This is the accessible text file for GAO report number GAO-02-1018R 
entitled 'Federal Reserve Banks: Areas for Improvement in Computer 
Controls' which was released on August 29, 2002. 

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United States General Accounting Office: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

August 29, 2002: 

Louise L. Roseman, Director: 
Division of Reserve Bank Operations and Payment Systems: 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System: 

Subject: Federal Reserve Banks: Areas for Improvement in Computer 
Controls: 

Dear Ms. Roseman: 

In connection with fulfilling our requirement to audit the U.S. 
government’s fiscal year 2001 financial statements, we reviewed the 
general and application computer controls over key financial systems 
maintained and operated by the Federal Reserve Banks (FRB) on behalf of 
the Department of the Treasury’s Bureau of the Public Debt (BPD). 
[Footnote 1] This report for public release summarizes the results of 
our fiscal year 2001 work, including our follow-up on previous years’ 
recommendations. 

The 12 FRBs perform fiscal agent services on behalf of the U.S. 
government, including BPD. The debt-related services primarily consist 
of issuing, servicing, and redeeming Treasury securities and processing 
secondary market securities transfers. Five FRB data centers maintain 
and operate key BPD financial applications relevant to the Schedule of 
Federal Debt. 

We used a risk-based and rotation approach for testing general and 
application controls. Under that methodology, every 3 years each 
significant data center and each key application is subjected to a full-
scope review, which includes testing in all the computer control areas 
defined in the Federal Information System Controls Audit Manual 
(FISCAM). [Footnote 2] In the interim years, we focus our testing on 
selected control areas defined in FISCAM. We performed our work at the 
FRBs from September 2001 through January 2002. Our work was performed 
in accordance with U.S. generally accepted government auditing 
standards. We requested comments on a draft of this report from the 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. The comments are 
discussed later in this report and are reprinted in the enclosure. 

As noted above, our review addressed both general and application 
controls. An effective general control environment (1) protects data, 
files, and programs from unauthorized access, modification, and 
destruction, (2) limits and monitors access to programs and files that 
control computer hardware and secure applications; (3) prevents the 
introduction of unauthorized changes to systems and applications 
software, (4) prevents any one individual from controlling key aspects 
of computer-related operations, and (5) ensures the recovery of 
computer processing operations in case of disaster or other unexpected 
interruption. An effective application control environment helps ensure 
that transactions performed by individual computer programs are valid, 
properly authorized, and completely and accurately processed and 
reported. 

As we reported in connection with our audit of the Schedules of Federal 
Debt for the fiscal years ended September 30, 2001 and 2000, [Footnote 
3] BPD maintained, in all material respects, effective internal control 
relevant to the Schedule of Federal Debt related to financial reporting 
and compliance with applicable laws and regulations as of September 30, 
2001. BPD’s internal control, which includes the general and 
application controls implemented by the FRBs over key BPD systems 
relevant to the Schedule of Federal Debt, provided reasonable assurance 
that misstatements, losses, or noncompliance material in relation to 
the Schedule of Federal Debt for the fiscal year ended September 30, 
2001, would be prevented or detected on a timely basis. 

Our follow-up on the status of the FRBs’ corrective actions to address 
vulnerabilities identified in our audit for fiscal year 2000 found that 
the FRBs had corrected or mitigated the risks associated with 25 of the 
29 general and application control vulnerabilities discussed in our 
prior report [Footnote 4] and are in the process of addressing the 
remaining 4. 

In a separately issued Limited Official Use Only report, we 
communicated detailed information regarding our findings to FRB 
managers and made 9 recommendations to improve certain computer 
controls in the areas of access, system software, and service 
continuity. None of our findings pose significant risks to BPD financial
systems. Nevertheless, they warrant FRB managers’ action to further 
decrease the risk of inappropriate disclosure and modification of 
sensitive data and programs, misuse of or damage to computer resources, 
and disruption of critical operations. 

In commenting on a draft of this report, the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System stated that overall it found the review helpful 
and that the information in the report will assist the Federal Reserve 
System in its ongoing efforts to enhance the integrity of its automated 
systems and information security practices. The board agreed with our 
assessment that FRBs have implemented effective computer controls and 
that while the vulnerabilities identified do not pose significant risks 
to Treasury’s financial systems, they warrant FRB management’s 
attention. The board stated that it has corrected or will correct all 
the vulnerabilities we identified. 

We will follow up on these matters during our audit of the federal 
government’s 2002 financial statements. 

We are sending copies of this report to the Chairman and Ranking 
Minority Member of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs; 
Subcommittee on Treasury and General Government, Senate Committee on 
Appropriations; House Committee on Government Reform; and Subcommittee 
on Treasury, Postal Service, and General Government, House Committee on 
Appropriations. We are also sending copies of this report to the 
Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and 
the Director of the Office of Management and Budget. Copies will also 
be made available to others upon request. In addition, the report will 
be available at no charge on GAO’s Web site at [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you have any questions regarding this report, please contact Paula 
M. Rascona, Assistant Director, at (202) 512-9816. Other key 
contributors to this assignment were Louise DiBenedetto, David B. 
Hayes, Greg Wilshusen, and Mickie Gray. 

Sincerely yours, 

Signed by: 

Gary T. Engel: 
Director: 
Financial Management and Assurance: 

[End of correspondence] 

Enclosure: 

Comments from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System: 

Board Of Governors Of The Federal Reserve System: 
Louise L. Roseman: 
Director, Division Of Reserve Bank Operations And Payment Systems: 
Washington, D.C. 20551: 

July 18, 2002: 

Mr. Gary T. Engel: 
Director: 
Financial Management and Assurance: 
United States General Accounting Office: 
441 G Street, N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20548: 

Dear Mr. Engel: 

We appreciate the opportunity to comment on the General Accounting 
Office's draft report assessing the Federal Reserve Banks' information 
security associated with the applications that support their role as 
fiscal agents of the United States. The GAO's review was performed as 
part of the audit of the U.S. government's fiscal year 2001 financial 
statements. 

Overall, we found the review and report helpful. The report provides 
information that will assist the Federal Reserve System in its ongoing 
efforts to enhance the integrity of its automated systems and 
information security practices. The Federal Reserve shares lessons 
learned from this review and its internal reviews with appropriate 
Federal Reserve staff to improve controls, processes and internal audit 
procedures more broadly within the System. 

We agree with GAO's assessment that the Federal Reserve has implemented 
effective controls over these applications. We also agree with the 
GAO's assessment that while the vulnerabilities identified in the 
report do not pose significant risks to the Treasury's financial 
systems, they still warrant management's attention. Of the nine 
vulnerabilities in the report that require attention, we have corrected 
or will correct all of them. Federal Reserve Board staff will monitor 
the status of uncorrected items. Internal auditors at the Reserve Banks 
will confirm all corrective measures taken. 

Sincerely, 

Signed by: 

Louise L. Roseman: 

[End of enclosure] 

Footnotes: 

[1] 31 U.S.C. 331(e) (2000). 

[2] U.S. General Accounting Office, Federal Information System Controls 
Audit Manual, Volume I: Financial Statement Audits, GAO/AIMD-12.19.6 
(Washington, D.C.: Jan. 1999). 

[3] U.S. General Accounting Office, Financial Audit: Bureau of the 
Public Debt’s Fiscal Years 2001 and 2000 Schedules of Federal Debt, GAO-
02-354 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 15, 2002). 

[4] U.S. General Accounting Office, Federal Reserve Banks: Areas for 
Improvement in Computer Controls, GAO-02-266R (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 
2001). 

[End of section] 

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