Department of Energy: Clear Strategy on External Regulation Needed for Worker and Nuclear Facility Safety

T-RCED-98-205 May 21, 1998
Full Report (PDF, 10 pages)  

Summary

With few exceptions, independent contractors do not inspect or license the Energy Department's (DOE) vast complex of research and nuclear facilities. Instead, DOE relies on its own staff to ensure the safety of these facilities. GAO has long criticized DOE for weaknesses in self-regulation. DOE's position on the external regulation of safety is unclear. Five years ago, DOE's leadership made a commitment to the external regulation of worker safety. DOE announced that it would phase out self regulation over a 10-year period, starting with legislation by 1998 to authorize external regulation. In late 1997, however, DOE launched a two-year pilot program to simulate regulation by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) at six to 10 of DOE's nuclear sites. At the end of this pilot, DOE and NRC will jointly decide if external regulation is warranted. DOE's decision to conduct pilots represents a shift from its earlier strong endorsement of external regulation of all its facilities. DOE's uncertain position has both NRC and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration concerned about the agency's commitment to external regulation. Although DOE's pilot will provide useful insights, the information collected will not reflect the size and complexity of DOE's vast nuclear complex and thus will not yield the data needed to address many critical issues on external regulation.

GAO noted that: (1) over the last 5 years, DOE leadership has often stated its intention to have its facilities subject to external regulation by independent agencies in matters of worker safety and nuclear facility safety; (2) in 1996, DOE endorsed recommendations to phase out its self-regulation over a 10-year period and announced it would seek immediate legislation to authorize the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) to become its external regulators; (3) DOE's position, however, has changed; (4) DOE is now evaluating the feasibility of external regulation by conducting a pilot program at selected DOE sites over a 2-year period; (5) DOE's pilot program is a sharp departure from its earlier strong position to immediately seek legislation enabling external regulation by NRC and OSHA; (6) moreover, DOE's pilot program, which is designed to simulate external regulation at selected facilities, will not provide managers with much of the information they will need to make well-informed judgments about the value and the practicality of external regulation; (7) the scope of the pilot program remains in doubt because no high-risk, complex, or defense facilities have been selected; (8) also, DOE's pilot program has been largely limited to simulate regulation by NRC; and (9) no joint pilots with OSHA have been completed or planned to study the jurisdictional overlap that exists between the two agencies.