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Prepare for and Respond to Major Catastrophic Disasters and Address 
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2007.

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Testimony:

Before the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, House of 
Representatives:

United States Government Accountability Office:

GAO:

For Release on Delivery Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT:

July 31, 2007:

HOMELAND SECURITY:

Observations on DHS and FEMA Efforts to Prepare for and Respond to 
Major and Catastrophic Disasters and Address Related Recommendations 
and Legislation:

Statement of William O. Jenkins, Jr. 
Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues:

GAO Highlights:

Highlights of GAO-07-1142T, a testimony before the Committee on 
Oversight and Government Reform, House of Representatives

Why GAO Did This Study:

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) within the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS) faces the simultaneous challenges of preparing 
for the season and implementing the reorganization and other provisions 
of the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006. The Act 
stipulated major changes to FEMA that were intended to enhance its 
preparedness for and response to catastrophic and major disasters.

As GAO has reported, FEMA and DHS face continued challenges, including 
clearly defining leadership roles and responsibilities, developing 
necessary disaster response capabilities, and establishing 
accountability systems to provide effective services while protecting 
against waste, fraud, and abuse. This testimony (1) summarizes GAO's 
findings on these challenges and FEMA's and DHS's efforts to address 
them; and (2) discusses several disaster management issues for 
continued congressional attention

What GAO Found: 

Effective disaster preparedness and response require defining what 
needs to be done, where and by whom, how it needs to be done, and how 
well it should be done. GAO analysis following Hurricane Katrina showed 
that improvements were needed in leadership roles and responsibilities, 
development of the necessary disaster capabilities, and accountability 
systems that balance the need for fast, flexible response against the 
need to prevent waste, fraud, and abuse. To facilitate rapid and 
effective decision making, legal authorities, roles and 
responsibilities, and lines of authority at all government levels must 
be clearly defined, effectively communicated, and well understood. 
Adequacy of capabilities in the context of a catastrophic or major 
disaster are needed—particularly in the areas of (1) situational 
assessment and awareness; (2) emergency communications; (3) 
evacuations; (4) search and rescue; (5) logistics; and (6) mass care 
and shelter. Implementing controls and accountability mechanisms helps 
to ensure the proper use of resources. FEMA has initiated reviews and 
some actions in each of these areas, but their operational impact in a 
catastrophic or major disaster has not yet been tested. Some of the 
targeted improvements, such as a completely revamped logistics system, 
are multiyear efforts. Others, such as the ability to field mobile 
communications and registration-assistance vehicles, are expected to be 
ready for the 2007 hurricane season.

The Comptroller General has suggested one area for fundamental reform 
and oversight is ensuring a strategic and integrated approach to 
prepare for, respond to, recover, and rebuild after catastrophic 
events. FEMA enters the peak of the 2007 hurricane season as an 
organization in transition working simultaneously to implement the 
reorganization required by the Post-Katrina Reform Act and moving 
forward on initiatives to address the deficiencies identified by the 
post-Katrina reviews. This is an enormous challenge. In the short-term, 
Congress may wish to consider several specific areas for immediate 
oversight. These include (1) evaluating the development and 
implementation of the National Preparedness System, including 
preparedness for natural disasters, terrorist incidents, and an 
influenza pandemic; (2) assessing state and local capabilities and the 
use of federal grants to enhance those capabilities; (3) examining 
regional and multi-state planning and preparation; (4) determining the 
status and use of preparedness exercises; and (5) examining DHS polices 
regarding oversight assistance.

What GAO Recommends:

This testimony includes no new recommendations, but identifies issues 
to which Congress, FEMA, and DHS may wish to give continued attention 
so that FEMA may fulfill the requirements of the Post-Katrina Reform 
Act. These issues are based on the findings and recommendations of more 
than 30 Katrina-related GAO reports.

[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-1142T.]

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
the link above. For more information, contact William Jenkins, Jr. at 
(202) 512-8777 or jenkinswo@gao.gov.

[End of section]

GAO-07-1142T:

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:

Thank you for the opportunity to discuss issues associated with the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA), an agency within the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS), and its efforts to address the 
shortcomings of the preparation and response to Hurricane Katrina and 
enhance its capabilities for responding to major disasters, including 
hurricanes. The 2007 hurricane season has started and its peak period 
will begin in a few weeks.

Almost two years ago, Hurricane Katrina severely tested disaster 
management at the federal, state, and local levels and revealed 
weaknesses in the basic elements of preparing for, responding, to and 
recovering from any catastrophic disaster. The goal of disaster 
preparedness and response is easy to state but difficult to achieve and 
can be stated as follows:

To prevent where possible, prepare for, mitigate, and respond to 
disasters of any size or cause with well-planned, well-coordinated, and 
effective actions that minimize the loss of life and property and set 
the stage for a quick recovery.

Achieving this goal for major disasters, and catastrophic disasters in 
particular, is difficult because success requires effective pre-and 
post-disaster coordination and cooperation among different levels of 
government, nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector. 
Individuals can also contribute to success through such things as 
knowing evacuation routes, complying with evacuation orders, and having 
a family and individual disaster preparation plan and supplies.

As the Comptroller General testified in February 2007 on DHS's high- 
risk status and specifically disaster preparedness and response, DHS 
must overcome continuing challenges, including those related to clearly 
defining leadership roles and responsibilities, developing necessary 
disaster response capabilities, and establishing accountability systems 
to provide effective services while protecting against waste, fraud, 
and abuse.[Footnote 1] These issues are enormously complex and 
challenging for all levels of government. It is important to view 
preparedness for and response to major disasters as a national system 
with linked responsibilities and capabilities. This is because 
effective preparedness for and response to major disasters requires the 
coordinated planning and actions of multiple actors from multiple first 
responder disciplines, jurisdictions, and levels of government as well 
as nongovernmental entities. Parochialism must be put aside and 
cooperation must prevail before and after an emergency event. The 
experience of Hurricane Katrina illustrated why it is important to 
tackle these difficult issues.

My testimony today (1) summarizes our key findings on leadership, 
response capabilities, and accountability controls and the efforts made 
by DHS and FEMA in their implementation of the Post-Katrina Reform 
Act[Footnote 2] and other recommendations made in the aftermath of 
Hurricane Katrina, and (2) highlights several disaster management 
issues for continued congressional attention. My comments today are 
based on our body of work on disaster and emergency management 
including more than 30 reports on the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, 
our review of recent emergency management reform legislative changes, 
and materials and statements provided by FEMA. We conducted our audit 
work in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 
standards.

Summary:

Our analysis of the preparation for and response to Hurricane Katrina 
showed the need for (1) clearly defined and understood leadership roles 
and responsibilities; (2) development of the necessary disaster 
capabilities; and (3) accountability systems that effectively balance 
the need for fast and flexible response against the need to prevent 
waste, fraud, and abuse.

A key issue in the response to Hurricane Katrina was the lack of 
clearly understood roles and responsibilities. One aspect of this issue 
that continues to be a subject of discussion is the roles and 
responsibilities of the Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO), who has the 
authority to make mission assignments to federal agencies for response 
and recovery, and the Principal Federal Official (PFO), whose role was 
to provide situational awareness to the Secretary of Homeland Security.

Since the 2006 hurricane season, DHS has designated a FCO for each 
region that includes states at risks of hurricanes and a supporting FCO 
for each of these states. It has also designated a PFO for each of 
three regions--the Gulf Coast, the Northeast Region, and the Mid-
Atlantic Region--plus a separate PFO for the state of Florida and 
Texas. However, this year's designations of PFOs, deputy PFOs have 
generated some questions in Congress as to the clarity of the lines of 
authority between these designated officials and DHS leadership such as 
the FEMA Administrator and the Secretary of DHS. In a July letter to 
the nation's governors, designating PFOs and FCOs, the Secretary of 
Homeland Security directed states to contact the head of the Office of 
Risk Management and Analysis at the National Protection and Programs 
Directorate (NPPD) with questions related to these designated 
officials. The reasons for this were not stated in the letter, and the 
Risk Management and Analysis Directorate of the NPPD has no designated 
role in the current National Response Plan, which outlines the 
principal roles and responsibilities of federal agencies in a major 
disaster. In a letter to the Secretary of Homeland Security, the 
Chairman of the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Homeland Security 
expressed concern about the role of the NPPD, noting that under the 
Post-Katrina Reform Act, the FEMA Administrator is designated to "lead 
the Nation's effort to prepare for, protect against, respond to, 
recover from, and mitigate against the risks of natural disasters, acts 
of terrorism and other man-made disasters including catastrophic 
incidents." [Footnote 3]

It is critically important that the authorities, roles, and 
responsibilities of FEMA and these designated FCOs and PFOs be clear 
and clearly understood by all. There is still some question among state 
and local first responders about the need for both positions and how 
they will work together in disaster response. One potential benefit of 
naming the FCOs and PFOs in advance is that they have an opportunity to 
meet and discuss expectations, roles and responsibilities with state, 
local, and nongovernmental officials before an actual disaster, 
possibly setting the groundwork for improved coordination and 
communication in an actual disaster.

Developing the ability to prepare for, respond to, and recover from 
major and catastrophic disasters requires an overall national 
preparedness effort that is designed to integrate and define what needs 
to be done, where, and by whom (roles and responsibilities); how it 
should be done; and how well it should be done--that is, according to 
what standards. The principal national documents designed to address 
each of these are, respectively, the National Response Plan (NRP), the 
National Incident Management System (NIMS), and the National 
Preparedness Goal (NPG). The NRP NIMS and the NPG are undergoing 
extensive review and revision by DHS with the input of federal, state, 
and local government officials, tribal authorities, non-governmental 
and private sector officials, according to DHS. This effort is intended 
to assess the effectiveness of the doctrine embodied in these 
documents, identify modifications and improvements, and reissue the 
documents. The results of the review for the NRP, for example, were 
initially scheduled for release in June 2007. However, in April 2007, 
DHS officials notified stakeholders that some important issues were 
more complex and require national-level policy decisions, and stated 
that additional time was needed to complete a comprehensive draft. DHS 
noted that the underlying operational principles of the current NRP, as 
revised in May 2006, remain intact and still apply. Were the latest 
revision of the NRP to be released in the next few weeks, it is 
unlikely that any changes from these revisions could be effectively 
implemented for the 2007 hurricane season, which is now two months old. 
FEMA officials have told us that the final version of the NPG and its 
corresponding documents are currently receiving final reviews by the 
White House and will be out shortly.

In addition to roles and responsibilities, the nation's experience with 
hurricanes Katrina and Rita reinforced some questions about the 
adequacy of the nation's disaster response capabilities in the context 
of a catastrophic disaster--particularly in the areas of (1) 
situational assessment and awareness, (2) emergency communications, (3) 
evacuations, (4) search and rescue, (5) logistics, and (6) mass care 
and sheltering. Overall, capabilities are built upon the appropriate 
combination of people, skills, processes, and assets. Ensuring that 
needed capabilities are available requires effective planning and 
coordination in conjunction with training and exercises in which the 
capabilities are realistically tested and problems identified and 
subsequently addressed in partnership with other federal, state, and 
local stakeholders. In various meetings with GAO, in congressional 
testimonies, and in some documents, FEMA has described a number of 
initiatives to address identified deficiencies in each of these areas. 
However, a number of FEMA programs are ongoing and it is too early to 
evaluate their effectiveness. In addition, none of these initiatives 
appear to have been tested on a scale that reasonably simulates the 
conditions and demand they would face following a major or catastrophic 
disaster. Thus, it is difficult to assess the probable results of these 
initiatives in improving response to a major or catastrophic disaster, 
such as a category 4 or 5 hurricane.[Footnote 4] The National Guard has 
traditionally been an important component of response to major 
disasters. States and governors rely on their National Guard personnel 
and equipment for disaster response, and National Guard personnel are 
frequently deployed to disaster areas, including those outside their 
home states. However, the types and quantities of equipment the 
National Guard needs to respond to large-scale disasters have not been 
fully identified because the multiple federal and state agencies that 
would have roles in responding to such events have not completed and 
integrated their plans[Footnote 5].

With regard to balancing speed and flexibility with accountability, 
FEMA has stated it has upgraded its victim recovery systems. For 
example, FEMA states that it can register up to 200,000 applicants per 
day for individual assistance while including safeguards for preventing 
fraudulent and duplicate applications. The inability to reliably and 
efficiently identify fraudulent and duplicate applications was a major 
problem following Katrina that resulted in hundreds of millions of 
dollars in improper payments. FEMA has also taken actions to revise its 
debris removal and contracting policies and to increase the use of 
advanced contracting for goods and services. Again, we have no basis to 
determine the effectiveness of these systems as they have yet to be 
tested on a large scale basis.

Entering the 2007 hurricane season, FEMA was and is an organization in 
transition working to implement the reorganization mandated by the Post-
Katrina Reform Act as it moves forward on initiatives to implement a 
comprehensive, risk-based national emergency management system as 
required by the act. In November 2006, the Comptroller General wrote to 
the congressional leadership suggesting that one area needing 
fundamental reform and oversight was preparing for, responding to, and 
rebuilding after catastrophic disasters. Among the topics that Congress 
might consider for oversight are:

* the development and implementation of the National Preparedness 
System, including preparedness for natural disasters, terrorist 
incidents, and an influenza pandemic;

* the assessment of state and local capabilities and the use of federal 
grants in building and sustaining those capabilities;

* regional and multistate planning and preparedness;

* the status and use of preparedness exercises; and:

* DHS policies that affect the transparency of its efforts to improve 
the nation's preparedness for and response to major and catastrophic 
disasters.

Background:

Several federal legislative and executive provisions support 
preparation for and response to emergency situations. The Robert T. 
Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (the Stafford 
Act)[Footnote 6] primarily establishes the programs and processes for 
the federal government to provide major disaster and emergency 
assistance to state, local, and tribal governments, individuals, and 
qualified private nonprofit organizations. FEMA, within DHS, has 
responsibility for administering the provisions of the Stafford Act.

Besides using these federal resources, states affected by a 
catastrophic disaster can also turn to other states for assistance in 
obtaining surge capacity--the ability to draw on additional resources, 
such as personnel and equipment, needed to respond to and recover from 
the incident. One way of sharing personnel and equipment across state 
lines is through the use of the Emergency Management Assistance Compact 
(EMAC), an interstate compact that provides a legal and administrative 
framework for managing such emergency requests. The compact includes 49 
states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin 
Islands.[Footnote 7] We issued a report this week examining how the 
Emergency Management Assistance Compact has been used in disasters and 
how its effectiveness could be enhanced.[Footnote 8] As the committee 
is aware, a number of specific recommendations have been made to 
improve the nation's ability to effectively prepare for and respond to 
catastrophic disasters following the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. 
Beginning in February 2006, reports by the House Select Bipartisan 
Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane 
Katrina,[Footnote 9] the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental 
Affairs Committee,[Footnote 10] the White House Homeland Security 
Council,[Footnote 11] the DHS Inspector General,[Footnote 12] and DHS 
and FEMA[Footnote 13] all identified a variety of failures and some 
strengths in the preparations for, response to, and initial recovery 
from Hurricane Katrina. In addition to these reviews, a report from the 
American National Standards Institute Homeland Security Standards Panel 
(ANSI-HSSP) contains recommendations aimed at bolstering national 
preparedness, response, and recovery efforts in the event of a natural 
disaster. A key resource identified in the document is the American 
National Standard for Disaster/Emergency Management and Business 
Continuity Programs (ANSI/NFPA 1600), which was developed by the 
National Fire Protection Association (NFPA). The standard defines a 
common set of criteria for preparedness, disaster management, emergency 
management, and business continuity programs.

Hurricane Katrina severely tested disaster management at the federal, 
state, and local levels and revealed weaknesses in the basic elements 
of preparing for, responding to, and recovering from any catastrophic 
disaster. Based on our work done during the aftermath of Hurricane 
Katrina, we previously reported that DHS needs to more effectively 
coordinate disaster preparedness, response, and recovery efforts, 
particularly for catastrophic disasters in which the response 
capabilities of state and local governments are almost immediately 
overwhelmed.[Footnote 14] Our analysis showed the need for (1) clearly 
defined and understood leadership roles and responsibilities; (2) the 
development of the necessary disaster capabilities; and (3) 
accountability systems that effectively balance the need for fast and 
flexible response against the need to prevent waste, fraud, and abuse. 
In line with a recommendation we made following Hurricane Andrew, the 
nation's most destructive hurricane until Katrina, we recommended that 
Congress give federal agencies explicit authority to take actions to 
prepare for all types of catastrophic disasters when there is warning. 
We also recommended that DHS:

1. rigorously retest, train, and exercise its recent clarification of 
the roles, responsibilities, and lines of authority for all levels of 
leadership, implementing changes needed to remedy identified 
coordination problems;

2. direct that the NRP base plan and its supporting Catastrophic 
Incident Annex be supported by more robust and detailed operational 
implementation plans;

3. provide guidance and direction for federal, state, and local 
planning, training, and exercises to ensure such activities fully 
support preparedness, response, and recovery responsibilities at a 
jurisdictional and regional basis;

4. take a lead in monitoring federal agencies' efforts to prepare to 
meet their responsibilities under the NRP and the interim National 
Preparedness Goal; and:

5. use a risk management approach in deciding whether and how to invest 
finite resources in specific capabilities for a catastrophic disaster.

The Post-Katrina Reform Act [Footnote 15] responded to the findings and 
recommendations in the various reports examining the preparation for 
and response to Hurricane Katrina. While keeping FEMA within DHS, the 
act enhanced FEMA's responsibilities and its autonomy within DHS. FEMA 
is to lead and support the nation in a risk-based, comprehensive 
emergency management system of preparedness, protection, response, 
recovery, and mitigation. Under the Act, the FEMA Administrator reports 
directly to the Secretary of DHS; FEMA is now a distinct entity within 
DHS; and the Secretary of DHS can no longer substantially or 
significantly reduce the authorities, responsibilities, or functions of 
FEMA or the capability to perform them unless authorized by subsequent 
legislation. FEMA has absorbed many of the functions of DHS's 
Preparedness Directorate (with some exceptions). The statute 
establishes 10 regional offices with specified responsibilities. The 
statute also establishes a National Integration Center responsible for 
the ongoing management and maintenance of the NIMS and NRP. The Post-
Katrina Reform Act also included provisions for other areas, such as 
evacuation plans and exercises and addressing the needs of individuals 
with disabilities. In addition, the act includes several provisions to 
strengthen the management and capability of FEMA's workforce. For 
example, the statute called for a strategic human capital plan to shape 
and improve FEMA's workforce, authorized recruitment and retention 
bonuses, and established a Surge Capacity Force. Most of the 
organizational changes became effective as of March 31, 2007. Others, 
such as the increase in organizational autonomy for FEMA and 
establishment of the National Integration Center, became effective upon 
enactment of the Post-Katrina Reform Act on October 4, 2006.

FEMA Is Reviewing Its Responsibilities, Capabilities as It Implements 
Recommendations and Post-Katrina Reform Act:

After FEMA became part of DHS in March 2003, its responsibilities were 
over time dispersed and redefined. FEMA continues to evolve within DHS 
as it implements the changes required by the Post-Katrina Reform Act, 
whose details are discussed later. Hurricane Katrina severely tested 
disaster management at the federal, state, and local levels and 
revealed weaknesses in the basic elements of preparing for, responding 
to, and recovering from any catastrophic disaster. According to DHS, 
the department completed a thorough assessment of FEMA's internal 
structure to incorporate lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina and 
integrate systematically new and existing assets and responsibilities 
within FEMA.

The effective implementation of recent recommendations and the Post- 
Katrina Reform Act's organizational changes and related roles and 
responsibilities should address many of our emergency management 
observations and recommendations.[Footnote 16] In addition, we 
previously reported that DHS needs to more effectively coordinate 
disaster preparedness, response, and recovery efforts, particularly for 
catastrophic disasters in which the response capabilities of state and 
local governments are almost immediately overwhelmed. Our September 
2006:

analysis showed the need for (1) clearly defined and understood 
leadership roles and responsibilities; (2) the development of the 
necessary disaster capabilities; and (3) accountability systems that 
effectively balance the need for fast and flexible response against the 
need to prevent waste, fraud, and abuse[Footnote 17].

Leadership Is Critical to Prepare for, Respond to, and Recover from 
Catastrophic Disasters:

In preparing for, responding to, and recovering from any catastrophic 
disaster, the legal authorities, roles and responsibilities, and lines 
of authority at all levels of government must be clearly defined, 
effectively communicated, and well understood to facilitate rapid and 
effective decision making. Hurricane Katrina showed the need to improve 
leadership at all levels of government to better respond to a 
catastrophic disaster. As we have previously reported, developing the 
capabilities needed for catastrophic disasters requires an overall 
national preparedness effort that is designed to integrate and define 
what needs to be done, where, and by whom (roles and responsibilities), 
how it should be done, and how well it should be done--that is, 
according to what standards. The principal national documents designed 
to address each of these are, respectively, the NRP, NIMS, and the NPG.

All three documents are undergoing extensive review and revision by DHS 
with input from state and local government officials, tribal 
authorities, non-governmental and private sector officials.[Footnote 
18] For example, the review of the NRP is intended to assess the 
effectiveness of the NRP, identify modifications and improvements and 
reissue the document. This review includes all major components of the 
NRP including the base plan, Emergency Support Functions (ESF), annexes 
such as the Catastrophic Incident Annex and its Supplement; the role of 
the PFO and FCO, and the Joint Field Office structure. Also during the 
current NRP review period, FEMA has revised the organizational 
structure of Emergency Support Function 6 (ESF-6), Mass Care, Housing, 
and Human Services, and places FEMA as the lead agency for this 
emergency support function. The Red Cross will remain as a supporting 
agency in the responsibilities and activities of ESF-6. According to a 
February 2007 letter by the Red Cross, this change will not take place 
until the NRP review process is complete and all changes are approved.

The revised NRP and NIMS were originally scheduled for release in June 
2007. In April 2007, however, DHS officials notified stakeholders that 
some important issues were more complex and required national-level 
policy decisions, and additional time was needed to complete a 
comprehensive draft. DHS noted that the underlying operational 
principles of the NRP remain intact and the current document, as 
revised in May 2006, still applies. FEMA officials have told us that 
the final version of the National Preparedness Goal and its 
corresponding documents like the Target Capabilities List, are 
currently receiving final reviews by the White House and are expected 
to be out shortly.

A key issue in the response to Hurricane Katrina was the lack of 
clearly understood roles and responsibilities. This is an issue that 
continues to be a subject of discussion is the roles and 
responsibilities of the FCO, who has the authority to make mission 
assignments to federal agencies for response and recovery under the 
Stafford Act, and the PFO, whose role was to provide situational 
awareness to the Secretary of Homeland Security. The May 2006 revisions 
to the NRP made changes designed to address this issue. However, the 
changes may not have fully resolved the leadership issues regarding the 
roles of the PFO and the FCO. While the Secretary of Homeland Security 
may avoid conflicts by appointing a single individual to serve in both 
positions in non-terrorist incidents, confusion may persist if the 
Secretary of Homeland Security does not exercise this discretion to do 
so. Furthermore, this discretion does not exist for terrorist 
incidents, and the revised NRP does not specifically provide a 
rationale for this limitation.

For 2006, FEMA pre-designated five teams of FCOs and PFOs in the Gulf 
Coast and eastern seaboard states at risk of hurricanes. This included 
FCOs and PFOs for the Gulf Coast Region,[Footnote 19] Northeast 
Region,[Footnote 20] and the Mid-Atlantic Region,[Footnote 21] and 
separate FCOs and PFOs for the states of Florida and Texas.

However, this year's designations of PFOs, deputy PFOs, and FCOs have 
generated some questions in Congress as to the clarity of the lines of 
authority between these designated officials and DHS leadership such as 
the FEMA Administrator and the Secretary of DHS. In a July letter to 
the nation's governors, designating PFOs and FCOs, the Secretary of 
Homeland Security directed states to contact the head of the Office of 
Risk Management and Analysis at the National Protection and Programs 
Directorate (NPPD) with questions related to these designated 
officials. The reasons for this were not stated in the letter, and the 
Risk Management and Analysis Directorate of the NPPD has no designated 
role in the current National Response Plan, which outlines the 
principal roles and responsibilities of federal agencies in a major 
disaster. In a letter to the Secretary of Homeland Security, the 
Chairman of the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Homeland Security 
expressed concern about the role of the NPPD, noting that under the 
Post-Katrina Reform Act, the FEMA Administrator is designated to "lead 
the Nation's effort to prepare for, protect against, respond to, 
recover from, and mitigate against the risks of natural disasters, acts 
of terrorism and other man-made disasters including catastrophic 
incidents."[Footnote 22]

It is critically important that the authorities, roles, and 
responsibilities of FEMA and the designated FCOs and PFOs be clear and 
clearly understood by all. There is still some question among state and 
local first responders about the need for both positions and how they 
will work together in disaster response. One potential benefit of 
naming the FCOs and PFOs in advance is that they have an opportunity to 
meet and discuss expectations, roles and responsibilities with state, 
local, and nongovernmental officials before an actual disaster, 
possibly setting the groundwork for improved coordination and 
communication in an actual disaster.

Enhanced Capabilities Are Needed to Adequately Prepare for and Respond 
to Major Disasters:

Numerous reports, including those by the House, Senate, and the White 
House, and our own work suggest that the substantial resources and 
capabilities marshaled by state, local, and federal governments and 
nongovernmental organizations were insufficient to meet the immediate 
challenges posed by the unprecedented degree of damage and the number 
of victims caused by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Developing the 
ability to prepare for, respond to, and recover from major and 
catastrophic disasters requires an overall national preparedness effort 
that is designed to integrate and define what needs to be done and 
where, how it should be done, and how well it should be done--that is, 
according to what standards. As previously discussed, the principal 
national documents designed to address each of these are, respectively, 
the NRP, NIMS, and the NPG, and each document is undergoing revision.

Overall, capabilities are built upon the appropriate combination of 
people, skills, processes, and assets. Ensuring that needed 
capabilities are available requires effective planning and coordination 
in conjunction with training and exercises in which the capabilities 
are realistically tested and problems identified and subsequently 
addressed in partnership with other federal, state, and local 
stakeholders. In recent work on FEMA management of day-to-day 
operations, we found that although shifting resources caused by its 
transition to DHS created challenges for FEMA, the agency's management 
of existing resources compounded these problems.[Footnote 23] FEMA 
lacks some of the basic management tools that help an agency respond to 
changing circumstances. Most notably, our January 2007 report found 
that FEMA lacks a strategic workforce plan and related human capital 
strategies--such as succession planning or a coordinated training 
effort. Such tools are integral to managing resources, as they enable 
an agency to define staffing levels, identify the critical skills 
needed to achieve its mission, and eliminate or mitigate gaps between 
current and future skills and competencies. FEMA officials have said 
they are beginning to address these and other basic organizational 
management issues. To this end, FEMA has commissioned studies of 18 
areas.[Footnote 24]

An important element of effective emergency response is the ability to 
identify and deploy where needed a variety of resources from a variety 
of sources--federal, state, local or tribal governments; military 
assets of the National Guard or active military; nongovernmental 
entities; and the private sector. One key method of tapping resources 
in areas not affected by the disaster is the EMAC. Through EMAC, about 
46,000 National Guard and 19,000 civilian responders were deployed to 
areas directly affected by the 2005 Gulf Coast hurricanes. We issued a 
report this week examining how the Emergency Management Assistance 
Compact has been used in disasters and how its effectiveness could be 
enhanced.[Footnote 25]

One of the resources accessed through EMAC is the National Guard. 
States and governors rely on their National Guard personnel and 
equipment for disaster response, and National Guard personnel are 
frequently deployed to disaster areas outside their home states. 
However, as we reported in January 2007, the types and quantities of 
equipment the National Guard needs to respond to large-scale disasters 
have not been fully identified because the multiple federal and state 
agencies that would have roles in responding to such events have not 
completed and integrated their plans.[Footnote 26] As a liaison between 
the Army, the Air Force, and the states, the National Guard Bureau is 
well positioned to facilitate state planning for National Guard forces. 
However, until the bureau's charter and its civil support regulation 
are revised to define its role in facilitating state planning for 
multistate events, such planning may remain incomplete, and the 
National Guard may not be prepared to respond as effectively and 
efficiently as possible. In addition, questions have arisen about the 
level of resources the National Guard has available for domestic 
emergency response. DOD does not routinely measure the equipment 
readiness of nondeployed National Guard forces for domestic civil 
support missions or report this information to Congress. Thus, although 
the deployment of National Guard units overseas has decreased the 
supply of equipment available to nondeployed National Guard units in 
the U.S., there has been no established, formal method of assessing the 
impact on the Guard's ability to perform its domestic missions. 
Although DOD has begun to collect data on units' preparedness, these 
efforts are not yet fully mature.

The nation's experience with hurricanes Katrina and Rita reinforces 
some of the questions surrounding the adequacy of capabilities in the 
context of a catastrophic disaster--particularly in the areas of (1) 
situational assessment and awareness, (2) emergency communications, (3) 
evacuations, (4) search and rescue, (5) logistics, and (6) mass care 
and sheltering. According to FEMA, the agency has described a number of 
actions it has taken or has underway to address identified deficiencies 
in each of these areas. Examples include designating national and 
regional situational awareness teams; acquiring and deploying mobile 
satellite communications trucks; developing an electronic system for 
receiving and tracking the status of requests for assistance and 
supplies; acquiring GPS equipment for tracking the location of supplies 
on route to areas of need; and working with the Red Cross and others to 
clarify roles and responsibilities for mass care, housing, and human 
services. However, a number of FEMA programs are ongoing and it is too 
early to evaluate their effectiveness. In addition, none of these 
initiatives appear to have been tested on a scale that reasonably 
simulates the conditions and demand they would face following a major 
or catastrophic disaster. Thus, it is difficult to assess the probable 
results of these initiatives in improving response to a major or 
catastrophic disaster, such as a category 4 or 5 hurricane. The section 
below briefly discusses actions taken or underway to make improvements 
in each of these areas.

Situational Awareness. FEMA is developing a concept for rapidly 
deployable interagency incident management teams, at this time called 
National Incident Management Team, to provide a forward federal 
presence on site within 12 hours of notification to facilitate managing 
the national response for catastrophic incidents. These teams will 
support efforts to meet the emergent needs during disasters such as the 
capability to provide initial situational awareness for decision-makers 
and support the initial establishment of a unified command.

Emergency Communications. Agencies' communications systems during a 
catastrophic disaster must first be operable, with sufficient 
communications to meet everyday internal and emergency communication 
requirements. Once operable, systems should have communications 
interoperability whereby public safety agencies (e.g., police, fire, 
emergency medical services, etc.) and service agencies (e.g., public 
works, transportation, and hospitals) can communicate within and across 
agencies and jurisdictions in real time as needed. DHS officials have 
identified a number of programs and activities they have implemented to 
improve interoperable communications nationally, and FEMA has taken 
action to design, staff, and maintain a rapidly deployable, responsive, 
interoperable, and reliable emergency communications capability.

Logistics. FEMA's inability to effectively manage and track requests 
for and the distribution of water, ice, food, and other supplies came 
under harsh criticism in the wake of Hurricane Katrina. Within days, 
FEMA became overwhelmed and essentially asked the military to take over 
much of the logistics mission.[Footnote 27] In the Post-Katrina Reform 
Act, Congress required FEMA to make its logistics system more flexible 
and responsive. FEMA's ongoing improvements to its logistics strategy 
and efforts are designed to initially lean forward and provide 
immediate support to a disaster site mainly through FEMA-owned goods 
and assets, and later on to establish sustained supply chains with the 
private vendors whose resources are needed for ongoing response and 
recovery activities, according to FEMA officials. In addition, we 
recently examined FEMA logistics issues, taking a broad approach, 
identifying five areas necessary for an effective logistics system. In 
short, FEMA is taking action to transition its logistics program to be 
more proactive, flexible, and responsive. While these and other 
initiatives hold promise for improving FEMA's logistics capabilities, 
it will be several years before they are fully implemented and 
operational.

Mass Care and Shelter. Our work examining the nation's ability to 
evacuate, care for, and shelter disaster victims, we showed that FEMA 
needs to identify and assess the capabilities that exist across the 
federal government and outside the federal government. In an April 
testimony, FEMA's Deputy Administrator for Operations said that 
emergency evacuation, shelter and housing is FEMA's most pressing 
priority for planning for recovery from a catastrophic disaster. He 
said that FEMA is undertaking more detailed mass evacuee support 
planning; the Department of Justice and Red Cross are developing 
methods for more quickly identifying and uniting missing family 
members; and FEMA and the Red Cross have developed a web-based data 
system to support shelter management, reporting, and facility 
identification activities.

In addition, FEMA is in the process of developing an Alternative 
Housing Pilot Program (AHPP) designed to evaluate new options for 
housing victims in the aftermath of a disaster. We have been asked to 
review the process FEMA used to evaluate proposals and award grants 
under this program and we expect to release a report at the end of 
August of this year.

Balance Needed between Quick Provision of Assistance and Ensuring 
Accountability to Protect against Waste, Fraud, and Abuse:

Controls and accountability mechanisms help to ensure that resources 
are used appropriately. Nevertheless, during a catastrophic disaster, 
decision makers struggle with the tension between implementing controls 
and accountability mechanisms and the demand for rapid response and 
recovery assistance. On one hand, our work uncovered many examples 
where quick action could not occur due to procedures that required 
extensive, time-consuming processes, delaying the delivery of vital 
supplies and other assistance. On the other hand, we also found 
examples where FEMA's processes assisting disaster victims left the 
federal government vulnerable to fraud and the abuse of expedited 
assistance payments.

We estimated that through February 2006, FEMA made about $600 million 
to $1.4 billion in improper and potentially fraudulent payments to 
applicants who used invalid information to apply for expedited cash 
assistance. DHS and FEMA have reported a number of actions that are to 
be in effect for the 2007 hurricane season so that federal recovery 
programs will have more capacity to rapidly handle a catastrophic 
incident but also provide accountability. Examples include 
significantly increasing the quantity of prepositioned supplies, such 
as food, ice, and water; placing global positioning systems on supply 
trucks to track their location and better manage the delivery of 
supplies; creating an enhanced phone system for victim assistance 
applications that can handle up to 200,000 calls per day; and improving 
computer systems and processes for verifying the eligibility of those 
applying for assistance. Effective implementation of these and other 
planned improvements will be critical to achieving their intended 
outcomes.[Footnote 28]

Finally, catastrophic disasters not only require a different magnitude 
of capabilities and resources for effective response, they may also 
require more flexible policies and operating procedures. In a 
catastrophe, streamlining, simplifying, and expediting decision making 
should quickly replace "business as usual" and unquestioned adherence 
to long-standing policies and operating procedures used in normal 
situations for providing relief to disaster victims. At the same time, 
controls and accountability mechanisms must be sufficient to provide 
the documentation needed for expense reimbursement and reasonable 
assurance that resources have been used legally and for the purposes 
intended.

We have recommended that DHS create accountability systems that 
effectively balance the need for fast and flexible response against the 
need to prevent waste, fraud, and abuse. Doing so would enable DHS to 
provide assistance quickly following a catastrophe and keep up with the 
magnitude of needs to confirm the eligibility of victims for disaster 
assistance, or assure that there were provisions in contracts for 
response and recovery services to ensure fair and reasonable prices in 
all cases. We also recommended that DHS provide guidance on advance 
procurement practices and procedures (precontracting) for those federal 
agencies with roles and responsibilities under the NRP. These federal 
agencies could then better manage disaster-related procurement and 
establish an assessment process to monitor agencies' continuous 
planning efforts for their disaster-related procurement needs and the 
maintenance of capabilities. For example, we identified a number of 
emergency response practices in the public and private sectors that 
provide insight into how the federal government can better manage its 
disaster-related procurements. These practices include developing 
knowledge of contractor capabilities and prices, and establishing 
vendor relationships prior to the disaster and establishing a scalable 
operations plan to adjust the level of capacity to match the response 
with the need.[Footnote 29]

Recent statutory changes have established more controls and 
accountability mechanisms. For example, The Secretary of DHS is 
required to promulgate regulations designed to limit the excessive use 
of subcontractors and subcontracting tiers. The Secretary of DHS is 
also required to promulgate regulations that limit certain 
noncompetitive contracts to 150 days, unless exceptional circumstances 
apply. Oversight funding is specified. FEMA may dedicate up to one 
percent of funding for agency mission assignments as oversight funds. 
The FEMA Administrator must develop and maintain internal management 
controls of FEMA disaster assistance programs and develop and implement 
a training program to prevent fraud, waste, and abuse of federal funds 
in response to or recovery from a disaster. Verification measures must 
be developed to identify eligible recipients of disaster relief 
assistance.

Several Disaster Management Issues Should Have Continued Congressional 
Attention:

In November 2006, the Comptroller General wrote to the congressional 
leadership suggesting areas for congressional oversight.[Footnote 30] 
He suggested that one area needing fundamental reform and oversight was 
preparing for, responding to, recovering from, and rebuilding after 
catastrophic events. Recent events--notably Hurricane Katrina and the 
threat of an influenza pandemic--have illustrated the importance of 
ensuring a strategic and integrated approach to catastrophic disaster 
management. Disaster preparation and response that is well planned and 
coordinated can save lives and mitigate damage, and an effectively 
functioning insurance market can substantially reduce the government's 
exposure to post-catastrophe payouts.

Lessons learned from past national emergencies provide an opportunity 
for Congress to look at actions that could mitigate the effects of 
potential catastrophic events. On January 18, 2007, DHS provided 
Congress a notice of implementation of the Post-Katrina Reform Act 
reorganization requirements and additional organizational changes made 
under the Homeland Security Act of 2002. All of the changes, according 
to DHS, were to become effective on March 31, 2007. The effective 
implementation of the Post-Katrina Reform Act's organizational changes 
and related roles and responsibilities--in addition to those changes 
already undertaken by DHS--should address many of our emergency 
management observations and recommendations.

The Comptroller General also suggested in November 2006 that Congress 
could also consider how the federal government can work with other 
nations, other levels of government, and nonprofit and private sector 
organizations, such as the Red Cross and private insurers, to help 
ensure the nation is well prepared and recovers effectively[Footnote 
31]. Given the billions of dollars dedicated to preparing for, 
responding to, recovering from, and rebuilding after catastrophic 
disasters, congressional oversight is critical.

Congress might consider starting with several specific areas for 
immediate oversight, such as (1) evaluating development and 
implementation of the National Preparedness System, including 
preparedness for an influenza pandemic, (2) assessing state and local 
capabilities and the use of federal grants in building and sustaining 
those capabilities, (3) examining regional and multistate planning and 
preparation, (4) determining the status of preparedness exercises, and 
(5) examining DHS policies regarding oversight assistance.

DHS Has Reorganized Pursuant to the Post-Katrina Reform Act:

On January 18, 2007, DHS provided Congress a notice of implementation 
of the Post-Katrina Reform Act reorganization requirements and 
additional organizational changes made under the Homeland Security Act 
of 2002. All of the changes, according to DHS, were to become effective 
on March 31, 2007. According to DHS, the department completed a 
thorough assessment of FEMA's internal structure to incorporate lessons 
learned from Hurricane Katrina and integrate systematically new and 
existing assets and responsibilities within FEMA. DHS transferred the 
following DHS offices and divisions to FEMA:

* United States Fire Administration,

* Office of Grants and Training,

* Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Division,

* Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program,

* Office of National Capital Region Coordination, and,

* Office of State and Local Government Coordination.

DHS officials stated that they have established several organizational 
elements, such as a logistics management division, a disaster 
assistance division, and a disaster operations division. In addition, 
FEMA expanded its regional office structure with each region in part by 
establishing a Regional Advisory Council and at least one Regional 
Strike Team. FEMA officials have:

noted that for the first time in recent memory there will be no acting 
regional directors and all 10 FEMA regional offices will be headed by 
experienced professionals.

Further, FEMA will include a new national preparedness directorate 
intended to consolidate FEMA's strategic preparedness assets from 
existing FEMA programs and certain legacy Preparedness Directorate 
programs. The National Preparedness Directorate will contain functions 
related to preparedness doctrine, policy, and contingency planning. It 
also will include the National Integration Center that will maintain 
the NRP and NIMS and ensure that training and exercise activities 
reflect these documents.

Effective Implementation of the Post-Katrina Reform Act's Provisions 
Should Respond to Many Concerns:

The effective implementation of the Post-Katrina Reform Act's 
organizational changes and related roles and responsibilities--in 
addition to those changes already undertaken by DHS--should address 
many of our emergency management observations and recommendations.

As noted earlier, our analysis in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina 
showed the need for (1) clearly defined and understood leadership roles 
and responsibilities; (2) the development of the necessary disaster 
capabilities; and (3) accountability systems that effectively balance 
the need for fast and flexible response against the need to prevent 
waste, fraud, and abuse. The statute appears to strengthen leadership 
roles and responsibilities. For example, the statute clarifies that the 
FEMA Administrator is to act as the principal emergency management 
adviser to the President, the Homeland Security Council, and the 
Secretary of DHS and to provide recommendations directly to Congress 
after informing the Secretary of DHS. The incident management 
responsibilities and roles of the National Integration Center are now 
clear. The Secretary of DHS must ensure that the NRP provides for a 
clear chain of command to lead and coordinate the federal response to 
any natural disaster, act of terrorism, or other man-made disaster. The 
law also establishes qualifications that appointees must meet. For 
example, the FEMA Administrator must have a demonstrated ability in and 
knowledge of emergency management and homeland security and 5 years of 
executive leadership and management experience.

Many provisions are designed to enhance preparedness and response. For 
example, the statute requires the President to establish a national 
preparedness goal and national preparedness system. The national 
preparedness system includes a broad range of preparedness activities, 
including utilizing target capabilities and preparedness priorities, 
training and exercises, comprehensive assessment systems, and reporting 
requirements. To illustrate, the FEMA Administrator is to carry out a 
national training program to implement, and a national exercise program 
to test and evaluate the NPG, NIMS, NRP, and other related plans and 
strategies.

In addition, FEMA is to partner with nonfederal entities to build a 
national emergency management system. States must develop plans that 
include catastrophic incident annexes modeled after the NRP annex to be 
eligible for FEMA emergency preparedness grants. The state annexes must 
be developed in consultation with local officials, including regional 
commissions. FEMA regional administrators are to foster the development 
of mutual aid agreements between states. FEMA must enter into a 
memorandum of understanding with certain non-federal entities to 
collaborate on developing standards for deployment capabilities, 
including credentialing of personnel and typing of resources. In 
addition, FEMA must implement several other capabilities, such as (1) 
developing a logistics system providing real-time visibility of items 
at each point throughout the logistics system, (2) establishing a 
prepositioned equipment program, and (3) establishing emergency support 
and response teams.

The National Preparedness System Is Key to Developing Disaster 
Capabilities:

More immediate congressional attention might focus on evaluating the 
construction and effectiveness of the National Preparedness System, 
which is mandated under the Post-Katrina Reform Act. Under Homeland 
Security Presidential Directive-8, issued in December 2003, DHS was to 
coordinate the development of a national domestic all-hazards 
preparedness goal "to establish measurable readiness priorities and 
targets that appropriately balance the potential threat and magnitude 
of terrorist attacks and large scale natural or accidental disasters 
with the resources required to prevent, respond to, and recover from 
them." The goal was also to include readiness metrics and standards for 
preparedness assessments and strategies and a system for assessing the 
nation's overall preparedness to respond to major events.

To implement the directive, DHS developed the NPG using 15 emergency 
event scenarios, 12 of which were terrorist related, with the remaining 
3 addressing a major hurricane, major earthquake, and an influenza 
pandemic. According to DHS's National Preparedness Guidance, the 
planning scenarios are intended to illustrate the scope and magnitude 
of large-scale, catastrophic emergency events for which the nation 
needs to be prepared and to form the basis for identifying the 
capabilities needed to respond to a wide range of large scale emergency 
events. The scenarios focused on the consequences that first responders 
would have to address. Some state and local officials and experts have 
questioned whether the scenarios were appropriate inputs for 
preparedness planning, particularly in terms of their plausibility and 
the emphasis on terrorist scenarios.

Using the scenarios, and in consultation with federal, state, and local 
emergency response stakeholders, DHS developed a list of over 1,600 
discrete tasks, of which 300 were identified as critical. DHS then 
identified 36 target capabilities to provide guidance to federal, 
state, and local first responders on the capabilities they need to 
develop and maintain. That list has since been refined, and DHS 
released a revised draft list of 37 capabilities in December 2005. 
Because no single jurisdiction or agency would be expected to perform 
every task, possession of a target capability could involve enhancing 
and maintaining local resources, ensuring access to regional and 
federal resources, or some combination of the two. However, DHS is 
still in the process of developing goals, requirements, and metrics for 
these capabilities and the NPG in light of the Hurricane Katrina 
experience.

Several key components of the National Preparedness System defined in 
the Post-Katrina Reform Act--the NPG, target capabilities and 
preparedness priorities, and comprehensive assessment systems--should 
be closely examined. Prior to Hurricane Katrina, DHS had established 
seven priorities for enhancing national first responder preparedness, 
including, for example, implementing the NRP and NIMS; strengthening 
capabilities in information sharing and collaboration; and 
strengthening capabilities in medical surge and mass prophylaxis. Those 
seven priorities were incorporated into DHS's fiscal year 2006 homeland 
security grant program (HSGP) guidance, which added an eighth priority 
that emphasized emergency operations and catastrophic planning.

In the fiscal year 2007 HSGP program guidance, DHS set two overarching 
priorities. DHS has focused the bulk of its available grant dollars on 
risk-based investment. In addition, the department has prioritized 
regional coordination and investment strategies that institutionalize 
regional security strategy integration. In addition to the two 
overarching priorities, the guidance also identified several others. 
These include (1) measuring progress in achieving the NPG, (2) 
integrating and synchronizing preparedness programs and activities, (3) 
developing and sustaining a statewide critical infrastructure/key 
resource protection program, (4) enabling information/intelligence 
fusion, (5) enhancing statewide communications interoperability, (6) 
strengthening preventative radiological/nuclear detection capabilities, 
and (7) enhancing catastrophic planning to address nationwide plan 
review results. Under the guidance, all fiscal year 2007 HSGP 
applicants will be required to submit an investment justification that 
provides background information, strategic objectives and priorities 
addressed, their funding/implementation plan, and the impact that each 
proposed investment (project) is anticipated to have.

The Particular Challenge of Preparing for an Influenza Pandemic:

The possibility of an influenza pandemic is a real and significant 
threat to the nation. There is widespread agreement that it is not a 
question of if but when such a pandemic will occur. The issues 
associated with the preparation for and response to a pandemic flu are 
similar to those for any other type of disaster: clear leadership roles 
and responsibilities, authority, and coordination; risk management; 
realistic planning, training, and exercises; assessing and building the 
capacity needed to effectively respond and recover; effective 
information sharing and communication; and accountability for the 
effective use of resources.

However, a pandemic poses some unique challenges. Hurricanes, 
earthquakes, explosions, or bioterrorist incidents occur within a short 
period of time, perhaps a period of minutes, although such events can 
have long-term effects, as we have seen in the Gulf region following 
Hurricane Katrina. The immediate effects of such disasters are likely 
to affect specific locations or areas within the nation; the immediate 
damage is not nationwide. In contrast, an influenza pandemic is likely 
to continue in waves of 6 to 8 weeks for a number of weeks or months 
and affect wide areas of the nation, perhaps the entire nation. 
Depending upon the severity of the pandemic, the number of deaths could 
be from 200,000 to 2 million. Seasonal influenza in the United States 
results in about 36,000 deaths annually. Successfully addressing the 
pandemic is also likely to require international coordination of 
detection and response.

The Department of Health and Human Services estimates that during a 
severe pandemic, absenteeism may reach as much as 40 percent in an 
affected community because individuals are ill, caring for family 
members, or fear infection. Such absenteeism could affect our nation's 
economy, as businesses and governments face the challenge of continuing 
to provide essential services with reduced numbers of healthy workers. 
In addition, our nation's ability to respond effectively to hurricanes 
or other major disasters during a pandemic may also be diminished as 
first responders, health care workers, and others are infected or 
otherwise unable to perform their normal duties. Thus, the consequences 
of a pandemic are potentially widespread and effective planning and 
response for such a disaster will require particularly close 
cooperation among all levels of government, the private sector, 
individuals within the United States, as well as international 
cooperation.

We have engagements under way examining such issues as barriers to 
implementing the Department of Health and Human Services' National 
Pandemic Influenza Plan, the national strategy and framework for 
pandemic influenza, the Department of Defense and Department of 
Agriculture's preparedness efforts and plans, public health and 
hospital preparedness, and U.S. efforts to improve global disease 
surveillance. We expect most of these reports to be issued by late 
summer 2007.

Knowledge of the Effects of State and Local Efforts to Improve Their 
Capabilities Is Limited:

Possible congressional oversight in the short term also might focus on 
state and local capabilities. As I testified in February on applying 
risk management principles to guide federal investments,[Footnote 32] 
over the past 4 years DHS has provided about $14 billion in federal 
funding to states, localities, and territories through its HSGP grants. 
However, little has been reported about how states and localities 
finance their efforts in this area, have used their federal funds, and 
are assessing the effectiveness with which they spend those funds.

Essentially, all levels of government are still struggling to define 
and act on the answers to basic, but hardly simple, questions about 
emergency preparedness and response: What is important (that is, what 
are our priorities)? How do we know what is important (e.g., risk 
assessments, performance standards)? How do we measure, attain, and 
sustain success? On what basis do we make necessary trade-offs, given 
finite resources?

There are no simple, easy answers to these questions. The data 
available for answering them are incomplete and imperfect. We have 
better information and a better sense of what needs to be done for some 
types of major emergency events than for others. For some natural 
disasters, such as regional wildfires and flooding, there is more 
experience and therefore a better basis on which to assess preparation 
and response efforts and identify gaps that need to be addressed. 
California has experience with earthquakes; Florida, with hurricanes. 
However, no one in the nation has experience with such potential 
catastrophes as a dirty bomb detonated in a major city. Although both 
the AIDS epidemic and SARS provide some related experience, there have 
been no recent pandemics that rapidly spread to thousands of people 
across the nation.

A new feature in the fiscal year 2006 DHS homeland security grant 
guidance for the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) grants was that 
eligible recipients must provide an "investment justification" with 
their grant application. States were to use this justification to 
outline the implementation approaches for specific investments that 
will be used to achieve the initiatives outlined in their state Program 
and Capability Enhancement Plan. These plans were multiyear global 
program management plans for the entire state homeland security program 
that look beyond federal homeland security grant programs and funding. 
The justifications must justify all funding requested through the DHS 
homeland security grant program. In the guidance DHS noted that it 
would use a peer review process to evaluate grant applications on the 
basis of the effectiveness of a state's plan to address the priorities 
it has outlined and thereby reduce its overall risk.

For fiscal year 2006, DHS implemented a competitive process to evaluate 
the anticipated effectiveness of proposed homeland security 
investments. For fiscal year 2007, DHS continued to use the risk and 
effectiveness assessments to inform final funding decisions, although 
changes have been made to make the grant allocation process more 
transparent and more easily understood. DHS officials have said that 
they cannot yet assess how effective the actual investments from grant 
funds are in enhancing preparedness and mitigating risk because they do 
not yet have the metrics to do so.

Regional and Multistate Planning and Preparation Should Be Robust:

Through its grant guidance, DHS has encouraged regional and multistate 
planning and preparation. Planning and assistance have largely been 
focused on single jurisdictions and their immediately adjacent 
neighbors. However, well-documented problems with the abilities of 
first responders from multiple jurisdictions to communicate at the site 
of an incident and the potential for large-scale natural and terrorist 
disasters have generated a debate on the extent to which first 
responders should be focusing their planning and preparation on a 
regional and multi-governmental basis.

As I mentioned earlier, an overarching national priority for the NPG is 
embracing regional approaches to building, sustaining, and sharing 
capabilities at all levels of government. All HSGP applications are to 
reflect regional coordination and show an investment strategy that 
institutionalizes regional security strategy integration. However, it 
is not known to what extent regional and multistate planning has 
progressed and is effective.

Our limited regional work indicated there are challenges in planning. 
Our early work addressing the Office of National Capital Region 
Coordination (ONCRC) and National Capital Region (NCR) strategic 
planning reported that the ONCRC and the NCR faced interrelated 
challenges in managing federal funds in a way that maximizes the 
increase in first responder capacities and preparedness while 
minimizing inefficiency and unnecessary duplication of 
expenditures.[Footnote 33] One of these challenges included a 
coordinated regionwide plan for establishing first responder 
performance goals, needs, and priorities, and assessing the benefits of 
expenditures in enhancing first responder capabilities. In subsequent 
work on National Capital Region strategic planning, we highlighted 
areas that needed strengthening in the Region's planning, specifically 
improving the substance of the strategic plan to guide decision 
makers.[Footnote 34] For example, additional information could have 
been provided regarding the type, nature, scope, or timing of planned 
goals, objectives, and initiatives; performance expectations and 
measures; designation of priority initiatives to meet regional risk and 
needed capabilities; lead organizations for initiative implementation; 
resources and investments; and operational commitment.

Exercises Must Be Carefully Planned and Deployed and Capture Lessons 
Learned:

Our work examining the preparation for and response to Hurricane 
Katrina highlighted the importance of realistic exercises to test and 
refine assumptions, capabilities, and operational procedures; build on 
the strengths; and shore up the limitations revealed by objective 
assessments of the exercises. The Post-Katrina Reform Act mandates a 
national exercise program, and training and exercises are also included 
as a component of the National Preparedness System. With almost any 
skill and capability, experience and practice enhance proficiency. For 
first responders, exercises--especially of the type or magnitude of 
events for which there is little actual experience--are essential for 
developing skills and identifying what works well and what needs 
further improvement. Major emergency incidents, particularly 
catastrophic ones, by definition require the coordinated actions of 
personnel from many first responder disciplines and all levels of 
government, nonprofit organizations, and the private sector. It is 
difficult to overemphasize the importance of effective 
interdisciplinary, intergovernmental planning, training, and exercises 
in developing the coordination and skills needed for effective response.

For exercises to be effective in identifying both strengths and areas 
needing attention, it is important that they be realistic, designed to 
test and stress the system, involve all key persons who would be 
involved in responding to an actual event, and be followed by honest 
and realistic assessments that result in action plans that are 
implemented. In addition to relevant first responders, exercise 
participants should include, depending upon the scope and nature of the 
exercise, mayors, governors, and state and local emergency managers who 
would be responsible for such things as determining if and when to 
declare a mandatory evacuation or ask for federal assistance. We are 
initiating work that will further examine the development and 
implementation of a national exercise program.

DHS Has Provided Limited Transparency for Its Management or Operational 
Decisions:

Congressional oversight in the short term might include DHS's policies 
regarding oversight assistance. The Comptroller General has testified 
that DHS has not been transparent in its efforts to strengthen its 
management areas and mission functions[Footnote 35]. While much of its 
sensitive work needs to be guarded from improper disclosure, DHS has 
not been receptive toward oversight. Delays in providing Congress and 
us with access to various documents and officials have impeded our work.

We need to be able to independently assure ourselves and Congress that 
DHS has implemented many of our past recommendations or has taken other 
corrective actions to address the challenges we identified. However, 
DHS has not made its management or operational decisions transparent 
enough so that Congress can be sure it is effectively, efficiently, and 
economically using the billions of dollars in funding it receives 
annually, and is providing the levels of security called for in 
numerous legislative requirements and presidential directives.

That concludes my statement, and I would be pleased to respond to any 
questions you and subcommittee members may have.

Contacts and Staff Acknowledgments:

For further information about this statement, please contact William O. 
Jenkins Jr., Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues, on (202) 
512-8777 or jenkinswo@gao.gov.

In addition to the contact named above the following individuals from 
GAO's Homeland Security and Justice Team also made major contributors 
to this testimony: Sharon Caudle, Assistant Director; and John Vocino, 
Analyst-in-Charge.

[End of section]

Appendix I: Related GAO Products:

Homeland Security: Observations on DHS and FEMA Efforts to Prepare for 
and Respond to Major and Catastrophic Disasters and Address Related 
Recommendations and Legislation. GAO-07-835T. Washington, D.C.: May 15, 
2007.

Homeland Security: Management and Programmatic Challenges Facing the 
Department of Homeland Security. GAO-07-833T. Washington, D.C.: May 10, 
2007.

First Responders: Much Work Remains to Improve Communications 
Interoperability. GAO-07-301. Washington, D.C.: April 2, 2007.

Emergency Preparedness: Current Emergency Alert System Has Limitations, 
and Development of a New Integrated System Will be Challenging. GAO-07- 
411. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2007.

Disaster Preparedness: Better Planning Would Improve OSHA's Efforts to 
Protect Workers' Safety and Health in Disasters. GAO-07-193. 
Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2007.

Public Health and Hospital Emergency Preparedness Programs: Evolution 
of Performance Measurement Systems to Measure Progress. GAO-07-485R. 
Washington, D.C.: March 23, 2007.

Coastal Barrier Resources System: Status of Development That Has 
Occurred and Financial Assistance Provided by Federal Agencies. GAO-07- 
356. Washington, D.C.: March 19, 2007.

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita Disaster Relief: Continued Findings of 
Fraud, Waste, and Abuse. GAO-07-300. Washington, D.C.: March 15, 2007.

Homeland Security: Preparing for and Responding to Disasters. GAO-07- 
395T. Washington, D.C.: March 9, 2007.

Hurricane Katrina: Agency Contracting Data Should Be More Complete 
Regarding Subcontracting Opportunities for Small Businesses. GAO-07- 
205. Washington, D.C.: March 1, 2007.

Hurricane Katrina: Allocation and Use of $2 Billion for Medicaid and 
Other Health Care Needs. GAO-07-67. Washington, D.C.: February 28, 2007.

Disaster Assistance: Better Planning Needed for Housing Victims of 
Catastrophic Disasters. GAO-07-88. Washington, D.C.: February 28, 2007.

Highway Emergency Relief: Reexamination Needed to Address Fiscal 
Imbalance and Long-term Sustainability. GAO-07-245. Washington, D.C.: 
February 23, 2007.

Small Business Administration: Additional Steps Needed to Enhance 
Agency Preparedness for Future Disasters. GAO-07-114. Washington, D.C.: 
February 14, 2007.

Small Business Administration: Response to the Gulf Coast Hurricanes 
Highlights Need for Enhanced Disaster Preparedness. GAO-07-484T. 
Washington, D.C.: February 14, 2007.

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Federal Actions Could Enhance Preparedness 
of Certain State-Administered Federal Support Programs. GAO-07-219. 
Washington, D.C.: February 7, 2007.

Homeland Security Grants: Observations on Process DHS Used to Allocate 
Funds to Selected Urban Areas. GAO-07-381R. Washington, D.C.: February 
7, 2007.

Homeland Security: Management and Programmatic Challenges Facing the 
Department of Homeland Security. GAO-07-452T. Washington, D.C.: 
February 7, 2007.

Homeland Security: Applying Risk Management Principles to Guide Federal 
Investments. GAO-07-386T. Washington, D.C.: February 7, 2007.

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita Disaster Relief: Prevention Is the Key to 
Minimizing Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Recovery Efforts. GAO-07-418T. 
Washington, D.C.: January 29, 2007.

GAO, Reserve Forces: Actions needed to Identify National Guard Domestic 
Equipment Requirements and Readiness, GAO-07-60 Washington, D.C.: 
January 26, 2007.

Budget Issues: FEMA Needs Adequate Data, Plans, and Systems to 
Effectively Manage Resources for Day-to-Day Operations, GAO-07-139. 
Washington, D.C.: January 19, 2007.

Transportation-Disadvantaged Populations: Actions Needed to Clarify 
Responsibilities and Increase Preparedness for Evacuations. GAO-07-44. 
Washington, D.C.: December 22, 2006.

Suggested Areas for Oversight for the 110th Congress. GAO-07-235R. 
Washington, D.C.: November 17, 2006.

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Continued Findings of Fraud, Waste, and 
Abuse. GAO-07-252T. Washington, D.C.: December 6, 2006.

Capital Financing: Department Management Improvements Could Enhance 
Education's Loan Program for Historically Black Colleges and 
Universities. GAO-07-64. Washington, D.C.: October 18, 2006.

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Unprecedented Challenges Exposed the 
Individuals and Households Program to Fraud and Abuse; Actions Needed 
to Reduce Such Problems in Future. GAO-06-1013. Washington, D.C.: 
September 27, 2006.

Catastrophic Disasters: Enhanced Leadership, Capabilities, and 
Accountability Controls Will Improve the Effectiveness of the Nation's 
Preparedness, Response, and Recovery System. GAO-06-618. Washington, 
D.C.: September 6, 2006.

Disaster Relief: Governmentwide Framework Needed to Collect and 
Consolidate Information to Report on Billions in Federal Funding for 
the 2005 Gulf Coast Hurricanes. GAO-06-834. Washington, D.C.: September 
6, 2006.

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Coordination between FEMA and the Red 
Cross Should Be Improved for the 2006 Hurricane Season. GAO-06-712. 
Washington, D.C.: June 8, 2006.

Federal Emergency Management Agency: Factors for Future Success and 
Issues to Consider for Organizational Placement. GAO-06-746T. 
Washington, D.C.: May 9, 2006.

Hurricane Katrina: GAO's Preliminary Observations Regarding 
Preparedness, Response, and Recovery. GAO-06-442T. Washington, D.C.: 
March 8, 2006.

Emergency Preparedness and Response: Some Issues and Challenges 
Associated with Major Emergency Incidents. GAO-06-467T. Washington, 
D.C.: February 23, 2006.

Homeland Security: DHS' Efforts to Enhance First Responders' All- 
Hazards Capabilities Continue to Evolve. GAO-05-652. Washington, D.C.: 
July 11, 2005.

Continuity of Operations: Agency Plans Have Improved, but Better 
Oversight Could Assist Agencies in Preparing for Emergencies. GAO-05- 
577. Washington, D.C.: April 28, 2005.

[End of section]

FOOTNOTES

[1] GAO, Homeland Security: Management and Programmatic Challenges 
Facing the Department of Homeland Security, GAO-07-452T (Washington, 
D.C.: Feb. 7, 2007).

[2] The Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 was 
enacted as Title VI of the Department of Homeland Security 
Appropriations Act, 2007, Pub. L. No. 109-295, 120 Stat. 1355, 1394 
(2006).

[3] Pub. L. No. 109-295, § 611(11), 120 Stat. 1355, 1396 (2006) 
(codified at 6 U.S.C. § 313(b)(2)(A)).

[4] Section 602 of the Post-Katrina Reform Act defines "catastrophic 
incident" as any natural disaster, act of terrorism, or other man-made 
disaster that results in extraordinary levels of casualties or damage 
or disruption severely affecting the population (including mass 
evacuations), infrastructure, environment, economy, national morale, or 
government functions in an area. 

[5] GAO, Reserve Forces: Actions needed to Identify National Guard 
Domestic Equipment Requirements and Readiness, GAO-07-60 (Washington, 
D.C.: January 26, 2007).

[6] The Stafford Act is codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 5121 et seq.

[7] California is currently not a member of EMAC as the state's 
legislation approving its membership in the compact had expired.

[8] GAO, Emergency Management Assistance Compact: Enhancing EMAC's 
Collaborative and Administrative Capacity Should Improve Disaster 
Response, GAO-07-854 (Washington, D.C.: June 29, 2007).

[9] House of Representatives, House Select Bipartisan Committee to 
Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina. A 
Failure of Initiative: Final Report of the House Select Bipartisan 
Committee to Investigate the Preparation for And Response to Hurricane 
Katrina (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 15, 2006). 

[10] U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental 
Affairs. Hurricane Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared (Washington, 
D.C.: May 2006). 

[11] White House Homeland Security Council. The Federal Response to 
Hurricane Katrina: Lessons Learned (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 23, 2006). 

[12] Department of Homeland Security's Office of Inspector General. A 
Performance Review of FEMA's Disaster Management Activities in Response 
to Hurricane Katrina, OIG-06-32 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 2006).

[13] Federal Emergency Management Agency. DHS/FEMA Initial Response 
Hotwash: Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana, DR-1603-LA (Baton Rouge, 
Louisiana. Feb. 13, 2006).

[14] GAO, Catastrophic Disasters: Enhanced Leadership, Capabilities, 
and Accountability Controls Will Improve the Effectiveness of the 
Nation's Preparedness, Response, and Recovery System, GAO-06-618 
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 6, 2006).

[15] Pub. L. No. 109-295, 120 Stat. 1355, 1394 (2006).

[16] GAO, Homeland Security: Observations on DHS and FEMA Efforts to 
Prepare for and Respond to Major and Catastrophic Disasters and Address 
Related Recommendations and Legislation. GAO-07-835T. (Washington, 
D.C.: May 15, 2007).

[17] GAO-06-618

[18] On May 25, 2006, DHS released changes to the NRP regarding 
leadership issues, such as which situations require secretarial 
leadership; the process for declaring incidents of national 
significance; and the scope of the NRP and its Catastrophic Incident 
Annex. The revised NRP clearly states that the Secretary of Homeland 
Security, who reports directly to the President, is responsible for 
declaring and managing incidents of national significance, including 
catastrophic ones. At the time of Hurricane Katrina, the supplement to 
the catastrophic incident annex, which provides more detail on 
implementing the annex, was still in draft. Subsequent to Hurricane 
Katrina, DHS published the final supplement to the Catastrophic 
Incident Annex, dated August 2006. 

[19] Includes Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana.

[20] Includes New York, New Jersey, New England, Puerto Rico, and the 
U.S. Virgin Islands.

[21] Includes Georgia, South Carolina, North Carolina, Virginia, 
District of Columbia, Maryland, Delaware, Pennsylvania, and Rhode 
Island.

[22] Pub. L. No. 109-295, § 611(11), 120 Stat. 1355, 1396 (2006) 
(codified at 6 U.S.C. § 313(b)(2)(A)).

[23] GAO, Budget Issues: FEMA Needs Adequate Data, Plans, and Systems 
to Effectively Manage Resources for Day-to-Day Operations, GAO-07-139 
(Washington, D.C.: Jan. 19, 2007).

[24] The areas are (1) individual assistance technical assistance 
contract, (2) contractor management program, (3) facilities; (4) 
payment process for contractors, (5) finance center operations, (6) 
capital planning and investment control, (7) security, (8) human 
resources, (9) logistics, (10) acquisition, (11) disaster emergency 
communications, (12) decision support systems (data resource 
management), (13) disaster workforce, (14) information technology, (15) 
federal coordinating officer cadre, (16) financial systems, (17) budget 
process, and (18) disaster relief fund.

[25] GAO, Emergency Management Assistance Compact: Enhancing EMAC's 
Collaborative and Administrative Capacity Should Improve Disaster 
Response, GAO-07-854 (Washington, D.C.: June 29, 2007).

[26] GAO, Reserve Forces: Actions Needed to Identify National Guard 
Domestic Equipment Requirements and Readiness, GAO-07-60 (Washington, 
D.C.: Jan. 26, 2007).

[27] GAO, Hurricane Katrina: Better Plans and Exercises Needed to Guide 
the Military's Response to Catastrophic Natural Disasters.GAO-06-643 
(Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2006).

[28] GAO, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita Disaster Relief: Prevention Is 
the Key to Minimizing Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Recovery Efforts. GAO-
07-418T. Washington, D.C.: January 29, 2007.

[29] GAO, Homeland Security: Management and Programmatic Challenges 
Facing the Department of Homeland Security, GAO-07-452T (Washington, 
D.C.: Feb. 7, 2007).

[30] GAO, Suggested Areas for Oversight for the 110th Congress. GAO-07- 
235R (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 17, 2006.

[31] GAO, Suggested Areas for Oversight for the 110th Congress. GAO-07- 
235R (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 17, 2006).

[32] GAO, Homeland Security: Applying Risk Management Principles to 
Guide Federal Investments, GAO-07-386T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 7, 2007).

[33] GAO, Homeland Security: Management of First Responder Grants in 
the National Capital Region Reflects the Need for Coordinated Planning 
and Performance Goals, GAO-04-433 (Washington, D.C.: May 28, 2004); 
Homeland Security: Coordinated Planning and Standards Needed to Better 
Manage First Responder Grants in the National Capital Region, GAO-04- 
904T (Washington, D.C.: June 24, 2004); Homeland Security: Effective 
Regional Coordination Can Enhance Emergency Preparedness, GAO-04-1009 
(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 15, 2004); Homeland Security: Managing First 
Responder Grants to Enhance Emergency Preparedness in the National 
Capital Region, GAO-05-889T (Washington, D.C.: July 14, 2005); and 
Homeland Security: The Status of Strategic Planning in the National 
Capital Region, GAO-06-559T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 29, 2006).

[34] GAO, Homeland Security: Assessment of the National Capital Region 
Strategic Plan, GAO-06-1096T (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 28, 2006).

[35] GAO, Homeland Security: Management and Programmatic Challenges 
Facing the Department of Homeland Security, GAO-07-398T (Washington, 
D.C.: Feb. 6, 2007); and GAO, Homeland Security: Management and 
Programmatic Challenges Facing the Department of Homeland Security, GAO-
07-452T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 7, 2007)

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