Battlefield Automation: Software Problems Hinder Development of the Army's Maneuver Control System

NSIAD-98-15 October 16, 1997
Full Report (PDF, 25 pages)  

Summary

The Army so far has spent more than $765 million on the Maneuver Control System, which is designed to provide battlefield information to maneuver commanders. Since 1980, the program has experienced many problems, such as fielding inadequate computer software and canceling the development of one software versions because of design flaws, cost growth, and schedule slippages. This report discusses whether (1) the Maneuver Control System software development strategy is appropriate to overcome prior development problems and (2) 207 new computers for system-related training should be procured as planned.

GAO noted that: (1) since its 1993 reorganization, the MCS has continued to experience development problems; (2) the initial operational test and evaluation of version 12.01 software has slipped 28 months, from November 1995 to March 1998, and interim tests have shown that significant software problems continue; (3) despite these problems, the Army awarded a contract in September 1996 for the concurrent development of the next software versions--12.1, 12.2, and 12.3--which are being developed by a new contractor and may involve substantially different software; (4) if the Army's current development strategy for the MCS is not strengthened, development problems may continue to occur; (5) currently, the Army's strategy allows: (a) less than full operational testing of version 12.1; and (b) development of follow-on versions 12.2 and 12.3 to start about 18 months before the operational testing of each version's predecessor; (6) despite the fact that the MCS has yet to undergo an initial operational test and evaluation or be approved for production, the Army plans to acquire 207 computers in fiscal years 1997 and 1998 to increase the number of computers available for system training; (7) program officials stated that they need to acquire the computers before operational testing to provide not only MCS specific training but also training for the larger Army Battle Command System, of which the Army Tactical Command and Control System and the MCS are major components; and (8) the 207 computers, however, are not needed to satisfy any of the three legislated reasons for low-rate initial production before an initial operational test and evaluation.