Summary
The Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) most visible layer of commercial aviation security is the screening of airline passengers at airport checkpoints, where travelers and their carry-on items are screened for explosives and other dangerous items by transportation security officers (TSO). Several revisions made to checkpoint screening procedures have been scrutinized and questioned by the traveling public and Congress in recent years. For this review, GAO evaluated (1) TSA's decisions to modify passenger screening procedures between April 2005 and December 2005 and in response to the alleged August 2006 liquid explosives terrorist plot, and (2) how TSA monitored TSO compliance with passenger screening procedures. To conduct this work, GAO reviewed TSA documents, interviewed TSA officials and aviation security experts, and visited 25 airports of varying sizes and locations.
Between April 2005 and December 2005, proposed modifications to passenger checkpoint screening standard operating procedures (SOP) were made for a variety of reasons, and while a majority of the proposed modifications--48 of 92--were ultimately implemented at airports, TSA's methods for evaluating and documenting them could be improved. SOP modifications were proposed based on the professional judgment of TSA senior-level officials and program-level staff. TSA considered the daily experiences of airport staff, complaints and concerns raised by the traveling public, and analysis of risks to the aviation system when proposing SOP modifications. TSA also made efforts to balance the impact on security, efficiency, and customer service when deciding which proposed modifications to implement, as in the case of the SOP changes made in response to the alleged August 2006 liquid explosives terrorist plot. In some cases, TSA tested proposed modifications at selected airports to help determine whether the changes would achieve their intended purpose. However, TSA's data collection and analyses could be improved to help TSA determine whether proposed procedures that are operationally tested would achieve their intended purpose. For example, TSA officials decided to allow passengers to carry small scissors and tools onto aircraft based on their review of threat information, which indicated that these items do not pose a high risk to the aviation system. However, TSA did not conduct the necessary analysis of data it collected to assess whether this screening change would free up TSOs to focus on screening for high-risk threats, as intended. TSA officials acknowledged the importance of evaluating whether proposed screening procedures would achieve their intended purpose, but cited difficulties in doing so, including time pressures to implement needed security measures quickly. Finally, TSA's documentation on proposed modifications to screening procedures was not complete. TSA documented the basis--that is, the information, experience, or event that encouraged TSA officials to propose the modifications--for 72 of the 92 proposed modifications. In addition, TSA documented the reasoning behind its decisions for half (26 of 44) of the proposed modifications that were not implemented. Without more complete documentation, TSA may not be able to justify key modifications to passenger screening procedures to Congress and the traveling public. TSA monitors TSO compliance with passenger checkpoint screening procedures through its performance accountability and standards system and through covert testing. Compliance assessments include quarterly observations of TSOs' ability to perform particular screening functions in the operating environment, quarterly quizzes to assess TSOs' knowledge of procedures, and an annual knowledge and skills assessment. TSA uses covert tests to evaluate, in part, the extent to which TSOs' noncompliance with procedures affects their ability to detect simulated threat items hidden in accessible property or concealed on a person. TSA airport officials have experienced resource challenges in implementing these compliance monitoring methods. TSA headquarters officials stated that they are taking steps to address these challenges.
Recommendations
Our recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change
from "In process" to "Implemented" or "Not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director:
Team:
Phone:
Norman J. Rabkin
Government Accountability Office: Homeland Security and Justice
(202) 512-3610
Recommendations for Executive Action
Recommendation: To help strengthen TSA's evaluation of proposed modifications to passenger checkpoint screening SOPs and TSA's ability to justify its decisions to implement or not implement proposed SOP modifications, in the March 2007 report that contained sensitive security information, GAO stated that the Secretary of Homeland Security should direct the Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security for TSA to develop sound evaluation methods, when possible, that can be used to assist TSA in determining whether proposed procedures would achieve their intended result, such as enhancing TSA's ability to detect prohibited items and suspicious persons and freeing up existing TSO resources that could be used to implement proposed procedures when operationally testing proposed SOP modifications.
Agency Affected: Department of Homeland Security: Directorate of Border and Transportation Security: Transportation Security Administration
Status: In process
Comments: Following the release of GAO's report, TSA reported that it plans to continue to perform operational testing of proposed SOP modifications, when practicable, as a method for determining their impact on passenger checkpoint security effectiveness and efficiency. TSA stated that it is committed to using sound methodological techniques when conducting these operational tests. TSA provided GAO with information on one effort the agency has underway to use sound methodological approaches. Specifically, TSA reported that the Office of Security Operations has developed a pilot plan to test procedures that will be used with new equipment to determine if exemptible liquids and gels in excess of travel size pose a threat to aircraft. According to TSA, the plan includes sound evaluation methods to ensure that the intended results are achieved. GAO is awaiting a copy of the pilot plan to determine whether it is in fact based on sound evaluation methods. TSA also stated that it will continue to emphasize the use of sound methodology for future operational tests. Once additional operational testing has been conducted by TSA, GAO will obtain appropriate documentation on the testing to determine whether sound evaluation methods have been used.
Recommendation: To help strengthen TSA's evaluation of proposed modifications to passenger checkpoint screening SOPs and TSA's ability to justify its decisions to implement or not implement proposed SOP modifications, in the March 2007 report that contained sensitive security information, GAO stated that the Secretary of Homeland Security should direct the Assistant Secretary of Homeland Security for TSA to generate and maintain documentation to include, at minimum, the source, intended purpose, and reasoning behind decisions to implement or not implement proposed modifications for future proposed SOP modifications that TSA senior leadership determines are significant.
Agency Affected: Department of Homeland Security: Directorate of Border and Transportation Security: Transportation Security Administration
Status: In process
Comments: According to TSA, a number of substantive changes to passenger screening procedures have been considered since GAO issued its final report. TSA reported that the Office of Security Operations initiated a process to track information on all substantive proposed changes to passenger screening procedures. Specifically, TSA will track the source of the input, the intended purpose as provided by the requester, and the reasoning behind each proposal's acceptance, rejection, or deferral. A TSA official reported that TSA has developed a template for how information on proposed modifications deemed significant will be documented. However, as of early August 2007, the template had not yet been approved by TSA senior management and, therefore, had not yet been used.
