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Address Vulnerabilities' which was released on November 25, 2008.

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Report to Congressional Committees: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 
GAO: 

November 2008: 

Northern Border Security: 

DHS's Report Could Better Inform Congress by Identifying Actions, 
Resources, and Time Frames Needed to Address Vulnerabilities: 

GAO-09-93: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-09-93, a report to congressional committees. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

Covering nearly 4,000 miles of land and water from Washington to Maine, 
the U.S.-Canadian border is the longest undefended border in the world. 
Various Department of Homeland Security (DHS) component agencies share 
responsibility for northern border security, primarily U.S. Customs and 
Border Protection (CBP), in collaboration with other federal, state, 
local, tribal, and Canadian entities. The Implementing Recommendations 
of the 9/11 Act of 2007 required the Secretary of Homeland Security to 
submit a report to Congress that addresses the vulnerabilities along 
the northern border, and provides recommendations and required 
resources to address them. The act also required GAO to review and 
comment on this report. In response to this mandate, GAO examined (1) 
the extent to which the DHS report to Congress is responsive to the 
legislative requirements and (2) actions that may be necessary to 
address northern border vulnerabilities in addition to the actions 
addressed in the report. To conduct this work, GAO reviewed DHS plans, 
reports, and other documents, and interviewed DHS officials. 

What GAO Found: 

The DHS February 2008 report to Congress is not fully responsive to 
legislative requirements in providing information for improving 
northern border security. In particular, DHS provided a listing of 
northern border vulnerabilities and initiatives to address them, but 
did not include recommendations and additional resources that are 
needed to protect the northern border. DHS officials provided several 
reasons for the lack of specificity and gaps in reported information, 
including the fact that the component agencies’ priorities for action 
and resources are reflected in the existing budget process, and that 
they had nothing further to recommend or request through this report. 
However, budget documents do not reflect the resources needed over time 
to achieve control of the northern border. The lack of this information 
makes it difficult for Congress to consider future actions and 
resources needed. 

DHS is developing northern border strategic plans and a risk-management 
process to help guide and prioritize action and resources, and fully 
implementing recommendations from past GAO evaluations would also 
provide benefit in addressing northern border security vulnerabilities. 
DHS is currently developing strategic plans that are intended to 
provide overall direction in addressing vulnerabilities in northern 
border security. DHS is also developing a risk-management process to 
assist in prioritizing efforts and resources that will provide greatest 
benefit to national security. DHS officials have said that the success 
of various pilot projects, such as DHS’s testing of new technology, 
will likely change the level and mix of resources needed to protect the 
northern border. In the meantime, DHS could take action to reduce 
vulnerabilities by implementing recommendations made in past 
evaluations. DHS has implemented 11 GAO recommendations designed to 
improve border security, but 39 recommendations are yet to be fully 
addressed. Eighteen of these open recommendations were made within the 
last year. However, 21 recommendations for improving use of air and 
marine assets, improving screening processes at the ports of entry, and 
deploying nuclear detection equipment—which DHS and other agencies 
generally agreed to take action to implement—have remained open for at 
least 1 year and, in some cases, over 3 years. GAO believes these 
outstanding recommendations continue to have merit and should be 
implemented. 

Figure: Vehicle Inspections and Agent Patrols at and between Northern 
Border Ports of Entry: 

[Refer to PDF for image] 

This figure contains two photographs of vehicle inspections and agent 
patrols at and between northern border ports of entry. 

Sources: GAO and U.S. Customs and Border Protection. 

[End of figure] 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends that the Secretary of Homeland Security provide more 
specific information in future reports on actions and resources needed 
to achieve northern border security, and in what time frame they are 
needed. DHS and CBP concurred with our recommendation. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-09-93]. For more 
information, contact Richard Stana at (202) 512-8777 or stanar@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Results in Brief: 

Background: 

DHS Report Is Not Fully Responsive to Congress in Providing Information 
for Improving Northern Border Security: 

DHS Is Taking Action to Improve Northern Border Security, and 
Implementing Past GAO Recommendations Would Also Provide Benefit: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendation for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Selected Open Recommendations from GAO on Various Border 
Security Issues: 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security: 

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Related GAO Products: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Department of Homeland Security Components with a Primary 
Mission to Secure the Northern Border: 

Table 2: Selected GAO Recommendations Relevant to Border Security That 
Have Not Been Fully Implemented: 

Table 3: Selected Open GAO Recommendations Regarding General Border 
Security Issues with Potential Implications for Northern Border 
Security: 

Table 4: Selected Open GAO Recommendations Regarding Nuclear Security 
with Potential Implications for Northern Border Security: 

Table 5: Selected Open GAO Recommendations Regarding SBInet with 
Potential Implications for Northern Border Security: 

Table 6: Selected Open GAO Recommendations Regarding Partnerships and 
Joint Operations with Potential Implications for Northern Border 
Security: 

Abbreviations: 

9/11 Act: Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 
2007: 

ASP: advanced spectroscopic portal: 

CBP: Customs and Border Protection: 

DEA: Drug Enforcement Administration: 

DHS: Department of Homeland Security: 

DNDO: Domestic Nuclear Detection Office: 

DOE: Department of Energy: 

DOJ: Department of Justice: 

FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation: 

HSPD-7: Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7: 

HSPD-11: Homeland Security Presidential Directive 11: 

IBET: Integrated Border Enforcement Team: 

ICE: Immigration and Customs Enforcement: 

NFCCG: National Fusion Center Coordination Group: 

OBP: Office of Border Patrol: 

OES: Office of the Executive Secretariat: 

OMB: Office of Management and Budget: 

PM-ISE: Program Manager for the Information Sharing Environment: 

PNNL: Pacific Northwest National Laboratory: 

POE: port of entry: 

RCMP: Royal Canadian Mounted Police: 

SBI: Secure Border Initiative: 

USCG: U.S. Coast Guard: 

US-VISIT: U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology: 

[End of section] 

United States Government Accountability Office:
Washington, DC 20548: 

November 25, 2008: 

The Honorable Joseph I. Lieberman: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Susan M. Collins: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Peter T. King: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Homeland Security: 
House of Representatives: 

The U.S.-Canadian border stands as the longest undefended border in the 
world, covering nearly 4,000 miles of land and water,[Footnote 1] most 
of which is sparsely populated with limited law enforcement presence. 
Historically, U.S. attention and resources have been focused primarily 
on the U.S. border with Mexico, which continues to experience 
significantly higher levels of drug trafficking and illegal immigration 
than the U.S-Canadian border. However, the extensive volume of trade 
and travel between the two countries, and large expanse of areas with 
limited law enforcement presence, provide potential for terrorists and 
other criminal elements to enter the United States undetected at or 
between the northern ports of entry. 

Securing the northern border is the primary responsibility of various 
components within DHS, in collaboration with other federal, state, 
local, tribal, and Canadian entities. Within DHS, U.S. Customs and 
Border Protection (CBP) is the frontline agency responsible for 
interdiction of persons and contraband crossing the border illegally; 
U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) is responsible for 
investigating the source of cross-border crimes and dismantling their 
operations; and the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) executes its maritime 
security mission on all navigable waterways on the northern border, 
including the Great Lakes. 

DHS submitted a report to Congress in February 2008, discussing ongoing 
initiatives of these agencies to improve security along the northern 
border, as required by law. Specifically, the Implementing 
Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (9/11 Act) required 
the Secretary of Homeland Security to submit a report within 180 days 
of enactment that was to (1) address the vulnerabilities along the 
northern border, and (2) provide recommendations to address such 
vulnerabilities, including required resources needed to protect the 
border.[Footnote 2] 

The 9/11 Act also directed us to submit to Congress, within 270 days of 
DHS's report, a report that reviews and comments on the DHS report, and 
to provide recommendations regarding any additional actions necessary 
to protect the northern border.[Footnote 3] In response to this 
mandate, we prepared this report to answer the following key questions: 

* To what extent is the DHS report to Congress responsive to the 
legislative requirements to report on ongoing initiatives to improve 
U.S. northern border security, address the vulnerabilities along the 
northern border, and provide recommendations to address these 
vulnerabilities and required resources to protect the northern border? 

* In addition to the actions addressed in the report, what actions may 
be necessary to address northern border security vulnerabilities? 

In conducting our work, we reviewed the DHS report structure and 
content against requirements in the 9/11 Act. We also reviewed whether 
the DHS report content was complete and consistent with information 
provided in its key management documents including strategic plans, 
performance and accountability reports, budget requests, and other 
documentation produced by relevant DHS agencies. We interviewed DHS 
officials from CBP, ICE, and USCG located at headquarters and Detroit, 
Michigan, who had roles and responsibilities for northern border 
security to obtain their perspectives on documented information. For 
this reason, we also interviewed Department of Justice (DOJ) officials 
with the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), which has national 
responsibility for drug enforcement, and the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI), which has national responsibility for terrorism. 
We selected Detroit, Michigan, among CBP's Office of Border Patrol's 
(OBP) eight northern border sectors based on factors including relative 
threat and vulnerabilities, priority for resources, and demonstration 
site for new technology. Our observations from the Detroit sector 
cannot be generalized across the other seven sectors; however, we 
believe that they were sufficient for the purposes of this report in 
comparing the headquarters and field perspective. While in Detroit, we 
also spoke with state and Canadian officials involved in northern 
border security to obtain their perspectives on northern border 
security threats and vulnerabilities, DHS actions to address them, and 
the effectiveness of binational and national partnerships. To determine 
actions that could help address northern border security 
vulnerabilities, we reviewed whether the information reported by DHS 
reflected a strategic risk-informed approach as required in the 
Homeland Security Act of 2002[Footnote 4] and Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7). We also identified report 
recommendations for strengthening national border security from past 
GAO evaluations from fiscal years 2005 through 2008 that when fully 
implemented have potential to help address northern border 
vulnerabilities. 

We conducted this performance audit from June 2008 through November 
2008 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit 
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable 
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for 
our findings based on our audit objectives. 

Results in Brief: 

The DHS report to Congress is not fully responsive in providing 
information for improving northern border security as required in the 
9/11 Act. DHS provided a listing of northern border vulnerabilities and 
initiatives to address them, but did not include recommendations and 
additional resources that are needed to protect the northern border. 
DHS officials responsible for preparing the report provided several 
reasons for the lack of specificity and gaps in reported information, 
including the fact that DHS reflects its priorities for action and 
resources in the existing budget process, and that they had nothing 
further to recommend or request. However, the budget process provides 
Congress with a 5-year plan to meet prioritized needs within projected 
resource constraints, not the time frame and resources needed to 
achieve control of the northern border. The lack of information 
regarding the extent that vulnerabilities remain unaddressed on the 
northern border and the time and resources it will take to address them 
makes it challenging for Congress to consider future actions and 
resources necessary for the northern border in the broader context of 
national security. DHS has an opportunity to increase the value of 
information it provides to Congress in fulfilling other reporting 
requirements established in law. 

DHS is developing northern border strategic plans and a risk-management 
process to help guide and prioritize action and resources, and fully 
implementing recommendations from past GAO evaluations would also 
provide benefit in addressing northern border security vulnerabilities. 
DHS officials are currently developing strategic plans that are 
intended to provide its component agencies with overall direction in 
addressing vulnerabilities in northern border security, as well as more-
targeted direction specific to vulnerabilities in the air and water 
environments. DHS is also developing a risk-management process to 
assist in prioritizing efforts and resources that will provide greatest 
benefit to national security. DHS officials said the success of various 
pilot projects will likely change the level and mix of resources needed 
to protect the northern border. For example, DHS is testing new 
technology that, if successful, may change the mix of technology and 
personnel deployed along the border, and partnerships among federal, 
state, and local agencies to coordinate information and operations may 
also create efficiencies that change resource requirements. DHS can 
also act to timely implement recommendations made in recent and past 
GAO evaluations. At the time of our review, DHS had implemented 11 GAO 
recommendations designed to improve border security, but 39 
recommendations had not been fully implemented. Eighteen of these open 
recommendations were made within the last year. However, 21 
recommendations for improving screening processes at the ports of 
entry, expediting deployment of nuclear detection equipment, and 
improving the use of air and marine assets have not been fully 
implemented in the course of at least 1 and, in some cases, over 3 
years. Internal control standards for the federal government state that 
agencies are to ensure that findings of audits and other reviews are 
promptly resolved. We believe that these outstanding recommendations 
continue to have merit and should be implemented. 

We are making a recommendation to the Secretary of Homeland Security to 
provide more specific information in addressing future reporting 
requirements to Congress, including planned actions, resource 
requirements, and time frames for increasing and achieving northern 
border security, and the basis used for prioritizing such action and 
resources in the context of other national security risks. In 
commenting on a draft of this report, DHS and CBP concurred with this 
recommendation and stated that CBP will work with the department to 
implement the recommendation through the approved budget process. 
Written comments from DHS are in appendix II. 

Background: 

The United States shares nearly 4,000 miles of border with Canada 
stretching from the Pacific to the Atlantic coasts, and the U.S.- 
Canadian border is considered to be the world's longest open border 
between two nations. There is a great deal of trade and travel across 
this border, and approximately 90 percent of Canada's population lives 
within 100 miles of the U.S. border. While legal trade is predominant, 
DHS reports networks of illicit criminal activity and smuggling of 
drugs, currency, people, and weapons between the two countries. 
Annually, CBP reports making approximately 4,000 arrests and interdicts 
approximately 40,000 pounds of illegal drugs at and between the 
northern border ports of entry. Historically, these numbers have been 
significantly lower than those of the southwest border;[Footnote 5] 
however, DHS reports that the terrorist threat on the northern border 
is higher, given the large expanse of area with limited law enforcement 
coverage. 

DHS agencies are charged with protecting the nation and its citizens 
from threats of terrorism, as shown in table 1. CBP is the lead federal 
agency in charge of securing our nation's borders, and has three 
components with a mission to interdict illegal contraband and persons 
seeking to enter illegally at and between the land ports of entry. Two 
other DHS agencies, ICE and USCG, also have key roles. The ICE mission 
includes investigating and dismantling criminal organizations that 
transport persons and goods across the border illegally, while USCG 
executes its maritime security mission by providing patrol presence and 
operational response for all navigable waterways on the northern 
border, including the Great Lakes. 

Table 1: Department of Homeland Security Components with a Primary 
Mission to Secure the Northern Border: 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) components: U.S. Customs and 
Border Protection (CBP); 
Role and responsibility on northern border: Lead federal component 
agency in charge of securing U.S. borders. 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) components: Office of Border 
Patrol (OBP); 
Role and responsibility on northern border: Prevents terrorists, 
terrorist weapons, inadmissible aliens, smugglers, narcotics, and other 
contraband from entering the U.S. between ports of entry. 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) components: Office of Field 
Operations; 
Role and responsibility on northern border: Prevents terrorists, 
terrorist weapons, inadmissible aliens, smugglers, narcotics, and other 
contraband from entering the U.S, while facilitating legitimate trade 
and travel, at the nation's air, land, and sea ports of entry. 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) components: Office of Air and 
Marine; 
Role and responsibility on northern border: Operates integrated air and 
marine forces to detect, interdict, and prevent acts of terrorism and 
the unlawful movement of people, illegal drugs, and other contraband 
toward or across U.S. borders. 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) components: U.S. Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement (ICE); 
Role and responsibility on northern border: Enforces federal 
immigration and customs laws--along with the Drug Enforcement 
Administration (DEA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)--in 
relation to activities occurring at, or with a nexus to, the border. 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) components: U.S. Coast Guard 
(USCG); 
Role and responsibility on northern border: Executes maritime security 
mission on and over the major waterways using marine and air assets. 

Source: GAO analysis of DHS data. 

[End of table] 

DHS agencies leverage their border security efforts through 
partnerships with state, local, tribal, and Canadian law enforcement 
agencies to share intelligence, information, and conduct joint 
operations for interdiction and investigation of cross-border crime. 
DHS considers these collaborative efforts particularly important for 
the northern border in remote, sparsely populated areas. 

There has been growing concern within Congress over the number of 
personnel assigned to the northern border, the increasing amount of 
illegal activity, and the potential for terrorists to gain unlawful 
entry into the United States. There has also been concern with respect 
to the adequacy of facilities and physical infrastructure to 
accommodate the increasing volume of traffic.[Footnote 6] Congress has 
shown increasing interest in issues surrounding security of the 
northern border--first authorizing, and later directing--resource 
allocations to the northern border for personnel and improved 
technology.[Footnote 7] Congress has also established various reporting 
requirements in laws that are to provide updates on the status of 
northern border security. In addition to the 9/11 Act, for example, the 
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008,[Footnote 8] directs DHS to 
prepare and submit a biennial National Land Border Security Plan. This 
plan is to include a vulnerability, risk, and threat assessment of each 
port of entry located on the northern border or the southern border, 
beginning in January 2009. 

The DHS report--issued to Congress on February 29, 2008--was overseen 
and facilitated by CBP's Office of the Executive Secretariat (OES). OES 
was formed in August 2007 to assign responsibilities for and coordinate 
the development of all CBP congressional reports, correspondence, and 
external requests for information. OES tasked the CBP Office for Secure 
Border Initiative with taking the lead in coordinating information 
gathering from the relevant CBP components.[Footnote 9] OES also 
received input from ICE and USCG in formulating the report. The 
information from these sources was compiled and reviewed within CBP, 
DHS, and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) before submission to 
Congress. 

DHS Report Is Not Fully Responsive to Congress in Providing Information 
for Improving Northern Border Security: 

While the DHS report to Congress discusses northern border 
vulnerabilities and ongoing initiatives in place as required in law, 
information is missing that identifies the extent that various 
vulnerabilities remain unaddressed, and recommendations and resources 
to address these security gaps. Without this information, it is 
difficult for Congress to consider future actions and resources needed 
on the northern border in the broader context of national security. 

The DHS Report Discusses Vulnerabilities and Initiatives Reflected in 
Key Management Documents, but Does Not Link This Information to 
Identify Security Gaps: 

The DHS report to Congress discusses northern border vulnerabilities 
and ongoing initiatives to improve northern border security consistent 
with the content of its planning, performance, and budget documents, 
but DHS does not link this information to show the extent that security 
gaps remain on the northern border. The DHS report states that the 
northern border is vulnerable to the primary threats of terrorism, drug 
trafficking, and illegal immigration. These facts were consistently 
supported by threat information obtained from Canadian officials, and 
officials from DHS and CBP.[Footnote 10] According to these sources, 
northern border vulnerabilities are most actively exploited to smuggle 
illegal drugs and contraband; illegal immigration is a lesser problem. 
While DHS reports significant concern that terrorists can enter the 
United States undetected at or between the northern ports of entry, 
U.S. and Canadian officials agree that there is currently no credible 
intelligence or evidence indicating that there are terrorists in Canada 
planning an attack on U.S. soil. 

The DHS report lists initiatives its component agencies have underway 
to address vulnerabilities and achieve operational control of the 
border but does not mention progress made in this regard, or how many 
border miles are under operational control.[Footnote 11] CBP reports on 
these indicators--border miles under effective (or operational) 
control, and border miles with increased situational awareness--as two 
of its key performance measures and reports that it plans to increase 
and achieve control of the northern border by deploying a proper mix of 
personnel, technology, facilities, and partnerships at and between the 
ports of entry. While the DHS report lists initiatives in each of these 
areas, they are not linked to the reported vulnerabilities, and the 
extent that these initiatives mitigate or eliminate vulnerabilities at 
and between the ports of entry is not mentioned. Also not mentioned in 
the report is the timeline DHS is using to request and deploy resources 
necessary to increase the levels of control of the northern border. The 
absence of such information makes it difficult for Congress to consider 
future action and resources needed on the northern border in the 
context of other areas of national security. 

Personnel: 

In terms of personnel, DHS lists ongoing initiatives for adequately 
staffing the northern ports of entry, and hiring initiatives to 
increase staffing between the ports of entry by 2010. For the ports of 
entry, DHS describes its implementation of a workload staffing model 
that considers workload and processing times to help identify the 
number of personnel that should be deployed at each location, which has 
resulted in the deployment of 190 CBP officers. Between the ports of 
entry, DHS does not provide its methodology for identifying adequate 
staffing, but does describe initiatives to more than double the number 
of border patrol agents from fiscal years 2007 to 2010, in response to 
direction from Congress. It is unclear, however, to what extent these 
staffing initiatives will result in obtaining effective control of the 
border. For example, the report states that 190 CBP officers have been 
deployed to ports of entry as indicated in part by the workload 
staffing model; however, DHS reports in its strategic plan for fiscal 
years 2008-2013 that additional CBP officers are needed at many ports 
of entry. Similarly, while DHS reports a commitment to meet statutory 
staffing goals between the ports of entry by the year 2010, OBP 
officials indicated that a greater number of agents would be needed to 
gain operational control of the northern border. 

Technology: 

In discussing technology initiatives, CBP reports that technology has 
been employed at the northern ports of entry to address a number of 
vulnerabilities, but between the ports of entry, discussion is focused 
on pilot projects intended to test capabilities for potential use on 
the northern border. At the ports of entry, CBP reports that much 
technology is in place to address vulnerabilities related to the 
transport of illegal radiological and nuclear materials, illegal 
contraband, and misrepresentation of identity through the use of 
fraudulent documents. Between the ports of entry, pilot projects 
address vulnerabilities related to the inability to detect low-flying 
aircraft; the inability to detect unauthorized border crossings in 
areas without law enforcement patrol; and to share communications. The 
report does not discuss when the results of the projects will be 
available or the extent that DHS would use these technologies, if 
successful, to address existing vulnerabilities. DHS also does not 
discuss initiatives to address the vulnerabilities cited in the report 
related to maritime security, such as the lack of video capabilities in 
marinas, unregulated access that small private vessels have on the 
Great Lakes and other border waterways, and insufficient resources to 
access boats on the open water. Subsequent to the report issued to 
Congress, DHS provided a thorough discussion of the vulnerabilities and 
challenges in addressing these aspects of maritime security in the DHS 
Small Vessel Security Strategy, issued April 2008. USCG stated that an 
implementation plan would be finalized at the end of December 2008, to 
guide agency actions in implementing the strategy, but this plan would 
not be released to the public due to its security classification. 
[Footnote 12] 

Facilities: 

In discussing facilities, the DHS report describes ongoing initiatives 
to systematically review the port of entry inspection facilities to 
identify the need for upgrade or replacement, and to develop a new 
standard station concept[Footnote 13] to accommodate the growth in 
number of border agents between the ports of entry. The report 
describes the age and condition of some facilities and volume of 
traffic and use. However, while the DHS strategic plan states that the 
department's secure border program depends significantly on modernizing 
the ports of entry, there is no discussion in the report to Congress on 
the status of these efforts, when they will be completed, and how they 
currently affect northern border security.[Footnote 14] 

Partnerships: 

The DHS report lists various initiatives underway that establish 
binational partnerships or partnerships among U.S. federal, state, and 
local agencies to share information and improve communication and 
cooperation among agencies working along the border. Five binational 
partnerships were discussed, four with a broad focus on cross-border 
law enforcement efforts,[Footnote 15] and one with a specific focus on 
preventing illegal air incursions.[Footnote 16] Six U.S. partnerships 
were also mentioned, one specific to smuggling on Indian reservations, 
[Footnote 17] two related to drug trafficking,[Footnote 18] two related 
to intelligence gathering,[Footnote 19] and one related to augmenting 
enforcement capacity by cross-designating federal authority to other 
agencies.[Footnote 20] DHS and CBP management documents support the 
report's discussion of these partnerships as a key strategy for 
northern border security; however, there is no discussion of the extent 
that these partnerships were responsible for increasing the level of 
control across the border or how they will do so in the future. 

DHS Report Does Not Provide Recommendations or Resource Requirements to 
Improve Northern Border Security: 

The DHS report contains a section for recommendations to address 
northern border vulnerabilities, but the information provided is a 
restatement of initiatives in place without mention of recommendations 
for further action or additional resources as required by law. 
Officials from DHS component agencies provided several reasons this 
information was missing from the report. One reason was that the Secure 
Border Initiative (SBI) office--which was tasked with coordinating 
component agency contributions to the report--directed them to discuss 
their resource needs in terms of the existing budget; therefore, they 
did not discuss actions or resource requirements for future years. A 
second reason was that some components were satisfied with their 
current budget allocation. CBP officials stated that they supported the 
President's budget and had nothing further to recommend or request in 
the report to Congress.[Footnote 21] A third reason is that some 
components did not have the information necessary to identify 
recommendations or additional resources. USCG officials indicated that 
the lack of departmentwide strategic direction for the northern border 
has made it difficult to identify specific resource needs. Similarly, 
ICE officials said that information was lacking to compare and assess 
overall resources devoted across various northern border agencies, 
initiatives, and border locations. 

DHS Is Taking Action to Improve Northern Border Security, and 
Implementing Past GAO Recommendations Would Also Provide Benefit: 

DHS is developing strategic plans, a risk-management process, and new 
initiatives that could change the level and mix of resources needed to 
protect the northern border; however, most efforts were incomplete and 
unavailable for our review. Over the years, we have conducted 
evaluations of various border security activities and our reports 
included a number of recommendations for improvement. DHS action to 
fully implement these recommendations would provide benefit in 
addressing northern border vulnerabilities. 

DHS Is Developing Strategic Plans and a Risk-Management Process: 

DHS and CBP have reported the need to provide a coherent framework to 
coordinate federal, state, local, and tribal northern border security 
efforts, and are developing northern border strategic plans, as well as 
a risk-management process to further these goals. Completion of these 
efforts should provide DHS with useful information in developing future 
reports to Congress on northern border security. 

DHS has completed, or begun efforts to develop, three strategic plans 
that will help address vulnerabilities on the northern border. 
Strategic plans help ensure that missions requiring a multiagency 
response are firmly aligned with articulated goals and objectives, and 
help keep agencies focused on the desired "end state." While DHS has 
developed a broad strategic plan to outline the department's overall 
mission and objectives, it has begun to focus on the need to develop 
coordinated and unified strategies to address more specific concerns, 
such as northern border security. A key effort under development is an 
overall northern border strategic plan that will, for the first time, 
take all DHS component agencies into account in efforts to address 
vulnerabilities necessary for control of the northern border. CBP did 
not indicate when this plan may be completed. A second strategic plan 
under development will address security vulnerabilities in the air 
environment, such as the inability to detect low-flying aircraft. CBP 
officials stated that they were working on performance measures for 
this plan, and estimate that it will be released in April 2009. DHS 
issued its third strategic plan, the Small Vessel Security Strategy, in 
April 2008 to help close existing maritime security gaps on waterways 
such as the Great Lakes, related to the small vessel environment. 

To help component agencies achieve the major goals outlined in each of 
these strategic plans, DHS plans to develop implementation plans that 
are to describe specific actions component agencies will take in 
support of each objective, identify lead component agencies for these 
actions, and provide target completion dates. USCG has stated that the 
implementation plan for the small vessel strategic plan is scheduled to 
be issued for use by component agencies at the end of December 2009, 
but will be considered security sensitive.[Footnote 22] Dates are not 
yet available for implementation plans to follow the remaining two 
strategic plans. 

Some DHS component agencies have acted to incorporate risk-management 
principles that provide information to prioritize and allocate 
resources for their individual programs and activities as required by 
law and presidential directive,[Footnote 23] but DHS has not yet 
completed efforts to implement this approach departmentwide. Risk 
management is important for strengthening homeland security resource 
allocations, as the nation cannot afford to fully protect against every 
type of threat. Therefore, an approach is needed that considers how 
best to allocate resources based on factors such as probability and 
adverse consequence. The DHS goal is to develop a risk-management 
process that will assess risk and inform strategic planning, 
programming, budgeting, and execution processes across all of its 
component agencies and that will evaluate the risk-reduction effects 
among relevant DHS programs. However, achieving this goal has been 
difficult. While risk management has been used in the private and 
public sectors for decades, its application for homeland security and 
combating terrorism is relatively new and without a precedent 
framework.[Footnote 24] As such, the effort to assess risk across DHS 
component agencies and programs is still in its very early stages of 
development. 

Future DHS Action to Improve Northern Border Security Is Influenced by 
Success of Pilot Projects, Partnerships, and External Factors: 

DHS component agencies have identified resources to increase and 
achieve northern border security, but the need for these resources 
constantly evolves in response to various factors. For example, the DHS 
report described many pilot projects for new technology. If successful, 
OBP officials report that these projects could reduce security 
vulnerabilities and current needs for other resources, such as existing 
technology, personnel, or infrastructure. However, these officials also 
indicate that new technology must be fully tested for operational 
effectiveness, and delays coupled with uncertainties of success have 
made it difficult to balance future resource investments in new 
technology with current investments in existing technology. Such 
balance is necessary to ensure security as well as effective 
stewardship of taxpayer dollars. 

Similarly, DHS officials discussed partnerships among federal, state, 
and local agencies to coordinate information and operations--either 
newly created or still in development--that could result in greater 
efficiencies in border security. However, time will tell if these 
partnerships are sustainable and warrant a decrease or change in 
current estimated needs for personnel. 

External factors--such as the interplay among private parties, 
governments, and agencies--also influence actions in addressing 
security vulnerabilities. In Detroit, for example, CBP officials said 
that action to improve facilities at northern ports of entry was 
stymied by private ownership of property and landlocked facilities. In 
addition, the Small Vessel Security Strategy indicates that efforts to 
address maritime vulnerabilities were challenged by different practices 
or views among federal, state, and Canadian governments in balancing 
security needs with the freedom of the waterways expected by the small- 
vessel community. Further, ICE officials said that the scope of their 
authority in pursuing narcotics investigations influenced their actions 
in addressing some cross-border crimes. 

DHS Action to Implement Past GAO Recommendations Would Strengthen 
Northern Border Security: 

DHS has an opportunity to address some northern border vulnerabilities 
by fully implementing recommendations made in past evaluations of its 
security efforts. Over the past few years, we have conducted 
evaluations and issued a number of reports related to the security of 
the U.S. border both at and between ports of entry (see Related GAO 
Products section at end of this report). In some instances, our reports 
included recommendations addressing vulnerabilities in border security--
including the northern border--while in other cases, our reports and 
recommendations were more general, but when implemented, would provide 
benefit to the northern border. 

We reviewed recommendations resulting from GAO evaluations conducted 
from fiscal years 2005 through 2008 and identified 11 reports 
containing 50 recommendations that had potential to address 
vulnerabilities in border security, or to address weaknesses in key 
initiatives. At the time of our review, DHS had implemented 11 of these 
50 recommendations. For example, DHS implemented a recommendation to 
formalize a performance measure for the traveler inspection program 
that would help agency management and Congress monitor effectiveness in 
apprehending inadmissible aliens and other violators. 

However, 39 recommendations from the 11 GAO reports are still open. In 
some cases, recommendations were open because DHS and other federal 
agencies[Footnote 25] had not yet had time to implement them. For 
example, 18 of the 39 open recommendations were from GAO reports issued 
within the last fiscal year. In regard to the remaining 21 
recommendations, DHS and other agencies agreed to take action, but at 
least 1 and, in some cases, over 3 years have passed without full 
implementation.[Footnote 26] Standards for Internal Control in the 
Federal Government state that agencies are to ensure that findings of 
audits and other reviews are promptly resolved.[Footnote 27] The time 
necessary to resolve recommendations varies depending on the type of 
action required. However, DHS does not have a transparent process to 
show how long it will take to implement each recommendation considering 
the resources, risk level, and complexity of effort required. Timely 
implementation of recommendations would help address vulnerabilities 
related to a variety of border security initiatives. Some of the older 
recommendations that have not been fully implemented include those to 
improve screening of travelers at ports of entry to ensure legal entry, 
preclude cross-border transport of illicit nuclear materials, reduce 
risks in delivering key technology for border surveillance and for 
information sharing, and increase information sharing and coordination 
among federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies, as shown in 
table 2 and appendix I. We believe that these outstanding 
recommendations continue to have merit and should be implemented. 

Table 2: Selected GAO Recommendations Relevant to Border Security That 
Have Not Been Fully Implemented: 

Traveler Screening: 

Number and year of recommendation: 4 (fiscal year 2007); 
Purpose of recommendations: Achieve benefits from investment in the US-
VISIT program at land ports of entry by developing performance measures 
for assessing US-VISIT operations, and ensuring reports to Congress 
include information regarding deployment of biometric exit 
capabilities, and how these capabilities align with existing land 
border security initiatives. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-248], December 2006. 

Number and year of recommendation: 3 (fiscal year 2007); 
Purpose of recommendations: Prevent fraudulent use of passports and 
visas by periodically reassessing and fully utilizing their security 
features, and establishing a comprehensive oversight program of 
passport acceptance facilities. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-1006], July 2007. 

Number and year of recommendation: 5 (fiscal year 2008); 
Purpose of recommendations: Mitigate vulnerabilities in terrorist watch 
list screening processes, enhance the use of the terrorist watch list 
as a counterterrorism tool and ensure its effectiveness, and ensure 
governmentwide terrorist-related screening efforts have oversight, 
accountability, and guidance. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-110], October 2007. 

Number and year of recommendation: 2 (fiscal year 2008); 
Purpose of recommendations: Mitigate the risk of failed traveler 
inspections at ports of entry by developing data on training programs 
and incorporating specific tasks and requirements into CBP's procedures 
for its on-the-job training program. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-219], November 2007. 

Nuclear Security: 

Number and year of recommendation: 6 (fiscal year 2006); 
Purpose of recommendations: Reduce delays in acquisition and deployment 
of radiation detection equipment to ports of entry, take steps to 
increase the chances that inspection officers find illicit radiological 
material, and ensure the reliability and effective use of cost-benefit 
information for risk assessment and acquisition decisions. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-389], March 2006. 

Number and year of recommendation: 4 (fiscal year 2007); 
Purpose of recommendations: Test the capabilities and limitations of 
radiation detection equipment before making production and acquisition 
decisions. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-1247T], September 2007. 

Number and year of recommendation: 3 (fiscal year 2008); 
Purpose of recommendations: Better track and detect radioactive 
materials and ensure that for materials transported across the U.S. 
border, personnel at ports of entry comply with guidance for verifying 
that materials licenses are legitimate. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-598], June 2008. 

Secure Border Initiative Technology (SBInet): 

Number and year of recommendation: 7 (fiscal year 2008); 
Purpose of recommendations: Improve acquisition, testing, and 
implementation of SBInet technology for improving surveillance and 
communications technologies along U.S. borders, and to permit 
meaningful measurement, oversight, and accountability of the SBInet 
program to CBP, DHS senior leadership, and Congress. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1086], September 2008. 

Federal, State, and Local Coordination: 

Number and year of recommendation: 2 (fiscal year 2005); 
Purpose of recommendations: Ensure that air and marine assets among DHS 
agencies are effectively coordinated to meet border security needs. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-543], August 2005. 

Number and year of recommendation: 2 (fiscal year 2007); 
Purpose of recommendations: Provide guidance and support to enhance 
collaboration at operations centers staffed by multiple DHS agencies. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-89], October 2006. 

Number and year of recommendation: 1 (fiscal year 2008); 
Purpose of recommendations: Improve efforts to create and support a 
national network of state and local information fusion centers. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-35], October 2007. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of table] 

Conclusions: 

Federal agency reporting requirements, such as those contained in the 
9/11 Act, can provide Congress with important information for debating 
policy and allocating scarce resources, and the level of agency 
responsiveness can either support or hinder these efforts. While the 
DHS report to Congress provided information on the status of its 
efforts, there is little sense of the relative effect these efforts 
have had in protecting the northern border, and what additional action 
or resources may be needed in the future. Requirements in law to 
periodically assess the status of northern border security provide DHS 
with additional opportunity to highlight information that can best meet 
congressional needs. 

Completion of DHS efforts to develop a northern border strategic plan 
and risk management process to prioritize action and funding could lead 
to better understanding among DHS, its component agencies, and Congress 
in determining whether resources are most effectively allocated across 
initiatives, border locations, and responsible agencies. However, 
balancing current and future funding for border security will remain 
challenging as the resource needs for the northern border will continue 
to evolve in response to the relative success of new initiatives. In 
the meantime, implementing recommendations for improving border 
security in a more timely fashion would help reduce the nation's risk 
due to unaddressed vulnerabilities. 

Recommendation for Executive Action: 

To provide Congress with information that will facilitate policy 
discussions and resource decisions for northern border security, we 
recommend that for future reporting requirements the Secretary of 
Homeland Security include more specific information on the actions, 
resources, and time frame needed to improve security of the northern 
border along with any attendant uncertainties, and the basis used to 
prioritize action and resources for northern border security relative 
to other areas of national security. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

We requested comments on a draft of this report from the Secretary of 
Homeland Security and Attorney General. In its response, DHS and CBP 
agreed with our recommendation and stated that CBP will work with the 
department to implement it through the approved budget process. DOJ did 
not provide formal comments. 

In its comments, DHS stated that our report said DHS and other agencies 
should proceed to adopt and address all of the recommendations from 
previous reports without any assessment of priority based on risk. Our 
intent in discussing these recommendations was to point out potential 
security vulnerabilities that exist, not to imply that all of these 
recommendations were of equal importance, or that risk-based 
prioritization should not be applied when addressing them. GAO has 
advocated the use of risk management principles, and using them to 
sequence actions on open recommendations would seem to be appropriate. 
We have added language to clarify that while the definition of timely 
implementation will vary across recommendations, DHS lacks a 
transparent process to show how long it will take to implement each 
recommendation considering the resources, risk level, and complexity of 
effort required. 

DHS's comments are reprinted in appendix II. DHS and DOJ also offered 
technical comments, which we considered and incorporated where 
appropriate. 

We are providing copies of this report to the Senate and House 
committees that have authorization and oversight responsibilities for 
homeland security. We are also sending copies to the Secretary of 
Homeland Security, the Attorney General, and other interested parties. 
In addition, this report will be available at no charge on GAO's Web 
site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please 
contact me at (202) 512-8777, or stanar@gao.gov. Contact points for our 
Office of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on 
the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to 
this report are listed in appendix III. 

Signed by: 

Richard M. Stana: 
Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Selected Open Recommendations from GAO on Various Border 
Security Issues: 

In the past, GAO has offered numerous recommendations to the Department 
of Homeland Security (DHS) related to border security. Although 
previous recommendations are not specific to the northern border, many 
touch on different aspects that do affect various elements of northern 
border security. Many recommendations made by GAO concerning general 
border security, nuclear security, technology, and interagency 
cooperation and information sharing, have yet to be implemented by DHS. 
Fully implementing these recommendations could provide great benefits 
to DHS and the nation in terms of strengthening general border 
security, and by extension, security of the northern border. Tables 3 
through 6 detail 39 selected open recommendations related to border 
security vulnerabilities. 

Table 3: Selected Open GAO Recommendations Regarding General Border 
Security Issues with Potential Implications for Northern Border 
Security: 

GAO report: GAO-07-248: Border Security: US-VISIT Program Faces 
Strategic, Operational, and Technological Challenges at Land Ports of 
Entry (Dec. 6, 2006); 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-248] 
Recommendation: 
To help DHS achieve benefits commensurate with its investment in U.S. 
Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology (US-VISIT) at land 
ports of entry (POE), and security goals and objectives, the Secretary 
of Homeland Security should direct the US-VISIT Program Director, in 
collaboration with the Commissioner of Customs and Border Protection 
to: 
(1) Develop performance measures for assessing the effect of US-VISIT 
operations specifically at land POEs. 

As DHS finalized the statutorily mandated report describing a 
comprehensive biometric entry and exit system for US-VISIT, the 
Secretary of Homeland Security should take steps to ensure that the 
report include, among other things: 
(2) Information on the costs, benefits, and feasibility of deploying 
biometric and nonbiometric exit capabilities at land POEs. 
(3) A discussion of how DHS intends to move from a nonbiometric exit 
capability, such as the technology currently being tested, to a 
reliable biometric exit capability that meets statutory requirements. 
(4) A description of how DHS expects to align emerging land border 
security initiatives with US-VISIT and what facility or facility 
modifications would be needed at land POEs to ensure that technology 
and process work in harmony. 

GAO report: GAO-07-1006: Border Security: Security of New Passports and 
Visas Enhanced, but More Needs to Be Done to Prevent Their Fraudulent 
Use (July 31, 2007); 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-1006] 
Recommendation: 
To improve the integrity of its travel documents, the Secretary of 
State should: 
(5) Develop a process and schedule for periodically reassessing the 
security features and planning the redesign of its travel documents. 
(6) Establish a comprehensive oversight program of passport acceptance 
facilities. In doing so, the Department of State should consider 
conducting performance audits of acceptance facilities, agents, and 
accepted applications and establishing an appropriate system of 
internal controls over the acceptance facilities. 

To more fully utilize the security features of passports and visas, the 
Secretary of Homeland Security should: 
(7) Develop a deployment schedule for providing sufficient e-passport 
readers to U.S. POEs, which would enable inspection officials to better 
utilize the security features in the new U.S. e-passport. 

GAO report: GAO-08-110: Terrorist Watch List Screening: Opportunities 
Exist to Enhance Management Oversight, Reduce Vulnerabilities in Agency 
Screening Processes, and Expand Use of the List (Oct. 11, 2007); 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-110] 
Recommendation: 
In order to mitigate security vulnerabilities in terrorist watch list 
screening processes, we recommended that the Secretary of Homeland 
Security and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
should: 
(8) Assess to what extent there are vulnerabilities in the current 
screening processes that arise when screening agencies do not accept 
relevant records due to the designs of their computer systems, the 
extent to which these vulnerabilities pose a security risk, and what 
actions, if any, should be taken in response. 

To enhance the use of the consolidated terrorist watch list as a 
counterterrorism tool and to help ensure its effectiveness, the 
Secretary of Homeland Security should, in consultation with the heads 
of other appropriate federal departments and agencies and private 
sector entities: 
(9) Develop guidelines to govern the use of watch list records to 
support private sector screening processes that have a substantial 
bearing on homeland security, as called for in Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive 6. 

To enhance the use of the consolidated terrorist watch list as a 
counterterrorism tool and to help ensure its effectiveness, the 
Secretary of Homeland Security should, in consultation with the heads 
of other appropriate federal departments: 
(10) Develop and submit to the President through the Assistant to the 
President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism an updated 
strategy for a coordinated and comprehensive approach to terrorist-
related screening as called for in Homeland Security Presidential 
Directive 11 (HSPD-11), which, among other things, (a) identifies all 
appropriate screening opportunities to use watch list records to 
detect, identify, track, and interdict individuals who pose a threat to 
homeland security and (b) safeguards legal rights, including privacy 
and civil liberties. 

(11) Develop and submit to the President through the Assistant to the 
President for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism an updated 
investment and implementation plan that describes the scope, 
governance, principles, outcomes, milestones, training objectives, 
metrics, costs, and schedule of activities necessary for implementing a 
terrorist-related screening strategy, as called for in HSPD-11. 

To help ensure that governmentwide terrorist-related screening efforts 
have the oversight, accountability, and guidance necessary to achieve 
the administration's vision of a comprehensive and coordinated 
approach, the Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and 
Counterterrorism should: 
(12) Ensure that the governance structure proposed by the plan affords 
clear and adequate responsibility and authority to (a) provide 
monitoring and analysis of watch list screening efforts governmentwide, 
(b) respond to issues that hinder effectiveness, and (c) assess 
progress toward intended outcomes. 

GAO report: GAO-08-219: Border Security: Despite Progress, Weaknesses 
in Traveler Inspections Exist at Our Nation's Ports of Entry (Nov. 5, 
2007); 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-219] 
Recommendation: 
To mitigate the risk of failed traveler inspections at ports of entry, 
we recommend that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct the 
Commissioner of Customs and Border Protection to take the following 
actions: 
(13) Develop data on cross-training programs that measure whether the 
individuals who require training are receiving it so that agency 
management is in a better position to measure progress toward achieving 
training goals. 

(14) Incorporate into CBP's procedures for its on-the-job training 
program (1) specific tasks that CBP officers must experience during on-
the-job training and (2) requirements for measuring officer proficiency 
in performing those tasks. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of table] 

Table 4: Selected Open GAO Recommendations Regarding Nuclear Security 
with Potential Implications for Northern Border Security: 

GAO report: GAO-06-389: Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS Has Made 
Progress Deploying Radiation Detection Equipment at U.S. Ports-of- 
Entry, but Concerns Remain (Mar. 22, 2006); 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-389] 
Recommendation: 
Since DHS provides Congress with information concerning the acquisition 
and deployment of portal monitors, and since DHS's procedures to obtain 
internal agreement on this information are lengthy and cumbersome-- 
often resulting in delays--the Secretary of Homeland Security, working 
with the Director of the Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) and 
the Commissioner of CBP, should: 
(15) Review these approval procedures and take actions necessary to 
ensure that DHS submits information to the Congress early in the fiscal 
year. 

In order to complete the radiation portal monitor deployment program as 
planned, the Secretary of Homeland Security, working with the Director 
of DNDO, and in concert with CBP and the Pacific Northwest National 
Laboratory (PNNL), should: 
(16) Devise a plan to close the gap between the current deployment rate 
and the rate needed to complete deployments by September 2009. 

To ensure that DHS's substantial investment in radiation detection 
technology yields the greatest possible level of detection capability 
at the lowest possible cost, the Secretary of Homeland Security, once 
the costs and capabilities of advanced technology portal monitors are 
well understood, and before any of the new equipment is purchased, 
should: 
(17) Work with the Director of DNDO to analyze the benefits and costs 
of deploying advanced portal monitors. This analysis should focus on 
determining whether any additional detection capability provided by the 
advanced equipment is worth its additional cost. After completing this 
cost-benefit analysis, the Secretary of Homeland Security, working with 
the Director of DNDO, should revise its total program cost estimates to 
reflect current decisions. 

To help speed seaport deployments and to help ensure that future rail 
deployments proceed on time, the Secretary of Homeland Security, in 
cooperation with the Commissioner of CBP, should: 
(18) Develop procedures for effectively screening rail containers and 
develop new technologies to facilitate inspections. 

To increase the chances that CBP officers find illicit radiological 
material, the Secretary of Homeland Security, working with the 
Commissioner of CBP, should: 
(19) Consider modifying the agency's standard operating procedures for 
secondary inspections to include physically opening cargo containers 
during secondary inspections at all ports of entry when the external 
inspection does not conclusively identify the radiological material 
inside. 

To ensure that CBP is receiving reliable cost and schedule data, the 
Secretary of Homeland Security should: 
(20) Direct PNNL to have its earned value management system validated 
so that it complies with guidance developed by the American National 
Standards Institute/Electronic Industries Alliance. In addition, the 
Secretary of Homeland Security should direct CBP and PNNL to conduct an 
Integrated Baseline Review to ensure its earned value management data 
is reliable for assessing risk and developing alternatives. 

GAO report: GAO-07-1247T: Combating Nuclear Smuggling: Additional 
Actions Needed to Ensure Adequate Testing of Next Generation Radiation 
Detection Equipment (Sept. 18, 2007); 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-1247T] 
Recommendation: 
The Secretary of Homeland Security should: 
(21) Delay Secretarial Certification and full-scale production 
decisions of the advanced spectroscopic portal (ASP) until all relevant 
tests and studies have been completed and limitations to these tests 
and studies have been identified and addressed. Furthermore, results of 
these tests and studies should be validated and made fully transparent 
to the Department of Energy (DOE), CBP, and other relevant parties. 

(22) Once the tests and studies have been completed, evaluated, and 
validated, determine in cooperation with CBP, DOE, and other 
stakeholders including independent reviewers, if additional testing is 
needed. 

(23) If additional testing is needed, appoint an independent group 
within DHS, not aligned with the ASP acquisition process, to conduct 
objective, comprehensive, and transparent testing that realistically 
demonstrates the capabilities and limitations of the ASP system. This 
independent group would be separate from the recently appointed 
independent review panel. 

(24) Report the results of the tests and analyses to the appropriate 
congressional committees before large scale purchases of ASPs are made. 

GAO report: GAO-08-598: Nuclear Security: NRC and DHS Need to Take 
Additional Steps to Better Track and Detect Radioactive Materials (June 
19, 2008); 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-598] 
Recommendation: 
Given the repeated delays in implementing improvements to the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission's ability to monitor and track radioactive sealed 
sources, the Chairman of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission should take 
steps, consistent with sound systems development practices, to: 
(25) Ensure that priority attention is given to meeting the current 
January 2009 and summer 2010 target dates for launching the National 
Source Tracking System, Web-based licensing system, and the new license 
verification system, respectively. 

Because some quantities of radioactive materials are potentially 
dangerous to human health if not properly handled, the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission should: 
(26) Complete the steps needed to include all potentially dangerous 
radioactive sources (category 3 and the larger category 4 sources, as 
well as categories 1 and 2) in the National Source Tracking System as 
quickly as is reasonably possible. 

To improve the likelihood of preventing radioactive sources and 
materials from being smuggled into the United States, the Secretary of 
Homeland Security should: 
(27) Direct the Commissioner of Customs and Border Protection to take 
measures to ensure that this guidance is being followed. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of table] 

Table 5: Selected Open GAO Recommendations Regarding SBInet with 
Potential Implications for Northern Border Security: 

GAO report: GAO-08-1086: Secure Border Initiative: DHS Needs to Address 
Significant Risks in Delivering Key Technology Investment (Sept. 22, 
2008); 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1086] 
Recommendation: 
To improve DHS's efforts to acquire and implement SBInet[A], we made 
the following recommendations: 

To permit meaningful measurement and oversight of and accountability 
for the program, the Secretary of Homeland Security should direct the 
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) Commissioner to: 
(28) Ensure that the risks associated with planned SBInet acquisition, 
development, testing, and deployment activities are immediately 
assessed. 

(29) Ensure that the results, including proposed alternative courses of 
action for mitigating the risks, are provided to the Commissioner and 
DHS's senior leadership, as well as to the department's congressional 
authorization and appropriation committees. 

We further recommended that the Secretary of Homeland Security direct 
the CBP Commissioner to have the Acting SBInet Program Manager take the 
following additional actions: 
(30) Finalize and approve an integrated master schedule that reflects 
the timing and sequencing of the work needed to achieve these 
commitments. 

(31) Revise and approve versions of the SBInet life cycle management 
approach, including the draft Systems Engineering Plan and draft Test 
and Evaluation Management Plan, and in doing so, ensure that these 
revised and approved versions are consistent with one another, reflect 
program officials' recently described changes to the engineering and 
testing approaches, and reflect relevant federal guidance and 
associated leading practices. 

(32) Ensure that the revised and approved life cycle management 
approach is fully implemented. 

(33) Implement key requirements development and management practices to 
include (1) baselining requirements before system design and 
development efforts begin; (2) analyzing requirements prior to being 
baselined to ensure that they are complete, achievable, and verifiable; 
and (3) tracing requirements to higher-level requirements, lower-level 
requirements, and test cases. 

(34) Implement key test management practices to include (1) developing 
and documenting test plans prior to the start of testing; (2) 
conducting appropriate component level testing prior to integrating 
system components; and (3) approving a test management strategy that, 
at a minimum, includes a relevant testing schedule, establishes 
accountability for testing activities by clearly defining testing roles 
and responsibilities, and includes sufficient detail to allow for 
testing and oversight activities to be clearly understood and 
communicated to test stakeholders. 

Source: GAO. 

[A] In November 2005, DHS launched the Secure Border Initiative (SBI), 
a multiyear, multibillion-dollar program to secure the nation's borders 
through enhanced surveillance technologies, increased staffing levels, 
improved infrastructure, and increased domestic enforcement of 
immigration laws. One component of SBI, known as SBInet, is focused on 
the acquisition and deployment of surveillance and communications 
technologies. 

[End of table] 

Table 6: Selected Open GAO Recommendations Regarding Partnerships and 
Joint Operations with Potential Implications for Northern Border 
Security: 

GAO report: GAO-05-543: Border Security: Opportunities to Increase 
Coordination of Air and Marine Assets (Aug. 12, 2005); 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-543] 
Recommendation: 
In order to help ensure that the use of available air and marine assets 
is effectively coordinated to meet border security needs, the Secretary 
of Homeland Security should: 
(35) Provide guidance that clarifies the roles and responsibilities of 
the United States Coast Guard (USCG) and CBP, the primary DHS agencies 
that employ air and marine assets, in their homeland security missions, 
as well as how asset use should be coordinated. 

(36) Determine whether the Homeland Security Act's prohibition on 
diversion of USCG assets, or any similar restriction in appropriations 
laws, limits the ability of USCG to coordinate assets with other 
agencies, and if so, evaluate the merits, including the costs and 
benefits of proposing a change in relevant laws to Congress. 

GAO report: GAO-07-89: Homeland Security: Opportunities Exist to 
Enhance Collaboration at 24/7 Operations Centers Staffed by Multiple 
DHS Agencies (Oct. 20, 2006); 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-89] 
Recommendation: 
To provide a setting for more effective collaboration among the staff 
at each multiagency 24/7/365 operations center, the Secretary of 
Homeland Security should charge the Director of the Operations 
Directorate with developing and providing guidance and helping to 
ensure the agencies that sponsor the center: 
(37) Conduct staffing needs assessments. 

(38) Address collaborative efforts at the four multiagency operations 
centers in plans and reports on the level of each operation center's 
managing agency. 

GAO report: GAO-08-35: Homeland Security: Federal Efforts Are Helping 
to Alleviate Some Challenges Encountered by State and Local Information 
Fusion Centers (Oct. 30, 2007); 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-35] 
Recommendation: 
To improve efforts to create a national network of fusion centers, the 
National Fusion Center Coordination Group (NFCCG), through the 
Information Sharing Council and the Program Manager for the Information 
Sharing Environment (PM-ISE), should: 
(39) Determine and articulate the federal government's role in, and 
whether it expects to provide resources to, fusion centers over the 
long term to help ensure their sustainability. Particular emphasis 
should be placed on how best to sustain those fusion center functions 
that support a national information sharing capability as critical 
nodes of the ISE. 

Source: GAO. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department of Homeland Security: 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security: 
Washington, DC 20528: 
[hyperlink, http://www.dhs.gov] 

November 17, 2008: 

Mr. Richard M. Stana: 
Homeland Security and Justice: 
Government Accountability Office: 
Washington, D.C. 20548: 

Dear Mr. Stana: 

Thank you for providing us with a copy of the Government Accountability 
Office's (GAO) draft report entitled, "NORTHERN BORDER SECURITY: DHS' 
Report Could Better Inform Congress by Identifying Actions, Resources 
and Timeframes Needed to Address Vulnerabilities," GAO-09-93, dated 
November 2008. The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Act of 2007 
required the Secretary of Homeland Security to submit a report to 
Congress within 180 days of enactment that addresses the 
vulnerabilities along the northern border, and provide recommendations 
to address such vulnerabilities, including required resources needed to 
protect the border. The Act also required GAO to submit to Congress 
within 270 days of the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) report, 
a report that reviews and comments on the DHS report, and to provide 
recommendations regarding additional actions necessary to protect the 
northern border. 

DHS submitted its report to Congress in February 2008, discussing 
ongoing initiatives to improve security along the northern border as 
required by law. GAO found that the DHS report to Congress is not fully 
responsive in providing information for improving northern border 
security as required in the 9/11 Act. GAO stated that DHS provided a 
listing of northern border vulnerabilities and initiatives to address 
them but did not include recommendations and additional resources that 
are needed to protect the northern border. GAO stated that the lack of 
information regarding the extent that vulnerabilities remain 
unaddressed on the northern border and the time and resources it will 
take to address them makes it challenging for Congress to consider 
future actions and resources necessary for the northern border in the 
broader context of national security. While we all grapple with 
resource issues and needs the Department makes requests to Congress for 
resources and programs through the approved budget justification 
process. GAO also stated that DHS could take action to reduce 
vulnerabilities by implementing recommendations made in past 
evaluations. 

The report rightly says that risk assessment should drive resource 
requests, and that DHS is working on plans and strategies that will 
guide resource decisions (based on risk assessment) to address northern 
border vulnerabilities. However, not all vulnerabilities have the same 
priority to address, depending on the assessment of risk that the 
vulnerability poses; i.e., a vulnerability that is not very likely to 
be attacked and/or would have little consequence if penetrated is not a 
high-risk and not the highest priority to address. However, the report 
then goes on to say that DHS (and other agencies) should proceed to 
adopt and address all of the recommendations from previous reports 
without any assessment of priority based on risk. While all of the 
recommendations previously made have merit, the Departments' ability to 
implement them will depend on many factors, including resources, the 
interplay between other relevant actors (the private sector, state, 
local enforcement, etc.) which the report also acknowledges are a 
reason why certain programs have not been able to get off the ground 
and risk. 

Many of the projects undertaken by DHS on the northern border (and 
overall) are dictated by various authorizing committees, which 
themselves do not take any risk assessment or prioritize across 
committee areas of jurisdiction. This creates difficulty for the 
Department in determining most appropriate allocation of resources. 
Streamlining oversight so that there is a unified approach will 
increase the likelihood the Department can craft a unified plan. 

GAO made one recommendation in its report. GAO is recommending that the 
DHS Secretary provide more specific information in future reporting 
requirements to Congress, including planned actions, resource 
requirements, and timeframes for increasing and achieving northern 
border security and the basis used for prioritizing such action and 
resources in the context of other national security risks. CBP concurs 
with the recommendation and will work with the Department to implement 
the recommendation through the approved budget process. 

We thank you again for the opportunity to review the report, to discuss 
the content, and to provide comments. 

Signed by: 

Jerald E. Levine: 
Director: 
Departmental GAO/OIG Liaison Office: 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

Richard M. Stana, (202) 512-8777 or stanar@gao.gov: 

Staff Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the contact named above, Cindy Ayers, Assistant 
Director, and Adam Couvillion, Analyst-in-Charge, managed this 
assignment. David Holt made significant contributions to the work. 
Amanda Miller and Michele Fejfar assisted with design, methodology, and 
data analysis. Linda Miller provided assistance in report preparation; 
and Frances Cook provided legal support. 

[End of section] 

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Delivering Key Technology Investment. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1086]. Washington, D.C.: 
September 22, 2008. 

Secure Border Initiative: Observations on Deployment Challenges. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-1141T]. Washington, 
D.C.: September 10, 2008. 

Risk Management: Strengthening the Use of Risk Management Principles in 
Homeland Security. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-904T]. Washington, D.C.: 
June 25, 2008. 

Nuclear Security: NRC and DHS Need to Take Additional Steps to Better 
Track and Detect Radioactive Materials. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-598]. Washington, D.C.: 
June 19, 2008. 

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[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-757]. Washington, D.C.: 
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[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-35]. Washington, D.C.: 
October 30, 2007. 

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[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-131T]. Washington, D.C.: 
October 24, 2007. 

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[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-110]. Washington, D.C.: 
October 11, 2007. 

Border Security: Despite Progress, Weaknesses in Traveler Inspections 
Exist at Our Nation's Ports of Entry. 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-123SU]. Washington, 
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[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-884T]. Washington, D.C.: 
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[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-1247T]. Washington, 
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[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-07-847]. Washington, D.C.: 
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[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-389]. March 22, 2006. 

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[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-05-543]. August 12, 2005. 

Footnotes: 

[1] The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) defines the U.S.-Canadian 
border as stretching from the state of Washington to Maine, and does 
not include the Alaskan border with Canada. 

[2] Pub. L. No. 110-53, § 731(a)-(b), 121 Stat. 266, 351. 

[3] Id. § 731(c), 121 Stat. at 351. 

[4] Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135. 

[5] For example, OBP data shows that in fiscal year 2008, apprehensions 
of inadmissible aliens along the northern border were approximately 1.1 
percent of apprehensions along the southwest border, and pounds of 
illegal narcotics seized along the northern border were about 0.6 
percent of pounds seized along the southwest border. 

[6] For example, see Congressional Research Service, Border Security: 
U.S.-Canada Immigration Border Issues, RS21258 (updated Dec. 28, 2004). 

[7] For example, the United and Strengthening America by Providing 
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 
2001 (USA PATRIOT Act) authorized funding to triple the number of 
border patrol and inspection personnel along the northern border and to 
improve technology for monitoring the northern border. See Pub. L. No. 
107-56, § 402, 115 Stat. 272, 342-43. The Intelligence Reform and 
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 required the Secretary of Homeland 
Security to assign to the northern border no less than 20 percent of 
the net increase in border patrol agents each year for fiscal years 
2006 through 2010. See Pub. L. No. 108-458, § 5202, 118 Stat. 3638, 
3734. Also, in March 2007, the House and Senate Committees on 
Appropriations both wrote to the Secretary of DHS expressing the 
committees' expectation that DHS redirect $20,000,000 of its Border 
Security Fencing, Infrastructure and Technology expenditure plan to 
begin addressing security needs along the northern border. 

[8] Pub. L. No. 110-161, div. E, § 604, 121 Stat. 1844, 2095-96 (2007) 
(codified at 6 U.S.C. § 1403). 

[9] OES tasked the following CBP components to provide input to the 
Report to Congress: Office of Field Operations, OBP, Office of Air & 
Marine, the Office of Intelligence and Operations Coordination, and the 
Office of Information Technology. 

[10] Our discussions with FBI officials on the terrorist threat, and 
DEA officials on the drug trafficking threat, were generally consistent 
with DHS-reported information. 

[11] OBP defines operational control as the ability to detect entries 
when they occur, identify the entry and classify its level of threat, 
effectively and efficiently respond to the entry and bring the 
situation to the appropriate law enforcement resolution. OBP data from 
fiscal year 2008 showed that few northern border miles were under 
operational control, but that a greater number of miles have shown 
progress toward this goal. 

[12] USCG also stated that a public strategic communication plan 
regarding the implementation plan would be released sometime in the 
spring of 2009. 

[13] The standard station concept is a base design that may be utilized 
at multiple locations to reduce design costs and time frame. The 
standard station being implemented on the northern border is capable of 
supporting 50 agents and their support personnel, and allows for 
addition or expansion as needed. 

[14] CBP officials commented that CBP conducts strategic resource 
assessments for ports of entry to gather facility and planning data, 
assess the facilities to determine critical needs in support of the 
mission, and make facility recommendations for budgeting and 
programming. CBP completed an initial round of these assessments at all 
land ports of entry from 2004 through 2006, and plans to soon begin a 
second round of expanded assessments that will include air and sea 
ports. CBP anticipates completing this second round of assessments 
within 3 years and repeating the process on a 2 to 3 year cycle. 

[15] The Integrated Border Enforcement Teams (IBET) are a multi-DHS- 
agency law enforcement initiative with Canada with a goal to ensure 
comprehensive and permanent coordination of cross-border law 
enforcement, antiterrorism efforts, and information sharing between the 
two countries. The Border Enforcement Security Task Force is an 
interagency task force designed to enhance border security and combat 
violence related to smuggling through coordinated effort involving 
federal, state, local, and Canadian law enforcement agencies. Upon 
completion of a bilateral agreement currently under negotiation, 
Shiprider operations will support IBETs and include joint cross-border 
maritime patrols of USCG and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP). 
In this effort, designated USCG and RCMP maritime law enforcement 
officers will embark on the other party's vessels for patrolling and 
enforcing U.S. and Canadian law on either side of the maritime border. 
Project North Star provides Canadian and U.S. law enforcement managers 
a mechanism to enhance communications, cooperation, and partnership. 

[16] The Airfields Initiative is a binational partnership between 
federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies of the United States 
and Canada involving the aviation community and the public as sources 
of information and intelligence on aircraft incursions. 

[17] ICE patrol officers, known as Shadow Wolves, were established by 
congressional mandate to remedy smuggling of narcotics across Indian 
reservations. 

[18] The High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area program is an antidrug 
support program providing a mechanism for federal, state, and local law 
enforcement agencies to share information and intelligence. The 
Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force is a mechanism to promote 
cooperation and coordination among federal, state, and local law 
enforcement agencies engaged in narcotics and money laundering 
investigations. 

[19] Border Security Evaluation Teams gather intelligence from state 
and local law enforcement agencies, local civic leaders, and the public 
to determine if suspected cross-border activities indicate a need for 
deployment of border patrol resources in those areas. Operation Last 
Call was created by the ICE Office of Deportation and Removal 
Operations to maximize intelligence collection through systematic 
debriefing of ICE detainees. 

[20] ICE reports cross-designating other federal, state, and local 
officers to supplement the ICE investigative mission and participate on 
task forces. 

[21] The budget process provides Congress with a 1-year President's 
budget, and a 5-year plan to meet prioritized needs within projected 
resource constraints. However, these documents do not reflect the 
resources and time frame needed to achieve control of the northern 
border. 

[22] An unclassified notice to the public is to be published sometime 
in spring 2009. 

[23] This requirement is found in the Homeland Security Act of 2002 and 
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7). 

[24] Our previous work pointed out the challenges DHS faces in 
developing its risk-management process. See GAO, Risk Management: 
Further Refinements Needed to Assess Risks and Prioritize Protective 
Measures at Ports and Other Critical Infrastructure, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-06-91] (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 15, 
2005), and GAO, Highlights of a Forum Convened by the Comptroller 
General of the United States: Strengthening the Use of Risk Management 
Principles in Homeland Security, [hyperlink, 
http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-08-627SP] (Washington, D.C.: April 
2008). 

[25] Other federal agencies included the FBI, Assistant to the 
President for Homeland Security and Counter Terrorism, the Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission, the National Fusion Center Coordination Group 
(NFCCG), Department of State, and Pacific Northwest National Laboratory 
(PNNL). 

[26] DHS officials provided us with reasons why two of the 21 GAO 
recommendations had not been implemented. DHS did not implement these 
fiscal year 2005 recommendations regarding coordination of its air and 
marine assets due to inadvertent exclusion of these recommendations 
from the agency tracking system. DHS and the Department of State report 
making progress towards implementing seven of the remaining pre-fiscal 
year 2008 recommendations. 

[27] GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1] 
(Washington, D.C.: November 1999). 

[End of section] 

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