Summary
The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is responsible for screening all checked baggage in U.S. airports for explosives and has deployed explosive detection systems and developed standard procedures for their use. TSA also allows alternative screening procedures to be used for short-term, special circumstances. This report addresses (1) how TSA prioritized the use of checked baggage screening procedures and identified trade-offs in security effectiveness and operational efficiencies; (2) how TSA reported use of the procedures and ensured that standard procedures are used whenever possible; and (3) what steps TSA took to reduce airports' need to use alternative screening procedures and to establish performance measures to monitor their use. To address these issues, GAO interviewed TSA officials, reviewed information from TSA's database on checked baggage screening operations; and conducted airport site visits.
TSA has prioritized standard and alternative checked baggage screening procedures based on legislative requirements and TSA officials' judgment of the procedures' effectiveness. Use of various procedures to screen checked baggage has involved trade-offs in security effectiveness, which vary by the type of procedure used and the circumstances of its use. It is TSA's policy to use standard procedures whenever possible because TSA officials determined that these procedures provide the most effective detection of explosives. TSA policy also allows the use of alternative screening procedures when volumes of baggage awaiting screening pose security vulnerabilities or when TSA airport officials determine that there is a security risk associated with large concentrations of passengers in an area waiting for their baggage to be screened. Regarding operational efficiencies, TSA has not fully determined the throughput and costs of the various alternative screening procedures in part because it does not count the number of bags screened using these procedures. TSA has conducted covert tests (undercover, unannounced) of standard procedures, but has not conducted this testing for alternative screening procedures. TSA cited logistical difficulties in conducting covert tests for alternative screening procedures. However, by not doing so, TSA is not collecting data that could provide useful information in determining the security effectiveness of the procedures in an operational setting and how to improve their effectiveness. TSA cannot identify the percentage of checked baggage screened using standard versus alternative screening procedures because TSA records standard procedures in terms of the number of bags screened in its management information system, but records alternative procedures in terms of the number of occasions and hours of use. However, TSA officials estimated that a low percentage of checked baggage is screened using alternative screening procedures. To assess the extent that standard screening procedures are used whenever possible, TSA has established internal controls to monitor the use of standard and alternative screening procedures; however, these controls were not always implemented to ensure the gathering of complete and accurate information. This may limit TSA managers' ability to assess the effect of using alternative screening procedures and determine what should be done to minimize the use of the procedures. TSA headquarters officials stated that they are working with TSA airport staff to correct such reporting problems. TSA has taken steps to reduce the need to use alternative screening procedures at airports, including anticipating factors that could increase passenger and baggage volume and acting to address these factors. However, TSA has not developed performance measures and targets to assess its progress in minimizing the need to use the procedures. By creating performance measures, TSA could gauge whether it is making progress toward minimizing the need to use alternative screening procedures at airports. Performance targets for the procedures would be an indicator of how much risk TSA is willing to accept in using the procedures.
Recommendations
Our recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change
from "In process" to "Implemented" or "Not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director:
Team:
Phone:
Cathleen A. Berrick
Government Accountability Office: Homeland Security and Justice
No phone on record
Recommendations for Executive Action
Recommendation: To help inform TSA of the security effectiveness of alternative screening procedures in an operational setting, and to help TSA strengthen its monitoring of the use of alternative screening procedures, the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security should direct the Assistant Secretary, Transportation Security Administration to use Performance Management Information System (PMIS) data on use of alternative screening procedures in determining at which airports to conduct covert testing and when to conduct testing at these airports as part of the Office of Inspections' new risk-based approach to covert testing.
Agency Affected: Department of Homeland Security: Directorate of Border and Transportation Security: Transportation Security Administration
Status: In process
Comments: In its comment letter of July 25, 2006, TSA stated that "The Office of Inspection will consider PMIS information on alternative screening procedures as part of TSA's new risk-based approach to covert testing."
Recommendation: To help inform TSA of the security effectiveness of alternative screening procedures in an operational setting, and to help TSA strengthen its monitoring of the use of alternative screening procedures, the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security should direct the Assistant Secretary, Transportation Security Administration to conduct local covert testing of alternative screening procedures to determine whether checked baggage Transportation Security Officers can detect simulated improvised explosives when using these procedures.
Agency Affected: Department of Homeland Security: Directorate of Border and Transportation Security: Transportation Security Administration
Status: In process
Comments: In its comment letter, TSA stated "TSA is currently making modifications to strengthen the local covert testing programs. TSA expects these modifications will better prepare TSOs to detect simulated improvised explosives." TSA did not specifically mention whether there will be local testing of alternative screening procedures as the recommendation directs.
Recommendation: To help inform TSA of the security effectiveness of alternative screening procedures in an operational setting, and to help TSA strengthen its monitoring of the use of alternative screening procedures, the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security should direct the Assistant Secretary, Transportation Security Administration, to strengthen the monitoring and tracking of the use of alternative screening procedures to help determine the progress the agency is making in minimizing its need to use these procedures. This effort would include continuing to address reporting problems in the PMIS database system, keeping a record of calls requesting permission to exceed 2 hours' use of the procedures, and providing a means for measuring the use of alternative screening procedures compared to the use of standard procedures, such as counting baggage screened with alternative screening procedures.
Agency Affected: Department of Homeland Security: Directorate of Border and Transportation Security: Transportation Security Administration
Status: In process
Comments: In its comment letter, TSA stated that "PMIS is enhanced with both functionality and data quality related processes to ensure data reliability. The system alerts the user when a data field is filled in with a value that falls outside of the operational norms for a particular airport." TSA also stated that since the amount of time alternative screening procedures are used is recorded in PMIS, there is no further documentation required for exceeding the 2-hour threshold. TSA noted that it will evaluate the necessity of requiring the recording of the number of bags screened by ASP and that it will require FSDs to record the number of bags screened by alternative screening procedures if it determines that this is a useful metric.
Recommendation: To help inform TSA of the security effectiveness of alternative screening procedures in an operational setting, and to help TSA strengthen its monitoring of the use of alternative screening procedures, the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security should direct the Assistant Secretary, Transportation Security Administration, to develop performance measures and performance targets for the use of alternative screening procedures in checked baggage screening, perhaps as part of the checked baggage screening program performance index, to help TSA measure its progress in working toward minimizing the need to use alternative screening procedures at airports and to have more complete information on the overall performance of the checked baggage screening system.
Agency Affected: Department of Homeland Security: Directorate of Border and Transportation Security: Transportation Security Administration
Status: In process
Comments: In its comment letter of July 25, 2006 TSA stated that it is meeting the intent of this recommendation by monitoring and tracking the use of alternative screening procedures through PMIS. According to TSA, using this system has assisted TSA in identifying areas of improvement nationwide and addressing local issues to minimize the need of alternative screening procedures. TSA also noted that it intends to continue monitoring and tracking the use of alternative screening procedures and to implement the recommendations in the GAO report in order to refine its data used in evaluating the need to make adjustments based on its current performance level.
