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PEACEKEEPING

Thousands Trained but United States Is Unlikely to Complete All Activities by 2010 and Some Improvements Are Needed

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Thousands Trained but United States Is Unlikely to Complete All Activities by 2010 and Some Improvements Are Needed

Why GAO Did This Study

In 2004, in response to the Group of Eight (G8) Sea Island Summit, the United States established the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), a 5-year program to build peacekeeping capabilities worldwide, with a focus on Africa. Since 2005, the Department of State (State) has allocated $374 million and selected 52 countries to participate in the program.

Congress mandated that GAO assess and report on the initiative. This report assesses (1) progress made in meeting GPOI goals, (2) whether State is consistently assessing the quality and effectiveness of the training, and (3) the extent to which countries meet program criteria and whether trainees are adequately screened for human rights abuses. GAO assessed State and Department of Defense (DOD) data and program documents, interviewed U.S. and host country officials, and conducted field work in eight countries.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that the Secretary of State improve oversight of equipment delivery, develop methods to assess the overall outcomes of the training program, and ensure that trainees are properly screened for human rights violations, among other things. State and DOD concurred or partially concurred with most of the recommendations, except for developing a method for evaluating the GPOI training program which State said already exists. GAO clarified the recommendation.

What GAO Found

State and DOD have made some progress in achieving GPOI objectives in three principal areas: training and equipping peacekeepers, providing equipment and transportation for peacekeeping missions, and building peacekeeping skills and infrastructure, but challenges remain in meeting these goals. First, nearly 40,000 military peacekeepers have been trained and some training equipment has been provided. However, State is unlikely to meet the goal of training 75,000 military peacekeepers by 2010 and has encountered problems in accounting for the delivery of training equipment to countries. Second, State supports an equipment depot in Africa and has supplied equipment for missions in Haiti, Lebanon, Somalia, and Sudan, but has been delayed in providing some equipment in support of these missions. Third, State and DOD have trained 2,700 military peacekeeping instructors, conducted several multinational peacekeeping exercises, and refurbished some training centers. However, State has targeted a smaller share of resources to build peacekeeping skills and infrastructure than for training and equipping peacekeepers in Africa in comparison to other regions, in part due to needs and capabilities of the region and a focus on training African peacekeepers for current missions. Of the $98 million State has spent in Africa, 12 percent was spent on building skills and infrastructure needed for long-term peacekeeping capabilities, compared to 20 percent to 51 percent in other regions.

While 56 percent of trained military peacekeepers—primarily from Africa—have deployed to peacekeeping missions, State faces challenges in assessing the proficiency of trained peacekeepers against standard skills taught in training and accounting for the activities of trained instructors. Although GPOI training standards follow U.S. military doctrine and United Nations requirements, State does not have a program-wide standard to assess the proficiency of military peacekeepers in skills taught. Further, State is unable to fully account for the training activities of the trained instructors. Collectively, these program limitations result in State's inability to assess the overall outcomes of its program in providing high-quality, effective training.

State, in consultation with DOD, has selected 52 partner countries that generally meet program criteria, but in some cases State did not screen trainees for human rights abuses. For 24 countries, State's human rights reporting identified documented human rights violations by security forces in 2007, and GAO found that peacekeepers were not always screened or were not properly screened for human rights abuses. For example, we found that 81 individuals from one country received military training but were not screened for human rights violations.

United States Government Accountability Office

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Abbreviations

ACOTA	Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance
AU	African Union
COESPU	Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units
DOD	Department of Defense
ECOWAS	Economic Community for West African States
EIPC	Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities
GCC	GPOI Coordination Committee
GPOI	Global Peace Operations Initiative
G8	Group of Eight
State	Department of State
UN	United Nations

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United States Government Accountability Office
Washington, DC 20548

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Congressional Committees

Peace support operations throughout the world have grown from 4 United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations in 1988 to 17 in 2008; more than half of these missions began in the last 10 years.[1] At the 2004 Group of Eight (G8) Sea Island Summit, the United States and other G8 nations responded to the growing need for well-trained and equipped peacekeepers by committing to expand the global capability for peace support operations—particularly African peacekeeping skills and capabilities.[2] In 2004, the United States established the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), a 5-year, $660 million program to build peacekeeping capabilities worldwide, with a focus on enhancing peacekeeping capabilities in Africa. Key goals of the program are to train military peacekeepers and stability police[3] for peacekeeping missions, including a target of 75,000 military peacekeepers; provide long-term skills and infrastructure to GPOI partner countries and regional organizations; and provide nonlethal equipment and transportation to support countries' deployment of peacekeepers. Since 2005, the Department of State (State), in consultation with the Department of Defense (DOD), has allocated $374 million to support GPOI objectives.[4]

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[1]In addition, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, regional organizations led 33 peacekeeping operations in 2007.

[2]G8 members are Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Russia, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

[3]In this report, we refer to two types of peacekeepers: military peacekeepers and stability police. We have defined stability police as police whose duties bridge the gap between military troops and civilian police in peace operations. The United States does not directly train stability police for peacekeeping missions. The Departments of State and Defense provide financial and personnel resources to support the Italian Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units, which trains instructors of stability police units for peacekeeping missions.

[4]State's and DOD's plans include funding activities for GPOI through fiscal year 2009.

GAO-08-754 Peacekeeping

In the fiscal year 2008 Defense Authorization Act,[5] Congress mandated that GAO assess the initiative and report on a number of issues, including the extent to which GPOI has met its goals, the metrics used to measure progress, the quality of training, GPOI's impact on countries' contributions to peacekeeping, and G8 and other countries' financial and technical assistance to expand global capacity for peace support operations. To address the mandate, this report assesses (1) progress made in meeting GPOI goals, (2) whether State is consistently assessing the quality and effectiveness of the training program, and (3) the extent to which countries meet program criteria and whether trainees are adequately screened for human rights abuses. Appendix III contains data on G8 and other countries' contributions to expanding the global capability for peacekeeping.

To complete this review, we assessed State Department data on the number of troops trained, equipment provided, and other indicators. We interviewed officials from State and DOD in Washington, D.C.; officials from U.S. Combatant Commands for the Pacific, Southern Hemisphere, and Africa during visits to Germany and Miami; and U.S. and host country officials during site visits to Guatemala, Italy, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Ghana, Ethiopia, and Mongolia. We determined that the data provided by State and DOD were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of our review. We conducted this performance audit from August 2007 to June 2008 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained in this review provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Results in Brief

State and DOD have made some progress in achieving GPOI goals in three principal areas: training and equipping peacekeepers, providing equipment and transportation for deployed missions, and building peacekeeping skills and infrastructure, but challenges remain in meeting these goals.[6] First, State and DOD have trained nearly 40,000 military peacekeepers, predominantly in Africa; supported the training of over 1,300 stability

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[5]National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub.L. 110-181 § 1211, 122 Stat. 369 (Jan. 28, 2008).

[6]We have categorized the seven objectives of the program under three key program goals.

police; and provided nonlethal training equipment to some military peacekeepers. However, State is unlikely to meet its goal of training 75,000 military peacekeepers by 2010 and has encountered problems with accounting for and timely delivery of nonlethal training equipment to partner countries. Second, State supports an equipment depot in Sierra Leone; has supplied equipment for missions in Lebanon, Somalia, Sudan, and Haiti; and has initiated a process for peacekeeping countries to request donor assistance for transportation and logistics needs.[7] However, State has encountered some delays in providing timely delivery of nonlethal equipment to deployed peacekeepers. Third, to build peacekeeping skills and infrastructure,[8] State and DOD have trained more than 2,700 military peacekeeping instructors, conducted multinational peacekeeping exercises, refurbished training centers, and taken steps to establish a communications system in West Africa. However, State is unlikely to complete skills and infrastructure activities in Africa by 2010, in part due to African peacekeeping countries' limited resources and capabilities for supporting their own peacekeeping programs. Moreover, State has targeted a smaller share of resources for the development of long-term skills and infrastructure for peacekeeping than for training and equipping peacekeepers in Africa in other regions, in part due to needs and capabilities of the region and a focus on training peacekeepers in this region for current missions. Of the $98 million State has spent in Africa, 12 percent has been spent—compared to 20 percent to 50 percent in other regions—on activities to build the long-term skills and infrastructure that countries need to sustain peacekeeping operations on their own.

While 56 percent of GPOI-trained military peacekeepers from 13 countries, primarily in Africa, have deployed to peacekeeping missions, State faces challenges in assessing the proficiency of peacekeepers it has trained and accounting for the activities of trained instructors. Although GPOI training standards follow U.S. military doctrine and UN requirements, State does not have a program-wide standard to assess the proficiency of military peacekeepers in the skills taught. For example, trainers we met with in Ethiopia, Ghana, and Senegal stated that they review participants'

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[7]The program provides only nonlethal equipment for training or to support deployments to peacekeeping mission.

[8]For the goal of building peacekeeping skills and infrastructure, we have included activities to enhance the ability of countries to conduct training for their own peacekeeping missions and improve the capabilities of regional organizations to plan, train for, and execute peacekeeping missions.

performance—of which Ghana and Senegal account for 44 percent of the total deployed GPOI-trained troops—in training exercises and exercise professional judgment to determine participants' ability to perform specific tasks, but they are not required to test the skills of military peacekeepers against a common standard. As a result, State cannot ascertain the proficiency of the military peacekeepers it has trained. State has mechanisms for monitoring and documenting the performance of contractors in Africa, including a program management team to monitor contractor performance in Africa. However, the responsibility for retaining evaluations of contractors' performance is unclear among State officials. Further, although State and DOD have trained more than 2,700 military peacekeeping instructors, State cannot fully account for the training activities of these instructors in their home countries. As of April 2008, State had only been able to identify that training had occurred by GPOI-trained instructors in two countries. In addition, State has supported the training of over 1,300 stability police instructors at Italy's Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units (COESPU), but cannot identify whether these instructors subsequently conduct training. Collectively, these program limitations result in State's inability to assess the overall outcomes of providing high-quality, effective peacekeeping training.

State, in consultation with DOD, has selected 52 partner countries that generally meet program criteria, but in some cases State did not screen trainees from partner countries for potential violations of human rights. Countries and their peacekeeping troops must generally meet a list of criteria identified in the program's strategy before they can receive GPOI-funded training and other assistance. Most partner countries generally met the participation criteria, including having an elected government, an acceptable human rights record, a willingness to participate in peace support operations, and an agreement on the use and security of U.S.-provided goods and services, but we found 24 countries in which State's human rights reporting identified documented human rights violations by security forces in 2007. We found that peacekeepers were not always screened or were not properly screened for human rights abuses, in accordance with State guidance. Specifically, we found that State trained 81 individuals in 2007 from one country but did not screen them before they participated in GPOI-funded training. In addition, 17 military peacekeepers and stability police from Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Nigeria, and Sri Lanka were not vetted out of 382 trained from those countries in 2007. We also found that the commanders of seven composite units in three countries were screened for human rights violations, but the individual members of these units were not screened, as required by State

guidance. As a result, it is possible that State and DOD have provided training to security personnel who have committed human rights abuses.

We recommend that the Secretary of State improve oversight of nonlethal equipment delivery to partner countries, develop methods to assess the overall outcomes of the training program, and ensure that trainees are properly screened for human rights violations. We also recommend that the Secretary of State, in consultation with DOD, assess the estimated resources and time frames needed to complete activities to help achieve the G8 goals for developing African countries' capabilities to maintain peacekeeping operations on their own.

We provided a draft of this report to the Departments of State and Defense. We received written comments from State and DOD, which we have reprinted in appendixes VII and VIII, respectively. State concurred or partially concurred with seven of the eight recommendations and provided additional information to highlight the program's achievements. State did not concur with the recommendation to develop a method for evaluating GPOI training. State noted that methods already exist to evaluate the quality of the training program and measure proficiency of trainees. We disagree that State's current evaluation methods address our recommendation. State has not developed military task lists and associated training that can be applied at all GPOI training sites; sites currently use varying standards to assess the proficiency of trainees. DOD agreed with the need for greater standardization and more analysis of trainee performance. We modified the recommendation to clarify the need for GPOI-wide standard military tasks and related training that State, in consultation with DOD, should develop in accordance with the commitments made in the GPOI strategy. State also commented that it now projects that GPOI will train 75,000 peacekeepers by July 2010 based on new training rates. We were unable to validate State's new data since as recently as May 2008, program officials indicated that slow expenditure rates would delay State's efforts to reach the 2010 training goal. DOD also concurred or partially concurred with the findings and recommendations of the report. DOD agreed that State should work with DOD and Italy to validate personnel shortfalls at COESPU and fill the identified positions. DOD also stated that an assessment of resources and time frames should apply to all regions engaged by the GPOI program. We did not revise this recommendation because it is intended to address our finding that State is unlikely to complete skills and infrastructure activities in Africa by 2010. State and DOD also provided technical comments, which we incorporated where appropriate.

Background

On April 1, 2004, the President approved GPOI, a 5-year program to help address significant gaps in international peace operations, including a shortage of capable peacekeepers, limited national capabilities to train and sustain peacekeeping proficiencies, and a lack of mechanisms to help countries deploy peacekeepers and provide logistics support for them in the field. To support the development of peacekeeping capabilities of GPOI countries, the program incorporates and expands on the pre-existing Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance (ACOTA) program and the Enhanced International Peacekeeping Capabilities (EIPC) program.[9]

GPOI Has Seven Objectives to Improve Peacekeeping Operations Worldwide

In 2004, the United States established GPOI as a $660 million, 5-year program with seven objectives to increase and maintain the capacity, capability, and effectiveness of peace operations worldwide. These objectives are to

- train and, when appropriate, equip 75,000 military peacekeepers by 2010;

- support efforts at the International Center of Excellence for Stability Police (COESPU) in Italy to increase the capabilities and interoperability of stability police to participate in peace operations;

- develop a program to procure and store peace operations equipment to facilitate the equipment's quick mobilization for peace operations;

- develop a transportation and logistics support system to deploy and sustain peacekeeping in the field;

- enhance the capacity of regional and subregional organizations for peace operations;

- provide a worldwide clearinghouse function for GPOI-related activities in Africa and globally; and

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[9]The ACOTA program was established in 1997 under African Crisis Response Initiative and focuses on field and staff training and exercises for African battalions and multinational force staffs. ACOTA continues to operate within the scope of GPOI. From 1997 to 2004, the EIPC program provided support to 31 countries to develop their institutional capacity to provide military units for peacekeeping and similar multinational operations and to promote interoperability.

- conduct activities that support and assist partners in achieving self-sufficiency and maintaining the proficiencies gained from GPOI.

U.S. Agencies and Partner Countries Participate in GPOI

State's Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, in coordination with DOD's Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Staff, is responsible for providing policy guidance; allocating resources; and coordinating GPOI programs, events, and activities. All GPOI allocations and program activities must be approved by the GPOI Coordination Committee (GCC), the formal decision-making body co-chaired by State's Bureau of Political-Military Affairs and the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Participants of the GCC include the Joint Staff and, as required, other program implementers. GPOI implementers include the U.S. Combatant Commands, State's regional bureaus, the Office of the Secretary of Defense's regional offices, and U.S. diplomatic posts. The regional combatant commands are the lead implementers of GPOI activities throughout the world, with the exception of Africa, where State's Bureau of African Affairs leads implementation of GPOI activities. Within the African Affairs Bureau, ACOTA is the lead implementer for the training and equipment portion of GPOI activities in Africa.

State has designated 52 countries as partner countries eligible to receive funding for GPOI activities—38 for military peacekeepers, 3 for stability police, and 11 for both military peacekeepers and stability police, as of April 2008. As figure 1 shows, the majority are located in Africa (22 countries) and the remaining are in Asia, South and Central America, Europe, and the Near East and Central Asia. (See app. II for a list of all GPOI partners.)

Figure 1: Map of GPOI Partner Countries

Military partner

Stability police partner

Both military and stability police partner

Sources: Map Resources (map); GAO analysis of Department of State data.

Majority of GPOI Funds Provided for Activities in Africa

State has allocated $374 million, from fiscal year 2005 through fiscal year 2008, for GPOI activities worldwide, of which it has expended about $152 million for activities in four major categories: training, training equipment, deployment assistance, and skills and infrastructure. As displayed in figure 2, the majority—about $98 million—has been spent[10] in Africa, followed by

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[10]In this report, we use "spent" to refer to expended funds.

about $30 million in Asia and $12 million in South and Central America. In Africa, the majority has been spent on training and training equipment together followed by deployment assistance of equipment and transportation for deployed peacekeeping missions. In Asia, the majority has been spent on skills and infrastructure followed by training. In South and Central America, the majority has been spent on training equipment followed by activities for building skills and infrastructure. (App. II identifies the GPOI partner countries in these geographic regions.)

Figure 2: GPOI Expenditures by Region, as of April 2008

Source: GAO analysis of Department of State data.

Note: Data for training and equipping in Africa are as of Mar. 15, 2008.

[a]Peacekeeping skills and infrastructure include activities to enhance the ability of countries to conduct training for their own peacekeeping mission and improve the capabilities of regional organizations to plan, train for, and execute peacekeeping missions. See app. VI for information on the status of these activities in each region.

State and DOD Provide Training Using a Variety of Means

Training of military peacekeepers under GPOI can be provided by contractors, U.S. military active duty personnel, or by trainers from neighboring countries in the region, and is focused on providing battalion-level training for peacekeeping missions. U.S. contractors provide the majority of training in Africa and, when available, U.S. military active duty personnel serve as mentors to African trainees. In Asia, U.S. military personnel provide the majority of training but use contractors to provide some of the training for military officers. In Central America, training is provided by other countries and by U.S. military personnel.[11] The United States has funded the training of a few individuals in the Near East and Europe. U.S. military personnel may serve as mentors to trainees in these regions. Training has not yet occurred in Central Asia. GPOI training of stability police is provided at COESPU—Italy's international training center for peace operations located in Vicenza, Italy, where the Italian Carabinieri[12] train instructors of stability police units.[13]

GPOI Has Made Progress in Meeting Program Goals, but Challenges Remain

State and DOD have made some progress in achieving GPOI goals in three principal areas: training and equipping peacekeepers, providing equipment and transportation for deployed missions, and building peacekeeping skills and infrastructure, but challenges remain in meeting these goals. Table 1 summarizes the status of GPOI activities for the three principal goals and seven objectives. First, State and DOD have trained about 40,000 military peacekeepers, predominantly in Africa, and supported the training of over 1,300 stability police, but it is unlikely that GPOI will meet its goal of training 75,000 military peacekeepers by 2010 due to the time it takes to expend program funds, and State and DOD have encountered delays in delivering nonlethal training equipment.[14] Second, State has provided equipment to deployed missions in Lebanon, Somalia, Sudan, and Haiti; supports an equipment depot in Sierra Leone; and initiated a process for

[11]For example, Argentine peacekeeping instructors provide trainers to Central America's peacekeeping training school in Coban, Guatemala.

[12] The Carabinieri are the Italian National Force that has both military and police authority.

[13]Stability police units bridge the gap between military troops and civilian police in peace operations.

[14]The program provides only nonlethal equipment for training or to support deployments to peacekeeping mission.

peacekeeping countries to request donor assistance for their transportation and logistics needs, but some efforts have been delayed. Third, State and DOD have trained more than 2,700 military peacekeeping instructors and conducted other activities. However, State faces delays in completing activities to build skills and infrastructure in Africa by 2010. In addition, State has targeted a smaller share of resources to build African peacekeeping skills and infrastructure than to train and equip African peacekeepers, compared to other regions. This is due in part to the needs and capabilities of the region and a focus on training peacekeepers in this region for current missions. The following sections provide more information about the progress made in these areas.

Table 1: Status of Activities for GPOI Goals and Objectives

GPOI Goal	Status of Activities
Train and equip peacekeepers	
Train and equip 75,000 peacekeepers by 2010	Trained about 40,000, not on track to train 75,000 by 2010. Expect to meet training goal when all training funds are fully expended. Problems with procuring and accounting for training equipment.
Provide support to Italy's International Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units (COESPU)	On track to train 3,000 by 2010. Provided personnel for one staff position at COESPU. Additional positions Italy requested the United States to fill remain unfilled.
Provide equipment and transportation to deployed missions	
Develop a deployment equipment program for quick mobilization of equipment to support peacekeeping missions	Equipment provided to six countries deployed in four peacekeeping missions. Maintain and provide equipment to depot in Sierra Leone. Delivery of some equipment has been slow.
Work with other G8 members to develop a program for peacekeeping countries to request donor assistance for transportation and logistics needs	In October 2007, established e-mail communication system in cooperation with G8 to facilitate requests for assistance. First request communicated through system in April 2008.
Build peacekeeping skills and infrastructure	
Enhance the capacity of regional and subregional organizations	In Africa, trained some staff of one regional organization, provided computer equipment to three regional peacekeeping centers, and provided equipment for communication systems.
Conduct activities that support peacekeeping countries' ability to develop and maintain their peacekeeping programs	Trained 2,700 military peacekeeping instructors, predominantly in Africa, and refurbished some training facilities in Central America and Asia. Limited ability in African countries to build and maintain their own training program.
Create a clearinghouse function	Supported the establishment of annual conferences held with G8 and other nations to share information and discuss efforts to support peacekeeping in Africa. In 2007, held first conference to discuss worldwide efforts to enhance peacekeeping.

Source: GAO analysis of Department of State data.

Thousands of Military Peacekeepers Trained in Africa, but Challenges Remain in Supporting Stability Police Training and Providing Training Equipment

The majority—92 percent—of military peacekeepers trained under GPOI are from African partner countries, while the remainder have been trained in Asia, Central America, and Europe. In addition, State has supported the training of over 1,300 stability police instructors at COESPU, providing about one-quarter of the school's budget. However, State is not likely to train 75,000 military peacekeepers by 2010 and has not provided support for all requested staff positions at COESPU. Further, State has provided about $31 million of training equipment to military peacekeepers in 27 countries, predominantly in Africa. However, State has faced challenges in delivering training equipment to GPOI partner countries in a timely manner and accounting for equipment delivery.

GPOI Has Supported Training and Equipping of Military Peacekeepers, but Is Unlikely to Meet Its Goals by 2010

State and DOD have trained about 40,000 military peacekeepers as of April 2008—36,968 in Africa; 1,805 in Asia; 455 in Central and South America; and 289 in Europe (see app. IV for details on the number trained by region and country). State is not likely to complete the training of 75,000 military peacekeepers by the target date of 2010. As figure 3 shows, the actual number of troops trained is lower than State's projections. State expects to reach its goal once it has spent all GPOI training funds, but this will likely not occur until after 2010 due to the time it takes to expend training funds. In commenting on a draft of this report, State asserts that it now expects that GPOI will train 75,000 peacekeepers by July 2010 based on new training rates. We were unable to validate State's new projections since as recently as May 2008, program officials from the GPOI office in the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs and its GPOI evaluation team indicated that slow expenditure rates related to training rates would delay their efforts to reach the 2010 training goal.

Figure 3: Projected and Actual Number of Trained Military Peacekeepers by Fiscal Year, as of April 2008

Number in thousands

Fiscal year

······ Projected number to be trained

—— Actual number trained

Source: State Department data.

State has spent approximately $56 million to train military peacekeepers, as of April 2008. Figure 4 shows the expenditures of GPOI funds for training military peacekeepers by region. The majority of the funds, about $39 million, have been spent in Africa.

Figure 4: Expenditures of GPOI Funds for Training Military Peacekeepers, by Region (fiscal years 2005 through 2008, as of April 2008)

0.5%
South and Central America
($263,018)

5.3%
Near East and Central Asia
($2,977,807)

Europe
($4,500,000)

8.1%

Asia
($9,220,040)

16.5%

69.6%

Africa
($38,812,079)

Source: GAO analysis of Department of State data.

In addition to these funds, some of the combatant commands have spent additional DOD funds to support the State-funded GPOI training. For example, U.S. Pacific Command officials identified that they spent an estimated $8 million of additional DOD funds to develop courses for peacekeeping training and support multinational training exercises held in Mongolia and Bangladesh.

COESPU Is Likely to Meet Training Goal for Stability Police by 2010 Despite Shortfalls in State's Assistance

Based on current projections, COESPU has indicated that it is likely to meet its goal of training 3,000 stability police instructors by 2010. As of April 2008, State had expended $9 million of $15 million obligated for COESPU's operations, directly supporting about one-quarter of COESPU's budget.[15] In 2005, the Italians requested assistance from the United States

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[15]State obligated $10.5 million in fiscal year 2005 funds for COESPU activities. State officials expect to obligate an additional $4.5 million of fiscal year 2005 GPOI funds by spring 2008. GPOI funds cover about half of training and program expenses at COESPU, according to U.S. officials in Italy.

in filling six staff positions at COESPU in the areas of management, training, research, and publications. Since 2005, the United States has provided a military officer to serve in the deputy director position, but support has not been provided for the other requested staff positions at COESPU.

According to a February 2008 State document and COESPU and U.S. officials we met with in Italy, the United States planned to provide support to fill a total of five staff positions at COESPU: deputy director, head of the training department for high-level courses, manager of research for stability police training doctrine, evaluator of course outcomes, and Web site and magazine manager. In January 2008, COESPU and U.S. officials we met with in Italy stated that these positions would help COESPU track the activities of its graduates, dispatch mobile training teams, and expand the number of students in each class. In May 2008, State officials in Washington, D.C., indicated that they plan to fund the position for an evaluator of course outcomes in the near future. In addition, we found that State does not always use staff at U.S. missions in partner countries to facilitate U.S. support to COESPU. For example, an embassy official in Senegal stated that when COESPU sent a questionnaire to Senegalese officials inquiring about deployments and training activities of COESPU graduates, State did not instruct the embassy to follow up and help obtain a response.

State and DOD Have Encountered Problems in Providing and Accounting for Training Equipment

State has provided about $31 million in nonlethal training equipment to military peacekeepers in 27 countries, predominantly in Africa. The equipment provided includes individual and unit equipment for military units training for peacekeeping missions, as well as equipment for COESPU to train stability police instructors. State has encountered delays in the purchase and delivery of this equipment, often resulting in State's inability to provide equipment concurrently with training sessions. Further, State officials have been unable to fully account for training equipment delivered in Africa.

The equipment provided includes individual equipment such as boots, first aid kits, and uniforms; and unit equipment such as radios, tents, and toolkits. (See app. V for more information on the types of training equipment provided in each region.) As figure 5 shows, the majority of the equipment was provided to partner countries in Africa. State also has provided individual training equipment directly to COESPU for students attending the school. This equipment included nonlethal items such as riot batons and shields.

Figure 5: Expenditures of GPOI Funds for Training Equipment by Region (fiscal years 2005 through 2008, as of April 2008)

Source: GAO analysis of Department of State data.

Note: Near East and Central Asia and Europe expended zero funds for training in this time period.

In addition, officials from some of the combatant commands stated that they use other sources of funds to provide additional equipment to military peacekeepers. For example, U.S. Central Command officials identified an estimated $14 million in funds from DOD accounts to provide items such as body armor, water purification units, vehicles, and uniform equipment for a peacekeeping brigade in Kazakhstan in fiscal years 2006 and 2007.

State and DOD have encountered problems in providing training equipment to partner countries in a timely manner. The procurement of equipment through the Defense Security Cooperation Agency, which is responsible for a large amount of equipment for GPOI, has encountered delays due to the procurement priorities for U.S. military forces, the time needed to identify the specific equipment needs for each country, and manufacturing backlogs. For example, a 2007 State program evaluation found that only two of several hundred training equipment items procured through the Defense Security Cooperation Agency for Central America with fiscal year 2005 funds had arrived in country by the end of 2007, and the delivery dates for the remaining equipment were unknown. Contractors and agency and host country officials in the countries we visited in Africa stated that training equipment often is not concurrently

provided with GPOI training, due to the delays in procurement and delivery. In addition, U.S. officials in Guatemala stated they had to delay training when equipment was not delivered in time.

State also has encountered problems in accounting for the delivery and transfer of equipment to partner countries. Specifically, State officials in Washington, D.C., have been unable to fully account for training equipment delivered to Africa. State has used a contractor to purchase in total approximately $19 million of equipment for African partner countries but, as of December 2007, could not account for the equipment's delivery. State officials responsible for implementing the program in Africa said that they instituted a new system in mid-2007 to account for the equipment delivered to partner countries. These officials said that the difficulties with accounting for equipment deliveries have been due to the fact that the previous system was poorly organized. In June 2008, these officials stated they had completed an inventory identifying the equipment items ordered and delivered using GPOI funds and were now able to fully account for the entire inventory of equipment purchase.

State Has Provided Equipment and Transportation Support to Deployed Missions, but Some Efforts Have Been Delayed

State has provided equipment to deployed missions and recently established a system to facilitate donor assistance for transport and logistic support to peacekeeping countries deploying to missions. However, State has encountered delays in delivering equipment to missions, similar to the delays in delivering equipment for training.

State has provided equipment to deployed missions in a number of ways. As figure 6 shows, the majority of this support has been provided to Africa. In Sierra Leone, since 2005, State has spent over $9 million in equipment and operational support, for an equipment depot used for peacekeeping missions and election support by the Economic Community for West African States (ECOWAS).[16] As of April 2008, State also had provided $18 million of nonlethal equipment for six countries deploying to missions in Haiti, Lebanon, Somalia, and Sudan. For example, State provided field kitchens, field medical clinics, water purification units, and generators to peacekeepers deploying to Somalia. This equipment helped support the deployment of at least 4,600 peacekeepers, according to State.

[16]This equipment depot is currently run jointly by the United States and ECOWAS. The 15 members of ECOWAS are Benin, Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Cote d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togolese Republic.

Figure 6: Expenditures of GPOI Funds for Deployment Assistance by Region (fiscal years 2005 through 2008, as of April 2008)

3%
South and Central America
($862,212)

Asia
($2,000,000)

Europe
($2,500,000)

6%

7%

84%

Africa
($28,274,176)

Source: GAO analysis of Department of State data.

Note: Near East and Central Asia expended zero funding in this time period.

Although State's goal is to provide equipment to countries deployed to peacekeeping missions in a timely manner, as of April 2008, $9 million of equipment obligated since 2005 for countries deployed to missions in Somalia and Sudan had not been provided by State. For example, State obligated $9 million in fiscal year 2005 to support Nigeria, Kenya, and the African Union in the peacekeeping mission to Sudan, but this equipment was not provided until 2007, according to State reporting, and $3.6 million remains to be expended. In another example, State documents indicate that $5.6 million in fiscal year 2006 funds obligated for the purchase of equipment to support peacekeepers deployed from Rwanda, Ghana, Burundi, and Nigeria have not yet been expended.

To facilitate donor support for transportation and logistical needs of countries deploying peacekeepers, State established an electronic communication system in the fall of 2007. Requests made by countries seeking assistance with transportation and equipment for peacekeeping

missions can be sent by e-mail to G8 and other countries that could provide such assistance. As of April 2008, five potential donor G8 countries have designated a contact person to receive such requests, according to State. Although the GPOI strategy committed to initiating the process and establishing an electronic system by 2006, State did not establish the system until 2007. In April 2008, the first request for assistance for one country's deployment to the African Union mission in Somalia was communicated by State to donors through the system, according to State.

State Has Targeted a Smaller Share of Resources to Build Peacekeeping Skills and Infrastructure in Africa Compared with Other Regions and Faces Delays in Completing Activities

State and DOD have conducted a number of activities to enhance peacekeeping skills and infrastructure to develop the ability of countries to conduct training for their own peacekeeping missions and to improve the capabilities of regional organizations to plan, train for, and execute peacekeeping missions. Although African partners receive the majority of GPOI funds, State has targeted a smaller share of resources, comparatively, for activities to build peacekeeping skills and infrastructure among Africa peacekeepers, in part due to the needs and capabilities of the region and its focus on training and equipping peacekeepers to serve in current missions.

State and DOD Have Conducted Activities to Build Skills and Infrastructure for Peacekeeping

State and DOD have conducted a range of activities to build peacekeeping skills and infrastructure among partner countries. (See app. VI for information on the status of these activities in each region.) These activities include the following:

- Enhancing the ability of countries to conduct their own peacekeeping training:

  - trained 2,384 military peacekeeping instructors in African countries, 266 in Asian countries, 43 in Central American countries, and 26 in European countries;

  - refurbished training centers in Guatemala, Indonesia, Jordan, Mongolia, and Ukraine; and

  - supported three annual multinational training exercises in Asia beginning in 2006, enabling peacekeeping units from different countries to train together.

- Improving the capabilities of regional organizations to plan, train for, and execute peacekeeping missions. These activities include the following:

- trained ECOWAS staff on mission planning and management;

- provided equipment and supported operations for the ECOWAS equipment depot;

- provided computer equipment to regional peacekeeping training centers in Ghana, Kenya, and Mali.; and

- funded training of units from El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua, which will serve as a multinational brigade under the Conference of Central American Armed Forces.

Smaller Proportion of GPOI Resources Have Been Targeted for Skills and Infrastructure Activities in Africa than in Asia

State has spent approximately $32 million in building skills and infrastructure in different regions of the world. As displayed in figure 7, State has spent more in Asia than Africa on activities that build skills and infrastructure—about $15 million in Asia and $12 million in Africa— although Africa receives the majority of GPOI funds overall.

Figure 7: Expenditures of GPOI Funds for Building Peacekeeping Skills and Infrastructure, by Region (fiscal years 2005 through 2008, as of April 2008)

Source: GAO analysis of Department of State data.

Note: Near East and Central Asia expended zero funding in this time period.

Further, State has targeted a higher proportion of funds in South and Central America, Asia, and Europe on building skills and infrastructure than on training and equipping peacekeepers within those regions. In support of its goal to build skills and infrastructure, State has spent 51 percent of all funds for Asia in this area, and about 20 percent of all funds for both South and Central America and Europe. In comparison, of the $98 million spent in Africa, 12 percent was spent on assisting with peacekeeping skills and infrastructure.[17] In response to our findings, State officials attributed the limited focus of resources for building skills and infrastructure in Africa to a drop in funding of more than 20 percent from the funding initially anticipated in 2005. These officials told us that the program objectives were developed with the expectation of receiving $660 million and the decrease in funding to approximately $500 million over 5 years has influenced program decisions and priorities. In May 2008, State and DOD officials said that discussions are underway to develop proposals for future GPOI activities after 2010.

In addition to the funds expended by State, some of the combatant commands have used DOD funds to support GPOI activities in Asia, Africa, and Europe. For instance, U.S. Pacific Command officials identified that they spent about $500,000 in fiscal year 2007 to supplement the refurbishment of buildings at Mongolia's peacekeeping training center. In addition, some of the commands assign officers to serve as liaisons at peacekeeping training centers in other countries. For instance, U.S. African Command has a liaison officer at a peacekeeping training center in Ghana, and U.S. European Command has an officer at a peacekeeping training center in Bosnia.[18]

State Faces Delays in Completing Skills and Infrastructure Activities in Africa

Activities to build skills and infrastructure in Africa have faced delays and will likely not be completed by 2010. Specifically, State faces delays in building African countries' ability to maintain their training programs, establishing a regional communication system for ECOWAS and the African Union, and transferring the equipment depot to ECOWAS. According to State officials, these delays are affected, in part, by African peacekeeping countries' limited resources and capabilities for supporting their own peacekeeping programs. State officials also have noted that the

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[17]Of the funds expended in Africa, 59 percent was spent on training and training equipment and 29 percent on deployment assistance.

[18]GPOI provides funding for the nonsalary costs of the U.S. European Command liaison officer position in Bosnia.

ability these countries have to support their peacekeeping program is directly affected by the rates of peacekeeper deployments these countries provide to peacekeeping missions.

- In two of the African countries we visited, high rates of deployments of trained instructors limit their ability to build and maintain a training program. For example, in Senegal, officials stated that building a cadre of Senegalese instructors was difficult because once these instructors complete GPOI training, they are frequently deployed on missions due to their high skill levels.

- The strategic communications system that State established for ECOWAS member countries is not fully operational. State documents identified that, while some countries were using the equipment, others had yet to either receive or use it. In commenting on a draft of this report, State told us that 11 countries have equipment and 2 are waiting on equipment delivery. State also obligated $4.5 million to set up a strategic communications system for the African Union but has been unable to install the system due to a licensing issue, according to State.

- The ECOWAS equipment depot in Sierra Leone is likely to continue to function under joint control of the United States and ECOWAS. State maintains the depot, including the delivery and maintenance of nonlethal equipment used by ECOWAS members for peacekeeping and election support. State intends to transfer full responsibility to ECOWAS for the maintenance of the depot, according to State officials, but this is unlikely to happen in the near term. State officials said that ECOWAS is not fully capable of financing the depot in the near future and will require U.S. support in the near term for its operations and maintenance.

More than Half of GPOI-Trained Military Peacekeepers Have Deployed to Missions, but State Cannot Assess the Quality or Effectiveness of Its Training Program

State and DOD provide training on a number of military peacekeeping skills, and 56 percent of these trained military peacekeepers from 13 countries have deployed to peacekeeping missions, as of April 2008.[19] However, State faces challenges in assessing the quality and effectiveness of its training program. First, State cannot ascertain the proficiency of the peacekeepers it has trained against a standard level of skills taught during their training to determine if it is providing effective training. Second, State officials are unclear about their responsibilities for maintaining and recording evaluations of performance evaluations in the contractor performance system of contractors who provide training in Africa. Third, State is unable to fully account for the activities of trained instructors to measure the program's impact in building countries' capability to continue this training. Specifically, as of April 2008, State had trained more than 2,700 military instructors and supported the training of over 1,300 stability police instructors at COESPU, but could not identify whether these instructors subsequently conduct training.

State and DOD Train Military Peacekeeping Units and Support Training of Stability Police but Cannot Ascertain the Proficiency of Trainees

State and DOD train military units in peacekeeping skills, primarily to aid participating countries in their deployment to peacekeeping operations.[20] According to GPOI strategy and agency officials, the instruction is based on standard tasks identified in U.S. military training doctrine and UN training materials and is modified by the partner country's or region's needs, the skill levels of the soldiers in the unit, and the specific requirements of the peacekeeping mission. However, State does not have program-wide standards in place to measure the proficiency of trainees, the quality of instruction they receive, the performance of deployed trainees, or the activities of the trained military peacekeeping instructors. Further, State supports the Italian government, specifically the Italian Carabinieri, in providing training to stability police instructors for unit-level police operations on peacekeeping missions. However, State has no

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[19]We identified a limitation in the data on deployments of trained peacekeepers. State is not able to obtain the individual names of those who deploy to compare with the rosters of those trained under GPOI. However, based on the fact that State can identify which of the units trained under GPOI have deployed, and that any individual who joins the peacekeeping unit subsequent to its training by GPOI may receive additional training from his or her unit officers, we determined that the data on military peacekeepers deployed were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of reporting the deployments of GPOI-trained peacekeeping.

[20]The intent of the training is to provide units with the skills to function at the level of a military battalion unit in a peacekeeping mission.

measures in place to identify the training provided by or the deployments of trained stability police instructors.

Military Peacekeeper Training Consists of U.S. Military and UN Training Materials

State and DOD have provided training to military peacekeeping units in 43 of the 52 countries, according to State documents.[21] According to State data, 56 percent of about 40,000 trained military peacekeepers from 13 countries have deployed to peacekeeping missions, the majority—97 percent—from African countries. Training is focused on providing peacekeeping skills to military units to assist preparation for deployment to a specific peacekeeping mission and is intended to supplement training already provided by the partner country.[22] According to GPOI strategy and agency officials, GPOI implementers use relevant U.S. military doctrine to develop training instruction for military tasks. As displayed in table 2, training for these military units includes categories such as tactical skills for peacekeeping, medical care issues, and interaction with civilian groups and organizations, which contain a variety of peacekeeping tasks. For example, DOD and State provide instruction on tactical peacekeeping tasks such as how to escort a convoy, conduct checkpoint operations, or guard fixed sites. In addition, training of military peacekeepers in Africa may include instruction on firearms safety and marksmanship when training in such skills is identified as a need of that unit or country's military peacekeepers.[23] Military peacekeeper training also includes standardized training identified by the United Nations, such as basic information about the United Nations, UN structure and capabilities, issues regulating the behavior of the individual peacekeeper, standard operations procedures, logistics, medical support, and human rights.

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[21]Five additional countries participated in GPOI training, but GPOI funds were not used to pay for their training.

[22]Basic training in military skills is the responsibility of the partner nation.

[23]GPOI does not provide bullets or lethal weapons used by troops during training.

Table 2: Peacekeeping Tasks Included in GPOI Military Skill Training

Category	Types of Tasks
Tactical peacekeeping	Escorting convoys
	Patrolling
	Checkpoint operations
	Guarding fixed sites
	Operating a disarmament operation
	Reacting to insurgents and improvised explosive devices
	Marking unexploded ordinance
Civil-military relations	Securing noncombatants
	Evacuating noncombatants
	Reacting to civil disturbances
Medical care	Treating casualties
	Evacuating casualties
Press and information operations	Interacting with the media
UN organization and standards	Understanding gender and sexual exploitation issues

Source: GAO analysis of DOD and State training documents.

Note: This table is not intended to serve as an exhaustive list of available peacekeeping tasks.

Military officers also are provided training in planning and managing battalion functions during peacekeeping operations. For example, officers are introduced to skills needed to plan and execute the protection of a fixed site, such as a food distribution site or protecting a convoy. In Africa, State provides more detailed training in military staff skills than in Asia, in response to the level of capabilities and needs of the peacekeeping units. For example, training of peacekeeping military officers in Africa includes instruction on the basic roles and responsibilities of officers staffed to a battalion.

While there are some consistencies across the regions in the curriculum available, military peacekeepers do not receive the same training in all regions. Regional implementers have developed a training curriculum that is generally based on tasks identified in U.S. military doctrine and UN training materials, which are modified to address the specific needs or desires of the region or country. Identified training instruction is further modified or adapted for each training session to meet the identified needs of the partner country, skill levels of the individuals in the unit to be trained, and the requirements of the specific peacekeeping mission, according to training officials and State and DOD program implementers.

COESPU Training Tailored to
General Topics of Instruction
for Stability Police Units

COESPU has trained stability police instructors from 13 countries,
providing training at two levels—senior- and junior-level officers or their
civilian equivalents. Training for junior-level instructors is focused on the
leaders of a stability police unit, while senior-level training is focused on
the overall leadership of stability police operations. Courses in both levels
include instruction on peace support operations, tactics, stability police
operations, humanitarian law, international law, territorial awareness, and
first aid. The Italian government developed the COESPU curriculum to
provide general instruction for unit-level police operations on
peacekeeping missions rather than tailoring the curriculum to specific
missions. The 5-week senior-level course instructs course participants on
the management of stability police operations as well as tactical
instruction on shooting and driving. The 7-week junior-level course
includes tactical courses on crowd control, urban area patrolling, high-risk
arrests, VIP security, fire fighting, shooting, driving, and personal defense.
The junior-level course also contains a simulation where course
participants practice their skills in the training area.

State Cannot Assess the
Proficiency of Trainees to
Determine if Capabilities Are
Comparable to Other GPOI-
Trained Peacekeepers

State does not have an established process for measuring the proficiency
of trainees who receive similar types of training. GPOI trainers conduct
training exercises and use after-action reviews and their professional
judgment to determine students' ability to perform tasks as a unit during a
training course. However, State and DOD do not evaluate the military
peacekeeper trainees against a program-wide standard level of proficiency
in the skills taught during their training. For example, the evaluation
process to assess a unit's proficiency in operating a checkpoint depends
on the instructor's judgment, and the information is not collected in a way
that can be compared against other trained units. Rather, a participant is
considered a GPOI-trained peacekeeper if he or she attends 80 percent of
the training GPOI provides.

In commenting on a draft of this report, State noted that an individual
participant is considered a GPOI-trained peacekeeper if his or her unit
masters 80 percent of the training GPOI provides. However, according to
the GPOI strategy and reporting provided by the GPOI evaluation team,
implementers and trainers collect information that identifies individuals
that participated in at least 80 percent of the training curriculum.
Furthermore, the GPOI strategy states that the number of individuals who
participate in unit training may be counted toward the goal of 75,000 if
individuals are present for 80 percent or more of the unit training. In
addition, implementers we met with told us that participants are counted
as trained if they participate in at least 80 percent of the training
curriculum. State provided one example in which 50 students from one

country participating in two training courses were not counted as GPOI-trained because it was determined that the personnel were not sufficiently trained due to poor English language ability.

Training and program officials in the countries we visited stated that, although they are not required to test students, they use their professional judgment as former or current U.S. military personnel to monitor students' performance and determine if more time should be spent in developing certain skills, when possible. According to training documents, after receiving instruction in tactical peacekeeping tasks, trainees perform the task as a unit, and the instructors are to observe their performance and determine how the unit is performing against a standard checklist of items. For example, during an exercise for securing a distribution site, instructors will observe the training to judge if the unit follows proper procedures to control a crowd, set up checkpoints and observation points for the distribution area, and report incident information. Trainers in Ethiopia, Ghana, and Senegal stated that the intent of the training is to expose students to the tasks they need for peacekeeping, although they are not expected to achieve a specific level of proficiency in the skills taught. Military troops from Ghana and Senegal account for 44 percent of the deployed GPOI-trained troops. In addition, State officials told us that although instructors follow training standards, the evaluation process of training is subjective and a unit's performance is affected by the skills and capabilities the soldiers bring to the training.

The 2006 GPOI strategy states that GPOI program management personnel were in the process of developing military task lists and related trainings standards to contribute to standardization, interoperability, and sustainability, and ensure the proper use of resources. The strategy also states that developing such standards would help efforts to evaluate the overall effectiveness of the GPOI training program, events, and activities. However, during the course of our review State officials were unable to provide program-wide standards against which they could collect assessments to identify and evaluate the overall proficiency in comparable peacekeeping skills provided by GPOI to trainees worldwide. In commenting on a draft of this report, State stated that the program currently does not have standard military task lists and associated training standards to specify tasks, conditions, and standards for different types of military units participating in peacekeeping operations but that steps are being taken to develop training standards and military task lists that would be used as a basis to develop training plans and assess trainees. Such an evaluation would provide a measure with which to evaluate data that may

be collected to identify the quality of the military peacekeepers GPOI has trained.

Another measure of trainees' performance is how a unit performs during a peacekeeping mission. However, State and DOD are unable to collect assessments of peacekeepers' performance during a mission. GPOI trainers in Senegal, Ghana, and Ethiopia said they occasionally receive UN after-action reports that provide feedback on the performance of military peacekeepers trained by GPOI. However, State and DOD do not routinely collect or analyze these reports or independently assess how GPOI-trained troops performed. Without consistent reporting on the performance of the deployed units, State is unable to compare the performance of units trained within a country or region or between regions to identify similarities in the proficiency of military peacekeepers trained by GPOI.

State Has Procedures for Monitoring Contractors Providing Training in Africa but Officials Are Unclear about Their Responsibility for Recording and Maintaining Performance Evaluations

State has some procedures in place to monitor whether contractors are meeting cost, schedule, and performance requirements in training peacekeepers and providing advisor support. Specifically, State has assigned personnel in its Bureau of African Affairs to monitor the performance of contractors providing advisor support in Africa, established a program management team to oversee the activities of contractors providing training in Africa,[24] and developed a plan to regularly monitor contractor performance. In addition, State receives regular status reports from the contractors.

Quality assurance, especially regular surveillance and documentation of results, is essential to determine whether goods or services provided by the contractor satisfy the contract requirements. Surveillance includes oversight of a contractor's work to provide assurance that the contractor is providing timely and quality goods or services and to help mitigate any contractor performance problems. An agency's monitoring of a contractor's performance may serve as a basis for past performance evaluations that are considered during future source selections. State has a plan for monitoring and evaluating the performance of its contractors providing training in Africa. The quality assurance plan specifies the desired outcomes of the training provided, performance standards that the

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[24]The ACOTA office is comprised of nine contractor employees and one federal employee, according to a State official.

contractors are to meet, and State's process for evaluating contractors' performance.

Although State's quality assurance plan identifies the process for evaluating contractors' performance, State officials implementing the program are unclear which office at State is responsible for recording the evaluation in the contractor performance system, as required by State regulations.[25] State's contracting officials were uncertain whether evaluations of past contractor performance for training in Africa had been entered in the system by the program management team. An official from the ACOTA program management team told us they are not responsible for entering performance evaluations in the contractor performance system, in part because they are unable to access the system. However, evaluations of contractor past performance are prepared and maintained by this team, according to this official. State provided some evidence that indicated that evaluations of contractors' past performance had been prepared by the ACOTA program management team and considered when new task orders were placed on the existing contract for training in Africa. However, we did not fully assess the extent to which the evaluations of contractors' performance had been completed and considered in awarding training task orders. We did not examine State's compliance with its performance plan and the extent to which past performance evaluations were used to award training task orders.

State Cannot Identify the Outcomes of the Training Program

State cannot fully account for the training activities of more than 2,700 military peacekeeping instructors trained by the GPOI program. Further, State has supported the training of more than 1,300 stability police instructors at COESPU but cannot account for either the training or the deployment activities of these instructors.

State Is Unable to Identify whether Military Peacekeeping Instructors Are Conducting Training as Intended

The activities of trained instructors provide a measure for the progress made in building a partner country's capacity to sustain its peacekeeper deployments in the future. Although State and DOD have trained more than 2,700 military peacekeeper instructors to continue training in their respective countries, State cannot fully determine whether this training has taken place. For example, as of April 2008, State had only been able to

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[25]State regulations require that past performance must be evaluated, recorded, and entered electronically into the contractor performance system, which is a computer database maintained by the National Institutes of Health (48 C.F.R. 42.1502, 42.1503; 48 C.F.R. 642.1503-70).

identify training that had occurred by GPOI-trained instructors for two countries.[26] The deployment of peacekeepers trained by these instructors is another measure of the program's ability to increase peacekeeping contributions. In March 2008, 47 GPOI partner countries had military peacekeepers and observers deployed to UN peacekeeping missions. State cannot fully identify how many troops from these 47 countries, if any, were trained by the 2,700 GPOI-trained military peacekeeping instructors.

State Is Unable to Identify the Extent to Which Stability Police Instructors Are Conducting Training and Deploying to Peacekeeping Missions

COESPU has estimated that instructors trained at its training program will train an additional 4,500 stability police, according to COESPU documents and officials. The training activities of COESPU graduates are one measure of the efforts by Italy and the United States to increase worldwide capacity for stability police. Although State has supported the training of more than 1,300 stability police instructors at COESPU, State and COESPU have been unable to fully account for training conducted by these instructors in their home countries. Specifically, State has only been able to account for the indigenous training of one stability police unit conducted by COESPU graduates from one country, according to a State document.

State and COESPU also are unable to identify if stability police units deploying to peacekeeping missions were trained by graduates from COESPU or if these graduates have deployed to missions themselves. First, State has been able to account only for the deployment of a stability police unit from the one country in which the unit was trained by graduates of COESPU, as of April 2008. Second, although COESPU has trained some instructors that are likely to lead stability police units in peacekeeping operations, State and COESPU cannot fully account for the deployments of these instructors. Specifically, State can account for the deployments of 13 of 236 students from India who were trained at COESPU, as of April 2008.

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[26]One of these countries participated in military peacekeeper training funded by GPOI in Mongolia, but is not a GPOI partner and paid for the costs associated with attending the training exercise, according to agency documents.

GPOI Partner Countries Generally Meet Program Criteria, but in Some Cases State Did Not Screen Trainees for Potential Violations of Human Rights

According to the GPOI strategy and State officials, before countries and their peacekeepers can receive GPOI training and other assistance, they must generally meet certain criteria including having an elected government, an acceptable human rights record, and the willingness to participate in peace support operations. GPOI partner countries generally met the criteria for inclusion in the program. However, for 24 of the 52 countries, State's human rights reports for 2007 identified human rights violations by security personnel. To comply with U.S. laws, State must verify that it does not have credible evidence that the foreign security forces identified to receive assistance have committed gross violations of human rights prior to the provision of training.[27] We found that military peacekeepers and stability police were not always screened or were not properly screened for human rights abuses, as required by State guidance for the legislative requirements.

GPOI Partner Countries Generally Meet Program Criteria

State, in consultation with DOD, has selected 52 partner countries to participate in GPOI based on a list of criteria identified in the program's strategy.[28] Partner countries should have an elected government and acceptable human rights record, willingness to participate in peace support operations, and agreements to ensure that U.S. training and equipment are used for the purposes intended, according to agency documents.

State and DOD periodically review whether partner countries continue to meet these criteria and may suspend GPOI funding in cases where criteria are not met, according to agency officials. For example, funding of GPOI activities for Thailand was suspended after a military coup overthrew the democratically elected government in 2006.[29] However, some DOD officials

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[27]The Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2008 made permanent the following requirement: "No assistance shall be furnished under this Act or the Arms Export Control Act to any unit of the security forces of a foreign country if the Secretary of State has credible evidence that such unit has committed gross violations of human rights." The prohibitions do not apply if the Secretary determines and reports to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, and the Committees on Appropriations that the government of such country is taking effective measures to bring the responsible members of the security forces unit to justice (22 U.S.C. 2378d). A similar provision has appeared in prior foreign operations appropriations acts.

[28]In May 2008, State officials informed us that Mauritania had been added as a new GPOI country. We did not assess if this country meets the criteria for partnership with GPOI.

[29]With the recent election of a new government in Thailand, State expects to resume activities once U.S. prohibitions on security assistance are lifted.

expressed concern about the selection of certain countries and the criteria used to select countries. For example, officials in the African and Pacific commands and the Joint Staff said they did not agree with the selection of two countries in Africa and Asia and they felt it would limit available resources for ongoing activities in other countries. In another example, a DOD official said that additional criteria, such as the military HIV infection rates or attrition rates, should be taken into account in selecting partner countries because these factors affect the country's ability to deploy. For the training of stability police at COESPU, Italy and the United States jointly decided which countries would participate.

We found that most of the 52 partner countries met the participation criteria, but 24 countries had identified human rights violations by security personnel in State's human rights reporting for 2007.[30] State officials cited a number of reasons to justify the inclusion of these countries in GPOI: State did not consider the human rights violations for some countries to be a systemic problem in the military or stated that these violations were associated with private security companies, not with the countries' military personnel;[31] some countries were selected to support other strategic goals; and participation would allow some countries to receive human rights training not otherwise available. In addition, State officials said that the selection criteria are recommended but not required by the program and the United States engaged in diplomatic discussions with these countries to improve their human rights records. These officials indicated that the vetting of trainees for human rights abuses guards against the training of any human rights violators. Finally, State also formally submits a list of GPOI partner countries each year to Congress to ensure that Congress has oversight over the list of partner countries.

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[30]These countries were Angola, Bangladesh, Burundi, Cameroon, Ethiopia, Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Cambodia, Fiji, Indonesia, India, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Sri Lanka, El Salvador, Honduras, and Paraguay.

[31]This was the case for Honduras, Cameroon, Mozambique, and Zambia.

State Did Not Properly Screen and Did Not Always Follow Its Guidance for Human Rights Vetting

Before providing any training or equipment support under GPOI, State must verify that it does not have credible evidence that the foreign security forces identified to receive assistance have committed gross violations of human rights. In our review of vetting documentation of 2007 GPOI trainees from 14 countries[32] identified in State reporting to have documented human rights violations by security personnel, we found cases where individuals and units that received training were not properly vetted.

Each of the annual Foreign Operations Appropriations Acts from 1998 to 2006 included a provision, commonly referred to as the Leahy Amendment, that restricted the provision of assistance appropriated in these acts to any foreign security unit when the Secretary of State has credible evidence that the unit has committed gross violations of human rights. In the fiscal year 2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act, the Foreign Assistance Act was permanently amended to restrict the provision of assistance to foreign security units when credible evidence exists of gross violations of human rights by that unit. While the legal provisions restrict funding to "any unit of the security forces of a foreign country," State guidance is to screen or vet individuals who are identified for individual training or who are members of newly formed or composite units.[33] Should an entire existing unit receive the training together, State guidance requires vetting of the unit name and commander only. To implement these legislative restrictions, State's guidance calls for U.S. embassies and State bureaus to screen individuals or units proposed for training to determine whether these foreign security forces have committed gross human rights violations.

We found that State did not vet some individuals and units for human rights violations before training. Specifically, all 81 military peacekeepers who received training in 2007 from Honduras were not vetted before participating in GPOI-funded training courses. In addition, 16 military peacekeepers and stability police from Bangladesh, India, Indonesia, Nigeria, and Sri Lanka were not vetted out of 382 trained in those countries in 2007, and a 665-person Nigerian battalion trained by GPOI was not vetted. In response to our findings, State officials have begun the

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[32]These 14 countries are Bangladesh, Cambodia, Cameroon, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Mozambique, Niger, Nigeria, Philippines, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Uganda, and Zambia.

[33]Composite units are defined as units in which individuals are temporarily drawn together from already-established units to form a new unit.

vetting process for the individuals from Honduras who received GPOI training. We also found that some individuals who received training in 2007 were not screened in accordance with State's guidance for vetting newly formed or composite units. Specifically, the commanders of seven composite units in Niger, Nigeria, and Uganda and the commander of the ECOWAS standby force were screened for human rights violations, but the individual members of these units were not vetted, as required by State guidance. As a result of these lapses in vetting, it is possible that State and DOD have provided training to security personnel who committed human rights violations.

State and DOD officials in the countries we visited said they face challenges in conducting vetting prior to training due to the difficulties both in getting the names of individuals in units prior to training and in having sufficient time to properly conduct vetting in the country and in Washington, D.C. State officials in the ACOTA office told us they have taken corrective action to prevent further vetting oversights by creating a new position in their office that would be responsible, in part, for monitoring the vetting data for all training provided in Africa.

Conclusions

The growth of peace support operations has increased the importance and need for more comprehensive measures to ensure worldwide capability and capacity for responding to peacekeeping demands. The United States has taken the lead in the G8 goal to build this peacekeeping capability worldwide through GPOI. Since 2005, State and DOD, focusing the majority of GPOI resources on efforts in Africa, have undertaken numerous activities to increase countries' ability to serve in peacekeeping missions, including the training of nearly 40,000 military peacekeepers. However, it appears that GPOI will fall short of reaching certain established goals, such as training 75,000 military peacekeepers by 2010. State also has faced some challenges in supporting COESPU's need for additional staff, accounting for the delivery and transfer of nonlethal training equipment to partner countries, evaluating the quality and effectiveness of its training program, and screening trainees for human rights abuses. Addressing these challenges will enhance GPOI's effectiveness as the program nears the end of its 5-year authorization and will help ensure that U.S. resources are focused on building partner countries' capabilities to provide quality peacekeepers worldwide. To meet the G8 commitment to expand global capabilities for peace support operations, GPOI activities that extend beyond 2010 will require more emphasis on developing the capabilities of African partners to maintain peacekeeping operations on their own.

Recommendations for Executive Action

To enhance GPOI's effectiveness, better identify program outcomes, and ensure proper screening for human rights violations, we recommend that the Secretary of State take the following six actions:

1. Work in consultation with DOD to assist Italy in staffing the key unfilled positions at COESPU to better evaluate progress made and monitor results.

2. Monitor implementation of new procedures to account for delivery and transfer of nonlethal training equipment to partner countries on an ongoing basis.

3. Provide additional guidance to U.S. missions to help the United States and Italy collect data on the training and deployment activities of COESPU graduates in their home countries.

4. Develop and implement, in consultation with DOD and in accordance with the GPOI strategy, the use of standard military task lists and related training standards to enable program managers to evaluate the quality of training and measure the proficiency of trainees program-wide.

5. Ensure that the evaluations of contractor performance of training in Africa are properly recorded into the contractor performance system as required by agency regulations.

6. Develop a system for monitoring the vetting activities for all GPOI training and ensure that all individuals in composite units are vetted for human rights violations, as required by State policy.

To ensure that GPOI activities enhance the capabilities of countries to maintain peacekeeping operations on their own, we also recommend that the Secretary of State, in consultation with DOD, take the following two actions:

1. Assess estimated resources and time frames needed to complete peacekeeping skills and infrastructure activities in Africa by 2010.

2. Ensure that any plans for extending GPOI activities beyond 2010 identify sufficient resources for developing long-term peacekeeping skills and infrastructure in Africa.

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation

We provided draft copies of this report to the Departments of State and Defense. We received written comments from State and DOD, which we have reprinted in appendixes VII and VIII, respectively. State and DOD provided technical comments which we have incorporated in the report, as appropriate.

State concurred or partially concurred with seven of the eight GAO recommendations and provided additional information to highlight the program's achievements. State did not concur with GAO's recommendation to develop a method for evaluating GPOI training. State notes that methods already exist to evaluate the quality of the training program and measure the proficiency of trainees. We disagree that State's current evaluation methods address our recommendation. State has not developed military task lists and associated training that can be applied at all GPOI training sites; sites currently use varying standards to assess the proficiency of trainees. DOD agrees with the need for greater standardization and more analysis of trainee performance. We modified the recommendation to clarify the need for GPOI-wide standard military tasks and related training that State, in consultation with DOD, should develop in accordance with the commitments made in the GPOI strategy. State also commented that it now projects that GPOI will train 75,000 peacekeepers by July 2010 based on new training rates. We were unable to validate State's new data since as recently as May 2008, program officials indicated that slow expenditure rates would delay State's efforts to reach the 2010 training goal.

DOD agreed with the findings and concurred or partially concurred with our recommendations. DOD agreed with the need for greater standardization and more analysis of trainee performance and agreed that State should work with DOD and Italy to validate personnel shortfalls at COESPU and fill the identified positions. DOD also stated that an assessment of resources and time frames required to achieve GPOI objectives should apply to all regions engaged by the GPOI program. We did not revise this recommendation because it is intended to address our finding that State is unlikely to complete skills and infrastructure activities in Africa by 2010.

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretaries of State and Defense. We will also make copies available to others on request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staffs have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 512-8979 or christoffj@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made contributions to this report are listed in appendix IX.

Joseph A. Christoff
Director, International Affairs and Trade

List of Committees

The Honorable Carl Levin
Chairman
The Honorable John McCain
Ranking Member
Committee on Armed Services
United States Senate

The Honorable Joseph R. Biden
Chairman
The Honorable Richard G. Lugar
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The Honorable Howard L. Berman
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The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen
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The Honorable John P. Murtha
Chairman
The Honorable C.W. Bill Young
Ranking Member
Subcommittee on Defense
Committee on Appropriations
House of Representatives

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

In response to a congressional mandate in the fiscal year 2008 Defense Authorization Act to review the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), we assessed (1) the progress made in meeting GPOI goals, (2) whether State is consistently assessing the quality and effectiveness of the training program, and (3) the extent to which countries meet program criteria and whether program participants are adequately screened for human rights abuses. We attended a planning conference in October 2007 in Washington, D.C., for GPOI implementers and an October 2007 conference with Group of Eight (G8) members and other partners to discuss worldwide efforts to enhance peacekeeping.

Our scope of work included the Departments of State (State) and Defense (DOD) in Washington, D.C.; U.S. Combatant Commands for Africa, Europe, Pacific, and Southern Hemisphere; and site visits to Ethiopia, Ghana, Guatemala, Italy, Mongolia, Senegal, and Sierra Leone. We observed training and visited facilities refurbished with GPOI funds during site visits to Ghana, Guatemala, Italy, Mongolia, and Senegal. In selecting field work countries, we considered the following criteria: funding allocations, number of military peacekeepers trained, number of trained peacekeepers that have deployed to missions, training schedules, and unique characteristics, such as the location of Italy's training school for stability police and the equipment depot in Sierra Leone. We selected these countries in Africa, Asia, and Central America because they had received more funding allocations and had trained and deployed more troops than other GPOI partner countries in those regions and also were scheduled to conduct training during our visits. We selected Italy to assess U.S. support to stability police training at the Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units (COESPU), Germany to interview officials from the U.S. European and African commands, Sierra Leone to assess the GPOI equipment depot, and Ethiopia to assess GPOI activities with the African Union.

To assess the progress GPOI made in meeting its goals, we reviewed data gathered by State on the number of troops trained and the equipment provided, reports from agencies and COESPU of activities at COESPU, and monthly and annual progress reports. We compared the information in these sources with benchmarks established in the GPOI strategy for the goals and objectives of the program. In addition, we collected and reviewed information on obligations and expenditures of GPOI funds and surveyed the combatant commands responsible for implementing GPOI to estimate any additional funds they used to support GPOI activities. To assess the reliability of State's data on troops trained and equipment provided, as well as obligations and expenditures, we reviewed relevant

documentation and spoke with agency officials, including the GPOI program assessment team, about data quality control procedures. We determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report.

To determine whether State is consistently assessing the quality and effectiveness of the GPOI training program, we identified the training provided and determined what training assessments were conducted. We reviewed training programs of instruction, training contracts and task orders, and related training documents. We also interviewed State and DOD officials in Washington, D.C., and during site visits to the countries listed, as well as trainers in Ethiopia, Ghana, Guatemala, Mongolia, and Senegal. To identify the training provided at COESPU, we reviewed training documents and conducted interviews with Italian officials at COESPU. To identify the measures that State has in place to oversee contractor activities for training and advisor support in Africa, we reviewed contracts and related documents and interviewed State officials, including officials from the Office of Acquisitions Management and the Bureau of African Affairs.

To identify the activities of trained instructors and stability police, we reviewed data gathered by State on the deployments of trained military peacekeepers, including instructors and stability police instructors, and data gathered by State and COESPU on the training activities of these instructors. We also interviewed Italian officials at COESPU, State officials, and training officials and contractors. We reviewed relevant documentation and spoke with agency officials, including the GPOI program assessment team, about data quality control procedures. We identified a limitation in the data on deployments of trained peacekeepers. State is not able to obtain the individual names of those who deploy to compare with the rosters of those trained under GPOI. However, based on the fact that State can identify which of the units trained under GPOI has deployed, and that any individual who joins the peacekeeping unit subsequent to its training by GPOI may receive additional training from their unit officers, we determined that the data on military peacekeepers deployed were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of reporting the deployments of GPOI-trained peacekeeping. For the data on the activities of instructors trained under GPOI, we found that State and COESPU did not have complete or reliable data for the purposes of identifying comprehensive information about the training activities of these individuals in their home country. We also found that COESPU and State did not have sufficient information to identify the deployment or training activities of stability police instructors trained at COESPU.

To determine the extent to which countries meet program criteria and whether participants are adequately screened for human rights abuses, we examined the GPOI strategy and interviewed State and DOD officials in Washington, D.C., and during site visits to the countries listed previously. To determine how human rights violations were taken into account, we compared State's 2007 human rights reports, which identified countries with documented human rights violations by security personnel, with the list of GPOI partner countries. We also reviewed State's human rights reports to identify whether partner countries had an elected government. To determine whether GPOI countries showed a willingness to deploy, we examined which countries had deployed troops on United Nations (UN) peacekeeping missions. To ensure that end-use and re-transfer provisions for equipment and training were agreed to, we reviewed whether Section 505 agreements were signed with each of the countries.[1] We interviewed State officials and collected additional information for countries that did not clearly meet some of these criteria. In addition, we reviewed State documents identifying human rights vetting procedures. We selected 14 countries with documented human rights violations by security forces that received training in 2007 and assessed whether individuals and units trained in these countries were vetted for human rights violations. To do this, we compared vetting records from State for the training provided to individuals and units from these countries with the training rosters provided by State.

We conducted this performance audit from August 2007 to June 2008 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

[1]Section 505 agreements prohibit the furnishing of defense articles or related services or training on a grant basis unless the country agrees that it will not use the defense articles or training for purposes other than those for which furnished.

Appendix II: GPOI Partner Countries

There are 52 countries that received GPOI training, equipment, or other support to enhance their peacekeeping capabilities and contributions. Table 3 provides a list of partner countries that received support for their military peacekeeping, stability police, or both, from 2004 to 2008, as of April 2008.

Table 3: GPOI Partner Countries 2004 to 2008, as of April 2008

Country/Organization	Military peacekeeping partner	Stability police partner	Military peacekeeping and stability police partner
Africa			
Angola	X		
Benin	X		
Botswana	X		
Burkina Faso	X		
Burundi	X		
Cameroon			X
Ethiopia	X		
Gabon	X		
Ghana	X		
Kenya			X
Malawi	X		
Mali			X
Mozambique	X		
Namibia	X		
Niger	X		
Nigeria			X
Rwanda	X		
Senegal			X
South Africa			X
Tanzania	X		
Uganda	X		
Zambia	X		
Europe			
Albania	X		
Bosnia and Herzegovina	X		
Macedonia	X		
Romania			X
Serbia		X	

Country/Organization	Military peacekeeping partner	Stability police partner	Military peacekeeping and stability police partner
Ukraine			X
Near East and Central Asia			
Jordan			X
Morocco[a]		X	
Kazakhstan	X		
Tajikistan	X		
Asia			
Bangladesh	X		
Cambodia	X		
Fiji[a]	X		
India		X	
Indonesia			X
Malaysia	X		
Mongolia	X		
Nepal	X		
Pakistan			X
Philippines	X		
Sri Lanka	X		
Thailand	X		
South and Central America			
Belize	X		
Chile	X		
El Salvador	X		
Guatemala	X		
Honduras	X		
Nicaragua	X		
Paraguay	X		
Peru	X		
Total: 52 countries	**38 countries**	**3 countries**	**11 countries**

Source: GAO analysis of State data.

[a]Morocco and Fiji are not currently GPOI partner countries.

Appendix III: International Contributions to 2004 G8 Summit Goal and GPOI

The members of the G8 and other nations have supported the commitments of the 2004 G8 Summit and GPOI.[1] The information below provides additional information on the nature of contributions made by the international community but does not provide a comprehensive list of all contributions made by the G8 and other nations.

G8 nations have contributed to peace support operations in a number of ways, including the training and equipping of military peacekeepers, individual police, and stability police; supporting the development of peacekeeping doctrine; providing funding to support national and regional peacekeeping training centers; providing funding and logistical support to regional organizations; and establishing a stability police training school. For example, three G8 nations have provided instructors to the COESPU, according to State and COESPU officials. In another example, countries have provided equipment to support the troops deployed to peacekeeping missions. Contributions of G8 nations are largely for activities in Africa or in support of peacekeeping missions in this region, according to State documents. According to State, in 2007, the G8 and other nations identified 760 peacekeeping-related programs, events, and activities that member states were conducting in Africa alone.

The G8 and other nations also have directly contributed to the U.S. GPOI program. According to State, 19 countries have contributed to the U.S. program, primarily by providing training instructors to support GPOI-funded training.[2] For example, 4 countries provided instructors to the Central American peacekeeper training school in Guatemala and 14 countries provided instructors to the multilateral peacekeeper training exercises held in Mongolia in 2006 and 2007. State paid travel costs for all the training instructors for the Central American training. For the Mongolia exercises, seven countries paid their own way, and State and DOD paid for the remaining countries.

Two countries also have provided funding and personnel support directly to State for GPOI. Specifically, the Netherlands has committed to provide State with $7 million per year for 3 years, to be used for peacekeeping

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[1]G8 members are Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Russia, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States.

[2]These countries include Argentina, Australia, Bangladesh, Canada, Chile, France, Fiji, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Malaysia, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Thailand, United Kingdom, and Uruguay.

training and equipment activities in Africa. According to State officials, about $5.3 million was received at the end of 2007, and they expect to receive the remaining $1.7 million for 2007 in the near term. State officials in the Bureau of African Affairs told us that two additional countries have indicated plans to provide a total of about $37 million directly to State to support peacekeeping missions in Darfur and Somalia.

State and DOD have trained nearly 40,000 military peacekeepers from a total of 43 countries and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). As of April 2008, about 56 percent of GPOI-trained military peacekeepers have deployed to peacekeeping missions, and the majority have deployed from African partner countries.[1] As table 4 shows, of the 39,518 military peacekeepers trained by GPOI, almost 22,000 have deployed to peacekeeping missions.[2] According to State, these peacekeepers have deployed to 12 United Nations or African Union missions, as well as other missions not supported by the UN or the African Union. African partner countries have deployed the majority of GPOI-trained military peacekeepers—97 percent or 21,435—and the remaining 3 percent have deployed from partner countries in Asia. An additional 6,277 military peacekeepers from African partner countries were trained in anticipation of deployments to UN missions in the near future, according to State reporting.

Table 4: Military Peacekeepers Trained by GPOI and Deployed, by Country and Region (as of April 2008)

GPOI partner	Peacekeepers trained	Peacekeepers deployed
Africa		
Benin	2,519	2,053
Botswana	165	0
Burkina Faso	1,890	0
Cameroon	12	0
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)[a]	288	0
Gabon	1,393	202
Ghana	3,853	2,920
Kenya	86	39

[1]We identified a limitation in the data on deployments of trained peacekeepers. State is not able to obtain the individual names of those who deploy to compare with the rosters of those trained under GPOI. However, based on the fact that State can identify which of the units trained under GPOI have deployed, and that any individual who joins the peacekeeping unit subsequent to its training by GPOI may receive additional training from his or her unit officers, we determined that the data on military peacekeepers deployed were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of reporting the deployments of GPOI-trained peacekeepers.

[2]An additional 572 troops were trained or received equipment for deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan.

GPOI partner	Peacekeepers trained	Peacekeepers deployed
Malawi	1,073	0
Mali	997	0
Mozambique	1,029	0
Namibia	882	0
Niger	1,157	666
Nigeria	4,988	3,758
Rwanda	4,903	4,811
Senegal	7,888	6,833
South Africa	243	98
Tanzania	971	55
Uganda	1,955	0
Zambia	676	0
Subtotal Africa	**36,968**	**21,435**
Asia		
Bangladesh	128	0
Brunei[b]	6	0
Cambodia	173	0
Fiji	47	0
India[b]	47	45
Indonesia	208	0
Laos[b]	1	0
Malaysia	116	0
Mongolia	629	497
Nepal	11	0
Philippines	8	0
Singapore[b]	10	0
Sri Lanka	58	0
Thailand	278	0
Tonga[b]	85	19
Subtotal Asia	**1,805**	**561**
South and Central America		
Belize	2	0
El Salvador	24	0
Guatemala	306	0
Honduras	87	0
Nicaragua	36	0

GPOI partner	Peacekeepers trained	Peacekeepers deployed
Subtotal South and Central America	**455**	**0**
Europe		
Albania	254	0
Bosnia and Herzegovina	1	0
Ukraine	34	0
Subtotal for Europe	**289**	**0**
Near East and Central Asia		
Jordan	1	0
Subtotal Near East and Central Asia	**1**	**0**
Total	**39,518**	**21,996**[c]

Source: GAO analysis of State data.

[a]Training for ECOWAS was for the commander and staff of the Standby Force Headquarters. Multiple countries participated in these exercises.

[b]Brunei, India, Laos, Singapore, and Tonga did not receive GPOI funds, but sent peacekeepers to be trained during GPOI-funded events.

[c]GPOI also has provided deployment equipment and transportation to support the deployment of 4,680 military peacekeepers from Indonesia, Kenya, Nigeria, and Uganda, and an unspecified number of military peacekeepers from Chile and Guatemala. In addition, 229 military peacekeepers from Mongolia deployed to Afghanistan and Iraq, and 343 military peacekeepers deployed to Afghanistan from the South-Eastern Europe Brigade of the Multinational Peace Force South-East Europe.

Appendix V: Equipment Provided to GPOI Partner Countries

Table 5 provides information on the type of equipment that has been or may be provided to partner countries to support training and deployments for peacekeeping. Table 6 provides information on the type of equipment that has been provided to COESPU to support stability police training. State officials indicated that military peacekeepers keep some of the individual training equipment for use during deployments.

Table 5: Types of Military Peacekeeping Equipment Provided to GPOI Partners

Category of equipment	Types of equipment
Individual equipment	• Uniforms[a]
	• Boots
	• Helmets
	• First aid kits
	• Sleeping bags
	• Flashlights
	• Knee and elbow pads
	• Goggles
	• Hammocks
	• Wet weather ponchos
	• Load-bearing suspenders
	• Small arms cases
	• Shovels
	• Duffel bags
	• Field packs

Category of equipment	Types of equipment
Unit equipment	• Computers, software, office supplies • Weapons cleaning kits • Kevlar helmets • Canteens • Compasses • Global positioning systems (GPS) • Radios • Tents • Mine detection kits • Riot batons or policeman clubs • Riot shields • Pickup trucks, buses, military HUMVEEs, ambulances • Topography equipment • Tool kits for carpenters, electricians, and plumbers • Folding cots • Insect nets • Portable bath units
Deployment equipment	• Level 1 medical clinic (100 beds, large tents, lab, surgery area)[b] • Field kitchens[b] • Night vision goggles • Radios • Refrigeration truck[b] • Water purification units • Generators • Tents • Fork lifts, pick-up trucks • Fuel tankers (10,000 liters)[c] • Fuel trucks (5000 liters)[c] • Water tankers (5000 liters)[c] • Concertina wire[b]

Source: GAO analysis of State data.

[a]Uniform includes undershirt, shirt, pants, hats and belts. Gloves include light duty gloves and barbed wire handling.

[b]Equipment provided to the African Union, directly to support the African Union Mission to Somalia.

[c]Equipment provided to African Union Mission in Sudan.

Table 6: Types of Training Equipment Provided for COESPU Training

Category of equipment	Types of equipment
Individual equipment	• Under garments • Uniforms • Gym suits • Winter jackets and hats • Basic hygiene products • Boots • Study materials (notebooks) • SWAT gloves
Training equipment	• Library and media materials • Computer equipment • Bedding • Plexiglas riot shields • Riot batons • Body armor • Shin and arm protectors • Mannequins for self-defense training • Helmets with face shields • NBCR[a] suits, decontamination kits, signals • Plastic weapons • Nonlethal teargas canister thrower • Nonlethal tear gas and flash bang canisters • Inert improvised explosive devices (for demonstrations) • Firefighting equipment

Source: GAO analysis of State data.

[a]NBCR is Nuclear Biological Chemical Radiological.

Appendix VI: GPOI Activities to Support Long-term Skills and Infrastructure for Peacekeeping

Table 7 provides information on the type and status of activities that State and DOD have conducted to build skills and infrastructure to meet partner countries' long-term needs to sustain peacekeeping.

Table 7: Activities to Build Skills and Infrastructure for Peacekeeping, by Region (as of April 2008)

Type of support provided, by region	Status
Africa	
Advisors to support African Union (AU) and ECOWAS	Currently providing two advisors to support AU and ECOWAS: one assisting ECOWAS Strategic Management Planning Cell, and one assisting the AU in planning peacekeeping operations. In 2005 to 2006, two additional positions for advisor support to AU and ECOWAS were supported. State officials are considering phasing out advisor support and providing direct financial assistance to AU and ECOWAS.
Training instructors to continue peacekeeping training	Trained 2,384 instructors.
Strategic communications systems for ECOWAS and AU	ECOWAS Regional Information Exchange System partially active, but some countries do not have equipment installed. AU Regional Information Exchange System has not been installed due to a licensing issue. Also provided travel support for a command control and communication information systems conference.
Training to ECOWAS to support stand up of regional peacekeeping battalion	Three training sessions conducted for ECOWAS Standby Taskforce Headquarters staff.
Multinational peacekeeping exercises	In 2006, implemented a multinational peacekeeping exercise for ECOWAS countries.
Support to peace operations training centers	Provide computer and software equipment to peace operations training centers in Ghana, Kenya, and Mali. Support also is planned for Nigeria in fiscal year 2008.
Support equipment depots	Supporting an ECOWAS motor pool depot with equipment refurbishment capability located in Freetown, Sierra Leone. Provided equipment to support AU deployments to Sudan.
Support of AU facility	Provided mechanical and electrical supplies for renovation of the AU situation room and computer equipment and furniture to the AU strategic planning cell.
Asia	
Support for a communications system among training centers in the region	Funds have been expended to purchase equipment for centers in Bangladesh, Mongolia, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Thailand to support a regional communication system for collaboration among peace support operations training centers. Plans are in place to add Malaysia. The network is not yet operational.
Multinational peacekeeping exercises	Supported three multinational peacekeeping capstone exercises: two in Mongolia and one in Bangladesh.
Peace operations training centers	Provided funds to refurbish centers in Mongolia and Indonesia. Additional support is planned for Bangladesh, Indonesia, Mongolia, Pakistan, and Thailand.

Type of support provided, by region	Status
Training instructors to continue peacekeeping training	Trained 266 instructors.
Europe	
Peace operations training centers	Supported U.S. uniformed instructor position at center in Bosnia and provided funds to refurbish and provide equipment to center in Ukraine.
Support for regional organizations	Provided communications equipment and contractor support to the South Eastern European Brigade for deployment to Afghanistan.
Training instructors to continue peacekeeping training	Trained 26 instructors.
South and Central America	
Peace operations training Centers	Provided funds to refurbish center in Guatemala.
Training instructors to continue peacekeeping training	Trained 43 instructors.
Near East	
Support to peace operations training centers	Plans to provide funds to peacekeeping training center in Jordan to refurbish and supply computer equipment.
Central Asia	
No activities to build skills and infrastructure as of April 2008	

Source: GAO analysis of Department of State funding data and reporting documents.

Appendix VII: Comments from the Department of State

United States Department of State

Assistant Secretary for Resource Management and Chief Financial Officer

Washington, D.C. 20520

Ms. Jacquelyn Williams-Bridgers
Managing Director
International Affairs and Trade
Government Accountability Office
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20548-0001

JUN 18 2008

Dear Ms. Williams-Bridgers:

We appreciate the opportunity to review your draft report, "PEACEKEEPING: Thousands Trained but U.S. is Unlikely to Complete All Activities by 2010 and Some Improvements Are Needed," GAO Job Code 320519.

The enclosed Department of State comments are provided for incorporation with this letter as an appendix to the final report.

If you have any questions concerning this response, please contact David Potter, Wing Commander, Bureau of Political and Military Affairs at (202) 647-1355.

Sincerely,

Bradford R. Higgins

cc: GAO – Monica Brym
 PM – Stephen Mull
 State/OIG – Mark Duda

See comment 1.

See comment 2.

U.S. Department of State Comments on GAO Draft Report

PEACEKEEPING: Thousands Trained but U.S. is Unlikely to Complete All
Activities by 2010 and Some Improvements Are Needed
(GA0-08-754, GAO Code 320519)

The Department of State appreciates the opportunity to review and comment on the
Government Accountability Office draft Report entitled, "*Thousands Trained but
U.S. is Unlikely to Complete All Activities by 2010 and Some Improvements Are
Needed.*" The Department believes, contrary to the findings of the report, that it is,
in fact, on track to meet the objectives of the Global Peace Operations Initiative
(GPOI) by 2010; and that with over 35,000 peacekeepers deployed to 18
peacekeeping operations around the world, GPOI has already demonstrated
significant success, forestalled the loss of life, prevented suffering, and
safeguarded property.

In outlining the rationale for this perspective, this response will address each of
GPOI's seven objectives, provide our position on the draft Report's
recommendations, which for the most part we are already fulfilling, and provide
additional comments where warranted. We will highlight areas where our analysis
differs from that of the GAO and acknowledge areas in the report that highlight the
need for improvement in certain aspects of GPOI implementation.

Achievement of GPOI Objectives

Contrary to the title of the GAO report, we assess that the GPOI objectives will be
achieved under current conditions and within projected resource levels. The basis
for this assessment is presented below. Our analysis first presents the objectives as
stated on page 6 of the draft GAO report, contrasts that wording with the actual
objectives of the GPOI Strategy, and then describes actual and/or projected
achievements by objective.

Objective 1:

Draft GAO Report – *"train and, when appropriate, equip 75,000 military
peacekeepers by 2010;"*

GPOI Strategy – "Train and, as appropriate, equip at least 75,000 peacekeepers
worldwide, with an emphasis on Africa, from FY 2005-2010, to increase global
capacity to participate in peace operations."

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See comment 3.

Analysis – We have modeled the projected training under three sets of
assumptions. Our most conservative projection is based on the Africa Contingency
Operations Training Assistance (ACOTA) Program's minimum contracted
throughput of 1,000 trainees per month with other programs operating at a
throughput of 75 percent of the current training rate. This set of conditions will
result in achievement of the 75,000 peacekeeper objective in the final quarter of
2010. More realistic projections using ACOTA's current throughput and more
representative training rates for other programs suggest the objective will be
achieved in the third quarter of 2010. The GAO report provides no data to the
contrary.

Objective 2:

Draft GAO Report – *"support the Italian government's efforts to establish an
international center to train stability police forces that would then participate in
peacekeeping operations;"*

GPOI Strategy – "Provide support to the international Center of Excellence for
Stability Police Units (COESPU) in Italy to increase the capabilities and
interoperability of stability police to participate in peace operations."

See comment 4.

Analysis – The GPOI program has contributed $10.5M to COESPU in
Vicenza, Italy, and will soon provide an additional $4.5M. As of May 31, 2008,
this institution has trained 1,399 stability police members from 26 countries at the
High Level/Senior Officers Course and the Middle Managers Course. Each course
provides their respective training audiences with the skills to lead, command, and
manage formed police units participating in peace support operations.

Objective 3:

Draft GAO Report – *"develop a program to procure and store peace operations
equipment to facilitate the equipment's quick mobilization for peace operations;"*

GPOI Strategy – "Develop a cached equipment program to procure and warehouse
equipment for use in peace operations anywhere around the globe."

Analysis –With a total $42.8M investment, the GPOI program has established a
system for storing and distributing equipment that has been used successfully by
seven GPOI partners in peace operations in Darfur, Somalia, Southern Sudan,

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Afghanistan, and Haiti. Over $9M has been expended to refurbish; re-stock with vehicles, communications equipment, generators, and water purification units; and manage an equipment depot in Sierra Leone. A further $33.8M has been obligated to procure other equipment such as personal protective gear, vehicles and vehicle parts, tactical radios, medical trauma kits, field rations, and other supplies.

Objective 4:

Draft GAO Report – *"develop a transportation and logistics support system to deploy and sustain peacekeeping in the field;"*

GPOI Strategy – "Work with other G8 members to develop a globally-oriented transportation and logistics support arrangement (TLSA) to help provide transportation for deploying peacekeepers and logistics support to sustain units in the field."

See comment 5.

Analysis –The United States is leading the G8 activity with regard to this initiative, which came out of the G8's Sea Island Action Plan of 2004. The United States established a virtual donors' coordination mechanism to enable deploying nations' requests for Transportation and Logistics Support Arrangement (TLSA) assistance to be shared among TLSA participants, which includes the United States and four other G8 member nations. In response to requests for transportation and logistics support, the USG has provided $13M to nations deploying to the African Union Mission in Darfur, Sudan (AMIS), the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), and the United Nations Interim Forces in Lebanon (UNIFIL).

Objective 5:

Draft GAO Report – *"enhance the capacity of regional and sub-regional organizations for peace operations;"*

GPOI Strategy – "Enhance the capacity of regional and sub-regional organizations to train for, plan, prepare for, manage, conduct, obtain, and sustain lessons-learned from peace operations by providing technical assistance, training, and material support; and, support institutions and activities which offer these capabilities to a regional audience."

Analysis – The draft GAO Report notes that GPOI has conducted activities to improve the capabilities of regional organizations to plan, train for, and execute peacekeeping missions. Specifically, they cite training activities for ECOWAS

See comment 6.

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and units from El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua that will comprise the multinational CFAC brigade. Globally, GPOI is supporting or has supported 18 peace operations training centers, 7 peace support operations collaboration centers, 7 multinational peacekeeping exercises, 3 technical advisors, and provided training for the peacekeeping mission planning and management staffs of two regional organizations. As a result of these and other programs, events, and activities, the peacekeeping-related capabilities of the affected regional organizations and institutions have been improved.

Objective 6:

Draft GAO Report – *"provide a worldwide clearinghouse function for GPOI-related activities in Africa and globally."*

GPOI Strategy – "Create a 'clearinghouse' function to exchange information and coordinate G8 efforts to enhance peace operations training and exercises in Africa; and continue to provide support to subsequent clearinghouse initiatives, including globally-oriented activities, throughout the life of the G8's Action Plan for Expanding Global Capability for Peace Support Operations."

Analysis – Africa Clearinghouse meetings were conducted in 2004, 2006, 2007, and 2008, with GPOI hosting the 2004 inaugural meeting in Washington. Clearinghouse meetings are now firmly established as an event within the annual cycle of G8 meetings. The United States initiated and hosted a G8++ Global Clearinghouse in 2007 and representatives from 32 countries concluded that the event was of value and should be continued. The Clearinghouse meetings have raised the awareness of all participants regarding the breadth and depth of peacekeeping capacity building programs and are helping to reduce potential redundancies and make individual country programs more complementary.

Objective 7:

Draft GAO Report – *"conduct activities that support and assist partners in achieving self-sufficiency and maintaining the proficiencies gained from GPOI."*

GPOI Strategy – "Conduct sustainment/self-sufficiency activities in support of the objectives above with a focus on assisting Partners to sustain proficiencies gained in training programs."

Analysis – The GPOI strategy contains a model showing the requirements to

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achieve and maintain operational effectiveness in peace operations. The model
recognizes that a number of elements are solely within the purview of national
governments and other organizations. Every activity funded through GPOI can be
linked directly or indirectly to one of the elements within that model, therein
demonstrating that GPOI activities do support and assist in achieving
self-sufficiency and maintaining proficiencies.

Department Response to Draft Report Recommendations:

The GAO Report recommends the Secretary of State take the following six actions
and then, in consultation with DoD, take two additional actions:

Recommendation 1: *"[W]ork in consultation with DoD to assist Italy in staffing
the key unfilled positions at COESPU to better evaluate progress made and
monitor results. "*

State Response: Concur. We were, prior to the GAO investigation, already
working with COESPU and the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) to staff
a position at the training facility to address evaluation and monitoring.

Recommendation 2: *"[M]onitor implementation of new procedures to account
for delivery and transfer of non-lethal training equipment to partner countries on
an ongoing basis."*

State Response: Concur. Three primary supply chains are used for the delivery
of non-lethal training equipment to partner countries: Foreign Military Sales
(FMS) - implemented through the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA);
commercial acquisition - implemented through the State Department's Office of
Acquisition Management's regional procurement support offices (RPSO); and
commercial acquisition - implemented through ACOTA. Procedural changes,
including the use of joint inventories, improved electronic record keeping, and the
requirement for national representatives to sign U.S. Government acquisition
documentation, are being implemented in each of these supply chains to assure
more robust accountability. Additional staff personnel are also being contracted to
ACOTA, U.S. Southern Command, and State to apply greater scrutiny in this area.

It should be noted that State's GPOI Evaluation Team identified the equipment
accountability shortfall prior to the GAO's investigation of the GPOI Program.
This same team, through its existing procedures for monitoring program
achievement, will monitor the effectiveness of the reforms being implemented.

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Recommendation 3: *"[P]rovide additional guidance to U.S. missions to help the
United States and Italy collect data on the training and deployment activities of
COESPU graduates in their home countries."*

State Response: Concur. GPOI has been examining mechanisms to improve data
collection on the activities of COESPU graduates and is developing a systematic
approach for the gathering of post-training data.

To that end, and following consultations with the Italian MFA and COESPU, State
has agreed to use GPOI funds to staff one contractor at the training facility to
develop an alumni database, outreach materials for COESPU graduates, and
tracking mechanisms. In addition, State is examining ways to strengthen
diplomatic outreach to COESPU partner countries to request ongoing feedback
from partners regarding the performance and activities of their COESPU graduates.
Guidance for identifying responsibilities will be provided to the Posts in our
COESPU partner countries once the contractor is in place at COESPU and the
tracking mechanisms have been established.

Recommendation 4: *"[D]evelop, in consultation with DoD, a method for
evaluating the quality of training and measuring the proficiency of trainees in
critical skills."*

State Response: These methods already exist. Evaluation of trainee proficiency
and the quality of training are conducted at all training events. These evaluations
occur at multiple levels. Lead trainers and mentors, both active duty military
and/or U.S. military veterans with 20 to 30 years experience constitute the core of
GPOI training and evaluation programs. The lead trainers conduct performance-
oriented training and remedial training; evaluate individual soldier proficiencies
and unit collective performance. The mentors, in turn, serve to coach the trainers
and render assessments on the overall quality of the training. Supporting these
individuals in conducting the evaluation, particularly at the GPOI-funded
United Nations-certified specialist courses, are subject matter experts drawn from
the broader international community. GPOI managers from State and Defense
evaluate the overall effectiveness of the broader GPOI program.

One of GPOI's strengths has been its ability to tailor the program of instruction to
the desires and capabilities of the recipient nation. This allows the GPOI partner to
receive training at an appropriate level, but does not mean that all nations are
assessed to be equally competent at the completion of training events. Units from
various countries participating in a multilateral peacekeeping operation will begin

See comment 7.

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the exercise with varying levels of proficiency and, while all will benefit from the experience, it is not expected that all will have exactly the same level of proficiency at the end. The evaluation data maintained by State and the implementing agent will accurately indicate the level of proficiency.

To provide greater standardization, we will be developing Military Task Lists (MTLs) and associated training standards to specify tasks, conditions, and standards for different types of military units participating in peacekeeping operations. The MTLs will form the basis from which training plans are developed and trainees assessed. A Statement of Work to develop the MTLs and training standards has been written, and requires a joint State and Defense steering board to oversee the development.

Another area where we seek to improve is in reviewing post-training proficiency. Currently, we collect formal and anecdotal reports from a variety of sources. Our process also includes after-action reports on UN peacekeeping operations and from the regional entities that field peacekeeping operations such as the African Union (AU) or ECOWAS. However, we recognize the need to do more and to do it in a systematic manner. We are considering greater use of technology, such as the ACOTA website and the Peace Support Operations Collaboration Center (PSOCC) network, to capture informal field and host nation anecdotes, field trips to mission areas, and post-training surveys. While we desire rigor in the information collected on the performance of GPOI-trained personnel when they deploy on operations or after they return to their home country, we recognize that any collection process is dependent, in part, on the cooperation of the host country, regional organization, or the UN.

Recommendation 5: *"[E]nsure that the evaluations of contractor performance in Africa are properly recorded into the contractor performance system as required by agency regulations."*

State Response: Concur. Although evaluation data has been collected, the data has yet to be entered into State's contracting databases. With the imminent arrival of additional staff for State's Office of Acquisition Management (AQM), we expect that evaluation data to be loaded shortly.

Recommendation 6: *"[D]evelop a system for monitoring the vetting activities for all GPOI training and ensure that all individuals in composite units are vetted for human rights violations, as required by State policy."*

See comment 8.

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State Response: Partially Concur. State's policy on vetting composite units has been published and distributed. While there were shortcomings when the process was first implemented, we believe that they have been remedied and that the process is effective in identifying and preventing any potential recipients from receiving training where there is credible evidence that they have committed gross violations of human rights.

In examining the section of the draft GAO Report that underpins this recommendation, we note that State's policy on vetting composite units changed in April 2007. At that time, the seven composite units referred to on pages 5 and 35 of the draft Report were already in the administrative pipeline for training (some of which was conducted in April 2007). The failure to vet in accordance with the updated policy should be considered as a consequence of the change in policy, a policy change which in itself should be taken as an indicator of State's commitment to ensure full compliance with this requirement.

Notwithstanding the above, the State is fully committed to compliance with the Leahy Law and will undertake regularly to remind those U.S. Government elements responsible for implementing GPOI of their obligations and responsibilities.

Recommendation 7: "*[I]n consultation with DoD, assess estimated resources and timeframes needed to complete peacekeeping and infrastructure activities in Africa by 2010.*"

State Response: Partially Concur. The GPOI Strategy objectives are a mixture of quantifiable targets and qualitative objectives that seek to improve the status quo. The quantifiable targets will be met and the status quo will be improved upon in the qualitative areas referred to in GPOI's objectives. ACOTA, GPOI's primary activity in Africa, regularly updates its Vision, Mission, and Strategy Plan to assess the resources and timelines needed to continue peacekeeper training programs for as long as they will be required by the AU, Africa's regional economic communities, and the continent's troop contributing countries.

Because African militaries are conscript armies, personnel at the enlisted levels often serve for limited periods of time, thus requiring that new and refresher training be conducted over the long term. In keeping with this requirement, ACOTA maintains a highly detailed program plan that lists all the requirements and resources pertaining to the annual and long-term commitments that it has entered into on a bilateral and multilateral basis, or in support of U.S. policy goals

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and objectives. This document identifies the annual requirements needed to conduct the ACOTA program in Africa at its optimum levels, and also allows for prioritization and management of activities when budgetary constraints restrict the full implementation of the program plan.

Recommendation 8: *"[I]n consultation with DoD, ensure that any plans for extending GPOI activities beyond 2010 identify sufficient resources for developing long-term peacekeeping skills and infrastructure in Africa."*

State Response: Concur. While the goals of GPOI will be met with the resources allocated for FY 2005-2009, the demand for international peacekeeping continues to grow. Accordingly, the Administration is exploring a proposal which would see GPOI-like activities continue across the globe, to include developing additional long-term peacekeeping skills and infrastructure in Africa.

Additional Comments

PART Score and Data Reliability:

GPOI achieved a score of 91.5 percent and a rating of "effective" (the highest of five possible ratings) by the Office of Management and Budget's 2007 Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART). We consider this external rating a significant endorsement of GPOI's success and that which deserves mention in the GAO Report. As the PART considered, *inter alia*, the verifiability and auditability of data collected in support of Program outcomes, we consider it an endorsement of the data presented in this response. Additionally, the draft GAO Report states on page 4 that "We determined that the data provided by State and DoD were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of our review."

Budget Projections:

GPOI's actual and projected achievements have occurred with increased efficiencies, allowing us to achieve the goals with an overall funding level projected at $480M over the life of the program. (This is a projection because the final year's allocation has not been established.) This amount will be well below the original announced commitment to GPOI of $660M over five years.

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Attribution of Activities against GPOI Objectives:

The template for activity proposals submitted as part of the budgetary allocation
development process requires GPOI implementing agencies to identify which
GPOI objectives the proposed activity would support. Many proposals contribute
towards two or three objectives, a fact further reflected in the matrix of annual
allocations approved by the GPOI Coordinating Committee.

In reviewing achievements against the seven GPOI objectives, the draft GAO
Report rates performance by region. This methodology attributes each GPOI
activity to a single GPOI objective instead of acknowledging the full spectrum of
benefits that any single activity may generate.

One example of the problems that arise when a GPOI activity is linked to only one
objective is the issue of nations deploying trainers on peace support operations. It
is inaccurate to suggest that a nation is not capitalizing on the GPOI investment by
deploying trainers on operations. Operational experience provides trainers with the
opportunity to reinforce the knowledge and skills that enable them to act as a force
multiplier for their nation in a practical setting that no training activity can fully
simulate.

Other Forms of Security Assistance / Foreign Aid in Africa

In addition to allocating each GPOI activity to only one GPOI objective, the draft
GAO Report's assessment also does not take into account other forms of U.S. and
non-U.S. assistance in Africa. GPOI is not the only USG program providing
foreign assistance for peacekeeping, nor is the United States the only country that
provides foreign assistance for peacekeeping in Africa. GPOI resource allocations
are based on regional program plans where implementers take into account
partner/regional needs, U.S. security objectives, and other U.S./international
programs. GPOI implementers are cognizant of concurrent efforts, and design
their programs accordingly. For example, the regional peace operations training
centers in Mali, Nigeria, Ghana, and Kenya receive a greater portion of their
operating funds from non-U.S. sources, requiring GPOI to contribute only a partial
amount of the total costs of those efforts. The European Union, through the
Reinforcement of African Peacekeeping Capabilities Program (RECAMP), and the
U.S. Combatant Commands provide regional exercise opportunities that reduce the
need to spend GPOI funds on capstone exercises (ACOTA has only conducted one
regional exercise).

**Appendix VII: Comments from the
Department of State**

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Human Rights

The USG invites countries to participate in GPOI following an assessment against
six criteria listed in the GPOI Strategy. One criterion is the country's human rights
record. The assessment is conducted in an interagency forum and involves
thoughtful consideration of all available information. Separately, individuals or
units nominated to participate in GPOI-funded training activities undergo vetting
for credible allegations of gross human rights abuses. This vetting demands that
there be an absence of credible evidence against the individual or unit prior to the
commencement of training. The draft GAO Report seeks to draw parallels
between these two processes. However, there is a significant difference between
systemic human rights abuses by the security forces of a nation and allegations of
abuse by an individual or single unit. The alleged actions of a small group should
not, in and of themselves, result in the cessation of GPOI activities with the non-
implicated security forces of that country. It is also important to note that all
GPOI-funded training contains instruction on human rights.

The following are GAO's responses to the Department of State's letter
dated June 18, 2008.

GAO Comments

1. State asserts that GPOI is on track to meet its objectives with over
   35,000 peacekeepers deployed to 18 peacekeeping operations. We
   disagree that 35,000 peacekeepers have deployed to 18 missions with
   the training or support of GPOI. State's assertion conflicts with GPOI
   evaluation team data that identified 22,000 peacekeepers trained by
   GPOI that deployed to 12 UN or AU missions, as well as other missions
   not supported by the UN or AU, as of April 2008. State's statistics
   include peacekeepers GPOI trained that have not deployed, supported
   but not trained by GPOI, or troops deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan
   (non-UN missions). Appendix IV provides additional information on
   the peacekeeper deployments of GPOI partners.

2. State asserts that GPOI objectives will be achieved under the current
   conditions and within projected resource levels. We disagree with this
   assessment because according to State's own training projections it is
   not likely to train 75,000 military peacekeepers by 2010, faces delays in
   providing support of nonlethal equipment to deployed peacekeepers,
   and is unlikely to complete planned skills and infrastructure activities
   in Africa by 2010. In addition, State has not provided additional
   support for requested staff positions at COESPU that would facilitate
   the evaluation of progress made at COESPU.

3. State now projects that GPOI will train 75,000 peacekeepers by the
   third quarter of 2010 based on new training rates and asserts that we
   do not provide a realistic projection. We were unable to validate this
   information. As of April 2008, the number of military peacekeepers
   trained is lower than the target number needed to meet the goal of
   75,000 by the end of 2010. As recently as May 2008, officials from the
   GPOI office in the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs and its GPOI
   evaluation team indicated that slow expenditure rates related to
   training rates would delay their efforts to reach the goal by 2010.
   Accordingly, we are unable to validate State's new projections
   provided in its comments to this report.

4. State asserts that it has contributed $10.5 million to COESPU and plans
   to provide an additional $4.5 million. We disagree that this is a
   contribution already provided to COESPU. State has obligated $15
   million for COESPU, which includes the $10.5 million and $4.5 million,
   but has only provided $9 million of that amount to COESPU, according
   to State funding data identifying expenditures as of April 2008.

5. State has stated that the United States established a virtual donors' coordination mechanism to enable deploying nations to facilitate donor assistance in transportation and logistics support. We agree that a communication system has been established, however, we note that the mechanism for facilitating this support is an e-mail system. We also note that the system was established in the fall of 2007 and that, as of April 2008, only one request had been communicated by State to donors through this system, according to the State officials responsible for this system.

6. State presents information on a number of activities that it asserts were conducted under GPOI to improve the capabilities of regional organizations to plan, train for, and execute peacekeeping missions. We disagree that GPOI has conducted all of these activities and believe that the activities listed in State's comment include a combination of planned and completed activities. In appendix VI we have presented the GPOI activities that have been completed to build skills and infrastructure for peacekeeping in support of the GPOI objective to assist partners in achieving self-sufficiency and maintaining GPOI proficiencies. The information we have presented was obtained from expenditure information and data provided by the GPOI assessment team and GPOI program office. To confirm activities that were completed as of April 2008, we crosschecked reported information by the GPOI program with GPOI program implementers responsible for implementing these activities, including the Africa Bureau and its ACOTA program, and U.S. African, Pacific, and Southern Commands.

7. State asserts that methods already exist for evaluating the quality of training and measuring the proficiency of trainees in critical skills. We disagree that these methods address our recommendation. State has not developed military task lists and associated training that can be applied at all GPOI training sites, although the GPOI strategy in 2006 identified the need for the development of military task lists and related military training standards to contribute to standardization, interoperability, and sustainability, and to ensure the proper use of resources. The strategy also indicated that developing such standards would help efforts to evaluate the overall effectiveness of GPOI training programs, events, and activities. We assert that there is value in evaluating the performance of trainees, in the areas where there are consistencies in the training, against a standard level of proficiency in the skills taught during their training, in order to identify the quality of training provided across the program and to identify the proficiency of trained troops program-wide. We modified the recommendation to clarify the need for GPOI-wide standards to provide program managers

with the ability to measure proficiency of GPOI-trained troops program-wide and in accordance with the commitments made in the GPOI strategy.

8. State asserts that its process for vetting composite units to prevent potential recipients from receiving training where there is credible evidence of committed gross violations of human rights is effective and that our findings on the vetting of composite units trained under GPOI are unfairly applied against an updated agency policy on vetting composite units. We disagree. The seven composite units we identify in this report were vetted and received training after the policy change in April 2007. We identified these units in our review of vetting records provided by State's ACOTA office and training rosters of individuals trained provided by State's GPOI evaluation team. According to the data provided by State, three composite units from Niger received training in August 2007 and November-December 2007, one composite unit from Nigeria received training in September-October 2007, and three composite units from Uganda received training in July 2007. Records for these units indicate that vetting was completed between June 2007 and November 2007.

Appendix VIII: Comments from the Department of Defense

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
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WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-2900

GLOBAL SECURITY
AFFAIRS

Mr. Joseph A Christoff
Director, International Affairs and Trade
U.S. Government Accountability Office
441 G Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20548

Dear Mr. Christoff,

The Department of Defense (DoD) supports the intent of the Global Peacekeeping Operations Initiative (GPOI), recognizes the increasing demand for trained peacekeepers, and supports the efforts of the Department of State in executing the program. DoD appreciates the opportunity to review and comment on the Government Accountability Office draft report, entitled "PEACEKEEPING: Thousands Trained but U.S. is Unlikely to Complete All Activities by 2010 and Some Improvements Are Needed," dated May 22, 2008. DoD believes that improvements in GPOI are needed.

RECOMMENDATION 1: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of State work in consultation with DoD to assist Italy in staffing the key unfilled positions at Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units (COESPU) to better evaluate progress made and monitor results. (p. 37/GAO Draft Report)

DOD RESPONSE:

Partially concur – The Department of State and DoD should encourage COESPU to better evaluate progress and monitor results. DoD has placed a U.S. military liaison at COSEPU, and the Department of State should work with DoD and Italy to validate any personnel shortfalls and fill positions that result from this process.

RECOMMENDATION 2: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of State develop in consultation with DoD, a method for evaluating the quality of training and measuring the proficiency of trainees in critical skills. (p. 37/GAO Draft Report)

DOD RESPONSE:

Partially concur – Some GPOI training events are evaluated, however there is room for greater standardization and more comprehensive analysis of post-training performance.

RECOMMENDATION 3: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of State in consultation with DoD assess estimated resources and timeframes needed to complete peacekeeping skills and infrastructure activities in Africa by 2010. (p. 38/GAO Draft Report)

DOD RESPONSE:

Partially concur – DoD agrees with the recommendation to assess resources and timeframes required to achieve GPOI objectives in Africa. However, DoD would like to see this effort applied to all regions engaged by the GPOI program.

RECOMMENDATION 4: The GAO recommended that the Secretary of State in consultation with DoD ensure that any plans for extending Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) activities beyond 2010 identify sufficient resources for developing long-term peacekeeping skills and infrastructure in Africa. (p. 38/GAO Draft Report)

DOD RESPONSE:

Concur – State should closely consult with DoD to ensure that resources provided are sufficient to meet the requirements of the extended program.

My points of contact for this memorandum are COL Steve Whitmarsh, 703-602-5287, and Ms. Kelly Waud, 703-602-5298.

Greg Gross
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
Partnership Strategy

Appendix IX: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments

GAO Contact

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