<DOC>
[110th Congress House Hearings]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office via GPO Access]
[DOCID: f:40482.wais]
WORKER RIGHTS
=======================================================================
REPRINTED
from the
2007 ANNUAL REPORT
of the
CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA
ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
OCTOBER 10, 2007
__________
Printed for the use of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.cecc.gov
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
40-482 WASHINGTON : 2008
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CONGRESSIONAL-EXECUTIVE COMMISSION ON CHINA
LEGISLATIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS
House Senate
SANDER LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman BYRON DORGAN, North Dakota, Co-Chairman
MARCY KAPTUR, Ohio MAX BAUCUS, Montana
MICHAEL M. HONDA, California CARL LEVIN, Michigan
TOM UDALL, New Mexico DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California
TIMOTHY J. WALZ, Minnesota SHERROD BROWN, Ohio
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas
JOSEPH R. PITTS, Pennsylvania CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey MEL MARTINEZ, Florida
EXECUTIVE BRANCH COMMISSIONERS
PAULA DOBRIANSKY, Department of State
CHRISTOPHER R. HILL, Department of State
HOWARD M. RADZELY, Department of Labor
Douglas Grob, Staff Director
Murray Scot Tanner, Deputy Staff Director
(ii)
Worker Rights
INTRODUCTION
The Chinese government does not fully respect
internationally recognized worker rights. Chinese citizens are
not guaranteed either in law or in practice full worker rights
in accordance with international standards. In the five-year
period the Commission has reported on worker rights in China,
the government has made progress in enacting more legal
protections for workers, but has continued to deny workers the
fundamental right to organize into independent unions and
strike to achieve meaningful change. In addition to these
restrictions, factors such as poor implementation of labor
protections on the books and collusion between local officials
and employers create obstacles for workers who attempt to
protect their rights. Although market liberalizations have
brought Chinese citizens more freedom to choose their
employment, along with prosperity and better jobs for some
workers, social and economic changes also have engendered
abuses from forced labor and child labor to flagrant violations
of health and safety standards, wage arrearages, and loss of
job benefits. Residency restrictions present hardships for
workers who migrate for jobs in urban areas. In addition, tight
controls over civil society organizations hinder the ability of
citizen groups to champion for worker rights.
In the last five years, local and central governments have
enacted a series of rules, regulations, and laws on labor, but
have not created the administrative structure to ensure
adequate enforcement. A new Labor Contract Law, passed in June
2007 and to take effect in January 2008, attempts to codify a
series of protections for worker rights but does not include
adequate provisions to guarantee equal bargaining power between
workers and employers, and entrenches the role of China's only
legal union, the Communist Party-controlled All-China
Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) in contract negotiations.\1\
The law's imprecision leaves interpretation and clarification
to the discretion of implementing officials, further limiting
the impact of potentially beneficial provisions within the law.
As the number of labor disputes rise,\2\ the government may aim
for the law to remedy this source of perceived social unrest,
but systemic weaknesses in implementing the law challenge the
law's capacity to protect workers and reduce conflict.
In 2006-2007, several high profile incidents underscored
the inhumane conditions and weak protections under which many
Chinese work. The discovery in 2007 that a massive network of
small-scale brick kilns in Shanxi and Hunan provinces were
employing forced labor evidenced China's weakness in
effectively enforcing even its own labor and workplace safety
laws. The discovery and admission that child labor was being
used in the manufacturing of Olympic souvenirs further
illustrated the state's failure to enforce worker rights.
China's labor practices contravene its obligations as a
member of the International Labor Organization (ILO) to respect
a basic set of internationally recognized labor rights for
workers, including freedom of association and the ``effective
recognition'' of the right to collective bargaining.\3\ China
is also a permanent member of the ILO's governing body.\4\ The
ILO's Declaration on the Fundamental Principles and Rights at
Work (1998 Declaration) commits ILO members ``to respect, to
promote and to realize'' these fundamental rights based on
``the very fact of [ILO] membership.'' \5\ The ILO's eight core
conventions articulate the scope of worker rights and
principles enumerated in the 1998 Declaration. Each member is
committed to respect the fundamental right or principle
addressed in each core convention, even if that member state
has not ratified the convention. China has ratified four of the
eight ILO core conventions, including two core conventions on
the abolition of child labor (No. 138 and No. 182) and two on
non-discrimination in employment and occupation (No. 100 and
No. 111).\6\ The ILO has reported that the Chinese government
is preparing to ratify the two core conventions on forced labor
(No. 29 and No. 105).\7\ Chinese labor law generally
incorporates the basic obligations of the ILO's eight core
conventions, with the exception of the provisions relating to
the freedom of association and the right to collective
bargaining,\8\ but many of these obligations remain unrealized
in practice.
The Chinese government is a state party to the
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR), which guarantees the right of workers to strike, the
right of workers to organize independent unions, the right of
trade unions to function freely, the right of trade unions to
establish national federations or confederations, and the right
of the latter to form or join international trade union
organizations.\9\ In ratifying the ICESCR, the Chinese
government made a reservation to Article 8(1)(a), which
guarantees workers the right to form free trade unions. The
government asserts that application of the article should be
consistent with Chinese law, which does not allow for the
creation of independent trade unions.\10\ The Chinese
government is a signatory to the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, which guarantees the right to
freedom of association, ``including the right to form and join
trade unions[.]'' \11\
Workers in China have no choice as to their representation
in the workplace. The ACFTU is China's only official trade
union and is required by the Trade Union Law to ``uphold the
leadership of the Communist Party.'' \12\ While the ACFTU has
made progress in unionizing more workplaces in China, and has
promoted pro-worker programs where they do not conflict with
Party policy, the basic structure of the union system in China
is at odds with meaningful representation of workers' rights
and interests. Surveys of local ACFTU branches have indicated
that a majority of union leaders hold concurrent positions
within Party committees, government, or enterprise. Union
leaders have represented enterprises, rather than workers, in
labor dispute arbitration.\13\
Workers who try to establish independent associations or
organize demonstrations risk arrest and imprisonment.
Independent labor organizers continue to serve long jail terms.
For example, He Chaohui, a former railway worker at the
Chenzhou Railway
Bureau and vice-chairperson of the Hunan Workers Autonomous
Federation during the May 1989 pro-democracy movement, has
faced multiple detentions, including a current nine-year
sentence, since taking part in labor strikes and
demonstrations, and giving information on the protests to
overseas human rights groups.
Another long-term prisoner, Hu Shigen (Hu Shenglun), received a
20-year sentence in 1994 for ``organizing and leading a
counterrevolutionary group'' and ``engaging in
counterrevolutionary propaganda and incitement'' after helping
to establish the China Freedom and Democracy Party and the
China Free Trade Union Preparatory Committee.\14\
LABOR CONTRACT LAW
Overview
The Standing Committee of the National People's Congress
(NPC) passed a new Labor Contract Law in June 2007, after
considering multiple draft versions and soliciting public
comments on the law.\15\ In addition to seeking public
comments, the Ministry of Labor and Social Security also sought
technical assistance from U.S. experts in drafting the law. In
2005 and 2006, a U.S. Department of Labor-funded technical
cooperation project sponsored a series of workshops and a study
tour for Chinese officials who requested to be briefed on U.S.
best practices in employment relationships, termination of
contracts, part-time employment, regulation of labor
recruitment, U.S. Wage and Hour regulations, the means of
protecting worker rights, the means of enhancing compliance,
and training for investigation.\16\
The new law, effective January 2008, governs the
contractual relationship between workers and employers from
enterprises, individual economic organizations, and private
non-enterprise units.\17\ The law expands requirements in
China's 1994 Labor Law that mandate the signing of labor
contracts.\18\ It requires workers and employers to establish a
written contract in order to begin a labor relation\19\ and
creates the presumption of an open-ended contract if the
parties have not concluded a written contract within one year
from the start of employment.\20\ The law also includes
provisions that allow certain workers with existing fixed-term
contracts to transition to open-ended employment.\21\ The law
mandates that contracts specify matters including working
hours, compensation, social insurance, and protections against
occupational hazards. In addition, the employer and worker may
add contractual provisions for probationary periods, training,
supplementary benefits, and insurance.\22\ The basic provisions
on establishing contracts accompany a series of other
stipulations within the law that attempt to regularize the
status of workers employed through staffing agencies;
strengthen protections in the event of job dismissals; and
establish a framework for penalizing non-compliance with the
law.\23\
Despite strengthening formal legal protections for workers,
the ultimate extent of the law's effectiveness, especially
without an independent union system to monitor enforcement,
remains untested until the law takes effect. China's track
record for implementing existing labor protections is poor at
best. One government official has described weak implementation
as the root cause of China's labor problems.\24\ A series of
surveys on the enforcement of existing requirements to sign
labor contracts found that many enterprises fail to use
contracts, and that workers lacked knowledge of their right to
sign a contract.\25\ Even if the Labor Contract Law promotes
the creation of more formal contracts, however, the benefits of
such a development may have limited impact without adequate
measures to ensure that employers adhere to the terms of the
contracts.\26\
Ambiguities in the law amplify the challenges of
implementation. While the law does not explicitly require
employers and employees to enter into new contracts on January
1, 2008, neither does it say whether it will apply to existing
employment contracts that do not comply with the new law.\27\
The law requires workplaces that receive workers through
staffing agencies to provide ``benefits suited for the job''
but does not elaborate on this provision.\28\ The law allows
employers to cover their costs for employees' ``professional
technical training'' by requiring employees first to agree to a
set service period in exchange, but it provides no definition
of ``professional technical training'' or a method of valuing
service.\29\ Finally, the law does not specify whether it will
apply to employees (whether local or expatriate) of foreign
company representative offices. Because the law leaves many
details to be fleshed out through the issuance of supplemental
regulations and interpretations during implementation, its full
impact will remain unclear for some time. In the interim, media
reports indicate that some employers are dismissing workers now
in order to avoid increased safeguards against terminations
once the law enters into force.\30\
Non-Standard Workers
The new law attempts to address a gap in legal protection
for workers employed through staffing agencies, who have
labored without explicit legal guidelines governing various
aspects of their relationships with both staffing agencies and
worksites that hire through the agencies. The Labor Contract
Law provides that staffing firms fulfill the same function as
other employers under the law by signing contracts with workers
that detail the terms of employment. Compliance with the law
requires staffing firms to agree to fixed-term contracts of at
least two years and to pay each worker on a monthly basis
including for periods where the worker has not been dispatched
to an outside employer.\31\ Compliance also requires workplaces
that receive workers through staffing agencies to provide the
same wages as directly hired employees.\32\ The law also
stipulates that these workplaces provide overtime, benefits,
and incremental wage increases, though the law lacks details on
these requirements.\33\ In addition, workers may join a union
affiliated with either the staffing firm or the workplace to
which they are dispatched.\34\ Finally, the law mandates that
neither staffing firms nor workplaces that receive workers may
levy placement fees from workers, nor can the staffing firm
keep part of the worker's wages.\35\ The provisions expand on
more limited stipulations for staffing firms specified in the
law's draft form.\36\
The Labor Contract Law attempts to extend a modest new
protection for part-time employees by mandating that these
workers (defined as those who work no more than 4 hours a day
or 24 hours a week) not receive less than the local minimum
hourly wage.\37\ Under the 1994 Labor Law, part-time employees
had no such protection, and in 2007, news sources in China reported that
fast food restaurants in Guangzhou paid part-timers 40 percent
less than the minimum wage.\38\ In addition, the law mandates
that part-time employees be paid no later than every 15
days.\39\ However, the Labor Contract Law does not require
employers to sign written contracts with part-time workers, and
allows employers to terminate part-time workers without notice
or termination compensation.\40\ The law's prospects for
improving conditions for non-standard workers, therefore, are
diminished not only by problems with implementation, but also
by certain weaknesses in the law itself.
Terminations
The Labor Contract Law stipulates a series of guidelines
governing workforce reductions. Where employers reduce their
workforce by 20 or more employees--a reduction from the 50 or
more workers earlier specified in the drafting process\41\--or
if they terminate employment for fewer than 20 workers but by
an amount that comprises 10 percent or more of the workforce,
the union or all employees must receive 30 days' advance
notice. In addition, in order to comply with the law, the
employer must explain the staff reduction and ``listen to the
opinions of the trade union or the employees.'' \42\ Such
provisions reinforce the tendency that runs throughout the new
law requiring notification to workers and the union, rather
than negotiations, over major issues such as mass layoffs. In
the event of layoffs, the law stipulates giving priority to
retaining workers with open-ended contracts or long periods of
employment under fixed-term contracts, as well as workers who
are the sole wage earner in the family and must support
children or elderly family members.\43\ The law also forbids
laying off several categories of workers, including workers
near retirement, pregnant and postpartum workers, and workers
who have sustained on-the-job injuries or occupational
diseases, or are in the process of having such a disease
diagnosed.\44\ Where employers end a contract unilaterally,
they must notify the union and allow the union to intervene
where the termination violates the law or contractual
terms.\45\
The law also specifies conditions under which employers
must give severance pay to employees. Severance provisions
apply to categories of workers including those laid off and
workers who terminate their contracts because of illegal
practices on the part of the employer.\46\ The law specifies a
formula for determining severance based on one month of wages
for each year worked; workers employed for fewer than six
months receive half of the monthly wage.\47\ It also specifies
severance pay caps for high-wage workers.\48\
Enforcement Mechanisms and Legal Liability
The Labor Contract Law includes a series of provisions to
monitor enforcement of the law and penalize non-compliance. It
assigns local labor officials at the county level and above
with responsibility for overseeing implementation, including
the enforcement of specific contractual terms.\49\ The law also
empowers authorities from other offices, such as construction
and health officials, to monitor aspects of the law within the
scope of their jurisdiction.\50\ A report from the State
Council Research Office issued in 2006 noted, however, a
``serious shortage'' of supervisors to enforce implementation
of labor laws, drawing into question the effectiveness of
provisions in the Labor Contract Law.\51\
Workers who allege an infringement of their rights may
appeal to government authorities to address the matter, apply
for arbitration, or initiate a lawsuit.\52\ A section on legal
liability requires employers who fail to sign a contract after
one month of employing a worker to pay double wages.\53\ It
also articulates a series of other remedies for workers and
stipulates additional penalties for employers, staffing firms,
and labor officials who violate the law.\54\ One provision
holds workers responsible for damages where they cause loss to
an employer for ending a labor contract in violation of the law
or breaching confidentiality and competition agreements.\55\
Collective Bargaining
The Labor Contract Law includes six articles that specify
guidelines for negotiating ``collective contracts,'' \56\ but
it does not provide for collective bargaining. Collective
contracting provisions have appeared in Chinese law for many
years.\57\ The limited scope of the collective contracting
process in the new law, including the lack of independent union
participation, however, prevents it from translating into a
meaningful mechanism for collective bargaining. Some leading
Chinese experts argue that the meaning of the phrase
``collective agreements'' is rendered meaningless due to the
ACFTU's historic record of never having negotiated genuine
collective bargaining agreements.\58\ Many provisions in the
Labor Contract Law appear to be based on the presumption that
workers will negotiate individual contracts. The final draft of
the Labor Contract Law includes a provision that permits
workers representatives to negotiate collective contracts where
no ACFTU branch exists in the workplace, but such negotiations
are ``under the guidance of the ACFTU at the next higher
level.'' \59\ As three labor experts have noted, however, ``the
idea of [ACFTU officials] representing and protecting the
legitimate rights and interests of their members in opposition
to those of the employer is something unfamiliar, if not
totally alien.'' \60\ To date, the terms of collective
contracts have been limited. One study of collective contracts
observed that a typical contract lacks ``detailed specification
of the terms and conditions of labour, and often does not
include reference to many of the benefits that are in fact
provided by the enterprise.'' \61\ In addition, workers' input
in the process is limited, and employers have concluded
collective contracts through model agreements rather than
through a process of negotiation with employees.\62\ At the
same time, use of the mechanism is widespread. According to the
ACFTU, as of September 2006, 862,000 collective contracts
covering 110 million workers had been signed, representing a
14.3 percent
increase since 2005 in the number of contracts signed and an
8.3 percent increase in number of workers covered.\63\
Labor Disputes
The Labor Contract Law includes default provisions designed
to function in the event of dispute over contractual terms.
Workers and employers may renegotiate a contract in the event
specific terms are not clearly specified in a contract, and
where negotiations fail, the terms of the collective contract
or ``pertinent regulations of the state'' apply.\64\ The law
also provides for the role of a labor arbitration board or
people's court in the event the validity of a contract is
disputed.\65\ In addition, the labor union may apply for
arbitration or initiate a lawsuit in the event of dispute over
a collective contract.\66\ Individual workers may do the same
where their rights have been violated, and the law mandates
that the labor union supply ``support and help'' in such
cases.\67\ The union's divided loyalties in practice, however,
call into questions the efficacy of these provisions. In
addition, the high cost of arbitration fees has the practical
effect of discouraging workers from pursuing this avenue of
dispute resolution.\68\ Moreover, the law does not specify
whether workers must first enter mediation before pursuing
arbitration or legal suits, the first stage of labor dispute
resolution listed in the 1994 Labor Law.\69\ Unlike the 1994
Labor Law, it does not specify that workers must first exhaust
arbitration options
before pursuing a legal suit.\70\
In addition, broader legislative developments may
ultimately deny workers a full range of options for resolving
labor disputes. A new draft Law on Labor Dispute Mediation and
Arbitration placed before the NPC Standing Committee on August
26, 2007, if passed, would limit the role of courts in labor
dispute resolution. According to a vice-chair of the
Legislative Affairs Commission of the NPC Standing Committee,
as cited in a Xinhua article, ``The draft bill is for
strengthening mediation and improving arbitration so as to help
fairly solve labor disputes without going to court and thus
safeguard employee's legitimate rights and promote social
harmony'' [emphasis added].\71\ The draft allows companies to
establish labor mediation committees in-house ``so as to solve
disputes at [the] grassroots level,'' according to the Xinhua
article, and specifies that the mediation committees may
consist only of management and employees.\72\ Taken as a whole,
China's emerging national labor law regime, billed as both
strengthening worker rights and grassroots dispute resolution,
appears equally intended to make sure that disputes do not
enter legal channels that lead to the central government.
Whether this represents deliberate local empowerment as part of
a measured long-term strategy to induce grassroots legal
development, a strategy of crisis localization and insulation
for the center, or some combination, remains an open question.
Criticism and Support for the Labor Contract Law
Observers have been divided in their evaluations of the
Labor Contract Law. While noting limitations for enforcing
workers rights in practice, some worker rights organizations
have expressed support for the law's role in strengthening
protections for workers. For example, the China Labour
Bulletin, directed by Hong Kong labor activist Han Dongfang,
describes the new law as ``a laudable attempt to protect the
rights of individual workers'' in its weekly publication but
contends that workers need freedom to join unions, not just the
ACFTU, and to freely elect their own representatives who would
have the power to negotiate with management for collective
bargaining agreements. It also expressed concerns about
protections in earlier drafts omitted from the final
version.\73\
Businesses and business associations have had mixed
reactions to the new law. Some multi-national companies raised
objections to the law during the drafting process because of
provisions perceived as impediments to employers, and analysts
have drawn attention to new requirements and extra costs the
law may impose on foreign firms.\74\
U.S. and European multi-national companies and their
representative associations commented upon or urged revisions
to the law after publication of a draft version in spring 2006
and continuing through the next year.\75\ The American Chamber
of Commerce in the People's Republic of China ``called several
meetings of its members and formed a team to carefully study
and discuss the draft'' and prepared a set of comments as part
of the NPC's formal public process of soliciting opinions.\76\
Some foreign corporations and their associations endorsed
revisions that would weaken some of the formal protections
written into draft versions of the law, according to business
association, media, and other sources.\77\ Among the aspects of
the drafts that concerned these companies were clauses on
hiring and termination procedures, layoffs, employee
probationary periods, the status of temporary workers, the
power of the official trade union, severance pay provisions,
and employee training repayment.\78\ The U.S.-China Business
Council contended that limitations on the use of temporary
employees would prove ``prohibitively expensive'' for
businesses. \79\ NGO sources report that some business
organizations threatened to withdraw manufacturing from
China.\80\
In its comments on the draft law publicized in March 2006,
the American Chamber of Commerce in the People's Republic of
China cautioned against ``impos[ing] additional and unrealistic
obligations on employers'' against the backdrop of poor
implementation of existing labor laws, stating that the law
instead ``should leave enough latitude for local governments to
make rules according to local needs.'' \81\ The European
Chamber of Commerce expressed support for the final version of
the law, after initial criticism, and urged the Chinese
government to focus on adequate implementation of the law.\82\
In answer to earlier complaints by foreign investors that
the new law would have a detrimental effect on foreign
investment, the director of the law department of the ACFTU
stated that the Labor Contract Law ``not only protects workers'
interests and rights, but also equally protects employers.''
\83\ According to one Chinese government official, ``If there
were some bias, it would be in favor of foreign investors
because local governments have great tolerance for them in
order to attract and retain investment.'' \84\
OTHER LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENTS
In August 2007, the Standing Committee of the National
People's Congress adopted an Employment Promotion Law,
effective January 1, 2008, that stipulates measures relating to
the promotion of employment growth and equal access to
employment.\85\ In addition to containing provisions aimed at
prohibiting discrimination based on factors including
ethnicity, race, sex, and religious belief,\86\ the law
addresses the equal right to work for women and ethnic
minorities;\87\ specifies disabled people's right to work;\88\
stipulates that rural workers' access to work should ``be equal
to'' urban workers;\89\ and forbids employers from refusing to
hire carriers of infectious diseases.\90\ The law also allows
workers to initiate lawsuits in the event of
discrimination.\91\ A survey publicized in June 2007 found
widespread discrimination among job-seekers, especially
physically disabled people, HIV/AIDS and hepatitis B carriers,
and migrant workers. Women reported discrimination related to
their entitlement to maternity benefits.\92\ [See Section II--
Status of Women for more information.]
If properly implemented, the law may offer support for
legal advocates pursuing employment discrimination cases, but other
aspects of the law raise potential difficulties. One article
assigns the state to spur workers to develop a ``proper''
mentality in job selections.\93\ Another provision carves out a
role for Party-controlled
organizations like the Communist Youth League to aid in
implementation of the law, which may dampen the role of civil
society groups that promote implementation in ways that
challenge Party policy.\94\ Potentially beneficial safeguards
also face barriers due to a lack of clearly defined terms. A
provision to promote the employment of workers with
``employment hardship,'' for example, defines this category of
workers in general terms but leaves precise details to local
authorities, introducing the possibility of uneven protections
that reduce the law's overall impact.\95\ In addition, the law
specifies the establishment of an unemployment insurance
system, but provides no extensive details on
implementation.\96\
CONDITIONS FOR CHINESE WORKERS
Wages
The 1994 Labor Law guarantees minimum wages for workers,
and assigns local governments to set wage standards for each
region.\97\ The new Labor Contract Law improves formal
monitoring requirements to verify workers receive minimum
wages. Article 74 requires local labor bureaus to monitor labor
practices to ensure rates adhere to minimum wage standards.
Article 85 imposes legal liability on employers who pay rates
below minimum wage. In addition, Article 72 guarantees minimum
hourly wages for part-time workers.\98\
The government reported progress in 2006 in establishing
hourly minimum wage standards in most of its provinces.
According to a report from the Ministry of Labor and Social
Security (MOLSS) released in October 2006, 29 of China's 31
provincial-level areas had established hourly minimum wage
standards, compared to 23 provinces in 2005. In addition, the
report found that all 31 provincial-level areas maintained
monthly minimum wage standards. The
report shows greater local government compliance in 2006 than
in 2005 with requirements to review monthly minimum wage
standards every two years.\99\ Local government discretion to
set minimum wages has resulted in wide variances across
provinces.\100\ In 2006, the All-China Federation of Trade
Unions reportedly urged provincial-level governments to
increase minimum wages.\101\
Illegal labor practices have undermined minimum wage
guarantees. In an investigation of working conditions for
migrant workers in China, Amnesty International noted that
``wages of internal
migrant workers are effectively reduced by management through
inadequate pay for compulsory overtime, fines, unpaid wages,
and other methods.'' \102\ The investigation found that some
factories' fines for tardiness--calculated for each minute a
worker is late--could constitute a major reduction in a
worker's daily salary.\103\ (See the discussions on ``wage
arrearages'' and ``working hours,'' below, for additional
information.)
China's leaders have expressed concerns over the growing
income gap between rural and urban workers, and between earners
at the top of the income ladder and those at the bottom. In
July 2006, the government announced it would institute reforms
aimed at cutting the wealth gap to promote a ``harmonious''
society and ``improve the socialist market economy,'' with
focus on increasing the middle class and improving wages of
low-level government employees.\104\ Party officials and
commentators have not yet settled on a firm opinion of the
wealth gap problem. In November 2006, Ministry of Finance
official Wang Bao'an outlined a new wage plan aimed at limiting
the rate of wage increases at the high end of the scale;
standardizing income subsidies; stabilizing the wages of
middle-income earners; and raising the income of low-wage
earners.\105\ A commentary reprinted in the China Economic
Daily, however, argued that ``the existence of a high-income
group is inevitable in a market economy,'' and argued against
``robbing the rich to give to the poor.'' \106\ Government
official Qiu Xiaoping, of the Ministry of Labor and Social
Security, agreed that the government should not intervene in
setting wages in a socialist market economy where a ``salary is
the market price of labor.'' \107\
Wage Arrearages
Wage arrearages remains a serious problem, especially for
migrant workers. In June 2006, the Ministry of Communications,
which oversees China's transportation sector, issued a circular
ordering provincial-level departments to finish resolving
migrant workers' claims for unpaid wages from work on
transportation projects by the end of 2006. The Ministry
circular responds to a 2004 State Council decree to resolve all
migrant worker wage arrears that have resulted from unpaid debt
on government projects.\108\ Government efforts have helped
lower the amount of outstanding unpaid wages, but progress in
this area remains limited. Employers in the construction sector
still owe workers a reported 10 billion yuan (US$1.2
billion).\109\ An inspection in Gansu province found that
companies owed 130 million yuan (US$16.6 million) in back wages
to 130,000 migrant workers, mainly in the construction and
restaurant industries.\110\
Some local governments have issued legal guidance and taken
other steps to address wage arrearages. Trial legal measures
implemented in Qinghai province in 2006 require construction
companies to set aside and deposit wage funds before projects
begin, to ensure that workers will be paid when the project is
completed. The measures punish enterprises that fail to deposit
sufficient funds, that do not make their deposits in a timely
manner, or that provide false contract information, and allow
authorities to bar non-compliant firms from participating in
the construction market.\111\ In Guangdong province,
authorities had barred 30 enterprises for failing to pay
employee wages as of June 2006. Though the government had given
the companies previous warnings and implemented other punitive
measures, the companies failed to remedy an outstanding debt of
over 20 million yuan (US$2.5 million) to over 8,000
workers.\112\
Subcontracting practices within industry exacerbate the
problem of wage arrearages. When investors and developers
default on their payments to construction companies, workers at
the end of the chain of labor subcontractors lack the means to
recover wages from the original defaulters. Subcontractors,
including companies that operate illegally, neglect their own
duties to pay laborers and leave workers without any direct
avenue to demand their salaries. In some cases, subcontractors
will pay partial wages to force workers to stay on site to
finish construction projects.\113\
Wage arrearages have resulted in protests and
demonstrations by workers, and some Chinese employers have
responding by hiring thugs or gangsters to drive off the
protesters. In July 2007, a group of armed gangsters beat up
300 migrant workers who had gone on strike in Guangdong
province to collect four months of back pay. The subcontractor
construction company claimed that it could not pay the workers
because it had not been paid by the contractor.\114\
Workers who try to take legal measures to recover lost
wages face prohibitive expenses and limited possibilities of
recovering wages, even where adjudicators decide in their
favor.\115\ Despite these obstacles, there has been a steady
increase in the number of workers who turn to labor arbitration
to settle their disputes with employers.\116\ In addition to
wage arrearages, sources of disputes have included illegal and
improperly compensated overtime and failure to adhere to labor
contracts.\117\
Working Hours
China's labor law mandates a maximum 8-hour work day and
44-hour average work week, but compliance with these standards
is weak.\118\ One specialist in China's compliance practices
has estimated that work weeks above 80 hours are common in the
apparel industry and other export sectors.\119\ A study of
migrant workers in southern China found that workers were
subject to forced overtime to upwards of 16 hours a day. The
report noted that employers dodged paying overtime rates by
compensating workers on a piece-rate basis with quotas high
enough to avoid requirements to pay overtime wages. Workers who
failed to comply with overtime requirements or who were late
faced fines.\120\
Suppliers in China avoid exposing themselves to claims of
requiring illegal, long hours by hiring firms that help them
set up double booking systems designed to deceive foreign
importers who aim to adhere to Chinese rules and regulations. A
detailed account of the practice found that these firms not
only help suppliers set up fake books for audit, but also coach
managers and employees on answers to give the auditors. One
specialist has estimated that only 5 percent of Chinese
suppliers comply with overtime regulations, and 20 percent
adhere to wage regulations.\121\
Benefits
The routine denial of legally guaranteed job benefits to
workers by some employers is a serious problem in China. Gaps
in social security and labor insurance coverage remain
widespread. Though the government has reported that 100 million
workers had unemployment insurance as of November 2006, this
figure accounted for only one-seventh of the total 760 million
workers in the country.\122\ An International Labor
Organization study found that enterprises dodge requirements to
provide contributions for old-age insurance by misreporting the
number of employees and wages, as well as by keeping workers in
irregular employment positions.\123\ In addition to failing to
secure social security safeguards, employers also have denied
workers benefits ranging from paid vacations to sick
leave.\124\ Workers have described being fined for taking sick
days.\125\
Women workers face additional obstacles, as employers
withhold maternity leave and related benefits.\126\ A 2006
survey of women migrant workers conducted by the All-China
Women's Federation found that only 6.7 percent of surveyed
workers had maternity insurance. Of the 36.4 percent who
reported that they were allowed to take maternity leave, 64.5
percent said this leave was unpaid.\127\ The survey also found
that only 23.8 percent have medical insurance and 19.1 percent
have occupational insurance.\128\ [See Section II--Status of
Women for more information.]
Systemic failings of local governance exacerbate
shortcomings in the provision of social security benefits, as
local governments bear responsibility for providing coverage
for retirement, illness or injury, occupational injuries,
joblessness, and childbirth.\129\ After local mismanagement of
the pension system in Shanghai, central government departments
issued a series of legal guidance in 2006 to increase oversight
of fund management.\130\ Li Jinhua, auditor-general of the
National Audit Office, pledged in 2007 to stop the misuse of
pension funds and said local governments would be held
responsible for repaying misused funds out of their own
budgets.\131\ Despite these measures, fundamental flaws within
the system persist. As one overseas media source observed,
``The party has talked for decades about building a social
safety net, yet as the working population ages the government
isn't investing nearly enough to head off looming crises in
health care, education, and pensions.'' \132\ Chinese officials
reported in 2006 that only 6 percent of the population
benefited from the existing social insurance system and pledged
to enlarge participation by 2020.\133\
In 2006, the government announced it would take
``compulsory measures'' to promote employer participation in
on-the-job injury insurance for migrant workers, expanding
coverage to over 140 million people by the year 2010. By the
end of July 2006, 18.71 million migrant workers nationwide were
covered by the insurance, while 87 million workers overall had
such insurance as of April 2006.\134\
WORKER SAFETY
Over the last year, the Chinese government enhanced its
efforts to enforce work safety laws by conducting national
inspections, promoting accident prevention through safety
campaigns, enforcing the closure of small, illegal mines, and
actively seeking international cooperation. According to latest
statistics provided by the Chinese government, mine fatalities
decreased by 20.1 percent in 2006 compared to 2005; fatalities
during the first eight months of 2007 also decreased by 15.7
percent compared to 2006, according to latest statistics
provided by the government.\135\
Industrial Accidents and Occupational Health
Industrial injuries and deaths remain widespread in China,
despite reported decreases in the number of workplace deaths
and accidents.\136\ In February 2006, the State Administration
for Workplace Safety (SAWS) closed nearly 36,000 businesses
that had failed to obtain safety licenses by the end of
2005.\137\ The government amended the Criminal Law in June 2006
to broaden punishments for work safety violations. The
amendments included new penalties for ``responsible'' personnel
who hinder rescue efforts by covering up or failing to report
accidents, though the amendments do not clarify how
responsibility for reporting such incidents is determined.\138\
In August 2006, the government pledged over US$50 billion to
lower workplace accidents.\139\
China has high rates of occupational disease and injuries.
As of 2006, official statistics indicated that 440,000 workers
suffered from the respiratory condition pneumonoconiosis, as a
result of exposure to toxic particles. Unofficial estimates
place the number as high as 5 million.\140\ In 2006, government
officials estimated the total number of workers with
occupational illnesses may be as high as 700 million.\141\
Workers have reported that workplaces fail to educate them on
occupational hazards or provide adequate safety equipment.\142\
Coal Mine Accidents
China's coal mining sector continues to have high accident
and death rates, and without independent worker organizations,
coal miners are limited in their ability to promote safer
working conditions. Though government statistics indicate a
decline in deaths in coal mine disasters, official statistics
are unreliable, and the reported death rate remains high
nonetheless. In 2006, officials indicated that 4,746 workers
died in coal mine accidents, representing a decline of 20
percent from 2005.\143\ Unofficial estimates have placed the
number as high as 20,000, not including the number of workers
who die from mining-related diseases.\144\ The central
government issued a series of legal guidance in 2006 aimed at
addressing coal mine safety. Interim provisions issued in
November 2006, for example, stipulate penalties for failing to
correct hidden dangers that result in an accident; concealing,
misreporting, or providing a delayed report of an accident; and
allowing mines with
revoked licenses to continue operations.\145\
Despite measures to penalize violations of coal mine
safety, punishment of coal mine officials is limited in
practice. In a Supreme People's Procuratorate investigation of
officials charged for their involvement in mining disasters,
95.6 percent were not given any punishment or were given
suspended sentences.\146\ In one case, where 56 miners died in
a flood at a coal mine in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous
Region, public outrage resulted in a retrial of the township
chief, whose sentence was increased from one year to 12.\147\
Officials and mine operators have thwarted efforts to
reconstruct evidence from coal mine disasters. After a series
of accidents in April 2007, China's chief safety officer, SAWS
head Li Yizhong, commented that mine operators ``sabotaged the
(accident) scenes, destroyed incriminating evidence and removed
the bodies.'' \148\
China's coal is the source of its huge economic growth rate
and some of its worst corruption.\149\ Weak central government
control over local governments has forced central authorities
to postpone closing many small mines until 2010. These mines
are the most dangerous ones, but are highly lucrative for local
owners. Mine owners raise production levels above the legal
limit, and if accidents happen, bribe local officials to ignore
their practices. Overseas media reported that mine owners have
sent corpses to other provinces to avoid requirements to report
accidents with more than three deaths.\150\
MIGRANT WORKERS
Chinese migrants face numerous obstacles in the protection
of their labor rights, and employers have exploited migrant
workers' uprooted status to deny them fair working conditions.
A report from the State Council Research Office found that
wages for migrant workers are ``universally low;'' workplaces
lack ``the most basic labor protection[s];'' migrant workers
``engage in overly intensive labor for excessively long
hours,'' without a guaranteed right to rest; and migrant
workers are ``unable to obtain employment rights and public
employment services'' on a par with permanent urban
residents.\151\ Migrant workers are reportedly denied a total
of 100 billion yuan in back pay, with 94 percent of migrant
workers in the construction sector not paid on time.\152\ The
central government has enacted a series of decrees to ease
restrictions for
migrant workers, but the measures lack sufficient legal force
and sustainability at the local government level to ensure
consistent implementation. [See Section II--Freedom of
Residency and Travel for more information about migrant
workers.]
Thirty-one Chinese city governments agreed to a plan in
2007 to set up a network of legal aid centers among the cities
to improve legal access for migrant workers and ensure
accountability among legal aid providers. Called the Chongqing
Pact, the agreement obliges legal aid centers in the network to
help migrant workers with issues such as labor disputes and
work-related injuries, regardless of a worker's residency
status. It also requires legal aid centers in a migrant
worker's original place of residency to assist in the
process.\153\ The program may be designed in part to avoid the
demonstrations, and sometimes violence, that break out when
workers are not paid.
Chinese officials reported in June 2007 on a draft plan to
change its pension system to address migrant workers' needs.
Under the proposed plan, those with steady employment would
join current pension schemes, and those without a permanent
place of employment would enter a new program designed
specifically for that population. Under the proposed system,
employers and employees would make mandatory contributions to
the fund that would be shifted to accounts in the migrants'
home towns but that would
retain portability as migrants change jobs and relocate.\154\ A
2006 investigation on old-age pensions by the International
Labor Organization identified an existing lack of portability
of pension funds as one of the ``major barriers'' to coverage
for migrants.\155\
CHILD LABOR
Child labor remains a persistent problem within China,
despite legal measures to prohibit the practice. As a member of
the International Labor Organization (ILO), China has ratified
the two core conventions on the elimination of child
labor.\156\ China's Labor Law and related legislation prohibit
the employment of minors under 16,\157\ and national legal
provisions prohibiting child labor stipulate a series of fines
for employing children.\158\ Under the Criminal Law, employers
and supervisors face prison sentences of up to seven years for
forcing children to work under conditions of extreme
danger.\159\ Systemic problems in enforcement, however, have
dulled the effects of these legal measures, though the overall
extent of child labor in China is unclear due to the government
categorizing data on the matter as ``highly secret.'' \160\ A
report on child labor in China found that child laborers
generally work in low-skill service sectors as well as small
workshops and businesses, including textile, toy, and shoe
manufacturing enterprises.\161\ It noted that many under-age
laborers are in their teens, typically ranging from 13 to 15
years old, a phenomenon exacerbated by problems in the
education system and labor shortages of adult workers.\162\
Children in detention facilities also have been subjected to
forced labor.\163\
Events from the past year underscore the government's
inability to prevent child labor. Underage workers were among
the forced laborers found working in brick kiln mines in 2007,
highlighting the existence of what the ILO terms the ``worst
forms of child labor.'' \164\ [See the subsection on ``Forced
Labor,'' below, for more information on forced labor in brick
kilns.] A company that produces Olympics-related products
admitted in 2007 that children as young as 12 years old had
worked in the factory.\165\
Although the Chinese government has condemned the use of
child labor and pledged to take stronger measures to combat
it,\166\ it continues to actively endorse other forms of child
labor under the guise of work-study activities. Under work-
study programs implemented in various parts of China, children
as young as elementary school students pick crops and engage in
other physical labor. In the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region
(XUAR), for example, some 800,000 students began their 2006
academic year by picking cotton in school-organized work-study
programs, while elementary school students in some parts of the
XUAR were forced to pick hops. The XUAR government issued legal
guidance that year to outline the contours of this labor
system, stating that priority should be placed on using labor
revenue to buy accident insurance for students and liability
insurance for schools. Reports from the region indicated that
in recent years students had been made to work in 12-hour
shifts and suffered injuries from dangerous working conditions
and sexual abuse from adult laborers. [See Section II--Ethnic
Minority Rights for more information on conditions in the
XUAR.] Also in 2006, over 10,000 students in the fourth grade
and higher in a city in Gansu province were made to harvest
corn.\167\
Central government legislation allows this form of child
labor. National provisions prohibiting child labor provide that
``education practice labor'' and vocational skills training
labor organized by schools and other educational and vocational
institutes do not constitute the use of child labor when such
activities do not adversely affect the safety and health of the
students.\168\ The Education Law supports schools that
establish work-study and other programs, provided that the
programs do not negatively affect normal studies.\169\ A
nationwide regulation on work-study programs for elementary and
secondary school students outlines the general terms of such
programs, which it says are meant to cultivate morals,
contribute to production outputs, and generate resources for
improving schools.\170\ These provisions contravene China's
obligations as a Member State to ILO conventions prohibiting
child labor.\171\ In 2006, the ILO's Committee of Experts on
the Applications of Conventions and Recommendations
``expresse[d] . . . concern at the situation of children under
18 years performing forced labour not only in the framework of
re-educational and reformative measures, but also in regular
work programmes at school.'' \172\
Beyond the parameters of government-approved work study
programs, some teachers have used their position of authority
to induce students into exploitative working conditions in
factories far from home. In 2006, for example, a teacher in
Henan province recruited 84 female students from her school to
work in a can factory in Zhejiang province. Students labored
under exploitative conditions until some escaped. Authorities
rescued the remaining students.\173\ The same year, teachers at
a school in Shaanxi province arranged for approximately 600
students, including under-age minors, to do ``work-study'' in
an electronics factory in Guangdong province, where students
were reported to work up to 14 hours a day without full
wages.\174\
FORCED LABOR
In May and June 2007, Chinese media and Internet activists
uncovered a massive network of forced labor in brick kilns in
Shanxi and Henan provinces. Reports indicated that people
forced to work in the kilns included children and mentally
challenged adults kidnapped by human traffickers and sold to
the kilns, where they were beaten, denied food, and forced to
work up to 20 hours per day. In other cases, workers were lured
to the kilns through promises of high salaries.\175\ One father
described his son's condition when he found him:
My son was totally dumb, not even knowing how to cry,
or to scream or to call out ``father''[ . . .] He was
in rags and had wounds all over his body. Within three
months he had lost over [22 pounds].\176\
Chinese officials announced in August 2007 that a
nationwide campaign led to the rescue of 1,340 enslaved
workers,\177\ but government reports of the size and scope of
the problem appeared to conflict with accounts by citizens.
Parents from Henan province, for example, said that up to 1,000
children were forced into labor in Shanxi province, but Shanxi
provincial vice-governor Xue Yanzhong said that authorities had
inspected 4,861 brick kilns in the province and identified only
15 child workers. According to Xue, only 17 of the brick kilns
inspected used forced labor.\178\
The reports of forced labor reveal a longstanding
phenomenon, according to an editorial in the Chinese newspaper
Southern Weekly:
The dirty slave trade has been thriving for a long time
but the local government didn't take any action. It's
become an actual accomplice. The scandal is so massive
and catastrophic that it poses a serious threat to
public security.\179\
According to a deputy director from the Ministry of Public
Security, official knowledge of the forced labor system goes
back as far as 2004. At that time, police discovered child
labor being used in brick kilns in Henan province after a
parent asked for help in finding his child. The deputy director
considered the problem ``solved . . . under the instructions of
our leaders.'' A kiln contractor reported that many kiln
operators received advance notice of the
inspections from local police and hid enslaved laborers during
inspections. Kilns were only closed if they had no business
licenses or did not adhere to safety and environmental
standards, not because they were using forced labor.\180\
By the middle of July 2007, 29 mine supervisors and owners
received prison sentences for their involvement in forced
labor. Of those convicted, a foreman who beat a mentally
disabled worker to death was given the death penalty. The owner
of this kiln, a son of a local Communist Party official,
received a sentence of nine years. Other defendants were given
prison terms from two years to life in prison.\181\ Critics
have complained that these few convicted criminals were being
used to deflect attention from the involvement of Party
officials.\182\ By August, no senior officials had been
punished and only 95 low ranking officials had been
reprimanded.\183\ [For information regarding Chinese officials'
disclosure of information on the forced labor scandal see
Section II--Freedom of Expression.]
In June, the All-China Lawyers Association asked the
National People's Congress Standing Committee to introduce new
legislation making slavery a criminal charge. The Association
noted that current law applies only to legally recognized
employers and does not apply to individuals or illegal
workplaces.\184\
U.S.-CHINA BILATERAL COOPERATION
The U.S. Department of Labor and two Chinese government
agencies continued to conduct cooperative activities during
2007 on wage and hour laws, occupational safety and health,
mine safety, and pension oversight. The two countries renewed
Letters of Understanding related to these areas and pledged to
continue the
cooperative activities for four more years. In addition, two
new cooperative agreements were signed in the areas of
unemployment insurance program administration and labor
statistics.\185\
Endnotes
\1\ See the discussion on the ``Labor Contract Law,'' infra, for
more information.
\2\ See, e.g., Guan Xiaofeng, ``Labor Disputes Threaten
Stability,'' China Daily, 30 January 07 (Open Source Center, 30 January
07).
\3\ These other rights are ``the elimination of all forms of forced
or compulsory labour; the effective abolition of child labour; and the
elimination of discrimination in respect of employment and
occupation.'' ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at
Work, 18 June 98, International Labor Organization (Online), art. 2
[hereinafter ILO Declaration].
\4\ See ``ILO Tripartite Constituents in China,'' International
Labour Organization (Online), last visited 27 September 07.
\5\ ILO Declaration, art. 2. China has been a member of the ILO
since its founding in 1919. For more information, see the country
profile on China in the ILO database of labor, social security and
human rights legislation (NATLEX) (Online).
\6\ ``Ratifications of the Fundamental Human Rights Conventions by
Country,'' International Labor Organization (Online), 11 September 07.
\7\ ``China: Forced Labor and Trafficking: The Role of Labour
Institution in Law Enforcement and International Cooperation,''
International Labour Organization (Online), August 05.
\8\ See generally PRC Labor Law, enacted 5 July 94, art. 12.
\9\ International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights
adopted by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66,
entry into force 3 January 76, art. 8.
\10\ Declarations and Reservations, United Nations Treaty
Collection (Online), 5 February 02. Article 10 of China's Trade Union
Law establishes the All-China Federation of Trade Unions as the
``unified national trade union federation,'' and Article 11 mandates
that all unions must be approved by the next higher-level union body,
giving the ACFTU an absolute veto over the establishment of any local
union and the legal authority to block independent labor associations.
PRC Trade Union Law, enacted 3 April 1992, amended 27 October 01, art.
10, 11.
\11\ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),
adopted by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 66,
entry into force 23 March 76, art. 22. The Chinese government has
committed itself to ratifying, and thus bringing its laws into
conformity with, the ICCPR and reaffirmed its commitment as recently as
April 13, 2006, in its application for membership in the UN Human
Rights Council. China's top leaders have previously stated on three
separate occasions that they are preparing for ratification of the
ICCPR, including in a September 6, 2005, statement by Politburo member
and State Councilor Luo Gan at the 22nd World Congress on Law, in
statements by Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao during his May 2005 Europe
tour, and in a January 27, 2004, speech by Chinese President Hu Jintao
before the French National Assembly. As a signatory to the ICCPR, China
is required under Article 18 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties, to which it is a party, ``to refrain from acts which would
defeat the object and purpose of a treaty'' it has signed. Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, enacted 23 May 69, entry into force
27 January 80, art. 18.
\12\ PRC Trade Union Law, art. 2, 4.
\13\ For an overview of ACFTU programs hat have promoted worker
rights, see the section on ``ACFTU Role in Protecting Worker Rights''
in the CECC 2006 Annual Report, 67. For a summary of surveys of trade
union leadership in Guangzhou and Shenyang, see ``Is the All China
Federation of Trade Unions Merely a Front for the Communist Party and
Enterprise Management?,'' China Labour Bulletin (Online), 1 August 07.
\14\ See the CECC Political Prisoner Database for more details.
\15\ According to information from the ACFTU reported by CSR Asia
Weekly, the government enacted its first comprehensive labor law in
1994, and officials first proposed supplementing it with a labor
contract law in 1996. After drafting of the law stalled in 1998, work
on a new labor contract law began in 2004. ``Labour Contract Law of the
PRC,'' CSR Asia Weekly (Online), 4 July 07. ``China's Legislature
Adopts Labor Contract Law,'' Xinhua (Online), 29 June 07. The
government claimed that more than 65% of the comments were from Chinese
workers. ``Chinese Public Makes Over 190,000 Suggestions on Draft Labor
Contract Law,'' Xinhua, 21 April 06 (Open Source Center, 21 April 06).
\16\ CECC Staff Interviews.
\17\ PRC Labor Contract Law, adopted 29 June 07, art. 2.
\18\ PRC Labor Law, art. 16, 19.
\19\ PRC Labor Contract Law, art. 10. If no contract exists at the
time the relationship starts, it must be signed within one month.
\20\ Ibid., art. 14.
\21\ Ibid., art. 14.
\22\ Ibid., art. 17.
\23\ Ibid., art. 36-50 (on terminations generally); 57-67 (on
workers employed through staffing firms); and 80-95 (on legal
liability). See also discussion infra.
\24\ Josephine Ma, ``New Law To Protect Mainland Workers,'' South
China Morning Post (Online), 30 June 07.
\25\ For an overview of several surveys on the use of labor
contracts, see ``Internal Migrants: Discrimination and Abuse,'' Amnesty
International (Online), 1 March 07.
\26\ As the China Labour Bulletin observes, ``All too often in
China, employers can disregard the terms and conditions of the
contracts they have signed with their workers and impose their own
terms and conditions as and when it suits them.'' ``National People's
Congress Approves New Labour Contract Law,'' China Labour Bulletin
(Online), 29 June 07.
\27\ Article 97 states that written contracts established before
the law's implementation remain in force, but includes no provisions to
address existing written contracts that do not abide by the terms of
the Labor Contract Law. PRC Labor Contract Law, art. 97.
\28\ Ibid., art.62.
\29\ Ibid., art.22.
\30\ ``Employers Sacking Workers Before the Labour Contract Law Is
Implemented,'' China Labour Bulletin (Online), 14 September 07.
\31\ PRC Labor Contract Law, art.58.
\32\ Ibid., art.63.
\33\ Ibid., art.62(3), 62(5).
\34\ Ibid., art.64.
\35\ Ibid., art. 60.
\36\ See, e.g., PRC Labor Contract Law (Draft) [Zhonghua renmin
gongheguo laodong hetong fa (cao an)], 20 March 2006, art. 12, 24, 40.
\37\ PRC Labor Contract Law, art. 72.
\38\ ``Draft Labour Contract Law Improves Protection of Part-Time
Workers,'' Xinhua (Online), 24 June 07. The foreign-owned fast food
restaurants investigated also denied part-time workers benefits and
failed to abide by overtime regulations, among other violations. ``Fast
Food and Wages in China,''CSR Asia, (Online), 12 April 07.
\39\ PRC Labor Contract Law, art. 72.
\40\ Ibid., art. 71.
\41\ PRC Labor Contract Law (Draft), art. 33.
\42\ PRC Labor Contract Law, art. 41.
\43\ Ibid., art. 41.
\44\ Ibid., art. 42.
\45\ Ibid., art. 43.
\46\ Ibid., art. 46.
\47\ Ibid., art. 47.
\48\ Ibid., art. 47.
\49\ Ibid., arts. 73-74.
\50\ Ibid., arts. 76.
\51\ Translated portions of the study, conducted by the State
Council Research Office Study Group and originally published as the
book China Peasant Worker Research Report in April 2006, is available
at ``PRC: Excerpts of State Council Research Report on Migrant
Workers,'' Open Source Center, 12 September 07.
\52\ PRC Labor Contract Law, art. 77.
\53\ Ibid., art. 82.
\54\ See generally Chapter 7, Legal Liability (articles 80-95) in
the Labor Contract Law.
\55\ Ibid., art. 90. Article 86 holds either party liable where an
invalid contract causes harm to one side.
\56\ Ibid., arts. 51-56. The draft of the law released in March
2006 provided for collective bargaining but lacked the consolidated set
of provisions of the final version. PRC Labor Contract Law (Draft),
art. 7, 11, 23, 44, 45, 46, 48, 50, 51.
\57\ PRC Trade Union Law, art. 20; Provisions on Collective
Contracts [Jiti hetong guiding], issued 20 January 04.
\58\ CECC Staff Interviews.
\59\ PRC Labor Contract Law, art. 51. See also ``National People's
Congress Approves New Labour Contract Law,'' China Labour Bulletin.
\60\ Simon Clarke, Chang-Hee Lee, and Qi Li, ``Collective
Consultation and Industrial Relations in China,'' 42 Brit. J.
Industrial Relations 235, 242 (2004).
\61\ Ibid., 246-247.
\62\ Information provided by U.S. Embassy Beijing.
\63\ ``ACFTU Issues `2006 Blue Book on Chinese Trade Unions
Safeguarding the Rights and Interests of Workers,''' People's Daily,
reprinted on China Trade Union News (Online), 15 May 07.
\64\ PRC Labor Contract Law, art. 18.
\65\ Ibid., art. 26.
\66\ Ibid., art. 56.
\67\ Ibid., art. 77-78.
\68\ For a description of costs involved, see ``Xinjiang People's
Congress Representative Appeals for Abolition of Labor Arbitration
Procedure'' [Xinjiang renda daibiao huyu quxiao laodong zhongcai
qianzhi de falu chengxu], Xinhua (Online), 20 January 06.
\69\ PRC Labor Law, art. 77-84.
\70\ Compare PRC Labor Law, enacted 5 July 94, art. 79 to PRC Labor
Contract Law, adopted 29 June 07, arts. 26, 56, 77.
\71\ ``Law To Deal with Rising Number of Labor Disputes To Be
Enacted,'' Xinhua, 27 August 07, reprinted on the National People's
Congress Web site.
\72\ Ibid.
\73\ ``National People's Congress Approves New Labour Contract
Law,'' China Labour Bulletin. For additional evaluations, see, e.g.,
Tim Costello, Brendan Smith, and Jeremy Brecher, ``Labor Rights in
China,'' Foreign Policy in Focus (Online), 21 December 06.
\74\ See, e.g., Bill Savadove, ``Firms Say New Labour Law is a Step
Backwards,'' South China Morning Post (Online), 21 March 06; Bill
Savadove, ``Labour Law Won't Go to NPC in March; But Regulation--Which
Foreign Firms Say is Too Strict--Still Expected To Pass This Year,''
South China Morning Post (Online), 31 January 07; Joe McDonald, ``China
Due to Enact New Labor Law After Heated Debate,'' Associated Press, 27
June 07; Joseph Kahn and David Barboza, ``China Passes a Sweeping Labor
Law,'' New York Times (Online) 30 June 07.
\75\ CECC Staff Interviews. Comments addressed the draft version
released in March 2006 and subsequent revisions. See, e.g., American
Chamber of Commerce in the People's Republic of China, ``Comments on
the Draft Labor Contract Law of the People's Republic of China,'' 19
April 06; US-China Business Council, ``Comments on the Draft Labor
Contract Law of the People's Republic of China (Draft of March 20,
2006),'' 19 April 06; American Chamber of Commerce in Shanghai,
``AmCham Shanghai and AmCham China (Beijing) Comments on Draft Two of
the PRC Labor Contract Law,'' last viewed 7 October 07; US-China
Business Council, ``Comments on the Draft People's Republic of China
Law on Employment Contracts (Draft of December 24, 2006),'' last viewed
7 October 07.
\76\ American Chamber of Commerce, ``Comments on the Draft Labor
Contract Law.''
\77\ CECC Staff Interviews; US-China Business Council, ``Comments
on the Draft People's Republic of China Law on Employment Contracts
(Draft of December 24, 2006);'' Sarah Schafer, ``Now They Speak Out,''
Newsweek International (Online), 28 May 07; Andrew Batson and Mei Fong,
``China Toils Over New Labor Law,'' The Wall Street Journal (Online), 7
May 2007; ``Undue Influence: Corporations Gain Ground in Battle Over
China's New Labor Law,'' Global Labor Strategies, March 2007; ``The
Chinese Draft Contract Law--A Global Debate,'' CSR Asia, 25 April 2007;
``Behind the Great Wall of China: U. S. Corporations Opposing New
Rights for Chinese Workers,'' Global Labor Strategies (Online), last
viewed 7 October 07.
\78\ CECC Staff Interviews; US-China Business Council, ``Comments
on the Draft People's Republic of China Law on Employment Contracts
(Draft of December 24, 2006);'' Batson and Fong, ``China Toils Over New
Labor Law;'' Schafer, ``Now They Speak Out;'' ``The Chinese Draft
Contract Law,'' CSR Asia; ``Behind the Great Wall of China,'' Global
Labor Strategies; ``Twenty-Seven Democrats Ask Bush To Support China's
Proposed Labor Law,'' Daily Labor Report, No. 213, 3 November 2006, A-
8.
\79\ US-China Business Council, ``Comments on the Draft People's
Republic of China Law on Employment Contracts (Draft of December 24,
2006).''
\80\ ``Behind the Great Wall of China,'' Global Labor Strategies,
3; ``The Chinese Draft Contract Law,'' CSR Asia.
\81\ American Chamber of Commerce, ``Comments on the Draft Labor
Contract Law.'' AmCham disputed reports that it had opposed the draft
Labor Contract Law. See American Chamber of Commerce in the People's
Republic of China, ``Re: Press Reports Concerning AmCham-China and the
PRC Draft Labor Contract Law,'' 18 June 07.
\82\ ``European Union Chamber of Commerce in China Welcomes the
Promulgation of the Labour Contract Law,'' European Chamber of Commerce
Web site (Online), 1 July 07. Joe McDonald, ``China Due To Enact New
Labor Law After Heated Debate.''
\83\ Guan Xiaofeng, ``Labor Law `Will Not Hurt Investment
Environment,''' China Daily, 3 July 07.
\84\ Quoted in Jude Blanchette, ``Key Issues for China's New Labor
Law: Enforcement,'' Christian Science Monitor, 2 July 07.
\85\ PRC Employment Promotion Law, adopted 30 August 07, art. 28.
\86\ Ibid., art. 3. Other laws have also included this provision.
See, e.g., PRC Labor Law, art. 12.
\87\ PRC Employment Promotion Law, art. 27, 28.
\88\ Ibid., art. 29.
\89\ Ibid., art. 31.
\90\ Ibid., art. 30.
\91\ Ibid., art. 62.
\92\ ``Survey: Discrimination in Job Market Common,'' Xinhua
(Online), 27 June 07.
\93\ PRC Employment Promotion Law, art. 7.
\94\ Ibid., art. 9.
\95\ Ibid., art. 52.
\96\ Ibid., art. 16.
\97\ PRC Labor Law, art. 48.
\98\ PRC Labor Contract Law, art. 72, 74, 85.
\99\ ``Most Provincial-Level Governments Issue Hourly Minimum Wage
Standards,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, November
2006, 7-8. Legal provisions governing minimum wages require provincial-
level governments to formulate the minimum wage standards for their
area, in consultation with local unions and businesses. The MOLSS has
two weeks to review draft standards submitted by the local labor and
social security bureaus. The standards are deemed approved if the MOLSS
does not raise objections during this period. The provisions set forth
a number of factors that provincial governments should consider in
calculating the minimum wage, including the average salary, minimum
living expenses, unemployment rate, and level of economic development
in their area. See generally Provisions on Minimum Wages [Zui di gongzi
guiding], issued 20 January 04.
\100\ See ``Most Provincial-Level Governments Issue Hourly Minimum
Wage Standards,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update,
November 2006, 7-8, noting that the 2006 MOLSS report recorded the
highest monthly minimum wage in Shenzhen, at 810 yuan (US$101.25), the
highest hourly minimum wage in Beijing, at 7.9 yuan (US$0.99), and the
lowest monthly and hourly minimum wages in Jiangxi, at 270 yuan
(US$33.75) and 2.7 yuan (US$0.34), respectively.
\101\ ``China's Trade Union Calls for Minimum Wage Boost,'' Xinhua
(Online), 19 May 07.
\102\ ``Internal Migrants: Discrimination and Abuse,'' Amnesty
International.
\103\ Ibid.
\104\ ``Government To Reduce Income Gap Through Reform,'' China
Daily, 18 July 06 .
\105\ ``Ministry of Finance 8-Item Work Deciphered: Wage Revolution
`Limits High [Wages], Stabilizes Middle [Incomes], Brings Up Low
[Wages]''' [Caizhengbu ba xiang goingzuo jiedu: gongzi gaige ``xian gao
wen zhong tuo di''], People's Daily (Online), 7 November 06.
\106\ `` `Limit High [Wages], Stabilize Middle [Incomes], Bring Up
Low [Wages],' Reducing Subsidies for High Income Earners Is Not the
Same as Equal Distribution,'' Yanzhao Metropolitan Newspaper, reprinted
in China Economic Daily, 9 November 06.
\107\ Stephen Chen, ``Forced Wages Rises Won't Work; Official
Labour Officer Says Beijing Can't Set Salaries,'' South China Morning
Post (Online), 18 July 2007.
\108\ ``Communications Ministry Orders Push To Resolve Unpaid
Migrant Wage Claims,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update,
August 2006, 2-3.
\109\This number figure represents a decrease from previous years
in the amount of unpaid wages. ``Internal Migrants: Discrimination and
Abuse,'' Amnesty International.
\110\ ``Migrants Frustrated Over Unpaid Wages, Xinhua, reprinted in
China Daily, 31 December 06.
\111\ Implementing Measures for the Qinghai Province Construction
Sector Migrant Worker Wage Payment Deposit System (Trial Measures)
[Qinghaisheng jianshe lingyu nongmingong gongzi zhifu baozhengjin zhidu
shishi banfa (shixing)], issued October 06, art. 2, 17.
\112\ ``30 Firms Blacklisted for Defaulting Wages,'' Xinhua
(Online), 27 June 06.
\113\ See, e.g., Chenyan Liu, ``China's Construction Sector:
Untangling CSR Issues,'' CSR Asia Weekly, Vol. 1 Week 22, 2005.
``Internal Migrants: Discrimination and Abuse,'' Amnesty International.
\114\ `More on Migrants Beaten Up in China After Demanding Unpaid
Wages,'' BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific, citing Xinhua, 2 July 07. Zhuang
Pinghui, ``Gang Beat Migrants Demanding Wages,'' South China Morning
Post (Online), 2 July 07.
\115\ See, e.g., ``Internal Migrants: Discrimination and Abuse,''
Amnesty International. See also the CECC 2006 Annual Report, 65-66, for
more information on financial and other obstacles workers face in
trying to recover wages and resolve other disputes.
\116\ See Ministry of Labor and Social Security (Online), ``2006
Statistical Communique on the Development of Labor and Social Security
Affairs,'' last visited 10 October 07. For statistics by year, see data
from the National Bureau of Statistics of China Web site. See also Guan
Xiaofeng, ``Labor Disputes Threaten Stability,'' China Daily, 30
January 07 Open Source Center, 30 January 07); ``China To Enact Law To
Deal With Rising Number of Labor Disputes,'' Xinhua, 26 August 07 (Open
Source Center, 26 August 07).
\117\ ``Labour Disputes Threaten China's Stability: Report,''
Reuters (Online), 30 January 07.
\118\ PRC Labor Law, art. 36.
\119\ Dexter Roberts and Pete Engardio, ``Secrets, Lies, and
Sweatshops,'' Business Week, 27 November 2006.
\120\ China Labour Bulletin, ``Falling Through the Floor: Migrant
Women Workers' Quest for Decent Work in Dongguan, China,'' September
06, 6, 10, 15.
\121\ Dexter Roberts and Pete Engardio, ``Secrets, Lies, and
Sweatshops.''
\122\ ``Work Injury Insurance Covers 100 Million Chinese,''
Corporate Social Responsibility Asia, 29 February 06; ``Loopholes Seen
To Undermine China's Unemployment Insurance System,'' BBC Asia, 6
December 2006.
\123\ ``Extending Old-age Insurance Coverage in the People's
Republic of China,'' International Labor Organization (Online), January
06, 6, 19.
\124\ Working Conditions in China: Just and Favorable, Staff
Roundtable of the Congressional-Executive Commission on China, 3
November 05, Testimony of Dan Viederman, Verite.
\125\ ``Internal Migrants: Discrimination and Abuse,'' Amnesty
International.
\126\ Women are entitled to 90 days of leave under the 1994 Labor
Law. PRC Labor Law, art. 62.
\127\ The survey data was collected from 6,595 questionnaires
handed out in 416 villages and four cities. ``Female Migrants Suffering
at Work,'' China Daily, 30 November 06 (Open Source Center, 30 November
06).
\128\ ``No Social Aid, Work Contracts for 50 Per Cent of Women in
Chinese Cities-Poll'' BBC Asia, 10 December 2006 (Nexis, 10 December
06).
\129\ PRC Labor Law, art. 73.
\130\ See, e.g., ``MOLSS Circular Concerning Implementation of the
Essence of the State Council Standing Committee on Issues Related To
Strengthening Social Security Funds Supervision'' [Laodong he shehui
baozhangbu guanyu guancheluoshi guowuyuan changwu huiyi jingshen
jiaqiang shehui baoxian jijin jianguan youguan wenti de tongzhi],
issued 30 November 06; See also Opinion Concerning Strengthening Social
Security Fund Supervision and Enforcing Fund Rules [Guanyu jin yi bu
jiaqiang shehui baoxian jijin jianguan yansu jijin jilu de yijian],
issued 29 September 06. For more information, see, e.g., Mu Tzu,
``Central Authorities Will Recover Power of Social Security Fund
Management,'' Hong Kong Commercial Daily, 27 September 06 (Open Source
Center, 29 September 06).
\131\ Cary Huang, ```Iron Face' Vows To Stop Forever Misuse of
Social Security Funds,'' South China Morning Post (Online), 25 June 07.
\132\ Pete Engardio, Dexter Roberts, Frederik Balfour, and Bruce
Einhorn, ``Broken China,'' Business Week (Online), 23 July 07.
\133\ ``2020 Set as Goal for National Insurance Plan,'' South China
Morning Post (Online), 13 October 06.
\134\ ``Government Strengthens Enforcement of Requirements on
Injury Insurance,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update,
October 2006, 4.
\135\ CECC Staff Interviews.
\136\ See, e.g., ``Fatalities Down in Work Accidents, But China's
Work Safety Still `Grim,''' Xinhua, 28 August 07 (Open Source Center,
28 August 07); ```Work Safety Situation Still Grim,''' China Daily
(Online), 3 September 07.
\137\ ``35,800 Firms Ordered To Close Over Safety Concerns,''
Xinhua (Online), 16 February 06.
\138\ Sixth Amendment to the Criminal Law of the People's Republic
of China [Zhonghua renmin gonghe guo xingfa xiuzheng an (liu)], issued
29 June 06. See also PRC Criminal Law, enacted 1 July 79, amended 14
March 97, 25 December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December 01, 28 December 02,
28 February 05, 29 June 05, 29 June 06, art. 244.
\139\ Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Country Reports
on Human Rights Practices--2006, China (includes Tibet, Hong Kong, and
Macau) (Online), 6 March 07.
\140\ Ibid.
\141\ ``700 Million People Might Suffer from Occupational
Illnesses, Government Says,'' China Labour Bulletin (Online), 23
January 06.
\142\ China Labour Bulletin, ``Falling Through the Floor: Migrant
Women Workers' Quest for Decent Work in Dongguan, China.''
\143\ ``China Sees Coal Mine Deaths Fall, But Outlook Grim,''
Reuters (Online), 10 January 07.
\144\ Simon Elegant and Zhang Jiachang, ``Where the Coal Is Stained
with Blood,'' Time Magazine, 2 March 07.
\145\ ``Government Issues New Coal Mine Provisions as Mining
Fatalities Increase,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update,
December 06, 7-8.
\146\ Investigation cited in ``95.6 Per Cent of All Officials in
Mining Disaster Cases Receive No Punishment or Get a Suspended
Sentence,'' China Labour Bulletin, May 24, 2006.
\147\ Ibid.
\148\ ``China Criticizes Mine Cover-ups,'' Agence France-Presse, 19
April 07 (Nexis, 19 April 07).
\149\ Rising prices for coal, which makes up over 70 percent of
China's energy supply, have fueled the proliferation on small,
unregulated mines. ``China's Coal Mines Bottoming Out,'' The Economist
(Online), 23 August 07.
\150\ Elegant and Zhang, ``Where the Coal Is Stained with Blood.''
\151\ Translated portions of the study, conducted by the State
Council Research Office Study Group and originally published as the
book China Peasant Worker Research Report in April 2006, is available
at ``PRC: Excerpts of State Council Research Report on Migrant
Workers,'' Open Source Center, 12 September 07.
\152\ Vivien Cui and Kevin Huang, ``China's Neglected
`Untouchables,''' South China Morning Post, 1 May 06.
\153\ Raymond Li, ``Legal Aid Network To Help Migrants; Pact to
Tackle Unpaid Wages and Injuries,'' South China Morning Post, 5 July
2007.
\154\ Josephine Ma, ``Pension Plan for Migrant Workers,'' South
China Morning Post, 12 June 07.
\155\ ``Extending Old-age Insurance Coverage in the People's
Republic of China,'' International Labor Organization (Online), January
06, 29.
\156\ ILO Convention (No. 138) concerning Minimum Age for Admission
to Employment, 26 June 73; ILO Convention (No. 182) concerning the
Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms
of Child Labour, 17 June 99.
\157\ PRC Labor Law, enacted 5 July 94, art. 15. See also Law on
the Protection of Minors, issued 4 September 91, art. 28. See generally
Provisions on Prohibiting the Use of Child Labor [Jinzhi shiyong
tonggong guiding], issued 1 October 02.
\158\ Provisions on Prohibiting the Use of Child Labor, art. 6.
\159\ This provision was added into the fourth amendment to the
Criminal Law in 2002. Fourth Amendment to the Criminal Law of the
People's Republic of China [Zhonghua renmin gonghe guo xingfa xiuzheng
an (si)], issued 28 December 02. See also PRC Criminal Law, enacted 1
July 79, amended 14 March 97, 25 December 99, 31 August 01, 29 December
01, 28 December 02, 28 February 05, 29 June 05, 29 June 06, art. 244.
\160\ ``Small Hands: A Survey Report on Child Labour in China,''
China Labour Bulletin (Online), September 07, 3.
\161\ Ibid., 8.
\162\ Ibid., 15, 22, 25-32.
\163\ For more information on this phenomenon, see Report of the
Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and
Recommendations Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention, 1999 (No. 182)
China (ratification: 2002) Observation, CEACR 2006/77th Session,
International Labor Organization (Online), 2006.
\164\ See, e.g., ILO Convention (No. 182) concerning the
Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms
of Child Labour, art. 3, defining such labor to include forced or
compulsory labor.
\165\ See, e.g., ``Olympic Firm Admits Child Labour,'' BBC
(Online), 13 June 07.
\166\ For the government response to forced labor in brick kilns,
including child labor, see, e.g., Zhang Pinghui, ``Crackdown on Slave
Labour Nationwide--State Council Vows To End Enslavement,'' South China
Morning Post (Online), 21 June 07.
\167\ ``Xinjiang Government Continues Controversial `Work-Study'
Program,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update, November
2006, 11.
\168\ Provisions on Prohibiting the Use of Child Labor, art. 13.
\169\ PRC Education Law, issued 18 March 95, art. 58.
\170\ See generally ``Regulation on Nationwide Temporary Work-Study
Labor for Secondary and Elementary Schools'' [Quanguo zhong xiaoxue
qingongjianxue zanxing gongzuo tiaoli], issued 20 February 83.
\171\ ILO Convention 138 permits vocational education for underage
minors only where it is an ``integral part'' of a course of study or
training course. ILO Convention 182 obligates Member States to
eliminate the ``worst forms of child labor,'' including ``forced or
compulsory labor.'' ILO Convention (No. 138) concerning Minimum Age for
Admission to Employment; ILO Convention (No. 182) concerning the
Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms
of Child Labour.
\172\ Report of the Committee of Experts on the Application of
Conventions and Recommendations Worst Forms of Child Labour Convention,
International Labor Organization.
\173\ ``Henan Teacher Recruits Underage Students for Work in
Zhejiang Factory,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of Law Update,
November 2006, 8.
\174\ ``Teachers Arrange for Underage `Interns' To Work at
Guangdong Electronics Factory,'' CECC China Human Rights and Rule of
Law Update, June 2006, 15.
\175\ Howard W. French, ``Child Slave Labor Revelations Sweeping
China,'' International Herald Tribune (Online), 15 June 07; He Huifeng,
``I Thought There Was Nothing He Could Take From Me, So I Went'' South
China Morning Post (Online), 15 June 07; Josephine Ma, ``Trafficker
Admits To Selling 3,000 Labourers in Three Years,'' South China Morning
Post (Online), 20 June 07; Zhang, ``Crackdown on Slave Labour
Nationwide--State Council Vows To End Enslavement;'' Josephine Ma,
``Illegal Kilns Used Over 50,000 Laborers,'' South China Morning Post
(Online), 26 June 2007.
\176\ Howard W. French, ``Child Slave Labor Revelations Sweeping
China.''
\177\ ``1,340 Rescued From Forced Labor,'' Xinhua (Online), 13
August 07.
\178\ ``Top Official Plays Down Scale of Kiln Slavery,'' South
China Morning Post (Online), 14 August 07.
\179\ Cited in Ting Shi, ``Officials Targeted in Slavery Scandal--
Public Anger Mounting at Coercion of Kiln Workers in Shanxi,'' South
China Morning Post (Online), 18 June 07.
\180\ Josephine Ma and Ng Tze-wei, ``Police Admit Failure To Stem
Slavery--Henan Labour Abuses `Solved' Three Years Ago,'' South China
Morning Post (Online), 20 June 07.
\181\ Alice Yan, ``Brick Kiln Foreman Gets Death Penalty; 28 Others
are Jailed,'' South China Morning Post (Online), 18 July 07; ``Death
Sentence Over China Slave Scandal,'' Agence France-Presse, reprinted in
Yahoo news, 17 July 07.
\182\ ``Death Sentence Over China Slave Scandal,'' Agence France-
Presse.
\183\ ``Top Official Plays Down Scale of Kiln Slavery,'' South
China Morning Post.
\184\ Ng Tze-wei, ``Lawyers' Group Calls for Anti-Slavery Law,''
South China Morning Post (Online), 10 July 07.
\185\ CECC Staff Interviews.
<all>