Summary

In response to changing global threats, substantial cuts in defense spending, and base closures and realignments, the Air Force has been restructuring in several ways. One initiative is the creation of composite wings, which place all aircraft at an installation under the base commander. Most composite wings are created by reorganizing existing base operations and command responsibilities, but the Air Force is also building three composite wings from the ground up by assembling a mix of aircraft to respond to contingencies. These wings are known as "force projection composite wings." The Air Force did not do enough analyses, however, before deciding to build these force projection composite wings. A nondeployed wing of this kind has never operated in peacetime and available evidence does not support such an arrangement. In addition, the Air Force has neither developed clear criteria for evaluating the concept nor determined all the costs associated with the wings. Force projection composite wings will have significant limitations as they must be augmented by aircraft from other bases in order to perform their missions. Limited opportunities exist for these new wings to train as large-scale composite forces. Further, the Air Force has done no analysis of alternative bases before determining the locations for the air/land wings, and the Army was not consulted before the sites were chosen. Putting wings at these sites may undermine combat capabilities and readiness.

GAO found that: (1) the Air Force did not conduct sufficient analyses before deciding to build force projection composite wings at three Air Force bases (AFB) in the United States; (2) the advantages attributed to force projection composite wings can be achieved without permanent collection of aircraft at AFB; (3) the Air Force has relied on analogies as justification for force projection composite wings, but the analogies do not support establishing the wings as permanent peacetime organizations; (4) the Air Force has not established clear criteria for the concept of force projection composite wings or for judging the validity of the concept; (5) the estimated construction cost for the wings is approximately $200 million; (6) force projection composite wings will have significant limitations, since they must be augmented by aircraft from other bases in order to perform peacetime and wartime tasks; (7) training facilities at Mountain Home and Pope AFB are too small to support force-level training; and (8) the Air Force might have avoided some implementation difficulties if it had evaluated alternative bases before determining the locations for the wings.