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BY THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL



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Report To The Congress


OF THE UNITED STATES

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The Public Diplomacy Of Other Countries: Implications For The United States

In a survey of international communication, cultural and educational programs of the United States and six other countries, GAO reached these and other findings:

- By comparison with allies and adversaries, the U.S. Government investment in this field is low.
- The U.S. can improve impact and efficiency of overseas programs by further cultivating cooperation with its allies.
- While leading allies and adversaries put heavy emphasis on teaching their languages to foreigners, the U. S. has neglected important opportunities in this field for more than a decade.
- The present ban on the domestic availability of International Communication Agency products should be re-examined.
- A periodic, public report and analysis of aims, content, and methods of Soviet propaganda in and concerning the United States would give the U.S. press and public new perspective on Soviet purposes.



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COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20548

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To the President of the Senate and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives

This report surveys essential similarities and differences among the international information, cultural and educational activities of the United States and six other countries and notes a number of possible implications for U.S. programs.

Copies are being sent to the Director, Office of Management and Budget; Secretary of State; and Director, International Communication Agency.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, reading "James B. Starks".

Comptroller General
of the United States

D I G E S T

"Public diplomacy"--international communication, cultural and educational activities in which "the public" is involved--has become a principal instrument of foreign policy for the United States and other nations. (See pp. 1 and 2.)

Chapter 2 outlines the main features and suggests the essential character of the public diplomacy of seven countries-- Britain, France, Japan, the Federal Republic of Germany, the People's Republic of China, the Soviet Union, and the United States. (See pp. 5 to 35.)

A number of similarities and differences among the programs of those countries carry possible implications for future directions, priorities, or administration of the U.S. Government's effort in this field. (See pp. 36 to 52.)

MAGNITUDE OF EFFORT

By comparison with both allies and adversaries, the U.S. Government investment in public diplomacy is low. In absolute terms, the United States is outspent by France and the Soviet Union and is nearly equalled by West Germany. As a percentage of national budget, the U.S. Government investment is smaller than that of any other country covered in this report (not counting the People's Republic of China, for which statistics are lacking). In proportion to gross national product, the comparison becomes even more striking. It does not necessarily follow from such data that the U.S. investment should be increased. The comparison does, however, provide pertinent new perspective for considering any increase of U.S. resources in this field, including those discussed below. (See pp. 36 and 37.)

STRUCTURE AND ORGANIZATION

Despite differences of formal structure, both the American and the West European organizational arrangements for conducting public diplomacy provide for active governmental participation in a manner generally assuring appropriate professional and operating independence for such activities as news broadcasting, education and cultural relations. At the same time the arrangements maintain a degree of official oversight and control sufficient to satisfy the legislatures that such activities are being carried out within a broad framework of national interests and objectives. Both models also tend to confirm that the cultural function and the policy articulation function need not and should not be administratively insulated from each other. (See pp. 37 to 39.)

RECOMMENDATION

Six of the eight issues identified and defined in chapter 3 appear to contain possibilities for prompt and worthwhile action by the International Communication Agency. They can be properly evaluated for that purpose, however, only upon a more detailed review and assessment than was undertaken in the present wide-angle survey. GAO therefore recommends that the International Communication Agency examine the six issues discussed below and determine what steps, or what further steps, it might usefully take. (See p. 39.)

COOPERATIVE PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

A far-sighted case can be made that wherever and whenever allied nations have a common "message" to deliver to third countries, common sense would dictate the use of common media. With few exceptions, however, efforts at cooperative public diplomacy have made little headway. While industrial democracies may be military allies, they are also economic and cultural competitors. Public diplomatists often

consult but seldom consort. The fact reflects not on their performance but on the present stage in the evolution of the state system. (See p. 39 to 41.)

It would nevertheless be premature to write off cooperative public diplomacy. Some progress has been made, notably in cultural exchanges and English language teaching. More progress can be expected, with attendant gains in efficiency and impact, to the extent that U.S. overseas missions keep themselves both informed of related local activities of other countries and alert to appropriate opportunities. To encourage the process, the International Communication Agency should consider issuing special instructions to the field and asking selected posts to examine and report on specific new possibilities. (See pp. 41 and 42.)

FOREIGN CURRENCY CONTINGENCY FUND

As a result of the decline of the dollar against European and other currencies, the International Communication Agency's overseas operations have lost as much as \$7 million in foreign exchange in a single year. A precedent for remedying such losses was established by the Congress when it created the currency reserve fund for Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty in fiscal year 1977. Such a fund facilitates sound planning and management, obviates the uncertainty and delay of seeking supplemental appropriations, and protects the level of activity originally mandated by the Congress. This view is acknowledged in pending legislation that would give the State Department and the International Communication Agency, as well as the Board for International Broadcasting, permanent authority to offset adverse fluctuations in foreign currency exchange rates. How best to implement such authority remains to be determined. (See pp. 42 and 43.)

ENGLISH LANGUAGE TEACHING

While Britain, France, West Germany, and the Soviet Union put strong emphasis on teaching foreigners their respective languages, the United States has neglected important opportunities in this field for more than a decade. Data of both the International Communication Agency and the British Council indicate a large and growing worldwide demand for English as the principal medium of international communication. New opportunities in the People's Republic of China alone could be vast. It would be in the interest of the United States to see that the demand continues to grow and is adequately met.

See The Agency should review the need and possibility for expanding and enriching its English-teaching program worldwide. (See pp. 43 to 47.)

AVAILABILITY OF INTERNATIONAL COMMUNICATION AGENCY MATERIALS IN THE UNITED STATES

Under present law there is a near-total ban on the domestic use of Agency products prepared for dissemination abroad. Some restriction on the domestic availability of such materials is essential to prevent their use for partisan political purposes and to help preserve the Agency's nonpartisan posture abroad and its bipartisan backing in the Congress. Many Agency products, however--for the most part films and video tapes--are educational and non-controversial. They could be used to advantage in fulfilling the Agency's "second mandate"--to help Americans understand international issues and deal with foreign peoples and cultures. A fresh examination of this issue would appear timely. (See pp. 47 to 50.)

REPRESENTATION ALLOWANCES

Unlike their foreign counterparts, and despite past Agency efforts, many officers of the International Communication Agency continue to spend significant amounts of personal funds in fulfilling official representational

duties overseas. Recent appropriations have narrowed but not closed the gap. The continued shortfall places a personal burden on the conscientious overseas officer and inhibits optimum cultivation of valuable personal contacts. (See pp. 50 and 51.)

SOVIET PUBLIC DIPLOMACY IN THE UNITED STATES

Soviet propaganda about and to the United States is one face of "detente" of which the U.S. Congress, press, and public are made aware only partially and episodically. There are indications that Soviet authorities are intensifying their efforts to influence American public opinion and policy-makers. The Director of Central Intelligence recently recommended that a study of such activity be undertaken. One need not be concerned that Soviet propaganda is in danger of subverting American values or basic purposes to believe that a periodic, accessible, public report and analysis of it would be worthwhile. It would tend to put Soviet purposes in clearer perspective, make the American press and public less vulnerable to Soviet deception, and perhaps even deter some of the more flagrant Soviet propaganda abuses, such as the deliberate misrepresentation of U.S. foreign policy.

→ The International Communication Agency should study the utility and feasibility of such a project, including the question as to which agency, if any, should be assigned the task. (See pp. 51 and 52.)

AGENCY COMMENTS

A draft of this report was submitted to the International Communication Agency for written comment. The Agency found the draft "an accurate and useful picture of the overall public diplomacy efforts of major foreign countries" and made a number of suggestions for updating or elaborating some of the factual data, all of which have been incorporated into this report. The Agency did not specifically comment on the substance of GAO's recommendations.

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ABBREVIATIONS

AFP	Agence France-Press
AID	Agency for International Development
APN	Novosti news service
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
BNC	Binational Center
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
COI	Central Office of Information
COSERV	National Council for Community Services to International Visitors
CU	Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs
CULCON	U.S.-Japan Committee on Scientific and Cultural Cooperation
DAAD	German Academic Exchange Service
DPA	Deutsche Presse Agentur
DSIP	Direction des Services d'Information et de Presse
FCO	Foreign and Commonwealth Office
FRG	Federal Republic of Germany
GAO	General Accounting Office
GNP	gross national product
ICA	International Communication Agency
MFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MOC	Ministry of Cooperation
NHK	Nippon Hoso Kyokai
NCNA	New China News Agency
ODM	Ministry of Overseas Development
PRC	People's Republic of China
TASS	Telegraphic Agency of the Soviet Union
U.K.	United Kingdom
U.S.S.R.	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
RFE/RL	Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
VOA	Voice of America

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

NATURE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF "PUBLIC DIPLOMACY"

The U.S. Government has sought over the past 30 years to supplement and reinforce traditional intergovernmental diplomacy by playing a key role in what has come to be called "public diplomacy"--international communication, cultural and educational affairs in which "the public" is involved.

Such activities may be sponsored and funded by governments, private agencies or jointly. They include: exchange programs, radio and television broadcasting, publishing, film distribution, wire services, schools, libraries, exhibits, trade fairs, and information centers. Exchange activities alone are of many kinds--research, study, observation, technical training, cultural presentations, sports events, conferences, lectures, and interviews. The international communication that is conducted in such ways may be government-to-people, people-to-government, or people-to-people.

In a world of rampant interdependence and mass involvement in public affairs, public diplomacy has become widely recognized as a legitimate and important instrument of policy, an effective means of serving those broad national interests that are advanced by improved mutual international understanding. Today's international environment necessitates the development of a better coordinated world system. The United States expects to play a major role in the organization and operation of such a system. To do so, it must among other things, see that its values, purposes, and policies are correctly understood by the rest of the world and that its policies consider the legitimate interests of other nations. These two national objectives define the mission of U.S. public diplomacy. They also dictate its essential characteristics: to be effective in today's world, international information and cultural activities must be candid, credible, comprehensive in coverage, attentive to other cultures and points of view, and endowed with adequate resources.

The U.S. Government's public diplomacy activities account for a small fraction of the personal relationships between Americans and foreigners. They are, however, the part that is explicitly directed toward achieving broad U.S. foreign policy objectives. They give the Government a voice it could not otherwise have in the organization of the transnational dialogue--in the choice of themes, establishment of

standards, selection of foreign visitors and American participants, encouragement of worthy but underfunded private initiatives, and the public explication of U.S. foreign policy.

PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF REVIEW

Many other national governments likewise assign an important role to public diplomacy. A German Foreign Minister called it the "third pillar" of foreign policy, alongside economic and traditional diplomatic activities. A French Government report described it as an instrumentality contributing "directly to the power of our country" in the international arena.

Although the programs of most such governments have probably more in common than not, they vary one from another in several ways--in allocation of total resources, media priorities, program emphases, themes, targets, and modes of administration.

This report surveys essential similarities and differences in the governmental public diplomacy operations of seven countries--Britain, France, Japan, Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), the People's Republic of China (PRC), the Soviet Union, and the United States. Our purpose was to:

- put the U.S. public diplomacy effort in a broader international perspective as background for future official judgments regarding its magnitude and directions;
- explore possibilities for what might be called "cooperative public diplomacy"--cooperation or coordination in this field between the U.S. and other governments that may see themselves as having certain common or compatible objectives in third countries; and
- identify differences of concept, method, or approach in the programs of selected foreign countries that might merit emulation or further study.

The foreign countries selected are among those whose international information and cultural operations are of a scale and sophistication comparable to those of the United States. They are also among those countries that have been the subject of detailed and ongoing study over the past 6 or 7 years by what is now the International Communication Agency (ICA).

In 1972-73, the U.S. Information Agency, now absorbed into ICA, published a series of detailed reports on "External Information and Cultural Relations Programs" of eight countries--Britain, Cuba, Egypt, France, Japan, West Germany, the People's Republic of China, and the Soviet Union. The reports, done in some cases within the Agency and in other cases under contract, range in length from 42 pages (Cuba) to 339 pages (People's Republic of China). In general, they follow a common outline that covers strategy and tactics (objectives, targets, themes, priorities, etc.), administration of programs (agencies and their legal bases, structure, budget, etc.), the media employed, and cultural programs. During 1976-78, the Agency published a series of much briefer reports which updated some of the statistical and descriptive data of the original reports and added material on three other countries (Brazil, Israel, and North Korea). The series of reports was intended to serve "as a reference source for officers of the United States Information Agency, other U.S. Government officials, and interested users." The material has also provided background for answering congressional inquiries and preparing budget presentations. It was not intended and has not been used as a basis for any systematic exploration of either lessons to be learned from foreign operations or opportunities for further development of cooperative public diplomacy.

In the present survey we made full use of the ICA material. Except on certain matters, we did not deem it sufficiently useful to update further or otherwise supplement the descriptive material. We did, however, make the respective country summaries in chapter 2 available to the Embassies of Britain, France, Japan, and West Germany and have taken account of their comments and suggestions. In seeking further enlightenment on unique features of the programs and on the possibilities for cooperative public diplomacy, we also consulted the Washington cultural counselors and/or press attaches of those embassies as well as many persons in U.S. Government and private life.

Two caveats about the available data in comparative public diplomacy must be mentioned. First, some of the statistics, especially the budgetary data, can be regarded as comparable only in a general way. One national information and cultural budget may include items not included in another. For example, part of what one government may include in its cultural affairs budget will appear in the foreign aid budgets of others. Or, to take another example, some of what one government may contribute to the country's overseas film program will take the form of production subsidies that do not show up in the public diplomacy accounts. For present

purposes, such discrepancies are not unduly troublesome. They do not obscure orders of magnitude, nor prevent their meaningful comparison. It should also be noted that this report focuses solely on government-funded or -sponsored programs. The figures do not purport to reflect the substantial contribution of the private sector to public diplomacy.

The second caveat is that in the field of public diplomacy no sensible treatment of the subject can expect to be definitive. The ICA reports are replete with allusions to the confusing array of countless governmental, quasi-governmental, private, and semiprivate agencies that crowd this field of endeavor. As we noted in a recent report, those concerned with interagency coordination of U.S. exchange and training programs necessarily find it difficult to map and track a universe that is large, dynamic, pluralistic, and unruly.

Definitive data on Soviet and Chinese public diplomacy is also lacking, although of course for entirely different reasons.

We believe the available data does permit an overview of concepts and patterns that may serve to put American public diplomacy in better perspective and yield some ideas for its future directions.

AGENCY COMMENTS

A draft of this report was submitted to the International Communication Agency for written comment. The Agency found the draft "an accurate and useful picture of the overall public diplomacy efforts of major foreign countries" and made a number of suggestions for updating or elaborating some of the factual data, all of which have been incorporated into this report. The Agency did not specifically comment on the substance of our recommendations.

CHAPTER 2

PUBLIC DIPLOMACY OPERATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES

AND SELECTED FOREIGN COUNTRIES

This chapter seeks to outline the main features and suggest the essential character of public diplomacy as conducted by seven countries--Britain, France, Japan, the Federal Republic of Germany, the People's Republic of China, the Soviet Union, and the United States. Similarities and differences among the programs of those countries suggest certain implications for the United States which are examined in chapter 3.

Except for the section on the Soviet Union, which relies mainly on a recent report of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), both the description and the analysis in this chapter are derived essentially from the basic studies of those countries done by or for what is now the International Communication Agency in the early 1970s and on the periodic updates provided by ICA officers in the field. Numerous verbatim excerpts are, for the most part, presented without the distracting apparatus of ellipses, brackets or quotation marks. From this material we have attempted to distill a coherent presentation of essentials. In so doing, we have reduced more than a quarter of a million words to about 10,000, an exercise that gains something in accessibility and focus at what should be, for present purposes, a tolerable cost in color and detail.

Comparative statistical data on the programs of five of the six foreign countries and the United States will be found in appendix II, the PRC being omitted from the table because of the paucity of quantitative information.

BRITAIN

Although Britain invests less in public diplomacy than any of the other six countries considered in this report, it has developed a flexible and integrated system for communicating information and maintaining cultural relations throughout the world.

The main emphasis of its overseas publicity today is on promoting commercial exports and attracting inward investment. The Central Office of Information (COI), which prepares material for use by the British Information Service overseas (as well as for internal consumption), was spending by 1972 two-thirds of its overseas activities budget on export promotion. This compares with 20 to 25 percent on explaining

diplomatic, defense or economic policies and about 10 percent for basic information about Britain and British affairs. A decade earlier, only 10 percent of the budget was spent on commercial development. Although its economic and trading position continues to be one of Britain's primary concerns, its cultural and information programs today also emphasize strengthening British participation in the European Economic Community, retaining Commonwealth ties, improving conditions in the developing countries, and supporting the North Atlantic Alliance and other international commitments.

Britain's primary targets include a dozen or so countries of Western Europe, the Middle East, sub-Saharan Africa, plus North America and, to a lesser extent, Japan and Australia. Commonwealth countries outside the primary area continue, however, to receive a special place in the U.K.'s overseas commitments.

British public diplomacy is conducted mainly by four entities--the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC); the British Council; the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) (through its British Information Service overseas); and the Central Office of Information, a common service agency located in the Department of Trade and Industry. Their functions overlap. Thus, while the Council is concerned primarily with cultural tasks, it also provides general information about the U.K. through films and other media. Although BBC is primarily a broadcaster, it also distributes cultural films and transcriptions to foreign broadcasting stations on a commercial basis. The British Information Service and the COI arrange for the publication in technical journals abroad of articles by outstanding authorities in Britain. And all four engage in the exchange of persons.

The Foreign and Commonwealth Office, an ICA study concluded, "retains a central position in all cultural and informational matters." Except in the U.S.S.R., however, it delegates cultural responsibilities to the British Council whose representatives serve as ambassadors' advisors in educational and cultural matters. FCO contains, among other offices concerned with public diplomacy, departments to handle cultural relations with the Communist bloc and the rest of the world. The Ministry of Overseas Development (ODM), handles foreign aid of all types, including the training of students and technicians, improving educational facilities abroad, and providing teachers, experts, and volunteers for service overseas. Much of that work is delegated on a reimbursable basis to the British Council. A Guidance and Information Policy Department of FCO gives advice concerning

official policies on current matters to other parts of FCO, overseas posts, and other agencies. A News Department serves as Government spokesman on foreign affairs and handles relations with the press.

According to ICA, coordination of the activities of the many agencies involved in this work, following a public diplomacy crisis at the time of the 1956 Suez affair, became a normal part of the Prime Minister's office. Today, however, FCO appears to assume the primary coordinating role. According to a 1978 British White Paper, summarized later in this chapter:

"The responsibilities of most Government Ministers have a significant overseas dimension and each must take this overseas dimension, like any other factor, into account in formulating policy. In many fields, the Minister with the predominant functional interest even though it may be primarily domestic, should and does take the lead abroad. * * * This said, the Government believe that the precondition for a properly co-ordinated and integrated approach is that the overall conduct of overseas relations in the broadest sense of the term should continue to be the responsibility of a single Cabinet Minister, namely the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs. This arrangement, within the framework of the Cabinet's collective responsibility, offers the most effective means of providing the right level of political input and control.* * *

"Within this overall structure there is room for improvement in the co-ordination of policies and in the joint identification of, and agreement on, priorities. Country Assessment Papers, which provide the basic policy guidelines for each country where Britain is represented, will in future be prepared by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in association with all relevant Government Departments.* * *

"The political work of an embassy cannot be divorced from its economic work, or from export promotion, aid administration or cultural activities. All should be mutually reinforcing; and none can be conducted in a vacuum without reference to each other or to the overall effort of the mission."

The BBC External Services in 1978 were broadcasting 728 radio program hours per week in 37 languages, employing 76 shortwave and 6 mediumwave transmitters located in Britain and at relay points overseas. In hours per week, among the seven countries considered here, BBC ranked sixth behind the Soviet Union with 2,003 hours, the United States--Voice of America (VOA) and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL)--with 1,812 hours, the PRC with 1,427 hours, Egypt (including domestic services intended for foreign audiences) with 954 hours, and West Germany--Deutsche Welle and Deutschlandfunk--with 791 hours. Overseas programming offers objective news, features, and English lessons and emphasizes information about British life, views, culture, and industrial products.

A major activity of the British Council is the promotion of English as a second language. As coordinator of cultural policy in the field, the Council presides over a vast enterprise which conducts basic research into teaching methods, trains experts in newly developed techniques, employs them in preparing teaching materials, instructs teachers in the use of these techniques and materials, inspects their use by teachers, and conducts examinations for pupils emerging from the system. Thousands of foreigners receive English instruction each year in Britain, while hundreds of Britons go abroad each year to teach English or other subjects in English. This work is supplemented today by the BBC, which in 1977 devoted 60 hours per week or about 8 percent of its broadcast time to a variety of English language courses. Tapes and discs of such programs and other teaching materials are also extensively packaged for local use by foreign broadcasters. According to BBC's 1977 annual report, at any given moment throughout the world, between 200 and 300 radio stations in more than 100 countries are broadcasting the English-by-Radio series. In 1978, English-by-Television programs were sold in 40 countries.

Both BBC and the British Council are corporations under royal charter whose effectiveness and credibility are acknowledged to require a considerable measure of professional and operating independence. Longstanding formal and informal relations between them and FCO, however, assure that both institutions function in appropriate awareness of official foreign policy and in the framework of broad national interests. The Government provides the bulk of funds for the Council and all funds of the External Services of BBC, but does not find it necessary to exercise editorial control over their output.

With respect to the British Council, the Government delegates to an independent Board determination of areas of

operation and general program lines. However, the appointment of the Director-General and of the Chairman of the Board is subject to the approval of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, an arrangement which one Foreign Secretary formally defended as permitting the FCO to discharge its ultimate responsibility for "the existence and activities" of the Council. Twelve members of the 30-member board are nominated by Government departments. The Council's field representatives are appointed with the concurrence of the local British ambassadors and are on occasion officers of the embassy. In 25 percent of the countries the British Council representative is also listed as cultural attache, but he/she normally has office, library, and other facilities apart from the embassy.

With respect to BBC, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office specifies the languages the External Services use and the number of hours devoted to each. Like Voice of America, BBC's external wing is obliged to acquaint itself with the Government view of matters of the day and is expected to include it as appropriate in its news broadcasts. Reportedly no formal veto has ever been placed on the broadcasting of a particular item, and the only general direction now in force is that which prohibits the BBC from broadcasting an opinion of its own on current matters of public policy, a restriction which does not of course prevent it from broadcasting a variety of non-official opinions. While BBC's charter and its renewable license from the Postmaster General theoretically give the Government full powers over the corporation, successive governments have treated their rights as reserve powers only, granting BBC independence in the day-to-day conduct of its business. According to ICA, this has not, however, prevented the emergence of differences on the handling of specific issues. BBC's reputation for speed, accuracy, and objectivity is the result of a half-century of resistance to individual governments that would on occasion seek to use it for immediate purposes.

With respect to both BBC and the British Council, much policy guidance at all levels is unwritten and frequently unspoken. Most individuals in the information-cultural complex are known to one another, have similar educational backgrounds, and in many cases have worked together for considerable time. There appears to be no routine review of materials. Only very sensitive or unusual materials are examined above the operating level.

The principal British agency for distributing news of Britain abroad is Reuters, a commercial organization. Owned by press associations and newspapers of the United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand, it has some 500 full-time and 800

part-time correspondents in 183 countries and territories and serves some 4,000 daily newspapers and 400 radio and television networks.

To supplement nongovernmental services, COI issues a daily high-speed roundup of important texts, items of regional interest, and news bulletins for use and placement by information officers abroad. Transmission, amounting to some 1,500,000 words a day, is by combination of radio-teletype, telex, and mail.

Official reassessments

In 1977, the British Government published an extensive study by the Central Policy Review Staff, "Review of Overseas Representation," which made recommendations concerning the most effective and efficient ways to promote British interests abroad over the ensuing 10 to 15 years. The principal recommendations of the report proved highly controversial and, following review by various parliamentary committees, were largely rejected by Her Majesty's Government in a White Paper of August 1978.

The Government's response is discussed at the end of this section. The report of the Central Policy Review Staff raises questions and offers judgments--and suffered a fate--which are bound to be of interest to any government concerned with future directions of its own public diplomacy.

The report began with the observation that "the UK's ability to influence events in the world has declined and there is very little that diplomatic activity and international public relations can do to disguise the fact." Arguing that "the scale and pattern of the U.K.'s overseas representation should be broadly that implied by its present relative position in the world," it recommended the elimination of 20 diplomatic missions and at least 35 subordinate overseas posts and a major reduction in information and cultural programs.

Such programs, it found, accounted for 30 percent of the total net expenditure on overseas representation, which was "out of proportion with the contribution they can make to the achievement of the main objectives." (It identified the main objectives as external security, economic and social well-being, honoring certain international commitments, and a peaceful and just world.)

The report recommended that the British Council be abolished and that a major portion of its educational and cultural work outside the developing world and the Soviet bloc be

eliminated. Such functions as remained would be absorbed by other agencies, including Britain's overseas posts. In the belief that the use of English as a second language will continue to grow with or without the £9 million the British Council was putting into its language services, the report proposed that such work be terminated except in the poor and intermediate developing countries.

The report found that information activities alone accounted for 11 percent of overseas representation expenditure and that this was excessive. Acknowledging that the judgment was necessarily subjective since "there is no scientific way" to evaluate the effect of information programs, the report recommended that

- there should be less emphasis on preparing and distributing written or other materials for press, radio, and television;
- the main emphasis in overseas posts should be on cultivating contacts with local media leaders;
- little information work should be done in the non-Communist developed countries except for highly specific export promotion material; and
- the present pattern of information work in the Third World should be discontinued, except for economic and commercial publicity in the rich or influential countries.

It also recommended a drastic reordering of international broadcasting priorities in a way that would deemphasize or eliminate service to those countries having free access to news and information, reduce the number of exotic languages, leave some language broadcasting to friendly countries (e.g., francophone Africa to France), and cut the World Service in English to peak-time rather than round-the-clock broadcasting.

Underlying these recommendations were several broad findings, including the following:

- official information services prepare and distribute with great efficiency high-quality information material which has only a most marginal effect on the U.K.'s ability to achieve its objectives overseas;
- BBC broadcasts to developed countries which have other sources of information; and

--the British Council finances educational interchange with developed countries whose scholars and students have other ways of establishing contact with the U.K.

The report further concluded that in both the Home Civil Service and the Diplomatic Service--which under those recommendations would bear a larger share of the public diplomacy burden--there was a serious deficiency in expertise in "the subject matter" as distinct from expertise in "living among and working with foreigners." In the future, more of the overseas responsibilities should be assigned to other, functional departments and less to the politically oriented Diplomatic Service.

The Government's 1978 White Paper responding to the report of the Central Policy Review Staff is also instructive. It began by declaring:

"The geographical and economic facts of life make it inevitable that today, as in previous centuries, British interests should extend round the world. The Government believe that Britain has the assets to defend her interests and effectively to promote her objectives. These assets include our economic and military strength as a nation; our historical ties with many members of the international community; the binding force of the English language; our unquestioned standing in the arts and science and our contribution to the world's cultural heritage; the example of British values and our country's democratic way of life; but above all the influence which we derive from co-operative and co-ordinated action with our partners in democracy.

"Politically, too, the position which we occupy in the principal areas of international affairs gives us a more than adequate springboard for an imaginative and effective foreign policy, and our resources can support the system of overseas representation which such a foreign policy entails."

The Government accordingly concluded that:

--it would make no change in the present balance of Ministerial and Departmental responsibilities but would "respond to the growing integration of

domestic and external policies by increasing substantially the interchange between the Home Civil Service and the Diplomatic Service";

- the value of educational and cultural work cannot be quantified but it plays "a distinctive and valuable role in projecting Britain abroad, in furthering relationships with other countries and in stimulating the use of the English language";
- the British Council would not be abolished but the Government would conduct "a country-by-country examination of how far separate British Council offices abroad could be merged with missions" on the presumption that such mergers should be effected unless good reasons not to do so are established;
- BBC's World Service in English would continue to be broadcast 24 hours a day, but some cuts could be made in some of the vernacular services;
- as a result of a post-by-post review there would be a cut in information staff overseas of some 16.5 percent (Diplomatic Service) and 10.5 percent (locally engaged);
- the Government would publish two new series of papers: Foreign Policy Documents and Background Briefs, designed "to increase the flow of available public information about the formulation and conduct of foreign policy"; and
- "Responsibility for the overall conduct of overseas relations in the broadest sense of the term would continue to be vested in a single Cabinet Minister, namely the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, to maintain the right level of political coordination and input. There would continue to be integrated staffing in posts abroad, under the control of the Head of Mission, to reflect the authority exercised by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs in the conduct of Britain's external relations."

FRANCE

France has long maintained the largest public diplomacy operation in the non-Communist world. A French Government report has described official activities in this field as

"essential instrumentalities of our foreign policy" contributing "directly to the power of our country" in the international arena. According to an ICA report, public diplomacy "has rarely, if ever, been a public issue in France * * *. If anything, there is a widespread feeling that the government should be doing more in this field."

A principal component of the French cultural and information effort is devoted to the extension of the French language as a medium of international communication and the projection of French achievements in literature, the fine arts, and intellectual history. In recent years technological and scientific cooperation and technical training have also received important emphasis.

Although worldwide in scope, French public diplomacy (including a large technical assistance component) has always been heavily concentrated in Africa--the three Maghreb countries of Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia and the 17 francophone countries of Black Africa and the Malagasy Republic. France also maintains an important presence, however, in Europe, North and Latin America, Asia, and the Middle East.

At least five major government departments take part in French public diplomacy. In the francophone countries of sub-Saharan Africa and the Indian Ocean islands, France's public diplomacy is managed by the Ministry of Cooperation (MOC), which in 1977 spent more than two-thirds of its \$500 million budget on cultural and information programs. But the principal and coordinating role worldwide is played by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). Through its Direction générale des Relations culturelles, scientifiques et techniques and its Direction des Services d'Information et de Presse (DSIP), the Foreign Ministry imposes a discernable pattern of planning and control over the dozens of governmental, semipublic and private organizations that are engaged in this work.

The Foreign Ministry's unifying functions, an ICA report notes, are supplemented by "the interlocking directorates of 'France Incorporated'--the personal and working relationships of a relatively small group of governmental, educational and scientific elites," the French counterpart of Britain's "old boy network."

In the field, information and cultural activities--publications, wireless files, lectures, radio and television, tapes and exhibits--are closely coordinated under the supervision of the chief of mission and generally a single counselor. In 1977 the French Government maintained 176 cultural centers

in foreign countries. These, supplemented by the work of nongovernmental organizations--notably the Alliance Francaise with its 1,200 centers and 250,000 students in more than 80 countries--provided a broad range of services, including libraries, record collections, films, exhibits, courses and lectures. The Government also contributes scholarships and other forms of support to some 126 schools abroad where several hundred thousand pupils work toward the French baccalaureate degree.

Guidance on French foreign policy is furnished to the overseas missions, French international broadcasting and other information activities by DSIP, which also serves as the Ministry's press spokesman.

In 1978 French international radio broadcasting amounted to some 390 program hours a week in six languages (English, French, German, Polish, Portuguese, and Spanish). This was about half the program hours sponsored respectively by Britain and West Germany and about a fourth of U.S.-sponsored output via VOA and RFE/RL.

Another major French information medium is Agence France-Presse (AFP), the Paris-based nonprofit wire service. In 1976 AFP was producing 600,000 words a day. It employed 954 journalists and correspondents and some 4,500 others in 163 countries or territories. Its clients outside metropolitan France included 105 news agencies, 840 newspapers, and 192 French diplomatic missions. According to a 1977 report, 70 percent of AFP's budget was underwritten by the French Government. As a professional news and news-feature service which competes with the other great Western wire services, AFP necessarily operates with a considerable degree of political independence. At the same time, it naturally tends to reflect predominant French foreign policy views and is an integral part of French public diplomacy.

The French Government is now conducting a review of its public diplomacy operations, the results of which are expected to be made known before the end of this year.

JAPAN

Japan's cultural and information programs emphasize general image building to promote Japanese relationships, which are heavily concerned with exports and access to raw materials.

During the fifties and sixties, the stress was on the country's industrial capabilities, to offset old ideas about

the inferiority of Japanese products. Today, however, the international success of the Japanese economy has led to a shift in emphasis in which Japan is portrayed as a culturally sophisticated, industrially advanced, democratic nation fully committed to a policy of liberal trade and peace with all nations. Since 1972 Japan's expenditures in public diplomacy have increased threefold.

"Culture" is possibly second to economics as a supplier of content for all Government media activities, but it is certainly far ahead of political subjects in this respect. ICA has reported that continued emphasis on the more esoteric Japanese fine and performing arts has been criticized in Japan as at best irrelevant to the most vital questions affecting foreign understanding of the realities of present day Japan and at worst tending to confirm foreign stereotypes of Japan as mysterious, quaint or old-fashioned.

For a number of reasons--including the singularity of Japanese culture and the Japanese recognition of this uniqueness--and particularly because of the barrier of the Japanese language, the flow of outside culture into Japan far exceeds the outward flow of Japanese culture. For example, English is widely studied and used in communication with foreigners. The Government has made some effort to redress this imbalance by increasing the number of foreign visitors to Japan. Thousands of people study the Japanese language in schools and colleges throughout the world but few of these students ever attain any real fluency. The Government is, however, now making a stronger effort to help foreigners do so. The conscious Japanese effort to expose foreigners to Japanese culture is undertaken not with the thought that it would be adopted, only that it be recognized as sophisticated and worthy of respect. The language barrier and sense of cultural uniqueness--the quality of separateness, however defined or explained--complicate international communication for the Japanese and create some diffidence about their ability to make themselves understood by foreigners. This may account partly for the extensive use the Japanese Government makes of foreign public relations firms and other agents to present their views and information.

Japan employs a fairly broad media mix, with no basic medium being entirely excluded or given overwhelming priority. By 1972 more money was spent on the exchange of persons than on any other activity, and that program has continued to grow.

The United States is Japan's principal communications target, followed by Southeast Asia and the Arab oil-producing

countries. Others receiving special attention are the People's Republic of China, South Korea, Australia, Canada, and Western Europe.

The primary importance which the Japanese attach to relations with the United States has led to the establishment of a number of special bilateral institutions, notably the U.S.-Japan Committee on Scientific and Cultural Cooperation and the U.S.-Japan Conference on Cultural and Educational Interchange (CULCON). CULCON's most useful function lies in bringing together cultural leaders from both countries every 2 years to exchange views on existing relationships and problems. Reports made to CULCON by the two sides serve a valuable purpose by requiring each party to assess the prevailing state of affairs and to make the assessment available to the other. Several joint subcommittees have been established in such fields as museum-lending, TV exchange, social science research, and problems of interpreting.

Although a number of Government departments, notably the Ministry of Education, are engaged in public diplomacy activities, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs is responsible, under the Prime Minister, for the coordination of foreign operations, including those in the field of international information and culture.

Located within the Foreign Ministry is a Public Information and Cultural Affairs Bureau comprising

- a Press Division;
- Overseas and Domestic Public Relations Divisions, responsible for media activities (including publications, films, information, and cultural centers) abroad; and
- two Cultural Divisions--one concerned with exchange policy, and the other providing guidance and support to overseas missions on cultural programs such as film festivals, performing arts, lectures, and exhibits.

Much of the exchange activity has been taken over by the quasi-official Japan Foundation, which the Government established under Foreign Ministry supervision in 1972, and which is financed largely by the Government and partly by Japanese business interests.

In Japanese overseas posts in 1976-77, there were 197 information and cultural affairs officers, most of them holding joint appointments. There were 30 cultural and information centers, of which 28 were under the direct jurisdiction of the Foreign Ministry and 2 in cultural affairs were operated by the Japan Foundation.

A number of private organizations are also engaged in public diplomacy, and business firms send significant numbers of their own employees abroad for study, research, or observation.

International broadcasting plays a comparatively minor role in Japanese public diplomacy. Radio Japan is the overseas arm of the Japan Broadcasting Corporation (Nippon Hoso Kyokai or NHK), a public corporation which reports to the Cabinet through the Ministry of Posts and Telecommunications. In 1978 Radio Japan broadcast 259 radio program hours per week in 21 languages over 12 medium powered (mostly 100 KW) shortwave transmitters. Over the past 8 years, weekly broadcasting was increased by only 2 program hours. English (54 hours), Japanese (89 hours), and Mandarin (21 hours) are Japan's major broadcasting languages. The Japan Broadcasting Corporation was reorganized during the Occupation in 1950 under legislation regulating it as a public entity, giving it substantial freedom from political control and governmental interference, and permitting the development of commercial stations. It is directed by a Board of Governors appointed by the Prime Minister with the consent of the Diet.

The Broadcast Law provides for a unique body called the Overseas Broadcasting Programme Council to advise on program content and other important matters. The role of this group is broadly analogous to that of the U.S. Board of Foreign Scholarships in guiding the Fulbright exchange program, but it meets more frequently (about once a month) and the membership is more broadly representative of the nation as a whole.

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

The external cultural and information program of the Federal Republic of Germany is the largest, next to the French, among the non-Communist countries. It is also the most complex in regard to structure since it was deliberately and thoroughly decentralized after World War II. An ICA study reported that more than 200 governmental, semi-official, or commercial organizations are engaged in this work. Ten ministries and the 10 states of the FRG are actively involved.

A number of the organizations are heavily subsidized, including the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD), the Konrad Adenauer, Friedrich Ebert, Otto Benecke, Friedrich Naumann, and Alexander von Humboldt foundations. The Government is also supporting activities of about 100 labor unions, women's and youth groups, professional associations and other organizations. A notable contribution of the FRG to cultural-scientific relations with the United States was the establishment in 1972 of the German Marshall Fund of the United States as an independent U.S. tax exempt foundation to commemorate the Marshall Plan. The Fund's mission is to provide new opportunities for Americans and Europeans to work together in resolving the common problems of industrial societies.

A measure of unity among the many German organizations is assured by reason of shared basic interests and purposes and the fact that the work is principally funded by and falls under the ultimate jurisdiction of the Foreign Ministry (cultural activities) and the Chancellor's Federal Press Office (information activities). According to an official statement, the Government "must always be able to guarantee that all measures taken are in accord with foreign policy." The Government, however, does not determine in detail the content of cultural policy abroad. It seeks to define objectives and priorities, delegate and coordinate activities, evaluate results, and provide financial support.

Inter Nationes, an autonomous service organization roughly comparable to the British Central Office of Information, is supported by both the Press Office and the Foreign Ministry. It coordinates thousands of foreign visits to the FRG; distributes press, audiovisual, and other materials abroad; and maintains contacts with foreign newspapers and their correspondents in the Federal Republic.

The West German program includes an international broadcasting capability that ranks among the world's largest, a network of 109 cultural centers (Goethe Institute) in 58 countries, 305 schools, three cultural institutes, and more than 100 friendship societies abroad. The Deutsche Presse Agentur (DPA), an independently operated news service, had in 1974 more than 130 clients in some 80 countries.

The Goethe Institute conducts the bulk of West German cultural activities abroad. It is funded principally by the Foreign Ministry but has an operational autonomy comparable to that of the British Council. Perhaps a fifth of its resources has been allocated to meeting the needs of for-

eigners in Germany, notably the 2 million "guest-workers" from Turkey, Yugoslavia, Italy, etc. The Institute's branches abroad operate libraries, arrange cultural presentations and other exchanges, present exhibits and films, and have spent a major share of their resources on German language instruction.

In a 1978 report on "Foreign Cultural Policy," the Government confirmed its long-standing commitment to German language teaching abroad, declaring that "there can be no cultural policy abroad without a meaningful language policy." It noted that some 19 million persons (about 13 million in East Europe, including the Soviet Union) are learning German. To foster language instruction, the FRG has made available:

- 371 lecturers sent by the German Academic Exchange Service,
- support in the form of book donations and assistance for over 500 university departments of German,
- 108 branches and 40 offices of the Goethe Institute,
- support of 305 German schools abroad, and
- hundreds of scholarships annually to foreign students.

The report found that, nevertheless, the demand for German language instruction worldwide exceeded supply and that further steps should be taken to strengthen the program, including:

- establishment of a university department at the University of Munich for "German as a Foreign Language";
- coordination of existing overseas language instruction through creation of a "German as a Foreign Language" working group; and
- increased attention to language-teaching research, methods, and materials.

The largest element in West German public diplomacy is radio and television. The Government's international radio broadcasting is conducted by two networks--Deutsche Welle, which broadcasts to foreign countries mainly outside Europe, and the much smaller Deutschlandfunk, which concentrates on Europe, with exclusive responsibility for programming to East Germany, as well as Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland. Together, the two stations produce 791 program hours a week in 37 languages.

Regional priorities in German public diplomacy are Western Europe, East Europe, and North America--the leading target areas--followed by the Near East, East Asia, Africa, South Asia, and Latin America.

The prime objectives of West Germany's public diplomacy are to enhance its reputation by presenting its cultural achievements and providing a balanced, realistic, "even self-critical," picture of the FRG; and to support Europe's political integration and the Atlantic Alliance while contributing toward a conciliation of interests between the industrial and the developing nations. Its major themes abroad emphasize the desire for peaceful relations with all countries; the economic and cultural attainments of the FRG; peaceful coexistence with Communist countries, in particular East Germany; and stability of the FRG's Federal institutions and mobility in its social structure.

In pursuing those objectives, according to an official 1977 statement, the Government would improve and intensify its efforts to foster the German language; continue supporting German schools abroad; increase support for exchanges of academic and scientific "multipliers"--persons of influence in the professions, business, and government; and intensify the use of films, radio, and television.

PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA

The PRC, established in October 1949, conducts cultural and information activities worldwide and on a scale comparable to those of the other countries considered in this review. Budgetary data and other quantitative measures, however, are generally not available, and this view of the magnitude of Chinese public diplomacy relies primarily on what can be gleaned about Chinese activity in two fields--international broadcasting and press wire services.

In broadcasting, the country's primary instrument of external information, China ranks third after the Soviet Union and the United States, with some 1,427 hours per week in 44 languages. The languages include Esperanto, Mandarin, and four other Chinese dialects. Chinese broadcasts in Russian to the Soviet Union, according to a 1976 report, led in single-language broadcast hours (over 147 weekly), but the Asian and Pacific area (with Taiwan the main target) received more than five times that amount in broadcast programming. After the Sino-Soviet controversy surfaced in 1960, East Europe gradually became another important target area for the PRC.

The bulk of the PRC's international broadcasting consists of programs translated from common scripts for dissemination to all parts of the world. The material used by Radio Peking in its international broadcasting is supplied by the New China News Agency (NCNA), the country's principal wire service, which is responsible for all media content. PRC program policy is determined by the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, of which the Committee's Politburo is the principal decisionmaker.

In addition to official and professional audiences, Radio Peking also reaches private listeners in various parts of the world. Surveys conducted largely in non-Communist countries of the developing world indicate that Radio Peking has a considerable popular audience though generally far lower than certain other broadcasters, notably BBC and VOA.

China's wire services, NCNA and the China News Service, are the other principal medium of the PRC's external information. The China News Service is a specialized arm of NCNA, created to provide tailored news and comment to Chinese communities abroad. NCNA collects and disseminates information both at home and abroad and, as noted above, furnishes material used in other PRC media. It also processes the output of various foreign news agencies, which it receives either by purchase arrangements or by radio intercept. Officials of the Agency make no effort to conceal the fact that the mission of NCNA is to interpret news according to Party ideology and to promote the Party line both at home and abroad.

NCNA is officially represented in approximately 65 countries. Its daily news file is broadcast, either by radioteletype or in Morse code, in six languages--Chinese, Arabic, English, French, Russian and Spanish. NCNA has also played other roles, notably providing a channel for quasi-diplomatic representation of the PRC and conducting various forms of covert and subversive activities.

Books and periodicals appear to be an important component of the PRC's public diplomacy, but distribution figures are not available. Peking's Foreign Languages Press now distributes or sells abroad works on Chinese culture and science, classics, and some fiction, as well as the standard texts by Marx and Engels. Seven principal periodicals are translated in a variety of languages. These include Peking Review, a weekly news magazine published in English, French, German, Japanese, and Spanish for a sophisticated audience and offering texts of significant speeches and announcements, self-initiated articles, and reprints of important editorials and other material from major Chinese newspapers. China Pictorial, a high quality monthly, appears in 15 languages and is the PRC's most widely distributed magazine.

China has been expanding its film industry since the end of the Cultural Revolution and produces a considerable number of documentaries and feature films, most for domestic consumption. Some of them have been shown abroad or placed with foreign TV stations.

Cultural and information centers, comparable to those maintained abroad by other leading powers, clearly identified as agencies of government, do not exist in the PRC public diplomacy system. A number of binational organizations and friendship associations, however, maintain local activity centers.

Much of the PRC's information activity is implemented by its more than 100 diplomatic missions abroad. Most if not all the missions have either a press attache or an information officer, who is frequently the NCNA representative.

Between 1949 and 1962, according to one estimate, some 75,000 to 100,000 foreigners visited China, while half that number of Chinese traveled abroad.

In the early 1970s the PRC began reviving an exchange of persons program that had been virtually terminated during the Cultural Revolution. By 1978 a major increase in exchanges of all kinds was getting underway as China embarked on the ambitious programs of modernization in agriculture, industry, science, technology, and national defense first announced by Chou En-lai in 1975.

From the beginning, international exchange activities have been administered by the Chinese on two planes, an official government-to-government level and a professed unofficial people-to-people level. On the Chinese side,

however, exchanges in the latter category are also sponsored and administered by organizations staffed and financed by the state, while in counterpart countries collaborating bodies are for the most part nongovernmental, though some receive government support. In the past several years, until at least mid-1978, only the Chinese, Japanese, Albanian, Korean, Romanian, and Latin American Friendship Associations have received any significant notice in the PRC media. Although apparently mere facades in the PRC itself, these are (with the exception of those in Communist Europe) active local organizations composed of friends and supporters of the PRC.

Following the Bandung Conference of Asian and African States in 1955 and the Suez crisis of 1956, China concluded that it had a direct role to play in the developing nations of Africa and the Middle East and initiated exchange and technical assistance programs with many of them. By the time the Cultural Revolution began in 1966, exchanges with the Soviet Union and most East European countries had virtually ceased. With the reemergence of the PRC on the international scene thereafter and the political rehabilitation of Deng Xiaoping, Peking shifted its primary direction of exchanges to the West and Japan. Following the establishment on January 1, 1979, of U.S.-PRC diplomatic relations, the U.S. Government accelerated preparations for the development of important new exchange activities with the PRC. An agreement covering academic and cultural exchanges was signed January 31, 1979.

The PRC currently enjoys an advantage in disseminating information and comment shared by only a few other countries. Because of worldwide interest in developments in China and its policies, and because of a dearth of other sources of news and information from the PRC's closed society, the international press and news agencies (and foreign governments and scholars as well) have been forced to use PRC media information in reporting and analyzing developments there. Thus, instead of PRC media seeking to cultivate target audiences, the audiences seek out the media, and the international press and scholars in turn give the media's output further dissemination.

Through its public diplomacy, the PRC has sought to:

- consolidate and enhance its national security, particularly vis-a-vis the Soviet Union;
- counter Soviet and American influence;

- improve relations with the Second World (developed countries other than the U.S. and U.S.S.R);
- present itself as a member of and spokesman for the Third World;
- project an image of a dynamic, developing China; and
- promote its version of Communism and world revolution.

Since the end of the Cultural Revolution, Chinese public diplomacy has shifted perceptibly to efforts to influence governments, educated elites, and public opinion in general rather than exclusively focusing on the groups with which it identified in the past for revolutionary or ideological reasons.

SOVIET UNION

The Soviet Union evidently invests more in public diplomacy than any other country in the world. In the absence of official budget data, Western estimates are necessarily rough and vary widely. An unclassified 1978 study by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency put the total "conservatively" at some \$2 billion a year but did not provide a breakdown. To promote its international position and weaken that of its opponents, the Soviet Union has, according to the CIA report:

"* * * developed a world wide network of assets second to none, consisting of an extensive shortwave radio system, broadcasting in many languages; two news agencies; the pro-Soviet communist parties; the international communist fronts; bilateral friendship societies and other quasi-official instrumentalities; a large corps of foreign correspondents, many of them Soviet intelligence officers; the foreign clandestine propaganda assets under the control of the KGB [Soviet secret police]; and the intelligence services and assets of Cuba and Moscow's East European allies."

Although the Soviets employ the full gamut of public diplomacy tools used in the West--publications, cultural exchanges, language training, radio, television, films, wire services, etc.--they also systematically employ techniques

which the democracies generally consider, relative to their own programs, unnecessary or counterproductive or impracticable. These include accusatory-derogatory terminology, harassment of foreign journalists, comprehensive media censorship, and radio jamming. Other techniques employed by the Soviets, the CIA report notes, include "disinformation" (e.g., the orchestrated effort to indict the United States as the kidnap-murderer of Aldo Moro) and forgery (e.g., a "letter" by a U.S. Ambassador in Cairo calling for the overthrow of the Sudanese Government).

Credibility is thought to be achieved, the CIA study notes, "not through accuracy but by careful blending together of fact, distortion and outright falsehood, enhanced by intensive repetition." In addition to sloganeering and language gymnastics, says a 1973 report of what was then the U.S. Information Agency, a favorite Soviet tactic involves use of a simplistic approach to complex questions. In promoting "socialism" at home and abroad, the Soviets have developed a style of "solemn hyperbole."

Another principal characteristic distinguishing Soviet public diplomacy from its democratic counterparts is the state monopoly of all means of mass communication, its centralized control, and its consequent ability to orchestrate themes and campaigns quickly and efficiently throughout its entire communication network.

A third distinguishing characteristic is the Soviet Union's ability in many countries to press its policies and ideology through international front organizations and local political parties supported financially and in other ways by Moscow. The CIA reports that there are more than 75 pro-Soviet Communist parties outside the Soviet Union and the Communist Bloc with a total estimated membership of more than 3.5 million, including some 2.5 million in Western Europe. Some such parties, notably in Western Europe, have displayed varying degrees of independence but still generally follow the Soviet line in foreign policy matters.

There are 13 major international Communist front groups (defined as organizations appearing to be independent but in fact funded and controlled by the Soviets). They include the World Peace Council, with headquarters in Helsinki and affiliates in 120 countries; the World Federation of Democratic Youth, with headquarters in Budapest and a claimed membership of 40 million; and the World Federation of Trade Unions, with headquarters in Prague and a claimed membership of 170 million. The methods of the front groups

include mass assemblies, international festivals, and publications (together they produce 33 monthly and biweekly publications worldwide). Bilateral friendship societies in many countries supplement the work of the front organizations.

Although the Soviets' use of intelligence services, Communist parties, and front organizations falls outside what others normally think of as "international communication, cultural and educational activities", their purpose in this context is to convey information and ideas to foreign publics. Such activities thus fall entirely within the concept of public diplomacy as defined in this study (see p. 1).

The Soviet daily and periodic press occupies a central position in Soviet public diplomacy. Such major dailies as Pravda and Izvestia are commonly used by the Party hierarchy to initiate new themes, or float new stories related to old themes, which are then replayed by other Soviet and pro-Soviet media.

In terms of effort if not listenership the Soviet Union is the world's leading international radio broadcaster. Its output over the past 20 years has doubled, to 2,003 program hours a week. Soviet programs are beamed in 82 languages, over more than 285 shortwave transmitters, to virtually every country in the world.

These figures include the output of Radio Moscow, the official voice of the Soviet Union; Radio Peace and Progress, a smaller station established in Moscow in 1964 as the "Voice of Soviet Public Opinion"; as well as smaller regional services. The Soviet Government disclaims responsibility for Radio Peace and Progress, which broadcasts to Latin America, Asia, and the Arab countries and which frequently takes a harder, more aggressive political line.

The best available statistical evidence of listenership to Soviet radio, according to an ICA report, shows a relatively low audience level compared to VOA in most countries. In some Third World countries seeking to maintain a nonaligned stance, there appears to be a sensitivity to the heavyhanded Soviet communication style that decreases receptivity not only to Soviet radio, but also to other Soviet media, including publications and the output of the Soviet wire services, Telegraphic Agency of the Soviet Union (TASS) and Novosti (APN).

TASS, established in 1925 as the official news agency of the Soviet Union, maintains bureaus and correspondents in about 100 countries and supplies its services directly to at least 60 countries in Russian, English, French, Spanish,

German, and Arabic. APN, established in 1961, is ostensibly a nongovernmental Soviet news agency controlled by its founders, such as the Union of Journalists and the Union of Soviet Societies of Friendship and Cultural Ties with Foreign Countries. Like its counterpart in broadcasting, Radio Peace and Progress, APN takes a harder line and shows less regard for the diplomatic niceties. Both agencies provide services without charge to certain countries, thus overcoming to some extent the inherent disadvantages of TASS/APN material, notably their propaganda content and slower speed of coverage.

Soviet cultural relations at home and abroad are tightly controlled under the Cultural Relations Department of the Foreign Affairs Ministry. In 1971 the Soviets claimed cultural relations within 126 countries (68 of these on the basis of bilateral agreements). The exchanges with the West are frankly conducted for the purpose of extracting the maximum of usable information, particularly in the scientific and technical fields. Western access to the Soviet public is restricted as far as possible within the terms of the exchange agreements. Such restrictions, certain perceived "asymmetries," and the very need for intergovernmental agreements to provide for scholarly and other East-West exchanges have occasioned considerable frustration and criticism in the West.

The Soviet Government obviously perceives a net gain in the exchanges under existing arrangements, although they present the regime with a serious dilemma: the price paid for access to Western science and technology is the exposure of their scientists and engineers to Western political values. Some Soviet scientists appear to have been impressed with Western openness and have returned home to raise their voices for freedom of communication with the outside world and for freedom of expression within the Soviet Union. The inward flow of exchangees--students, scholars, artists, tourists, military personnel--is also a process that cuts both ways: while the foreign exchangees are exposed to Soviet propaganda, they also experience first hand the political restrictions and material shortages of the Soviet system.

Finally, it should be noted that the Soviets put significant emphasis on teaching Russian as a second language. This is part of a long-term program designed to increase receptivity to Russian and Soviet culture, to improve understanding and acceptance of Soviet aims and policies, and where applicable, to facilitate Soviet-sponsored technical and military training programs. Abroad, Soviet cultural centers and libraries are the focal points for Russian-language instruction. In the Soviet Union, the Ministry of

Education offers foreigners a variety of instructional programs, including summer refresher courses which in 1970 attracted 3,800 teachers and prospective teachers from all over the world (the American contingent was limited under the cultural agreement to 20 a summer). According to a 1973 ICA report, the Soviets claimed that more than 20 million persons in 70 countries were then studying Russian. This included the other countries of the Soviet bloc.

UNITED STATES

Responsibility for the conduct of U.S. public diplomacy is centered in the International Communication Agency, which on April 1, 1978, under Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1977, assumed all exchange functions of the State Department's Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (CU) and all information functions of the former U.S. Information Agency. A number of other Federal agencies--notably ACTION (Peace Corps); Agency for International Development; Department of Defense; Department of Health, Education, and Welfare; and National Science Foundation--conduct specialized exchange or training programs. In addition, through the Board for International Broadcasting, the U.S. Government finances the specialized "home service" broadcasts of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty to East Europe and the Soviet Union. According to a 1976 Senate committee report, the Central Intelligence Agency prior to that time had conducted a variety of covert activities designed to influence foreign opinion.

ICA is an independent agency of the executive branch of the U.S. Government, responsible for its own budget, personnel system and programs. Its Director, who (with his Deputy and four Associate Directors) is appointed by the President with the consent of the Senate, reports to both the President and the Secretary of State. From the latter, ICA seeks and receives guidance on the foreign policies and interests of the United States.

ICA maintains 189 posts in 120 countries. As of April 1, 1978, its authorized staffing was 8,879 employees--4,462 Americans and 4,417 non-Americans hired locally in foreign countries. Of the Americans, 1,064 were assigned overseas, and 3,398 were based in the United States, principally in Washington, D.C. ICA's estimated total expenditure for fiscal year 1979 is \$413,327,000.

ICA's legislative mandate is provided in the Smith-Mundt Act of 1948 and the Fulbright-Hays Act of 1961. The former authorizes programs to "increase mutual understanding

between the people of the United States and the people of other countries"; it also generally prohibits dissemination within the United States of ICA materials produced for distribution overseas. The Fulbright-Hays Act provides for the U.S. educational and cultural exchange programs.

In his mission statement of March 13, 1978, President Carter said the principal function of ICA should be "to reduce the degree to which misperceptions and misunderstandings complicate relations between the United States and other nations." Its consequent tasks would be to:

- encourage "the broadest possible exchange of people and ideas" between the United States and other nations;
- give foreign peoples "the best possible understanding" of U.S. policies and the American society and culture;
- help the U.S. Government and American individuals and institutions adequately understand foreign public opinion and cultures;
- assist in the development and execution of "a comprehensive national policy on international communications" looking to the maximum international flow of information and ideas; and
- conduct negotiations on cultural exchanges with other governments.

In performing those tasks, ICA is under Presidential mandate to preserve the scholarly integrity of the exchange programs, maintain the independence of Voice of America news broadcasts, and avoid all "covert, manipulative or propagandistic activities." What has come to be called ICA's "second mandate," also stressed in the Carter memorandum, requires ICA to help give Americans "the opportunity to understand the histories, cultures and problems" of other nations.

U.S. information and cultural activities are conducted worldwide, with a rather even-handed attention to all regions. As measured by the 1979 plans reflected in the 1980 budget (including overseas posts, ICA funded exchanges, VOA program costs, and exhibits), regional priorities are: Western Europe (\$44.2 million); North Africa, Near East, and South Asia (\$40.1 million); East Asia and the Pacific (\$39.3 million); and Africa and East Europe/Soviet Union (\$31.9 million each).

ICA's functional priorities, as indicated by the 1979 estimates, can be broken down as follows: (1) cultural and educational exchange activities--information center activities, libraries, book programs, cultural presentations, and academic and professional exchanges--\$135.9 million; (2) radio--principally the Voice of America--\$80.8 million; and (3) "programs"--exhibits, press and publications, motion picture and television activities, and speakers--\$74.7 million.

Overseas the Agency's operations are an integral part of the U.S. Diplomatic Missions, though some elements may be housed separately. (See app. I for agency structure diagram.) Each country operation is headed by a Public Affairs Officer, who reports in the field to the Chief of Mission and at ICA headquarters to the Office Director for the appropriate geographic area. The Area Directors are responsible for the initial approval and general direction of the overseas programs in their areas. They communicate Agency policies and priorities to the field and evaluate field performance. They are the prime Washington source of Agency expertise for their areas on policy issues and on foreign public opinion.

The work abroad is supplemented by the activities of at least 93 Binational Centers, institutions jointly sponsored by nationals of the host countries and American residents to foster mutual understanding. Although ICA provides some continuing program support to 28 such centers, they are independent and, principally through fees for English language instruction, generally self-supporting.

ICA will have the benefit of a new United States Advisory Commission on International Communication, Cultural and Educational Affairs--renamed in pending legislation United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy. It will be composed of seven persons appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate from a cross section of educational, communications, cultural, scientific, technical, public service, business, labor, and professional backgrounds. The Commission--which gives the Congress and the executive branch annual reports, independent assessments, and suggestions on ICA operations--replaces two Advisory Commissions concerned respectively with international information and cultural affairs.

ICA exchange programs, generally implemented by private organizations under contract, are of three kinds:

--Academic program--This includes the Fulbright Scholarships Program, which involves the annual exchange of approximately 1,750 U.S.

and foreign predoctoral students and 1,000 professors and senior researchers. The program is supervised by the Presidentially appointed 12-member Board of Foreign Scholarships. The academic exchanges include many other programs for students, teachers, and scholars.

--Foreign leaders program--Invitations are extended annually by U.S. Chiefs of Mission to about 2,000 foreign leaders in government, labor, mass media, science, education and other fields to visit their counterparts in the United States. About 500 of these foreign leaders participate in multiregional projects on such topics as energy, food systems, environment, communications, and the role of women. The others have individually tailored itineraries. Programing these visitors in the communities to which they travel involves more than 100,000 U.S. volunteers and 90 community organizations, many of them members of the National Council for Community Services to International Visitors (COSERV).

--American participants program--In response to specific requests from U.S. overseas missions some 200 Americans (experts in a variety of fields) travel abroad under ICA auspices to take part in transnational dialogues with fellow specialists or others.

ICA also extends financial aid to selected private American organizations whose programs abroad are deemed to complement or enhance those of the U.S. Government. In recent years approximately 225 awards totaling nearly \$10 million have been made annually.

The Voice of America, ICA's broadcasting element, transmits 807 hours of programing a week in 38 languages via short-wave and mediumwave to an estimated 75 million listeners. The backbone of VOA programing is news, news-related material, and analysis. This accounts for 59 percent of airtime. Seven percent of the current-events segment is commentary and analysis. Twenty-five percent of air time is feature material on the American society.

The broadcasts of Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty to East Europe and the Soviet Union, financed and monitored by the U.S. Government through the Board for International

Broadcasting, serve a quite different but complementary purpose. Whereas VOA is the radio spokesman of the U.S. Government and interpreter of American society, RFE/RL functions as a substitute free press, concentrating on news and analysis of national and regional developments in the listeners' area that are withheld or distorted by official censorship. RFE/RL broadcasts from 8 to 24 hours a day in the 6 main East European languages and two of the Soviet languages (less in 14 other Soviet languages) and has an estimated daily audience of 18 million. VOA broadcasts an average of only 1-1/4 hours daily in eight East European languages, 14 in Russian, 4 in Ukrainian, and an hour in six other Soviet languages. Like BBC, both VOA and RFE/RL enjoy--and have sometimes had to struggle to maintain--professional and operating independence within broad guidelines.

VOA's Charter, signed into law in 1976, obliges VOA to (1) provide accurate, objective, and comprehensive news reports; (2) reflect American life, thought, and institutions; and (3) present American policies, and reports of public discussion on those policies. To convey official views of U.S. policy accurately, VOA obtains guidance from the Department of State through a continuing close relationship.

An ICA radioteletype network called the Wireless File makes five regional transmissions, 5 days a week, of policy statements and interpretive material to 126 ICA posts overseas. Each regional transmission averages 12,000 to 16,000 words in English. There are also Spanish, French, and Arabic language versions. This material is used abroad for the background information of U.S. Mission personnel, for distribution to foreign opinion leaders, and for media placement.

ICA also publishes 14 magazines in 16 languages, most of them printed at Regional Service Centers in Manila and Mexico City. The contents consist largely of reprints from the best of American periodicals.

These and other aspects of ICA's activities--including cultural presentations, athletic programs, libraries, motion pictures, videotape programs, and exhibitions--are summarized in appendix II.

According to a 1976 Senate committee report, the CIA prior to that time had also played a role in influencing foreign opinion, providing covert support of foreign politicians, media, and other groups and circulating information to them deemed beneficial to the United States. William Colby, a former Director of CIA, has testified that

in the 1950s the political and paramilitary work of the CIA accounted for some 40 to 50 percent of its budget but now accounts for less than 2 percent. Its output, he said, consisted of "gray propaganda"--information attributed to some ostensible third source--and "black propaganda"--information purportedly emanating from the target group.

Mr. Colby testified that by far the largest part of the propaganda effort was in the gray area, including support of journalists and the provision of information, and that while some of that material was "lopsided" most of it sought to convey accurate information as a counter to hostile propaganda. Before 1967, according to the (Rusk) Committee on Overseas Voluntary Activities, the CIA supported international activities of a number of private American organizations to counter the overseas influence of Communist front groups. After covert support of such American groups was terminated in 1967, the Rusk Committee recommended the establishment by law of an independent commission to support such organizations openly, but this was never implemented.

With the reorganization of the International Communication Agency in 1978 and the new definition of its mission, ICA embarked on a course that differs in significant matters of emphasis from what went before:

--The priority subjects on which programing is based are foreign policy/security affairs, economics, U.S. political and social processes, arts and humanities, and science and technology. Under congressional and Presidential leadership, there is a new emphasis on human rights. ICA support to nongovernmental organizations active in that area, such as the American Association for the International Commission of Jurists and the American Bar Association, has been increased.

--With encouragement from both the White House and some Congressmen, ICA has developed a possible "Program for the '80's" that contemplates a major increase in program funds for international exchanges designed in part to enhance the impact and prestige of the Fulbright-Hays program, to explore new avenues of nonacademic exchanges, and to create new forums for international discussion of critical issues.

- ICA has taken initial steps to implement its mandate as the coordinator of U.S. international information and exchange programs and as a governmental focal point for private U.S. international exchange programs.
- The sharper focus that has been put on "mutuality" in international communication and on the mandate to help American individuals and institutions better understand foreign public opinion and cultures is expected to bring further change in operations as ICA settles into its new mode.

CHAPTER 3

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES

A number of similarities and differences among the American and the foreign public diplomacy programs reviewed above carry implications for the future directions, priorities, or administration of the U.S. Government's effort in this field. Based not only on the published data but also on consultations with U.S. and foreign officials and specialists outside of government, this chapter identifies and defines eight issues, six of which appear to contain opportunities for prompt and useful action by the International Communication Agency.

MAGNITUDE OF EFFORT

By comparison with both allies and adversaries, the U.S. Government investment in international communication, cultural and educational affairs is low. In absolute amounts, the United States is outspent by France and, on the basis of either the ICA or the CIA estimates noted in the preceding chapter, by the Soviet Union. ICA's figure for the United States as shown in the table (see app. II), included only the ICA and RFE/RL budgets (for 1977). However, even if pertinent activities of other U.S. agencies--AID training; Peace Corps; Department of Health, Education, and Welfare; National Science Foundation; Smithsonian Institution; and National Endowment for the Humanities--are included in the U.S. total, the French and Soviet investments still exceeded that of the United States, with West Germany's not far behind. (Foreign military training is excluded from all figures; inclusion of the U.S. International Military Education and Training Program would increase the U.S. total by less than 5 percent.)

As a percentage of total national budget--again taking the inclusive U.S. figure--the U.S. falls behind five of the countries under review here: 0.13 percent of the national budget for the United States compared to 0.18 for Britain, 0.2 for Japan, 0.3 for the Soviet Union, 0.6 for West Germany, and 0.7 for France.

If these U.S. and foreign investments in public diplomacy are considered in proportion to gross national products (GNP), the comparison becomes even more striking, since the U.S. GNP is twice that of the Soviet Union, about three times those of West Germany and Japan, nearly five times that of France, and more than 7 times that of Britain.

These budgetary differences between the United States and the others are reflected in several other available indices. As shown in appendix II, the Governments of two of the four other industrial democracies (France and West Germany) recently sponsored more overseas exhibits; the same two sponsored a larger number of schools; all four sponsored more language teachers and artistic performances; and all but Japan distributed more documentary films and donated as many or more books for overseas consumption. Japan and Britain sent about as many or more of their nationals abroad on grants, and Britain brought in more foreign grantees. In none of the categories mentioned, and in only one of the others presented in appendix II (radio broadcasting), does the U.S. program show an effort that is comparable to that of the others in proportion to GNP.

It does not necessarily follow from such data that the U.S. investment in public diplomacy should be increased. Judgments about that must be based on assessments of prospective benefits and costs of specific proposals. The comparison does, however, provide pertinent new perspective for considering any increase of U.S. resources in this field, including those discussed below.

STRUCTURE AND ORGANIZATION

Some practitioners and students of public diplomacy believe that U.S. Government-funded cultural exchange activities would be better administered by a quasi-independent organization analogous to the British Council.

The use of such entities--the British Council, the Goethe Institute, the Alliance Francaise--to manage government-supported cultural programs appears at first blush to be significantly different from American practice, in which such programs are the direct administrative responsibility of a Government agency. Indeed some students of public diplomacy interpret the European practice as recognition of what they perceive as a fundamental principle of organization in public diplomacy, that the articulation of policy and the conduct of cultural programs must be kept administratively and organizationally separate if both functions are to be effectively fulfilled.

In fact, as material in the preceding chapter makes clear, the separation is more apparent than real. The modalities--deriving from distinctive constitutional and cultural backgrounds--are indeed different, but the practical effects are substantially comparable. Both the American and West European models provide for active governmental

participation in public diplomacy in a manner assuring in large measure appropriate professional and operating independence for such activities as news broadcasting, education, and cultural relations while at the same time maintaining a degree of official oversight and control sufficient to satisfy the legislatures that such activities are being carried out within a broad framework of national interests and objectives.

In the British, French, and West German models, as we have seen, the functions of those concerned primarily with policy articulation or with general information and culture tend to overlap, and both are part of or closely associated with the foreign ministry. In West Germany, the Federal Press and Information Office is in the Chancellor's office, while the Department for External Cultural Policy is in the Foreign Office. Overseas, the press counselor and the cultural counselor are part of the embassy and report to different sections of the Foreign Office. In Britain, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office retains a central position in all cultural and informational matters, while overseas the British Council's field representatives are appointed with approval of the ambassador, whom they serve as advisors and on occasion as officers of the embassy. In the French system, both the policy spokesman and the cultural directorate are integral parts of the Foreign Ministry, and in the field the press and the cultural counselors report to their respective directorates in the Foreign Ministry.

In the European models, in short, distinct administrative entities are created to manage cultural relations but are then linked to the policymakers and policy spokesmen by a range of budgetary, administrative and consensual relationships designed to keep the work in the mainstream of national interests. In the American system, both policy articulation and cultural exchange functions are now entrusted to a single agency, but safeguards--including the Board of Foreign Scholarships, the U.S. Advisory Commission, explicit congressional and Presidential guidelines, and consensual relationships--are then relied upon to provide the necessary operational independence.

Thus, both the European and the American structures and arrangements for conducting public diplomacy tend to confirm that the policy information and cultural functions are not so different in purpose and methods that they need to be administratively insulated from each other. Effective advocacy of foreign policy requires high standards

of accuracy, candor and even "dialogue." If the work is understood and conducted in that manner, the problem of incompatibility between cultural activities and policy articulation disappears, and a closely coordinated or integrated operation--as is provided for in ICA's recent reorganization--becomes both feasible and preferable.

RECOMMENDATION

Six of the eight issues identified and defined in this chapter appear to contain possibilities for prompt and worthwhile action by the International Communication Agency. They can be properly evaluated for that purpose, however, only upon a more detailed review and assessment than was undertaken in the present wide-angle survey. Therefore, we recommend that the Director, ICA, examine the six issues discussed below and determine what steps, or what further steps, the Agency might usefully take.

COOPERATIVE PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

Among the five industrial democracies whose programs were reviewed in the last chapter, there are more similarities than differences of concept, technique, or organization.

Although geographical and media priorities vary among them, all five--and indeed the Soviet Union and the PRC as well--implicitly define the objectives of their public diplomacy in broadly comparable terms. At bottom, each seeks to influence the attitudes and behavior of other nations by conveying the image of a cultured, modern, dynamic, democratic society; desirable trading partner; reliable ally; and champion of human rights, economic development, and world peace. All deploy in varying ways the full array of communications tools, from the personal contact to the shortwave broadcast. All are concerned to understand and evaluate foreign public opinion.

The similarities suggest the possibility of at least some governments coordinating some of their efforts in third countries.

From one point of view, there is a plausible case for cooperative public diplomacy among industrial democracies. They share basic human and political values; they have quite similar perceptions of the external threat to their security, which for many of them are reflected in mutual treaty commitments; and they seek the same core objectives with regard to Third World development and international trade. Yet the

machinery by which each communicates to the rest of the world is entirely separate, independent, and essentially uncoordinated. Duplication of communication facilities and personnel, with consequent loss of efficiency and impact, must be substantial. In short, on this view, wherever and whenever such countries have a common message to deliver, common sense would dictate the use of common media.

Some such view of the matter has in fact inspired a number of proposals and initiatives. It can be inferred, for example, in the suggestion of Britain's Central Policy Review Staff, noted in the preceding chapter, that Britain might safely leave some of BBC's foreign language broadcasting to other friendly nations. The same view led to an effort not long ago to develop a joint British-American program in Africa to explain common positions on trade and economic development. It was at the root of certain inter-allied discussions looking to the establishment of jointly sponsored international centers in third countries that might embrace common auditoriums, classrooms, exhibit space, etc. It underlay a number of Anglo-American projects for cooperation in teaching English abroad.

At least as early as 1974, the U.S. Advisory Commission on Information noted increased attention to public diplomacy on the part of certain Western European countries and Japan and suggested that while this "increases the competition among foreign embassies for the attention of their foreign hosts" it also "provides new opportunities in which information and cultural programs are jointly sponsored and planned."

With the exception of the English-language projects, most such efforts at cooperative public diplomacy have made little headway. They have foundered on policy issues, differences of method, "turf" problems, personality conflicts, and practical details such as the commingling of funds. Even in the area of English-language training abroad, practitioners have found distinct limits on the potential for coordination. There is, for example, a natural element of competition for contracts and the sale of textbooks and other teaching aids. The student's exposure to those, in turn, may predispose him/her to the goods, services, techniques, and ideas of the sponsoring country. As an annual report of the British Council noted in a revealing passage:

"There is a hidden sales element in every English teacher, book, magazine, filmstrip and television program sent overseas.

"Nor can language be completely neutral. Something of the culture, attitudes and habits of thought it describes will influence those who speak it. The British teacher of English cannot help being a teacher about Britain * * *."

Cooperative efforts confront the fact that while industrial democracies may be military allies, they are also economic and cultural competitors. This is no more than a reflection of the present stage in the evolution of the sovereign state system and international organization. The principal examples of a "higher order" of cooperative public diplomacy among Western nations are the information and exchange programs of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Community. In general, as one ICA officer summed it up, Western public diplomatists consult but do not consort. Cooperative public diplomacy on any extensive scale is an idea whose time has yet to come.

It would nevertheless be premature to write it off. Some progress has been made. The consultations, whether through individual contact, publications, or conferences, are numerous. These permit the sharing of professional experiences and insights, and sometimes the coordinated scheduling of events that might otherwise overlap.

They can also lead to action. Effective U.S.-U.K. cooperation in English teaching appears to have been developed in several countries, including Egypt, Poland, and Italy, and plans for extending such cooperation to other countries are under consideration. Some Western countries cooperate on cultural exchanges: they share program information and occasionally arrange to "piggyback" exchanges, so that a foreign visitor to one host country may be enabled to extend his/her Western experience by visiting another. Britain and West Germany, for example, share about 20 of each other's visitors each year. Some Western countries exchange TV films, share technical broadcasting facilities, or construct joint radio relay stations.

Finally, there is another form of cooperative public diplomacy that appears to be gaining ground. This entails the effort by, for example, public diplomatists of the United States to advise their counterparts from another country on how best to present their "case" or message to the American public. ICA officers have given such cooperation to Japanese and German colleagues in recent months and view the process as a way of enhancing the "American learning experience" in accordance with ICA's "second mandate."

To date most such cooperation has resulted from informal, ad hoc responses to specific opportunities. ICA missions abroad are expected to report in their periodic "country data papers" on the related local activities of other countries and to take account of them in their program planning. Further progress can be expected, with accompanying gains in efficiency and impact, to the extent that ICA officers overseas keep themselves both informed of pertinent foreign programs and hospitable to the concept.

A conscious effort should be made, however, to gain more experience in this kind of effort and to accumulate illustrative cases of successful cooperation. To that end ICA should consider issuing special instructions to the field and asking selected posts to examine and report on specific new possibilities.

FOREIGN CURRENCY CONTINGENCY FUND

Worldwide inflation and the erosion of the dollar against European and other currencies over the past decade adversely affect all U.S. agencies having substantial overseas operations. ICA's appropriations for dollar devaluation, through budget amendment and supplemental appropriations, exceeded \$7 million in fiscal year 1974, the peak year. In the current fiscal year, ICA's pending requests for supplemental appropriations amount to \$737,000, but the Agency reports having absorbed \$2,290,000 in additional devaluation costs. Whenever such costs are not covered by additional funds, an agency is obliged to meet the shortfall by reducing program or personnel or both. In either case, the effect is to establish a level of operation below that contemplated by the Congress in annual appropriations.

In fiscal year 1977, on recommendation of the Comptroller General, the Congress created a currency reserve fund to insure Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty against such contingencies. While that fund has not worked perfectly, in part because the amount appropriated has not always been sufficient to cover exchange losses, it has provided significant protection against dollar devaluation. For an agency like ICA which spends some 30 percent of its budget in foreign currencies, such an arrangement can have important advantages. It can facilitate sound planning and management, obviate the uncertainty and delay of seeking supplemental appropriations, and protect the level of activity originally mandated by the Congress.

The point is recognized in pending legislation that gives State and ICA as well as the Board for International

Broadcasting permanent authority to offset adverse fluctuations in foreign currency exchange rates. How best to implement such authority is an issue that remains to be determined.

The State Department is now studying a new approach--that of a "Buying Power Maintenance Fund"--that would permit adjustments in available buying power not only for exchange rate changes but also for inflation rate changes between the budgeted and actual rates. Whether such an arrangement might also embrace other Government agencies in the foreign affairs community is under consideration.

ENGLISH LANGUAGE TEACHING

Reports of both ICA and the British Council describe a large and growing worldwide demand for English as the principal medium of international communication. The U.S. financial investment in English language teaching for foreigners has long been a fraction of that which Britain, France, or West Germany allocate to teaching foreigners their languages. More significantly, it appears that the current U.S. investment falls short of meeting existing and prospective opportunities to promote U.S. interests in this field.

The three West European countries all give top priority in their overseas cultural programs to teaching their respective languages. West Germany was reported to be spending in 1973 some 55 percent (\$49 million) of its external cultural affairs budget on German instruction. For the French in 1971 the figures were about \$53 million or nearly one-third of the total cultural budget. In 1977-78, the British Council spent £14.5 million in direct or support teaching services. It had 669 English teaching specialists in its employ--24 in London, 76 in Council overseas posts, 58 in key posts in developing countries, 95 in technical cooperation posts, 123 in direct teaching operations, and 293 in posts partly or completely financed outside the Council. It had 122,112 students of English worldwide in Council centers, British Institutes, and anglophile societies assisted by the Council. The BBC has had its English-by-Radio department since 1945, and as noted in chapter 2, allocates 8 percent of air time to its courses, which are supplemented by the distribution of a wide range of teaching materials. The Soviet Union also conducts a large-scale language training program for foreigners.

In contrast, the U.S. Government's investment in language teaching abroad was \$1.8 million in fiscal year 1978, down from \$2.8 million in 1968. (To the 1978 figure should

be added the cost of 85 to 100 exchange grants to Americans sent abroad annually to take part in English teaching programs). In February 1978 ICA had six field English Teaching Officer positions, one of them regional, with five English Teaching Consultants serving the rest of the world from a Washington base. Between 1968 and 1976, 40 field English teaching positions were eliminated, including all 27 Binational Center grantees and 13 of 19 field English Teaching Officer positions. ICA's English Teaching Advisory Panel was disbanded, decreasing contact and cooperation with the academic community.

President Johnson's National Security Action Memorandum 332 of 1965, which gave English teaching high priority, was withdrawn under a review of policy documents in 1969 and was never revised or revalidated. According to a 1978 ICA task force report:

"There are those who assert that there was a deliberate policy of downgrading English teaching following the change of administrations in 1968. * * * With regard to the drastic decline in field ETO's [English Teaching Officers], there are others who state that it did not come entirely as a result of a deliberate policy to downgrade English teaching. Rather, the field English teaching positions were frequently the first to go [under personnel and program reductions between 1967 and 1969], with the Washington English Teaching Staff powerless to check the uncoordinated and unintended onslaught on its field programs."

Reports of professional linguists in both Britain and the United States indicate that the quality of English instruction in many foreign educational systems is seriously deficient. Of the some 10,000 teachers of English in one important Latin American country, according to a private study, "less than half have had some type of [teacher] training." In an important Asian country, according to a British Council report, if English is to survive there other than among the elite, "it is essential that the standards of English teaching in the schools be raised by the training of more and better English language teachers."

A large share of English teaching abroad with which the U.S. Government has been associated is sponsored by scores of Binational Centers (BNCs). Of 93 such centers listed by ICA in 1978, 28 received some continuing support from the Agency and had as directors either Agency officers or Agency approved local-hire Americans. The number so supported has been declining rapidly. The 28 centers, together with

25 contract Information Centers, had nearly 162,000 registered students of English during that year. ICA posts also cooperate with and occasionally provide project support to many of the other Binational Centers.

All Binational Centers are independent local legal entities responsible to boards comprising local citizens and resident Americans and sustaining their programs essentially through tuition charges. ICA officers we consulted consider the work of such centers useful and important.

For several reasons, however, the existing Binational Centers cannot be expected to meet all of the expanding opportunities for worldwide English language instruction. Fewer than 10 percent of them are to be found outside of Latin America. The scarcity of native U.S. teachers in most centers minimizes the possibilities to provide not just a linguistic skill but access to American ideas and culture. Finally, ICA's relationship with the bulk of the BNCs offers U.S. specialists little opportunity to take part in the determination of such important matters as teaching priorities, curriculum, teaching materials, quality control, or recruitment policy.

Other U.S. agencies--notably the Defense Department, Agency for International Development (AID), and Peace Corps--contribute to the U.S. presence in this field. The language programs of the latter two, however, peaked in the late 1960s and have since been declining under the influence of the current basic-human-needs development philosophy.

The international teaching of English can give the United States many important advantages in its relations with other countries:

- It provides a special medium for presenting cultural values through the instructional process itself.
- It gives the United States more effective access to influential foreigners for the exchange of ideas, information, goods and services.
- It facilitates technical training programs such as those offered by AID and the Defense Department.
- It assures greater worldwide currency to American literature, political philosophy, and commercial data.

--It encourages tourism in both directions and promotes more productive personal contacts.

--It offers an entering wedge into closed societies.

For these reasons, it would be in the interest of the United States to see that the foreign demand for English language instruction continues to grow and is adequately met. (New opportunities in the PRC alone could be vast.) 1/ To that end, ICA should review the need and possibilities for expanding and enriching its English-teaching program worldwide. The present and potential effectiveness of Binational Centers would be an important consideration in such a review.

If British Council experience is an indication, it is likely that an expanded language program would in time largely "pay its own way."

About 11.5 percent of the British Council's budget is "earnings." These include receipts from library subscriptions, fees for certain specialist courses, sales of Council publications, fees for administering British examinations overseas, and--by far the largest--fees for the direct teaching of English. The cost of such activities very nearly balances the income from them. Despite the low "profit" margin, the effort to obtain such earnings is, the Council's Director-General argues, well worthwhile, because it:

--permits a significant increase in the activities mandated by the Council's Royal Charter without further burden to the taxpayer;

--provides a significant "trade spin-off"--a direct return to Britain in the form of exports of materials and equipment;

--has helped the Council to attain its high level of professional involvement worldwide and to "speak with authority among those who plan national language policies"; and

1/Since 1973, ICA has been broadcasting English language lessons to the PRC in three half-hour daily programs that appear to have become increasingly popular. The Agency reports that requests for teaching materials advertised on the programs as give-aways averaged only 5 to 10 a month before normalization of U.S.-PRC relations. Recently they have jumped to some 2,500 a month, forcing VOA to terminate its on-the-air offers of English texts.

--provides a market test for the quality and efficiency of Council services--a "tangible yardstick of effectiveness" in a line of work that is otherwise difficult to evaluate--with beneficial effects on the whole range of Council activities.

Under U.S. law, proceeds from any program are remitted to the Treasury rather than, as in the British case, reinvested in the program. In both cases, however, to the extent that proceeds cover costs, the burden on the taxpayer is reduced.

AVAILABILITY OF ICA MATERIALS IN THE UNITED STATES

The recent assignment to ICA of the State Department's functions in educational and cultural exchanges and the President's recent elaboration of a "second mandate" under which ICA is to promote American understanding of foreign cultures and international issues suggest another matter in which other countries' experience in public diplomacy may be instructive. The issue: the use at home of materials prepared for dissemination abroad.

In Britain, as noted in the preceding chapter, a single agency of government--the Central Office of Information in the Department of Trade and Industry--prepares a wide range of materials for both domestic and foreign consumption. In Japan, Germany and France, as in Britain, there is no explicit ban on the domestic use of materials prepared for overseas dissemination, and the only limitations are those that might be dictated by discretion and good taste in particular cases. For them the issue does not often arise because such materials either may be inapplicable to domestic needs or are drawn from commercial sources and hence already available.

Under a 1972 amendment to the U.S. Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948 (the Smith-Mundt Act), tightening previous restrictions, there is a near-total ban on the domestic use of ICA products prepared for dissemination abroad. The ban applies to all such ICA materials except the scholarly review Problems of Communism. (Such materials must, however, be made available "at the State Department" on request for examination by representatives of the media, research students, and scholars, and must be given to Members of Congress for examination on request.) The Smith-Mundt provision was designed to guard against Government competition with private U.S. media and the domestic use of what might be viewed as "propaganda"

materials for partisan political purposes. Any exception to the rule, such as was made for the film, "John F. Kennedy: Years of Lightning, Day of Drums," must be legislated.

Limiting the domestic availability of ICA products serves important purposes. One need not endorse the view that Agency output is "propaganda" in any pejorative sense to recognize that some materials designed to articulate and advocate an administration's policies abroad could, if domestic dissemination were unrestricted, be turned to unfair partisan advantage in matters of partisan controversy. By keeping ICA out of politics, the provision helps preserve the Agency's nonpartisan posture abroad as well as its bipartisan backing in the Congress.

There are those, however, including some Members of Congress, the U.S. Advisory Commission on Information, and at least two former Directors of ICA, who have suggested that the provision is too restrictive and unnecessarily denies the American public a range of useful and purely educational Agency materials, as well as information about the way in which the Government is presenting American life and policy abroad.

In 1968 ICA sought legislative authority to make its film histories of previous Presidents available to scholars for screening at Presidential archival depositories. The bill, designed to meet what the Agency described as numerous scholarly requests each month, died in committee. During the early 1970s the Agency began to suggest broader dissemination of its products. Its then Director argued that it was wrong for the Agency "to make a film which wins an Academy Award and which is shown all over the world and the only people who can't see it are the Americans who paid for it." He further suggested that the ban inhibited the Agency's ability to develop public understanding, support, and funding.

An Agency review of procedures at that time concluded that some relaxation of the policy could be undertaken without detriment to congressional intent, under guidelines providing that:

- the Agency could not be actively involved in any general dissemination of its materials;
- no appropriated Agency funds could be expended in making products available in the United States;

- no products containing commentary on domestic political issues could be disseminated; and
- under the law authorizing domestic release of the Kennedy film, no Agency film about public officials living or dead could be shown in public without specific legislative authorization.

The restrictive 1972 amendment, in part a response to that change in Agency policy, was essentially a restatement of the original congressional purpose. The amendment had several additional effects, one of which was that Agency films can no longer be included in the National Audio-visual Center inventory. Agency materials are not subject to disclosure through a Freedom of Information Act request.

Pending legislation would exempt from the rule the ICA films, "Aspen" and "Reflections: Margaret Mead," and the highly regarded professional journal English Teaching Forum. Those who believe further steps should be taken to broaden the exemptions do not generally dispute the importance of maintaining limitations. They argue that many ICA products--for the most part films and video tapes--are educational and noncontroversial and could be used to advantage not only in presenting aspects of American life and policy, thus helping prepare Americans for the international dialogue, but in fulfilling the Agency's second mandate, to help Americans understand international issues and foreign peoples and cultures.

Under present constraints the Agency reportedly has even felt obliged to refuse naturalization groups the use of its English teaching materials and to deny the Library of Congress access to VOA "special English" or simplified vocabulary tapes for use in its library of recordings for the handicapped. As early as 1967, the U.S. Advisory Commission on Information took the position that:

"The American taxpayer should no longer be prohibited from seeing and studying the product a government agency produces with public funds for overseas audiences. Students in schools and colleges all over this country who are interested in government, foreign affairs and international relations should not be denied access to what the U.S. government is saying about itself and the rest of the world. The Commission recommends that the Congress effect the same 'open door' policy on overseas-intended information materials as decreed by

the 'Freedom of Information Act' (The Moss Act, passed July 4, 1966) for domestically-based government operations."

A fresh look at this issue would seem to be in order. As a first step, ICA should draw up a descriptive list of those Agency products that might usefully and prudently be given wider dissemination in the United States, without cost to the Government, together with suggestions as to the guidelines and safeguards that might be applied in any relaxation of the existing rule.

REPRESENTATION ALLOWANCES

Another area in which comparison between U.S. and foreign practice could be instructive concerns overseas representation allowances.

In the view of many experienced ICA officers, the single most valuable function they and their colleagues can perform overseas is the cultivation of personal contacts and working relations with local government officials, editors, and other opinion molders. As early as 1968, the House Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements was recommending that "new emphasis be placed on personal contacts overseas at all levels."

ICA continues to seek ways to expand its contacts with important audiences. This often entails unavoidable expenditures for lunches or entertainment for small groups at Agency officers' homes. Unlike at least their British, French, and German counterparts, ICA officers continue to find themselves significantly out-of-pocket in fulfilling official representational duties overseas.

Reimbursement for such activities cannot exceed the limitation fixed by the Congress in the Agency's annual appropriation. ICA's overseas posts can obligate money for representation only within the amount allotted to them for that specific purpose. Authority to approve expenditures within such limits is delegated to the Country Public Affairs Officer. Reimbursement is made on the basis of a detailed voucher submitted by an officer after the expense is incurred.

In 1978, eligible ICA officers worldwide were authorized and received reimbursement for a total of \$290,000. Total expenditures incurred and accounted for came to \$442,676. Those involved were thus personally out-of-pocket in the aggregate \$152,676, which is to say that of the total spent

and accounted for, 34.5 percent was unreimbursed. ICA officers report it is not unusual for individuals to spend \$1,500 to \$3,000 a year of their own funds for representation purposes.

Increased appropriations in recent years have covered the impact of inflation and have narrowed but not closed the gap. ICA Inspection Staff reports confirm that representation allowances at most ICA posts remain markedly insufficient to meet the responsibilities. The U.S. Advisory Commission on Information called attention to this problem as early as 1968. ICA's objective is to build up its per capita allowance until it approximates that of State Department officers. As projected for fiscal year 1980, these amounts were \$905 for State as against \$793 for ICA. (The State Department figure excludes the allowance for the ambassador.)

The continued shortfall places a personal burden on the conscientious overseas ICA officer and inhibits optimum cultivation of personal contacts.

SOVIET PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

An important question about Soviet public diplomacy was raised by the CIA in the study cited in the preceding chapter:

"This paper has not dealt with Soviet propaganda activities conducted within the United States, as they do not fall within the responsibilities of this Agency. We believe that some of the evidence presented in this paper suggests that such a study would be worthwhile. The recent visits to the United States of the leading personalities of both the Soviet central propaganda apparatus and the WPC [World Peace Council], the major Soviet front group, may well presage, as we have suggested, an intensification of Soviet propaganda intended to influence American public opinion and policy-makers. Campaigns initiated abroad against American policies, and particularly new U.S. weapons--such as the 'neutron bomb' or the cruise missile--presumably had their U.S.-based counterpart. We have mentioned that certain Soviet themes floated overseas have reached the U.S. press; but the Soviets would be unlikely to rely on mere windfalls such as these as the mainstays of a propaganda assault against their principal adversary. If, as must

be assumed, the main objective of Soviet propaganda is to weaken the United States and her allies, operations to further this end are undoubtedly taking place on our home soil."


The International Communication Agency, for its part, has issued reports on the public diplomacy operations conducted by various countries, including those of the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, in all major world regions except North America.

Soviet (and PRC) propaganda about and to the United States is indeed one face of "detente" of which the U.S. Congress, press, and public are made aware only partially and episodically. There is a gap in American understanding of Communist propaganda, but the gap needs to be defined with care. Literature in English of course abounds on the Soviet state, ideology, society, history, culture, policies, and programs, including the structure, tactics, and broad purposes of the Soviet propaganda apparatus. What is lacking is an accessible, periodic, public report and analysis of the aims, themes, assertions, and interpretations about the American and the Soviet societies and policies which the Soviets are conveying to the United States and other countries, and the various means by which they are doing so. Also lacking is any even rough measure of the quantity and quality of exposure in American media and councils which such Soviet output is achieving. As the U.S. Advisory Commission on Information remarked in its 1974 report, "The unrelenting worldwide propagation of communist ideology," which "constantly disparages the U.S. system * * * requires vigilant attention."

One need not be concerned that such output is in danger of subverting American values or basic purposes to believe that it could be useful to fill that gap in American understanding. A comprehensive, periodic, published analysis of Soviet propaganda in the United States would tend to put Soviet purposes in clearer perspective. It would tend to make the American public and press less vulnerable to Soviet deception. It might deter some of the more flagrant Soviet propaganda abuses, such as the letters the Soviet secret service forges to misrepresent U.S. policy and to discredit U.S. Government officials and others. In the process, this could provide new insights into East-West relations of value not only to the United States but to its allies and the non-aligned as well.

ICA should study the utility and feasibility of such a project, including--if the finding is affirmative--the question as to which agency should be assigned the task.

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Source: ICA, 1979.

COMPARATIVE CULTURAL AND INFORMATION PROGRAM DATA						
(Source: ICA publications) (PRC omitted for lack of statistics)						
	BRITAIN	FRANCE	JAPAN	WEST GERMANY	USSR	USA
YEAR OF DATA	1976/77	1977	1976/77	1977	-	FY1977
GNP (Billions) 1976	\$234	\$356	\$574	\$462	\$718	\$1,695
FISCAL DATA						
Annual budget (billions)	\$ 69.0	\$ 88	\$114	\$ 74.2	\$266 (1974)	\$ 402
Program expenditures (millions)	\$125.0	\$618.5 (MFA contributed \$270 million; MOC contributed \$348.5 million)	\$235.3 (\$123.8 million of the \$235.3 million were spent on development aid for technical instruction and advisory assistance)	\$471.2	\$800 (ICA est) (CIA estimates that the USSR expends perhaps \$2 billion total propaganda activity)	379.6 (Includes USIA, State (CU), RFE, and RL only)
Percent of budget	0.18%	0.7%	0.21%	0.6%	0.3%	0.1%
PERSONNEL						
Cultural attaches	80 (Plus 38 Regional Directors of cultural posts, all British Council officers. One head of post (USSR) is an FCO officer. In a few countries the British Council office is part of the embassy--e.g. United States, Turkey, Hungary.)	131 (60 attaches and 71 counselors)	197 (91 full-time; 106 part-time. Information and cultural affairs officers generally hold joint appointment. At the 106 missions having no full-time info/cultural officer at least one officer has this function as a collateral duty)	46 (1976) (In 1976, 46 officers served as full-time cultural attaches and 30 as press and cultural attaches)	N.A. 1/	271 (85 Cultural Affairs Officers and Branch CAO's, 186 Public Affairs Officers and Branch PAO's)
Press Attaches and Information Officers	N.A.	134 (1976) (96 career personnel and 38 under contract)	197 (See above explanation)	80 (1976) (50 officers served as full-time press attaches and 30 served as press and cultural attaches)	N.A.	75 (Information Officers (IO), Branch IO's, Press and Publications Officers)
----- 1/ Not available.						

Center Directors	118 (Includes administrative personnel)	176	70 (51 persons at 28 centers under jurisdiction of Foreign Ministry, 19 at seven Japan Foundation offices and its two centers)	195 (Includes administrative personnel)	N.A.	41 (Includes BNC directors)
Teachers	603	24,052 (1976--7,700 with MOC in 1975-76; 16,352 with MFA, including <u>Alliance Francaise</u> teachers)	29	2,600 (Includes librarians and clerical personnel. Goethe Institute teachers totaled 1,400 (700 full-time and 700 part-time) and 371 lecturers)	800 (1971) (Teachers and other specialists mainly stationed in Third World countries)	3 (English teaching officers)
Vocational Instructors and Advisors	7,000	6,435	526(1973-74)	c. 2,800	N.A.	Not applicable
<u>INFORMATION PROGRAMS</u>						
RADIO BROADCASTING Program hours per week	706	403 (Total Broadcasting by MFA and MOC)	261	795 (217 by Deutschlandfunk and 578 by Deutsche Welle)	1,999 (1977)	1,806 (VOA, RFE/FL)
Languages	38 (17 are in continental European languages, 21 in other languages)	6 (Arabic, English, French, German, Portuguese, Spanish)	21 (Principally English, Japanese, and Mandarin)	37 (32 by DW, 13 by DLF, not mutually exclusive)	84 (1976)	58 (36 by VOA, 22 by RFF/RL, not mutually exclusive)
Transmitters	76	23 (1976)	12	27 (DW only)	130 (1975 est)	156 (VOA, RFE/RL)
TELEVISION (Hours placed weekly) (Produced annually)	N.A. c.7,000 hours (distributed commercially to 90 countries)	155 (1976)	N.A. 45 programs	N.A.	N.A. (Some placements, primarily in West Europe; some in Near East and Latin America)	N.A. (26 documentaries, 44 mini-documentaries, 55 shows via satellite, and 14 VTR's (closed circuit))
PUBLICATIONS Donated books	235,000	1,242,000(1976) (In addition, the <u>Alliance Francaise</u> distributed 72,000 books in 1976)	23,720 (Donated by the Japan Foundation)	480,000 (1974)	(USSR in 1975 published 80 million copies of books and pamphlets in 46 languages supplemented by about 100 million printed abroad)	212,046

	BRITAIN	FRANCE	JAPAN	WEST GERMANY	USSR	USA
YEAR OF DATA	1976/77	1977	1976/77	1977	-	FY1977
GNP (Billions) 1976	\$234	\$356	\$574	\$462	\$718	\$1,695
Periodicals	2,602 (Titles distributed overseas)	10 (MFA published 3 titles in 4 languages for distribution abroad, MOC published 7)	7 (Three periodicals appear regularly and the remainder at irregular intervals. Biweekly <u>Information Bulletin</u> --29 languages, circulation of 1,450,000)	20 (1974)	17 (1975) (Published in 88 language editions. Circulation about 2 million. USSR also publishes newspapers in 9 foreign languages with external circulation of about 800,000.)	14 (In 16 languages)
<u>FILMS</u>						
Documentaries	80-100 (Government sponsored production and distribution through the British Council)	130 (1976)	7 (1975/76) (Produced by the Foreign Ministry)	51	450 (1973)	40
Features	136	64 (1976) (24 distributed by MFA and 40 by MOC)	28 (Produced by the Japan Foundation, which also produced 33 short cultural films)	9	130-140 (1977) (Produced for both domestic and foreign audiences)	None
Prints	7,399	10,264 (1976)	54 (1975)	11,300 (1973)	N.A.	12,775
<u>CULTURAL PROGRAMS</u>						
Cultural and information centers	116 (UK also operates 170 libraries in a few of which the British Council has a joint responsibility with the British Information Service)	176 (147 are MFA associated and 29 are MOC associated. In addition there were 146 centers of the <u>Alliance Francaise</u> attended by 240,000 students)	30 (28 Centers are under the jurisdiction of the Foreign Ministry. Two Centers are operated by the Japan Foundation)	112 (109 are Goethe Institutes operating in 58 countries; 3 are Federal Institutes)	72 (1975) (Some sponsored by local friendship societies but heavily subsidized by USSR)	166 (129 centers and 37 BNC's)
Schools abroad	N.A.	126 (66 under MFA, 60 under MOC)		305		

Exchanges						
Grantees from abroad	29,861	16,109 (1976)	2,899	4,915(1974)	24,000 (1977)	29,312
Grantees going abroad	19,914 (1975/76) (Includes exchanges of students and youth, community leaders, specialists, and professionals)	2,377 (1976) (Includes 11,388 grantees from abroad sponsored by MFA; 3,221 sponsored by MOC and 1,500 sponsored by other ministries. Grantees from France sponsored by MFA were 684, including 268 to the U.S. and 1,693 sponsored by other foreign governments)	7,818 (Includes teachers, students, journalists, scientists, community leaders and others)	3,688 (1974) (In 1976, the Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) alone sponsored 8,819 foreign scholars and scientists)	N.A. (Includes athletes, scientists, students, primarily from Third World countries)	8,512 (Includes official government exchanges of Peace Corps, AID, DOD, HFW, State (CU) and NSF. It does not include private exchanges)
Exhibits	19	125(1976)	25	1,500 (1975)	300 (1975)	50
Artistic performances	117	1,433 (1976) (561 theater performances, 725 concerts, and 147 dance performances)	130 (Performances involved 15 groups and 579 individuals and included cultural festivals, concerts & stage performances.)	212 (1975) (The 212 ensembles gave 1,095 performances)	300-400 (1971) (In music and drama)	29 (Number of performing arts groups funded)

(467300)