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Testimony:

Before the Subcommittee on Aviation, Committee on Transportation and 
Infrastructure, House of Representatives:

United States General Accounting Office:

GAO:

For Release on Delivery Expected at 10:00 a.m. EST:

Thursday, February 12, 2004:

Aviation Security:

Challenges Exist in Stabilizing and Enhancing Passenger and Baggage 
Screening Operations:

Statement of Cathleen A. Berrick, Director, Homeland Security and 
Justice:

GAO-04-440T:

GAO Highlights:

Highlights of GAO-04-440T, a testimony before the Subcommittee on 
Aviation, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, House of 
Representatives 

Why GAO Did This Study:

Securing commercial aviation is a daunting task—with hundreds of 
airports and thousands of flights daily carrying millions of 
passengers and pieces of baggage. In an effort to strengthen the 
security of commercial aviation, the Transportation Security 
Administration (TSA) was created and charged with making numerous 
enhancements to aviation security, including federalizing passenger 
and baggage screening and screening checked baggage using explosive 
detection systems. To assess the progress of passenger and baggage 
screening operations, GAO was asked to describe TSA’s efforts to (1) 
hire and deploy passenger and baggage screeners, (2) train the 
screening workforce, (3) measure screener performance in detecting 
threat objects, and (4) leverage and deploy screening equipment and 
technologies. 

What GAO Found:

TSA met its mandate to establish a federal screener workforce by 
November 2002, but continues to face challenges in hiring and 
deploying passenger and baggage screeners. Staffing shortages at some 
airports and TSA’s hiring process have hindered TSA’s ability to fully 
staff screening checkpoints without using additional measures, such as 
overtime. In addition, while TSA has taken steps to enhance its 
screener training programs, staffing shortages and lack of high-speed 
connectivity at airport training facilities have made it difficult for 
screeners at some airports to fully utilize these programs.

TSA has also undertaken several initiatives to measure the performance 
of passenger screeners in detecting threat objects. These efforts 
include increasing covert testing at screening checkpoints and 
conducting annual recertifications of screeners. While TSA is making 
progress in measuring the performance of passenger screeners, it has 
collected limited performance data related to its baggage screening 
operations. However, TSA has begun collecting additional performance 
data related to its baggage screening operations, and plans to 
increase these efforts in the future.

TSA also continues to face challenges in deploying and leveraging 
screening equipment and technologies. TSA deployed Explosive Detection 
Systems and Explosive Trace Detection equipment to all airports to 
screen checked baggage. However, TSA has been unable to fully utilize 
this equipment to screen 100 percent of checked baggage due to 
screener shortages, and equipment out of service for maintenance 
and/or repairs. When this equipment is not available, TSA continues to 
screen checked baggage using alternative means. TSA also has ongoing 
initiatives designed to increase the efficiency of screening checked 
baggage, including implementing in-line baggage screening systems and 
streamlining screening processes. 

TSA is also conducting research and development (R&D) activities to 
strengthen passenger and baggage screening. These efforts are designed 
to improve detection capability, performance, and efficiency for 
current technologies, and to develop next generation screening 
equipment. TSA faces a number of challenges with its R&D program, 
including balancing funding with competing priorities, and working 
with other components of the Department of Homeland Security to 
develop a strategy for merging their R&D programs.

What GAO Recommends:

In prior reports, GAO has made numerous recommendations designed to 
strengthen airport passenger and baggage screening. GAO also have 
several ongoing reviews related to the issues addressed in this 
testimony, and will issue separate reports related to these areas at 
later dates, with additional recommendations as appropriate.

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-04-440T.

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click 
on the link above. For more information, contact Cathleen A. Berrick, 
(202) 512-8777, Berrickc@gao.gov.

[End of section]

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

Thank you for inviting me to participate in today's hearing to discuss 
progress and challenges in airport passenger and baggage screening. 
Securing commercial aviation is a daunting task--with hundreds of 
airports, thousands of aircraft, and thousands of flights daily 
carrying millions of passengers and pieces of baggage. In an effort to 
strengthen the security of commercial aviation, the President signed 
into law the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA) on 
November 19, 2001.[Footnote 1] ATSA created the Transportation Security 
Administration (TSA) and mandated actions designed to strengthen 
aviation security, including the federalization of passenger and 
baggage screening at over 440 commercial airports in the United States 
by November 19, 2002, and the screening of all checked baggage using 
explosive detection systems.[Footnote 2] Notwithstanding these 
efforts, recent reviews and covert testing conducted by us, the 
Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) Office of Inspector General, 
and TSA's Office of Internal Affairs and Program Review revealed 
continuing weaknesses and vulnerabilities in the screening system.

My testimony today focuses on the progress TSA is making in developing 
and deploying tools to enhance and measure screener performance and the 
challenges that remain. In particular, my testimony highlights four key 
areas, including TSA's efforts to (1) hire and deploy passenger and 
baggage screeners, (2) train the screening workforce, (3) measure 
screener performance in detecting threat objects, and (4) leverage and 
deploy screening equipment and technologies. My testimony is based on 
our prior work and preliminary observations from our ongoing reviews of 
TSA's passenger and baggage screening programs, and research and 
development efforts.

In summary:

While TSA met its mandate to establish a federal screener workforce by 
November 2002, it continues to face challenges in hiring and deploying 
its screener workforce. To accomplish its security mission, TSA needs a 
sufficient number of passenger and baggage screeners trained and 
certified in the latest TSA screening procedures and technology. 
However, staffing shortages and TSA's hiring process have hindered the 
ability of some Federal Security Directors (FSD)[Footnote 3] to provide 
sufficient resources to staff screening checkpoints and oversee 
screening operations at their airports.

TSA has taken steps to enhance its training programs for passenger and 
baggage screeners. In addition to strengthening its basic and recurrent 
training programs, TSA is also enhancing and standardizing remedial 
training for screeners who fail covert tests conducted by TSA's Office 
of Internal Affairs and Program Review. TSA has also established 
leadership and technical training programs for screening supervisors. 
Although TSA continues to make progress in this area, staffing 
shortages and lack of high-speed connectivity[Footnote 4] at many 
airport training facilities have made it difficult for screeners to 
fully utilize these programs and complete required training.

While TSA has undertaken several initiatives to measure the performance 
of passenger screeners in detecting threat objects, it has collected 
limited data related to the performance of baggage screeners. In 
response to its July 2003 Passenger Screener Performance Improvement 
Study, TSA developed a short-term action plan that identified key 
actions TSA planned to take to strengthen the performance of passenger 
screeners. These actions built on several initiatives that TSA already 
had underway, including enhancing training for screeners and 
supervisors, increasing covert testing, completing installation of the 
Threat Image Projection System (TIP),[Footnote 5] and conducting annual 
recertification of screeners. TSA has focused on assessing the 
performance of passenger screeners, but has collected limited data 
related to the performance of baggage screeners. However, TSA has begun 
collecting additional performance data related to its baggage screening 
operations, and plans to increase these efforts in the future.

Although TSA has made progress in its checked baggage screening 
operations, it continues to face operational and funding challenges in 
its efforts to screen all checked baggage using Explosive Detection 
Systems (EDS) or Explosive Trace Detection (ETD) systems. TSA deployed 
this equipment to all airports to screen checked baggage, but has been 
unable to fully utilize this equipment due to screener and equipment 
shortages and equipment being out of service for maintenance and/or 
repairs. When EDS and ETD equipment cannot be used, TSA continues to 
use alternative screening means identified in ATSA,[Footnote 6] 
including K-9 teams, manual searches, and positive passenger bag 
match.[Footnote 7] TSA has ongoing initiatives to increase the 
efficiency of screening all checked baggage using EDS and ETD, 
including the development and construction of in-line baggage screening 
systems--which streamlines screening processes[Footnote 8] and airport 
operations at larger airports. In addition, although TSA is funding 
research and development (R&D) on several technologies designed to 
improve the effectiveness of screening checked baggage and passengers 
for explosives, progress has been delayed due to competing priorities 
in a tight budget environment.

Background:

The security of the U.S. commercial aviation system has been a long-
standing concern. Over the years, numerous initiatives have been 
implemented to strengthen aviation security. However, as we and others 
have documented in numerous reports and studies, weaknesses continue to 
exist. It was due in part to these weaknesses that terrorists were able 
to hijack four commercial aircraft on September 11, 2001, with tragic 
results. Concerns continue to exist regarding the security of the 
aviation system, as evidenced by the recent cancellations of several, 
mostly transatlantic flights to and from the United States in response 
to intelligence information regarding specific threats to those 
flights.

In response to the attacks of September 11th, ATSA mandated specific 
actions designed to strengthen aviation security, and established 
ambitious deadlines for completing many of these initiatives. 
Consequently, TSA initially focused on attempting to meet these 
deadlines, particularly creating a federalized screener workforce at 
commercial airports nationwide by November 19, 2002. TSA also focused 
on screening 100 percent of checked baggage using explosive detection 
systems by the original deadline of December 31, 2002.[Footnote 9] 
These efforts resulted in the deployment of more than 55,000 federal 
screeners at over 440 commercial airports nationwide by November 19, 
2002, as well as the deployment of thousands of EDS and ETD systems.

Virtually all aviation security responsibilities now reside with TSA. 
Two of the most important of these responsibilities are passenger and 
checked baggage screening. Passenger screening involves the use of 
metal detectors, X-ray machines, ETDs, and manual searches to examine 
passengers and their carry-on baggage to identify threat objects. 
Checked baggage screening involves the use of EDS, ETDs, K-9 teams, 
positive passenger bag match, and manual searches to screen checked 
baggage. Performing these screening functions can be cognitively 
demanding and difficult for screening personnel.

The results I am presenting today are based on our preliminary 
observations of TSA's passenger and baggage screening programs and 
related research and development efforts, based on our ongoing reviews 
of these areas for this committee. As part of our ongoing reviews of 
TSA's passenger and baggage screening operations, we interviewed TSA 
officials and visited 15 category X airports; 11 category I airports; 
and 7 category II, III, and IV airports.[Footnote 10] During these 
visits, we observed screening operations and interviewed FSDs, their 
staffs, and, at some airports, airport authority and airline officials. 
We plan to visit additional airports and conduct additional analysis 
during the remainder of our review, including conducting a survey of 
all 158 FSDs regarding their screening operations. Additionally, we 
will continue to assess TSA's and DHS's research and development 
programs and the views of a panel of security and technology experts 
that we convened with the assistance of the National Academy of 
Sciences. We will report on the results of these reviews later this 
year.

Although Progress Has Been Made, Concerns Remain Regarding Hiring and 
Deploying the Screener Workforce:

Although TSA successfully met its mandate to establish a federal 
screener workforce by November 2002, it continues to face challenges in 
hiring and deploying passenger and baggage screeners. To accomplish its 
security mission, TSA needs a sufficient number of passenger and 
baggage screeners trained and certified in TSA security procedures and 
technologies. TSA has acknowledged that its initial staffing efforts 
created imbalances in the screener workforce and is taking steps to 
address these imbalances. However, staffing shortages at some airports 
and TSA's hiring process have hindered the ability of some FSDs to 
fully staff screening checkpoints without using additional measures, 
such as overtime and the use of a National Screening Force[Footnote 
11].:

Staffing Shortages Affect Screening Operations:

TSA accomplished a significant goal by hiring and deploying more than 
55,000 passenger and baggage screeners by November 19, 2002. However, 
TSA continues to struggle to maintain an adequate number of screeners 
at airport checkpoints, and has not yet achieved a stable screener 
workforce. Recognizing these difficulties, TSA has taken several steps 
to address staffing imbalances--including enhancing its workforce 
planning efforts, and deploying a National Screening Force to airports 
with pressing screening needs.

Screener Imbalances:

After meeting its deadline of deploying over 55,000 screeners by 
November 19, 2002, TSA recognized that its initial efforts created 
imbalances in the screener workforce, as some airports had too many 
screeners while others had too few. To address these imbalances, as 
well as congressional concerns regarding screener-staffing levels, TSA 
began attempting to right-size its screener workforce. Specifically, 
TSA established a goal to reduce its screener workforce by 3,000 
screeners by June 1, 2003, and an additional 3,000 screeners by 
September 30, 2003. These reductions were achieved through attrition, 
voluntary transfers from full to part-time, and involuntary transfers 
to part-time or terminations based on screeners' scores on competency-
based examinations.[Footnote 12]

Currently, a congressionally imposed staffing cap[Footnote 13] 
prohibits TSA from exceeding a screener staffing level of 45,000 full-
time equivalents (FTE).[Footnote 14] Figure 1 shows that based on 
annualized FTE data, TSA is currently below the 45,000 cap.[Footnote 
15]

Figure 1: TSA Full-Time Equivalent Screeners, May 2003 through January 
2004:

[See PDF for image]

Source: TSA annualized data.

[End of figure]

According to TSA officials, TSA has experienced an average annual 
attrition rate of 14 percent for screeners. However, attrition among 
the nation's more than 440 commercial airports is sometimes 
considerably higher. For example, at 8 category X airports visited 
during our review, FSDs reported that average annual attrition ranged 
from 15 to 36 percent.

TSA has also experienced difficulties in hiring new staff, particularly 
part-time staff. FSDs at 11 of the 15 category X airports we visited 
reported that they were below their authorized staffing levels due to 
attrition and difficulties in hiring new staff. In addition, 3 of these 
FSDs noted that they were never successful in hiring up to the 
authorized staffing levels. FSDs said that some of the factors 
contributing to their inability to hire and retain screeners were the 
location of their airport, the lack of accessible and affordable 
parking and/or public transportation, and the high cost of living.

In addition, FSDs at several of the airports we visited stated that 
they experienced difficulty in attracting needed part-time screeners, 
which they believed to be due to low pay and benefits, as well as 
undesirable hours. Additionally, FSDs stated that very few full-time 
screeners were interested in converting to part-time status, and TSA 
officials stated that attrition rates for part-time screeners were 
considerably higher than those for full-time screeners. TSA began 
actively recruiting part-time screeners during the summer of 2003, and 
continues to recruit part-time screeners at more than 80 airports.

Due to screener shortages, FSDs at 6 of the category X airports we 
visited stated that they frequently had to require mandatory overtime, 
particularly during the holiday season, to accomplish passenger and 
baggage screening functions. FSDs' use of overtime was particularly 
high during peak summer and holiday travel seasons. Figure 2 shows that 
between May 2003 and January 2004, TSA used the equivalent of an 
annualized average of 2,315 full-time-equivalent screeners in overtime 
hours per pay period (every 2 weeks).

Figure 2: TSA Screener Overtime in Full-Time Equivalents, May 2003 
through January 2004:

[See PDF for image]

Source: TSA annualized data.

[End of figure]

Workforce Planning Efforts:

In an effort to right-size and stabilize its screener workforce, TSA 
hired a consultant in September 2003 to conduct a study of screener 
staffing levels at the nation's commercial airports. Specifically, the 
consultant was tasked with:

* evaluating TSA's current staffing methodology and systems to 
establish a baseline for model development;

* developing a method for collecting and analyzing data to 
realistically portray specific airport conditions rather than using a 
generalized large/small airport protocol;

* developing a comprehensive modeling approach with appropriate details 
to account for the considerable variability that occurs among 
airports;[Footnote 16]

* integrating modeling parameters into TSA's screener scheduling 
system;

* implementing a staffing analysis model to be used as a management 
tool to determine daily and weekly staffing levels and deploy the model 
to commercial airports nationwide; and:

* delivering user-friendly simulation software that will determine 
optimum screener staffing levels for each of the more than 440 
commercial airports with federal screeners.

TSA expects the consultant's study to be completed in April 2004. In 
the interim, TSA officials stated that they will continue to review the 
staffing allocation provided through their internal modeling efforts, 
which, among other things, assesses air carrier and airport growth 
patterns, and makes adjustments as appropriate. We will continue to 
review TSA's efforts to determine appropriate staffing levels for 
passenger and baggage screeners during the remainder of our review.

National Screening Force:

To compensate for screener shortages and to enable operational 
flexibility to respond to changes in risk and threat, in October 2003, 
TSA established a National Screening Force to provide screening support 
to all airports in times of emergency, seasonal demands, or under other 
special circumstances that require a greater number of screeners than 
regularly available to FSDs. This force replaced the Mobile Screening 
Force--a regionally-based force--that was created in early 2002 
primarily to support the initial deployment of federal screeners to 
commercial airports. The National Screening Force currently consists of 
over 700 full-time passenger and baggage screeners, of which about 10 
percent are screening supervisors. Members of the National Screening 
Force volunteer to participate on the force for a 1-year period. TSA 
officials stated that while these screeners have a home airport to 
which they are assigned, they travel to airports in need of screening 
staff approximately 70 percent of the year.

TSA officials stated that they determine where to deploy members of the 
National Screening Force based on four priorities. The highest priority 
is given to those airports that need additional screeners in order to 
be able to screen 100 percent of checked baggage using EDS and ETD. The 
second priority is given to small airports that have never met their 
authorized screener staffing levels and have no permanent screeners. 
TSA officials stated that several small airports have screening 
checkpoints that are entirely staffed by the National Screening Force. 
They also stated that some National Screening Force staff are deployed 
to airports, particularly small airports, where they are only needed on 
a part-time basis. The third priority is given to airports that are so 
understaffed that significant screening delays would occur without 
additional staff. Finally, the fourth priority is given to those 
airports with peak seasonal needs, such as Palm Springs, airports that 
have a shortage of female passenger screeners;[Footnote 17] and 
airports offering new commercial service. Additionally, when DHS 
recently increased the threat condition from yellow (elevated) to 
orange (high),[Footnote 18] TSA reportedly redeployed about 50 percent 
of the National Screening Force to airports determined to be at a 
higher risk based on intelligence data.

TSA is also currently drafting standard operating procedures for the 
National Screening Force. We will continue to examine TSA's use of the 
National Screening Force during the remainder of our review.

TSA's Hiring Process Not Fully Responsive to FSD Needs:

TSA's hiring process is designed to ensure that its hiring practices 
are standardized and consistent throughout all airports. However, this 
process has hindered the ability of some FSDs to adequately staff 
passenger and baggage screening checkpoints. Several FSDs we 
interviewed expressed concern that TSA's hiring process was not 
responsive to their needs, and wanted to have more input in the hiring 
process. These FSDs faced screener shortages that hindered their 
screening capability.

To ensure consistency in its hiring process, TSA headquarters manages 
hiring centrally through its Aviation Operations and Human Resources 
offices. In general, the process includes the following steps.

* FSDs identify their need for additional passenger or baggage 
screeners, within their authorized allocation of screeners, and request 
headquarters to initiate the hiring process.

* Aviation Operations reviews and prioritizes each request in 
consultation with FSDs.

* Human Resources develops a hiring plan that identifies a schedule of 
hiring events - from vacancy postings to the establishment of centers 
at which the applicants' skills are assessed.[Footnote 19]

* A recruiting contractor receives and assesses all screener 
applications to ensure the applicants meet the basic requirements for 
employment, including U.S. citizenship and specific education and work 
experience. All applicants that meet the minimum qualifications are 
invited to schedule themselves for the assessment process.[Footnote 20]

* Upon successfully completing the assessment process, the recruiting 
contractor sends the list of qualified applicants to TSA's hiring/
personnel contractor responsible for making job offers.

* The hiring contractor schedules the candidates for orientation and 
training once they have accepted the offers.

Many of the FSDs we interviewed expressed concern with the lack of a 
continuous hiring process to backfill screeners lost through attrition, 
and their lack of authority to conduct hiring on an as needed basis. 
The FSDs also complained of the time lag between their request for 
additional staff and having trained and certified screeners on board. 
FSDs at 4 of the category X airports we visited stated that the time 
lag between their request for additional staffing and the opening of an 
assessment center took several months. For example, one FSD stated that 
in response to continued attrition at his airport, he notified TSA in 
advance that additional screeners would be needed before the peak 
summer travel season. However, an assessment center was not opened 
until mid-June and the initial training did not begin until July. The 
FSD reportedly had to rely on the Mobile Screening Force and overtime 
to accommodate the demand during the peak summer season. This same FSD 
also stated that the lengthy hiring process limited his ability to 
address screener performance issues, such as absenteeism or tardiness, 
and contributed to screener complacency because screeners were aware 
that they were unlikely to be terminated due to staffing shortages. In 
another example, an FSD at one large airport found it difficult to fill 
the more than 100 part-time approved screener positions because the 
nearest assessment center was too far away for local applicants to be 
processed.

Several FSDs we interviewed also stated that not all of the applicants 
who were offered positions showed up for initial basic screener 
training. For example, in November 2003, at one large category X 
airport, the FSD reported that 80 individuals who accepted screener 
positions were scheduled to report for basic screener training, but 
following orientation, only 15 individuals (less than 20 percent) 
reported for training. TSA headquarters reported that an average of 13 
percent of screeners who are hired fail to attend basic screener 
training.[Footnote 21]

FSDs also expressed concern regarding the lack of input they had during 
the hiring process. Specifically, they stated that they do not have a 
role in reviewing applications, interviewing applicants, or making 
hiring decisions. In response to these concerns, TSA officials reported 
that they plan to redesign and streamline their hiring process, 
particularly the assessment center process (Phase II), to allow for 
more involvement by FSDs and their staff. Specifically, officials 
reported that they are beginning to (1) ensure that the recruiting 
contractor includes the FSD in recruitment planning, including 
obtaining input regarding where and how the contractor recruits; (2) 
allow FSDs to participate with the contractor in the structured 
interview of the candidates during Phase II of the hiring process; and 
(3) ensure that FSDs swear in the candidates and provides 
organizational briefings on their first day of orientation. Officials 
also reported that they plan to establish an advisory council of FSDs 
to help guide the piloting and implementation of this new process. The 
goal of these efforts is to make the hiring process more responsive to 
the wide range of airports' needs while ensuring efficiency and 
quality. We will continue to review these initiatives as part of our 
ongoing review of TSA's process for hiring and deploying passenger and 
baggage screeners.

TSA Has Enhanced Its Screener Training Programs, but Access to Programs 
Is Sometimes Limited:

TSA has taken steps to enhance its training programs for passenger and 
baggage screeners. However, staffing shortages and lack of high-speed 
connectivity[Footnote 22] at airport training facilities have made it 
difficult for screeners to fully utilize these programs. Specifically, 
TSA recently revamped its screener training program to include three 
main components: (1) dual training for both passenger and baggage 
screeners (replaces basic screener training); (2) recurrent (skills 
refresher) screener training; and (3) technical screener training/
certification for EDS.[Footnote 23] In addition to strengthening its 
basic and recurrent training programs, TSA is also enhancing and 
standardizing remedial training for screeners who fail a covert test 
conducted by TSA's Office of Internal Affairs and Program Review. 
Despite these efforts, however, FSDs at 5 of the 15 category X airports 
we visited stated that ensuring screeners received required training 
continued to be a challenge.

Dual Passenger and Baggage Screener Training:

As required by ATSA, TSA established a basic screener training program 
comprised of a minimum of 40 hours of classroom instruction and 60 
hours of on-the-job training for passenger and baggage screeners. The 
initial basic screener training courses were updated at the end of 
2003, respectively, to incorporate changes to standard operating 
procedures. In addition to these updates, TSA officials stated that 
they recently developed a new basic screener training program, "dual 
function screener training," to address technical aspects of both 
passenger and baggage screening. This training will utilize modular 
courses to provide skills refresher (recurrent) training or to cross-
train screeners, such as refreshing baggage screening skills for a 
screener who has worked predominately as a passenger screener. TSA 
officials reported that beginning in April 2004, all newly hired 
screeners will receive dual function screener training in order to 
provide FSDs with the flexibility to staff them as either passenger or 
baggage screeners.

Recurrent Training:

Comprehensive and frequent training is key to passenger and baggage 
screeners' ability to detect threat objects. TSA requires passenger and 
baggage screeners to participate in 3 hours of recurrent training per 
week, averaged over each quarter. One hour is required to be devoted to 
x-ray image interpretation, and the other 2 hours on screening 
techniques or reviews of standard operating procedures.

We reported in September 2003 that TSA had not fully developed or 
deployed a recurrent training program for passenger screeners.[Footnote 
24] Since then, TSA has developed 12 recurrent training modules for 
passenger and baggage screeners. Two of these modules have been 
deployed to airports nationwide,[Footnote 25] while 9 additional 
modules are expected to be deployed by March 2004. The final module, a 
Web-based x-ray image interpretation tool, is scheduled for 
implementation in April 2004.

As we reported in September 2003, many of the passenger screeners and 
supervisors we interviewed expressed the need for recurrent 
training.[Footnote 26] Screeners were particularly interested in 
receiving additional training related to recognizing x-ray images of 
threat objects, and also identified an interest in more realistic 
training for the detection of improvised explosive devices. FSDs and 
training coordinators also emphasized that screeners needed to receive 
more hands-on training using threat simulators and emulators. TSA 
headquarters also identified these training needs as part of a study of 
passenger screener performance, and developed and deployed training 
tools to help address these needs.[Footnote 27] For example, TSA 
officials reported that they provided every airport with at least one 
Modular Bomb Set kit and one weapons training kit. These Modular Bomb 
Sets and weapons training kits are intended to fill an identified gap 
in training by allowing screeners to touch and feel the threat objects 
that they are looking for. TSA also instituted a training program 
called "Threat In the Spotlight" that provides screeners with the 
latest in threat information regarding terrorist attempts to get threat 
objects past screening checkpoints.

TSA is also in the process of developing specialized certification 
training for technologies used by passenger and baggage screeners. TSA 
has developed only one course, for EDS use, but plans to develop other 
certifications and courses as new technologies are utilized and 
integrated into the screening process. Additionally, in October 2003, 
TSA fielded an Online Learning Center--a Web-based tool with 366 self-
guided training courses available to all screening staff. The courses 
provided on the Online Learning Center Web site capture common 
developmental needs identified by TSA. The Online Learning Center also 
enables screeners to view the list of required and optional training 
courses and materials, review their training records, and track their 
training progress.

Remedial Training:

Consistent with ATSA, TSA requires remedial training for any passenger 
or baggage screener who fails an operational test, and prohibits 
screeners from performing the screening function related to the tests 
they failed until they successfully complete the training.[Footnote 28] 
FSDs must certify that screeners identified as requiring remedial 
training complete the training before they can perform the screening 
function identified as a performance weakness.

TSA is in the process of enhancing and standardizing remedial training 
requirements required after failure of covert operational tests. 
Program enhancements will provide specific guidance regarding materials 
to be reviewed during remedial training and standardize the practice of 
demonstrating proper techniques and procedures in the area of 
deficiency noted during the failed test.

Supervisory Training:

TSA's Office of Internal Affairs and Program Review identified a lack 
of supervisory training as a cause for screener testing failures. In 
addition, both FSDs and TSA headquarters officials have recognized the 
need to enhance the skills of screening supervisors through supervisory 
training. As we reported in September 2003, TSA had begun working with 
the Department of Agriculture (USDA) Graduate School to tailor USDA's 
off-the-shelf supervisory course to meet the specific needs of TSA's 
screening supervisors. According to TSA, 500 screening supervisors 
participated in the course during the fourth quarter of fiscal year 
2003.[Footnote 29] Since then, TSA reportedly has sent an additional 
1,500 of its approximately 3,600 screening supervisors to the enhanced 
USDA Graduate School supervisory course, and expects all screening 
supervisors to have received this training by April 2004. TSA officials 
also stated that they intend to schedule recently promoted supervisors 
to attend the USDA Graduate School supervisory course after March 2004 
if they had not yet attended, and plan to extend the course offering to 
include screening managers, once screening supervisors are trained.

In addition to the USDA Graduate School supervisory course, TSA 
officials reported that the agency plans to have a Web-based technical 
training course-required for all screening leads, supervisors, and 
managers-by the end of February 2004. This course will cover technical 
issues such as resolving alarms at screening checkpoints. Additionally, 
TSA's Online Learning Center includes over 60 supervisory courses 
designed to develop leadership and coaching skills. TSA officials noted 
that they focused their efforts on training supervisors that were 
initially hired into supervisory roles, rather than internally promoted 
supervisors.

Challenges Exist in Providing Screeners Access to Available Training:

While TSA has begun developing and fielding recurrent training modules 
to airports, staffing shortages and a lack of high-speed connectivity 
at airports have made it difficult for all screeners to access these 
courses. Specifically, due to staffing shortages, FSDs at 5 of the 15 
category X airports we visited stated that it was difficult, if not 
impossible, to comply with the requirement that screeners receive 3 
hours of recurrent training each week, averaged over a 3-month period. 
FSDs stated that due to staffing shortages, they were unable to let 
screeners take this training because it would impact the FSDs' ability 
to provide adequate screener coverage. Consequently, screeners received 
an average of only 3 hours of recurrent training per month. In an 
attempt to ensure screeners receive required training, several FSDs 
provided training through overtime, or established training relief 
teams with the sole purpose of staffing screening checkpoints while 
screeners participated in training.

The lack of high-speed connectivity at airport training facilities has 
also limited access to TSA's training tools. TSA's Online Learning 
Center was established to provide passenger and baggage screeners with 
high-speed access to over 350 training courses. However, TSA did not 
begin deploying high-speed connectivity to its training sites and 
checkpoints until May 2003. Currently, TSA has reportedly provided 
high-speed connectivity to 71 airport locations, including training 
sites where 927 training computers are fully connected.[Footnote 30] 
TSA expects to install high-speed connectivity at up to 81 additional 
airports by the end of fiscal year 2004. Until high-speed connectivity 
is fully achieved, TSA plans to continue to distribute new training 
products using multiple delivery channels, including written training 
materials and CD-ROMs.

TSA Continues to Strengthen its Efforts to Measure Screener Performance 
in Detecting Threat Objects:

TSA has undertaken several initiatives to measure the performance of 
passenger screeners in detecting threat objects. However, TSA has 
collected limited data related to the performance of baggage screeners. 
In July 2003, TSA completed a study of the performance of its passenger 
screening system, which identified numerous performance deficiencies. 
These deficiencies were determined to be caused by a lack of skills and 
knowledge, low motivation, ineffective work environment, and wrong or 
missing incentives. In response to this study, TSA developed a short-
term action plan that identified key actions TSA plans to take to 
strengthen the performance of passenger screeners. These actions build 
on several initiatives that TSA already had underway, including 
enhancing training for screeners and supervisors, increasing covert 
testing conducted by TSA's Office of Internal Affairs, completing 
installation of the TIP, and conducting annual recertifications of 
screeners. While TSA is making progress in each of these areas, it has 
collected limited data on the performance of its baggage screening 
operations. Officials stated that they have collected limited 
performance data related to baggage screeners due to their focus on 
passenger screener performance, but plan to collect additional 
performance data in the future.

Performance Improvement Study and Short-Term Action Plan:

In July 2003, TSA completed a Passenger Screener Performance 
Improvement Study designed to identify root causes for gaps between the 
current performance of passenger screeners and TSA's desired 
performance--defined as 100 percent interception of prohibited items 
coming through screening checkpoints. The study identified many of the 
performance deficiencies that FSDs reported to us during our site 
visits to more than 30 airports, including inadequate staffing and poor 
supervision of screeners. While the study was focused on passenger 
screening, TSA officials stated that many of the performance issues 
cited also pertained to baggage screeners. TSA officials stated that 
they plan to assess the performance of baggage screeners after 
recommendations from the performance improvement study relative to 
passenger screening have been implemented.

In October 2003, to address passenger screener performance deficiencies 
identified in the Screener Performance Improvement Study, TSA developed 
a "Short-Term Screening Performance Improvement Plan." This plan 
included nine action items that TSA plans to pursue to provide tangible 
improvements in screener performance and security, and identified 6 
week, 3 month, 6 month, and, in some cases, milestones of 1 year or 
more. These action items include increasing covert testing at screening 
checkpoints, completing installation of TIP at all airports, enhancing 
screener training, and strengthening supervisor's skills through 
leadership and technical training. TSA is also establishing a longer-
term plan that addresses identified deficiencies, such as the need to 
establish adequate training facilities at airports and to reconfigure 
checkpoints to eliminate screener distractions. Table 1 provides a 
summary of TSA's short-term action items for strengthening passenger 
screener performance.

Table 1: Summary of TSA's Short-Term Action Items for Strengthening 
Passenger Screener Performance:

Category: People; 
Action Item: 1; Increase FSD support and accountability; 
Description: Hold FSDs accountable for screening performance and 
delivery of security; 
Benefit: Management accountability is driven down to the local 
airport; 
FSD performance is linked to screener performance, creating incentives 
for maintaining and improving security.

Category: People; 
Action Item: 2; Enhance training; 
Description: Provide ongoing training for screeners and supervisors to 
maintain their skills and provide new skills and techniques based on 
evolving threats and lessons learned; 
Benefit: Maintains and improves knowledge base of screeners; 
Ensures proper oversight by supervisors; 
Ensures that screeners are capable of addressing evolving threats.

Category: People; 
Action Item: 3; Increase Internal Affairs covert testing; 
Description: Increase the frequency of TSA covert testing; 
Benefit: Improved identification of systemic vulnerabilities in 
airport security systems; 
Immediate implementation of limited remedial actions.

Category: People; 
Action Item: 4; Continue to pursue human performance improvements; 
Description: Better understand reasons and causes for human errors and 
interactions with technology in order to identify opportunities for 
performance improvements with a goal of identifying optimum work 
conditions; 
Benefit: Reduces human-based errors; 
Increases workforce morale and working conditions, leading to improved 
performance.

Category: Technology; 
Action Item: 5; Continue to identify screening technology 
improvements; 
Description: Continue to research alternative technologies and seek 
short-term technological solutions, especially for potential vectors; 
Benefit: Identifies threats more accurately and quickly; 
Decreases number of false positives from equipment.

Category: Technology; 
Action Item: 6; Finish installing TIP; 
Description: The TIP system is a series of 2,400 images of threat 
objects that can be automatically fed into X-Ray machines during 
actual screening; 
Benefit: Maintains alertness of screeners; 
Identifies individual screener performance issues.

Category: Technology; 
Action Item: 7; Expedite high-speed connectivity to checkpoints and 
training computers; 
Description: Connect all TSA offices, checkpoints and screening 
equipment (X-rays, EDS machines) to the internet in order to automate 
and improve processes that are currently done manually or not at all; 
Benefit: Provides immediate feedback on and response to screener 
performance issues; 
Improves communication with managers in the field.

Category: Process; 
Action Item: 8; Refresh aviation operations policy, procedures and 
practice; 
Description: Conduct a thorough and expedited review of all policies 
and procedures developed during the rollout of TSA with a focus on 
increasing screening performance and capabilities; 
Benefit: Maintains "freshness" of standard operating procedures based 
on most recent intelligence about security threats; 
Removes or updates outdated or unnecessary screening techniques based 
on lessons learned.

Category: Process; 
Action Item: 9; Action Item: Improve workforce management; 
Description: Determine the optimal workforce staffing levels based on 
latest passenger flows and other factors; 
Benefit: Maximizes utilization of existing resources. 

Source: TSA:

[End of table]

Covert Testing:

TSA's Office of Internal Affairs and Program Review conducts 
unannounced covert tests of passenger and baggage screeners to assess 
their ability to detect threat objects and adherence to TSA-approved 
procedures. These tests, in which TSA undercover agents attempt to pass 
threat objects through screening checkpoints, are designed to identify 
systematic problems affecting the performance of screeners related to 
their adherence to standard operating procedures and handling of 
equipment. TSA's testing to date has identified weaknesses in the 
ability of passenger and baggage screeners to detect threat objects.

In November 2003, we reported that the Office of Internal Affairs and 
Program Review had conducted 733 covert tests at 92 airports of 
passenger screeners at screening checkpoints.[Footnote 31] Since then, 
TSA has conducted an additional 362 passenger screening checkpoint 
tests through January 17, 2004, for a total of 1,095 tests, and 
estimates that it will double the number of tests conducted during 
fiscal year 2004. However, even with the doubling of these tests, only 
a small percentage of the screener workforce is subject to a covert 
test.

TSA initially focused most of its resources on testing passenger rather 
than baggage screeners. While TSA began conducting covert tests of 
passenger screeners in September 2002, it did not begin conducting 
covert tests of checked baggage screeners until January 2003--after 
Congress's initial deadline for 100 percent screening of checked 
baggage using explosive detection systems had passed. Between January 
2003 and September 2003, TSA conducted checked baggage tests as part of 
the Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening selectee testing 
protocol.[Footnote 32] In November 2003, TSA developed a protocol 
specifically designed to test checked baggage. From January 2003 
through January 17, 2004, TSA conducted 192 checked baggage tests at 
128 airports, and plans to increase the number of checked baggage tests 
it conducts this fiscal year. We plan to review the Office of Internal 
Affairs and Program Review's covert testing in more detail during the 
remainder of our reviews.

Threat Image Projection System:

Another key source of information on screener performance in detecting 
threat objects is the TIP system, which places images of threat objects 
on the X-ray screen during actual operations and records whether 
screeners identify the threat objects. TIP was shut down immediately 
following the September 11th terrorist attacks due to concerns that it 
would result in screening delays and panic, as screeners might think 
that they were actually viewing threat objects. Recognizing that TIP is 
a key tool in maintaining and enhancing screener performance, TSA began 
reactivating and expanding TIP in October 2003. Additionally, TSA has 
increased the number of TIP-ready X-ray machines at passenger screening 
checkpoints from about 1,300 in October 2003 to over 1,770 as of 
January 20, 2004. In January 2004, TSA also reported that it had 
installed a new library of 2,400 threat images on all existing TIP 
ready X-ray machines--a significant increase from the 200 images the 
Federal Aviation Administration had in place. TSA has ordered an 
additional 30 TIP-ready X-ray machines and expects TIP to be 100 
percent operational by April 2004.

With an operational TIP program, FSDs have the capability to query and 
analyze passenger screening performance data in a number of ways, 
including by individual screeners, checkpoints, terminals, and 
airports. However, until high-speed connectivity is available at 
screening checkpoints, collecting this information for reporting and 
analysis purposes will continue to be cumbersome.[Footnote 33] For 
example, at airports where high-speed connectivity is not available, 
TIP data have to be downloaded onto a disk and mailed to a remote 
location where they are uploaded for analysis.

Although TIP is available to measure the performance of and train 
passenger screeners, it is not currently available for baggage 
screeners. TSA officials stated that they are currently working to 
resolve technical challenges associated with using TIP for checked 
baggage screening on EDS machines and have started EDS TIP image 
development.

Annual Recertification Program:

ATSA requires that TSA collect performance information on all passenger 
and baggage screeners by conducting an annual proficiency evaluation to 
ensure each screener continues to meet all qualifications and standards 
related to the functions that he or she performs. To meet this 
requirement, TSA established an annual recertification program. 
Currently, there are two parts to recertification: a knowledge and 
skills assessment program and a final rating on a screener's annual 
assessment. The knowledge and skills assessment is comprised of three 
modules: (1) knowledge of standard operating procedures, (2) image 
recognition, and (3) a practical demonstration of skills. To be 
certified, a passenger screener must pass all applicable modules of the 
knowledge and skills assessment program and have a rating of "met" or 
"exceeded" standards on a screener's annual assessment. However, 
baggage-only screeners are not required to complete the image 
recognition test.[Footnote 34] If a screener does not meet the 
recertification requirements, he/she is not certified and may not 
continue employment as a screener.[Footnote 35] According to TSA 
officials, approximately 200 screeners have been terminated to date for 
failure to pass the recertification program.

TSA began implementing its recertification program in October 2003, and 
expects to complete testing at all airports in March 2004.[Footnote 36] 
As of January 30, 2004, TSA reportedly had completed modules one and 
two of its annual screener recertification program at 100 percent of 
federalized airports, and had completed module three at 50 percent of 
these airports. TSA does not have a recertification track specifically 
for cross-trained screeners. However, TSA officials stated that they 
plan to establish a dual functioning screener recertification track for 
the 2004-2005 recertification cycle. Currently, all screeners who are 
cross-trained and actively performing both passenger and baggage 
screening functions are considered passenger screeners for the purpose 
of recertification. However, the current recertification program 
ensures that cross-trained screeners pass the image interpretation test 
for x-ray threat image interpretation, as well as the ETD system and 
manual bag search, which are also performed in checked baggage 
screening. We will continue to examine TSA's progress in administering 
its annual recertification program during the remainder of our reviews.

Performance Management Information System:

TSA's Performance Management Information System (PMIS) is designed to 
collect, analyze, and report passenger and baggage screening 
performance data. While PMIS does not contain information on screener 
performance in detecting threat objects, it collects information on 
operational performance, such as wait times at selected airports, 
workload data, and the performance and utilization of passenger and 
baggage screening equipment. TSA headquarters uses PMIS data to support 
external reporting on performance and internal decision-making 
processes.

TSA recently surveyed FSDs or members of their staff who use PMIS by 
inputting or analyzing data, to solicit their feedback on the 
usefulness of the system.[Footnote 37] PMIS users who responded to the 
survey identified several areas for improvement, including additional 
capabilities, such as the ability to customize reports, and enhanced 
technical features, such as split screen report viewing and data entry. 
TSA reported that, to the extent possible, they plan to use feedback 
from the survey to make enhancements to the system.

TSA provides FSDs and other PMIS users with monthly PMIS system updates 
that include new functionalities and improvements to the system. These 
enhancements have allowed TSA to collect additional information with 
which to better analyze its operations. For example, when TSA began 
collecting employee census data in June 2003, it only collected 
information on the number of screeners. TSA is now able to collect more 
detailed information on screeners including the number of part-time 
screeners, hours worked per week, and screener gender. TSA also 
developed pilot programs in order to determine the usefulness of PMIS 
data before making systemwide changes. For example, TSA began to 
collect additional data regarding checked baggage screening operations 
during the spring of 2003 at 36 airports. Among other things, the 36 
airports collect data on the number of checked bags screened, number of 
prohibited items confiscated, and number of law enforcement officer 
interventions. TSA is evaluating whether to expand collection of 
baggage screening data to additional airports. TSA plans to 
continuously enhance the system as it learns what data are needed to 
best manage the agency.

To help ensure the quality of the data, TSA has also developed PMIS 
user guides and procedures. TSA officials reported that headquarters' 
staff and contactors provide consultation to and review the input from 
FSDs to ensure that the data provided are complete and consistent. The 
PMIS also contains checks for data entries that are out of normal 
bounds. However, because the PMIS system relies on self-reporting by 
FSDs, there may be inconsistencies in the way in which the data are 
reported, reducing the overall usefulness of the system in aiding 
management decisions. We will continue to review TSAs plans to enhance 
the system and its reliability during the remainder of our review.

Performance Indexes for Screeners and Screening Systems:

In September and November 2003, we reported that in addition to making 
improvements to PMIS, TSA was developing performance indexes for both 
individual passenger and baggage screeners and the screening system as 
a whole. The screening performance index will measure the effectiveness 
of the screening system through nationwide TIP results and covert 
testing data; efficiency through a calculation of dollars spent per 
passenger screened or dollars spent per bag screened; and customer 
satisfaction through a national poll, customer surveys, and customer 
complaints at both airports and TSA's national call center. TSA is 
currently developing baseline data for fiscal year 2004 and plans to 
report the indexes to the DHS in fiscal year 2005 in support of its 
Government Performance and Results Act performance measures.[Footnote 
38]

TSA Faces Challenges in Its Efforts to Deploy and Leverage Screening 
Equipment and Technologies:

TSA has made progress in its checked baggage screening operations, but 
continues to face operational and funding challenges in screening all 
checked baggage using explosive detection systems, as mandated by ATSA. 
Although TSA has deployed EDS and ETD equipment to all airports, TSA 
has not been able to fully utilize this equipment to screen 100 percent 
of checked baggage for explosives by December 31, 2003, due to screener 
and equipment shortages and equipment being out of service for 
maintenance and/or repairs. When TSA cannot screen 100 percent of 
checked baggage using EDS and ETD, TSA continues to use alternative 
means outlined in ATSA, including K-9 teams, manual bag search, and 
positive passenger bag match. TSA has ongoing initiatives to increase 
the efficiency of screening checked baggage using EDS, including the 
development and construction of in-line baggage screening systems at 
larger airports--which, streamlines the screening processes. TSA is 
also conducting research and development activities to strengthen 
passenger and baggage screening. These efforts are designed to improve 
detection capability, performance, and efficiency for current 
technologies, and to develop the next generation of EDS equipment.

TSA Is Not Fully Utilizing Equipment for Meeting the 100 Percent 
Checked Baggage Screening Requirement:

While TSA has made progress in its checked baggage screening processes, 
it continues to face challenges in attaining 100 percent screening 
using explosive detection systems[Footnote 39] 100 percent of the time. 
Since its creation in November 2001, TSA has deployed over 1,100 EDS 
machines and 6,000 ETD machines to over 440 airports nationwide. 
However, TSA has not been able to fully utilize this equipment to 
screen 100 percent of checked baggage due to screener and equipment 
shortages, and equipment being out of service for maintenance and/or 
repairs.

In its effort to meet ATSA's original requirement to screen 100 percent 
of checked baggage using explosive detection systems by December 31, 
2002, TSA deployed hundreds of EDS and thousands of ETD machines to 
over 440 airports. As it became apparent that TSA would be unable to 
attain the December 31, 2002, deadline, the Congress authorized an 
extension of that deadline for noncompliant airports until December 31, 
2003. In its effort to meet these deadlines, in June 2002, TSA and its 
contractors began to deploy EDS and ETD equipment to the nation's 
commercial airports. This effort involved designing and implementing 
facility modifications for EDS and ETD equipment, installing equipment, 
and developing and administering equipment training for baggage 
screeners. As EDS and ETD were being deployed to airports, TSA 
implemented interim solutions to screen 100 percent of checked baggage, 
until more permanent solutions could be designed and constructed. For 
example, many large airports were equipped with stand-alone EDS 
machines that were not integrated with baggage conveyor systems. These 
minivan-sized machines were sometimes deployed in airport lobbies, 
which led to crowding as passengers filled lobbies waiting to have 
their checked baggage screened. In addition, stand-alone EDS machines 
are both labor and time intensive to operate since each bag must be 
physically carried to an EDS machine for screening and then moved back 
to the baggage conveyor system prior to being loaded onto an aircraft.

Realizing the inefficiencies of these interim solutions, TSA and some 
airport authorities are developing more permanent solutions, such as 
in-line systems. TSA also continues to look for ways to improve the 
efficiency and effectiveness of the baggage screening process, 
especially ways that reduce reliance on screener personnel.

TSA has made progress during 2003 in its efforts to deploy equipment to 
screen 100 percent of checked baggage using explosive detection 
systems. However, some airports are currently unable to use this 
equipment to screen all checked baggage for explosives, or reported 
that they do not have enough EDS or ETD to conduct baggage screening. 
These airports are unable to achieve the requirement to screen 100 
percent of checked baggage, 100 percent of the time, using EDS and ETD 
due to insufficient screener staff to operate screening equipment, 
insufficient staff and equipment to meet surges in passenger volume, 
and equipment being out of service for maintenance and/or repairs. As a 
way to monitor baggage-screening operations, FSDs are expected to 
report, using TSA's PMIS, when they are unable to screen all checked 
baggage using EDS and ETD and the reasons that prevented them from 
doing so.[Footnote 40] We reviewed TSA's Aviation Operations division's 
report on the status of checked baggage screening (based on PMIS data), 
dated January 5, 2004, to determine whether airports were conducting 
100 percent screening using EDS and ETD, and to identify reasons for 
not achieving this deadline. Our preliminary review of that data showed 
that the most frequently cited reasons for not being able to meet the 
requirement--noted by about two-thirds of the FSDs that reported they 
were not conducting 100 percent screening using EDS or ETD[Footnote 41] 
---were staff shortages, absenteeism, and a lack of training. Almost 
half of these FSDs also identified that they did not have sufficient 
EDS and ETD equipment to screen all checked baggage, and/or that some 
of their EDS and ETD equipment was inoperable.

Of the airports reporting that they were not screening 100 percent of 
checked baggage using EDS or ETD, the number of consecutive days that 
they were not conducting this screening ranged from 1 to 371 days. In 
addition, almost one-third of these FSDs reported that they did not 
conduct 100 percent screening using EDS or ETD less than 10 consecutive 
days, while half of the FSDs reported not conducting 100 percent 
screening using EDS or ETD for more than 200 consecutive days. This 
reporting status can change daily as the events that caused airports to 
not conduct 100 percent screening using explosive detection systems may 
be corrected. FSDs are also expected to report whenever there is need 
to use alternative screening means because fewer than 100 percent of 
checked bags are being screened using EDS and ETD.

Furthermore, in our visits to several category X and I airports, FSDs 
identified EDS and ETD machines that were unable to be used due to an 
insufficient number of screeners to operate the equipment or because 
the equipment was not in the locations where it was needed. FSDs at 
some of these airports expressed concerns about not being able to 
resolve operational issues that were causing them to be noncompliant 
with the requirement for 100 percent screening using explosive 
detection systems.

To comply with a requirement from the Homeland Security Act that TSA 
report on its status in achieving the checked baggage-screening 
deadline,[Footnote 42] TSA provides classified reports monthly to 
selected committees of the Congress identifying its progress in 
deploying EDS and ETD equipment to screen 100 percent of checked 
baggage. As of December 31, 2003, TSA reported that it fell short of 
this goal at several large airports, primarily because these airports 
did not have the EDS and ETD equipment needed and/or experienced 
staffing shortages to operate the equipment. We compared TSA's January 
5, 2004, Aviation Operations Reports to the December 2003 monthly 
report provided to the selected congressional committees, and 
identified additional airports that were not using EDS and ETD to 
screen checked baggage 100 percent of the time. TSA officials stated 
that the discrepancies were caused because the primary focus of their 
report to the selected congressional committees was on initial 
deployment of the equipment, rather than fluctuations in staffing and 
maintenance issues that affect TSA's ability to utilize the equipment. 
We will continue to monitor TSA's compliance with the requirement to 
screen 100 percent of checked baggage using explosive detection systems 
during the remainder of our review.

TSA Faces Funding and Operational Challenges in Achieving Efficiencies 
in Checked Baggage Screening:

TSA has two major initiatives underway to achieve efficiencies in its 
baggage screening operations--integrating EDS machines into the 
airports' baggage handling systems and resolving EDS alarms using 
computer images, referred to as on-screen resolution. Reconfiguring 
airports for in-line checked baggage screening could be extensive and 
costly, especially when new construction or extensive conveyor belt 
systems are required. TSA estimates that the systemwide costs to 
complete installations of in-line baggage screening systems may be as 
high as $3 to $5 billion, not including the costs of EDS and ETD 
equipment. In addition, TSA's efforts to develop protocols for on-
screen resolution, which may permit more efficient screening operations 
without increasing security risks, have taken longer than anticipated.

Many large airports are planning to install in-line baggage screening 
systems--installing EDS machines as an integrated part of the airport 
baggage handling systems--to improve throughput of baggage and reduce 
crowding in airport lobbies. These in-line systems have been funded in 
part through letters of intent (LOI) signed by TSA.[Footnote 43] To 
date, TSA has signed 6 LOIs covering 7 airports promising multiyear 
financial support totaling about $772 million for in-line integration 
of EDS equipment. For example, LOIs are to provide $87 million in 
airport modifications at Boston Logan International Airport, and over 
$104 million at Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport. In addition, 
TSA is negotiating LOIs with 4 additional airports. The 7 airports with 
signed LOIs and the 4 airports negotiating LOIs with TSA are shown in 
table 2.

Table 2: Airports Receiving or Negotiating Letters of Intent:

Letter of intent issued: Airport: BOS - Boston; 
Letter of intent issued: Amount: $87,000,000. 

Letter of intent issued: Airport: DEN - Denver; 
Letter of intent issued: Amount: $71,250,000. 

Letter of intent issued: Airport: DFW - Dallas/Fort Worth; 
Letter of intent issued: Amount: $104,437,359. 

Letter of intent issued: Airport: LAS - Las Vegas; 
Letter of intent issued: Amount: $93,750,000. 

Letter of intent issued: Airport: LAX/ONT - Los Angeles International 
and Ontario; 
Letter of intent issued: Amount: $256,467,000.

Letter of intent issued: Airport: SEA - Seattle; 
Letter of intent issued: Amount: $159,000,000. 

Letter of Intent in negotiation: Airport: ATL - Atlanta; 
Letter of Intent in negotiation: Amount: $175,700,000.

Letter of Intent in negotiation: Airport: IAH - Houston; 
Letter of Intent in negotiation: Amount: $101,520,000.

Letter of Intent in negotiation: Airport: MCO - Orlando; 
Letter of Intent in negotiation: Amount: $80,000,000.

Letter of Intent in negotiation: Airport: PHX - Phoenix; 
Letter of Intent in negotiation: Amount: $65,565,000.

Source: Transportation Security Administration:

Note: Amounts reflected are TSA's contribution, which is 75% of funding 
needed for an in-line EDS screening solution.

[End of table]

TSA also reported that 23 additional airports, shown in table 3, have 
requested LOIs.[Footnote 44]

Table 3: Additional Airports Requesting Letters of Intent:

Airports: SNA - Orange County, California; 
Airports: TPA - Tampa; 
Airports: CLE - Cleveland; 
Airports: MCI - Kansas City, Missouri; 
Airports: PVD - Providence; 
Airports: MIA - Miami; 
Airports: PHL - Philadelphia; 
Airports: FLL - Fort Lauderdale; 
Airports: SJC - San Jose; 
Airports: MDW - Chicago-Midway; 
Airports: RSW - Ft. Meyers; 
Airports: SFO - San Francisco; 
Airports: SAN - San Diego; 
Airports: SLC - Salt Lake City; 
Airports: MSP - Minneapolis/St. Paul; 
Airports: PDX - Portland, Oregon; 
Airports: STL - St. Louis; 
Airports: MKE - Milwaukee; 
Airports: ANC - Anchorage; 
Airports: PBI - West Palm Beach; 
Airports: RIC - Richmond; 
Airports: BDL - Bradley, Connecticut; 
Airports: GPT - Gulfport-Biloxi; 

Source: TSA.

[End of table]

TSA officials stated that they are assessing requested LOIs based on a 
security evaluation, as well as a determination of return on 
investment. Officials stated that top priority would be given to 
airports that need in-line systems to comply with the requirement for 
100 percent screening of checked baggage using explosive detection 
systems. However, officials stated that they would also assess other 
airports that are currently conducting 100 percent baggage screening 
using EDS and ETD. Officials gave the following reasons why these 
airports may be good candidates for in-line checked baggage screening 
systems.

* airports that will fall out of compliance at peak passenger load 
times due to seasonal fluctuations and/or carrier moves, additions, or 
changes;

* airports with highly disruptive operational implementations and high 
staffing levels; and:

* airports with a heavy reliance on ETDs that would benefit by improved 
operational efficiencies and cost reductions.

In December 2003, the Vision 100--Century of Aviation Reauthorization 
Act shifted the funding formula for LOIs from a 75 percent TSA (25 
percent local contribution) to a 90 percent TSA (10 percent local 
contribution).[Footnote 45] This increase in TSA's required 
contribution for both future and previously issued LOIs could diminish 
TSA's capacity to accommodate additional LOIs.

In addition, TSA has not yet approved protocols for on-screen 
resolution of EDS alarms. TSA's promulgation of these protocols is an 
important element in enabling efficiencies in in-line baggage screening 
systems and affects the design of the systems being constructed or 
planned.[Footnote 46] Under these protocols, EDS operators would be 
able to view images of alarmed bags and either clear the bags or divert 
them for further screening. Using on-screen resolution, baggage 
screeners could be able to view images of the baggage from a remote 
location electronically connected to the EDS machines, raising the 
throughput rate of bags screened. Currently, TSA is testing protocols 
for on-screen resolution at 4 airports. Officials from TSA's Office of 
Security Technologies initially reported that they anticipated the 
protocols being completed by December 2003. However, to date, the 
protocols have not been approved for nationwide use. Advance knowledge 
of on-screen resolution protocols could assist airports in developing 
in-line systems by providing valuable information that could be used to 
design the systems for optimal efficiency. We are examining TSA's 
baggage screening program, including both development of in-line 
systems and its issuance of letters of intent, in an ongoing review.

TSA is Funding R&D on Screening Technologies, but Deployment Is Years 
Away, and TSA Faces Several Challenges:

TSA is funding R&D on several technologies designed to improve the 
screening of checked baggage and passengers at the nation's airports. 
However, while the majority of these technologies are scheduled for 
pilot testing within the next 12 to 18 months, they are not scheduled 
to be deployed in quantity for 2 to 5 years. Furthermore, progress on 
this research was delayed in fiscal year 2003 when TSA used more than 
half of its R&D funds for other programs that TSA viewed as higher 
priorities. As TSA moves forward with its R&D program, it faces a 
number of challenges, including maintaining its schedule while planning 
for a merger with the DHS's Science and Technology Directorate. TSA 
must also balance funding for competing priorities in a tight budget 
environment, not only between R&D and other requirements, but also 
between aviation and other modes of transportation.

Checked Baggage Screening Technologies:

To improve the detection capability and operational efficiency of its 
current checked baggage-screening program, TSA has both near-term (2 to 
5 years) and long-term (more than 5 years) approaches designed to 
develop, test, acquire, and deploy checked baggage screening equipment. 
In fiscal year 2003, TSA obligated about $12 million for near-term 
activities, significantly more than the $75,000 it obligated for long-
term activities. For fiscal year 2004, TSA has budgeted $45 million for 
the development of next generation explosive detection systems, which 
encompass technologies for screening checked baggage, carry-on baggage, 
and individuals. The President's fiscal year 2005 budget requests a 
total of $155 million for TSA's R&D program, of which $45 million is 
planned for the development of next generation explosive detection 
systems.[Footnote 47]

The near-term activities for developing next-generation checked baggage 
screening equipment are largely reflected in the Phoenix program, which 
is funded jointly by government and industry. In September 2003, TSA 
obligated about $9.4 million of the $12 million obligated for near-term 
activities to enter into five cooperative agreements with private 
sector firms under the Phoenix program.[Footnote 48] While the five 
agreements are designed to enhance existing systems and develop new 
screening technologies, TSA was not able to provide us with scheduled 
deployment dates. The five agreements are described below:

* Two cooperative agreements, totaling $4.7 million, provide 
enhancements to existing systems. These upgrades are intended to reduce 
false alarm rates, advance screener user-interface tools, and improve 
service diagnostics, thereby increasing reliability, maintainability, 
and availability.

* One cooperative agreement, for $1.2 million, is intended to enhance 
detection capabilities and reduce false alarm rates by combining two 
new and emerging detection technologies, X-ray diffraction, and 
quadrupole resonance, with currently deployed EDS technology, and 
computed tomography.[Footnote 49]

* Two cooperative agreements, totaling $3.5 million, are aimed at 
developing new screening technologies that perform substantially better 
than current technologies. One technology is intended to triple the 
pace of checked baggage screening (throughput), reduce false alarms by 
75 percent, and enhance detection through superior spatial resolution. 
The other technology is intended to take up less space at less than 
half the unit cost of current systems.

In addition to these checked baggage-screening technologies, TSA is 
testing radio frequency identification (RFID) baggage tags at several 
airports, including those in Jacksonville, Atlanta, San Francisco, and 
Las Vegas.[Footnote 50] The RFID tags, which identify baggage much more 
accurately than the bar code tags that are currently used, are intended 
to allow TSA to track luggage, such as bags that must be searched by 
hand because they triggered alarms. The tags are also intended to allow 
TSA to redirect bags that require further screening because of receipt 
of updated intelligence information or interactions with the passenger 
who checked the bag. TSA expects these tags to also benefit industry by 
reducing the incidence of lost, mishandled, or misdirected luggage. TSA 
expects the pilot systems at the previously mentioned airports to be 
fully operational by May 2004.

TSA's long-term approach for improving checked baggage screening 
systems, called the Manhattan II program, is in the planning stages. 
This program will consist of several initiatives and technologies that 
are designed to achieve "revolutionary" improvements in detection 
capability and operational efficiency in 5 to 10 years using new 
screening technologies. TSA intends to award this project's first 
contracts in fiscal year 2004.

Passenger Screening Technologies:

To better detect explosives and weapons that an individual may try to 
carry into an aircraft cabin, TSA obligated about $1.2 million in 
fiscal year 2003 for research, development, testing, and evaluation of 
checkpoint screening technologies. As mentioned previously, for fiscal 
year 2004, TSA has budgeted $45 million for the development of next-
generation explosive detection systems, which encompass technologies 
for screening checked baggage, carry-on baggage, and individuals. For 
example:

* TSA has conducted tests of two explosive trace detection portals at 
airports in Orlando and Knoxville. These portals analyze the air for 
explosives as passengers pass through them. TSA anticipates that these 
portals will be ready for limited deployment in 2004.

* TSA is funding the development of a document scanner capable of 
detecting traces of explosives on a document handled by a passenger, 
such as a boarding pass. TSA anticipates that the scanner will be ready 
for limited deployment in 2004.

* TSA is evaluating body-scanning technologies--such as backscatter X-
ray, millimeter wave energy analysis, and terahertz wave 
technology[Footnote 51]--that can detect a variety of weapons and 
explosives on passengers. However, TSA acknowledges that it needs to 
resolve issues related to passenger privacy before deploying any of 
these technologies.

Future Challenges:

As TSA moves forward with passenger and baggage screening R&D, it faces 
a number of organizational, funding, and coordination challenges. One 
challenge will be to sustain its R&D efforts during a period of 
organizational uncertainty and a possible merger. Under the Homeland 
Security Act, TSA is mandated to operate as a distinct entity until 
November 25, 2004, but after that date its organizational future is not 
specified in statute. According to a DHS official, the Secretary of 
Homeland Security intends to transfer TSA's R&D program from DHS's 
Border and Transportation Security Directorate to DHS's Science and 
Technology Directorate, which is responsible for homeland security R&D. 
One of the key areas that we will be reporting on later this year is 
the extent to which TSA and DHS have developed strategies for the 
merger of their R&D programs.

Balancing funding for competing priorities may also pose challenges for 
TSA. In a tight budget environment, TSA may be under pressure to use 
R&D funds for other purposes, as it did during fiscal year 2003, when 
it reprogrammed about $61 million, or more than half of its $110 
million R&D appropriations to programs outside of R&D. As a result, TSA 
had to delay several key R&D projects, including developing a device to 
detect weapons, liquid explosives, and flammables in containers found 
in carry-on baggage or passengers' effects, and further development and 
testing of a walk-through chemical trace detection portal for detecting 
explosives on passengers. Competition for resources may also increase 
the difficulty that TSA already faces in allocating funds to address 
security threats in modes of transportation other than aviation. While 
aviation has historically faced, and continues to face, significant 
security threats, and improving aviation security is an important goal, 
TSA is also responsible for security in the other transportation modes, 
and these modes have significant vulnerabilities that remain to be 
addressed.[Footnote 52]

Concluding Observations:

Having achieved many of ATSA's deadlines designed to strengthen 
passenger and baggage screening, TSA has begun to focus on longer-term 
planning to assist in stabilizing its screener workforce and screening 
operations. Carefully considering how it strategically hires, deploys, 
and manages its screener workforce will help TSA meet its mission and 
stabilize its passenger and baggage screening operations. We are 
encouraged that TSA is undertaking efforts to develop the tools needed 
to train its screener workforce and measure their performance. However, 
as TSA works toward improving the performance of individual screeners 
and screening operations, it will also be important that the agency 
deploy and leverage screening equipment and technologies and sustain 
its research and development efforts.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to answer 
any questions that you or other members of the Subcommittee may have at 
this time.

Contact Information:

For further information on this testimony, please contact Cathleen A. 
Berrick at (202) 512-8777. Individuals making key contributions to this 
testimony include David Alexander, Lisa Brown, Tammy Conquest, Kevin 
Copping, Gerald Dillingham, Christine Fossett, David Goldstein, 
Christopher Jones, Lemuel Jackson, Noel Lance, Thomas Lombardi, Jan 
Montgomery, Jobenia Odum, Jean Orland, Maria Strudwick, Mark Tremba, 
and Susan Zimmerman.

FOOTNOTES

[1] Pub. L. No. 107-71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001).

[2] According to TSA, Explosive Detection Systems (EDS) and Explosive 
Trace Detection (ETD) are the only technologies available to TSA for 
meeting ATSA's requirement to screen 100 percent of checked baggage 
using explosive detection systems. EDS operate in an automated mode and 
use probing radiation to examine objects inside baggage and identify 
the characteristic signatures of threat explosives. ETD works by 
detecting vapors and residues of explosives. Human operators collect 
samples by rubbing bags with swabs, which are chemically analyzed to 
identify any traces of explosive materials.

[3] Federal Security Directors are responsible for overseeing security 
at each of the nation's commercial airports.

[4] High-speed connectivity refers to broadband access to TSA's field 
operations training sites and checkpoints. 

[5] TIP is designed to test screeners' detection capabilities by 
projecting threat images, including guns and explosives, into bags as 
they are screened. Screeners are responsible for positively identifying 
the threat image and calling for the bag to be searched. Once prompted, 
TIP identifies to the screener whether the threat is real and then 
records the screener's performance in a database that could be analyzed 
for performance trends.

[6] Pub. L. No. 107-71, § 110, 115 Stat. 597, 617, requires the use of 
alternative means for screening any piece of checked baggage not 
screened by an explosive detection system. Authorized alternative means 
include a bag match program, manual search, K-9 explosive detection 
units, and other means or technology approved by the Under Secretary.

[7] Positive passenger bag match is an alternative means of screening 
checked baggage, conducted by the airline, which requires that the 
passenger be on the same aircraft as the checked baggage.

[8] In-line baggage screening systems integrate EDS equipment into 
airport baggage handling systems to improve the pace of checked baggage 
screening (i.e., throughput).

[9] Pursuant to the Homeland Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 425, 
116 Stat. 2135, 2185-86 (2002), the deadline for screening all checked 
baggage using explosive detection systems was extended until December 
31, 2003, at airports the Under Secretary of Transportation for 
Security determined could not meet the December 31, 2002, deadline due 
to TSA's inability to deploy sufficient explosive detection systems to 
those airports.

[10] There are five categories of airports--X, I, II, III, and IV. 
Category X airports have the largest number of enplanements and 
category IV airports have the smallest number.

[11] TSA's National Screening Force provides screening support to all 
commercial airports in times of emergency, seasonal demands, or under 
other special circumstances that require a greater number of screeners 
than currently available to FSDs.

[12] TSA instructed FSDs to use competency-based testing at airports 
that were over their authorized screener staffing levels as the 
identification method for involuntary conversions to part-time and 
reductions-in-force. Based on an airport's staffing plan, the FSD was 
required to identify the number of screeners and screening supervisors 
to be converted to part-time or be reduced-in-force. Screeners were 
ranked based on testing scores. The competency-based tests consisted of 
two computer-based tests, including image recognition and knowledge of 
standard operating procedures. 

[13] The fiscal year 2004 Department of Homeland and Security 
Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 108-90, 117 Stat. 1137, 1141-42 (2003).

[14] One full-time-equivalent is equal to one work year or 2,080 non-
overtime hours. 

[15] According to TSA, an annualized number represents an estimate of 
the usage of FTEs over the fiscal year assuming that the usage in a 
given pay period remains constant over all future pay periods.

[16] TSA officials stated that it required the contractor to validate 
the staffing model using statistical samples of all staff and equipment 
operations at all category X airports and as many category I, II, III, 
and IV airports as necessary.

[17] TSA's standard operating procedures require that a screener of the 
same gender as the passenger conduct secondary searches (i.e., hand 
wanding and pat downs) of the passenger.

[18] DHS's Homeland Security Advisory System consists of 5 threat 
conditions, ranging from low (green) to severe (red).

[19] An assessment center is a temporary testing site that TSA's hiring 
contractor assembles to conduct assessments of screener applicants. The 
centers are generally constructed at locations such as hotels and TSA 
training facilities that are in close proximity to the airport(s) where 
FSDs have requested additional staff.

[20] The assessment process consists of three phases. Phase I includes 
three computer-based tests (1) the English Proficiency Test; (2) the 
Screener Object Recognition Tests, which assesses an applicant's 
ability to identify an X-ray images through visual observation and 
identification and mental rotation; and (3) the Aviation Security 
Screener Employment Test, which evaluates interpersonal skills such as 
customer service and dependability and work values. Applicants who pass 
Phase I of the assessment process are scheduled to attend Phase II, 
which includes (1) a structured interview; (2) physical ability tests, 
such as luggage lift and baggage search; (3) a medical examination such 
as vision, color vision, hearing, physical coordination, and motor 
skills; and (4) a drug test. Applicants who pass Phase II proceed to 
Phase III, which entails a background investigation including credit 
and criminal checks. TSA officials reported that approximately 8 
percent of applicants pass both the Phase I and II assessments, and 
about 90 percent of applicants pass Phase III. Officials further 
reported that nearly 80 percent of offers made are accepted.

[21] TSA attempts to contact hired screeners who do not show up for 
basic screener training, and reschedule training when possible.

[22] High-speed connectivity refers to broadband access to TSA's field 
operations training sites and checkpoints. 

[23] TSA plans to develop other certifications as new technologies are 
utilized and integrated into the screening process. 

[24] U.S. General Accounting Office, Airport Passenger Screening: 
Preliminary Observations on Progress Made and Challenges Remaining, 
GAO-03-1173 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 24, 2003).

[25] The 2 completed modules are videos that provide training on 
procedures for conducting handheld metal detector, pat down, and manual 
bag searches. 

[26] As we did not select statistical samples of passenger screeners 
and supervisors to interview, the views of those we interviewed should 
not be considered representative of the views of all screeners and 
supervisors at the airports we visited.

[27] While the study was focused on passenger screening, TSA officials 
stated that many of the performance issues identified also pertained to 
baggage screening.

[28] Screening supervisors and managers may also require screeners to 
participate in corrective action training based on their observations 
of performance deficiencies, such as failure to follow a standard 
operating procedure. 

[29] The USDA course covers topics related to supervising staff within 
the federal government.

[30] TSA defines fully connected as a training computer with the new 
network image installed and connected to the TSA broadband network.

[31] U.S. General Accounting Office, Aviation Security: Efforts to 
Measure Effectiveness and Address Challenges, GAO-04-232T (Washington, 
D.C.: Nov. 5, 2003).

[32] The Computer Assisted Passenger Screening System is a stand-alone 
application residing in an air carrier's reservation system that 
analyzes certain behavioral patterns to score and calculate each 
passenger's risk level for determining the appropriate level of 
screening. 

[33] TSA began deploying high-speed connectivity to screening 
checkpoints in May 2003. 

[34] Checked baggage screeners will not recertify on EDS as part of the 
current recertification program. EDS is a separate certification 
program under development. The need for other skills or equipment-
certifications is under consideration for future certification 
programs.

[35] Screeners that fail any module will receive study time, 
remediation, and one retest opportunity. 

[36] At the time the recertification testing began, TSA considered 
about 28,000 screeners as having already completed the first two 
components of the knowledge and skills assessment because they 
successfully passed competency tests TSA administered at many airports 
as part of a screener workforce reduction effort.

[37] The PMIS user survey was conducted in July 2003 and had a response 
rate of 21.9%. Given this low response rate, the results of the survey 
may not be representative of the views and opinions of PMIS users. TSA 
plans to administer a second survey in March 2004.

[38] The Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 
103-62, 107 Stat. 285, shifts the focus of government operations from 
process to results by establishing a foundation for examining agency 
mission, performance goals and objectives, and results. Under the act, 
agencies are to prepare 5-year strategic plans that set the general 
direction for their efforts, and annual performance plans that 
establish connections between the long-term strategic goals outlined in 
the strategic plans and the day-to-day activities of managers and 
staff. Finally, the act requires that each agency report annually on 
the extent to which it is meeting its annual performance goals and the 
actions needed to achieve or modify those goals that have not been met.

[39] According to TSA, Explosive Detection Systems (EDS) and Explosive 
Trace Detection (ETD) are the only technologies available to TSA for 
meeting ATSA's requirement to screen 100 percent of checked baggage 
using explosive detection systems. EDS operate in an automated mode and 
use probing radiation to examine objects inside baggage and identify 
the characteristic signatures of threat explosives. ETD works by 
detecting vapors and residues of explosives. Human operators collect 
samples by rubbing bags with swabs, which are chemically analyzed to 
identify any traces of explosive materials.

[40] FSDs are expected to list all reasons that prevented them from 
screening 100 percent of checked baggage using EDS and ETD. Also, FSDs 
are to report when they do attain 100 percent screening of checked 
baggage using EDS and ETD.

[41] The number of airports unable to attain 100 percent screening of 
checked baggage using EDS and ETD is Sensitive Security Information 
and, therefore, is not included in this testimony.

[42] The baggage-screening requirements of 49 U.S.C. § 44901(d)(1), on 
which TSA must report, include: (A) that explosive detection systems 
are deployed as soon as possible to ensure that all airports described 
in § 44903(c) have sufficient explosive detection systems to screen all 
checked baggage no later than December 31, 2002 (as discussed earlier, 
the Homeland Security Act extended this deadline to December 31, 2003, 
for airports that the Under Secretary of Transportation for Security 
determines could not meet the original deadline), and that as soon as 
these systems are in place at an airport, all checked baggage at the 
airport is screened by those systems; (B) that all systems deployed 
under subparagraph (A) are fully utilized; and (C) if explosive 
detection equipment at an airport is unavailable, all checked baggage 
is screened by an alternative means.

[43] A letter of intent represents a nonbinding commitment from an 
agency to provide multiyear funding to an entity beyond the current 
authorization period. Thus, that letter allows an airport to proceed 
with a project without waiting for future federal funds because the 
airport and investors know that allowable costs are likely to be 
reimbursed.

[44] In addition, in-line systems have been funded through the Federal 
Aviation Administration's AIP funds. The Airport Improvement Program 
trust fund is used to fund capital improvements to airports, including 
some security enhancements, such as terminal modifications to 
accommodate explosive detection equipment. Thirteen airports are using 
AIP funds to make infrastructure upgrades to support EDS equipment that 
TSA will supply.

[45] Pub. L. No. 108-176, § 605, 2490 Stat. 2566-68 (2003).

[46] On-screen resolution could also be used with stand-alone EDS 
machines to potentially increase screening efficiencies.

[47] The President's fiscal year 2005 budget is requesting a total of 
$155.2 million for TSA's R&D program.

[48] The remaining about $2.7 million was obligated for continuous 
improvement to currently deployed equipment and for contractor support 
activities for the Phoenix program.

[49] X-ray diffraction technology is based on the detection of scatter 
patterns as X-rays interact with crystal lattice structures of 
materials. Quadrupole resonance uses radio frequency pulses to probe 
bags by eliciting unique responses from explosives based on their 
chemical characteristics. Computed tomography uses an X-ray source that 
rotates around a bag, obtaining a large number of cross-sectional 
images that are integrated by a computer, which displays the densities 
of objects in the bag. The machine automatically triggers an alarm when 
objects with high densities, characteristic of explosives, are 
detected.

[50] RFID is a technology that uses radio waves to automatically 
identify individual items, such as checked luggage, for tracking 
purposes. 

[51] Backscatter X-ray detects reflected X-ray energy, providing an 
image that highlights organic materials such as explosives on a 
passenger. Millimeter wave energy analysis provides a 360-degree image 
of the human body in order to detect weapons and explosives. Terahertz 
imaging penetrates many common materials and reveals not only the shape 
but also the composition of hidden objects, including explosives.

[52] U.S. General Accounting Office, Transportation Security: Federal 
Action Needed to Help Address Security Challenges, GAO-03-843 
(Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2003).