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entitled 'Information Concerning the Arming of Commercial Pilots' which 
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June 28, 2002:



The Honorable Ernest F. Hollings:



Chairman, Committee on Commerce, 



Science, and Transportation:



United States Senate:



Subject: Information Concerning the Arming of Commercial Pilots:



Dear Mr. Chairman:



Since the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, legislation has been 

enacted to enhance the nation’s approach to aviation security. 

Specifically, the Aviation and Transportation Security Act created the 

Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and, among other actions, 

federalized passenger and baggage screening staff at airports and 

authorized the arming of commercial pilots, subject to the approval of 

the Under Secretary of Transportation for Security and other 

conditions. [Footnote 1] On May 21, 2002, the Under Secretary testified 

that he would not approve the arming of commercial pilots because he 

believed they must focus exclusively on flying the aircraft. However, 

the question of arming pilots remains open because H.R. 4635, 

introduced on May 1, 2002, would require TSA to establish a program to 

arm pilots within 90 days of the bill’s enactment. On June 19, 2002, 

the House Transportation and Infrastructure’s Subcommittee on Aviation 

passed an amended version of H.R. 4635 to:



* limit the maximum number of pilots participating in this pilot 
program 

to 2 percent of the total number of pilots employed by air carriers 

and:



* require that TSA address a number of procedural issues before 
beginning 

the selection, training, and deputizing of pilots.



In addition, four other bills, introduced before the Aviation and 

Transportation Security Act’s enactment, include proposals to carry 

weapons. [Footnote 2] (See enc. I for more detailed information.)



To facilitate congressional decision-making, you asked us to provide 

information on (1) reasons for and against allowing pilots to carry 

firearms in the cockpit; (2) questions to be addressed if pilots were 

to be armed; and (3) possible alternatives to arming pilots, such as 

providing them with less-than-lethal weapons. On May 20, 2002, we 

briefed you on the results of our work. This report summarizes the 

information we provided at that time.



To obtain the information you requested, we analyzed a docket of over 

7,500 comments that the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) had 

received by March 15, 2002, in response to a request for comments, 

published in the Federal Register on December 31, 2001, [Footnote 3] on 

whether pilots should be allowed to carry firearms in the cockpit. 

[Footnote 4] Our analysis included all comments from airlines, trade 

associations, unions, other advocacy groups, and aviation security 

firms and a sample of comments from individuals. In addition, we 

examined available research studies on the potential risks and benefits 

of using firearms on aircraft and possible alternatives, such as the 

use of less-than-lethal weapons. We identified only one study that 

addressed the use of firearms on aircraft; this study focused on 

structural damage to aircraft by ammunition and bombs. We also examined 

a study by the National Institute of Justice, mandated by the Aviation 

and Transportation Security Act, on the potential use of less-than- 

lethal weapons on aircraft. [Footnote 5] To obtain further information, 

we interviewed industry aviation security experts on the issue of 

arming pilots with firearms or less-than-lethal weapons. Finally, we 

reviewed articles and position papers by airlines, industry 

associations, pilot and flight attendant unions, and other 

organizations. The detailed results of our analysis appear in 

enclosures II, III, and IV. We performed our work in accordance with 

generally accepted government auditing standards in May and June 2002.



Results in Brief:



Without additional research, the potential benefits, risks, and costs 

of using weapons on aircraft cannot be fully determined. Proponents’ 

and opponents’ views on allowing pilots to carry firearms in the 

cockpit fell into four categories: the potential effectiveness, risk, 

and cost-effectiveness of their carrying weapons, and the policy issues 

that would arise if pilots were allowed to carry weapons. For example, 

proponents saw arming pilots as a last line of defense if other 

security measures failed, while opponents considered the current 

security enhancements, such as improved screening and increases in the 

number of federal air marshals, sufficient. Views also differed on 

whether arming pilots with firearms would be effective or safe. 

Proponents maintained that arming pilots would be more cost-effective 

than other security enhancements, while opponents contrasted the 

potentially high costs of the risks with the small benefits they 

anticipated. Finally, views differed on the public policy implications 

of arming pilots. Proponents cited the potential deterrent value of 

firearms and past regulatory precedents for arming pilots (see enc. I), 

whereas opponents cited the moral dilemma pilots would face if they 

were prohibited from using firearms outside the cockpit and passengers 

or crew members were being threatened in the cabin (see enc. III). 

Opponents also said that arming pilots would introduce from 10,000 to 

100,000 guns into our society. Enclosure II summarizes the reasons for 

and against arming pilots that we obtained from our analysis of FAA’s 

docket and from our research and interviews. 



If pilots were to be armed, a number of questions would need to be 

resolved, such as (1) who would regulate and oversee pilots’ carriage 

of weapons; (2) what qualifications and training would pilots need to 

carry weapons; (3) what types of weapons could be carried and how would 

they be maintained, stored, and transported; (4) what modifications to 

aircraft would be required; and (5) how much would it cost to arm 

pilots. FAA raised some of these questions in its request for comments, 

and some respondents raised additional questions and proposed 

solutions. Most respondents that addressed these questions were 

proponents of arming pilots. Yet even these proponents expressed a 

range of views on critical questions, such as whether pilots’ 

participation would be voluntary, whether the use of firearms would be 

restricted to defending the cockpit, and where the firearms would be 

stored between flights. The responses generally attempted to maximize 

the effectiveness of any program to arm pilots while minimizing its 

risk to safety and security. Opponents of arming pilots generally did 

not address these questions or maintained that the questions could not 

be addressed in a way that would sufficiently mitigate unacceptable 

risks to safety and security. Enclosure III summarizes these questions. 



The National Institute of Justice reviewed the information available on 

less-than-lethal weapons, as mandated by the Aviation and 

Transportation Security Act, and identified six general categories--

electrical shock, chemical, impact projectile, physical restraint, 

light, and acoustic. [Footnote 6] While FAA’s request for comments did 

not identify particular types of less-than-lethal weapons that might be 

used as alternatives to firearms, most of the comments that FAA 

received on less-than-lethal weapons and most of the Institute’s study 

focused on electric shock devices, which are already used outside 

aircraft for law enforcement purposes, such as riot control. Proponents 

of arming pilots with these devices emphasized their ability to 

incapacitate an aggressor without posing a lethal risk to others, while 

opponents noted that recovery from electrical shock takes less than a 

minute and that the effectiveness of the devices can be limited in a 

variety of ways. Although one major U.S. carrier has tested electric 

shock devices onboard aircraft and has found no effects on 

airworthiness, the Institute regards their effects on aircraft avionics 

as unknown and favors further testing. Observations on the other less-

than-lethal weapons focused primarily on their value as temporary 

deterrents to aggressors and on the difficulty of controlling their 

effects. Enclosure IV provides more detailed information on these 

weapons.



In addition to less-than-lethal weapons, we identified other security 

enhancements that organizations or individuals suggested as 

alternatives to arming pilots. These included:



* providing additional training for pilots in maneuvers that could 

disable attackers, such as steeply banking the aircraft;



* installing technical improvements that would allow the aircraft to be 

controlled from the ground if the pilot were disabled or the aircraft 

were hijacked;



* adding other enhancements to cockpit security, including changes to 
the 

design and equipment of aircraft that would (1) limit access to the 

cockpit by unauthorized personnel, such as the double-door system used 

by El Al, Israel’s national airline or (2) permit the flight crew to 

monitor cabin activities through the use of video cameras in the cabin; 

and:



* having more armed security or law enforcement officers onboard.



Detailed information was not available on the feasibility or cost of 

these suggested alternatives.



Agency Comments:



We provided the Department of Transportation with a draft of this 

report for its review and comment. The Department generally agreed that 

the information in the report fairly presented the range of opinions on 

the issue of arming pilots. The Department provided technical 

corrections that we incorporated as appropriate.



We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Transportation 

and will make copies available to others upon request. If you have any 

questions about our work, please contact me at (202) 512-2834. Key 

contributors to this letter were Bonnie Beckett, Michael Bollinger, 

Elizabeth Eisenstadt, David Goldstein, Heather Krause, Teresa Spisak, 

and Alwynne Wilbur.



In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO web 

site at http://www.gao.gov.



Sincerely yours,



Gerald L. Dillingham:



Director, Physical Infrastructure Issues.



Signed by Gerald L. Dillingham.



[End of Section]



Enclosure I: 



Background Information on Arming Pilots:



In 1961, regulations [Footnote 7] promulgated by the former Federal 

Aviation Agency, now the FAA, exempted law enforcement officers and 

other persons authorized by air carriers, such as pilots and other crew 

members, from a general prohibition against the carriage of weapons 

aboard aircraft. In 1975, the FAA changed the provision covering the 

nation’s largest commercial carriers (known as part 121 carriers) to 

provide that law enforcement officers or crew members, including 

pilots, could not carry weapons onboard aircraft unless (1) the FAA 

Administrator, as well as the carrier, authorized the carriage of 

weapons and (2) the individual successfully completed a course of 

training in the use of the weapon. On July 21, 2001, FAA limited the 

carriage of weapons on aircraft to certain law enforcement officers. 

[Footnote 8]:



Although pilots and other crew members are currently prohibited from 

carrying weapons onboard aircraft, the Aviation and Transportation 

Security Act raises the possibility of arming pilots in the future. 

Specifically, this act authorizes air carrier pilots to carry a firearm 

in the cockpit if:



* the Under Secretary of Transportation for Security approves;



* the air carrier approves;



* the firearm is approved by the Under Secretary; and:



* the pilot has received proper training in the use of the firearm, as 

determined by the Under Secretary.



TSA has issued regulations that will continue to allow the arming of 

pilots who operate in special situations. Specifically, TSA will 

continue to allow guns onboard aircraft if they are part of a state-

required emergency kit. Alaskan law, for example, provides that 

certain aircraft must have emergency equipment onboard, including a 

firearm, in case they make a forced landing at a remote wilderness 

location. [Footnote 9] This regulation becomes effective on June 24, 

2002.



[End of Section]



Enclosure II: 



Reasons for and against Arming Pilots:



Issue; Need; Reasons presented by those in favor of arming pilots; We 

need a last line of defense if other security measures fail. Reasons 

presented by those opposed to arming pilots: Current security 

enhancements, such as improved screening, increases in the number of 

federal air marshals, and cockpit door reinforcement, are sufficient.



Issue; Effectiveness; Reasons presented by those in favor of arming 

pilots; Firearms are a highly effective means of permanently disabling 

one or multiple attackers. Arming pilots is the best deterrent to 

hijackers. Reasons presented by those opposed to arming pilots: 

Firearms are not sufficiently effective compared with the risks they 

present. Trained law enforcement officials have only an 18 to 22 
percent 

hit ratio in armed confrontation. The cramped quarters of a cockpit do 
not 

lend themselves to success.



Issue; Risk; Reasons presented by those in favor of arming pilots; 

The risk to aircraft integrity, including depressurizing aircraft 

or damaging vital flight components, is very small. The risk to 

other people onboard is very small, particularly if the firearms are 

used only in the cockpit and pilots are well trained. Only when all 

other measures have failed would the pilot be authorized to use the 

firearm to protect the cockpit. Pilots are trained to do several 

tasks at once and would be able to incorporate the use of a firearm 

into their other tasks. Many pilots have had previous military 

training in the use of firearms. Reasons presented by those opposed 

to arming pilots: The risk to aircraft integrity, including 

depressurizing the aircraft or damaging vital flight components, 

is significant. The risk to other people is significant. The firearm 

could be used against a pilot or other passengers. Violence Policy 

Center cites statistics that 21 percent of officers killed with a 

handgun were shot with their own weapon. Accidental weapon discharge 

and pilot mishandling of the weapon are also risks. Pilots are 

trained to land aircraft quickly in an emergency, and in an emergency 

this should be their primary task. Firearms could distract pilots from 

their critical mission of flying and landing the aircraft. Military 

training for ground combat differs significantly from what would be 

needed to defend the cockpit. Generally, law-enforcement officers have 

serious objections to arming pilots.



Issue; Cost-effectiveness; Reasons presented by those in favor of 
arming 

pilots; Arming pilots is cost-effective when compared with the cost of 

expanding the federal marshal program or implementing other security 

enhancements. Reasons presented by those opposed to arming pilots: 

Arming pilots is not cost-effective when compared with the risks it 

would present and the small likelihood it would be beneficial.



Issue; Policy issues; Reasons presented by those in favor of arming 
pilots; 

There is a precedent for arming pilots: FAA authorized the arming of 
flight 

crew members in the 1960s. Section 128 of the Aviation and 
Transportation 

Security Act permits air carrier pilots to carry a TSA-approved firearm 

into the cockpit if approved by the Under Secretary for TSA and the 
carrier, 

and if the pilot has received proper training. Reasons presented by 
those 

opposed to arming pilots: Arming pilots would introduce 10,000-100,000 

guns into our society, contradicting other efforts to discourage the 

number of firearms in the population. Arming pilots might lead to other 

transportation workers requesting to carry weapons onboard aircraft. 

For example, the Maryland Pilots’ Association has petitioned to allow 

ship captains to carry their weapons onboard aircraft when in transit 

to their ships. In addition, it might lead to requests for the arming 

of other transportation workers, such as bus or taxi drivers.; ; Many 

air carriers oppose arming pilots because of concerns about liability, 

training, and storage of the weapons when not in use.



Sources: Comments received as of March 15, 2002, on FAA docket 2001- 

111229, published in the Federal Register on December 31, 2001; 

testimonies on May 2, 2002, before the Subcommittee on Aviation, House 

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, by Sarah V. Hart, 

Director, National Institute of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, 

and Henry P. Krakowski, Vice President, Safety, Security, and Quality 

Assurance, United Airlines; literature search; and interviews with 

aviation experts and officials from DOT, FAA, and TSA.



[End of Table]



[End of Section]



Enclosure III:



Questions to Be Addressed If Pilots Were to Be Armed:



Topic; Regulation and oversight; Questions: How would protocols be 

established and enforced? What entity would decide what types of 

weapons, ammunition, or aircraft modifications would be required and 

whether airlines or pilots would have any choice in these matters? 

What entity would be responsible for ensuring that only acceptable 

firearms and ammunition were used on aircraft, and how would it 

accomplish this? How would the use of firearms by unauthorized persons 

be prevented? What entity would be responsible for establishing 

protocols for the use of firearms and to minimize risks such as 

unauthorized use or accidental discharge? How would the defensive

efforts of armed pilots, air marshals, and other law enforcement 

officers be coordinated?



Topic; Pilot qualifications; Questions: What qualifications, if any, 

would be used to establish which pilots would be permitted to carry 

firearms? If carriage of a firearm were authorized, would carriage be 

at the pilot’s discretion? What background checks or other screening 

would be required? Would all pilots of commercial airlines be permitted 

to carry firearms? Would periodic recertification of pilots be 
required? 

What actions by a pilot, such as the commission of a felony or 
misdemeanor 

or the abuse of alcohol or drugs, would trigger an automatic review of 

the right to carry a firearm? Would pilots of cargo-only aircraft be 

permitted to carry firearms? Would any types of general aviation 

pilots be permitted to carry firearms? ; Would permission to carry 

firearms first be offered to those pilots with prior military or law 

enforcement experience? Would the qualifications for using firearms 

be integrated into the existing systems for establishing and 

maintaining airman qualifications, such as pilot certifications and 

ratings?



Topic; Deputizing of pilots; Questions: Would pilots be deputized as 

law enforcement officers? What rights would this grant pilots beyond 

the carriage of weapons in aircraft cockpits? How would this affect 

liability issues?



Topic; Training of pilots in the use of firearms; Questions: What 
entity 

would provide firearms training to pilots? ; Would the training require 

certification? How extensive would the initial training be and what 

would it cover? Would recurrent training be required, and if so, how 

often and what type? If the weapon were stored on the aircraft, would 

training be required for other personnel who had access to the 

aircraft?



Topic; When and where to use firearms; Questions: Under what 
circumstances 

would pilots be authorized to use firearms? Would pilots be restricted 

to using firearms to defend the cockpit? If there were two pilots, 
would 

one be permitted to use the firearm in the cabin as long as the other 

remained in the cockpit? If a pilot had a firearm in the cockpit, 

would a severe disturbance in the cabin present an unacceptable moral 

dilemma?



Topic; Type(s) of firearms and ammunition; Questions: What type(s) of 

firearms and ammunition would be most appropriate to meet the dual 

purpose of maximizing the pilot’s ability to permanently disable an 

attacker while minimizing the risk of damage to the aircraft and 

other people?  What criteria would be used (e.g., simplicity, caliber, 

maintenance, reloading) in authorizing types of weapons and ammunition?

Which weapons have the least risk of accidental discharge? Are the 

weapons that have been authorized for use by FBI agents or air marshals 

appropriate for pilots?



Topic; Maintenance of firearms; Questions: Who would be responsible for 

the maintenance and care of the firearms? What procedures would be 

required to ensure that the firearm was properly maintained and cared 

for, and to reduce the possibility of accidental discharge?



Topic; Storage and transportation of firearms; Questions: How would 

firearms be stored to minimize security risks? Would firearms be stored 

on the aircraft, at the airport, or with the pilot? If the firearm were 

stored on the aircraft or in the airport, what kind of lock and 
container 

would be used to ensure security, and how would access be controlled? 
If 

the firearm remained with the pilot, how would the authority be 

established for the pilot to carry the firearm from home to work or 
during 

overnight stays in other cities, states, or foreign countries? Given 

that it is not uncommon for pilots to cross state lines in their 

commute between home and the place their work duties begin, how would 

jurisdictional issues regarding interstate travel with a concealed 

firearm be resolved? If the firearm remained with the pilot, how 

would the firearm be transported through the airport to the aircraft? 

Would current screening procedures be revised? Would separate screening 

facilities for pilots be established to facilitate pilots getting 

through security without delays while minimizing their contact with the 

public while in possession of a firearm?; How would the security and 

liability risks associated with each option be addressed? Are the 

procedures that have been established for federal air marshals on these 

matters appropriate for pilots?



Topic; Aircraft modifications; Questions: Would aircraft modifications 
be 

required for the storage of weapons? Would aircraft modifications be 

required to reduce the possibility of damage to key aircraft components 

caused by a bullet?



Topic; International issues; Questions: How would pilots handle 
firearms 

when flying to or from other countries? Are the procedures that have 
been 

established for air marshals on this matter appropriate for pilots?  

Would foreign pilots flying for a foreign air carrier be permitted to 

carry firearms when flying on routes in the United States?



Topic; Cost; Questions: Is arming pilots a cost-effective way to 
increase 

aviation security?  How much would it cost to purchase firearms and 

ammunition for pilots, train pilots, service and maintain firearms, 

and make any necessary modifications to aircraft? Would liability 
concerns 

raise insurance costs? What other costs would be involved? What entity 

would bear the cost of arming pilots? Would arming pilots be less 

expensive than sufficiently expanding the air marshal program?



Topic; Coordination; Questions: How would armed pilots coordinate 

with air marshals and other law enforcement officers on the aircraft 

to minimize risk and confusion?



Sources: Comments received as of March 15, 2002, on FAA docket 2001- 

111229, published in the Federal Register on December 31, 2001; 

testimonies on May 2, 2002, before the Subcommittee on Aviation, House 

Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, by Sarah V. Hart, 

Director, National Institute of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, 

and Henry P. Krakowski, Vice President, Safety, Security, and Quality 

Assurance, United Airlines; literature search; and interviews with 

aviation experts and officials from DOT, TSA, and FAA.



[End of Table]



[End of Section]



Enclosure IV:



Less-Than-Lethal Weapons:



The National Institute of Justice has identified six general categories 

of less-than-lethal weapons--electrical shock, chemical, impact 

projectile, physical restraint, light, and acoustic. Weapons in the 

first three categories already exist. Weapons in the last two 

categories are currently under development. Because the effects of 

these less-than-lethal weapons are temporary, physical restraints, 

which are not considered weapons, are often used in conjunction with 

them. The following table provides information, where applicable, on 

the types of weapons in each category, their benefits and 

disadvantages, and their readiness for deployment. 



Electric shock; Types; Characteristics: Handheld direct-contact 
weapon: 

Has two probes that are pressed against an aggressor’s skin or 
clothing. 

When the operator presses a switch, the skin contact and pressed switch 

complete a circuit and the subject receives a debilitating and possibly 

painful electrical shock. Dart-firing electrical shocking device: Fires 

two barbs connected to trailing wires that lead back to the operator; 

contact with the subject’s skin or clothing completes an electrical 

circuit, and an electrical discharge automatically results.



Electric shock; Benefits; Characteristics: Immediately incapacitates 

an aggressor, who loses control over muscles and nerves and cannot 

perform coordinated action. Not likely to kill or maim. Can be 

reactivated repeatedly as long as the wires remain attached to the 

assailant. Can be used in a confined space, especially if handheld. 

Not likely to damage buildings or aircraft fuselages or to ignite 

standard solids or black gunpowder. Easier to control than chemicals 

and less likely to cause damage than blunt instruments, such as beanbag 

weapons.; Easy to operate--little training needed.



Electric shock; Disadvantages; Characteristics: Does not disable an 

aggressor for long--recovery takes less than a minute. Highly motivated 

and trained aggressors may be able to withstand the effects. Can be 

used on only one aggressor at a time and requires immediate use of 

physical restraints. Can be deflected by a book or dinner tray; may be 

foiled by thick clothing; may not penetrate soft body armor. 
Effectiveness 

substantially limited if one probe lands on a nonconductive surface 
(e.g., 

concrete, asphalt, or wood). Range of dart version may be too great for 

the cockpit or inadequate for the cabin. Sparks can ignite some 
flammable 

liquids, vapors, or sensitive explosives. Requires preventative 
maintenance

--batteries must be fully charged.



Electric shock; Readiness for deployment; Characteristics: Deployment 

has begun. Presently used by three international foreign carriers. 

At least one domestic carrier has provided training and another three 

are moving forward on using these items. One carrier has tested devices 

on all types of aircraft it flies and has found no effect on 
airworthiness 

and negligible effects on electrical and electronic equipment during 

testing, and has purchased several hundred devices.; National Institute 

of Justice considers weapon’s effects on aircraft avionics and other 

critical systems unknown--favors further testing.



Chemicals; Types; Characteristics: Tear gas and pepper spray; 
Anesthetics 

or calmative chemicals.



Chemicals; Benefits; Characteristics: Tear gas, pepper spray can limit 

mobility of an aggressor. Anesthetics or calmative chemicals could be 

released, potentially remotely, into the cabin to incapacitate all 

passengers, including hijackers, until the plane can be safely landed.



Chemicals; Disadvantages; Characteristics: Chemicals cannot be 
adequately 

controlled in an aircraft and may contaminate pilots and flight 
attendants, 

although handheld dispensers of pepper spray offer better control than 
tear 

gas. Some individuals may become more violent in response to the use of 

these chemicals. Tear gas and pepper spray have reversible, but not 
rapidly 

reversible, effects--problematic if flight crew is affected. 

Anesthetics or calmative chemicals; do not take effect rapidly, may 

create unacceptable health risks to infants and persons with upper 

respiratory problems, and; may prevent other passengers from helping to 

immobilize or restrain hijackers.



Chemicals; Readiness for deployment; Characteristics: Remains under 

study or development. Should be tested in multiple aircraft settings 

before any deployment.



Impact projectiles; Types; Characteristics: Rubber bullet or blunt 

trauma projectile.



Impact projectiles; Benefits; Characteristics: May be appropriate in 

the aircraft’s cabin, where restrictions on space are less severe and 

the risk of damage to critical systems or injury to the flight crew are 

reduced.



Impact projectiles; Disadvantages; Characteristics: Degree of 

incapacitation varies greatly. Effect can wear off quickly. 

Not designed for use in confined spaces--launched from a pump-action 

shotgun or a single round tear gas gun that requires two hands to 
operate. 

Large and not designed to be easily carried on a belt or in a pocket.



Impact projectiles; Readiness for deployment; Characteristics: Should 
be 

tested in multiple aircraft settings before any deployment.



Physical restraints[A]; Types; Characteristics: Handcuffs Nets--also 
exist 

in a prototype electrified design; Surface chemicals applied to 
surfaces 

to make them extremely slippery or extremely sticky, to impede the 
movement 

of an aggressor.



Physical restraints[A]; Benefits; Characteristics: Handcuffs and 
flexible 

cuffs--common and useful in conjunction with less-than-lethal weapons.



Physical restraints[A]; Disadvantages; Characteristics: Nets are 
probably 

not adequate to incapacitate a determined and trained hijacker. Surface 

chemicals could impede efforts of passengers and crew to subdue 
hijacker.

Deployment may not be fast enough to be helpful. Net guns are not 
practical 

in the cabin.



Physical restraints[A]; Readiness for deployment; Characteristics: 
Effect 

of electrified nets on aircraft electrical systems is unknown--further 

testing is needed.



Light; Types; Characteristics: Bright white lights or lasers can 
produce 

a “wall of light” that may deter an aggressor from attacking someone 

behind the light.



Light; Benefits; Characteristics: Lower power level could be used to 

distract or delay the advance of an aggressor and provide time for 

passengers and crew to protect themselves or restrain the aggressor.



Light; Disadvantages; Characteristics: May not prevent determined 

aggressor from using a weapon. If powerful enough to disable an 

aggressor, may cause eye damage.



Light; Readiness for deployment; Characteristics: Still being developed 

by the Department of Defense with support from the National Institute 

of Justice. Should be tested in multiple aircraft settings before any 

deployment.



Acoustics; Types; Characteristics: A sound source produces acoustic 

energy at audible and inaudible frequencies.



Acoustics; Benefits; Characteristics: “Ear-splitting” audible sounds 

halt the advance of an aggressor.



Acoustics; Readiness for deployment; Characteristics: Still being 

developed by the Department of Defense with support from the National 

Institute of Justice. Should be tested in multiple aircraft settings 

before any deployment.



[A] Although not considered weapons, physical restraints are used in 

conjunction with less-than-lethal weapons. 



Sources: Comments received as of March 15, 2002, on FAA docket 2001- 

111229, published in the Federal Register on December 31, 2001; 

interviews with aviation experts; and testimonies on May 2, 2002, 

before the Subcommittee on Aviation, House Committee on Transportation 

and Infrastructure, by Sarah V. Hart, Director, National Institute of 

Justice, Office of Justice Programs, and Henry P. Krakowski, Vice 

President, Safety, Security, and Quality Assurance, United Airlines.



[End of Table]



[End of Section]



(540026):



FOOTNOTES



[1] P.L. 107-71, November 19, 2001.



[2] H.R. 2958, H.R. 2896, H.R. 3171, and S. 1463. 



[3] 66 Fed. Reg. 67620.



[4] According to FAA’s analysis, more than 96 percent of the comments 

favored the arming of pilots. FAA noted that more than 99 percent of 

the comments were from individuals and pilots and that most of the 

comments appeared to have been solicited by a few gun advocacy groups. 

FAA also noted that less than 1 percent of the comments were from 

organizations, such as industry associations, unions, airlines, public 

interest groups, or security-related businesses. 



[5] For publicly available information on this report, see the 
testimony 

of Sarah V. Hart, Director, National Institute of Justice, Office of 

Justice Programs, before the Subcommittee on Aviation, House Committee 

on Transportation and Infrastructure, May 2, 2002.



[6] Weapons in the first three categories already exist. Weapons in the 

last two categories are currently under development. Because the 

effects of these less-than-lethal weapons are temporary, physical 

restraints, which are not considered weapons, are often used in 

conjunction with them.



[7] These regulations initially responded to hijackings of U.S. 
aircraft 

to Cuba.



[8] See 66 Fed. Reg. 37330.



[9] 9 C.F.R. 1544.103. 67 Fed. Reg. 8205, February 22, 2002.