Why Some Weapon Systems Encounter Production Problems While Others Do Not: Six Case Studies

NSIAD-85-34 May 24, 1985
Full Report (PDF, 108 pages)  

Summary

GAO identified the causes of early production problems six weapons systems experienced and how such problems might be avoided in future acquisitions. The programs reviewed were the: (1) Copperhead projectile; (2) Black Hawk Helicopter; (3) High Speed Anti-Radiation Missile (HARM); (4) Tomahawk cruise missile; (5) F-16 fighter; and (6) Air-Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM).

The Department of Defense's (DOD) policy regarding production management states that: (1) production engineering and production planning should be done throughout full-scale development; (2) voids in production technologies should be identified and addressed; and (3) contractors should demonstrate the capability to produce within cost and schedule. GAO found that production preparations for the Copperhead, Black Hawk, Tomahawk, and HARM programs were sporadic and underfunded which resulted in increased costs, delayed deliveries, and slower attainment of higher, more efficient production rates. GAO noted several conditions under which the development phase strongly influenced production, including whether: (1) pressures to achieve technical performance requirements dominated the development phase; (2) sufficient program management attention and staff resources were devoted to production concerns; and (3) funding and quantity stability permitted early consideration of production matters during the development phases. In the six weapons reviewed, the degree to which technical performance concerns could be balanced with production concerns was directly affected by the: (1) technical requirements of the weapons; (2) structure of competition between contractors during development; and (3) weight given to production concerns in subsequent program decisions. GAO found that production readiness reviews can be used as tools for managing production preparations and facilitating reduced production risks.