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entitled 'Aviation Security: Federal Air Marshal Service Could Benefit 
from Improved Planning and Controls' which was released on November 29, 
2005. 

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Report to the Honorable Peter A. DeFazio, House of Representatives: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 

GAO: 

November 2005: 

Aviation Security: 

Federal Air Marshal Service Could Benefit from Improved Planning and 
Controls: 

Aviation Security: 

GAO-06-203: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-06-203, a report to the Honorable Peter A. DeFazio, 
House of Representatives: 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

The U.S. Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS) has undergone a number of 
changes in recent years, including a 2003 transfer from the 
Transportation Security Administration (TSA) to the U.S. Immigration 
and Customs Enforcement Bureau (ICE), and a 2005 transfer from ICE back 
to TSA. A key aspect of federal air marshals’ operating procedures is 
the discreet movement through airports as they check in for their 
flight, transit screening checkpoints, and board the aircraft. This 
report discusses FAMS’s (1) transfer to ICE and key practices that 
could facilitate its return to TSA, and (2) management of mission-
related incidents that affect air marshals’ ability to operate 
discreetly. 

What GAO Found: 

DHS made limited progress in achieving the intended objectives of its 
transfer of FAMS to ICE, which included (1) developing a “surge” 
capacity through cross-training ICE agents, and (2) enhancing federal 
air marshals’ career opportunities. Specifically, DHS had developed 
some surge capacity by cross-training a number of ICE agents but 
suspended these efforts in October 2004 in response to congressional 
concerns that the cross-training was an ineffective use of resources 
and training. DHS indicated that it would continue to support the surge 
effort, but had not determined whether and when it would resume cross-
training to support this initiative. Further, although DHS recognized 
that federal air marshals’ career opportunities were limited, it had 
not developed plans to expand them through investigative or other 
duties. Moreover, DHS had not determined how these transition 
objectives would be met because it had not developed an overall 
strategy to include implementation goals, measures, and a timeline to 
help target performance shortfalls and suggest midcourse corrections—a 
key practice for a successful transformation. DHS also had not 
developed a communication strategy to create shared expectations and 
report related progress on the transition to employees and other 
stakeholders—another key practice. With its return of FAMS to TSA, 
DHS’s prior experience in transferring FAMS to ICE can provide useful 
information on key practices to consider in effecting a successful 
transition. 

FAMS lacks adequate management controls to help ensure that mission-
related incidents that affect air marshals’ ability to operate 
discreetly are recorded, tracked, and addressed. For example, FAMS has 
not developed a written policy that establishes criteria for when and 
how federal air marshals are to complete mission reports on incidents 
they encounter during their missions. In addition, FAMS lacks adequate 
controls to ensure that the outcome of actions taken to address these 
incidents was communicated to the federal air marshals who originally 
reported them. Not providing such information may serve to discourage 
federal air marshals from submitting future reports. FAMS officials 
have acknowledged that FAMS lacks written policies to govern the use 
and management of mission reports and stated that FAMS plans to develop 
such policies in the near future. 

Federal Air Marshals Protect Passengers, Crew, and Aircraft: 

[See PDF for image] 

[End of figure] 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends that the Secretary of the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS) adopt key practices for successful mergers and 
transformations, to include developing an overall strategy with 
implementation goals and milestones and a communication strategy. GAO 
is also recommending that the Secretary direct FAMS to improve 
management controls for recording, tracking, and addressing mission 
incidents and communicating the outcome of actions taken to address 
them. 

DHS reviewed a draft of this report and agreed with GAO’s findings and 
recommendations. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-06-203. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
the link above. For more information, contact Cathleen A. Berrick at 
(202) 512-8777 or berrickc@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Results in Brief: 

Background: 

DHS Made Limited Progress in Achieving its Stated Objectives in 
Transferring FAMS to ICE and Could Benefit from Key Transformation 
Practices in Returning FAMS to TSA: 

FAMS Lacks Adequate Controls to Manage Incidents That Affect Federal 
Air Marshals' Ability to Operate Discreetly: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments: 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Key Practices and Implementation Steps for Mergers and 
Organizational Transformations: 

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security: 

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Related GAO Products: 

Abbreviations: 

ATSA: Aviation and Transportation Security Act: 
BTS: Border and Transportation Security Directorate: 
DHS: Department of Homeland Security: 
DOT: Department of Transportation: 
FAA: Federal Aviation Administration: 
FAMS: Federal Air Marshal Service: 
GS: General Schedule: 
ICE: U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement Bureau: 
OPM: Office of Personnel Management: 
SAC: Special Agent-in-Charge: 
TSA: Transportation Security Administration: 

November 28, 2005: 

The Honorable Peter A. DeFazio: 
House of Representatives: 

Dear Mr. DeFazio: 

With approximately 25,000 flights arriving or departing the United 
States each day, the Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS) plays a 
critical role in securing our nation's commercial aviation system by 
detecting, deterring, and defeating hostile acts targeting U.S. air 
carriers, airports, passengers, and crews. In recent years, FAMS has 
undergone a number of significant changes to its organizational 
structure, workforce, and mission. In response to the September 11, 
2001, terrorist attacks, FAMS was faced with the formidable task of 
ramping up its workforce--from an agency with fewer than 50 federal air 
marshals to thousands--and expanding its mission to include the 
protection of both domestic and international flights.[Footnote 1] 
Pursuant to the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA)-- 
enacted in November 2001--authority over FAMS shifted from the Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA) to the Transportation Security 
Administration (TSA) within the Department of Transportation 
(DOT).[Footnote 2] Over the next 2 years, FAMS transferred two more 
times. FAMS's most recent transfer during that timeframe[Footnote 3] 
occurred in November 2003, when FAMS moved from TSA to the U.S. 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement Bureau (ICE)--the largest law 
enforcement component within the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS).[Footnote 4] 

There were two stated objectives related to FAMS's transfer to ICE. 
According to the then-Secretary of Homeland Security, the first 
objective involved cross-training customs agents and immigration 
officers to function as federal air marshals during heightened threat 
levels, thereby providing a "surge" capability that could be deployed 
in response to an increased threat. In announcing the second objective, 
the Secretary stated that the transfer would also provide federal air 
marshals a greater range of law enforcement career options within a 
single agency. That is, because of the limited number of nonairborne 
(i.e., ground-based) positions within FAMS, federal air marshals had 
few career opportunities, which, if left unaddressed, could lead to 
morale and retention issues. Nearly 2 years after FAMS transferred to 
ICE--in July 2005--the newly appointed Secretary of DHS announced that 
FAMS would be transferred back to TSA to increase operational 
coordination and strengthen efforts to meet the common goal of aviation 
security. This transfer became effective in October 2005. 

To carry out its mission, FAMS deploys specially trained and armed 
federal air marshals on board aircraft to protect passengers, crew, and 
aircraft from terrorist activities. According to FAMS's mission 
deployment procedures, federal air marshals are to operate as 
"discreet" (semicovert) professionals when checking-in at airports, 
passing through security screening checkpoints, and boarding the 
aircraft during their missions. In doing so, federal air marshals are 
to blend in with passengers while covering high-risk domestic and 
international flights on U.S. aircraft. While FAMS's procedures focus 
on discretion, there are times when federal air marshals encounter 
mission-related situations (i.e., incidents) that affect their ability 
to conduct their missions discreetly. Such incidents may include 
miscommunication between a federal air marshal and an airline staff 
regarding the manner in which the federal air marshal can board the 
aircraft. 

In this report, we address: (1) the progress DHS made in achieving its 
stated objectives in transferring FAMS to ICE and the key practices 
that could facilitate its efforts to return FAMS to TSA and (2) the 
extent to which FAMS has adequate controls to manage mission-related 
incidents that affect federal air marshals' ability to operate 
discreetly. Some information related to FAMS and federal air marshals' 
ability to operate discreetly is considered sensitive security 
information. Accordingly, we issued a separate restricted version of 
this report containing that information.[Footnote 5] 

To answer these questions, we reviewed applicable laws, regulations, 
operational policies and procedures, and other relevant documentation. 
We also interviewed officials from DHS, ICE, BTS, TSA, and FAMS to 
discuss FAMS's transfer to ICE. Additionally, we considered our prior 
work on key practices used by public and private sector organizations 
that have undergone successful mergers and transformations.[Footnote 6] 
The nine key practices are described in greater detail in appendix II. 
We did not conduct an in-depth analysis comparing all of these 
practices with the transfer of FAMS to ICE. However, using the 
documentation provided and interviews we conducted, we examined the 
information gathered in light of two of the nine transformation 
practices to determine the extent to which the agency (1) established 
an overall strategy with implementation goals and a timeline to guide 
the integration effort into ICE, and (2) employed a communication 
strategy to keep employees informed of the progress of the integration. 
We selected these two practices as criteria for this review because 
they are especially important to ensuring that DHS has the planning 
framework necessary to guide and monitor its transformation efforts-- 
which we have also underscored in our previous work on DHS. 

In addition, we interviewed 19 federal air marshals and 5 FAMS Special 
Agents in Charge (SAC) in 5 selected field locations around the 
country. Generally, we chose these locations on the basis of 
geographical dispersion. They included: Washington, D.C; Dallas, Texas; 
New York, New York; Atlanta, Georgia; and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. 
Federal air marshals at these locations fly throughout the nation so 
their experiences potentially cover airports throughout the United 
States. During these interviews, we obtained information on a range of 
issues related to the transfer of FAMS to ICE. Through these 
interviews, we also gained a more complete understanding of federal air 
marshals' mission deployment procedures and their experiences regarding 
incidents that affect their ability to operate discreetly during their 
mission. However, the information we obtained during these interviews 
cannot be generalized to all federal air marshals. A more detailed 
description of our scope and methodology is contained in appendix I. We 
conducted our work from June 2004 through August 2005 in accordance 
with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

In July 2005, after we had completed most of this review, the Secretary 
of Homeland Security announced that FAMS would be transferred back to 
TSA. This transfer became effective in October 2005. We believe that 
DHS's prior experience in transferring FAMS to ICE can provide useful 
information in identifying key practices for DHS to consider in 
effecting a successful transition to TSA. Accordingly, this report 
addresses key lessons learned from the earlier transition to help 
facilitate FAMS's movement back to TSA. 

Results in Brief: 

In the nearly 2 years that FAMS was part of ICE, DHS had made limited 
progress in achieving its stated objectives to develop a surge capacity 
through cross-training ICE agents and to enhance federal air marshals' 
career opportunities. Specifically, DHS had developed some surge 
capacity by cross-training a number of ICE agents but suspended these 
efforts in October 2004 in response to congressional concerns that the 
cross-training was an ineffective use of resources and 
training.[Footnote 7] DHS indicated that it would continue to support 
the surge effort but had not determined whether and when it would 
resume cross-training to support this initiative. Further, although DHS 
recognized that federal air marshals' career opportunities were 
limited, it had not developed plans to expand them by providing 
additional opportunities through investigative or other duties. 
Moreover, DHS had not determined how these stated transition objectives 
would be met because it had not developed an overall strategy to 
include implementation goals, measures, and a timeline to help target 
performance shortfalls and suggest midcourse corrections, including any 
needed adjustments to future goals and milestones--a key practice for a 
successful merger and transformation effort. In addition, DHS had not 
developed a communication strategy to create shared expectations within 
the organization and report related progress on the transition to 
employees and other stakeholders--another key practice. Our previous 
reports have underscored the importance of DHS's adopting similar 
practices to facilitate its transformation efforts.[Footnote 8] With 
its return of FAMS to TSA, DHS has an opportunity to learn from its 
experience, including how these key practices can help to facilitate 
FAMS's transfer back to TSA. 

In addition, FAMS lacks adequate management controls to help ensure 
that mission-related incidents that affect air marshals' ability to 
operate discreetly are recorded, tracked, and addressed. For example, 
FAMS has not developed a written policy that establishes criteria for 
when and how federal air marshals are to complete mission reports on 
incidents they encounter during their missions. In addition, FAMS lacks 
adequate controls to ensure that the outcome of actions taken to 
address these incidents are communicated to the federal air marshals 
who originally reported them. Not providing such information may serve 
to discourage federal air marshals from submitting future reports. FAMS 
officials have acknowledged that FAMS lacks written policies to govern 
the use and management of mission reports and stated that FAMS plans to 
develop such policies in the near future. 

To help the department in its efforts to achieve a successful 
transformation effort in returning FAMS to TSA, we are recommending 
that the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security adopt, for 
this transformation, key practices for successful mergers and 
transformations that we have previously recommended to the department, 
which include developing an overall strategy with implementation goals 
and a timeline to build momentum and show progress as well as a 
communication strategy to share expectations and report related 
progress. We are also recommending that the Secretary take four actions 
to establish better management controls related to recording, tracking, 
and addressing mission incidents as well as communicating the outcome 
of actions taken to address these incidents. 

We provided a draft copy of this report to DHS for review. DHS, in its 
written comments, agreed with the findings and recommendations in the 
report. The full text of DHS's comments is included in appendix III. 

Background: 

Originally established as the Sky Marshal program in the 1970s to 
counter hijackers, FAMS was expanded in response to the September 11, 
2001, terrorist attacks through the passage of ATSA. This law required 
a dramatic increase in FAMS's mission and workforce and mandated the 
deployment of federal air marshals on all high security risk 
flights.[Footnote 9] To create an expanded workforce, FAA began an 
intensive effort on September 17, 2001, to recruit federal air marshals 
in unprecedented numbers. Until FAA could hire, train, and deploy the 
first few classes of federal air marshals, other federal agencies made 
law enforcement officers available to augment FAMS. Since that time, 
FAMS has grown from a relatively centralized organization with one 
office to a highly decentralized agency with thousands of federal air 
marshals assigned to 21 field offices--each headed by a Special Agent 
in Charge, or SAC--throughout the United States. 

In addition to changes in its size and mission, FAMS has also undergone 
several organizational transformations since September 11, 2001, moving 
from FAA to TSA in November 2001, and from DOT to DHS in March 2003. 
Several months later--in November 2003--FAMS was transferred from TSA 
to ICE, based, in part, on the conclusions reached by a BTS- 
commissioned internal working group.[Footnote 10] Tasked with 
determining the merits of a potential transfer, the working group 
concluded that transferring FAMS to ICE could improve the security of 
the nation's aviation system by providing a surge capability during 
times of increased aviation threats by augmenting federal air marshals 
with ICE agents. The working group also concluded that FAMS's transfer 
to ICE could provide federal air marshals with the same type of law 
enforcement career options that were available to ICE agents. In July 
2005--nearly 2 years after its transfer of FAMS from TSA to ICE--DHS 
announced that FAMS would be returned to TSA to increase operational 
coordination and strengthen efforts to meet the common goal of aviation 
security. This transfer became effective in October 2005. 

To carry out its mission, FAMS deploys federal air marshals on board 
flights either destined for or originating in the United States, based 
on FAMS's Concept of Operations. Deployed to passenger flights, federal 
air marshals dress in plain clothes to blend in with other passengers 
and perform their duties discreetly in an effort to avoid drawing undue 
attention to themselves. Federal air marshals are subject to FAMS 
procedures for checking-in for their flights, passing through security 
screening checkpoints, and boarding aircraft.[Footnote 11] According to 
FAMS, these procedures were designed to enable federal air marshals to 
carry out their missions in a discreet manner in order to help protect 
their identities, while facilitating coordination and communication 
with crew and airline staff. 

While FAMS's mission deployment procedures focus on discretion, federal 
air marshals may encounter mission-related incidents that affect their 
ability to conduct their missions discreetly.[Footnote 12] FAMS has 
directed that, in the event that federal air marshals encounter such 
incidents, they should contact the FAMS Mission Operations 
Center,[Footnote 13] to the extent they believe that the incident could 
be evidence of a systemic problem. As we discuss later in this report, 
federal air marshals are not required to file a "mission report" for 
every incident they encounter. That is, the Mission Operations Center 
staff may or may not request that the federal air marshal who 
encountered the incident file a written mission report. 

DHS Made Limited Progress in Achieving Its Stated Objectives in 
Transferring FAMS to ICE and Could Benefit from Key Transformation 
Practices in Returning FAMS to TSA: 

In the nearly 2 years that FAMS was part of ICE, DHS had made limited 
progress in achieving its stated objectives to develop a surge capacity 
through cross-training ICE agents and to enhance federal air marshals' 
career opportunities. Specifically, DHS had developed some surge 
capacity by cross-training a number of ICE agents,[Footnote 14] but 
suspended these efforts in October 2004 in response to congressional 
concerns that the cross-training was an ineffective use of resources 
and training. DHS indicated that it would continue to support the surge 
effort, but had not determined whether and when it would resume cross- 
training to support this initiative. Further, although DHS recognized 
that federal air marshals' career opportunities were limited, it had 
not developed plans to expand them by providing additional 
opportunities through investigative or other duties. Moreover, DHS had 
not determined how these stated transition objectives would be met 
because it had not developed an overall strategy to include 
implementation goals, measures, and a timeline to help target 
performance shortfalls and suggest midcourse corrections, including any 
needed adjustments to future goals and milestones--a key practice for a 
successful merger and transformation effort. In addition, DHS had not 
developed a communication strategy to create shared expectations within 
the organization and report related progress on the transition to 
employees and other stakeholders--another key practice. Our previous 
reports have underscored the importance of DHS's adopting similar 
practices to facilitate its transformation efforts.[Footnote 15] With 
its return of FAMS to TSA, DHS has an opportunity to learn from its 
experience, including how these key practices can facilitate FAMS's 
transfer back to TSA. 

Some Surge Capacity Had Been Developed, but DHS Suspended Efforts to 
Cross-Train ICE Agents: 

One of DHS's objectives in transferring FAMS to ICE was to create a 
"surge capacity;" that is, strengthening aviation security in a 
heightened threat environment by tactically deploying ICE agents to 
supplement FAMS's existing deployments of federal air marshals on U.S. 
aircraft. The Secretary of DHS announced in December 2003 that this 
surge capacity would be achieved through training the over 5,000 ICE 
agents from ICE's Office of Investigations.[Footnote 16] Specifically, 
these agents, who typically conduct immigration and customs-related 
investigations, could also be deployed to supplement federal air 
marshals on commercial airlines, thereby providing a manpower reserve 
from which DHS could draw upon when heightened threat conditions 
warranted increased flight coverage. In March 2004, the Assistant 
Secretary for ICE testified before the Appropriations Committees that 
ICE anticipated providing this cross-training to no less than 800 ICE 
agents by the end of fiscal year 2004.[Footnote 17] 

Between December 2003 and October 2004, a number of ICE agents received 
cross-training in the skills necessary to supplement federal air 
marshals during a heightened threat level. Some of those agents were 
deployed and temporarily assigned to augment federal air marshals on 
flights in response to a heightened threat alert.[Footnote 18] 
According to FAMS, these ICE agents were chosen for surge deployment 
based on their previous FAMS training--including extensive firearms 
training--and flying experience as temporary federal air 
marshals.[Footnote 19] That is, these agents, employees of the former 
U.S. Customs Service, had been among the law enforcement officers who 
had previously flown as temporary federal air marshals to augment FAMS 
following the September 11, 2001, attacks, from October 2001 through 
May 2002.[Footnote 20] To prepare for the surge deployment, these ICE 
agents received a 3-day refresher training in current FAMS's 
procedures, policies, and updated firearms techniques. 

Following the surge deployment in January 2004, FAMS developed and 
implemented a 40-hour cross-training curriculum for ICE agents so they 
could supplement federal air marshals during a surge deployment. This 
training was substantially similar to the training provided to federal 
air marshals, which included instruction in areas such as the use of 
firearms and boarding procedures. 

In October 2004, ICE suspended its cross-training efforts in response 
to congressional concerns that the cross-training was an ineffective 
use of resources and training. Specifically, in a June 2004 House 
Appropriations Committee report, the Committee expressed concerns 
regarding how ICE agents would maintain their skills as federal air 
marshals since they did not regularly perform federal air marshal 
duties. The Committee directed that each cross-trained ICE agent fly 
missions with a federal air marshal for a minimum of 24 hours per 
quarter, beginning October 1, 2004.[Footnote 21] However, in the 
October 2004 report that accompanied the fiscal year 2005 DHS 
Appropriations Act, the Conference Committee suggested that the cross- 
training provided to ICE agents was an ineffective use of 
resources.[Footnote 22] The Committee further suggested that the 
training of ICE agents to serve as federal air marshals in a surge 
capacity be discontinued. In response, DHS suspended its cross-training 
efforts at that time. ICE later stated that it would continue to 
support the surge effort, but had not determined whether and when it 
would resume cross-training to support this initiative. With DHS's 
transfer of FAMS to TSA, it is unclear whether or how cross-training 
will be used to augment federal air marshals during heightened threat 
levels. 

DHS Recognized That Federal Air Marshals' Career Opportunities Were 
Limited but Had Not Developed Plans to Expand Them: 

Another of DHS's objectives in its transfer of FAMS from TSA to ICE was 
to expand career opportunities for federal air marshals. Both FAMS and 
ICE officials have stated that the transfer was intended to provide 
federal air marshals with ground-based assignments, such as nonflying 
supervisory or other positions and thus establish additional career 
opportunities for federal air marshals. These officials told us that 
federal air marshals cannot sustain a career in an airborne position, 
based on such factors as the frequency of flying, their irregular 
schedules, and the monotony of flying repetitive assignments. 

A study commissioned by ICE in March 2004 reflected concerns over 
federal air marshals' limited career opportunities. Specifically, ICE 
commissioned IBM to determine, among other things, the current status 
of federal air marshals' career development and advancement 
opportunities. The study found that the overwhelming majority of 
federal air marshals were expected to reach the highest pay level in 
their job position by August 2004, and that FAMS had only a limited 
number of supervisory opportunities beyond that pay level. The study 
concluded that without career development and promotion opportunities, 
FAMS could experience a decline in employee morale and an increase in 
attrition rates. 

As a means of providing expanded career opportunities, FAMS management 
has advocated that federal air marshals' current position as a "civil 
aviation security specialist" be re-classified to that of a criminal 
investigator.[Footnote 23] Recognizing that career paths for criminal 
investigators provide greater opportunity for movement than civil 
aviation security specialists, FAMS commissioned a study by a private 
contractor to determine the feasibility of such a conversion. Among 
other things, the study concluded that because the mission of air 
marshals had changed after September 11, 2001--from enforcing FAA 
regulations onboard aircraft, to detecting, deterring, and defeating 
criminal acts in the aviation domain--federal air marshals satisfied 
the requirements of a criminal investigator position. The study further 
stated that career opportunities were more prevalent for those 
qualified as criminal investigators because these positions possess 
knowledge, skills, and abilities that are interchangeable across 
different agencies. In addition, the study found that criminal 
investigators could more successfully compete for similar positions in 
other law enforcement agencies and enjoyed greater opportunities for 
advancement and higher compensation in the federal government. 

In January 2005, FAMS presented the results of the study to the 
management of DHS's Border and Transportation Security (BTS) 
directorate for their consideration. In reviewing the study's findings 
and additional research conducted by ICE's legal and human resources 
staff, BTS, along with ICE management, concluded that the 
reclassification of federal air marshals from an aviation security 
specialist position to a criminal investigator position was not an 
appropriate course of action. In addressing the study's conclusions, 
officials maintained that the primary duties of a federal air marshal-
-to protect passengers, crews, and aircraft from terrorist activities-
-were "not investigative in nature" and were inconsistent with the 
Office of Personnel Management's (OPM) classification standards for the 
criminal investigator series. DHS also concluded that without any 
significant changes in the duties of federal air marshals, it did not 
see a basis for the conversion. 

In January 2005, ICE formed an Advisory Board to address issues related 
to FAMS's transfer to ICE, including expanding federal air marshals' 
career opportunities.[Footnote 24] ICE senior management officials, who 
served as members of the board, stated that they would have liked to 
expand career opportunities for federal air marshals if FAMS were to 
continue to reside in ICE, such as creating additional ground-based 
mission assignments. One of these officials said that federal air 
marshals could have potentially assumed a limited intelligence and 
surveillance role, such as assessing aircraft vulnerability and 
interdicting drugs and/or contraband aboard aircraft. As of June 2005, 
however, ICE had not developed any plans for doing so. With FAMS's 
transition to TSA, it is unclear whether or how federal air marshals' 
career opportunities may be expanded. 

Key Practices Could Facilitate FAMS's Return to TSA: 

In light of its announcement to return FAMS to TSA, DHS has an 
opportunity to learn from its experience in transferring FAMS to ICE, 
including the importance that key practices can have in leading to 
successful transformation efforts within public and private sector 
organizations. Our July 2003 report on implementation steps to assist 
mergers and transformations identified nine key practices followed by 
public and private sector organizations that have led to successful 
transformations.[Footnote 25] All nine key practices and associated 
implementation steps are shown in appendix II. While all nine practices 
are important, we identified two practices that, in our view, could 
have enhanced DHS's efforts to meet its stated objectives in 
transferring FAMS to ICE. These practices are (1) developing an overall 
strategy with implementation goals and a timeline to build momentum and 
show progress, and (2) establishing a communication strategy to create 
shared expectations and report related progress. We believe these 
practices would be particularly helpful for DHS and could increase its 
likelihood for a successful transformation effort in returning FAMS to 
TSA. 

As we discussed earlier, one of DHS's stated objectives in transferring 
FAMS to ICE was to create a surge capacity during heightened threat 
levels. However, while DHS had indicated that it would train no less 
than 800 ICE agents by the end of fiscal year 2004, it did not have an 
overall strategy to identify how it would sustain a surge capacity. 
Such a strategy could have contained implementation goals, measures, 
and milestones to help target performance shortfalls and suggest 
midcourse corrections. Another of DHS's stated objectives was to expand 
career opportunities for federal air marshals. However, DHS had not 
identified any implementation goals nor time frames for how and when it 
planned to develop these career opportunities, such as the types of 
opportunities to be provided or when federal air marshals could expect 
these opportunities to become available. 

Establishing implementation goals and associated timelines are critical 
to ensuring a successful integration as well as pinpointing performance 
shortfalls and gaps and suggesting midcourse corrections. Such goals 
and timelines could be contained in an overall integration strategy for 
a merger or transformation effort. Further, such a strategy typically 
goes beyond what is contained in an agency strategic plan and provides 
more specific operational and tactical information to manage a 
sustained effort. Our previous work has also underscored the importance 
of DHS adopting similar practices to help guide its overall management 
integration effort.[Footnote 26] 

Further, DHS had not developed a communication strategy to create 
shared expectations within the organization and report related progress 
on FAMS's transition into ICE to employees and other stakeholders-- 
another key practice of a successful merger or transformation. ICE 
officials shared with us various forms of communications they had 
issued to employees over the period of a few months, between September 
and December 2003. Those communications included e-mails, broadcast 
messages, and agency press releases. Officials also provided us with an 
agenda for a televised roundtable discussion that had been broadcast to 
ICE employees at various times in October 2003 regarding aspects of the 
transition. The discussion centered on an exchange between the Director 
of FAMS and the Acting Assistant Secretary of ICE to address, among 
other things, issues related to personnel and the cross-training of ICE 
agents and federal air marshals. Beyond these efforts, ICE could not 
identify any subsequent communications made to keep ICE employees 
informed about the progress of the transition--specifically, what 
employees could expect and by when. Further, 14 of the 19 federal air 
marshals we interviewed during our review felt that ICE management had 
not kept them adequately informed about the progress of the transition. 
Also, 13 of the 19 federal air marshals said they were unclear or 
confused about how they would become integrated into ICE. 

Creating an effective, ongoing communication strategy is essential to 
implementing a merger or transformation. Organizations should develop a 
communication strategy that reaches out to employees and seeks to 
genuinely engage them in the merger and transformation process and not 
just "push the message out." For example, communication should help 
employees understand how the changes from the transformation will 
affect them and how their responsibilities might change with the new 
organization. In addition, a communication strategy is especially 
crucial in the public sector where policy-making and program management 
demands transparency. For example, such a strategy should include not 
only what results are to be achieved, but also which processes are to 
be used to achieve those results. 

FAMS Lacks Adequate Controls to Manage Incidents That Affect Federal 
Air Marshals' Ability to Operate Discreetly: 

FAMS lacks adequate controls to manage mission-related incidents that 
affect air marshals' ability to operate discreetly. Internal controls 
comprise the plans, methods, and procedures used to meet organizations' 
missions, goals, and objectives. Federal standards for internal control 
define the minimum level of quality acceptable for internal control in 
the federal government. Accordingly, these standards provide that: (1) 
internal controls and all transactions and other significant events be 
clearly documented, (2) controls be generally designed to ensure that 
ongoing monitoring occurs during the course of normal operations, and 
(3) pertinent information be communicated throughout an organization to 
allow employees to perform their duties efficiently.[Footnote 27] Our 
review of FAMS's mission reporting process noted weaknesses in each of 
these control areas. 

FAMS lacks adequate controls to help ensure that incidents federal air 
marshals encounter that affect their ability to operate discreetly are 
recorded. Specifically, FAMS officials stated that FAMS does not 
maintain a record of these types of incidents unless a mission report 
is filed. Standards for internal control in the federal government 
require that all transactions and other significant events be clearly 
documented in a manner that is complete, accurate, and useful to 
managers and others involved in evaluating operations. FAMS has 
directed that, in the event that federal air marshals encounter 
incidents affecting their ability to operate discreetly, they are to 
contact the Mission Operations Center to the extent the air marshals 
believe that the incident could be evidence of a systemic 
problem.[Footnote 28] In contacting the Operations Center, the federal 
air marshal is to request guidance for resolving the incident. The 
Operations Center may then ask the federal air marshal to submit a 
mission report to FAMS's Office of Field Operations (Field Operations) 
to describe the incident in greater detail.[Footnote 29] However, if 
the federal air marshal does not submit a mission report, FAMS does not 
maintain a record of the incident. In addition, FAMS has not developed 
a written policy that establishes criteria for when and how mission 
reports are to be completed and filed. According to FAMS, instruction 
in the use and completion of mission reports is communicated orally 
through FAMS training and not through formal written guidance. Without 
a means for ensuring that all incidents are recorded, and absent 
written criteria that defines when and how mission reports are to be 
completed, FAMS cannot provide reasonable assurance that it is aware of 
the full extent of incidents that federal air marshals encounter. 

FAMS also lacks controls to help ensure that reported incidents are 
systematically tracked so that it can retrieve and analyze data on 
reported incidents, thereby ensuring ongoing monitoring of incidents. 
Federal standards for internal control require that controls generally 
be designed to ensure that ongoing monitoring occurs during the course 
of normal operations. FAMS has acknowledged that it lacks a tool to 
capture and retrieve data on mission reports. The absence of such a 
tool limits FAMS's ability to track and analyze relevant information 
and monitor trends to identify operational areas in need of improvement 
based on the reported incidents and thereby preventing potential 
incidents. 

In addition, while FAMS has developed a process for reviewing and 
addressing incidents identified in mission reports once filed, and 
issued guidance to its field offices that outlines this process, it has 
not established formal written policies and procedures to document the 
process. Federal standards for internal control require that internal 
controls are to be documented and the documentation be readily 
available for examination. According to FAMS, its process for reviewing 
and addressing incidents identified in mission reports involves Field 
Operations' review of the mission reports to determine if further 
action is warranted on the incident. FAMS officials stated that, as 
part of this review, Field Operations may deem some incidents as "local 
issues;" for example, miscommunication between a federal air marshal 
and an airline staff regarding the manner in which the air marshal can 
board the aircraft. Mission reports involving local issues are 
forwarded to the relevant FAMS field office and may be resolved through 
the on-site airport liaisons or the local Special Agent in Charge for 
the airport where the incident occurred.[Footnote 30] Field Operations 
may also deem some incidents as "national issues;" that is, incidents 
that are not unique to a specific airport, such as an incident 
involving the flight crew of a particular airline. These types of 
incidents are forwarded to FAMS's Liaison Division (located within the 
Office of Flight Operations). In attempting to address the issue, the 
Liaison Division may contact TSA or the airline's corporate security 
office, depending on whether the incident involved check-in, security 
checkpoint, or boarding procedures. 

Furthermore, FAMS lacks controls to help ensure that the results of 
actions taken to address incidents identified in mission reports are 
communicated to the federal air marshals who originally filed the 
reports. Not providing such information may serve to discourage federal 
air marshals from submitting future reports. Standards for internal 
control state that pertinent information should be communicated 
throughout an organization to allow employees to perform their duties 
efficiently. According to FAMS, Field Operations provides feedback to 
the relevant field office SAC on actions taken to resolve incidents in 
the mission reports. The SAC's communication of these results to the 
federal air marshals in the particular office is discretionary. Of the 
15 federal air marshals we interviewed who said they had filed a 
mission report, 12 said they had not received feedback on the outcome 
of the report. Some federal air marshals identified the importance of 
having feedback on the outcome of the reports, noting that not having 
feedback discourages them from filing future reports. For example, one 
federal air marshal stated that he and other federal air marshals in 
his office had stopped filing mission reports because they did not 
receive feedback on the outcome of the reports they had previously 
filed. Another federal air marshal said that federal air marshals in 
his field office were generally dissatisfied with the lack of feedback 
on the mission reports they had filed. 

FAMS officials stated that they recognize the importance of written 
policies to govern the use and management of these reports, and stated 
that FAMS is in the process of developing such policies to include how 
FAMS will review and address incidents identified in the reports and 
provide feedback on the outcome of these incidents in a timely manner. 
Although FAMS identified plans to strengthen controls over the 
management of these incidents, they did not identify time frames for 
when these would be completed. 

Conclusions: 

In the nearly 2 years that FAMS was part of ICE, DHS made only limited 
progress in achieving its stated transition objectives of creating a 
surge capacity and enhancing federal air marshals' career 
opportunities. With its return of FAMS to TSA, DHS has an opportunity 
to learn from its experiences and adopt key practices for successful 
mergers and transformations to assist its efforts to transfer FAMS back 
into TSA. Such key practices include developing an overall strategy to 
include implementation goals, measures, and milestones to track the 
organization's progress in achieving its goals. By showing progress 
towards these goals, DHS could build momentum and demonstrate that real 
progress is being made. In addition, having a strategy with 
implementation goals and milestones could help target performance 
shortfalls and gaps and suggest midcourse corrections, including any 
needed adjustments to future goals and milestones. In addition, 
developing a communication strategy would help to inform employees 
about the status of the transition and provide transparency about 
specific actions to be taken and time frames for their completion. In 
light of the number of transformations FAMS has undergone in recent 
years, providing open communication to create shared expectations among 
all staff and stakeholders takes on added significance. 

Further, with its critical role in helping to secure the nation's 
commercial aviation system, it is important that FAMS has adequate 
controls to manage information regarding incidents federal air marshals 
encounter during their missions that could compromise their mission. 
Such controls take on added importance in light of FAMS's growth from a 
small, centralized organization with only one office and the ability to 
cover a few missions to a larger decentralized organization with 
thousands of federal air marshals and a capacity to provide 
significantly expanded coverage. Absent adequate management controls, 
FAMS does not have a full account of reported incidents or a means for 
tracking, analyzing, and monitoring these incidents. Such information 
is necessary for identifying the full extent of reported incidents and 
for determining the operational areas in need of improvement. In 
addition, such controls would help to ensure that actions taken to 
resolve these incidents are reported to the federal air marshals who 
filed them. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

To help ensure that the Department of Homeland Security has the 
planning framework necessary to guide and monitor its efforts to merge 
the Federal Air Marshal Service with the Transportation Security 
Administration, we are recommending that the Secretary of the 
Department of Homeland Security adopt key practices that have led to 
successful transformation efforts within public and private sector 
organizations by taking the following two actions: 

² Develop an overall strategy with implementation goals and a timeline 
to build momentum and show progress. 

² Develop a communication strategy to share expectations and report 
related progress. 

In addition, to facilitate the Federal Air Marshal Service's management 
of incidents that affect federal air marshals' ability to operate 
discreetly during their missions, we are recommending that the 
Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security direct the Director of 
the Federal Air Marshal Service to take the following four actions: 

² Develop a means for recording all incidents reported to the Mission 
Operations Center that affect federal air marshals' ability to operate 
discreetly and criteria for determining which incidents require federal 
air marshals to complete a mission report. 

² Develop a means for tracking and retrieving data on mission reports 
to enable FAMS to analyze and monitor reported and systemic incidents. 

² Establish written policies and procedures for reviewing and 
addressing reported incidents. 

² Establish a means for providing feedback on the status and outcome of 
FAMS mission reports to the federal air marshals who submit them. 

Agency Comments: 

We provided a draft of this report to DHS for review and comment. On 
November 7, 2005, we received written comments on the draft report, 
which are reproduced in full in appendix III. DHS agreed with the 
findings and recommendations in the report and described actions it had 
started or planned to take to implement them. With regard to our two 
recommendations related to key practices that have led to successful 
transformation efforts, DHS stated that FAMS and TSA will work closely 
with DHS's Under Secretary for Policy and Assistant Secretary for 
Strategic Planning to develop a comprehensive strategy with achievable 
goals and a timeline to assure progress. DHS also stated that FAMS will 
work with TSA and DHS leadership to develop a communication strategy 
intended to facilitate shared expectations and report progress. In 
addition, regarding our recommendations related to FAMS's management of 
incidents that affect federal air marshals' ability to operate 
discreetly during their missions, DHS stated that FAMS is in the 
process of drafting a written directive to establish policies and 
procedures for reporting and managing mission incidents. The directive 
is intended to restructure FAMS's management of mission reports to 
enable timely dissemination of and access to information, including 
feedback to management and employees. The directive will also establish 
a formalized tracking system for reporting incidents. Shortly after 
receiving comments from DHS, FAMS provided us with an official written 
directive that establishes policies and procedures for reporting and 
managing mission incidents. We reviewed this directive and believe that 
it addresses our recommendations related to (1) developing a means for 
recording all incidents reported to the Mission Operations Center that 
affect federal air marshals' ability to operate discreetly and criteria 
for determining which incidents require federal air marshals to 
complete a mission report and (2) establishing written policies and 
procedures for reviewing and addressing reported incidents. 

In addition to commenting on our findings and recommendations, DHS 
provided technical comments on the report under separate cover, and we 
revised the draft report where appropriate. 

We will send copies of this report to the Secretary of Homeland 
Security, the TSA Administrator, and interested congressional 
committees as appropriate. We will also make copies available to others 
on request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on 
GAO's Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report or wish to 
discuss it further, please contact me at (202) 512-8777 or 
berrickc@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional 
Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this 
report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are 
listed in appendix IV. 

Sincerely yours, 

Signed by:

Cathleen A. Berrick: 
Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and Methodology: 

The objectives of this report were to determine: (1) the progress DHS 
made in achieving its stated objectives in transferring FAMS to ICE and 
the key practices that could facilitate its efforts to return FAMS to 
TSA; and (2) the extent to which FAMS has adequate controls to manage 
mission-related incidents that affect federal air marshals' ability to 
operate discreetly. To address these objectives, we reviewed relevant 
regulations, internal planning documents, agency policies and 
procedures, and federal air marshal mission reports, and interviewed a 
variety of federal officials and federal air marshals in selected field 
office locations. Some information related to FAMS and federal air 
marshals' ability to operate discreetly is considered Sensitive 
Security Information. Accordingly, we issued a separate restricted 
version of this report.[Footnote 31] 

To determine the progress DHS made in achieving its stated objectives 
in transferring FAMS to ICE, we reviewed and analyzed key documents 
about the transition effort as well as interviewed key officials from 
BTS, FAMS, and ICE management. Key documents included, but were not 
limited to, agency memorandums, various transition documents, materials 
from offices involved with implementing the transition effort, and 
studies that addressed issues related to career opportunities for 
federal air marshals. We also analyzed surge training information on 
the number of ICE agents cross-trained between December 2003 and 
October 2004 by geographical location. In addition, we spoke with 
officials at DHS, BTS, ICE, and FAMS to discuss the purpose and 
progress related to the transition of FAMS to ICE, including creating a 
surge capacity and enhancing federal air marshals' career 
opportunities. Further, we assessed DHS's progress in meeting its 
stated objectives by using key practices consistently found at the 
center of successful mergers, acquisitions, and transformations. These 
practices were identified to assist DHS in its consolidation before the 
department was created and were based on useful practices and lessons 
learned from major private and public sector organizational mergers, 
acquisitions, and transformations.[Footnote 32] We selected two of 
these nine key practices as criteria for this review because they are 
especially important to ensuring that DHS has the planning framework 
necessary to guide and monitor its efforts--which we have also 
underscored in our previous work on DHS--and to facilitating trust and 
transparency within the organization. The two selected practices were: 
setting implementation goals and a timeline to build momentum and show 
progress from day one and establishing a communication strategy that 
will serve to create shared expectations within the organization and at 
the same time report related progress on the merger. 

In addition, we interviewed FAMS officials at their headquarters 
offices in Reston, Virginia, and their Mission Operations Center in 
Herndon, Virginia. Specifically, we spoke with officials in FAMS' 
Mission Support, Flight Operations, Training and Development, and Field 
Operations offices to discuss the types of mission-related incidents 
that federal air marshals encounter during the course of their mission 
and how FAMS manages these incidents. Further, to determine the extent 
to which FAMS has adequate controls to manage mission-related incidents 
that affect federal air marshals' ability to operate discreetly, we 
used our Standards for Internal Controls in the Federal Government and 
Internal Control Management and Evaluation Tool.[Footnote 33] 

Furthermore, in accomplishing our objectives, we conducted structured 
interviews with FAMS officials--including 5 SACS--and 19 federal air 
marshals in 5 of FAMS's 21 field offices. Generally, we chose these 
offices on the basis of geographical dispersion. They included: 
Washington, D.C; Dallas, Texas; New York, New York; Atlanta, Georgia; 
and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Among other things, we asked questions 
about the federal air marshals' understanding of the transition of FAMS 
to ICE, including whether their roles and mission had changed as a 
result of the transition. We also asked the federal air marshals in 
these interviews a series of questions related to their mission 
experience at various airports. For example, we asked about the check- 
in, screening, and boarding practices that they have experienced while 
carrying out their missions. The results of these interviews provide 
examples of FAMS officials' and federal air marshals' experiences and 
perspectives and cannot be generalized beyond those we interviewed 
because we did not use statistical sampling techniques in selecting the 
field offices, officials, and federal air marshals. We conducted these 
interviews between October and November 2004 and in April 2005. We also 
made some follow-up calls in May and July of 2005. We conducted our 
work from June 2004 through August 2005 in accordance with generally 
accepted government auditing standards. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Key Practices and Implementation Steps for Mergers and 
Organizational Transformations: 

Practice: Ensure top leadership drives the transformation; 
Implementation step: * Define and articulate a succinct and compelling 
reason for change* Balance continued delivery of services with merger 
and transformation activities. 

Practice: Establish a coherent mission and integrated strategic goals 
to guide the transformation; 
Implementation step: * Adopt leading practices for results-oriented 
strategic planning and reporting. 

Practice: Focus on a key set of principles and priorities at the outset 
of the transformation; 
Implementation step: * Embed core values in every aspect of the 
organization to reinforce the new culture. 

Practice: Set implementation goals and a timeline to build momentum and 
show progress from day one; 
Implementation step: * Make public implementation goals and timeline* 
Seek and monitor employee attitudes and take appropriate follow-up 
actions* Identify cultural features of merging organizations to 
increase understanding of former work environments* Attract and retain 
key talent* Establish an organizationwide knowledge and skills 
inventory to allow knowledge exchange among merging organizations. 

Practice: Dedicate an implementation team to manage the transformation 
process; 
Implementation step: * Establish networks to support implementation 
team* Select high-performing team members. 

Practice: Use the performance management system to define the 
responsibility and assure accountability for change; 
Implementation step: * Adopt leading practices to implement effective 
performance management systems with adequate safeguards. 

Practice: Establish a communication strategy to create shared 
expectations and report related progress; 
Implementation step: * Communicate early and often to build trust* 
Ensure consistency of message* Encourage two-way communication* Provide 
information to meet specific needs of employees. 

Practice: Involve employees to obtain their ideas and gain ownership 
for the transformation; 
Implementation step: * Use employee teams* Involve employees in 
planning and sharing performance information* Incorporate employee 
feedback into new policies and procedures* Delegate authority to 
appropriate organizational levels. 

Practice: Build a world-class organization; 
Implementation step: * Adopt leading practices to build a world-class 
organization. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security: 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security Washington, DC 20528: 
Homeland Security: 

November 7, 2005: 

Ms. Cathleen A. Berrick: 
Director, Homeland Security and Justice; 
Issues U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, NW Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Ms. Berrick: 

RE: Draft Report GAO-06-203, "Aviation Security: Federal Air Marshal 
Service Could Benefit from Improved Planning and Controls" 

Thank you for the opportunity to comment on the subject draft report. 
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) concurs with the 
recommendations. The Federal Air Marshal (The FAMS) and Transportation 
Security Administration (TSA) leadership will work closely with the new 
DHS Under Secretary for Policy and the Assistant Secretary for 
Strategic Planning to develop a comprehensive strategy with achievable 
goals and a timeline to assure progress. The FAMS also will work with 
TSA and DHS leadership to formulate a communication strategy which 
facilitates shared expectations and reports progress. 

The Department and FAMS recognize that formalization is required as a 
function of continued development and incident and mission reporting. 
Accordingly, earlier this year, FAMS began formulating a FAMS Reporting 
System Policy and Procedure. A draft of this proposed directive is 
under review by FAMS management. When issued, the Directive will 
establish the reporting and policy and procedures for the Federal Air 
Marshal Service. Its purpose is to restructure the management of FAMS 
official reports to enable timely dissemination of and access to 
information, feedback to management and employees, and its further 
operational use. This proposed Directive will address the use and 
format of Activity Reports and Reports of Investigation, and 
establishes a formalized tracking system, which will utilize elements 
of the Treasury Enforcement Communications System. 

Among the envisioned improvements is the standardization of incident 
nomenclature. For example, all reportable matters will be addressed in 
Activity Reports. These reports will be categorized as Class 1 and 
Class 2 Activities. Class 1 Activities are irregularities involving 
routine FAM mission procedures that do not present a direct or imminent 
threat to an aircraft, passenger, crew or other persons or property. 
These irregularities are the actions of an employee of an external 
organization that may affect the security of a FAM mission. Class 2 
Activities are events that require a law enforcement response. The 
coordination and follow-up of these reports also will be more 
cohesively administered under the new system. 

DHS appreciates your review, analysis and discussion of FAMS planning 
and controls. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by:

Steven J. Pecinovsky: 
Director: 
Departmental GAO/OIG Liaison Office: 

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Cathleen A. Berrick (202) 512-8777: 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the individual named above, Leo Barbour, Steve Caldwell, 
Grace Coleman, Joel Grossman, Wilfred Holloway, Charles Johnson, Thomas 
Lombardi, Brenda Rabinowitz, Minette Richardson, Jack Schulze, Angela 
Thomas, Sarah Veale, and Keith Wandtke made key contributions to this 
report. 

[End of section] 

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Aviation Security: Better Planning Needed to Optimize Deployment of 
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2, 2005. 

Aviation Security: Secure Flight Development and Testing Under Way, but 
Risks Should Be Managed as System Is Further Developed. GAO-05-356. 
Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2005. 

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Washington, D.C.: March 15, 2005. 

Aviation Security: Measures for Testing the Impact of Using Commercial 
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Security Efforts. GAO-04-592T. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2004. 

Aviation Security: Challenges Delay Implementation of Computer- 
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Aviation Security: Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System 
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Transportation Security: Federal Action Needed to Enhance Security 
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Aviation Security: Terrorist Acts Illustrate Severe Weaknesses in 
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[End of section] 

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[End of figure] 

FOOTNOTES 

[1] The exact number of federal air marshals is classified. 

[2] Pub. L. No. 107-71,115 Stat. 597 (2001). 

[3] In March 2003, pursuant to the Homeland Security Act of 2002, FAMS, 
along with TSA, was transferred from the Department of Transportation 
to the Department of Homeland Security. Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 
2135. 

[4] FAMS was formerly located within DHS's Border and Transportation 
Security Directorate (BTS), one of five operational directorates within 
the department. As part of his July 2005 reorganization announcement, 
the Secretary of DHS proposed the dissolution of BTS, pending the 
enactment of legislation to effect this change. With the passage of the 
fiscal year 2006 Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act 
(Pub. L. No. 109-90), signed into law on October 18, 2005, the 
functions of BTS have been merged into other offices and component 
agencies throughout DHS. 

[5] The report containing sensitive security information is GAO, 
Aviation Security: Federal Air Marshal Service Could Benefit From 
Improved Planning and Controls, GAO-05-884SU (Washington D.C.: Sept. 
29, 2005). 

[6] GAO, Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist 
Mergers and Organizational Transformations, GAO-03-669 (Washington, 
D.C.: July 2, 2003), and GAO, Highlights of a GAO Forum: Mergers and 
Transformation: Lessons Learned for a Department of Homeland Security 
and Other Federal Agencies, GAO-03-293SP (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 14, 
2002). 

[7] The exact number of ICE agents who received cross-training is 
considered sensitive security information and discussed in the 
restricted version of this report, GAO-05-884SU. 

[8] See for example, GAO, Highlights of a GAO Forum: Mergers and 
Transformations: Lessons Learned for a Department of Homeland Security 
and Other Federal Agencies, GAO-03-293SP (Washington D.C.: Nov. 14, 
2002). 

[9] § 105 of ATSA amended title 49 of the United States Code by 
inserting § 44917 into chapter 449. 

[10] Members of the working group included the Director of FAMS and 
representatives from BTS, DHS, TSA, and ICE. 

[11] Federal air marshals are also subject to certain TSA operating 
procedures--which vary by airport--and to airline procedures in 
boarding aircraft, which differ by air carrier. In this regard, federal 
air marshals must interact, to varying degrees, with airline and 
airport personnel and TSA staff during the course of their daily 
mission. 

[12] More specific information regarding the nature of these incidents 
is considered sensitive security information and discussed in the 
restricted version of this report, GAO-05-884SU. 

[13] The Mission Operations Center controls daily operations and 
monitors ongoing missions by, among other things, tracking federal air 
marshal teams that are in the aviation domain worldwide. 

[14] As we noted earlier, the exact number of ICE agents who received 
cross-training is considered sensitive security information and 
discussed in the restricted version of this report, GAO-05-884SU. 

[15] See for example, GAO, Highlights of a GAO Forum: Mergers and 
Transformations: Lessons Learned for a Department of Homeland Security 
and Other Federal Agencies, GAO-03-293SP (Washington D.C.: Nov. 14, 
2002). 

[16] With agents located in 27 field offices throughout the United 
States, ICE's Office of Investigations enforces trade and immigration 
laws through the investigation of activities, persons, and incidents 
that may pose a threat to U.S. safety and security. These include the 
illegal trafficking in weapons, narcotics and contraband smuggling, 
human smuggling and trafficking, violations of the immigration system, 
money laundering and other financial crimes, fraudulent trade 
practices, child pornography, and child sex tourism. Its key missions 
are strengthening national security, combating smuggling and promoting 
public safety, and securing the nation's economic system from terrorist 
and criminal exploitation. 

[17] For example, see Statement of Michael J. Garcia, Assistant 
Secretary, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, Department of 
Homeland Security, before the Senate Appropriations Committee, 
Subcommittee on Homeland Security, March 30, 2004. 

[18] The exact number of ICE agents who were deployed is considered 
sensitive security information and discussed in the restricted version 
of this report, GAO-05-884SU. 

[19] Once these agents completed FAMS's 40-hour training program, they 
were temporarily assigned to the FAA's air marshal program to augment 
their security mission. 

[20] These agents were among the federal law enforcement officers used 
from various agencies who had been trained and deployed as temporary 
air marshals to augment the small number of federal air marshals 
employed at that time. These officers acted as a stopgap measure, while 
FAMS selected, hired, trained, and deployed permanent air marshals. 

[21] H.R. Rep. No. 108-541, at 32, 36 (June 15, 2004).

[22] H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 108-774, at 46 (Oct. 9, 2004). 

[23] Under OPM's position classification standards, aviation security 
specialists are classified within the general inspection, 
investigation, and compliance occupational series (referred to as a GS- 
1801), which involves ensuring compliance with federal laws, 
regulations, or mandatory guidelines. Criminal investigator positions 
are classified within the "criminal" investigation occupational series 
(referred to as a GS-1811), which involves planning and investigating 
alleged or suspected criminal violations. 

[24] Board members included ICE's Deputy Assistant Secretary, the 
senior advisor to ICE's Deputy Assistant Secretary, the special counsel 
to ICE's Assistant Secretary, FAMS's Deputy Director, and two FAMS 
field senior executives. 

[25] GAO, Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist 
Mergers and Organizational Transformations, GAO-03-669 (Washington, 
D.C.: July 2, 2003). 

[26] For example, see GAO, Department of Homeland Security: A 
Comprehensive and Sustained Approach Needed to Achieve Management 
Integration, GAO-05-139 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 16, 2005) and GAO, 
Homeland Security: Critical Design and Implementation Issues, GAO-02-
957T (Washington, D.C.: July 17, 2002). 

[27] GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, 
GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1 (Washington, D.C.: November 1999). 

[28] Specifically, the federal air marshal contacts a designated 
controller at the Mission Operations Center to describe the details of 
the incident. The controller then attempts to provide guidance to the 
federal air marshal to help resolve the incident. If the controller 
cannot resolve the situation at that point in time, he/she refers the 
federal air marshal to a designated watch officer at the Operations 
Center who will attempt to resolve the incident directly or provide 
guidance to the federal air marshal for resolving the issue. 

[29] According to FAMS, mission reports do not include incidents that 
present a direct or imminent threat to aircraft, passengers, crew, or 
other persons or property. In the event that federal air marshals 
encounter incidents that pose such threats, they can file an "incident 
report." 

[30] FAMS field offices have assigned federal air marshal supervisors 
to serve as on-site airport liaisons at various airports that are 
within their geographical location. In general, these liaisons assist 
in establishing and maintaining effective working relationships with 
airport, law enforcement, and private industry officials. Liaison 
duties include, among other things, addressing with the local Federal 
Security Director at their assigned airport various incidents 
identified in mission reports, providing a consistent federal air 
marshal presence at airports, performing surveillance detection and 
counter-surveillance in their airport, and following up on suspicious 
individuals and activities reported by federal air marshals while 
carrying out their mission. 

[31] The report containing sensitive security information is GAO, 
Aviation Security: Federal Air Marshal Service Could Benefit From 
Improved Planning and Controls, GAO-05-884SU (Washington D.C.: Sept. 
29, 2005). 

[32] GAO, Highlights of a GAO Forum, Mergers and Transformations: 
Lessons Learned for a Department of Homeland Security and Other Federal 
Agencies, GAO-03-292SP (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 14, 2002). 

[33] GAO issues standards for internal control in the federal 
government as required by the Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act 
of 1982. See 31 U.S.C. § 3512(c). GAO first issued the standards in 
1983. GAO revised the standards and reissued them as Standards for 
Internal Control in the Federal Government, GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1 
(Washington, D.C.: November 1999). These standards provide the overall 
framework for establishing and maintaining internal control and for 
identifying and addressing major performance challenges and areas at 
greatest risk for fraud, waste and abuse, and mismanagement. GAO issued 
its Internal Control Management and Evaluation Tool, GAO-01-1008G 
(Washington, D.C.: August 2001) to assist agencies in maintaining or 
implementing effective internal control and, when needed, to help 
determine what, where, and how improvements can be implemented. 

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