after receiving written 
comments from DHS, TSA did not provide us with a copy of the plan. 
Therefore, we cannot assess the extent to which the plan DHS referenced 
in its written comments fulfills our recommendation. In addition, 
regarding our recommendation that TSA develop internal controls clearly 
defining responsibilities for monitoring and documenting the completion 
of required training, and clearly communicate those responsibilities 
throughout TSA, DHS stated that it is taking steps to define 
responsibility for monitoring the completion of required training and 
to insert this accountability into the performance plans of all TSA 
supervisors. TSA's successful completion of these ongoing and planned 
activities should address the concerns we raised in this report. DHS 
has also provided technical comments on our draft report, which we 
incorporated where appropriate. 

As agreed with your office, we will send copies of this report to 
relevant congressional committees and subcommittees and to the 
Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security. We will also make 
copies available to others upon request. In addition, the report will 
be made available at no charge on GAO's Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you have any questions about this report or wish to discuss it 
further, please contact me at (202) 512-8777. Key contributors to this 
report are listed in appendix VI. 

Sincerely yours,

Signed by: 

Cathleen A. Berrick: 
Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues:

[End of section]

Appendix I: Summary of Previous Findings Related to Screener Training 
and Performance:

Product date: September 2003; 
Summary of previous findings related to screener training and 
performance: The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) had 
deployed a basic screener training program and required remedial 
training but had not fully developed or deployed a recurrent training 
program for screeners or supervisors; 
TSA had collected little information to measure screener performance in 
detecting threat objects; 
* TSA's Office of Internal Affairs and Program Review's (OIAPR) covert 
testing was the primary source of information collected on screeners' 
ability to detect threat objects. However, TSA did not consider the 
covert testing a measure of screener performance; 
* TSA was not using the Threat Image Projection system (TIP) but 
planned to fully activate the system with significantly more threat 
images than previously used in October 2003; 
* TSA had not yet implemented an annual proficiency review to ensure 
that screeners met all qualifications and standards required to perform 
their assigned screening functions; 
Title and GAO product number: Airport Passenger Screening: Preliminary 
Observations Made and Challenges Remaining; GAO-03-1173. 

Product date: November 2003; 
Summary of previous findings related to screener training and 
performance: Although little data existed on the effectiveness of 
passenger screening, TSA was implementing several efforts to collect 
performance data; 
* TSA's OIAPR had conducted little covert testing of the screener 
workforce but planned to double the number of tests it conducted during 
fiscal year 2004; 
* TSA only recently began activating TIP on a wide-scale basis and 
expected it to be fully operational at every checkpoint at all airports 
by April 2004; 
* TSA only recently began implementing the annual recertification 
program and did not expect to complete testing at all airports until 
March 2004; 
* TSA was developing performance indexes for individual screeners and 
the screening system as a whole but had not fully established these 
indexes. TSA expected to have them in place by the end of fiscal year 
2004; 
Title and GAO product number: Aviation Security: Efforts to Measure 
Effectiveness and Address Challenges; GAO-04-232T. 

Product date: November 2003; 
Summary of previous findings related to screener training and 
performance: Although TSA had not fully developed or deployed recurrent 
or supervisory training programs, it was in the process of; 
* deploying six recurrent training modules and was pilot-testing an 
online learning management system, and; 
* working with the U.S. Department of Agriculture's Graduate School to 
tailor its off-the-shelf supervisory course to meet the specific 
training needs of screening supervisors; 
Title and GAO product number: Aviation Security: Efforts to Measure 
Effectiveness and Strengthen Security Programs; GAO-04-285T. 

Product date: February 2004; 
Summary of previous findings related to screener training and 
performance: While TSA had taken steps to enhance its screener training 
programs, staffing imbalances, and lack of high-speed connectivity at 
airport training facilities had made it difficult for screeners at some 
airports to fully utilize these programs; Although TSA was making 
progress in measuring the performance of passenger screeners, it had 
collected limited performance data related to its checked baggage 
screening operations. However, TSA had begun collecting additional 
performance data related to its checked baggage screening operations 
and planned to increase these efforts in the future; As part of its 
efforts to develop performance indexes, TSA was developing baseline 
data for fiscal year 2004 and planned to report the indexes to DHS in 
fiscal year 2005; 
Title and GAO product number: Aviation Security: Challenges Exist in 
Stabilizing and Enhancing Passenger and Baggage Screening Operations; 
GAO-04-440T. 

Product date: April 2004; 
Summary of previous findings related to screener training and 
performance: With the exception of covert testing and recent TIP data, 
data were not yet available to assess how well screeners were 
performing and what steps if any TSA needed to take to improve 
performance. Also, TSA was not using TIP as a formal indicator of 
screening performance, but instead was using it to identify individual 
screener training needs; 
Title and GAO product number: Aviation Security: Private Screening 
Contractors Have Little Flexibility to Implement Innovative Approaches; 
GAO-04-505T. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of table]

[End of section]

Appendix II: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology:

To examine efforts by the Transportation Security Administration to 
enhance their passenger and checked baggage screening programs, we 
addressed the following questions: (1) What actions has TSA taken to 
enhance training for screeners and supervisors? (2) How does TSA 
monitor compliance with screener training requirements? (3) What is the 
status of TSA's efforts to assess and enhance screener performance in 
detecting threat objects?

To determine how TSA has enhanced training for screeners and 
supervisors and how TSA has monitored compliance with screener training 
requirements, we obtained and analyzed relevant legislation, as well as 
TSA's training plans, guidance, and curriculum. We reviewed data from 
TSA's Online Learning Center and assessed the reliability of the Online 
Learning Center database. We compared TSA's procedures for ensuring 
that screeners receive required training according to Standards for 
Internal Controls in the Federal Government. We interviewed TSA 
officials from the Office of Workforce Performance and Training and the 
Office of Aviation Operations in Arlington, Virginia. At the airports 
we visited, we interviewed Federal Security Directors and their staffs, 
such as Training Coordinators. We also met with officials from four 
aviation associations--the American Association of Airport Executives, 
Airports Council International, the Air Transport Association, and the 
Regional Airline Association. We did not assess the methods used to 
develop TSA's screener training program, nor did we analyze the 
contents of TSA's curriculum. Although we could not independently 
verify the reliability of all of this information, we compared the 
information with other supporting documents, when available, to 
determine data consistency and reasonableness. We found the data to be 
sufficiently reliable for our purposes. 

To determine what efforts TSA has taken to assess and to enhance 
screener performance in detecting threat objects, we reviewed related 
reports from the Department of Transportation and the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) Inspector General, Congressional Research 
Service, and TSA, as well as prior GAO reports. We obtained and 
reviewed TSA's covert test data and results of the annual 
recertification testing. (Results of the covert testing are classified 
and will be the subject of a separate classified GAO report.) We 
discussed methods for inputting, compiling, and maintaining the data 
with TSA officials. We also assessed the methodology of TSA's covert 
tests and questioned OIAPR officials about the procedures used to 
ensure the reliability of the covert test data. When we found 
discrepancies between the data OIAPR maintained in spreadsheets and the 
data included in the hard copy reports we obtained from TSA, we worked 
with OIAPR to resolve the discrepancies. Further, we visited TSA 
headquarters to review TSA's annual recertification testing modules and 
discuss TSA's process for validating the recertification exams. As a 
result, we determined that the data provided by TSA were sufficiently 
reliable for the purposes of our review. We also reviewed TSA's 
performance measures, targets, and indexes. Finally, we interviewed TSA 
headquarters officials from several offices in Arlington, Virginia, 
including Aviation Operations, Workforce Performance and Training, 
Strategic Management and Analysis, and Internal Affairs and Program 
Review. 

In addition, in accomplishing our objectives, we also conducted site 
visits at select airports nationwide to interview Federal Security 
Directors and their staffs and conducted two Web-based surveys of 
Federal Security Directors. Specifically, we conducted site visits at 
29 airports (13 category X airports, 9 category I airports, 3 category 
II airports, 3 category III airports, and 1 category IV airport) to 
observe airport security screening procedures and discuss issues 
related to the screening process with TSA, airport, and airline 
officials. We chose these airports to obtain a cross-section of all 
airports by size and geographic distribution. In addition, we selected 
each of the five contract screening pilot airports. The results from 
our airport visits provide examples of screening operations and issues 
but cannot be generalized beyond the airports visited because we did 
not use statistical sampling techniques in selecting the airports. The 
category X airports we visited were Baltimore Washington International 
Airport, Boston Logan International Airport, Chicago O'Hare 
International Airport, Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport, Denver 
International Airport, Washington Dulles International Airport, John F. 
Kennedy International Airport, Los Angeles International Airport, 
Newark Liberty International Airport, Orlando International Airport, 
Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport, San Francisco International 
Airport, Seattle-Tacoma International Airport. The category I airports 
we visited were Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport, John Wayne Airport, 
Chicago Midway International Airport, Dallas Love Field, Kansas City 
International Airport, Little Rock National Airport, Metropolitan 
Oakland International Airport, Portland International Airport, and 
Tampa International Airport. The category II airports we visited were 
Jackson International Airport, Dane County Regional Airport, and 
Greater Rochester International Airport. The category III airports we 
visited were Idaho Falls Regional Airport, Jackson Hole Airport, and 
Orlando Sanford International Airport. The category IV airport we 
visited was Tupelo Regional Airport. 

Further, we administered two Web-based surveys to all 155 Federal 
Security Directors who oversee security at each of the airports falling 
under TSA's jurisdiction. One survey, the general survey, contained 
questions covering local and national efforts to train screeners and 
supervisors and the status of TSA's efforts to evaluate screener 
performance, including the annual recertification program and TIP. The 
second survey attempted to gather more specific airport security 
information on an airport(s) under the Federal Security Director's 
supervision. For the airport-specific survey, each Federal Security 
Director received one or two surveys to complete, depending on the 
number of airports they were responsible for. Where a Federal Security 
Director was responsible for more than two airports, we selected the 
first airport based on the Federal Security Director's location and the 
second airport to obtain a cross-section of all airports by size and 
geographic distribution. In all, we requested information on 265 
airports. However, two airports were dropped from our initial selection 
because the airlines serving these airports suspended operations and 
TSA employees were redeployed to other airports. As a result our sample 
size was reduced to 263 airports, which included all 21 category X, and 
60, 49, 73, and 60 category I through IV airports respectively. In that 
we did not use probability sampling methods to select the sample of 
airports that were included in our airport-specific survey, we cannot 
generalize our findings beyond the selected airports. 

A GAO survey specialist designed the surveys in combination with other 
GAO staff knowledgeable about airport security issues. We conducted 
pretest interviews with six Federal Security Directors to ensure that 
the questions were clear, concise, and comprehensive. In addition, TSA 
managers and an independent GAO survey specialist reviewed the survey. 

We conducted these Web-based surveys from late March to mid-May 2004. 
We received completed general surveys from all 155 Federal Security 
Directors and completed airport-specific surveys for all 263 separate 
airports for which we sought information, for 100 percent response 
rates. The surveys' results are not subject to sampling errors because 
all Federal Security Directors were asked to participate in the surveys 
and we did not use probability-sampling techniques to select specific 
airports. However, the practical difficulties of conducting any survey 
may introduce other errors, commonly referred to as nonsampling errors. 
For example, difficulties in how a particular question is interpreted, 
in the sources of information that are available to respondents, or in 
how the data are entered into a database or were analyzed can introduce 
unwanted variability into the survey results. We took steps in the 
development of the surveys, the data collection, and the data editing 
and analysis to minimize these nonsampling errors. Also, in that these 
were Web-based surveys whereby respondents entered their responses 
directly into our database, there was little possibility of data entry 
or transcription error. In addition, all computer programs used to 
analyze the data were peer reviewed and verified to ensure that the 
syntax was written and executed correctly. 

[End of section]

We performed our work from May 2003 through April 2005 in accordance 
with generally accepted government auditing standards. Certain 
information we obtained and analyzed regarding screener training and 
performance are classified or are considered by TSA to be sensitive 
security information. Accordingly, the results of our review of this 
information are not included in this report.[Footnote 59]

[End of section]

Appendix III: TSA Screener Training Tools Designed to Help Improve 
Screener Performance:

Training tool: Hand Held Metal Detector and Pat Down Video; 
Purpose: Provide an informative and effective learning tool to enhance 
screeners' skills in the areas of hand-wanding and pat-down searches of 
passengers; 
Status reported by TSA: Deployed November 21, 2003. 

Training tool: MBS II Weapons Kits; 
Purpose: This tool allows screeners to touch actual improvised 
explosive device (IED) components and build their own devices. This 
experiential learning will enable screeners to more readily detect real 
IEDs during screening. These weapons are also used to assist in 
training by using them for live testing conducted by FSD staff; 
Status reported by TSA: Deployed January 26, 2004. 

Training tool: Firearms Weapons Kits; 
Purpose: This tool allows screeners to touch actual firearms and begin 
to understand how they can be broken down into various parts. By 
understanding this and experiencing it, screeners are better able to 
see the components of a firearm during actual screening. These weapons 
are also used to assist in training by using them for live testing 
conducted by FSD staff; 
Status reported by TSA: Deployed January 26, 2004. 

Training tool: X-Ray Operator Video; 
Purpose: Maintain and enhance the screeners' X-ray image operational 
skills; 
Status reported by TSA: Deployed February 5, 2004. 

Training tool: X-Ray Tutor Version 1; 
Purpose: Provide a tool that includes about 14,000 image combinations 
to practice threat identification; 
Status reported by TSA: Deployed February 15, 2004. 

Training tool: Basic Supervisory Technical Web-Based Training 1; 
Purpose: Assist screener supervisors to understand additional roles 
they must perform, including enhanced technical skills needed to 
adequately supervise screening functions and resolve alarms using 
interactive, performance-based training tool; 
Status reported by TSA: Deployed April 16, 2004. 

Training tool: Mobile Training Assist Teams (MTAT); 
Purpose: These teams go into airports where data shows performance 
needs attention. The team offers a variety of services to assist in 
improving the performance, such as on-the-spot training and consulting 
services. Team visits can be initiated by FSDs, Internal Affairs 
reports, Quality Assurance trips, or MTAT Supervisors proactively 
visiting the airport and FSD; 
Status reported by TSA: Site visits completed from October 2003 through 
December 3, 2004: 
* North Central (37 visits); 
* South Central (51 visits); 
* Northeast (25 visits); 
* Southeast (60 visits); 
* Western (53 visits); 
* 54 FSD Stakeholder Relations Meetings. 

Training tool: Basic Screener Supervisory Classroom Training; 
Purpose: Improve screener supervisors' knowledge of federal government 
and TSA personnel rules and how to effectively coach and communicate 
with employees; 
Status reported by TSA: Approximately 3,800 supervisors have been 
trained. 

Training tool: ETD Maintenance Course; 
Purpose: Certification of screeners to perform supervisory maintenance 
tasks above and beyond operator training; 
Status reported by TSA: Delivered April 1, 2004. 

Training tool: Credential Verification Training; 
Purpose: Provide students with basic skills needed to verify the 
identity of flying armed law enforcement officers; 
Status reported by TSA: Deployed April 15, 2004. 

Training tool: Threat in the Spotlight; 
Purpose: This weekly product brings to light actual cases of weapons 
being found by law enforcement, with an explanation of how those 
weapons could be used to attack aviation; 
Status reported by TSA: Deployed weekly in 2004. 

Training tool: EDS Operations Web-Based Training; 
Purpose: Provide interactive, performance based recurrent Web-based 
training modules for checked baggage explosive detection systems (EDS); 
Status reported by TSA: Deployed April 30, 2004. 

Training tool: Handwanding and Pat Down Web-Based Training; 
Purpose: Improve screener performance by providing an interactive tool 
complementary to Hand Held Metal Detector and Pat Down Video that 
allows the screener to practice proper techniques and receive immediate 
feedback; 
Status reported by TSA: Deployed April 30, 2004. 

Training tool: Customer Service Web-Based Training; 
Purpose: Reinforces TSA's customer service principles and places the 
screener in various situations requiring effective customer service 
responses; 
Status reported by TSA: Deployed April 30, 2004. 

Training tool: Checkpoint and Checked Baggage Operations Web-Based 
Training; 
Purpose: Provide interactive, performance-based recurrent training 
modules for checkpoint and checked baggage operations; 
Status reported by TSA: Deployed April 30, 2004. 

Training tool: Physical Bag Search Video; 
Purpose: Maintain and enhance screeners' explosive trace detection 
(ETD) and physical bag search skills for carry-on and checked baggage; 
Status reported by TSA: Deployed April 30, 2004. 

Training tool: ETD and Physical Bag Search Web-Based Training; 
Purpose: Provide interactive recurrent Web-based training modules for 
ETD and physical bag search; 
Status reported by TSA: Deployed April 30, 2004. 

Training tool: Prohibited Items Web-Based Training; 
Purpose: Provide an interactive, performance-based training tool to 
enhance screener's ability to identify prohibited items; 
Status reported by TSA: Deployed June 25, 2004. 

Training tool: Effectively Screening Prosthetics Video; 
Purpose: Provide an informative and effective learning tool to maintain 
and enhance the skills of screeners in the areas of persons with 
prosthetics; 
Status reported by TSA: Deployed December 16, 2004. 

Training tool: X-Ray Tutor Version 2; 
Purpose: Provide a tool to practice threat identification with about 
10,000,000 image combinations; 
Status reported by TSA: Scheduled to be deployed during the second 
quarter of fiscal year 2005. 

Training tool: X-Ray Simulator Training; 
Purpose: Sharing the X-Ray Tutor Version 2 library, this tool will 
allow screeners to practice finding threat items using the full 
capabilities of the TIP-ready X-ray machines; 
Status reported by TSA: Scheduled to be deployed during the second 
quarter of fiscal year 2005. 

Training tool: Basic Supervisory Technical Web-Based Training 2; 
Purpose: Provide an interactive, performance-based tool to convey how 
the supervisor is to handle screening situations, handed off by the 
screening, following standard operator procedures; 
Status reported by TSA: To be developed. 

Training tool: Safety, Lifting, and Twisting Web-Based Training; 
Purpose: Provide a Web-based training that will engage the student with 
3-dimensional representations of the muscular frame, showing proper 
lifting techniques and the results of improper techniques; 
Status reported by TSA: Scheduled to be deployed during the second 
quarter of fiscal year 2005. 

Source: TSA. 

[End of table]

[End of section]

Appendix IV: Summary of TSA's Short-Term Action Items for Strengthening 
Passenger Screener Performance:

People: 1; 
Action item: Increase FSD support and accountability; 
Description: Hold FSDs accountable for screening performance and 
delivery of security; 
Benefit: Management accountability is driven down to the local airport; 
FSD performance is linked to screener performance, creating incentives 
for maintaining and improving security. 

People: 2; 
Action item: Enhance training; 
Description: Provide ongoing training for screeners and supervisors to 
maintain their skills and provide new skills and techniques based on 
evolving threats and lessons learned; 
Benefit: Maintains and improves knowledge base of screeners; Ensures 
proper oversight by supervisors; Ensures that screeners are capable of 
addressing evolving threats. 

People: 3; 
Action item: Increase Internal Affairs covert testing; 
Description: Increase the frequency of TSA covert testing; 
Benefit: Improved identification of systemic vulnerabilities in airport 
security systems; Immediate implementation of limited remedial actions. 

People: 4; 
Action item: Continue to pursue human performance improvements; 
Description: Better understand reasons and causes for human errors and 
interactions with technology in order to identify opportunities for 
performance improvements, with a goal of identifying optimum work 
conditions; 
Benefit: Reduces human-based errors; Increases workforce morale and 
working conditions, leading to improved performance. 

Technology: 5; 
Action item: Continue to identify screening technology improvements; 
Description: Continue to research alternative technologies and seek 
short-term technological solutions, especially for potential vectors; 
Benefit: Identifies threats more accurately and quickly; Decreases 
number of false positives from equipment. 

Technology: 6; 
Action item: Finish installing TIP; 
Description: The TIP system is a series of 2,400 images of threat 
objects that can be automatically fed into X-ray machines during actual 
screening; 
Benefit: Maintains alertness of screeners; Identifies individual 
screener performance issues. 

Technology: 7; 
Action item: Expedite high-speed connectivity to checkpoints and 
training computers; 
Description: Connect all TSA offices, checkpoints and screening 
equipment (X-rays, EDS machines) to the Internet in order to automate 
and improve processes that are currently done manually or not at all; 
Benefit: Provides immediate feedback on and response to screener 
performance issues; Improves communication with managers in the field. 

Process: 8; 
Action item: Refresh aviation operations policy, procedures, and 
practice; 
Description: Conduct a thorough and expedited review of all policies 
and procedures developed during the rollout of TSA with a focus on 
increasing screening performance and capabilities; 
Benefit: Maintains "freshness" of standard operating procedures based 
on most recent intelligence about security threats; Removes or updates 
outdated or unnecessary screening techniques based on lessons learned. 

Process: 9; 
Action item: Improve workforce management; 
Description: Determine the optimal workforce staffing levels based on 
latest passenger flows and other factors; 
Benefit: Maximizes utilization of existing resources. 

Source: TSA. 

[End of table]

[End of section]

Appendix V: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security:

U.S. Department of Homeland Security: 
Washington, DC 20528:

February 4, 2005:

Ms. Cathleen Berrick:
Director, Homeland Security & Justice Issues: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office:
441 G Street, N.W.: 
Washington, D.C. 20548:

Dear Ms. Berrick:

RE: GAO-05-143SU, Aviation Security: Screener Training and Performance 
Measurement Strengthened, but More Work Remains:
(GAO Job Code 440256):

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the subject draft report. 
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) appreciates the work done to 
identify areas for improvement in the Transportation Security 
Administration's training and performance measurement of passenger and 
baggage screeners. We generally concur with the report and its 
recommendations and appreciate the discussion of challenges, and 
related on-going and planned work designed to fully meet our 
responsibilities.

The report acknowledges the substantial progress the Transportation 
Security Administration (TSA) has made in enhancing Screener training, 
and measuring and enhancing performance. However, there are areas 
within the report about which DHS would like to comment.

The U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) made the following two 
recommendations regarding passenger and baggage screening training and 
performance:

1. Develop a plan that prioritizes and schedules the deployment of high-
speed internet/intranet connectivity to all TSA's airport training 
facilities to help facilitate the delivery of Screener training and the 
documentation of training completion.

2. Develop internal controls, such as specific directives, clearly 
defining responsibilities for monitoring and documenting the completion 
of required training, and clearly communicate these responsibilities 
throughout [TSA].

DHS agrees that efforts to implement these recommendations are critical 
to successful passenger and baggage screening training and performance. 
We believe that we have fulfilled the first recommendation because TSA 
has developed such a plan.

Specifically, TSA has developed a plan to facilitate connectivity to 
all of TSA's airport training facilities. The High-Speed Operational 
Connectivity (HiSOC) program is a detailed plan and corresponding 
schedule for ensuring that training centers in airports receive high 
speed connectivity. The $174 million of funding necessary to complete 
HiSOC installation is included in the President's FY 2006 budget 
request. To date in FY 2005, $3 million has been allocated to the HiSOC 
effort. As additional funds are made available for the HiSOC program, 
connectivity can be deployed to additional training centers.

The HiSOC program includes a detailed plan for Wide Area Network (WAN) 
connectivity to TSA Airports including the following services:

* Local Area Networking (LAN) linking Operation Centers, Training 
Centers and Break Rooms, Checkpoint/Passenger Screening Areas and 
Baggage Screening Areas, and Federal Security Directors:

* XP Migration:

* Intelligent Phone Deployment: 

* Email Migration:

* Remote Access via Virtual Private Network (VPN):

TSA is already taking steps to address the second recommendation. The 
TSA Executive Leadership is drafting a memorandum to advise all 
Assistant Administrators and Federal Security Directors that managers 
and supervisors will be held accountable for their subordinates 
completing all mandatory training requirements. This accountability 
will be inserted into the performance plans of all TSA supervisors.

In February 2005, TSA's Office of Workforce Performance and Training 
will be updating the existing Management Directive on Training Records. 
This directive will be revised to strengthen and clarify recordkeeping 
requirements. By the end of March 2005, the TSA Online Learning Center 
(OLC) should be enhanced to include a robust reporting tool that will 
produce a number of detailed and summary level training performance 
accountability reports directly accessible to local training 
administrators. By the summer 2005, management plans to expand TSA's 
Performance Information Management System to include select OLC 
training summary data. This data will be visible to managers and will 
include the ability to correlate training performance data with other 
TSA source data for cause and effect and trending analyses.

Sincerely,

Signed by: 

Steven Pecinovsky: 
Acting Director: 
Departmental GAO/OIG Liaison Office:

MMcP: 

[End of section]

Appendix VI: GAO Contacts and Acknowledgments:

GAO Contacts:

Cathleen A. Berrick (202) 512-8777:

Maria D. Strudwick (202) 512-5419:

Staff Acknowledgments:

In addition to those named above, David Alexander, Leo Barbour, Lisa 
Brown, Elizabeth Curda, Kevin Dooley, Kathryn Godfrey, David Hooper, 
Christopher Jones, Stuart Kaufman, Kim Gianopoulos, Thomas Lombardi, 
Cady S. Panetta, Minette Richardson, Sidney Schwartz, Su Jin Yon, and 
Susan Zimmerman were key contributors to this report. 

FOOTNOTES

[1] The Federal Security Director is the ranking TSA authority 
responsible for the leadership and coordination of TSA security 
activities at the nation's commercial airports. We sent two surveys--a 
general survey and an airport-specific survey--to all 155 Federal 
Security Directors on March 23, 2004. In the general survey, we asked 
each Federal Security Director to answer security-related questions 
that pertain to all of the airports for which he/she is responsible. In 
the airport-specific survey, we asked Federal Security Directors a 
number of airport-specific questions about screening and other security 
concerns for one or two airports, depending on the number of airports 
they were responsible for. By early May 2004, we had received responses 
from 100 percent of the Federal Security Directors for both surveys. 

[2] Pursuant to section 108 of the Aviation and Transportation Security 
Act (ATSA), TSA conducted a 2-year private screening pilot program at 
five airports--one in each airport security category (Pub. L. No. 107-
71). The mission of the pilot, as defined by TSA, was to test the 
effectiveness of using private screening contractors in a post-
September 11 environment. The pilot concluded on November 18, 2004. On 
November 19, 2004, consistent with ATSA, TSA began allowing airports to 
apply to opt out of using federal screeners in favor of private 
contractors. For additional information on TSA's progress in developing 
the opt-out program, see GAO, Aviation Security: Preliminary 
Observations on TSA's Progress to Allow Airports to Use Private 
Passenger and Baggage Screening Services, GAO-05-126 (Washington, D.C.: 
Nov. 19, 2004). 

[3] GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, 
GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1 (Washington, D.C.: November 1999). 

[4] The Threat Image Projection system is designed to test screeners' 
detection capabilities by projecting threat images, including images of 
guns and explosives, into bags as they are screened. Screeners are 
responsible for positively identifying the threat image and calling for 
the bag to be searched. 

[5] ATSA requires that TSA collect performance information on all 
passengers and baggage screeners by conducting an annual proficiency 
evaluation to ensure each screener continues to meet all qualifications 
and standards related to the functions he or she performs. 

[6] TSA's performance indexes show how well screening systems are 
functioning on a scale of 1 to 5, using a weighted average of the 
values of four distinct performance indicators. 

[7] We issued two additional reports detailing the results of our 
review, which discuss information deemed to be classified or sensitive 
security information. The report containing sensitive security 
information is GAO, Aviation Security: Screener Training and 
Performance Measurement Strengthened, but More Work Remains, GAO-05-
143SU (Washington D.C.: Feb. 28, 2005). The report containing 
classified and sensitive security information is GAO, Aviation 
Security: Results of Transportation Security Administration's Covert 
Testing for Passenger and Checked Baggage Screening for September 2002 
through September 2004, GAO-05-437C (Washington D.C.: Apr. 7, 2005). 

[8] The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United 
States: The 9/11 Commission Report (Washington, D.C., July 2004). 

[9] Consistent with ATSA, TSA was created as an agency within the 
Department of Transportation (DOT) with responsibility for securing all 
modes of transportation, including aviation. The Homeland Security Act 
of 2002, signed into law on November 25, 2002, transferred TSA from the 
DOT to the new Department of Homeland Security (Pub. L. No. 107-296). 

[10] TSA defines an operational screening test as any covert test of a 
screener conducted by TSA, on any screening function, to assess the 
screener's threat item detection ability and/or adherence to TSA-
approved procedures. 

[11] Pursuant to the Homeland Security Act, the deadline for screening 
all checked baggage using explosive detection systems was, in effect, 
extended until December 31, 2003. 

[12] Sterile areas are located within the terminal where passengers 
wait after screening to board departing aircraft. Access to these areas 
is controlled by TSA screeners at checkpoints where they conduct 
physical screening of passengers and their carry-on baggage for weapons 
and explosives. 

[13] Screeners must deny passage beyond the screening location to any 
individual or property that has not been screened or inspected in 
accordance with passenger screening standard operating procedures. If 
an individual refuses to permit inspection of any item, that item must 
not be allowed into the sterile area or aboard an aircraft. 

[14] Explosive detection systems use probing radiation to examine 
objects inside baggage and identify the characteristic signatures of 
threat explosives. EDS equipment operates in an automated mode. 

[15] Explosive trace detection works by detecting vapors and residues 
of explosives. Human operators collect samples by rubbing bags with 
swabs, which are chemically analyzed to identify any traces of 
explosive materials. 

[16] Positive passenger bag match is an alternative method of screening 
checked baggage, which requires that the passenger be on the same 
aircraft as the checked baggage. 

[17] GAO, Airport Passenger Screening: Preliminary Observations on 
Progress Made and Challenges Remaining, GAO-03-1173 (Washington, D.C.: 
Sept. 24, 2003). 

[18] The Online Learning Center is TSA's central, official electronic 
source of all training and related performance/development 
accomplishments for TSA employees. It serves as the delivery platform 
for online training and is the official repository for TSA training 
records. TSA launched the Online Learning Center on October 31, 2003. 

[19] Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General: An 
Evaluation of the Transportation Security Administration's Screener 
Training and Methods of Testing, OIG-04-045 (Washington, D.C., Sept. 
2004). 

[20] For local employees to be approved as instructors by TSA, they 
must be nominated by an FSD and have a current or prior instructor 
certification by a recognized training and development organization or 
have had at least 2 years of experience as an instructor. In addition, 
local TSA instructors must have successfully completed the course of 
instruction they will be teaching and demonstrate instructional skills 
by assisting a TSA-approved instructor in classroom instruction and 
monitoring actual classroom instruction. 

[21] In April 2004, a TSA-sponsored independent evaluation of screening 
operations was completed by a consultant (Private Screening Operations 
Performance Evaluation Summary Report, BearingPoint, Apr. 16, 2004). 
The study was designed to evaluate the performance of federal and 
private screening operations. 

[22] The MBS II and weapons training kits were provided to airports to 
address the identified training gap by allowing screeners to see and 
feel the threat objects that they are looking for. These kits contain 
some of the test objects used by TSA's OAIPR to conduct the covert 
testing. In February 2004, TSA issued guidance to FSDs on use of these 
kits to conduct local screener testing. These guidelines were updated 
in June 2004. 

[23] Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General, Audit 
of Passenger and Baggage Screening Procedures at Domestic Airports, OIG-
04-37 (Washington, D.C., September 2004). 

[24] TSA headquarters training officials stated that the Training 
Coordinators at airports should be aware of the availability of the 
supervisory and leadership training courses. 

[25] GAO, Human Capital: A Guide for Assessing Strategic Training and 
Development Efforts in the Federal Government, GAO-04-546G (Washington, 
D.C., March 2004). 

[26] Methods used by FSDs for determining and reporting recurrent 
training time have not been verified by GAO. 

[27] The staffing model took into account factors such as the number of 
screening checkpoints and lanes at an airport; originating passengers; 
projected air carrier service increases and decreases during calendar 
year 2003; and hours needed to accommodate some screener training, 
leave, and breaks. 

[28] In May 2003, TSA hired a contractor to develop a staffing model 
for its screening workforce. TSA officials told us that the contractor 
completed the staffing model in June 2004, and all airports now have 
the capability to use the contractor's stand-alone software. TSA 
completed installation of the software on its intranet in March 2005. 
This installation provides TSA headquarters with access to the staffing 
models used by airports. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
Prevention Act of 2004 requires TSA to develop and submit to the 
appropriate congressional committees, standards for determining 
aviation security staffing at commercial airports no later than 90 days 
after December 17, 2004, the date of the act's enactment, and GAO to 
conduct an analysis of these standards (Pub. L. No. 108-458). As of 
April 15, 2005, these standards had not been submitted. 

[29] High-speed Internet/intranet access is provided by a series of 
technologies that give users the ability to send and receive data at 
volumes and speeds far greater than Internet access over traditional 
telephone lines. In addition to offering speed, the technology provides 
a continuous, "always on" connection (no need to dial up) and a "two-
way" capability, that is, the ability to both receive and transmit data 
at high speeds. 

[30] TSA defines fully connected as a training computer with the new 
network image installed and connected to the TSA broadband network. 

[31] GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1. 

[32] GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1. 

[33] GAO-AIMD-00-21.3.1. 

[34] Consistent with ATSA, TSA requires remedial training for any 
passenger or baggage screener who fails an operational (covert) test 
and prohibits screeners from performing the screening function related 
to the test they failed until they successfully complete the training. 

[35] According to TSA officials, between September 2002 and December 8, 
2004, the Office of Internal Affairs and Program Review issued 12 
memorandums to Aviation Operations that identified screeners requiring 
remedial training based on covert testing conducted from September 2002 
through September 30, 2004. 

[36] OIAPR designs its covert testing methods based, in part, on 
intelligence regarding the most recent threats. 

[37] Statement before the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon 
the United States, Statement of the Honorable Kenneth M. Mead, 
Inspector General, U.S. Department of Transportation, May 22, 2003. 

[38] Covert testing is an ancillary duty and not a full-time assignment 
for the majority of OIAPR staff. According to OIAPR, of the 
approximately 123 full-time-equivalent positions in headquarters, 14 
are dedicated fully to the covert testing program, which includes 
covert testing of all modes of transportation, not just airports. These 
14 full-time-equivalents are in OIAPR's Special Operations group and 
form the core of team leaders for the covert testing trips. In 
addition, two full-time-equivalents from OIAPR's Office of Program 
Analysis support the covert testing program full-time in terms of data 
analysis, report writing, and quality assurance. The remaining OIAPR 
staff in headquarters and the field are responsible for conducting 
criminal and noncriminal investigations of employee misconduct; 
conducting program reviews, inspections, and special inquiries into 
security incidents; and managing OIAPR. 

[39] TSA established five mission support centers staffed with OIAPR, 
training, and other personnel. These centers are located in Atlanta, 
Dallas, Detroit, Philadelphia, and San Francisco. In fiscal year 2004, 
OIAPR began to use field staff to support its covert testing 
activities. In addition, OIAPR has 12 investigators located at seven 
airports. 

[40] GAO, Airport Passenger Screening: Preliminary Observations on 
Progress Made and Challenges Remaining, GAO-03-1173 (Washington, D.C.: 
Sept. 24, 2003). GAO, Aviation Security: Private Screening Contractors 
Have Little Flexibility to Implement Innovative Approaches, GAO-04-544T 
(Washington, D.C.: Apr 22, 2004). 

[41] Results of TSA's covert testing of passenger and checked baggage 
screening are classified and are discussed in a separate classified 
report, GAO, Results of Transportation Security Administration's Covert 
Testing for Passenger and Checked Baggage Screening for September 2002 
through September 2004, GAO-05-437C (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 5, 2005). 

[42] Test results cannot be generalized because sample tests were not 
identified using the principles of probability sampling. In a 
probability sample to assess screener detection of threat objects, each 
screening of a passenger or baggage would have to have a chance of 
being selected. A well-designed probability sample would enable failure 
rates to be generalized to all airports. However, for cost and 
operational reasons, probability sampling may not be feasible for 
passenger and checked baggage screening because it would require a very 
large sample size and an exhaustive examination of each sampled 
passenger or baggage to determine if there was a threat object to 
detect. 

[43] Test failure rates are classified and have been excluded from this 
report. 

[44] The local covert testing protocols were updated in June 2004 and 
August 2004 to provide information on alternative testing methods. 

[45] TIP is not yet operational at one airport because of construction 
at the screening checkpoint to prepare for its installation. However, 
the TIP-ready X-ray machines have already been procured for the airport 
and are expected to be installed once the construction issues have been 
resolved. 

[46] The TIP database records both the TIP hit rate and TIP false alarm 
rate. These two results are used to determine the probability of 
detection and probability of false alarm, which determine overall TIP 
performance. 

[47] GAO-03-1173. 

[48] Some screeners, such as those on extended leave, leave without 
pay, military leave, or leave because of an on-the-job injury were not 
tested. These screeners are retested as they return to work. 

[49] According to TSA records, between October 2003 and May 2004, 
13,516 screeners completed the recertification testing as baggage 
screeners. 

[50] As of January 7, 2005, TSA reported that its workforce included 
approximately 25,947 dual-trained screeners who were certified to serve 
as passenger or baggage screeners. 

[51] TSA's onscreen resolution protocol requires that when an EDS 
machine alarm goes off, indicating the possibility of explosives, TSA 
screeners, by reviewing computer-generated images of the inside of the 
bag, attempt to determine whether or not a suspect item or items are in 
fact explosive materials. If the screener is unable to make this 
determination, the bag is diverted from the main conveyor belt into an 
area where it receives a secondary screening by a screener with an ETD 
machine. 

[52] TSA officials stated that in early fiscal year 2005, TSA's Office 
of Information Technology committed to extending high-speed 
connectivity to an additional 16 locations, but is still awaiting 
funding to further expand network coverage and to extend the network to 
checkpoints. 

[53] OIAPR has issued its reports to the TSA Administrator; the TSA 
Administrator's Chief of Staff; Associate Undersecretary for Aviation 
Operations; Associate Undersecretary for Workforce, Performance and 
Training; Assistant Secretary and Chief Technology Officer; Assistant 
Administrator and Chief Support Systems Officer; Chief Operating 
Officer, the Office of Transportation Security and Intelligence, and 
the Office of Security Policy. The report recommendations are directed 
to the office(s) responsible for taking the corrective action. 

[54] Some recommendations appear repeatedly in multiple reports issued 
by OIAPR. 

[55] According to the Government Performance and Results Act, the 
Office of Management and Budget, and GAO, outcomes assess actual 
results as compared with the intended results or consequences that 
occur from carrying out a program or activity. Outputs count the goods 
and services produced by a program or organization. 

[56] TSA analyzed data from fiscal years 2003 and 2004 to establish 
baselines and establish performance targets. 

[57] According to TSA, the machine probabilities of detection are 
established by the certification standards for each particular model of 
machines, and machines are not deployed unless they have met those 
standards. 

[58] TSA headquarters officials stated that their intent is to provide 
FSDs with various mechanisms to assess their screening effectiveness at 
the airports for which they are responsible. Specifically, they stated 
that FSDs are provided with TIP data and the results of OIAPR's covert 
testing at their airports. Additionally, they have access to the 
results of local covert testing at their airports. 

[59] We issued two additional reports detailing the results of our 
review, which discuss information deemed to be classified or sensitive 
security information. The report containing sensitive security 
information is GAO, Aviation Security: Screener Training and 
Performance Measurement Strengthened, but More Work Remains, GAO-05-
143SU (Washington D.C.: Feb. 28, 2005). The report containing 
classified and sensitive security information is GAO, Results of 
Transportation Security Administration's Covert Testing for Passenger 
and Checked Baggage Screening for September 2002 through September 
2004, GAO-05-437C (Washington D.C.: Apr. 7, 2005). 

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