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REPORT TO THE CONGRESS 095945



Telling America's Story
To The World --
Problems And Issues

B-118654

United States Information Agency

**BY THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL
OF THE UNITED STATES**

MARCH 25, 1974

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ABBREVIATIONS

GAO	General Accounting Office
USIA	United States Information Agency
USIS	United States Information Service
VOA	Voice of America

D I G E S T

WHY THE REVIEW WAS MADE

The unofficial slogan of the United States Information Agency (USIA) is "Telling America's Story to the World." Despite the seemingly uncontroversial nature of this slogan, there is substantial disagreement over the type of information to be distributed in foreign countries and USIA's role in the foreign affairs community.

GAO reviewed USIA's mission and goals over its 20-year history to determine whether they were current, realistic, and even achievable. Overall direction of the USIA program and the approaches used in carrying out its mandate were scrutinized.

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS

Program direction

For the U.S. overseas information program to function efficiently and effectively, the executive branch and the Congress must agree on the overall direction of the USIA program. (See p. 22.) It was the understanding of the Congress--through the Smith-Mundt Act of 1948--to promote a better mutual understanding between the peoples of the United States and other countries. However, USIA's current mission--last defined by President Kennedy in 1963--is to help achieve U.S. foreign policy objectives.

The approaches to be used in accomplishing this mission--influencing public attitudes in other nations and advising the President on the implications of foreign opinion for present and contemplated U.S. policies, programs, and official statements--have been a subject of continuing controversy. They remain unresolved. (See p. 22.)

Issues related to USIA's efforts to influence public attitudes involve

--the role of propaganda in the overseas information program (see p. 24),

--the propriety of not identifying certain media materials as being USIA produced and distributed (see p. 26),

--the practice of directing some media products to the masses and others to elite groups (see p. 28),

--the production of media products for worldwide distribution as contrasted to targeting products to specific geographic areas and (see p. 34), and

--the continuation of USIA activities in their present form and intensity in those countries where communications facilities are similar to those in the United States (see p. 37).

Although it was intended that USIA should take the initiative in advising the President and other departments and agencies on the implications of foreign opinion for present and contemplated U.S. policies, GAO believes that USIA is not in a position to effectively do this.

Its participation in the National Security Council is limited and a formalized system for providing guidance to several agencies having programs with possible foreign opinion implications is lacking. (See pp. 42 to 45.)

Because of USIA's limited participation at the highest level of the Government's foreign policymaking process, USIA could be unaware of changes in direction in U.S. foreign policy.

The lack of advance knowledge of top decisionmakers' contemplated policies would hamper USIA's ability to advise other agencies on the implications of these policies for foreign opinion or to effectively plan for programs and products to support these policies. (See p. 45.)

Program effectiveness

USIA annually spends about \$200 million on the overseas information program. Yet it is unable to measure with any preciseness the effectiveness of its products or its worldwide operations.

The difficulties and complexities involved in determining the impact of its operations on foreign audiences are readily recognizable; however, GAO believes that USIA should strive to obtain more than secondary or sporadic evidence of its effectiveness.

In spite of concern over the effectiveness of the program, not only

by the Advisory Commission on Information, but also by the Congress, USIA has still not devised adequate research methods to respond to the problem. (See p. 47.)

GAO believes that, before the measuring capabilities of USIA can be strengthened, a fundamental issue must be resolved: The Congress and the executive branch must agree on the aims and expected achievements of USIA operations.

The agreement should provide aims which USIA can further define in terms of specific goals that can be objectively measured within a specific time frame.

Although USIA has conducted and is conducting or contracting for various types of research studies, GAO believes that none of these directly address the issue of measuring program impact. (See p. 48.)

RECOMMENDATIONS

This report contains no recommendations to USIA.

AGENCY ACTIONS AND UNRESOLVED ISSUES

USIA took no specific action as a result of the GAO review.

USIA believed that, in conducting the overseas information program, its present practices--directing resources to both the masses and elite groups, expanding the use of targeted products, and continuing program efforts in the more sophisticated countries--were reasonable. (See pp. 31, 36, and 40.)

USIA felt that a stronger role in the policymaking process is the practical approach for increasing the effectiveness of its advisory responsibility. (See p. 46.)

USIA also believed that a closer association with the Congress in setting its overall goals and the level of resources needed to achieve them could only be beneficial.

MATTERS FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE CONGRESS

In view of the significant changes in the world and its peoples, a reform may be needed to communicate America's story to the world more effectively.

Such a reform, GAO believes, must be predicated upon the long-range U.S. objectives to be achieved in this and future decades. (See p. 19.)

GAO believes that the Congress, with its oversight responsibility for Government activities, is in a good position to evaluate the varied aspects of the overseas information program and related

political, economic, and strategic ramifications.

Accordingly, the Congress may wish to:

- Assess the objectives and goals established for the overseas information program.
- Determine the types of peoples that should be reached, especially in light of vast communication changes of the last 20 years.
- Establish policies and priorities necessary to "Telling America's Story To The World."

Also, GAO believes the Congress should require USIA to develop a formal program evaluation system and to report annually to the Congress the results of its evaluation efforts.

Additional GAO observations on the matters above begin on page 19.



COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20548

B-118654

CI To the President of the Senate and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives


This report presents our findings and conclusions concerning the role of the United States Information Agency in the foreign affairs community and the problems and issues inherent in the overseas information program. The report also contains a number of matters for consideration by the Congress.

We made this review pursuant to the Budget and Accounting Act, 1921 (31 U.S.C. 53), and the Accounting and Auditing Act of 1950 (31 U.S.C. 67).

We are sending copies of this report to the Director, Office of Management and Budget, and to the Director, United States Information Agency.

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "James B. Stacks".

Comptroller General
of the United States



CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

DEVELOPMENT OF INFORMATIONAL ACTIVITIES

International information activities of the U.S. Government officially began when the Committee on Public Information, known as the Creel Committee, was established in 1917. It operated during World War I and went out of existence in 1919. Not until 1934, when an Information Service was formed in the Division of Current Information, Department of State, did U.S. interest in international informational activities revive.

The next step in implementing an overseas information program was taken in 1938 with the establishment of the Interdepartmental Committee on Cooperation with the American Republics and State's Division of Cultural Relations. These groups were to develop more effective relations between the United States and other American countries. In 1940 the Office of the Coordinator for Inter-American Affairs was established as a separate agency.

In 1941 the Foreign Information Service and the Office of Facts and Figures were established to report on the foreign war and U.S. defense efforts, respectively, and most of these activities were consolidated into the Office of War Information in 1942. The Office of Strategic Services also became involved in providing war information overseas. In 1944 State's Division of International Information was established to coordinate its activities with those of the Coordinator for Inter-American Affairs and the Office of War Information.

At the end of World War II, the Office of War Information and the Office of the Coordinator for Inter-American Affairs were abolished and their functions temporarily placed under the Interim International Information Service before being combined with State's international information and cultural activities. In 1946 State's Office of International Information and Cultural Affairs was established to administer a greatly reduced information program. This Office was later reorganized into the Office of International Information and Educational Exchange to administer educational exchange programs; relationships with binational institutes abroad; and the reduced radio, press, and film programs.

UNITED STATES INFORMATION AND
EDUCATIONAL EXCHANGE ACT OF 1948

This act, more commonly known as the Smith-Mundt Act (22 U.S.C. 1431), was passed to provide specific objectives for the peacetime overseas information programs; its declared purpose was "* * * to promote a better understanding of the United States in other countries, and to increase mutual understanding between the people of the United States and the people of other countries." It gave legislative form to the above-mentioned activities of State which had been carried out under authorities in annual appropriation bills and provided the basis for operating overseas information programs.

This act authorized the interchange of educational materials between the United States and other countries; provided for assistance to schools, libraries, and community centers overseas; and authorized the preparation and overseas distribution of information about the United States, its peoples, and its policies. This act also established the U.S. Advisory Commission on Information to formulate and recommend policies and programs for carrying out the legislation.

In implementing this law, State reorganized the Office of International Information and Educational Exchange into the Office of International Information, to administer mass media functions, and the Office of Educational Exchange, to carry out the program for exchanging persons and supporting libraries and institutions. These offices were later consolidated in 1952 under the International Information Administration.

ESTABLISHMENT OF
AN INDEPENDENT INFORMATION AGENCY

The Congress, Presidential committees, and the Advisory Commission on Information reviewed overseas information programs of the U.S. Government in 1953. Each review recommended that overseas information programs be consolidated into an independent agency.

Therefore, in 1953, the President's Reorganization Plan No. 8 (18 F.R. 4542) established the United States Information Agency (USIA) as a separate agency in the executive branch under State's foreign policy guidance. This plan transferred to the Director of USIA many of the functions

previously vested in the Secretary of State by the Smith-Mundt Act. Additional responsibilities were later given to USIA by Executive Order No. 11034 under provisions of the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2451).

USIA OPERATIONS AND RESOURCES

In its overseas information program for fiscal year 1973, USIA operated at approximately 192 posts in 109 foreign countries. The program consisted primarily of disseminating information through various communication media and educational and cultural exchanges.

Appropriations for USIA programs have increased to about \$200 million, as follows:

Appropriations for Fiscal Years 1965-73

<u>Fiscal year</u>	<u>Salaries and expenses (note a)</u>	<u>Special international exhibitions (note a)</u>	<u>Radio construction</u>	<u>Total (note a)</u>
----- (000 omitted) -----				
1973	\$200,500	\$ 5,303	\$ 1,000	\$206,803
1972	194,255	3,825	1,100	199,180
1971	185,075	4,365	600	190,040
1970	180,446	2,870	-	183,316
1969	172,740	3,928	-	176,668
1968	163,652	12,403	18,200	194,255
1967	163,179	3,059	6,510	172,748
1966	155,117	3,904	26,205	185,226
1965	148,454	15,400	2,000	165,854

^aIncludes foreign currency authorizations.

Authorized positions, however, have decreased, as illustrated by the following schedule.

Authorized Agency Positions
Fiscal Years 1965-73

<u>Fiscal year</u>	<u>Domestic positions</u>	<u>Overseas positions</u>		<u>Total</u>
		<u>Americans</u>	<u>Locals</u>	
1973	3,234	1,217	5,385	9,836
1972	3,231	1,240	5,402	9,873
1971	3,266	1,288	5,629	10,183
1970	3,343	1,364	5,770	10,477
1969	3,484	1,539	5,968	10,991
1968	3,366	1,702	6,840	11,908
1967	3,328	1,716	7,062	12,106
1966	3,308	1,637	6,973	11,918
1965	3,322	1,520	7,186	12,028


USIA ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT

The USIA organization consists of the directorate with supporting staffs, the media services, the geographic offices, and United States Information Service (USIS) posts. An organization chart is on page 9.

The Director is assisted at the Washington, D.C., headquarters by two deputy directors, two associate directors, and several assistant directors. An assistant director is in charge of each of the geographic area program offices. Each of these officials is responsible for directing, coordinating, and managing USIA programs for countries within a particular geographic area. USIS posts carry out the USIA program overseas. Each major post is headed by a country public affairs officer, who receives program direction from the appropriate USIA geographic area office in Washington but closely coordinates his activities with the chief of the diplomatic mission (ambassador or minister).

Some material the USIS posts use is acquired or produced locally; however, much of it is provided by the four USIA media services in Washington. These services, each headed by an assistant director, include the Broadcasting Service (more commonly known as the Voice of America (VOA)), the Information Center Service, the Motion Picture and Television Service, and the Press and Publications Service. USIA policy requires that the media material be designed to advance U.S. policies generally, as well as specifically, in each geographic area. In this manner, the media services support USIS

UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY



country programs. Following is a brief discussion of the media services' activities and products.

Broadcasting Service

The Service produces and broadcasts VOA radio programs in English as well as approximately 35 other languages and operates broadcasting and relay facilities to transmit these programs. It also furnishes technical services and materials to USIS posts for broadcasting radio programs through local outlets, and it furnishes packaged programs to the posts. Broadcasts originating in the United States are directed primarily at Communist bloc countries and secondarily at selected areas of the free world.

Information Center Service

The Service provides program support, guidance, and materials to the 160 information centers and reading rooms and 110 binational centers in foreign countries. It promotes and helps present American books, in English and in translation, to selected individuals and institutions. The Service also operates a worldwide exhibit program as well as a separate program which presents U.S. national exhibitions in the U.S.S.R. and East Europe and at selected international fairs and exhibitions. In addition, it supports the English-teaching activities at USIS posts, binational centers, and special institutes by providing materials and consultative services. It operates a donated books program, under which U.S. publishers make available selected current books for presentation abroad, and it facilitates and promotes the use of American music, art, and drama in overseas programming.

The Service also provides the posts with prepared thematic programs on foreign policy and such other subjects as science and technology, economics, U.S. political and social processes, and education and the arts.

Motion Picture and Television Service

The Service produces, contracts for, or otherwise acquires motion picture and television films and prints in English and foreign languages for use in the overseas information program. These may be single films and television documentaries as well as series.



Technicians at master control board for Voice of America

USIA Photograph



Books and newspapers in USIS library, Kuala Lumpur, Federation of Malaysia

USIA Photograph

More recently the Service has been producing open-end documentaries and video tape materials for selected audiences on current themes which serve key foreign policy objectives; it is also providing assistance to foreign correspondents and networks. The Service also furnishes USIS posts with technical services and direction for local overseas video tape and film productions.


Press and Publications Service

The Service produces editorial material for USIS posts to place in local newspapers and periodicals and for use in post publications. It produces and operates the wireless file, a radioteletype service to all areas offering program materials for local placement and background information for post and Embassy personnel. The Service provides posts with a general and regional feature service, photographs, magazines, pamphlets, posters, and magazine reprints. It also manages printing plants at regional service centers in Manila, Beirut, and Mexico City; furnishes posts with press and photo supplies and equipment; and offers them technical advice.

Media Activities in
Fiscal Year 1973 (note a)

	<u>Media service</u>	<u>USIS activities</u>	<u>Total</u>
	—————(millions)—————		
Broadcasting Service	\$48.1	\$ 6.3	\$54.4
Information Center			
Service	5.1	34.8	39.9
Motion Picture and			
Television Service	8.5	7.3	15.8
Press and Publications			
Service	10.0	17.4	27.4

^a Estimated.



American Cultural Center, Nairobi, Kenya

USIA Photograph



Press and Publications Service's wire room--Washington, D. C.

USIA Photograph

CHAPTER 2

REPORT HIGHLIGHTS AND

MATTERS FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE CONGRESS

HIGHLIGHTS

USIA's unofficial slogan is "Telling America's Story to the World." Despite the seemingly uncontroversial nature of this slogan, the type of information to be distributed in foreign countries and the proper role of the program in the foreign affairs community have been a subject of continuing debate.

This continued debate indicates not only the misunderstandings caused by an unclear mandate and conflicting directions but also the need to evaluate the objectives and underlying assumptions regarding the program. In view of the substantive changes made since USIA was established-- particularly in foreign relations, communication techniques, foreign audiences, and attitudes in this country and throughout the world--a current appraisal is needed to determine the proper direction and placement of the program in the foreign affairs community.

Historically, the overseas information activities became more propagandistic with the advent of World War II. After the war, the overseas information program was reduced significantly; however, controversy arose as to whether an information program should distribute propagandistic products. The Smith-Mundt Act attempted to provide specific objectives for the role of a peacetime information program but did not resolve this controversy.

The "Campaign of Truth" launched in 1950 by President Truman as a psychological offensive against propaganda disseminated by the U.S.S.R. appeared to digress from the mission of the overseas information program as set forth in the Smith-Mundt Act. In July 1952, the Advisory Commission on Information described the change in the mission of the overseas information program as a shift from an objective portrayal of the United States to one of "hard-hitting propaganda".

After creating USIA as an independent agency in 1953, President Eisenhower, upon recommendation of the National

Security Council, issued a directive that appeared to place more emphasis on submitting evidence to demonstrate a harmony of interests with other peoples of the world than on distributing propaganda. However, during the ensuing years, USIA's activities received congressional criticism when they were not strongly anti-Communist and received praise when they were oriented toward combating Communist propaganda.

The program's mission was last officially defined by President Kennedy in January 1963 and provided that USIA help achieve U.S. foreign policy objectives by (1) influencing public attitudes in other nations and (2) advising the President, his representatives abroad, and departments and agencies on the implications of foreign opinion for present and contemplated U.S. policies, programs, and official statements. This memorandum did not, however, resolve the problem of whether the program would function more effectively through distributing objective media products or through a persuasive commentary on American political involvement.

In March 1972, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations inquired into USIA's mission and goals and its varied programs. During these hearings, the Committee criticized USIA for the seemingly propagandistic nature of certain of its products which, the Committee said, opposed the current emphasis on negotiation and conciliation in foreign affairs.

We believe the continued controversy stems, in part, from the apparently different directions provided by the enabling legislation and the executive memorandum and has resulted in confusion and misunderstanding as to USIA's overall direction. Although the Smith-Mundt Act was intended to promote a better understanding of the United States in other countries and to increase mutual understanding, which could presumably be accomplished by distributing information, the task of influencing attitudes requires a concerted effort beyond the mere dissemination of information.

Notwithstanding this issue, the question arises as to whether influencing public attitudes is a reasonable or achievable goal for the overseas information program. Although USIA has been operating under this mandate for the past 10 years, there has never been a delineation of who constitutes the public nor a consensus as to the approaches to be used in influencing public attitudes. Furthermore,

there are certainly no precise means of measuring USIA's effectiveness in attempting to achieve this goal. The complexities involved with measurement and the absence of concrete evidence not only becloud program successes and failures but add impetus to controversies involving the approaches and techniques used in carrying out informational activities.

The issue of whether USIA activities should continue in their present form and intensity in those foreign countries with sophisticated communications facilities has been of concern due to the likelihood of duplicative and competitive output in those countries. The advantages of providing a balanced picture of the American scene must realistically be weighed against the existence of numerous private news agencies operating in the United States and in other countries.

The continued controversy and apparent misunderstanding indicate the need to evaluate the objectives and underlying assumptions regarding the informational program. The need for this reevaluation is not necessarily a new idea. In 1968 the USIA Director stated that the changing times called for a new and expanded study of USIA and its directions for the future. Similarly, the Advisory Commission, in its 23d report dated February 14, 1968, concluded that it was time for a searching reexamination of USIA's mission and execution. This need was recently reiterated by the Advisory Commission in its 1973 report:

"The Commission believes that the need for an overall review of USIA, including its position in the overall structure of the government's foreign affairs community, remains necessary. After 25 years of experience, it is time for a reexamination and an appraisal of its accomplishments, its role and its future potential."

More recently, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, in a report dated May 22, 1973, recognized a number of USIA's valuable functions; however, it questioned whether all its activities were worthwhile and whether others might be carried out better under a different Government organization. The Committee indicated further that a fundamental renovation of U.S. information and cultural programs was needed.

MATTERS FOR CONSIDERATION BY THE CONGRESS

In view of the significant changes in the world and its peoples, a reform may be needed to more effectively communicate America's story to the world. Such a reform, we believe, must be predicated upon the long-range U.S. objectives to be sought in this and future decades.

We believe that, because of its oversight responsibilities, the Congress is in a good position to evaluate the varied aspects of the overseas information program and the related political, economic, and strategic ramifications. The Director of USIA stated, in October 1973, that he welcomes the Congress to take a strong and continuous interest in USIA's purposes and operations. He stated that, while it may not be feasible for the Congress to play as detailed and useful a role in such technical matters as audience selection and media operations, a closer association of the Congress with USIA in setting goals, and the level of resources needed to achieve them, could be beneficial. Accordingly, the Congress may wish to consider the following suggestions in formulating the overseas information program.

- Assess the objectives and goals established for the overseas information program.
- 1. Is the prescribed mission appropriate in view of the present world atmosphere?
- 2. Is the present program mission in consonance with the enabling legislation?
- 3. Can the current objective of influencing attitudes realistically be achieved?
- 4. Should the basic objective be to create better mutual understanding rather than to influence attitudes?
- 5. Can the program create better mutual understanding when the people of the United States have limited knowledge of the information being disseminated overseas?
- Determine the types of peoples to be reached, especially in light of the vast communication changes of the last two decades.

1. Is the basic assumption that elite groups are the most influential and that limited efforts should be directed toward the masses still valid?
2. Should greater program emphasis be placed on reaching the peoples of the developing countries?

--Establish policies and priorities for carrying out an information program.

1. Is the use of propaganda justifiable during an era of detente and conciliation?
2. Would an information program be more effectively carried out by the department primarily responsible for conducting foreign affairs?
3. Should the program continue in the same form and intensity of years gone by?

Is it necessary to have an informational facility in almost every country in the world?

4. Is the need to present a balanced picture of the American scene in certain sophisticated countries justifiable in light of the competitive aspects of all media output?
5. Should the distribution of commercial media materials rather than Government-produced materials be emphasized?

Also, we believe the Congress should require USIA to develop a formal program evaluation system and report annually to the Congress the results of its evaluation efforts. USIA's annual evaluation report to the Congress should include:

1. A statement of specific and detailed objectives for the information program and how these objectives relate to those in the legislation.
2. Conclusions as to the program's effectiveness in meeting the stated objectives measured through the end of the preceding fiscal year.

3. Recommendations for any changes or additional legislative action deemed necessary or desirable in carrying out the program.
4. A list identifying the principle analyses and studies supporting the major conclusions and recommendations.
5. The plans for continued evaluation of the program through the ensuing fiscal year.

CHAPTER 3

PROGRAM DIRECTION

For an efficient and effective overseas information program, the executive branch and the Congress must agree on the overall direction of the USIA program. The current mission, which was last defined by President Kennedy in 1963, is to help achieve U.S. foreign policy objectives. However, the approaches to be used have been a subject of continuing controversy and should be reevaluated and clarified.

INFLUENCING PUBLIC ATTITUDES

Although the Smith-Mundt Act was intended to promote a better mutual understanding between the peoples of the United States and other countries, the statement of USIA's mission by President Kennedy provides for "influencing public attitudes." However, there has been neither a delineation as to who constitutes the public nor a consensus as to the techniques to be used in influencing public attitudes. An even more basic issue is whether influencing public attitudes is a reasonable or achievable goal. As will be discussed in chapter 4, there are certainly no precise means of measuring USIA's effectiveness in attempting to achieve this goal by distributing voluminous media materials.

In the following sections, we will discuss certain controversial issues relating to USIA's efforts to influence public attitudes. Should USIA activities be informational or propagandistic? Should USIA use unattributed, as well as attributed, materials? Should USIA activities be directed toward the masses or toward selected groups? Should USIA products be designed for worldwide or for targeted country distribution? Finally, should USIA's efforts within certain developed countries be reduced?

Information versus propaganda

As international events have unfolded and as foreign policy has changed with each administration, information program activities have oscillated between disinterested distribution of information and open propaganda.

Changing emphasis

With the advent of World War II, information distributed overseas became more propagandistic. After World War II, the overseas information program was reduced significantly; however, inquiry continued as to whether an information program should distribute propaganda. Although the Smith-Mundt Act of 1948 did provide objectives for a peacetime information program, it did not resolve this fundamental controversy.

President Truman's 1950 "Campaign of Truth," a psychological offensive against Russian propaganda, appeared to stray from the mission of the overseas information program, which had been set forth in the act as one of enhancing "mutual understanding." Under this campaign, the funds normally appropriated for the information program rose from \$47.3 million to about \$121.3 million. In its sixth semi-annual report to the Congress, published in July 1952, the Advisory Commission on Information described the change in the program's mission as a shift from an objective portrayal of the United States to one of "hard-hitting propaganda."

After creating USIA as an independent agency, President Eisenhower, upon recommendation of the National Security Council, issued a directive on October 28, 1953, establishing its basic mission:

"* * * to submit evidence to peoples of other nations by means of communication techniques that the objectives and policies of the United States are in harmony with and will advance their legitimate aspirations for freedom, progress and peace."

This statement appeared to place less emphasis on distributing propaganda. However, during the ensuing years, USIA's program activities received congressional criticism when they were not strongly anti-Communist and received praise when they were specifically oriented toward combating Communist propaganda.

As last officially defined by President Kennedy in a January 1963 memorandum to the Director of USIA, the program's mission was

"* * * to help achieve U.S. foreign policy objectives by (a) influencing public attitudes in

other nations, and (b) advising the President, his representatives abroad, and the various departments and agencies on the implications of foreign opinion for present and contemplated U.S. policies, programs and official statements."

It further stated that individual USIA country programs for influencing attitudes should support country and regional objectives determined by the President and set forth in official policy pronouncements. It established the following general objectives for USIA activities: (1) to encourage constructive public support abroad for the goal of a peaceful world community of free and independent states, free to choose their own futures and their own systems so long as the freedom of others is not threatened, (2) to identify the United States as a strong, democratic, dynamic nation qualified for its leadership of world efforts toward this goal, and (3) to unmask and counter hostile attempts to distort or frustrate U.S. objectives and policies.

The memorandum also directed that USIA programs for influencing attitudes abroad be carried out by overt use of such techniques as personal contact, radio broadcasting, libraries, book publication and distribution, the press, motion pictures, television, exhibits, and English language instruction.

It did not, however, resolve the problem of whether the information program should distribute objective media products or persuasive partisan commentary on American political involvement.

In March 1972, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, in discharging its newly acquired responsibility for authorizing USIA appropriations, made an in-depth inquiry into USIA's mission, goals, and programs. During these hearings, the Committee criticized USIA for the seemingly propagandistic nature of certain of its products, which the Committee said opposed the current emphasis on negotiation and conciliation in foreign affairs.

Distinction between information and propaganda

Fundamental to the controversy over the nature of media products distributed overseas is the inability to clearly

differentiate between information and propaganda. At times it is difficult to draw the line between the two, either on a theoretical or practical level.

Webster's Dictionary defines information as "the communication or reception of knowledge or intelligence," and propaganda as "the spreading of ideas, information, or rumor for the purpose of helping or injuring an institution, a cause, or a person." The term "propaganda" has sensitive connotations; what one individual considers information, another may consider propaganda. In recent congressional hearings, the Director himself testified that USIA was a propaganda agency but he added that he meant propaganda in the pre-Nazi-era sense of the term; that is, "the dissemination of information."

To consider some USIA products as purely informational, however, appears questionable. For example, to call attention to the 10th anniversary of the Berlin Wall, the media services and area directors were directed in 1971 to make a major effort to publicize the event and its significance, with the underlying theme to be "that Communist societies inevitably turn into prisons where men daily risk their lives in an effort to flee to freedom." The Motion Picture and Television Service responded by producing a documentary film entitled "Barrikade," which it distributed to 94 USIS posts for showing in August 1971.

More recently, three films dealing in varying degrees with oppression by Communist countries have been produced. "History of Totalitarianism," a film about tyrants from Nebuchadnezzar to Mao-Tse-tung and Leonid Brezhnev, was released in August 1972. "Six Who Fled," a film about refugees from Communist bloc countries, and "Chapters," a film portraying systematic Communist aggression, had not been released as of October 1973. This delay, we believe, is due to USIA's having recognized the propagandistic nature of these films. "Six Who Fled" will be released only if relations between the United States and these countries deteriorate. Similarly, "Chapters" will be released only if relations between the United States and the Peoples Republic of China deteriorate.

Other films produced and disseminated overseas have been so political or propagandistic that placement was impossible in countries which, wishing to maintain their

neutral status, adhere to a "third country rule" that prohibits one foreign power from distributing media products critical of another. For example, "Undercurrents," a film about dissent in the U.S.S.R., was released in May 1971; however, certain USIS posts reported that, under the terms of this third country rule, they could not obtain TV placement. Another film, "Changing of the Guard," released in April 1971, addressed the problem of Vietnamization. Some posts reported that placement was impossible because the host government's censor board would not approve it for viewing.

Although certain USIA products appear propagandistic, others are informational. We believe this is indicative of the continuing controversy over USIA's proper direction. Even the position taken by the Advisory Commission on Information in its latest report, February 1973, is unclear as to whether USIA activities should be informational or propagandistic. While stating that USIA should strive to encourage detente throughout the world, a goal which we believe precludes the use of propaganda, the Commission also states that USIA must remain competitive with the informational and cultural programs of nations whose ideas are competing for attention, a goal which we believe entails the use of propaganda.

USIA's present position regarding this controversy is that it is essentially a case of semantics rather than substance and that the distinction between information and propaganda is really in the eye of the beholder. It cites the recent Soviet condemnation of "Sesame Street" as insidious propaganda, as a case in point.

Attribution versus nonattribution

Interrelated with the question of using propaganda is the propriety of not identifying certain media products as being USIA produced and distributed. USIA's enabling legislation is silent on the matter of attribution. Moreover, the history of the information program revealed only one directive regarding attribution. In 1955, the House Committee on Appropriations stated it believed the program would be more effective if greater emphasis were placed on distributing unattributed materials.

It appears that not attributing USIA-produced material is contrary to the intent of the 1963 USIA mission statement,

which called for the overt use of various techniques of communication. USIA officials have indicated to a Senate committee that, although certain products are unattributed when distributed, they would be "attributable" if a question ever arose regarding the source of the material.

The justification for not attributing certain products appears questionable. For example, USIA justified the non-attribution of 7,500 copies of a monthly bulletin on English teaching, because of requests for the bulletin from teachers in closed societies where possession of material labeled as having come from the U.S. Government would be undesirable. The remaining 100,000 copies, which were distributed worldwide, were attributed to USIA; accordingly, it seems unlikely that the source of this bulletin was unknown to the governments of those societies where it was distributed without attribution. USIA stated, in October 1973, that the non-attribution of the bulletin on English teaching ("English Teaching Forum") distributed in closed countries is no longer practiced.

In another case, USIA released the documentary film, "In Memorium Hue: February 1968," and suggested that USIS overseas posts cut the end attribution titles if it would strengthen presentation of the film.

The issue of attribution has received attention recently in congressional hearings. Agency officials indicated that there was no firm policy in this regard and that in the past the decision was left up to USIS officials overseas. After these hearings, a bill (S. 3526), "to provide authorizations for certain agencies conducting the foreign relations of the United States and other purposes," was amended to prohibit any Government agency from distributing abroad unattributed materials which it had prepared or assisted in preparing, whether such assistance was financial, technical, or otherwise. The bill, dated April 20, 1972, was not approved.

More recently, in August 1972, USIA's Office of Policy and Plans distributed a policy to the overseas posts, which stated, in part, that:

"Media products issued by posts should routinely be attributed to USIS.* * * Assistance to local institutions, including media, should be identified to

recipients as coming from USIS. For example, in local placement programs, the press release form, can for a TV clip, or box for a radio tape should carry the imprint of the issuing USIS office. Any requests for exceptions should be referred to the Agency for prior approval."

Although the above policy provided for a more controlled and restrictive use of unattributed material, a substantive question as to the propriety of such a practice still remains. USIA officials believe the Director should retain the option of nonattribution for use in major emergencies. They do, however, reiterate that, under normal conditions, the agency attributes all materials issued unless the Director makes an exception. They also stated that no exceptions have been made since this policy was established in 1972.

Masses versus elite groups

Throughout USIA's history, viewpoints have differed as to whether the information program, to be effective, should be directed toward mass audiences or toward elite groups. USIA has never made a conclusive statement as to who constitutes the public that the program is attempting to influence. Consequently, certain USIA media products have been designed to appeal to mass audiences and others to elite or target groups.

The designation of target groups within each country began in mid-1950 as a consequence of the "Campaign of Truth." Available information indicates that before that time target groups were in fact self-selected. That is, a target group was any group which wanted information about the United States. With the changes in emphasis to a propaganda offensive, the basis for designating target groups changed. The U.S. Advisory Commission on Information, in its sixth report to the Congress, described the new target groups as follows:

"They are for the most part individuals whose opinions and actions are of the greatest importance in combating the spread of communism and in promoting the truth about the United States of America and its foreign policy. Among target groups in each country are persons who by virtue of their positions may exert influence over the opinions of larger groups."


Designating target audiences for each country continues to be of great importance in planning USIA activities. Annually, a Country Program Memorandum is prepared by each principal USIS post and submitted to headquarters for review and approval. The document sets forth in precise terms the USIA objectives for the country and, for each objective identified, lists the target audiences, in order of priority, to which the objective relates. This document then becomes the basis for USIS operations in-country; USIS efforts are to be directed toward reaching the target audiences to further country objectives.

Although individual USIS country programs are justified on the basis of reaching target audiences and attaining stated objectives, certain media products appear to have been designed with the masses as the intended audience. For example, placing films in commercial theaters and on television appears to have as its objective the reaching of the largest audience possible. In addition, USIA's VOA radio operations are, we believe, directed toward a mass audience.

If USIA expands its efforts to reach the masses, we believe it should take advantage of the opportunities afforded by technological changes--in particular, by the increased availability of transistor radios throughout the world.

Over the years USIA has established capability for instant access to all corners of the world with its radio shortwave facilities. Since the establishment of this capability, many technological changes have occurred, making it possible for millions of people to own radios they once could not afford. The transistor radio has become available in abundance throughout the world. Although transistor radios can and do have shortwave bands, most of these radios are low priced and have a mediumwave capability. Thus, millions of listeners can now receive local mediumwave programs.

VOA does have some mediumwave capabilities. In the new USIA relay station at Kavala, Greece, a 150 kW mediumwave transmitter was installed. Other relay stations at Rhodes, Marathon, and Munich have similar capabilities. More powerful mediumwave transmitters are in Thailand, Okinawa, and the Philippines.



35-story VOA antennas beam broadcasts abroad.

USIA Photograph

However, USIA's mediumwave capabilities are relatively insignificant when compared to its shortwave capabilities. As of March 1973, USIA had seven overseas relay stations with 3600 kW mediumwave potential, representing approximately 26 percent of the combined mediumwave and shortwave capability. However, at that time, only 8 percent of the daily broadcasting time was being devoted to mediumwave transmission. Furthermore, USIA has no mediumwave capability in several regions. (See app. II.)


It appears advantageous to place more packaged radio programs with local stations having mediumwave facilities. Packaged programs are radio tapes distributed throughout the world for dissemination by USIS posts. Certain USIS posts have placed hundreds of hours of programming each week in this manner. For example, in Peru, USIS regularly supplied packaged programs to an average 106 stations in 1971. Although similar efforts have been made in other countries, the total resources planned for packaged programs and related supplies have been relatively insignificant, with only about \$620,000 budgeted for fiscal year 1972.

Conclusions and agency comments

Program efforts have continued to be directed toward limited audiences in each individual country partly because of budgetary limitations. USIA has not had, nor does it presently have, the resources to conduct all-out programs directed toward the masses. Giving due consideration to this factor, we believe USIA in the past has used a reasonable and logical approach in using its resources to reach the overseas audience.

USIA's position, as stated in its letter of October 5, 1973, was as follows:

"The problem of defining the USIA audience abroad was one that bedevilled the information program in its earliest years. In general our approach to this problem has been conditioned by two factors: (1) the lack of sufficient resources to reach mass audiences through all media, and (2) the realization that the most effective Agency effort would depend on an appropriate mix of media tailored to the various audiences we most needed to reach on particular issues or with particular messages.



4,000 foreign stations use VOA taped programs.

USIA Photograph

"In regard to the limitation of resources, some 'media' (such as personal contact, exchange programs, or visiting specialists) obviously require a high degree of selection both in the audience to be reached and in the content of the message conveyed. For the wider-reaching media generally thought of as 'mass' communications media (such as films, radio, and publications), we have found that we could reach the audiences we were seeking--within the limits of our resources--by attuning the subject matter to the appropriate levels of sophistication and specialization of the intended audience."

Worldwide versus targeted products

Although a worldwide media product, centrally produced to help advance general U.S. foreign policy objectives, is less costly to produce than several targeted products designed for specific geographic areas or countries, the effectiveness of these worldwide products has been questioned by the Advisory Commission on Information.

The philosophy behind producing worldwide media products assumes that intended audiences in the developed and developing countries have the same level of understanding and that one film would be appropriate for audiences in every country. Targeted products generally support regional or country objectives as stated in the Country Program Memorandum and they deal with subjects of a more local interest.

The advantages of worldwide products are primarily economic while the advantages of targeted products are effectiveness. This factor was recognized by a responsible USIA official in 1962 who stated:

"Perhaps the most difficult problems of decisionmaking are in the field of the expensive media products, such as motion pictures, television programs, and large exhibits, where the decision has to be made between tailoring individual products to the needs of one country (or only a few countries) or preparing more general-purpose products which will meet worldwide, or at least regional, needs. Obviously, it is less expensive to make one motion picture on a subject such as, for example, the American economic system, than it would be to make fifteen pictures each one tailored to the situation in a particular country. Equally obviously, the latter effort would be more likely to come up with a more effective product for any one country * * *. Experience has been that, because of limited overall resources, a substantial percentage of Agency films, television programs, and major exhibits have had to be general purpose products."

Although worldwide media products may be less costly to produce than targeted products, other factors should be

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
COMMUNISM IN SOUTH ASIA

India

Bhabani Sen Gupta Donald S. Zagoria

Sri Lanka

Charles S. Blackton



NORTH KOREA

Economic Development

Ilpyong J. Kim

Foreign Policy

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considered. The worldwide product is apparently predicated upon a universal level of sophistication and understanding; however, USIS posts have frequently indicated to the Motion Picture and Television Service that a given worldwide film was either too sophisticated or too elementary to be effective.

The Advisory Commission on Information has repeatedly recognized the need for media products oriented to the audience and for presentations varying from area to area. In its 23d report to the Congress, the Commission recommended eliminating or substantially reducing media materials prepared for a "mythical, worldwide audience." More recently, in its 26th report, of February 1973, the Commission stated that:

"Too often, the contents of communications do not interest the audiences to which they are directed. Too many of USIA's products are conceived and prepared with a worldwide audience in mind. Too few deal with specific topics that are of interest to and desired by particular countries."

Conclusions and agency comments

Although we recognize that budgetary constraints would necessarily affect any decisions as to the type of media materials to be produced, in view of the critical position taken by the Advisory Commission on the production of media products for worldwide audiences, we believe the use of products designed for specific geographic areas or countries should be expanded.

USIA replied in October 1973 that the advantages and disadvantages of productions for worldwide use and those pinpointed to particular groups or countries have constituted a difficult issue over many years. Nonetheless, USIA stated that its current expansion of targeted material is in consonance with the above suggestion.

Reduction versus continuation of efforts

Whether USIA activities should continue in their present form and intensity in those countries with sophisticated communications facilities has been an issue of concern due to the likelihood of duplicative and competitive output in these countries.

The composition of the overseas information program as it exists today is, in many respects, quite similar to that of nearly 20 years ago. Programs continue to be presented in almost every country with which the United States maintains diplomatic relations. Moreover, individual country activities are composed of essentially the same elements--film programs, press and publications programs, and cultural activities.

That certain countries' communication facilities have vastly increased over the last 20 years is indicated by the existence of numerous American and foreign news agencies in Europe and other areas of the world. (See app. III.) Nonetheless, USIA resources continue to be channeled according to the political, strategic, economic, and geographic importance of the various countries. As a result, West Germany, Japan, Italy, the United Kingdom, and France have been assigned high priorities even though they are the very countries that have sophisticated communications facilities.

From a total of about \$108 million budgeted for the fiscal year 1973 program in 129 countries (see app. IV.), 14 percent was allocated to carry out information activities in these 5 developed countries.


<u>Country</u>	<u>Resources allocated</u>
West Germany	\$5,195,000
Japan	4,523,000
Italy	2,302,000
United Kingdom	1,040,000
France	2,258,000

As long as significant resources continue to be allocated to the developed countries, the possibility of duplicative and competitive media output is ever present. This factor was recognized by the executive branch and the Congress even before USIA was established as an independent agency.

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President Truman, upon transferring the international information functions of the Office of War Information to the Secretary of State in August 1945, stated:

"To the fullest possible extent, American private organizations and individuals in such fields as news, motion pictures and communications will, as in the past, be the primary means of informing foreign peoples about this country. The Government's international information program will not compete with them."

The passage of the Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948, as amended, which sets forth overall policies governing overseas information activities, provides in section 502 that:

"In authorizing international information activities under this Act, it is the sense of the Congress (1) that the Secretary [of State] [note 1] shall reduce such Government information activities whenever corresponding private information dissemination is found to be adequate * * *."

This act is unclear as to what is "corresponding private information dissemination" or what is "adequate." Moreover, the Director, USIA, has established neither quantitative nor qualitative guidelines for measuring the nature and extent of nongovernmental information sources.

In recent hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, USIA has insisted that it is not competing with nongovernmental information sources in developed countries. It does argue, therefore, for the continuation of its activities in these countries. Although West Europeans are exposed to wide-ranging and almost immediate coverage of developments in U.S. domestic and foreign affairs, USIA believes that this coverage tends to be superficial and sensationalized,

¹This responsibility was transferred to the Director, USIA, in 1953 upon the establishment of USIA as an independent agency.

often highlighting negative aspects of American life. Consequently, USIA justifies its efforts in Western Europe on the basis of the need to furnish background and interpretive materials to balance commercial media coverage. (See app. V for USIA posts in Western Europe.)

Conclusions and agency comments

Although we recognize the need to present a balanced picture of the U.S. scene, we believe it is possible that certain USIA efforts will compete with or duplicate those of the private media. An alternative would be a redirection of USIA efforts in those countries with sophisticated communications facilities. The Advisory Commission on Information, in its 23d report to the Congress in February 1968, recommended such a redirection.

"In these areas [developed countries, particularly Western Europe and Japan] with sophisticated and complex communications and educational systems, only a minimal media presence is required. Personal contact is at a premium. The optimum would be (a) a small but top-flight media documentation service supplied with texts and basic materials about U.S. policy, (b) a highly visible cultural presence with emphasis on education, art, science and technology, and supported by first-rate libraries, bi-national centers or information centers, and (c) a doubling or even tripling of the exchange program."

We therefore believe that USIA should assess its program activities to determine whether they should be continued in their present form and intensity in countries with sophisticated communications facilities. This assessment should consider the possibility of competitive and duplicative media output, as well as the political and strategic importance of the countries involved.

In his reply of October 1973, the Director, USIA, stated that a high degree of importance is attached to the advanced countries in terms of our national interests as well as the resources devoted to USIA efforts. This, he noted, was

particularly true in Western Europe and Japan, two of the five major power centers, whose attitudes have a significant influence not only on the larger world issues but also in the developing world.

With regard to competitive and duplicative media output, USIA commented that:

"As the Report points out, the Agency has argued and continues to believe that the major thrust of our admittedly limited effort does not duplicate or compete with commercial media.

"The rapid growth of international communications channels in recent years has not lessened the role of USIA, but in fact has made it more important. This is not a role that is or can be filled by private or commercial channels, no matter how efficient or skilled they may be, because their purpose is different."

* * * * *

"The fact is, of course, that USIA is but one voice among many in a world sometimes surfeited with information. The implications for our programs are clear. USIA must define its role with care if it is to have any effect. It must concentrate on those areas of concern to the U.S. not served by nongovernmental communications channels. It must carefully adapt its output to the intended audiences, for if we are to claim the attention of busy people, our programs must be relevant to their interests. Accordingly, we try to focus our programs on issues of mutual concern or where our interests intersect.

"In Western Europe and in other areas, the Agency does draw on American media output (articles, TV programs) where such material is available and relevant. However, this utilization will always be quantitatively limited by the fact that most U.S. domestic output is designed for American audiences as its built-in frame of reference.

"Constant monitoring and assessment should help us to avoid duplication. Flexibility, careful targeting and versatility of effort are, in our view, what is required in these critically important countries -- not further reduction."

ADVISING ON FOREIGN OPINION

Although it was intended that USIA advise the President and departments and agencies on the implications of foreign opinion for present and contemplated policies, USIA cannot effectively do this under its present system.

USIA was officially assigned an advisory function by the 1963 statement of mission. This statement provided that USIA should advise the President, his representatives abroad, and departments and agencies on the implications of foreign opinion for present and contemplated U.S. policies, programs, and official statements. The Director, USIA, was authorized to take the initiative in offering counsel when he deemed it advisable, and the various departments and agencies were to seek such counsel when considering policies and programs which might substantially affect or be affected by foreign opinion.

Before 1963, USIA provided little or no feedback to Government policymakers. In our opinion, officially assigning this advisory responsibility to USIA acknowledged the valuable contributions which the information program could make, both in Washington and in the field, in forming U.S. foreign policy. That foreign opinion should be considered in formulating policy was recognized in the report of the President's Committee on Information Activities Abroad, dated December 1960, which stated:

"U.S. economic assistance agencies, scientific research and development programs and the military establishment exert enormous influence on foreign opinion as a result of their activities. The Committee believes that in all these programs it is important to give careful attention to the impact on foreign opinion both in the formulation of policies and the execution of programs. While the opinion factor will not be the controlling element in most substantive decisions,

in every case it deserves to be taken into consideration along with other relevant factors, economic, military and political."

In line with the 1963 Presidential memorandum, the Director of USIA was invited to attend the National Security Council meetings. Including the Director as a member of the Senior Interdepartmental Group, which was established in 1966 as a part of the National Security Council system, enabled USIA to participate in the overall direction, coordination, and supervision of U.S. interdepartmental activities overseas. In addition, USIA assistant directors for geographic areas were included as members of the Interdepartmental Regional Groups, which corresponded to the Department of State's geographic bureaus.

USIA's advisory function was reaffirmed by Executive Order No. 11522, dated April 6, 1970, which assigned emergency preparedness functions to USIA. It stated that the Director shall advise the executive branch on foreign opinion and its implications for U.S. policies, programs, and official statements.

To fulfill its advisory responsibility, USIA established a reporting system whereby USIS posts submit illustrations and appraisals of foreign media reaction to events and issues of prime concern to the United States. Six major posts--Berlin, Bonn, London, Paris, Rome, and Tokyo--report daily. Twenty-six other posts, including Saigon, New Delhi, and Rio de Janeiro, report several times each week, while other posts report on an ad hoc basis when, in their judgment, important world, regional, or local events produce significant discussion affecting U.S. interests. The Office of Research and Assessment uses these reports to summarize and analyze worldwide television, press, and radio treatment. The Office of Policy and Plans, which has been assigned the overall responsibility of fulfilling USIA's advisory role, reviews this data and distributes it to responsible Government officials.

In addition, USIA surveys public opinion abroad to determine the trends of continuing issues related to U.S. foreign policy and to assess opinion on specific topics of current interest to foreign policy decisionmakers.

Although USIA can obtain data on foreign public opinion, its accessibility to the National Security Council is limited: possibly it can participate in two of the six bodies supporting and assisting the Council. These are the Senior Review Group, which handles most policy issues, and the Under Secretaries Committee, which insures effective and uniform execution of foreign policy decisions throughout the Government.

We were informed that the Director of USIA does not participate in the meetings of the Council itself. Moreover, he has been invited to attend only one meeting of the Under Secretaries Committee since 1971, and his participation in the Senior Review Group is limited to commenting on the initial studies prepared by interdepartmental groups. Even though USIA is generally given an opportunity to comment on these studies, it is not informed of the foreign policy decisions based on them.

USIA's Director, in hearings before the House of Representatives in March 1972, when asked what recommendations he would make to improve its operations, stated, "at the executive level this Agency ought to have its Director on the National Security Council * * *." Participation at such a level would provide a means for USIA to advise the President on foreign policy opinions and for timely and significant advice to be disseminated to Government agencies having programs overseas.

The 1963 mission statement, as indicated above, assigned USIA the responsibility of providing advice on the implications of foreign opinion not only to the President and his representatives abroad but also to other departments and agencies. With the exceptions noted below, no formal arrangements have been established between USIA and other departments and agencies through which consultations are made and advice provided regularly.

USIA and the Department of Defense entered into an agreement in November 1972 which provides that USIA's Office of Policy and Plans advise the Department on the public opinion impact of Defense programs and policies abroad; the Department's Office of the Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs will advise and assist USIA, as appropriate, in developing USIA policies and programs aimed at increasing

foreign understanding and acceptance of U.S. security policies. Also, USIA advisors are to be assigned to designated military commands, and a personnel exchange program will enhance mutual understanding of agency operations and missions.

On June 29, 1954, USIA entered into an agreement with the Foreign Operations Administration (now the Agency for International Development) to clarify the relationships of the two agencies' activities in producing and distributing media materials; to insure that the staff skills, materials, and facilities of the agencies' installations in the field are used effectively; and to eliminate unnecessary duplication of resources and activities.

In addition, under a 1965 agreement with the Smithsonian Institution, USIA and the Department of State were to guide the Institution on foreign public opinion and international relations which the Institution should consider when holding international art exhibits overseas. Although this agreement was superseded in 1972, the new agreement still provides for continued consultations regarding the overseas exhibits.

Several other agencies, including the Departments of the Treasury, Commerce, and Agriculture; the Atomic Energy Commission; and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration have international programs, and USIA has not entered into similar agreements with these agencies. We recognize that USIA and these agencies interact sometimes but we were unable to measure the extent of the interaction. Some criteria or guidelines, outlining those agency actions or policies having foreign opinion implications and determining at what point the agencies should seek USIA's counsel, would increase the effectiveness of USIA's advisory role.

Conclusions and agency comments

USIA is not in a position to most effectively fulfill its responsibility for providing advice on the implications of foreign opinion to U.S. foreign policymakers because the necessary formal relations and systems have not been established.

USIA's participation in the foreign policymaking process at the National Security Council level apparently has been

curtailed rather than expanded in the last several years. As a result, USIA could be unaware of changes in direction in U.S. foreign policy. The lack of advance knowledge of the top decisionmakers' "contemplated" policies would hamper USIA's ability to advise responsible Government officials on the implications of these policies for foreign opinion or to effectively plan for programs and products to support these policies other than on a "crash" basis. Therefore, we believe that if USIA played a greater role in the decision-making process, it could better fulfill its advisory responsibility to the President and other departments and agencies.

In addition, to increase the effectiveness of its advisory role, we believe that USIA should establish criteria outlining agencies' actions or policies which could have foreign opinion implications and the point at which the agencies should seek USIA's counsel.

In October 1973, the Director of USIA said that, by not participating directly in the higher policy councils, USIA often lacks the information that would enable it to make a meaningful contribution to U.S. foreign policy planning. He believed the solution was to institutionalize USIA's advisory role within the foreign policy community. In particular, its advisory function should be more clearly defined and activated, especially at the level of the National Security Council and in interagency planning groups.

USIA did not believe our suggestion to establish a formal system for advising other Government agencies to be a practical solution to the problem. Instead, USIA believes that, if it were given a stronger, formal role in the policy-making process, it would be in a better position to advise other agencies.

CHAPTER 4

PROGRAM EFFECTIVENESS

For many years the United States information program has been criticized for its failure to adequately evaluate the effectiveness of its operations. Even before USIA was established as a separate agency, the Advisory Commission on Information highlighted this matter and in 1950 recommended that more attention be given to evaluating the impact of the program on the peoples of the world. The Advisory Commission reports during the next 20 years repeatedly brought up the need for more research into the effectiveness of USIA programs.

COMPLEXITIES OF MEASUREMENT

Despite this concern, USIA has still not devised adequate research methods for measuring the effect of its activities on foreign audiences or the net results of the information program.

In the past, USIA's attempts to demonstrate its effectiveness have been limited to presenting anecdotal or quantitative evidence. Anecdotal evidence might include a story concerning the foreign minister of a certain country who faithfully listened to a VOA broadcast during his morning meal or a high official's reference to an article in a USIA publication which he found very informative. Quantitative evidence can be illustrated by the following examples which USIA provided to a subcommittee of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs in March 1972.

"Philippines - In 1971, nine thousand copies of the Agency cultural quarterly 'Dialogue' were placed with priority audiences in that country."

* * * * *

"Venezuela - In 1971, a total of 10,906 press items were placed in local newspapers and magazines. This comprises materials from the Agency's wireless file, press features, photographs, and locally prepared materials."

As the Director of USIA has remarked, such evidence of placement or exposure does not directly address the question of impact.

USIA's inability to measure the effectiveness of its products and programs relates to several problems that have existed for a number of years. USIA has attempted to improve its measuring capabilities and has assigned the Office of Research and Assessment this difficult and complex task. The Director of USIA, in a June 1971 response to our report that USIA could not measure its accomplishments in Ecuador, stated that:

"For some years the Agency has been concerned with developing methodology for measuring the impact of its overall program, and it is still seeking a practicable solution. If the real world were like a controlled laboratory situation, it would be much more feasible to measure opinions before and after Agency efforts to program.

"The fact of the matter is that often there is tremendous input of other information about the United States from many and varied sources--the daily newspapers, magazines, commercial motion pictures, etc.--and in countries where this phenomenon occurs it is exceptionally difficult to measure the net effect of Agency products and Agency interpretation. In certain cultures social research itself is suspect, and an attempt to question a local population with respect to its beliefs and attitudes can meet considerable resistance.

"The degree to which Agency material is used can often be traced, and the extent to which public exposure to it comes about can frequently be measured with some precision, but the net effect on attitudes of exposure over a period of time to Agency programming is rarely amenable to direct measurement."

Before USIA's measuring capabilities can be strengthened, the Congress, the executive branch, and USIA must

DIALOGUE

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Joseph Adelson
A CRITIQUE OF WOMEN'S LIB

agree on the aims and expected achievements of USIA operations. As mentioned in chapter 3, USIA's broad aim must be further defined in terms of specific goals that can be objectively measured within a specific time frame. Whether or not USIA's goals are revised, however, the definition of "public" must be clarified.

In its 26th report, the Advisory Commission indicated a need for closer liaison with the Congress and for the delineation of USIA aims and expected achievements. We agree with the Commission's recommendation that USIA expand its present practice of inviting U.S. Senators and Representatives to attend USIA regional conferences and exhibitions. Such participation, we believe, allows not only for the constructive exchange of ideas but also for the formulation of more realistic aims and expectations.

RESEARCH APPROACHES

We should recognize USIA's present efforts, as well as contemplated changes, in attempting to measure the effectiveness of the information program and products.

The responsibility for assessing the effectiveness of USIA programs lies with the Office of Research and Assessment. Although this Office is divided into five groups which work together in discharging this responsibility (Research Service, Media Reaction Staff, Inspection and Audit Staff, Evaluation and Analysis Staff, and the USIA Library), the Research Service has primary responsibility in this area.

The six categories in which the Research Service is doing or contracting for research are:

Basic attitudes and values studies

To determine patterns of attitude formation and underlying values affecting attitudes.

Current public opinion studies

To determine the trends of continuing issues related to U.S. foreign policy and to assess opinion on specific topics of current interest to foreign policy decision-makers.

Influence and social
structure studies

To determine which groups are really influential in a given society and to assist in defining target audiences.

Media habits and
program exposure
studies

To determine media preferences and habits of target groups, including the extent to which they are reached by USIA programs.

Agency program
evaluation studies

To evaluate information output for worldwide, regional, and local distribution; to pretest sample output on sample groups; and to test new programming approaches.

Post program evaluation
studies

To evaluate local information output and programs, ranging from post-produced periodicals to binational center operations.

Other studies are to provide information about the cultural and/or propaganda activities of certain foreign countries. Although these studies may be needed, we do not believe that any have directly addressed the issue of measuring impact. However, the current public opinion studies and both the USIA and post program evaluation studies do touch on the issue and deserve further comment.

Current public opinion studies address issues varying from new U.S. economic policies to U.S. space achievements. Our discussion with USIA personnel disclosed that these studies are initiated at the request of the executive branch and/or are initiated by the Research Service in expectation that this data will be needed.

These studies are indirectly related to measuring the effectiveness of USIA products in that changes in foreign public opinion may indicate that operations are having some impact or, on the other hand, are having little or no impact. However, the tremendous input of other information about the United States from many varied sources

and, more significantly, U.S. policies and actions themselves complicate enormously the task of assessing USIA's contribution to the change in attitude. Furthermore, these opinion polls have been conducted primarily on specific issues, and until recent years, virtually no trend analyses of major issues have been made.

Information on USIA and post program evaluation studies indicates that they evaluate primarily whether the products are reaching the intended audiences, whether the media is of interest to them, and how placement could be improved. Nothing in these reports, however, indicates what impact USIA programs or products are having on the recipients.

In its attempt to provide more effective evaluation, USIA has recently undertaken or is contemplating new research methods and techniques designed to provide meaningful data on a systematic or cyclic basis. A continuing audience analysis program has been developed to measure the impact of VOA activities by analyzing information obtained periodically. From recommendations in our report dated July 31, 1972, a project was approved in May 1973 for the Research Service to carry out a comprehensive and systematic evaluation of USIA-produced films.

Opinion polls, which have been made on an ad hoc basis in the past, are now being made to provide more meaningful trend analysis through sampling techniques which insure that the same groups in the same countries are polled periodically. The questions will remain unchanged, enabling trends to be developed and indicating changes in attitudes. Finally, the Research Service plans to expand its cyclic studies of publications not only to determine the most effective means for reaching the intended audiences but also to develop better instruments for measuring effectiveness.

USIA has from time to time invited private researchers and college professors having expertise in research and research techniques to present the latest innovations in research methodology. Also, USIA personnel have attended professional conferences and have met with private researchers to obtain data on the latest developments and to exchange ideas on research.



USIA magazine Free World distributed in East and South Asia

Although we recognize that these innovations, along with the interchange of new research ideas, may improve USIA's present capabilities, we believe that consideration should be given to other approaches or techniques that could possibly facilitate the task of measurement.

For example, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, hearing testimony on the sale of publications in March 1972, asked why USIA did not set at least a nominal charge for all publications to gain an indication as to the effectiveness of the materials. Although a responsible official indicated that USIA would like to move in that direction, USIA has sold media products only in a few instances.

Current USIA policy provides that fees, admission charges, and sales be permitted when (1) program effectiveness can be improved or (2) operating economies can be realized. The decision on whether a particular product is to be sold is, however, the responsibility of the individual USIS post.

Media materials currently sold include films and periodicals. USIA sells films, if resale rights are available, to foreign institutions, organizations, and governments and to overseas missions of other U.S. Government agencies. These films may be purchased or produced by USIA. The number of periodicals USIA sells is insignificant when compared with the number of periodicals it produces. America Illustrated, which is distributed in Russia and Poland under reciprocal agreements, accounts for a large portion of the periodicals sold and is considered a very effective magazine by USIA.

Available data does not indicate what factors are considered in deciding to sell specific periodicals. For example, in certain countries USIA's worldwide cultural magazine Dialogue is distributed at no cost to the recipient but in Korea it is sold.

Also, an analysis of any significant changes in USIS posts' use of resources could indicate the effectiveness of USIA's products and programs. The present Resource Management System, initially implemented during fiscal year 1970, was developed to give public affairs officers more control of funds for media products and services supplied by USIA in support of country programs. This approach presumably gave



Customers at a kiosk in the Soviet Union await their turn to buy the Russian-language edition of USIA magazine AMERICA ILLUSTRATED

USIA Photograph

public affairs officers greater flexibility in determining the use of those resources for the country programs. Since the USIS posts throughout the world can, with certain limitations, select what they need to carry out their programs, these operations should theoretically be more effective.

Significant changes in individual posts' allocation of resources should be analyzed to determine the reasons involved. Although a post's reasons for making such changes might be subjective, analysis of changes in the use of resources by numerous posts should provide management with an overall idea as to those indicators useful in measuring the effectiveness of USIA programs.

Conclusions and agency comments

The difficulties and complexities inherent in measuring the extent to which public attitudes have been influenced have often been noted. In fact, there are those who question whether reliable means even exist by which to measure the impact of USIA operations. The 25th report of the Advisory Commission stated that:

"It is generally agreed that there are systematic means of measuring the attitude of the public of a given foreign country towards the United States at any given time. But is there a way to measure the contribution of USIA towards that attitude? In 1969 the United States scored heavily in world opinion as the result of the Apollo 11 moon landing.

"USIA took extraordinary pains to publicize that enterprise. Is there a means of measuring USIA's contribution? Is it significant that foreigners clamor for USIA films on Apollo and that USIA distributed untold hundreds of thousands of packets of information secured from the National Aeronautics and Space Administration?

"The question needs to be answered, not because there is any harm in continuing, e.g., to manufacture material for overseas distribution, but because we need to know whether the money and the time would be better spent on other activities * * *."

We recognize the enormity of the task of measuring USIA's success in influencing public attitudes. Nonetheless, we believe that, with revision or at least clarification of this mission, USIA could obtain more meaningful evidence on the effectiveness of its activities.

In the interim, we believe that USIA should explore the advantages of selling more of its media products and analyzing changes in the use of resources by the posts as means of improving its measuring capabilities and the effectiveness of its products.

In commenting on our belief that a possible revision or clarification of the mission statement would make the task of measurement easier, USIA said:

"We would, however, further point out that no matter what statement of mission is adopted, USIA or any other entity, governmental or private, which deals in the interaction of human communication, thought and behavior, finds it extremely difficult if not impossible to determine with precision and then document whether particular actions have achieved a given effect. This would be true whether the aim were 'better understanding,' 'influencing attitudes' (the former would seem to involve the latter anyway) or any other psychological process. There are, in the social science phrase, 'too many variables.' Even the person involved often does not know why he has changed his mind.

"Nonetheless, while recognizing these limits, neither we nor others engaged in public-relations communication conclude that our efforts are not worthwhile * * *."

USIA's comments on our proposals for improving its measuring capabilities were not totally responsive and/or did not clearly focus on the major thrust of our message. For example, USIA was silent regarding our suggestion to analyze significant changes in overseas posts' use of resources. Our suggestion for USIA to explore the advantages

of selling more of its products was to obtain better indicators of effectiveness rather than a measurement of true effectiveness. USIA's specific comments regarding this latter point follow.

"With respect to the Report's recommendation that the sale of products be expanded as a measure of effectiveness: this technique had been tried^e where it is felt that such a proceeding might enhance the attractiveness of the product.

(Parenthetically, in financial terms sales are a minus, not a plus for the Agency: the proceeds--a fraction of the cost--go to the Treasury while the extra bookkeeping required must be paid by USIA).

In general, the sales results tell us little about true effectiveness--whether the message was received or had any effect. If such a system were to become the rule, we would lose control of the targeted distribution to the influential people we wish to reach. We would also be entering a subsidized product into direct competition for the commercial magazine market, creating enemies of many of the local media leaders we are seeking to influence."

CHAPTER 5

SCOPE OF REVIEW

We undertook this review as part of our continuing effort to assist the Congress in its oversight of U.S. foreign relations and affairs. We reviewed USIA's mission and goals, noting changes in emphasis over its entire history, to determine whether they were current and, more significantly, whether they were realistic or even achievable. We especially emphasized an analysis of the most recent mission statement and of the controversial issues which have arisen due to lack of clarity in that statement. Overall direction of the USIA program and the approaches used in carrying out its mandate were scrutinized. Finally, we addressed the complex task of measuring the impact of USIA activities.

Our review, which was completed in June 1973, involved discussions with responsible Washington officials. It also entailed examination of historical and current data and an analysis of congressional hearings, Advisory Commission reports, USIA reports, and other pertinent information.



DIRECTOR

UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY
WASHINGTON

October 5, 1973

Dear Mr. Duff:

In accordance with the request in your letter of July 31, I am enclosing the Agency's comments on the GAO proposed report to Congress, "Telling America's Story to the World - Problems and Issues."

As noted in our comments, we appreciate the thoroughness of the GAO study. Various Agency elements have given considerable attention to the points raised in the draft. I hope that our comments will be useful.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "James Keogh".

James Keogh

Mr. James A. Duff
Associate Director
General Accounting Office
Washington, D. C. 20548

USIA Comments on GAO Proposed Report to Congress,
"Telling America's Story to the World -- Problems and Issues"

Introduction

We appreciate the opportunity to review and comment on the draft Report "Telling America's Story to the World -- Problems and Issues" by the Comptroller General.

The officers of the General Accounting Office who contributed to this Report are to be commended for the thoroughness of their examination of Agency programs and purposes, for the insights they developed into the Agency's problems, and for the interested and helpful approach they have taken toward those problems.

As the Report notes, the Agency has evolved its operating doctrine over the twenty years of its existence. This has included research, study, experimentation, and refinement as world conditions and Agency resources have changed. Thus, we have not been static in facing up to the inherent problems of methodology which the draft Report discusses. Based on this accumulated experience, we offer the following observations on the issues which it raises. We hope they will be useful to the GAO in setting forth its findings to the Congress.

The Mission of USIA

The mission of the United States Information Agency, as we see it, is to support U.S. national interests by:

1. Conveying an understanding of what the United States stands for as a nation and as a people, and presenting a true picture of the society, institutions and culture in which our policies evolve;
2. Explaining U.S. policies and the reasons for them; and
3. Advising the U.S. Government on the implications of foreign opinion for the formulation and execution of U.S. foreign policy.

Closely related to the Agency's general purposes is the question of USIA's institutional relationship to the Department of State and other foreign affairs elements of the Executive Branch. The Congress has already established a commission to study this question in depth.

In addition to several of the factors mentioned in the GAO Report, however, we believe there are other important circumstances which have a bearing on the question of organizational relationships within the Executive Branch:

- The changing U.S. strategic posture in world affairs;
- The evolution among our allies of new perceptions of themselves and their relationships;
- Changes in U.S. relations with the USSR, the Peoples Republic of China and other communist countries;
- U.S. relations with the less developed countries;
- The growing importance of economic factors in the international relations of the U.S. (broadly speaking, monetary problems,

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trade, and tourism, but including more specific issues such as energy sources, overseas investments, and environmental questions as well); and

--Changing patterns of world-wide communications.

While these areas were not within the scope of the draft Report, we believe they are factors requiring study if the question raised in the Report about the Agency's future organizational role is to be considered.

Finally, we welcome the suggestion in the draft Report that the Congress, in its legislative oversight capacity, take a strong and continuous interest in Agency purposes and operations. While it may not be feasible for the Congress to play as detailed and useful a role as the Report suggests in such technical matters as audience selection and media operations, a closer association of Congress with the Agency in setting overall goals, and the level of resources needed to achieve them, could only be beneficial.

Advisory Role

An important part of the Agency's mandate is to provide Washington foreign-affairs policy makers with a continuing assessment and analysis of the state of overseas public opinion so that this factor can be considered in formulating and carrying out policies. On a day-to-day basis, the Agency has good working level contacts with the Department of State and other agencies in our field. Personal relations at the top level are excellent. Nevertheless, we believe that this aspect of the Agency's mandate can and should be strengthened.

We have the resources, in our research operation and in the field experience of our officers in assessing and dealing with foreign opinion, to make a stronger contribution to U.S. foreign policy planning. As noted earlier, foreign public opinion is only one element among the factors which should be considered in forming and carrying out foreign policies. In some cases it is more relevant than in others, but it should always be taken into account. Our policies should not, in many cases, be modified to assure a more favorable public-opinion response abroad. However, policy makers should know about potential overseas reaction, both positive and negative, so that they can adjust their strategy to it when desirable.

Not participating directly in the higher policy councils, the Agency often lacks the information on the issues under review that would enable it to make a meaningful contribution to U.S. foreign policy planning. We believe the solution lies in institutionalizing the Agency's advisory role within the foreign policy community. In particular the Agency's advisory function should be more clearly defined, and activated, especially at the level of the NSC and in inter-Agency planning groups.

We have examined the suggestion in the draft Report that the Agency might "establish criteria or guidelines" in advance which would help other agencies of the Government determine "at what point (they) should seek USIA's counsel" on actions or programs in the foreign affairs field.

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While we appreciate the motivation for this suggestion, we do not believe that such criteria could be written except in such general terms as to have little practical applicability. There are so many variable factors that stimulate foreign opinion at any given time, and there is such a range of actions or policy concerns of U. S. Government agencies in the foreign field, that it is difficult to develop practical guidelines in advance of specific situations. If the Agency were to be given a stronger formal role in the policy-making process, as suggested above, it would be in a better position to advise other agencies in such situations.

For a number of types of action by government agencies, the point at which such counsel is most effective is in the field under specific conditions in a particular country. In such cases, the USIA Public Affairs Officer, as a member of the Embassy Country Team, does provide such guidance.

Distinction Between Information and Propaganda

The question of whether the nature of the Agency's products is more informational than propagandistic, or vice versa, is essentially one of semantics rather than substance. If one is opposed to an idea, he tends to interpret advocacy of that idea as propaganda, even if the advocacy is expressed in the blindest statement of fact. Thus, the distinction is really in the eye of the beholder. The recent Soviet condemnation of "Sesame Street" as insidious propaganda is a case in point.

All the Agency's statements of mission have assigned to it an advocacy role in support of U.S. foreign policy. Those opposed to our policies were and are quick to denounce USIA programs as propaganda. Even with the Cold War hopefully behind us and in a period when negotiation replaces confrontation, USIA still has an advocacy role in support of our policies and the objectives for which we are negotiating. For reasons of morality, as well as credibility, it is axiomatic that USIA programs and material be factual and accurate, and that commentaries and opinion be identified as such. We go to considerable lengths to assure this.

A related issue discussed in the Report is that of the attribution of Agency products. We agree that, under normal conditions, all Agency products should be clearly attributed. This is Agency policy and all materials issued by USIA currently bear such attribution, including all English teaching materials.

It should be recognized, however, that the Agency can control this only at the original point of issue. An article can be issued as a clearly attributed USIS press release, for example, but if an editor decided to publish it without attribution to USIA, his decision is -- and should be -- outside the control of USIA. In some cases, such a decision would be based on the belief that attribution to USIA, an official U.S. Government agency with its recognized advocacy role, would tend to imply the editor's support of U.S. policies when that might well not be the case, or to discount prima facie the credibility of the article

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in the minds of some readers. In countries where American motives are regularly impugned, the discounting of the credibility of material attributed to USIA can reduce the effectiveness of USIA programs. Regardless of this factor, however, it is Agency policy to require attribution for all materials issued by the Agency unless an exception is specifically authorized by the Director. No exceptions have been made since this policy was adopted last year, but we believe the Director should retain the option of non-attribution for use in major emergency situations.

Masses versus Elites

The problem of defining the USIA audience abroad was one that bedeviled the information program in its earliest years. In general our approach to this problem has been conditioned by two factors: (1) the lack of sufficient resources to reach mass audiences through all media, and (2) the realization that the most effective Agency effort would depend on an appropriate mix of media tailored to the various audiences we most needed to reach on particular issues or with particular messages.

In regard to the limitation of resources, some "media" (such as personal contact, exchange programs, or visiting specialists) obviously require a high degree of selection both in the audience to be reached and in the content of the message conveyed. For the wider-reaching media generally thought of as "mass" communications media (such as films, radio, and publications), we have found that we could

reach the audiences we were seeking -- within the limits of our resources -- by attuning the subject matter to the appropriate levels of sophistication and specialization of the intended audience.

The GAO Report accurately notes that at the present time, audience selection is defined in each country according to the societal structure, the resources of the USIS post, and the program objectives in that country. In general terms, the audience selection is made by moving down a pyramid, to the extent resources permit, of those in a position to influence that country's policies on issues of interest to the United States. (The reference to "pyramid" is figurative and does not imply that every society has a simple hierarchical power structure that can be dealt with everywhere in the same way.) For our longer-range interests, the audience may also include those who can reasonably be expected to have such influence in the future, such as students.

Programs are then designed to reach those audiences with the mix of media that will most effectively contribute to the USIS objectives in that country. For those near the top of the pyramid who exert the greatest influence, a highly selective approach is obviously necessary. Limited resources restrict the selectivity and require a wider-reaching mix of media as more numerous audiences are reached. In some countries, for example, students make up a high percentage of

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commercial theater audiences. While USIS cannot hope to reach all students, it can be reasonably certain that student leaders will see films placed in commercial theaters. When those students are also reached on selected themes, through additional means, a reinforcing mix of media can be achieved.

For such broader audiences, some selectivity can also be attained by the nature of the message being carried. The Voice of America, for example, can be reasonably certain that the broadcast of scholarly lectures (in the "Forum" programs, for instance) by leading American authorities will not only self-select but will also attract the academic and intellectual audience USIA is seeking to reach on specific subjects relevant to USIA objectives. Other VOA programs, of course, reach much broader audiences with music, news, commentaries, and special events coverage -- the size and nature of the audiences being influenced by such factors as the availability of radios, of alternative credible sources of information, and of government restrictions. In times of crisis, this wider audience is known to increase considerably. At such times, of course, it is vital that the U.S. Government have the capability of reaching mass audiences throughout the world.

We concur with the observation in the Report that, with the recent increase in ownership of transistor radios around the world, medium wave transmissions are preferable to short wave. There are limitations on this general observation, however. Medium wave

frequencies are not available in many parts of the world and are growing scarcer in other areas as time goes by. Medium wave transmitter construction requires resources the Agency does not presently have. Medium wave is more easily jammed. It cannot cover the distance that short wave can and therefore it must be located in or very close to the intended listening area. If it is intended for nearby audiences, this becomes a factor deterring most countries from allowing foreign powers to construct medium wave transmitters on their soil.

Achieving a proper mix is thus, once again, the key to optimum effectiveness -- in this case the best mix possible of medium and short wave transmitters. There is still a large short wave listening audience in the world, especially in the closed societies. It is important that VOA have the capability of reaching them.

Worldwide versus Targeted Products

As the Report suggests, the advantages and disadvantages of productions for worldwide use and those pinpointed to particular groups or countries have constituted a difficult issue over many years. The question is one aspect of the broader philosophical issue, discussed above, of how broad -- or narrow -- an audience the Agency should try to reach. It is also, as the Report notes, a matter of resources.

The recommendation in the Report that the use of targeted products should be expanded is in line with the current direction of

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Agency production. At the same time, the old terms of reference which equated "worldwide" with general purpose and "targeted" with material suitable only within narrow geographic limits have undergone modification in the light of new developments. National and cultural differences obviously remain important limiting factors in many areas of communication. On the other hand, new and complex issues -- diplomatic, economic, environmental, social, etc. -- to which the country and hence the Agency must address themselves -- are increasingly of worldwide impact and also of concern, at least to the specialized influential groups which must deal with them. Recent research supports the concept of "international informational elites" comprised of people in each country (of varying numbers, to be sure) who have similarities of interest and background despite their differences of nationality and region. At the same time, familiarity with English on the part of these groups has greatly expanded.

In response to these considerations, Agency products have been moving toward more careful targeting and thematic treatment. In the field of magazines, for example, we have recently launched Economic Impact to reach an international group with special knowledge and interest in that subject area. We are developing another magazine which will deal with broader political and cultural subjects on a high level, and will incorporate or replace a number of one-country or regional

magazines now being published. This new "core" magazine, Horizons USA, to be published in 11 languages, can be adapted to particular country or regional situations by the insertion of locally tailored material if the Country Public Affairs officers wish to do so.

The success of previous Agency publications of this sophisticated and specialized type, e. g., Problems of Communism and Dialogue, has encouraged this trend. It is also in accord with the recent experience of the U. S. commercial magazine business: general-purpose publications are giving way to those appealing to particular interest groups. Similarly, the press service (Wireless File) gives worldwide dissemination of specialized information often not otherwise available (e. g., texts of important policy statements, coverage of Congress and other U. S. institutions, etc.) while regional files do take account of geographic interests.

The Agency is also expanding its use of some new targeting techniques. Fast and relatively inexpensive, videotape recordings (VTR's) of lectures, interviews and discussions are geared to particular themes and countries in support of foreign policy objectives. (Arrangements have also been made with some U. S. networks permitting us to tape some of their public affairs material for this purpose.) VTR's constitute the most rapidly accelerating activity of the Motion Picture/TV Service. They form an element in other recently applied and successful targeting concepts such as: Special Thematic Programs (STP's), a multi-media approach to programming built around a particular

theme of major international importance (e.g., economic issues, urban problems, etc.) and electronic dialogues whereby a VTR message from a U.S. expert is shown abroad to a special audience assembled for the purpose and is followed by a trans-oceanic telephonic two-way discussion of the issues.

In addition to VTR's, the film and motion picture service has increasingly concentrated on the tailoring of Agency-produced materials and selective acquisition of commercial films for individual countries or audiences. In fact, the bulk of its output is targeted and it has reduced production of general-purpose documentaries (from 30 to 17 a year). Nonetheless, in addition to the important role of budgetary factors in so expensive a medium, we also feel that worldwide treatment is appropriate for some outstanding events of universal interest (e.g., lunar landings, Presidential trips to the PRC and USSR). Therefore a mix of worldwide and tailored treatments is perhaps the most realistic objective.

The whole question raised here will, of course, continue to pose issues to which there are no absolute answers and we welcome the opportunity for discussion.

Appropriate Level of Effort in Advanced Countries

The GAO Report properly notes the high degree of importance attached to the advanced countries in terms of our national interests as well as the resources devoted to USIA efforts, particularly in

Western Europe and Japan. Concern is expressed over the "likelihood of duplicative and competitive output," given the highly sophisticated media of these countries and their frequent saturation by private U.S. media as well.

It is incontestible that these countries, as the Report acknowledges, are of supreme importance to the United States, strategically, politically and economically. Taken together, they constitute two of the five major world power centers. They have been our major allies. The outcome of the larger world issues, the subjects of current or likely future negotiations, will be heavily influenced by their attitudes. Further, their influence in some parts of the developing world exceeds our own. For all these reasons, it would be extremely damaging to our national interests were their attitudes to become predominantly hostile to us.

The extent and nature of Agency operations in these countries relates fundamentally to our role as advocate of the U.S. and purveyor of information, ideas and interpretations. We consider it important that USIA contribute to a balanced picture of American society and a greater understanding of U.S. policies, attempting to correct distortions where possible, especially in countries where cooperation, or lack of it, may vitally effect American interests and where informed public opinion carries heavy weight.

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Relationship to Commercial Media

As the Report points out, the Agency has argued and continues to believe that the major thrust of our admittedly limited effort does not duplicate or compete with commercial media.

The rapid growth of international communications channels in recent years has not lessened the role of USIA, but in fact has made it more important. This is not a role that is or can be filled by private or commercial channels, no matter how efficient or skilled they may be, because their purpose is different.

The news media -- which are essentially and properly commercial enterprises -- tend to highlight the spectacular, bizarre or sensational events while the normal, undramatic endeavors of society and its more mundane problems or quiet achievements are rarely reported. The news media have no desire to be the platform for official statements or explanations of U.S. policy. Replying to foreign critics of the U.S. is not their job. Nor have they any financial incentive to attempt to communicate with people in closed societies or poorer nations which cannot afford costly media services. It is, however, vital for us to do so. The continuing efforts to explain the facts and underlying principles of our actions and policies, to correct the willful or unintentional distortions about our country abroad -- a daily task of USIA -- is simply not the primary purpose or concern of the private media. And yet, as one informed observer has written: "The confused and often distorted image of the United States that reaches foreign eyes and ears becomes an element in the balance sheet of

our foreign relations."

The fact is, of course, that USIA is but one voice among many in a world sometimes surfeited with information. The implications for our programs are clear. USIA must define its role with care if it is to have any effect. It must concentrate on those areas of concern to the U.S. not served by non-governmental communications channels. It must carefully adapt its output to the intended audiences, for if we are to claim the attention of busy people, our programs must be relevant to their interests. Accordingly, we try to focus our programs on issues of mutual concern or where our interests intersect.

In Western Europe and in other areas, the Agency does draw on American media output (articles, TV programs) where such material is available and relevant. However, this utilization will always be quantitatively limited by the fact that most U.S. domestic output is designed for American audiences as its built-in frame of reference.

Constant monitoring and assessment should help us to avoid duplication. Flexibility, careful targeting and versatility of effort are, in our view, what is required in these critically important countries -- not further reduction.

Measurement of Effectiveness

The Report correctly perceives the difficulty inherent in measuring "achievement" in such an intangible area. Clearly, any concept of effectiveness is related to some definition both of audiences and of what one should try to achieve.

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We have already discussed aspects of this problem above.

There is no doubt that ongoing dialogue within the Agency, with other elements of the Executive, and increasingly, with members of Congress will help us to clarify further some of these complex issues.

We would, however, further point out that no matter what statement of mission is adopted, USIA or any other entity, governmental or private, which deals in the interaction of human communication, thought and behavior, finds it extremely difficult if not impossible to determine with precision and then document whether particular actions have achieved a given effect. This would be true whether the aim were "better understanding," "influencing attitudes" (the former would seem to involve the latter anyway) or any other psychological process. There are, in the social science phrase, "too many variables." Even the person involved often does not know why he has changed his mind.

Nonetheless, while recognizing these limits, neither we nor others engaged in public-relations communication conclude that our efforts are not worthwhile. At the same time, a great deal more research effort and record-keeping have gone into the attempt to find indications of effectiveness as communicators than the Report suggests.

In-depth studies of audience habits and preferences and of utilization of our products have been conducted for years. For example, we know from a dozen readership studies that at least half but most often about two-thirds of recipients of given USIA publications read some parts of them; that a quarter to a third say they read each

article thoroughly; that a majority say they keep copies for later use or transmit them to friends. Such assessment studies are also conducted regularly with respect to VOA, information centers, films, etc. In the field, more posts have established or are establishing increasingly demanding systems of "program accountability" or quantitative records of the various types of communications transactions.


Non-quantitative reactions -- including statements by opinion molders, and periodic evaluations of activities by experts in the field -- have also made valuable contributions to our knowledge. These, in our view, are not adequately characterized by the term "anecdotal evidence."

With respect to the Report's recommendation that the sale of products be expanded as a measure of effectiveness: this technique has been tried where it is felt that such a proceeding might enhance the attractiveness of the product. (Parenthetically, in financial terms, sales are a minus, not a plus for the Agency: the proceeds -- a fraction of the cost -- go to the Treasury while the extra bookkeeping required must be paid by USIA.) In general, the sales results tell us little about true effectiveness -- whether the message was received or had any effect. If such a system were to become the rule, we would lose control of the targeted distribution to the influential people we wish to reach. We would also be entering a subsidized product into direct competition for the commercial magazine market, creating

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enemies of many of the local media leaders we are seeking to influence.

The experience of communications research generally -- and our own in particular -- cautions against excessive expectation of short-run success in influencing attitudes. It also suggests that we should avoid absolute criteria for success or failure and should continuously stress the need for adaptation. We believe, nonetheless, that we can and do facilitate communication and the clarification of issues, that we can and do reach given audiences with certain important information and ideas which they might not otherwise obtain, and that these results at least can be probed within the limits of the current state of the art. The interest and assistance of Members of Congress and others is vitally important to this difficult task.



INTERNATIONAL NEWS AGENCIES

IN CERTAIN FOREIGN COUNTRIES

Australia:

Associated Press, AP (U.S.)
 United Press International, UPI
 (U.S.)
 Reuters-Australian AP (British-
 Australian)
 Thompson Press Agency (British-
 Canadian)
 Business Press Service (British-
 United States)

Austria:

AP (U.S.)
 UPI (U.S.)
 Reuters (British)
 Agence France Presse, AFP
 (French)
 Deutsche Presse Agentur, DPA
 (West German)
 ANSA (Italian)
 Hsinhua (Chinese Communist)
 China Press & Information Service
 (Taiwan)
 CETEKA (Czechoslovakian)
 ADN (East German)
 MTI (Hungarian)
 Interpress (Polish)
 Agerpres (Rumanian)
 TASS (Soviet)
 Novosti (Soviet)
 Tanjug (Yugoslav)
 McGraw-Hill World News (U.S.)

Belgium:

AP (U.S.)
 UPI (U.S.)
 AFP (French)
 Reuters (British)
 Algemeen Nederlands Presbureau
 ANP (Dutch)
 DPA (West German)
 EFE (Spanish)
 ANSA (Italian)
 Prensa Latina (Cuban)
 Ritzaus Bureau (Danish)
 ADN (East German)
 Zaire Press Service (Zaire)
 Novosti (Soviet)
 APA (Austrian)

Canada:

AP (U.S.)
 UPI (U.S.)
 Reuters (British)
 AFP (French)

Denmark:

AP (U.S.)
 UPI (U.S.)
 Ritzaus Bureau (Danish)
 Reuters (British)
 AFP (French)
 DPA (West German)
 ADN (East German)
 PAP (Polish)
 AFS (Swiss)
 SI (Italian)
 TASS (Soviet)
 Novosti (Soviet)

Finland:

AFP (French)
 DPA (West German)
 ADN (East German)
 AP (U.S.)
 UPI (U.S.)
 EFE (Spanish)
 VNA (North Vietnamese)
 NTB (Norwegian)
 TT (Swedish)
 PAP (Polish)
 Reuters (British)
 TASS (Soviet)
 Novosti (Soviet)
 Hsinhua (Chinese Communist)

Federal Republic of Germany:

DPA (West German)
 Deutscher Depeschen Dienst, DDP
 (West German)
 AP (U.S.)
 Reuters (British)
 UPI (U.S.)
 AFP (French)

France:

AFP (French)
 Reuters (British)
 DPA (West German)

ANSA (Italian)
 AP (U.S.)
 UPI (U.S.)
 TASS (Soviet)
 PAP (Polish)

Great Britain:
 Reuters (British)
 AP (U.S.)
 UPI (U.S.)
 AFP (French)
 TASS (Soviet)
 DPA (West German)
 Anglo-Danish Press Agency (British-Danish)
 Associated Press of Australia (Australian)
 Canadian Press (Canadian)
 Ghana News Agency (Ghanaian)
 New Zealand Press Association (New Zealand)
 PAP (Polish)
 SAPA (South African)
 AFS (Swiss)

Iceland:
 NTB (Norwegian)
 AP (U.S.)
 UPI (U.S.)
 TASS (Soviet)

Italy:
 AP (U.S.)
 UPI (U.S.)
 Reuters (British)
 TASS (Soviet)
 AFP (French)
 DPA (West German)
 Tanjug (Yugoslav)
 ANSA (Italian)
 PAP (Polish)

Japan:
 AP (U.S.)
 UPI (U.S.)
 North American Newspaper Alliance, NANA (U.S.)
 King Features (U.S.)
 Fairchild Features (U.S.)
 TASS (Soviet)
 Novosti (Soviet)
 Korean News Service (North Korean)

VNA (North Vietnamese)
 Hsinhua (Chinese Communist)
 ADN (East German)
 MTI (Hungarian)
 PAP (Polish)
 Tanjug (Yugoslav)
 Prensa Latina (Cuban)
 BTA (Bulgarian)
 Central News Agency (Republic of China)
 Reuters (British)
 DPA (West German)
 AFP (French)
 ANSA (Italian)
 EFE (Spanish)
 Anatolian News Agency (Turkish)
 Antara (Indonesian)
 Associated Press of Pakistan (Pakistani)
 Press Trust of India (Indian)
 Vietnam Press (South Vietnam)
 PNS (Philippine)
 Bernama (Malaysian)
 INA (Iraqi)
 MENA (Egyptian)
 NTB (Norwegian)
 PTC (Ceylonese)
 STT-FBN (Finnish)
 TELAM (Argentina)
 Item (Israeli)

The Netherlands:
 AFP (French)
 ANP (Dutch)
 Antara (Indonesian)
 AP (U.S.)
 DPA (West German)
 Reuters (British)
 UPI (U.S.)
 TASS (Soviet)

New Zealand:
 Reuters (British)
 AP (U.S.)
 UPI (U.S.)

Norway:
 AP (U.S.)
 UPI (U.S.)
 Reuters (British)
 AFP (French)
 Novosti (Soviet)

APPENDIX III

Portugal:

Reuters (British)
AP (U.S.)
UPI (U.S.)
AFP (French)
ANSA (Italian)
EFE (Spanish)
Lusitania (Portuguese)

South Africa:

South African Press Association,
SAPA
UPI (U.S.)
AP (U.S.)
Reuters (British)
AFP (French)
DPA (West German)

Sweden:

TT (Swedish)

AP (U.S.)
UPI (U.S.)
Reuters (British)
AFP (French)
DPA (West German)
TASS (Soviet)
Tanjug (Yugoslav)

Switzerland:

AFS (Sweden)
AP (U.S.)
UPI (U.S.)
Reuters (British)
AFP (French)
DPA (West German)
TASS (Soviet)
ANSA (Italian)

APPENDIX IV
(pages 86 through 97)

UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY
 RESOURCE ALLOCATION GROUP BY COUNTRY RESOURCES
 (In Thousands of Dollars)
 FY 1973

	Full-time Permanent Employment	PAO Resources									
		PAO Dollar Resources						Sub-Total		Total PAO Resources	
		Am.	Local	GOF	DSA	SAS	American Salaries	Dollar Resources	SFC		
									GOF		SAS
<u>RAG I</u>											
Germany, Federal Rep. of (in- cluding Berlin)	32	202	\$2,933	\$ 148	\$1,145	\$ 939	\$5,165	\$ -	\$ -	\$5,165	
Japan	27	186	2,964	156	553	850	4,523	-	-	4,523	
USSR	12	-	86	320	241	306	953	-	-	953	
China, Peoples Rep. of	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Sub-Total, RAG I	71	388	5,983	624	1,939	2,095	10,641	-	-	10,641	
<u>RAG II</u>											
India	37	465	40	271	264	1,218	1,793	6,051	427	8,271	
Brazil	36	139	2,059	326	744	1,013	4,142	-	-	4,142	
Vietnam, Re- public of	32	174	1,051	301	495	1,428	3,275	-	-	3,275	
Yugoslavia	15	93	84	233	106	408	831	1,538*	142	2,571	
Italy	13	101	1,291	152	461	398	2,302	-	-	2,302	
Indonesia	17	65	475	221	305	546	1,547	-	-	1,547	
Sub-Total, RAG II	150	1,037	5,000	1,504	2,375	5,011	13,890	7,649	569	22,108	
<u>RAG III</u>											
German Dem. Rep. (RIAS)	3	-	3,681	123	90	113	4,007	-	-	4,007	
France	15	66	1,399	92	376	391	2,258	-	-	2,258	
Mexico	21	83	1,010	231	380	568	2,189	-	-	2,189	
Thailand	25	131	987	282	124	762	2,155	-	-	2,155	
Korea, Re- public of	14	96	851	165	274	447	1,737	-	-	1,737	
Nigeria	15	50	767	97	280	452	1,596	-	-	1,596	
Iran	14	81	821	120	241	403	1,585	-	-	1,585	
Argentina	19	62	663	122	244	521	1,550	-	-	1,550	
Turkey	16	75	617	96	196	471	1,380	-	-	1,380	
Greece	9	65	686	89	222	279	1,276	11	-	1,287	
Philippines	11	76	429	174	265	385	1,253	-	-	1,253	
Chile	14	42	603	129	128	361	1,221	-	-	1,221	
Spain	9	42	542	101	152	250	1,045	-	-	1,045	
United Kingdom	10	32	517	32	191	300	1,040	-	-	1,040	
Poland	10	23	58	263	56	236	613	280	80	973	
Romania	7	14	223	87	93	183	586	-	-	586	

*Includes \$104,000 for transshipment of America Illustrated to Poland and the U.S.S.R.

APPENDIX IV

VOA		SIE		Total	(non-add)	
One-Country	Broadcasts	Resources	Country		Renovation	
Staff	Cost	\$	SFC	Program	\$	SFC
-	\$ -	\$ 30	\$ -	\$ 5,195	\$ -	\$ -
-	-	-	-	4,523	-	-
173	2,694	2,404	16	6,067	-	-
<u>47</u>	<u>907</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>907</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>
220	3,601	2,434	16	16,692	-	-
10	195	-	-	8,466	15	35
14	299	-	-	4,441	50	-
9	200	-	-	3,475	-	-
16	346	433	239	3,589	-	166
-	-	-	-	2,302	-	-
<u>17</u>	<u>315</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>1,862</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>
66	1,355	433	239	24,135	65	201
-	-	-	-	4,007	-	-
-	-	-	-	2,258	-	-
Spanish	-	-	-	2,189	-	-
7	113	-	-	2,268	-	-
4	93	-	-	1,830	-	-
English	-	-	-	1,596	-	-
-	-	-	-	1,585	-	-
Spanish	-	-	-	1,550	-	-
5	141	-	-	1,521	-	-
7	143	-	-	1,430	-	-
-	-	-	-	1,253	-	-
Spanish	-	-	-	1,221	-	-
-	-	-	-	1,045	-	-
-	-	-	-	1,040	-	-
17	356	205	70	1,604	18	120
15	271	334	6	1,197	-	-

UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY
 RESOURCE ALLOCATION GROUP BY COUNTRY RESOURCES
 (In Thousands of Dollars)
 FY 1973

	Full-time Permanent Employment		PAO Dollar Resources					PAO Resources		Total PAO Resources
	Am.	Local	GOE	DSA	SAS	American Salaries	Sub-Total			
							Dollar Resources	SFC		
							GOE	SAS		
<u>RAG III (cont.)</u>										
DSNATO Brussels	5	-	\$ 112	\$ 3	\$ 23	\$ 126	\$ 264	\$ -	\$ -	\$ 264
USEC Brussels	3	4	106	1	39	72	218	-	-	218
Arab Republic of Egypt	1	5	11	21	9	30	71	45	33	149
Cuba	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Vietnam, Peoples Rep. of	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Sub-Total, RAG III	221	949	14,083	2,228	3,383	6,350	26,044	336	113	26,493
<u>RAG IV</u>										
Pakistan	18	156	54	162	214	583	1,013	688	225	1,920
Zaire	13	38	532	97	335	421	1,385	-	-	1,385
Venezuela	13	31	569	84	141	354	1,148	-	-	1,148
Colombia	14	29	495	156	124	355	1,130	-	-	1,130
Morocco	12	39	490	84	197	339	1,110	-	-	1,110
Peru	12	29	405	121	107	306	939	-	-	939
Ethiopia	7	30	309	116	92	205	722	-	-	722
Australia	6	17	275	49	105	190	619	-	-	619
Israel	5	36	6	43	101	141	291	310	-	601
Czechoslovakia	3	4	46	21	40	70	177	-	-	177
Hungary	2	4	24	20	46	63	155	-	-	155
Sub-Total, RAG IV	105	413	3,205	953	1,502	3,027	8,687	998	225	9,910
<u>RAG V</u>										
Bangladesh	5	79	336	57	162	162	717	34	-	751
South Africa	6	15	202	50	199	153	604	-	-	604
Tunisia	5	28	39	56	78	112	313	200	-	513
Lebanon	5	33	239	49	138	2	568	-	-	568
Sweden	5	22	304	39	77	128	548	-	-	548
Panama	5	21	262	51	56	161	330	-	-	530
Canada	4	9	172	34	57	114	377	-	-	377
Korea, Peoples Rep. of	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Sub-Total, RAG V	35	207	1,554	336	767	602	3,659	294	-	3,953

APPENDIX IV

VOA		SIE		Total Country Program	(non-add) Renovation	
One-Country Broadcasts	Resources	Staff	Cost		\$	SFC
-	\$ -	\$ -	\$ -	\$ 264	\$ -	\$ -
-	-	-	-	218	-	-
Arabic	-	-	-	149	-	-
Spanish	-	-	-	-	-	-
<u>9</u>	<u>200</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>200</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>
64	1,317	539	76	28,425	-	-
7	129	-	-	2,055	-	-
Swahili	-	-	-	1,385	-	-
Spanish	-	-	-	1,148	-	-
Spanish	-	-	-	1,130	-	-
Arabic	-	-	-	1,110	25	-
Spanish	-	-	-	939	-	-
-	-	-	-	722	-	-
-	-	-	-	619	-	-
-	-	-	-	601	-	-
19	338	2	-	517	-	-
<u>19</u>	<u>335</u>	<u>300</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>788</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>
45	802	302	-	11,014	25	-
3	61	-	-	812	6	-
English	-	-	-	604	-	-
French, Arabic	-	-	-	575	-	-
Arabic	-	-	-	568	-	-
-	-	-	-	548	-	-
Spanish	-	-	-	530	-	-
-	-	-	-	377	-	-
<u>5</u>	<u>93</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>93</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>
8	154	-	-	4,107	6	-

UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY
 RESOURCE ALLOCATION GROUP BY COUNTRY RESOURCES
 (In Thousands of Dollars)
 FY 1973

	Full-time Permanent Employment		PAO Resources							Total PAO Resources	
			PAO Dollar Resources				Sub-Total Dollar Resources		SFC		
			Am.	Local	GOE	DSA	SAS	American Salaries	GOE		SAS
<u>RAG VI</u>											
Laos	8	40	\$ 322	\$ 89	\$ 178	\$ 303	\$ 892	\$ -	\$ -	\$ 892	
Austria	6	29	501	31	168	128	828	-	-	828	
China, Republic of	8	57	376	94	68	247	785	-	-	785	
Belgium	4	21	350	27	90	114	581	-	-	581	
Ghana	6	20	188	74	92	188	542	-	-	542	
Saudi Arabia (Yemen)	5	9	196	29	105	142	472	-	-	472	
Netherlands	4	13	227	38	55	116	436	-	-	436	
Norway	4	18	210	50	72	99	431	-	-	431	
Algeria	2	4	72	24	48	57	201	-	-	201	
Sub-Total, RAG VI	47	211	2,442	456	876	1,394	5,168	-	-	5,168	
<u>RAG VII</u>											
Hong Kong	5	36	393	47	104	148	692	-	-	692	
Ecuador	8	25	258	36	117	241	652	-	-	652	
Malaysia	5	31	304	67	73	138	582	-	-	582	
Uruguay	5	33	209	66	100	144	519	-	-	519	
Kenya	4	18	213	49	120	133	515	-	-	515	
Guatemala	5	26	258	42	38	145	483	-	-	483	
Denmark	4	19	261	29	67	119	476	-	-	476	
Finland	6	21	233	32	46	162	473	-	-	473	
Ivory Coast	4	11	166	38	142	104	450	-	-	450	
Singapore	3	26	225	35	73	91	424	-	-	424	
Afghanistan	5	18	143	40	83	147	413	-	-	413	
Sri Lanka (Ceylon)	4	28	169	48	49	107	372	-	-	372	
Tanzania	3	15	123	47	73	93	336	-	-	336	
Sudan	1	12	136	42	128	28	334	-	-	334	
Portugal	3	14	139	21	49	75	284	-	-	284	
Cyprus	3	15	142	19	46	61	268	-	-	268	
New Zealand	2	8	91	38	50	73	252	-	-	252	
Kuwait (incl. Gulf States)	2	6	120	14	52	66	252	-	-	252	
Jordan	2	12	123	28	41	41	233	-	-	233	
Khmer Republic (Cambodia)	3	10	25	17	79	97	218	-	-	218	
Iceland	2	7	101	20	19	47	187	-	-	187	
USIO Geneva	2	3	77	3	51	45	177	-	-	177	
Libya	-	-	38	-	19	15	72	-	-	72	
Sub-Total, RAG VII	81	394	3,948	778	1,618	2,320	8,664	-	-	8,664	

APPENDIX IV

VOA		SIC		Total Country Program	(non-add) Renovation	
One-Country Broadcasts	Resources				\$	SIC
Staff	Cost	\$	SFC			
8	\$ 147	\$ -	\$ -	\$1,039	\$ 15	\$ -
-	-	-	-	828	-	-
-	-	-	-	785	-	-
-	-	-	-	581	-	-
English	-	-	-	542	118	-
Arabic	-	-	-	472	-	-
-	-	-	-	436	12	-
-	-	-	-	431	-	-
<u>French, Arabic</u>				<u>201</u>		
8	147	-	-	5,315	145	-
-	-	-	-	692	-	-
Spanish	-	-	-	652	-	-
-	-	-	-	582	-	-
Spanish	-	-	-	519	-	-
Swahili, English	-	-	-	515	-	-
Spanish	-	-	-	483	-	-
-	-	-	-	476	-	-
-	-	-	-	473	-	-
French	-	-	-	450	200	-
-	-	-	-	424	-	-
-	-	-	-	413	-	-
-	-	-	-	372	-	-
Swahili, English	-	-	-	336	25	-
Arabic, English	-	-	-	334	-	-
-	-	-	-	284	-	-
-	-	-	-	268	-	-
-	-	-	-	252	-	-
Arabic	-	-	-	252	-	-
Arabic	-	-	-	233	-	-
9	179	-	-	397	-	-
-	-	-	-	187	-	-
-	-	-	-	177	-	-
<u>Arabic, French</u>				<u>72</u>		
9	179	-	-	8,843	225	-

UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY
 RESOURCE ALLOCATION GROUP BY COUNTRY RESOURCES
 (In Thousands of Dollars)
 FY 1973

	Full-Time Permanent Employment	PAO Resources								Total PAO Resources
		PAO Dollar Resources					Sub-Total Dollar Resources	SFC		
		Am.	Local	GOE	DSA	SAS		American Salaries	GOE	
<u>RAG VIII</u>										
Cameroon	4	12	\$ 236	\$ 44	\$158	\$ 109	\$ 547	\$ -	\$ -	\$ 547
Bolivia	5	26	261	51	54	140	506	-	-	506
Burma	4	33	19	64	47	131	261	182	57	500
Nepal	3	29	15	38	28	78	159	152	18	329
Liberia	2	10	138	37	78	64	317	-	-	317
Costa Rica	3	11	100	58	41	91	290	-	-	290
Zambia	2	10	140	38	45	52	275	-	-	275
Bulgaria	2	3	21	12	53	59	145	-	-	145
Malta	1	4	61	20	7	13	101	-	-	101
Iraq	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Syria	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Sub-Total, RAG VIII	26	138	991	362	511	737	2,601	334	75	3,010
<u>RAG IX</u>										
Semalia	2	11	137	38	181	72	428	-	-	428
Dominican Republic	2	13	153	16	65	108	342	-	-	342
Senegal	3	11	176	26	48	78	328	-	-	328
Paraguay	4	9	108	31	56	109	304	-	-	304
Malagasy Republic	2	12	174	36	43	48	301	-	-	301
El Salvador	4	8	105	38	64	87	294	-	-	294
Honduras	4	7	89	37	57	91	274	-	-	274
Nicaragua	3	8	97	31	51	75	254	-	-	254
Uganda	2	10	112	36	31	66	245	-	-	245
Guyana	2	9	105	27	26	66	224	-	-	224
Sierra Leone	2	6	63	27	60	58	208	-	-	208
Trinidad	2	10	83	19	43	54	199	-	-	199
Guinea	1	4	18	23	42	36	119	36	43	198
Jamaica	2	6	76	15	30	51	172	-	-	172
Malawi	1	5	61	16	34	35	146	-	-	146
Switzerland	-	3	38	9	29	-	76	-	-	76
Albania	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Rhodesia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Sub-Total, RAG IX	36	132	1,595	425	860	1,034	3,914	36	43	3,993

APPENDIX IV

VOA		SIF		Total	(non-add)	
One-Country		Resources			Country	Renovation
Staff	Cost	\$	SFC	Program	\$	SFC
French		\$ -	\$ -	\$ 198	\$ -	\$ -
French		-	-	197	-	-
French		-	-	196	-	-
French		-	-	195	-	-
-		-	-	180	-	-
French		-	-	169	-	-
French		-	-	161	-	-
French		-	-	154	-	-
French		-	-	151	-	-
English		-	-	81	-	-
French		-	-	41	-	-
French		-	-	24	-	-
French		-	-	24	-	-
-		-	-	19	-	-
-		-	-	13	-	-
-		-	-	12	-	-
-		-	-	8	-	-
-		-	-	3	-	-
-		-	-	3	-	-
-		-	-	2	-	-
English		-	-	1	-	-
-		-	-	1	-	-
-		-	-	<u>1,813</u>	-	-
<u>448</u>	<u>8,109</u>	<u>3,940</u>	<u>331</u>	<u>108,133</u>	<u>466</u>	<u>216</u>

-	-	-	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-
French	-	-	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-

UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY
 RESOURCE ALLOCATION GROUP BY COUNTRY RESOURCES
 (In Thousands of Dollars)
 FY 1973

	Full-Time		PAO Resources							Total PAO Resources
	Permanent Employment	Am. Local	PAO Dollar Resources			Sub-Total		SFC		
			GOE	DSA	SAS	American Salaries	Dollar Resources	GOE	SAS	
Posts receiving only marginal, if any, USIS programming - continued										
Guadeloupe	-	-	\$-	\$-	\$-	\$-	\$-	\$-	\$-	\$-
Luxembourg	-	-				(Receives \$565 in programming from France)				
Maldives, Republic of	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Martinique	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Mauritania	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Outer Mongolia	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Papua - New Guinea	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Seychelles	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Sikkim	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Society Islands	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Surinam	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Tonga	-	-				(Receives some programming from Fiji)				
Western Samoa	-	-				(Receives some programming from New Zealand)				
Yemen Peoples Dem. Rep. of (Aden)	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-

NOTE:

A word rather than a numerical amount in the VOA column indicates that the post shares in one of the following multi-country language broadcasts.

- (a) Spanish to Latin America - 26 positions and \$542,000.
- (b) Swahili to West Africa - 7 positions and \$132,000.
- (c) French to Francophone Africa - 14 positions and \$282,000.
- (d) English to Africa - 12 positions and \$314,000.
- (e) Arabic to Near East and North Africa - 11 domestic positions, 10 Americans Overseas, and 12 locals, along with \$930,000.

ABBREVIATIONS:

RAG Resource Allocation Group
 PAO Public Affairs Officer
 GOE general operating expenses
 DSA direct support allocation
 SAS shared administrative support
 SFC special foreign currency
 SIE special international exhibitions

USIA OVERSEAS POSTS

WEST EUROPE

JANUARY 1, 1973

- ★ Mission Post
- Branch Post
- Binational Center
- Reading Room
- * RIAS
- ◆ REX
- Information Center (with no USIS Post present)
- ✕ Radio Relay Station
- ✕ Radio Program Center
- ✕ Radio Monitoring Office
- △ Distribution Outlet
- Agency Representatives to Special U.S. Missions

Boundaries are not necessarily those recognized by the U.S. Government

Communist Bloc Countries

CANADA


Ottawa ★

Montreal ■

Toronto ■


ICELAND

Reykjavik ★



PRINCIPAL OFFICIALS OF
THE UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY
RESPONSIBLE FOR MATTERS
DISCUSSED IN THIS REPORT

	<u>Tenure of office</u>	
	<u>From</u>	<u>To</u>
DIRECTOR:		
James Keogh	Feb. 1973	Present
Frank J. Shakespeare, Jr.	Feb. 1969	Jan. 1973
DEPUTY DIRECTOR:		
Eugene P. Kopp	Apr. 1973	Present
Vacant	Oct. 1972	Mar. 1973
Henry I. Loomis	Apr. 1969	Sept. 1972
DEPUTY DIRECTOR (POLICY AND PLANS):		
R. Kenneth Towery	Oct. 1971	Present
ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR (RESEARCH AND ASSESSMENT):		
Walter R. Roberts	June 1971	Present



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