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entitled 'Force Structure: The Army Needs a Results-Oriented Plan to 
Equip and Staff Modular Forces and a Thorough Assessment of Their 
Capabilities' which was released on November 14, 2008. 

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Report to Congressional Committees: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 

GAO: 

November 2008: 

Force Structure: 

The Army Needs a Results-Oriented Plan to Equip and Staff Modular 
Forces and a Thorough Assessment of Their Capabilities: 

Army Modularity: 

GAO-09-131: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-09-131, a report to congressional committees. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

Amid ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Army embarked in 
2004 on a plan to create a modular, brigade-based force that would be 
equally capable as its divisional predecessor in part because it would 
have advanced equipment and specialized personnel. GAO has previously 
reported that restructuring and rebuilding the Army will require 
billions of dollars for equipment and take years to complete. For this 
report, GAO assessed the extent to which the Army has (1) developed a 
plan to link funding with results and (2) evaluated its modular force 
designs. GAO analyzed Army equipment and personnel data, key Army 
reports, planning documents, performance metrics, testing plans, and 
funding requests. GAO also visited Army Training and Doctrine Command, 
including selected Army proponents and schools; Army Reserve Command; 
and the National Guard Bureau. 

What GAO Found: 

The Army will have established over 80 percent of its modular units by 
the end of 2008 but does not have a results-oriented plan with clear 
milestones in place to guide efforts to equip and staff those new 
units. The Army has been focused on equipping and staffing units to 
support ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan; however, the 
equipment and personnel level of non-deployed units has been declining. 
The Army now anticipates that modular units will be equipped and 
staffed in 2019—more than a decade away—but has provided few details 
about what to expect in the interim. And while the Army projects that 
it will have enough equipment and personnel in the aggregate, its 
projections rely on uncertain assumptions related to restoring 
equipment used in current operations, as well as meeting recruiting and 
retention goals while simultaneously expanding the Army. Further, GAO’s 
detailed analysis of Army data shows that the Army could face 
shortfalls of certain modern equipment. Such items are important 
because the success of the modular design rests in part on obtaining 
key enablers needed for modular units to function as planned, such as 
equipment to provide enhanced awareness of the battlefield. GAO has 
previously reported that the Army lacks a funding plan that includes 
interim measures for equipping and staffing the modular force, making 
it difficult to evaluate progress. Without a plan for equipment and 
staffing that links funding with results and provides milestones, the 
Army cannot assure decision makers when modular units will have the 
required equipment and staff in place to restore readiness. Finally, 
without this plan the Army risks cost growth and further timeline 
slippage in its efforts to transform to a more modular and capable 
force. 

The Army uses several approaches in testing unit designs and 
capabilities, but these efforts have not yielded a comprehensive 
assessment of modular forces. Testing the force is intended to 
determine whether modular units are capable of performing missions 
across the full spectrum of conflict. The Army has focused its testing 
efforts on combat units conducting ongoing counterinsurgency 
operations. However, gaps in the Army’s testing could affect its 
forces’ ability to deliver needed capabilities. First, the Army has not 
fully assessed the effectiveness of its support units because the 
doctrine that would define how modular support units will train, be 
sustained, and support the fight has not been completed. This doctrine 
provides a benchmark to measure the effectiveness of support units. 
Further, the Army has not assigned a focal point the responsibility for 
integrating assessments across activities, such as equipping and 
training. Second, the Army tested the capability of modular designs 
primarily unconstrained by resources, not at the level of personnel and 
equipment that the Army plans to provide units. Lacking an analysis of 
the capabilities of the modular force at levels that it plans to have, 
the Army will not be in a position to realistically assess whether the 
capabilities that it is fielding can perform mission requirements. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends that the Army develop and report to Congress a results-
oriented plan, that includes milestones that better links funding to 
results; complete a plan for developing doctrine for its modular 
forces; and better assess the effectiveness of modular forces with 
authorized levels of equipment and personnel. Because DOD’s comments 
disagreed or were not fully responsive to these recommendations, GAO 
elevated them to Congress for consideration. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-09-131]. For more 
information, contact John Pendleton at (404) 679-1816 or 
pendletonj@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter: 

Results in Brief: 

Background: 

The Army Has Made Progress Establishing Modular Units but Does Not Have 
a Plan That Links Funding and Results to Guide Its Efforts to Equip and 
Staff the Modular Force: 

The Army Has Not Fully Evaluated the Capabilities of the Modular Force 
across the Full Spectrum of Conflict: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Matters for Congressional Consideration: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: List of Key Equipment and Personnel Enablers: 

Appendix II: Scope and Methodology: 

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Tables: 

Table 1: Key Equipment Enablers Identified by GAO: 

Table 2: Key Personnel Enablers Identified by GAO: 

Table 3: Projected Availability of Selected Key Modern Equipment 
Compared to the Authorized Level in Fiscal Year 2012: 

Table 4: Projected Availability of Selected Key Equipment Enablers at 
the Design Level in Fiscal Year 2012: 

Table 5: Key Equipment Enablers Available at the Authorized Level in 
Fiscal Years 2007 and 2012. 

Table 6: Key Equipment Enablers Available and Shortages of Modern 
Equipment at the Design Level in Fiscal Year 2007: 

Table 7: Key Equipment Enablers Available and Shortages of Modern 
Equipment at the Design Level in Fiscal Year 2012: 

Table 8: Percentage of Active Army Enlisted and Officer Personnel On 
Hand by Career Field at Fiscal Year 2007 and 2012 Authorized Levels: 

Table 9: Percentage of Active Army Enlisted and Officer Occupational 
Specialties at Fiscal Year 2007 Authorized Levels: 

Table 10: Percentage of Active Army Enlisted and Officer Personnel 
Available by Career Field at Fiscal Year 2007 and 2012 Design Levels: 

Figure: 

Figure 1: Actual and Planned Army Modular Unit Restructuring Including 
the Army's Expansion Plan, March 2008: 

Abbreviations: 

ACE: Analysis and Control Element: 
DOD: Department of Defense: 
DOTMLPF: doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, 
personnel, and facilities: 
TRADOC: Army's Training and Doctrine Command: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 

Washington, DC 20548: 

November 14, 2008: 

Congressional Committees: 

During a period of continuing high demand for military capability, the 
Army is undertaking a significant transformation of its organization 
and force structure as well as an expansion of its force by more than 
74,200 military personnel. One major initiative of this transformation-
-referred to as Army modularity--is the redesign of units from a large 
division-based structure to a brigade-based structure. An important 
difference between the new modular brigade combat teams and the 
previous division-based brigades is an increased capability to operate 
independently enabled by embedded combat support functions such as 
military intelligence, reconnaissance, and logistics. Although somewhat 
smaller in size than the divisional brigades, the new modular brigades 
are envisioned to be just as capable because they will have different 
equipment--including key enablers[Footnote 1] such as advanced 
communications and surveillance equipment--and a broad mix of 
personnel. Continuing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan led the 
Defense Department to expand the Army to help reduce the stress on the 
force and meet increasing strategic demands. This initiative, called 
Grow the Force, will increase equipment and personnel needs, and we 
have reported that the full costs to restructure and rebuild the Army 
are large but uncertain.[Footnote 2] 

The John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2007[Footnote 3] directed the Comptroller General to provide to 
congressional defense committees an annual assessment, among other 
things, of the Army's progress equipping and staffing modular units in 
the active and reserve components, progress by the Army in conducting 
further testing and evaluation of the Army's modular unit designs, and 
the use of funds by the Army for equipping its modular units. In 
accordance with this mandate for fiscal year 2008, we provided a 
briefing to your offices in March 2008 on our preliminary observations. 
This report expands on the information reported in those briefings and 
addresses in more detail the extent to which the Army (1) has developed 
a comprehensive plan that links results to investments with defined 
milestones and (2) has tested and evaluated its modular force design. 

To assess the Army's plan to guide its efforts to equip and staff the 
modular force, we analyzed relevant Army plans and reports to Congress 
for equipping and staffing the modular force. We developed in 
conjunction with the Army a means for analyzing key equipment and 
personnel enablers of the modular force. Based on our review of Army 
modularity studies and reports, we defined key enablers as those pieces 
of equipment or personnel that are required for the organization to 
function as planned, providing the modular design with equal or 
increased capabilities compared with the previous divisional structure 
in areas such as a unit's firepower, survivability, and intelligence- 
surveillance-reconnaissance. To develop a preliminary list of key 
equipment and personnel enablers, we reviewed key Army modularity 
reports and obtained official comments from the Department of the Army 
and Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), which is responsible 
for the design and evaluation of modular units.[Footnote 4] We then 
submitted the preliminary list to the Headquarters, Department of the 
Army, for official input and held subsequent discussions with Army 
officials. Our identification and analysis of fifteen key equipment 
enablers compares total Army (active, National Guard, and Reserve) 
equipment authorizations and design requirements for the operating and 
institutional forces with total Army on-hand quantities in April 2007 
with planned equipment deliveries and projected equipment on hand in 
fiscal year 2012. Our identification and analysis of nine key personnel 
enablers compares active Army personnel authorizations and design 
requirements for the operating and institutional forces with active 
Army on-hand personnel strength in April 2007 and projected personnel 
strength for fiscal year 2012 (see app. I for details on our analysis 
of key equipment and personnel enablers). The Army's fiscal-year 2007 
to 2012 equipment and personnel plans were the most recent data 
available to us when we developed this analysis. The Army provided 
updated data on the status of the Army's equipment as compared to the 
design requirement as of June 29, 2008. We did not assess the 
reliability of this 2008 data. However, the 2008 data were generally 
consistent with the data we analyzed in 2007. To assess the extent to 
which the Army has tested and evaluated the design of the modular 
force, we examined TRADOC's modular force assessment process and plans 
to evaluate modular combat and combat support unit designs. Although we 
did not independently test the reliability of Army data electronically, 
we determined the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of 
this report based on discussions with Army officials about the data 
quality control procedures used to ensure the reliability of the 
relevant equipment and personnel databases. We conducted this 
performance audit from April 2007 to September 2008 in accordance with 
generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards 
require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, 
appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and 
conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence 
obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions 
based on our audit objectives. The scope and methodology used in the 
report are described in more detail in appendix II. 

We conducted this review as part of a continuing body of work related 
to the Army's transformation to the modular force. In December 2007, we 
reported that the Army is making progress establishing modular units in 
the active and reserve components but has not established sufficient 
management controls to provide accountability for results for 
establishing modular units and expanding the force.[Footnote 5] In 
response to that report, the Secretary of Defense agreed with our 
recommendations to improve management controls and develop a 
comprehensive Army strategy and funding plan for staffing and equipping 
modular units. We also found that while the Army is evaluating lessons 
learned from its ongoing counterinsurgency operations, it lacks a 
comprehensive plan to determine whether fielded modular unit designs 
meet the Army's original goals for modular units across the full 
spectrum of conflict.[Footnote 6] In January 2008, we reported that the 
Army did not develop a transparent and comprehensive funding plan for 
its estimated $70.2 billion Grow the Force initiative that would allow 
decision makers to understand the full magnitude of the funds needed 
and weigh competing defense priorities.[Footnote 7] 

Results in Brief: 

The Army will have established 84 percent of its planned modular units 
by the end of 2008 although non-deployed units may not be fully 
equipped and staffed, and the Army continues to lack a plan to guide 
efforts to equip and staff new units that links funding with results 
and defines interim milestones. Our prior work has shown that 
successful transformation initiatives have a plan that links overall 
results with funding needs. The Army has been concentrating on 
providing units deploying to ongoing operations in Iraq and Afghanistan 
with specially trained personnel and the most modern equipment 
available. However, as military operations have continued, the 
equipment and personnel levels of non-deployed units have declined. The 
Army has extended its estimates of how long it will take to equip the 
modular force from 2011 to 2019, and the full costs have not been 
determined. The Army projects that it will have enough equipment and 
personnel in the aggregate by 2012, but it will continue to rely on 
older equipment to mitigate significant shortfalls in modern equipment. 
Moreover, the Army's projections depend on uncertain planning 
assumptions related to repairing equipment used in operations in Iraq 
and Afghanistan and recruiting and retaining personnel. According to a 
2004 Army Task Force Modularity study, the success of the modular 
design rests in part upon the availability of key enablers, such as 
equipment to provide enhanced awareness of the battlefield. Despite our 
December 2007 recommendations to develop measures of progress, the Army 
continues to lack a results-oriented plan to equip and staff modular 
units that provides interim milestones against which to measure the 
Army's progress. For example, in its 2008 annual report to Congress on 
modularity and other equipment issues,[Footnote 8] the Army did not 
provide detailed information--such as equipment available and planned 
investments compared to requirements--that would enable Congress to 
assess the Army's progress in meeting its equipment needs. Section 323 
of the John Warner Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 does 
not require the Army to submit detailed information in its annual 
report. However, until the Army assembles and provides sufficient 
detail to show how requirements, proposed investments, and planned 
procurements are linked, it will not be in the best position to 
demonstrate that it is making progress in delivering the modern 
equipment and specialized personnel capabilities envisioned in its 
modular force design. Because the Army has not provided the kind of 
results-oriented plan needed to enhance congressional oversight of the 
Army's equipping and staffing plans, we are recommending that the 
Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to develop and 
report to Congress, in conjunction with its annual report on the 
progress of the modular force, a results-oriented plan that provides a 
detailed assessment of the Army's progress toward meeting overall 
personnel equipment requirements for the modular force by year and 
identifies any risks associated with equipment and personnel 
shortfalls. 

The Army uses a variety of analytic approaches to evaluate its modular 
forces and update organizational designs, but these approaches have not 
yet represented a thorough assessment of the capabilities of modular 
units across the force. Specifically, the Army has not (1) completed 
the doctrine of how support units will operate or designated a focal 
point for ensuring that assessments are integrated or (2) assessed the 
modular force's capabilities with the levels of equipment and personnel 
that the Army expects to provide. Methodically testing, exercising, and 
evaluating new concepts are established practices for entities that are 
undergoing significant organizational transformation. According to the 
Army, the utility of its modular design is being proven in current 
operations, and lessons learned from current operations have identified 
changes that have made units more capable. However, while the Army has 
placed priority on developing the doctrine that defines how combat 
units will train, be sustained, and fight, it has not completed 
developing doctrine for how modular support forces will operate or 
designated an organization focal point to lead an integrated assessment 
of their capabilities. Until the doctrine is completed and a focal 
point is established to integrate assessments of areas that affect 
their capabilities, the Army will not have assurance that its support 
forces will have the capabilities they require. In addition, the Army 
projects that it will face significant shortfalls of selected modern 
equipment and personnel in some modular units that could result in less 
capability than envisioned by the modular force design. Lacking a 
comprehensive analysis of the capabilities of the modular force at 
authorized levels, the Army will not be in the best position to 
prioritize investments to maximize the capabilities that it is fielding 
across the Army. We are recommending that the Army complete the 
development of doctrine for modular support forces, establish a focal 
point for integrating assessments of support forces capabilities, and 
assess the effectiveness of modular forces with the authorized levels 
of equipment and personnel. 

In reviewing a draft of this report, DOD disagreed with one 
recommendation, agreed with two recommendations, and partially agreed 
with one recommendation. DOD disagreed with our recommendation that it 
develop and report to Congress a results-oriented plan that links 
investments with expected results and provides interim milestones. DOD 
stated that modularity is a strategy for having interchangeable units 
to support operations, not a program for equipping, manning, or 
modernizing the force that requires a plan separate from the Army's 
overall equipping and manning plans. However, although DOD has 
processes for equipping, manning, and modernizing the force, these 
plans are not clearly linked in a way that demonstrates the results of 
investment decisions made through these processes. Without a plan that 
details how investments will be linked to improvements in readiness and 
the goals and milestones against which progress may be assessed, DOD 
leaders and congressional decision makers will not have complete 
information with which to make informed investment decisions. DOD 
agreed with our recommendations that it complete doctrine for modular 
support forces and appoint a focal point for ensuring that support 
units' requirements for doctrine, organization, training, materiel, 
leadership, personnel, and facilities are integrated, and DOD cited in 
its written comments some actions it has taken to provide doctrine and 
appoint a focal point for integration of activities across these 
domains. However, the actions DOD cited in its comments do not meet the 
intent of the recommendations, and the department did not specify any 
additional actions that it intends to implement the recommendations. We 
continue to believe that by implementing these recommendations, DOD 
could improve the operation of its modular support forces. DOD 
partially agreed with our recommendation to assess the capabilities of 
modular forces across the full spectrum of possible missions and with 
authorized levels of personnel and equipment, stating that the Army is 
currently assessing modular force capabilities and additional direction 
is not required. As the report discusses, we believe that assessing 
whether modular forces are capable of fulfilling the range of missions 
they may be called upon to undertake is important and that until the 
Army begins to test units with realistic personnel and equipment levels 
and across the full spectrum of conflict, the Army faces risks 
associated with shortfalls of key equipment should a different type of 
capability be needed in future operations in a different kind of 
conflict. Because DOD did not specify in its written comments actions 
that it will take to address three of our recommendations, we have 
elevated these as matters for congressional consideration, suggesting 
that Congress consider requiring the Army to provide in its annual 
report on modularity more detailed information on equipping plans, 
status of doctrine for support forces, and testing of modular forces 
with equipment and personnel levels that can realistically be expected 
in the near future. DOD's comments and our evaluation are discussed in 
detail in the Agency Comments and Our Evaluation section of this 
report. 

Background: 

The Army's modular restructuring initiative began in 2004 as part of 
the overall transformation of the Army and was informed by earlier Army 
studies, such as the Striker Brigade Combat Team effort. The foundation 
of the modular force is the modular brigade combat team. A primary goal 
of the restructuring was to increase the number of available brigade 
combat teams to meet operational requirements while maintaining combat 
effectiveness that is equal to or better than previous division 
brigades. Modular combat brigades have one of three standard designs-- 
heavy brigade, infantry brigade, or Stryker brigade. In addition, 
combat support and combat service support formations have a common 
design that can be tailored to meet varied demands of the combatant 
commanders. As opposed to the Army's legacy units, the standardized 
modular unit designs are being implemented in the National Guard and 
Army Reserves with the same organizational structure, equipment, and 
personnel requirements as active duty units. The Army plans to have 
reconfigured its total force--to include active and reserve components-
-into the modular design. 

With the assistance of the Army, GAO identified the types of personnel 
and equipment that will enable the brigade-based modular force to be as 
capable as its predecessor, the division-based force. These key 
equipment enablers are classified by category, such as tactical radios. 
Within each category we identified the different equipment items that 
provide that capability; for example, in the tactical radio category, 
there are 317 different types of equipment (see table 1). 

Table 1: Key Equipment Enablers Identified by GAO: 

Key equipment enablers by category: All-source Analysis System; 
Description of equipment capabilities: Provides battlefield commanders 
with enhanced situational awareness and intelligence on enemy forces; 
Number of different types of equipment items in each category: 4. 

Key equipment enablers by category: Analysis and control element; 
Description of equipment capabilities: Furnishes higher-level 
commanders with intelligence processing, analysis, and dissemination 
capability; 
Number of different types of equipment items in each category: 8. 

Key equipment enablers by category: Battle command systems; 
Description of equipment capabilities: Enhances the commander's 
information- gathering and decision-making capability; 
Number of different types of equipment items in each category: 95. 

Key equipment enablers by category: Fire support sensor system; 
Description of equipment capabilities: Designates targets to enable 
ground and air delivered precision-strike capability; 
Number of different types of equipment items in each category: 6. 

Key equipment enablers by category: Firefinder radar; 
Description of equipment capabilities: Detects the location of mortars, 
artillery, and short and long-range rockets through the use of radar; 
Number of different types of equipment items in each category: 6. 

Key equipment enablers by category: Joint network node; 
Description of equipment capabilities: Provides high-speed, high-
capacity tactical communications down to battalion level; 
Number of different types of equipment items in each category: 8. 

Key equipment enablers by category: Long range advanced scout 
surveillance; 
Description of equipment capabilities: Affords long- range target 
acquisition capabilities to armor and infantry scouts enabling them to 
conduct reconnaissance and surveillance operations; 
Number of different types of equipment items in each category: 3. 

Key equipment enablers by category: Radios - high frequency; 
Description of equipment capabilities: Provides commanders with radios 
that provide beyond the line-of-sight voice and data capability; 
Number of different types of equipment items in each category: 17. 

Key equipment enablers by category: Radios - tactical; 
Description of equipment capabilities: Allows higher-level units to 
command and maintain contact with lower-level units; 
Number of different types of equipment items in each category: 317. 

Key equipment enablers by category: Tactical wheeled vehicles - light; 
Description of equipment capabilities: Provides multipurpose 
transportation using light, mobile four-wheel drive vehicles; 
Number of different types of equipment items in each category: 43. 

Key equipment enablers by category: Tactical wheeled vehicles - medium; 
Description of equipment capabilities: Provides multipurpose 
transportation using medium trucks; 
Number of different types of equipment items in each category: 176. 

Key equipment enablers by category: Tactical wheeled vehicles - heavy; 
Description of equipment capabilities: Provides multipurpose 
transportation using heavy trucks; 
Number of different types of equipment items in each category: 106. 

Key equipment enablers by category: Trojan spirit; 
Description of equipment capabilities: Furnishes high-capacity, secure 
satellite communications services to tactical Army units; 
Number of different types of equipment items in each category: 14. 

Key equipment enablers by category: Unmanned aerial vehicle - Prophet; 
Description of equipment capabilities: Allows an all-weather, near- 
real-time view of an area of responsibility through the use of signals 
and intelligence sensors; 
Number of different types of equipment items in each category: 8. 

Key equipment enablers by category: Unmanned aerial vehicle - small; 
Description of equipment capabilities: Provides reconnaissance, 
surveillance, and target acquisition capabilities to ground commanders; 
Number of different types of equipment items in each category: 51. 

Source: GAO analysis of Army data. 

[End of table] 

We also classified key personnel enablers by category, such as 
psychological operations, and within each category we examined specific 
types of officer and enlisted skills. For example, within the 
psychological operations category we identified psychological 
operations officers and enlisted psychological operations specialists 
as key personnel enablers of the modular force (see table 2). 

Table 2: Key Personnel Enablers Identified by GAO: 

Key personnel enablers by category: Ammunition; 
Description of officers and enlisted personnel skills in each category: 
Manage and maintain armament, missile and electronic systems, 
conventional and nuclear munitions and warheads; and the detection, 
identification, rendering safe, recovery, or destruction of hazardous 
munitions. 

Key personnel enablers by category: Armor; 
Description of officers and enlisted personnel skills in each category: 
Direct, operate, and employ tanks, armored vehicles, support infantry 
and related equipment. 

Key personnel enablers by category: Civil affairs; 
Description of officers and enlisted personnel skills in each category: 
Support the commander's relationship with civil authorities, the local 
populace, non-governmental organizations and international 
organizations. 

Key personnel enablers by category: Communication and information 
systems operation/Signal Corps; 
Description of officers and enlisted personnel skills in each category: 
Manage all facets of Army and designated Department of Defense 
automated, electronic, and communication assets. More specifically, 
Signal Corps personnel are involved in the planning, design, 
engineering, operations, logistics and evaluation of information 
systems and networks. 

Key personnel enablers by category: Field artillery; 
Description of officers and enlisted personnel skills in each category: 
Provide fire support to Army units through the employment of field 
artillery systems. These personnel control, direct and perform 
technical firing operations, and coordinate the efforts of multiple 
fire support assets. 

Key personnel enablers by category: Mechanical maintenance; 
Description of officers and enlisted personnel skills in each category: 
Perform repair functions on Army weapons systems and equipment that 
support maneuver forces in their preparation for and conduct of 
operations across the entire operational spectrum. 

Key personnel enablers by category: Military intelligence; 
Description of officers and enlisted personnel skills in each category: 
Provide commanders with all-source intelligence assessments and 
estimates at the tactical, operations, and strategic levels dealing 
with enemy capabilities, intentions, vulnerabilities, effects of 
terrain and weather on operations, and predicts enemy courses of 
action. 

Key personnel enablers by category: Psychological operations; 
Description of officers and enlisted personnel skills in each category: 
Plan, conduct, and evaluate operations that convey selected information 
and indicators to foreign audiences to influence their emotions, 
motives, objective reasoning, and ultimately the behavior of foreign 
governments, organizations, groups and individuals throughout the 
entire spectrum of conflict. 

Key personnel enablers by category: Transportation; 
Description of officers and enlisted personnel skills in each category: 
Manage all facets of transportation including the planning, operating, 
coordination and evaluation of all methods of transportation. 

Source: GAO analysis of Army data. 

[End of table] 

As part of the redesign of the modular force, the Army is developing 
unit blueprints that identify design requirements for equipment and 
personnel. The design requirement, also known as the Objective Table of 
Organization and Equipment or objective requirement, represents the 
Army's goal of a fully modernized level of equipment and staffing for 
each type of modular unit and is unconstrained by resources. Because 
the Army's design requirements represent a future objective that is 
continually updated and refined over time, the Army establishes an 
interim requirement, known as the Modified Table of Organization and 
Equipment, and authorizes equipment and personnel levels across the 
Army based on its current inventory of equipment and personnel, planned 
procurement timelines, and anticipated funding. The Army expects to use 
this modified list of equipment and personnel for the foreseeable 
future to guide the conversion of existing divisions to modular 
brigades. In sum, the design requirement is the level that the Army 
would like each unit to have in the long-term, whereas the authorized 
level is what the Army can afford in the interim. 

The Army also considered DOD's strategic plan as it restructured to a 
brigade-based force. For example, the Army's Brigade Combat Team 
designs were intended to be effective across the full spectrum of 
conflict, including global war, major theater war, smaller scale 
contingencies, insurgency/counter-insurgencies, and stability and 
support operations. Full spectrum of conflict includes a span of 
threats ranging from low intensity conflict, where the major threats 
are from ambush and skirmishes carried out by insurgents, to high- 
intensity conflict, where an enemy operates large numbers of armored 
vehicles and advanced weapons. DOD's most recent strategic plan, the 
2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, now refers to Army combat power in 
terms of brigade combat teams rather than number of divisions, 
consistent with the Army's new structure. In addition, the Army will 
create a number of different types of modular support units, and 
multifunctional and functional support brigades, which will provide, 
for example, intelligence, logistics, communications, and other types 
of important support capability to brigade combat teams. 

The Army has traditionally evaluated units' designs and capabilities, 
such as support units and support capability, across a number of 
domains or areas: doctrine, organization, training, materiel, 
leadership, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF). Doctrine describes how 
DOD fights, trains, and sustains it forces and is generally the 
starting point for assessing capabilities. Organization refers to the 
design of units--how many and what types of personnel and materiel 
(equipment) a unit needs to provide a specific capability. Training, 
materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities are also important 
components in building and sustaining capabilities. By looking across 
the domains, the Army can evaluate how proposed changes in one area can 
affect other areas and the units' overall capability. For example, the 
Army may evaluate the effect of adding more or different types of 
materiel or equipment on the capability of a unit to determine whether 
such changes would require changes in a unit's doctrine, organization, 
or training requirements. TRADOC is responsible for developing designs 
of modular units and evaluating whether modular combat and support 
units will be capable of successfully conducting operations across the 
full spectrum of conflict. Other organizations within the Army have 
responsibilities for personnel, equipment, and facilities that are also 
critical to building and maintaining the modular force. 

The Secretary of Defense announced an initiative in January 2007-- 
referred to as the Grow the Force initiative--to expand the size of the 
Army by about 74,200 military personnel to meet increasing strategic 
demands and to help reduce stress on the force. This planned expansion 
includes building six additional active modular brigade combat teams 
and additional modular support units, which will require a substantial 
increase in funding for personnel, equipment, and infrastructure. In 
January 2007, the Army estimated this expansion may require about $70.2 
billion in increased funding initially and a significant amount in 
annual funding to sustain the expanded Army. 

The Army Has Made Progress Establishing Modular Units but Does Not Have 
a Plan That Links Funding and Results to Guide Its Efforts to Equip and 
Staff the Modular Force: 

The Army is making progress establishing modular units, but does not 
have a transparent results-oriented plan with clear milestones to guide 
efforts to fully equip and staff the modular force. Although the Army 
has extended the timeline from 2011 to 2019 for fully equipping the 
modular force, it has not identified the total cost needed to achieve 
its revised equipping goal. Our prior work has shown that successful 
transformation initiatives have a plan that links overall results with 
funding needs. While the Army projects that it will make progress 
toward its authorized equipment and staffing goals, it is likely to 
face some significant shortfalls by 2012 of modern equipment that is 
required for the modular force to operate as originally designed. 
Further, the Army's equipment and personnel plans depend on some 
assumptions related to rehabilitating equipment used in operations in 
Iraq and Afghanistan and related to recruitment and retention that may 
be uncertain, given the current pace of operations. According to a key 
2004 Army Task Force Modularity study, the success of modular design 
rests in part on the availability of key enablers that are required for 
modular brigade combat teams to function as planned.[Footnote 9] 
Without providing a detailed plan for equipment and staffing that links 
funding with results, the congressional decision makers will not have 
information to track the Army's progress toward equipping and staffing 
its forces. 

The Army Is Making Progress Restructuring the Modular Force but Is 
Forming Units with Shortages in Equipment and Personnel: 

The Army is making progress establishing modular units. In accordance 
with Army strategy, including its expansion plans, the Army plans to 
have converted 256 of 303 (84 percent) modular combat and support units 
through the end of fiscal year 2008. Figure 1 shows the status of the 
conversions for active, reserve, and National Guard combat and support 
brigades. 

Figure 1: Actual and Planned Army Modular Unit Restructuring Including 
the Army's Expansion Plan, March 2008: 

This figure is a bar graph showing actual and planned army modular unit 
restructuring including the Army's expansion plan, March 2008. The X 
axis represents the number of modular units, and the Y axis represents 
the component and unit type. The bars represents units converted 
through fiscal year 2007, units expected to convert in fiscal year 
2008, and units expected to convert in fiscal years 2009 through 2013. 

Component: Total Army; 
Unit Type: Brigade combat teams; 
Units converted through fiscal year 2007: 65; 
Units expected to convert in fiscal year 2008: 3; 
Units expected to convert in fiscal years 2009 through 2013: 8. 

Component: Total Army; 
Unit Type: Multifunctional support brigades; 
Units converted through fiscal year 2007: 52; 
Units expected to convert in fiscal year 2008: 27; 
Units expected to convert in fiscal years 2009 through 2013: 18. 

Component: Total Army; 
Unit Type: Functional support brigades; 
Units converted through fiscal year 2007: 93; 
Units expected to convert in fiscal year 2008: 16; 
Units expected to convert in fiscal years 2009 through 2013: 21.  

Component: Active Army; 			
Unit Type: Brigade combat teams; 
Units converted through fiscal year 2007: 39;  
Units expected to convert in fiscal year 2008: 1; 
Units expected to convert in fiscal years 2009 through 2013: 8. 

Component: Active Army; 
Unit Type: Multifunctional support brigades; 
Units converted through fiscal year 2007: 29; 
Units expected to convert in fiscal year 2008: 3; 
Units expected to convert in fiscal years 2009 through 2013: 7. 

Component: Active Army; 
Unit Type: Functional support brigades; 
Units converted through fiscal year 2007: 28; 
Units expected to convert in fiscal year 2008: 8; 
Units expected to convert in fiscal years 2009 through 2013: 8. 

Component: National Guard; 
Unit Type: Brigade combat teams; 
Units converted through fiscal year 2007: 26; 
Units expected to convert in fiscal year 2008: 2; 
Units expected to convert in fiscal years 2009 through 2013: 0. 

Component: National Guard; 
Unit Type: Multifunctional support brigades; 
Units converted through fiscal year 2007: 19; 
Units expected to convert in fiscal year 2008: 19; 
Units expected to convert in fiscal years 2009 through 2013: 8. 

Component: National Guard; 
Unit Type: Functional support brigades; 
Units converted through fiscal year 2007: 30; 
Units expected to convert in fiscal year 2008: 6; 
Units expected to convert in fiscal years 2009 through 2013: 2. 

Component: U.S. Army Reserve; 			
Unit Type: Brigade combat teams; 
Units converted through fiscal year 2007: 0; 
Units expected to convert in fiscal year 2008: 0; 
Units expected to convert in fiscal years 2009 through 2013: 0. 

Component: U.S. Army Reserve; 	
Unit Type: Multifunctional support brigades; 
Units converted through fiscal year 2007: 4; 
Units expected to convert in fiscal year 2008: 5; 
Units expected to convert in fiscal years 2009 through 2013: 3. 

Component: U.S. Army Reserve; 	
Unit Type: Functional support brigades; 
Units converted through fiscal year 2007: 35; 
Units expected to convert in fiscal year 2008: 2; 
Units expected to convert in fiscal years 2009 through 2013: 11. 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: United States Army. 

Note: The Army will convert two additional units in the National Guard 
to brigade combat teams in fiscal year 2008. However, one of the 
brigade combat teams will be redesignated as a maneuver enhancement 
brigade in fiscal year 2008 and the other as a battlefield surveillance 
brigade in fiscal year 2010. 

[End of figure] 

As we reported in December 2007,[Footnote 10] however, modular units 
are being established with shortfalls of some equipment and personnel. 
To meet operational needs, the Army has allocated available equipment 
and personnel to deployed and next-to-deploy units. As a result, 
although the Army is converting units to modular unit designs, 
nondeployed units do not have all the equipment or personnel needed for 
the new combat and support brigades. Using a combination of regular and 
supplemental appropriations, the Army has spent billions of dollars 
procuring and repairing equipment in recent years. However, equipping 
deployed and deploying forces has been the priority, and the amount of 
equipment left for non-deployed forces has declined. In February 2008, 
the Chief of Staff of the Army testified before the Senate Armed 
Services Committee that the Army's readiness is being consumed as fast 
as it can be built. The Army has announced a plan to restore balance to 
the force by 2011, but it has not detailed how it will achieve its 
goals of sustaining the force, preparing for missions, resetting 
equipment, and transforming for the future. 

The Army Has Not Linked Planned Investments with Interim Milestones: 

The Army has extended its estimate for when it can fully equip the 
modular force from 2011 to 2019, but it still has not identified the 
total cost or established interim milestones toward reaching its 
revised equipping goal. Our prior work has shown that successful 
transformation initiatives have a clear plan with interim milestones 
that links overall results with funding needs.[Footnote 11] In our 
December 2007, report we recommended that the Army develop a 
comprehensive strategy and funding plan as well as measures of progress 
for equipping and staffing the modular force. [Footnote 12] We also 
recommended that the Secretary of the Army report this information to 
Congress to assist in its oversight of Army plans. Even though the Army 
agreed with our recommendations, it has not yet developed the 
comprehensive strategy or measures of progress needed to enable 
congressional oversight. 

The Army's current investment plan is depicted in its 5-year defense 
plan, known as the future years defense program. However, this plan 
does not provide details about the Army's equipping and staffing plans 
to reach goals that stretch until 2019. When developing its personnel 
or equipment plans, the Army must consider a number of factors. First, 
the Army gives priority to meeting the needs of deployed forces, and 
these requirements depend on dynamic operational conditions. For 
example, the surge of forces into Iraq in 2007 required the Army to 
equip and staff additional units quickly. Second, the Army must 
consider the wear and tear of ongoing operations on its equipment and 
make assumptions about how much equipment currently in use can be 
repaired. Third, the Army must determine how much equipment to buy to 
replace worn-out equipment and modernize the force. Finally, the Army 
has to decide how to distribute equipment and personnel across its 
remaining units within acceptable levels of risk. 

Army officials told us that they use internal tracking systems to plan 
procurements of equipment and assess projected levels against 
requirements; however, visibility outside the Army over the progress in 
equipping and staffing the force is limited. The Army has not provided 
congressional decision makers with this detailed information. The John 
Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 
(hereafter Public Law 109-364) requires the Secretary of the Army to 
include in a report submitted annually with the President's budget, 
among other things, an assessment of the progress made during that 
fiscal year toward meeting the overall requirements of the funding 
priorities for equipment related to the modularity initiative as well 
as the requirements for repair and recapitalization of equipment used 
in the Global War on Terrorism, and reconstitution of equipment in 
prepositioned stocks.[Footnote 13] In its fiscal year 2008 report, the 
Army submitted a list of requested fiscal year-2009-funding amounts for 
selected equipment. However, the Army did not provide comprehensive 
information that is necessary to determine the progress it is making in 
equipping modular forces. Specifically, the Army's report did not 
include: (1) planned annual investments in acquisition and reset for 
equipment beyond fiscal year 2009 and quantities that it expects to 
procure or repair, (2) annual target levels for equipment and 
personnel, (3) key assumptions underlying the Army's plans, or (4) an 
assessment of interim progress toward meeting overall Army requirements 
and the impacts of shortfalls. While Public Law 109-364 does not 
expressly delineate the level of detail the Army should submit in the 
progress assessment included in its annual report, unless DOD provides 
information that links requirements, funding requests, and planned 
procurements, Congress may not have the best information on which to 
base funding decisions. 

Army Projects That It Will Meet Overall Equipment and Personnel 
Requirements but Faces Challenges in Meeting These Goals: 

The Army's equipping and staffing projections indicate that the Army 
will have enough equipment and personnel to meet aggregate equipping 
and staffing requirements by 2012. However, our analysis of the Army's 
projections showed some potential shortfalls of modern equipment, and 
its projections are based partly on the continued use of some older 
equipment. For example, the Army projects that it will exceed its 
authorized level of medium tactical vehicles by fiscal year 2012, but 
its projections include continued use of more than 12,500 obsolete two- 
and-one-half-ton medium trucks that are not deployable 
overseas.[Footnote 14] As table 3 shows, our analysis of Army data 
found that when older equipment is excluded, shortfalls are projected 
in selected types of modern equipment within the key equipment 
categories. For example, our analysis showed significant shortages 
projected for three systems that make up the tactical internet: the 
Enhanced Position Location Reporting System and the Single Channel 
Ground and Airborne Radio System.[Footnote 15] According to the 2004 
Task Force Modularity study, the full benefits of networking may not be 
realized if only some elements of the force have the capability. 
Appendix I contains a more complete discussion of our analysis, and 
findings. 

Table 3: Projected Availability of Selected Key Modern Equipment 
Compared to the Authorized Level in Fiscal Year 2012: 

Key Enabler Category (Specific equipment items): Radios - Tactical; 
* Single channel ground and airborne system; 
* Enhanced position location reporting system; 
* Rescue radio; 
* Squad radio; 
Percentage of authorized equipment projected to be available[A]: 67. 

Key Enabler Category (Specific equipment items): Tactical wheeled 
vehicles - light; 
* High mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicle; 
Percentage of authorized equipment projected to be available[A]: 52. 

Key Enabler Category (Specific equipment items): Tactical wheeled 
vehicles - medium; 
* Medium trucks; 
Percentage of authorized equipment projected to be available[A]: 46. 

Source: GAO analysis of Army data. 

Note: We did not analyze the Army's ability to provide equipment to 
units either deploying, about to be deployed, or returning from current 
operations. For the purpose of this table, our analysis excluded 
equipment items that the Army authorizes as substitutes because we 
assessed the Army's progress obtaining modern equipment items. Data 
retrieved from Army databases reflect equipment levels as of April 23, 
2007. 

[A] The types of authorized equipment represented here are some of the 
top equipment we identified as part of our study. For example, there 
were 7 kinds of tactical radios and 2 types of light and 2 kinds of 
medium tactical vehicles in the top 15 shortfalls. In the tactical 
radio and medium and light truck categories, we used generic 
descriptions to describe several related systems. For example, the 
tactical radios category includes four different types of Single 
Channel Ground and Airborne System radios. 

[End of table] 

The Army's projections of when it will be able to fully equip and staff 
the modular force are based on assumptions that will affect the actual 
equipment and personnel available. Expanding the size of the Army, 
rehabilitating equipment that has experienced wear and tear from 
overseas operations, recruiting and retaining personnel, and 
competition for increasingly scarce resources, each presents the Army 
challenges in planning and implementation as described below. 

* Expanding the Army: The Army's planned expansion includes building 
six additional active modular brigade combat teams and additional 
modular support brigades within its increased end strength of 
74,200.[Footnote 16] Our prior work on recruiting and retention as well 
as equipping modular units have identified some potential difficulties 
that could arise in implementing an increase in the size of the Army at 
a time when the services are supporting ongoing operations in Iraq and 
Afghanistan.[Footnote 17] For example, our prior work has identified 
shortages in mid-level officers for a larger force. 

* Repair and restore deployed equipment: Equipment is currently 
experiencing significant wear and tear in overseas operations, reducing 
the equipment's expected service life. It is uncertain whether it is 
economically feasible to repair and restore equipment that has been 
deployed overseas, also known as equipment reset, to preserve its 
service life.[Footnote 18] An Army procurement official confirmed that 
the Army's equipment projections rest on some uncertain assumptions 
related to the ability to reset the force. 

* Recruiting and retention of personnel: While the services have 
generally met their recruiting and retention goals, several factors 
suggest that challenges for recruitment and retention are likely to 
continue. For instance, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
testified in February 2008 before the Senate Armed Services Committee 
that recruiters have difficulty meeting their accession goals because 
of a decline in the willingness of persons in a position of influence 
to encourage potential recruits to enlist during a time of war. Another 
factor that DOD has reported contributing to the Army's recruiting 
challenges is that more than half of today's youth between the ages of 
16 and 21 are not qualified to serve in the military because they fail 
to meet the military's entry standards.[Footnote 19] Further, the Army 
has experienced decreased retention among officers early in their 
careers and shortages within certain specialty areas such as military 
intelligence[Footnote 20] (see app. I for a detailed analysis of the 
Army's projections for specific personnel that are critical to the 
modular force). 

* Availability of personnel: A growing number of Army personnel are 
unavailable for assignment because they are in training or are 
students, are transiting between positions, or are in a "holding 
facility" due to medical, disciplinary, or pre-separation reasons. 
Historically, about 13 percent of the Army's end-strength has been 
unavailable.[Footnote 21] However, the number of service members who 
are unavailable now is likely to be greater because the number of 
personnel unavailable due to war wounds has increased over the past 
several years.[Footnote 22] 

* Availability of Funding: The Army's ability to execute its equipment 
and personnel plans rests on several assumptions related to future 
costs and available funding. DOD has relied on a combination of regular 
appropriations and supplemental funding to finance the transition to 
modularity. How long supplemental funding will be available for this 
purpose is unclear. We have previously reported that DOD tends to 
understate future costs in its equipment plans by employing overly 
optimistic planning assumptions in its budget formulations.[Footnote 
23] A growing governmentwide fiscal imbalance could limit growth in 
defense funding and force choices among competing defense priorities, 
and rising costs for acquisition programs could require DOD to reassess 
the types and quantities of equipment it procures in the 
future.[Footnote 24] A senior Army official in the Office of the Deputy 
Chief of Staff for Programs stated that significant increases in costs 
to procure equipment required for current operations, such as armored 
vehicles, represents another factor that may lead the Army to procure 
less equipment than expected. Moreover, personnel costs are rising 
dramatically, and as the costs for military pay and benefits grow, 
questions arise whether DOD has the right pay and compensation 
strategies to cost-effectively sustain the total force in the 
future.[Footnote 25] 

While Congress has provided substantial funding in response to DOD 
requests, our analysis has shown the Army has not adequately 
demonstrated to Congress how it intends to invest future funding to 
procure the modern equipment and provide staff with critical skills 
that will enable modular units to operate most effectively and when it 
can expect all modular units to have the equipment and personnel they 
are authorized. Decision makers may not be fully informed of the Army's 
equipment status because the Army has not developed a comprehensive 
equipment and personnel plan that details the equipment the Army has in 
its inventories as compared with the equipment required for units to 
operate effectively in their modular designs and that sets milestones 
against which to measure the Army's progress equipping and staffing the 
modular force with key enablers. 

The Army Has Not Fully Evaluated the Capabilities of the Modular Force 
across the Full Spectrum of Conflict: 

The Army uses a variety of approaches in testing unit designs and 
capabilities, but these efforts have not yielded a comprehensive 
evaluation of modular forces. Testing the modular force is intended to 
determine whether modular units are capable of performing potential 
missions across the full spectrum of conflict--and therefore needs to 
be as realistic as possible. Gaps in the Army's testing of the modular 
support forces and lack of a focal point for ensuring thorough testing 
of these forces could result in less capable support forces than 
planned. First, the Army has not fully assessed the effectiveness of 
its support units because it has not completed the doctrine that would 
define how modular support units will train, be sustained, and support 
the fight. Without this underpinning doctrine, the Army does not have a 
basic framework upon which to develop measures to assess the 
effectiveness of support units. Second, the Army has been testing the 
capability of modular forces primarily at unconstrained design levels, 
not the authorized level of personnel and equipment units that the Army 
actually plans to provide. However, our analysis found significant 
shortfalls in the Army's projected equipment and personnel when 
measured against design levels; as a result, this approach may not 
realistically test the capabilities of units that will generally be 
given less equipment and fewer personnel than called for in the design 
level. To support ongoing operations, the Army has focused its testing 
and evaluation efforts thus far on conducting ongoing counterinsurgency 
operations. However, without testing that is realistic and includes 
support forces across a full spectrum of potential conflict, the Army 
faces risks associated with equipment and personnel shortfalls should 
another type of conflict occur. 

Lack of Doctrine for Support Units Hinders Testing of the Modular 
Force: 

The urgent need for modular combat units has caused the Army to place 
its priority on assessing these critical units, but it has not 
completed doctrine that would define how support units--which also have 
important roles--will operate. Further, unlike its approach for 
assessing combat units, TRADOC has not identified an organization 
responsible for performing integrated assessments of its modular 
support forces. In managing its transformation to the modular design, 
the Army has assessed combat units across seven domains or areas-- 
doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and 
facilities (DOTMLPF). These areas are interrelated--for example, adding 
more or different types of materiel or equipment can change the 
capability of a unit that would need to be reflected in the unit's 
organization or doctrine. TRADOC has made some changes in how its 
modular units operate based on lessons learned in current operations. 

The Army has stated that its transformation efforts will be based on 
the underlying doctrine that defines how the Army trains, sustains, and 
fights. Doctrine represents an approved guidebook that details how 
units are expected to operate, how they will be organized, trained, and 
equipped to perform their missions. Army officials stated that without 
doctrine it is difficult to assess a unit because doctrine provides the 
standards by which a unit is evaluated. Even though many support units 
have been converted to modular designs, the Army has not yet completed 
the doctrine that is basic to developing strategies to train and equip 
units. For example, doctrine for logistics units had not been 
completed, and the Army did not have a firm estimate for when it will 
be completed. Similarly, doctrine for all military intelligence and 
signal units was incomplete, and military intelligence officials were 
uncertain when this might be finalized. In 2005, the Army Science Board 
cited the lack of completed doctrine for modular support units as one 
issue that might limit effectiveness of the modular force. These 
officials explained that the Army cannot be sure that unit training is 
appropriate if doctrine is incomplete, because doctrine provides the 
standards by which the Army assesses unit training. Without approved 
doctrine, the Army cannot be assured that its efforts to assess and 
train modular units are adequate. 

Once doctrine is in place, the Army can evaluate support units across 
the other domains of the DOTMLPF domains. In contrast to its approach 
for combat units, however, the Army has not identified an organization 
responsible to ensure that integrated assessments of its support units 
are performed across the DOTMLPF domains that affect the unit's 
capabilities. For combat brigades, the Army has designated experienced 
officials within TRADOC's infantry and armor centers, called 
capabilities managers, who act as focal points for evaluating combat 
unit designs and coordinating comprehensive assessments of these units 
across the DOTMLPF domains to determine how best to mitigate potential 
risks with changes to doctrine and unit design, resolve training and 
equipping issues, and incorporate lessons learned. By assigning 
responsibility and authority for assessing forces to the capability 
managers, the Army has created a focal point for evaluating unit 
capabilities that clarifies lines of accountability and helps ensure 
that the designs of support units are fully tested across the DOTMLPF 
domains. For example, the Stryker Brigade Combat Team capability 
manager monitors the status of doctrine for Stryker units and lessons 
learned from current operations and updates as necessary doctrine and 
unit design as needed. Similarly, TRADOC established a capability 
manager for the Infantry Brigade Combat Team formation who, among other 
things, monitors the development of assessments across the DOTMLPF 
domains to ensure these areas are integrated and that the infantry unit 
design supports operational requirements. For example, the commander of 
one infantry brigade combat team stated that the infantry capability 
manager could help resolve concerns regarding training and equipment 
issues before deploying units to support the global war on terror. 
Without a responsible focal point to ensure that assessments across the 
DOTMLPF domains are conducted in an integrated fashion, the Army runs a 
risk that support units will not have the capabilities needed to 
support the modular force. 

The Army Has Not Comprehensively Tested the Modular Force Based on 
Authorized Equipment and Personnel Levels: 

TRADOC conducts computer simulations to test and evaluate the 
capability of the modular force based on designed equipment and 
personnel levels but does not perform these tests based on either 
authorized or available equipment or personnel levels.[Footnote 26] 
According to the Army, TRADOC assessed the modular force in 2004 based 
on the resources, equipment, and personnel specified in the modular 
unit design, not the authorized levels that would reflect the equipment 
and personnel that the units will actually have. During this assessment 
process, TRADOC identified some risks related to this modular 
transformation process and identified enablers, [Footnote 27] such as 
those we discussed earlier in this report, that would be needed to 
mitigate these risks. For example, when TRADOC used computer modeling 
tools to assess the combat capabilities of modular combat units, it 
determined that there was a risk associated with having two combat- 
focused, or maneuver, battalions in a modular combat brigade, as 
opposed to the three maneuver battalions that made up a combat brigade 
in the previous divisional structure. Based on this analysis, the Army 
made adjustments in the design of the units, such as adding battlespace 
awareness equipment such as unmanned aerial vehicles and increasing the 
number of intelligence personnel, before accepting the modular designs. 
However, the Army's design represents an ideal future objective that is 
unconstrained by resources.[Footnote 28] 

Measured against the design level, the Army is projecting significant 
shortfalls in a number of different equipment and personnel areas. 
Since the Army accepted the modularity concept based on the design 
level, these shortfalls could also affect the capabilities modular 
units can deliver to combatant commanders. As table 4 shows, our 
analysis of selected key enabler equipment projections against design 
requirements found that the Army projects it will have less than half 
of the design requirement for some key equipment, such as battle 
command equipment, fire-finder radars, tactical and high frequency 
radios, and medium-wheeled vehicles. (For details of this analysis, see 
table 7 in app. I.) 

Table 4: Projected Availability of Selected Key Equipment Enablers at 
the Design Level in Fiscal Year 2012: 

Selected key equipment enablers by category: Battle command (includes 
computers and communications equipment); 
Percent of design requirement[A] projected to be available: 40. 

Selected key equipment enablers by category: Firefinder radar; 
Percent of design requirement[A] projected to be available: 17. 

Selected key equipment enablers by category: High frequency radios; 
Percent of design requirement[A] projected to be available: 45. 

Selected key equipment enablers by category: Joint network node (signal 
equipment); 
Percent of design requirement[A] projected to be available: 55. 

Selected key equipment enablers by category: Light tactical wheeled 
vehicles; 
Percent of design requirement[A] projected to be available: 56. 

Selected key equipment enablers by category: Medium tactical wheeled 
vehicles; 
Percent of design requirement[A] projected to be available: 31. 

Selected key equipment enablers by category: Tactical radios; 
Percent of design requirement[A] projected to be available: 38. 

Selected key equipment enablers by category: Unmanned Prophet 
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance system; 
Percent of design requirement[A] projected to be available: 61. 

Selected key equipment enablers by category: Unmanned aerial vehicle 
(small); 
Percent of design requirement[A] projected to be available: 61. 

Source: GAO analysis of Army equipment databases. 

Note: We did not analyze the Army's ability to provide equipment to 
units either deploying, about to be deployed, or returning from current 
operations. Our analysis also excluded equipment items that the Army 
authorizes as substitutes because we assessed the Army's progress 
obtaining modern equipment items. Data retrieved from these databases 
reflect equipment levels as of April 23, 2007. 

[A] Design equipment is more modern equipment. Some of the progress 
equipping the modular force is based on maintaining older equipment and 
while this may allow the Army to have the equipment it needs overall, 
the Army still has shortfalls for specific types of modern equipment. 

[End of table] 

According to the Army, such enablers are critical to the modular force. 
During the development of the new modular brigade combat team designs, 
the Chief of Staff of the Army directed the Army to develop designs 
that would be "as capable as" the legacy designs the Army wanted to 
replace.[Footnote 29] Working under Army TRADOC, in 2004, the Army Task 
Force Modularity assessed several brigade combat team design 
alternatives and concluded that selected key enablers largely 
determined the performance of each of the alternatives.[Footnote 30] As 
a result, the Army made some changes to modular unit blueprints and 
assumed that modern equipment--including advanced battle command 
systems, unmanned aerial vehicles, and top of the line intelligence- 
surveillance-reconnaissance equipment that provide a brigade commander 
enhanced situational awareness--would be available for these units. 
These changes were meant to mitigate the risks associated with smaller 
but more numerous brigades; the Army created four modular brigade 
combat teams out of three former divisional brigades and reduced from 
three to two the number of battalions within a combat brigade.[Footnote 
31] The Army approved an initial brigade combat team design, which 
senior Army leaders assessed as "good enough" for the Army's modular 
restructuring. 

Since the initial 2004 assessment of the modular brigades, the Army has 
used a case-by-case review process to analyze specific shortfalls and 
identify any needed risk mitigation strategies. These assessments have 
been focused on supporting ongoing counterinsurgency operations. 
However, because these assessments focus on a few specific shortfalls 
and do not examine how all the equipment and staffing work together in 
modular force across the full spectrum of conflict, it is unclear 
whether the currently authorized personnel and equipment achieve the 
capability that was originally envisioned. 

Conclusions: 

Restructuring and modernizing the Army amid ongoing operations presents 
a complex and growing challenge. To date, the Army has received 
billions of dollars in regular and supplemental appropriations that 
have helped to prepare deploying units, but these investments have not 
yet translated into improved readiness for non-deployed units. As 
operations have continued, the target date for rebuilding the Army has 
slipped considerably and is now more than a decade away. We previously 
recommended that the Army establish management controls to assess 
progress in achieving its goal of fully equipping the modular force and 
report this information to Congress, and the Army agreed. However, in 
its 2008 report to Congress, the information the Army provided focused 
primarily on the 2009 budget year and did not include the detailed, 
year-by-year information that would represent the comprehensive 
management controls that are needed to demonstrate progress in 
equipping and staffing the modular force. Without detailed planning for 
results that includes interim targets for equipping and staffing the 
modular force and clearly links investments with goals for equipping 
and staffing modular units, DOD and Congress will not have the 
information needed to fully assess the Army's progress or determine the 
impact of any shortfalls. Moreover, without the information the Army 
needs to show progress toward its goals, the Army could face 
difficulties competing for increasingly scarce resources in the future 
and risks additional slippage in its timeline for rebuilding the Army. 

The Army's transition to the modular design has provided flexibility in 
supporting ongoing operations, but the effectiveness of the design 
across the full range of potential conflicts and with potential 
shortfalls in key equipment and personnel is still unknown. 
Understandably, the Army has focused its evaluation efforts on combat 
brigades supporting ongoing operations, although these are primarily 
counterinsurgency operations and do not represent the full spectrum of 
potential conflicts. However, although the integration of support 
forces with combat brigades is a key factor to the success of the 
modular design, the underpinning doctrine for modular support forces 
has yet to be completed. And, unlike its approach for combat forces, 
the Army has not yet identified an organization or focal point to be 
responsible for conducting integrated assessments of support forces 
across the DOTMLPF domains. By conducting an assessment of the total 
force against the full spectrum of requirements and identifying 
capability gaps in combat and support units, the Army can identify 
options that balance short-term needs with long-term risks. Lacking an 
analysis of the capabilities of the modular force at authorized levels-
-which represents what the Army actually plans to have--the Army will 
not be in a position to realistically assess whether the capabilities 
that it is fielding can perform mission requirements. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

To improve the Army's focus on the relationship between investments and 
results and the completeness of the information that the Army provides 
Congress, we recommend the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of 
the Army take the following action: 

* Develop and report to Congress a results-oriented plan that provides 
detailed information on the Army's progress in providing the modular 
force with key equipment and personnel enablers. The plan should show 
actual status and planned milestones through 2019 for each type of key 
equipment and personnel, including: 

- goals for on-hand equipment and personnel levels at the end of each 
fiscal year; 

- projected on-hand equipment and personnel levels at the end of each 
fiscal year, including planned annual investments and quantities of 
equipment expected to be procured or repaired as well as key 
assumptions underlying the Army's plans; and: 

- an assessment of interim progress toward meeting overall Army 
requirements and the risks associated with any shortfalls. 

To enhance the Army's efforts to comprehensively assess modular designs 
we are recommending that the Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary 
of the Army to take the following three actions: 

* Develop a plan, including timelines, for completing doctrine for 
modular support forces. 

* Establish an organizational focal point to ensure that integrated 
assessments of modular support units' designs are performed across the 
DOTMLPF domains. 

* Assess the capabilities of the modular force based on the amount and 
type of authorized equipment and personnel to identify capability 
shortfalls between authorized and design levels and take steps to 
revise authorized levels where appropriate. 

Matters for Congressional Consideration: 

In commenting on these recommendations, DOD either disagreed or offered 
responses that we considered not to be fully responsive to the intent 
of our recommendations. We are therefore elevating the following 
matters for Congressional consideration. 

Congress should consider amending section 323 of Public Law 109-364 to 
require the Army to include in its statutorily required report on 
modularity a results-oriented plan that provides (1) goals for on-hand 
equipment and personnel levels at the end of each fiscal year; (2) 
projected on-hand equipment and personnel levels at the end of each 
year, including planned annual investments and quantities of equipment 
expected to be procured or repaired, as well as key assumptions 
underlying the Army's plans; and (3) an assessment of interim progress 
toward meeting overall Army requirements and the risks associated with 
any shortfalls. 

To ensure that Congress is kept informed about the progress in 
implementing modular designs across the Army's operating forces and the 
capabilities of the modular force and associated risks from personnel 
and equipment shortfalls, it should consider revising section 323 
Public Law 109-364 to require the Army to report on the status of its 
transition to modularity to include assessments of (1)the status of 
development of doctrine for how support forces will train, be 
sustained, and fight, (2) capabilities of modular units with expected 
personnel and equipment and risks associated with any shortfalls 
against required resources. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD disagreed with one 
recommendation, agreed with two recommendations, and partially agreed 
with one recommendation. DOD disagreed with our recommendation to 
report detailed information on the Army's progress in equipping and 
staffing the modular force. The department agreed with our 
recommendations to develop a plan for completing doctrine for modular 
support forces and establishing a focal point for assessing modular 
support units' designs. However, the department stated that its current 
processes adequately address these issues. The department partially 
agreed with our recommendation to assess the capabilities of the 
modular force. However, DOD stated that the Army assesses the 
capabilities of the force in many ways and that its current assessments 
are adequate and that additional actions are not necessary. As 
discussed below, we continue to believe that the actions we recommended 
are important to improve the Army's ability to identify gaps in 
personnel and equipment and target investments to improve capabilities 
more efficiently as well to manage the transition of support forces to 
modular designs and operations. Therefore, we have raised these actions 
as matters for congressional consideration. 

DOD stated that our first recommendation to develop and report to 
Congress a results-oriented plan that provides detailed information on 
the Army's progress in providing the modular force with key equipment 
and personnel enablers is not needed because the department's budget, 
yearly acquisition reporting, and congressionally required reporting 
provide information on the status and plans for equipping and manning 
the force. In addition, DOD stated that yearly goals and projections 
for on-hand equipment and personnel are highly variable, given 
fluctuations attributed to unit position in the Army Force Generation 
cycle, equipment repair and reset plans, and planned modernization 
acquisitions. Although we agree that the Army provides Congress with 
information on planning, budgeting, and acquisitions systems, these 
systems do not constitute a coherent plan that provides sufficient 
information on the agency's progress in equipping and staffing the 
modular force. Without the benefit of a clear plan and milestones 
against which to assess progress, the Army cannot assure Congress that 
it is on a path to restore readiness or when it will have the equipment 
and personnel it needs. The Army has relied heavily on supplemental 
funding to support its transition to modularity, and the Army has 
placed its priority for equipping and staffing on deploying forces. 
However, in light of pressures on the federal budget, the Army needs to 
make clear how it will use the funding it requests, when the Army 
expects to be able to fully resource its forces in accordance with its 
force generation cycle and the extent to which improvements are being 
achieved in the interim. Therefore, we have elevated this to a matter 
for congressional consideration, suggesting that Congress consider 
directing the Army to include in its annual report on modularity 
detailed information on equipment and personnel levels, progress toward 
equipment and staffing goals, and risks associated with any shortfalls. 

DOD agreed with our recommendation that the Secretary of the Army 
develop a plan, including timelines, for completing doctrine for 
modular support forces but stated that its current assessments are 
adequate. However, DOD's response did not address two specific issues 
we raised: (1) the doctrinal manuals for support forces are not 
complete and (2) no plan with milestones for completing the manuals has 
been developed. In its comments, DOD stated that it had published Field 
Manual 3-0, Operations and that this manual included doctrine for 
modular support forces. We agree that Field Manual FM 3-0 serves as 
broad-based direction for all Army doctrine; however, it does not 
include specific modular support force doctrine that defines how 
modular support units will train, be sustained, and fight. As the 
report discusses, the Army's Training and Doctrine Command has 
published, in separate field manuals, doctrine for each of the types of 
modular combat units that details how these units will train, be 
sustained, and fight. Our report highlights the need for the support- 
unit-specific doctrine to provide the standards by which support unit 
training can be evaluated. Until the Army develops a plan to complete 
such doctrine that includes a timeline and designates appropriate 
authority and responsibility, it is not clear that priority will be 
placed on this effort. We believe that the actions the department has 
taken do not meet the intent of our recommendation to improve the 
assessment of support forces and that our recommendation has merit. 
Therefore, we have elevated this to a matter for congressional 
consideration, suggesting that Congress consider requiring DOD to 
report on the Army's progress in developing specific doctrine for 
modular forces, including support forces, in its annual report on Army 
modularity. 

DOD agreed with our recommendation that the Army establish an 
organizational focal point to ensure that integrated assessments of 
modular support units' designs are performed across the doctrine, 
organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities 
domains. However, in its written comments, the Army indicated that the 
Deputy Chief of Staff is the focal point for organization, integration, 
decision making, and execution of the spectrum of activities 
encompassing requirements definition, force development, force 
integration, force structure, combat development, training development, 
resourcing, and privatization and that these activities included being 
the focal point for integrated assessments of unit designs across the 
doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, personnel, and 
facilities domains. However, our recommendation was not directed toward 
the responsibilities or authorities of senior Army leadership. Rather, 
our recommendation focuses more narrowly on the need to address the 
current lack of integrated assessments of modular support units. Our 
recommendation was intended to encourage as a best practice the Army's 
current strategy of appointing a focal point for ensuring integrated 
assessments of modular combat units and to highlight how applying this 
strategy could improve the integration of assessments for support 
units. We recognize that there are a number of ways that the Army could 
address the intent of this recommendation to improve integration of 
assessments for support forces, so we have not elevated this as a 
matter for congressional consideration at this time. However, we 
continue to believe that employing the best practice of appointing a 
focal point for integration would improve the Army's ability to 
integrate assessments across domains for each type of support unit. 

DOD partially agreed with our recommendation to assess the capabilities 
of the modular force based on the amount and type of authorized 
equipment and personnel in order to identify capability shortfalls 
between authorized and design levels and to revise authorized levels 
where appropriate. In its comments, DOD stated that the Army assesses 
the capabilities of the force in many ways and that modular brigades 
are assessed based on the missions assigned and the ability to 
accomplish these missions given personnel, training, and equipment 
available. Further, DOD stated that the Army is currently assessing its 
capabilities and no new direction is needed. We agree that the Army 
performs many types of assessments of force capabilities. However, 
although the Army provided us documentation of its assessments of 
modular combat force designs with the level of equipment called for in 
the unit design, we found no evidence that the Army has assessed the 
modular forces with the equipment that these forces can realistically 
expect to have given the personnel and equipment available. As our 
report discussed, we identified significant shortfalls in the Army's 
projected equipment and personnel when measured against the design 
levels. Further, the Army has focused its testing and evaluation 
efforts thus far on conducting ongoing counterinsurgency operations. We 
continue to believe that until the Army begins to test units with 
realistic personnel and equipment levels and across the full spectrum 
of conflict, the Army faces risks associated with shortfalls of key 
equipment should a different type of capability be needed in future 
operations in a different kind of conflict. Therefore, we elevated this 
to a matter for congressional consideration, suggesting that Congress 
consider requiring an assessment of modular force capabilities and 
associated risks at expected levels of personnel and equipment and 
across the full spectrum of conflict. 

We are sending copies of this report to the appropriate congressional 
committees; the Secretary of Defense; and the Secretary of the Army. We 
will also make copies available to others upon request. In addition, 
this report will be available at no charge on the GAO web site at 
[hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. If you or your staff have any 
questions about this report, please contact me at (404) 679-1816 or 
pendletonj@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional 
Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this 
report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are 
listed in appendix IV. 

Signed by: 

John H. Pendleton: 
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management: 

List of Congressional Committees: 

The Honorable Carl Levin: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable John McCain: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Thad Cochran: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Defense: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
United States Senate: 

The Honorable Ike Skelton: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Duncan L. Hunter: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Armed Services: 
House of Representatives: 

The Honorable John P. Murtha: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable C. W. Bill Young: 
Ranking Member: 
Subcommittee on Defense: 
Committee on Appropriations: 
House of Representatives: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: List of Key Equipment and Personnel Enablers: 

For the 15 key equipment and the 9 key personnel enabler categories we 
identified, each profile presents a general description of the 
equipment item or functions of military personnel. We grouped key 
enablers into broad equipment and personnel categories that include 
more specific equipment items and military occupational specialties 
that are critical to the modular force design. For example, tactical 
radios are a key equipment enabler category that includes numerous 
equipment items, such as the Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio 
System, that may consist of both older and more modern variants. 
Signals is a key personnel enabler category that includes two enlisted 
occupational specialties (nodal network operator/maintainer and 
satellite communication systems operator/maintainer) and one officer 
(signal corps officer) occupational specialty. 

Our selection methodology generally required that equipment and 
personnel be assigned to at least two types of modular units (brigade 
combat teams, multifunctional support brigades, or functional support 
brigades) to qualify as a key enabler.[Footnote 32] We excluded certain 
types of equipment that are important to brigade combat teams, such as 
Abrams and Bradley tanks, because they are present in both the new 
brigade designs as well as the previous divisional structure. After we 
identified a preliminary list of key enablers, we submitted this list 
to the Headquarters, Department of the Army, for official input and 
held subsequent discussions with Army officials. Based on our 
discussions, we developed and submitted to the Department of the Army a 
final list of key equipment and personnel enablers of the modular force 
that served as the basis for our data request. An Army procurement 
official identified the specific equipment line items associated with 
each of the key equipment enablers and personnel officials verified 
that we had identified the appropriate skills associated with these 
enablers. 

Key Equipment Categories: 

All-Source Analysis System: 

The All-Source Analysis System is the Army's primary intelligence 
integration program, found at all Army echelons at battalion and higher 
level organizations. This system is composed of a laptop and desktop 
configuration that provides battlefield commanders with enhanced 
situational awareness and timely intelligence on enemy force 
deployments, capabilities, and potential courses of action. Our 
analysis includes the four equipment items that encompass this system 
such as All Source Analysis System: AN/TYQ-93. The Office of the Army 
Deputy Chief of Staff for Programs stated that capabilities from this 
system will convert into the Army Distributed Command Ground System, 
which is expected to be fielded to active Army, Army National Guard, 
and Army Reserve units by the end of fiscal year 2010. 

Analysis and Control Element: 

The Analysis and Control Element is a subsystem of the All Source 
Analysis System that provides commanders above the brigade level with 
intelligence processing, analysis, and dissemination capability. This 
category includes eight different equipment items including the 
Analysis and Control Element (ACE) AN/TYQ-89 which operates at the 
divisional level. 

Battle Command Systems: 

Battle command systems enhance the ability of the commander to gain 
information and make decisions through the use of technology, such as 
Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, 
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance equipment. Our analysis includes 95 
equipment specific equipment items within this enabler category, such 
as the Force XXI Battle Command Brigade-and-Below and the Movement 
Tracking System. The Force XXI Battle Command Brigade-and-Below forms 
the principal digital command and control system for the Army at 
brigade levels and below; it also connects platforms from lower-level 
units through the Tactical Internet. The Movement Tracking System is a 
tracking and communications satellite-based system that provides 
situational awareness to combat support and combat service support 
units. Army officials in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for 
Programs indicated that to mitigate the overall shortfall of battle 
command equipment, the Army will retain older variants that are in 
oversupply until new equipment is delivered. However, shortfalls in 
this category are greater than the availability of older equipment. 

Fire Support Sensor System: 

The Fire Support Sensor System designates targets to enable ground and 
air delivered precision strike capability. Our analysis includes six 
equipment items for this enabler category, such as the Armored Knight 
Fire Support Vehicle, the Bradley Fire Support Vehicle, and the Stryker 
Fire Support Vehicle. For example, the Knight vehicle provides 
precision strike capability by locating and designating targets for 
both ground and air-delivered laser-guided ordnance and conventional 
munitions. Army officials in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff 
for Programs indicated that force structure changes are expected to 
reduce overall requirements for this system, which would eliminate 
potential equipment shortages. The officials also stated the Army plans 
to continue to modernize its fleet of Fire Support Vehicles with 
upgrades and replacements of non-repairable equipment. 

Firefinder Radar: 

Firefinder radar is specialized equipment that detects the location of 
mortars, artillery, and short and long-range rockets through the use of 
radar. Our analysis includes six equipment items for this enabler 
category, such as the Firefinder AN/TPQ-36 that locates medium-range 
rockets. To mitigate overall shortfalls of these radars, the Army will 
retain a surplus of older radars until its modernization efforts 
replace existing equipment. 

Joint Network Node: 

The Joint Network Node is the Army's modernization of the tactical 
communications network. This node provides high-speed, high-capacity 
tactical network communications and data transport down to battalion 
level, which supports command and control, intelligence, and logistics 
communications. Our analysis includes 8 equipment items for this 
enabler category, such as the Battalion Command Post which provides 
communications at the battalion level. In June 2007, the Under 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisitions, Logistics, and Technology 
approved a merger of the Joint Network Node with the Warfight 
Information Network-Tactical system. 

Long Range Advanced Scout Surveillance: 

The Long Range Advanced Scout Surveillance System provides long range 
target acquisition and far target location capabilities to armor and 
infantry scouts enabling them to conduct reconnaissance and 
surveillance operations outside of enemy fire. It is a component of the 
Fire Support Sensor System, which provides target designation 
capability for fire support teams. Our analysis includes 3 equipment 
items for this enabler category, such as the Night Vision Sight Set and 
Long Range Scout Surveillance System AN/TAS-8. Army officials in the 
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Programs stated that the Army 
plans to mitigate shortages by using substitute items that can provide 
the same or similar capabilities as the required item until the Army 
can procure the modernized item. 

Radios - High Frequency: 

High Frequency radios provide commanders with radios that provide 
beyond the line of sight voice and data capability. Our analysis 
includes 17 equipment items for this enabler category, such as the High 
Frequency Radio Set AN/PRC-150C man pack that is carried by soldiers. 
The Army's goal is to procure the Joint Tactical Radio System, which 
provides a networking capability with multichannel, multiwaveform 
capabilities to increase speed and reliability of service. Currently, 
the Army is using older radios that it plans to replace; however, these 
older systems do not exist in enough numbers to address these 
shortages. 

Radios - Tactical: 

Tactical radios provide the ability and flexibility for command and 
control of combat forces on the battlefield and maintain contact with 
the lowest level, the squad leader. Our analysis includes 317 equipment 
items for this enabler category, such as the Enhanced Position and 
Location Reporting System. The Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio 
System radio provides commanders with a secure combat net radio with 
voice and data handling capability in support of Command and Control 
operations. The Enhanced Position and Location Reporting System radio 
provides a tactical Internet and communications capability. The Army's 
goal is to procure the Joint Tactical Radio System, which provides a 
networking capability with multichannel, multiwaveform capabilities to 
increase speed and reliability of service. In the near term, the Army 
maintains older less capable radios such as earlier versions of the 
Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System to meet its tactical 
radio requirements. 

Tactical Wheeled Vehicles - Light: 

The family of light tactical wheeled vehicles consists of the High 
Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle, which is a light, mobile, four- 
wheel drive vehicle. It has six configurations: troop carrier, armament 
carrier, shelter carrier, ambulance, missile carrier, and scout 
vehicle. Our analysis includes 43 equipment items for this enabler 
category such as the 1-1/4 ton cargo and troop carrier. Current 
operations are placing a heavy burden on these vehicles, and the Army 
has made numerous design and configuration changes to these vehicles 
such as improving their armored protection. Ultimately, the Army plans 
to replace this vehicle with the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle that will 
be available in 2015. 

Tactical Wheeled Vehicles - Medium: 

The family of medium tactical wheeled vehicles provides multipurpose 
transportation such as re-supply and mobility assets for combat support 
and combat service support units and includes cargo, tractor, van, 
wrecker, and dump trucks. Our analysis includes 176 equipment items for 
this enabler category; some of the older vehicles are 2-1/2 ton cargo 
vehicles, while newer models are 5 ton trucks. The Army has a medium 
vehicle modernization strategy that is scheduled to be completed in 
2022. Until then, the Army will use older trucks to meet its 
requirements. 

Tactical Wheeled Vehicles - Heavy: 

The family of heavy wheeled tactical vehicles performs unit resupply 
for combat, combat support, and combat service support units. Our 
analysis includes 106 equipment items for this enabler category, such 
as Heavy Expanded Mobility Tactical Trucks, Palletized Load System 
trucks, Heavy Equipment Transport, and Line Haul trucks. The Heavy 
Expanded Mobility Tactical Trucks provides all-weather, rapidly 
deployable transport capabilities for re-supply of combat vehicles and 
weapon systems. The Palletized Loading System truck is a prime mover 
with a load handling system. The Heavy Equipment Transport truck 
transports equipment such as tanks, fighting and recovery vehicles, and 
self-propelled howitzers. Line Haul trucks include the line haul 
tractor, light equipment transporter, and dump trucks. To address the 
shortfall of these trucks, the Army uses older equipment items that are 
authorized as substitute items. 

Trojan Spirit: 

The Trojan Spirit is an intelligence dissemination system that provides 
high capacity satellite communications services at Top Secret and 
Special Compartmented Information levels to tactical Army forces. Our 
analysis includes 14 equipment items for this enabler category, such as 
the Trojan Spirit Lite. Army officials in the Office of the Deputy 
Chief of Staff for Programs stated that the Army plans to modernize and 
upgrade Trojan Spirit with current technology to prevent the 
obsolescence of this program until the system is replaced by the 
Warfighter Information Network - Tactical in the 2014-2021 timeframe. 

Unmanned Aerial Vehicle - Prophet: 

The Prophet unmanned aerial vehicle provides an all-weather, near-real- 
time view of an area of responsibility through the use of signals and 
intelligence sensors. According to the Army, the Prophet provides the 
brigade combat team commander with the intelligence capability to 
visually display the battles space. Our analysis includes eight 
equipment items for this enabler category including the Countermeasures 
Detection System AN/MLQ-40. Army officials in the Office of the Deputy 
Chief of Staff for Programs stated that the Army's strategy to mitigate 
equipment shortfalls is to maintain older equipment longer as 
substitutes until they can be replaced. 

Unmanned Aerial Vehicle - Small: 

The small unmanned aerial vehicle provides reconnaissance, 
surveillance, and target acquisition capabilities to ground commanders. 
Our analysis includes 51 equipment items for this enabler category, 
such as the Extended Range Multi-Purpose Unmanned Aircraft System and 
the Raven B. The Army has a shortfall for these items at the authorized 
and design level, and the conversion to the modular force structure 
increased the requirement for these vehicles. However, the Army does 
not have older equipment to make up for these shortages. 

Table 5 illustrates, by key equipment enabler category, the on hand or 
available equipment at the authorized level for modular force units for 
the total Army--active and reserve components--in fiscal years 2007 and 
2012. For example, the Army projects to have 100 percent of its 
authorized equipment by 2012 in the Analysis and Control Element 
category,[Footnote 33] whereas the Army had 21 percent of authorized 
levels in fiscal year 2007. In contrast, the Army projects to have 67 
percent of authorized levels of small unmanned aerial vehicles in 
fiscal year 2012 --an improvement from fiscal year 2007, when it had 34 
percent of its authorized level. 

Table 5: Key Equipment Enablers Available at the Authorized Level in 
Fiscal Years 2007 and 2012. 

Key equipment enablers by category: All-Source analysis system; 
Description of capabilities: Provides battlefield commanders with 
enhanced situational awareness and intelligence on enemy forces; 
Percent of actual authorized available 2007: 96; 
Percent of projected authorized available 2012: 185. 

Key equipment enablers by category: Analysis and control element; 
Description of capabilities: Furnishes higher-level commanders with 
intelligence processing, analysis and dissemination capability; 
Percent of actual authorized available 2007: 21; 
Percent of projected authorized available 2012: 100. 

Key equipment enablers by category: Battle command systems; 
Description of capabilities: Enhances the commander's information 
gathering and decision-making capability; 
Percent of actual authorized available 2007: 50; 
Percent of projected authorized available 2012: 115. 

Key equipment enablers by category: Fire support sensor system; 
Description of capabilities: Designates targets to enable ground and 
air delivered precision-strike capability; 
Percent of actual authorized available 2007: 131; 
Percent of projected authorized available 2012: 177. 

Key equipment enablers by category: Firefinder radar; 
Description of capabilities: Detects the location of mortars, 
artillery, and short and long-range rockets through the use of radar; 
Percent of actual authorized available 2007: 71; 
Percent of projected authorized available 2012: 123. 

Key equipment enablers by category: Joint network node; 
Description of capabilities: Provides high-speed, high-capacity 
tactical communications down to battalion level; 
Percent of actual authorized available 2007: 54; 
Percent of projected authorized available 2012: 159. 

Key equipment enablers by category: Long-range advanced; 
scout surveillance; 
Description of capabilities: Affords long-range target acquisition 
capabilities to armor and infantry scouts enabling them to conduct 
reconnaissance and surveillance operations; 
Percent of actual authorized available 2007: 64; 
Percent of projected authorized available 2012: 155. 

Key equipment enablers by category: Radios - high frequency; 
Description of capabilities: Provides commanders with radios that 
provide beyond the line of sight voice and data capability; 
Percent of actual authorized available 2007: 50; 
Percent of projected authorized available 2012: 101. 

Key equipment enablers by category: Radios - tactical; 
Description of capabilities: Allows higher-level units to command and 
maintain contact with lower-level units; 
Percent of actual authorized available 2007: 185; 
Percent of projected authorized available 2012: 208. 

Key equipment enablers by category: Tactical wheeled vehicles - light; 
Description of capabilities: Provides multipurpose transportation using 
light, mobile four-wheel drive vehicles; 
Percent of actual authorized available 2007: 91; 
Percent of projected authorized available 2012: 126. 

Key equipment enablers by category: Tactical wheeled vehicles - medium; 
Description of capabilities: Provides multipurpose transportation using 
medium trucks; 
Percent of actual authorized available 2007: 98; 
Percent of projected authorized available 2012: 128. 

Key equipment enablers by category: Tactical wheeled vehicles - heavy; 
Description of capabilities: Provides multipurpose transportation using 
heavy trucks; 
Percent of actual authorized available 2007: 91; 
Percent of projected authorized available 2012: 125. 

Key equipment enablers by category: Trojan Spirit; 
Description of capabilities: Furnishes high-capacity, secure satellite 
communications services to tactical Army units; 
Percent of actual authorized available 2007: 93; 
Percent of projected authorized available 2012: 133. 

Key equipment enablers by category: Unmanned aerial vehicle - Prophet; 
Description of capabilities: Allows an all-weather, near-real-time view 
of an area of responsibility through the use of signals and 
intelligence sensors; 
Percent of actual authorized available 2007: 20; 
Percent of projected authorized available 2012: 99. 

Key equipment enablers by category: Unmanned aerial vehicle; - small; 
Description of capabilities: Provides reconnaissance, surveillance, and 
target acquisition capabilities to ground commanders; 
Percent of actual authorized available 2007: 34; 
Percent of projected authorized available 2012: 67. 

Source: GAO analysis of Army data. 

Note: Data reflects equipment levels as of April 23, 2007. We did not 
conduct an analysis of the Army's ability to provide equipment to units 
either deploying, about to be deployed, or returning from current 
operations. For the purpose of this table, our analysis excluded 
equipment items that the Army authorizes as substitutes because we 
assessed the Army's progress obtaining modern equipment items. 

[End of table] 

Table 6 illustrates, by key equipment enabler category, the on hand or 
available equipment at the design level for modular force units for the 
total Army--active and reserve components--in fiscal year 2007. This 
data includes an analysis at the aggregate level of all equipment on 
hand in a category and the specific modern equipment required in the 
design. 

Table 6: Key Equipment Enablers Available and Shortages of Modern 
Equipment at the Design Level in Fiscal Year 2007: 

Key equipment enablers by category: All-source analysis system; 
Design requirement (Number required): 3,713; 
All equipment: Available: 1,750; 
Design equipment[A]: Percent: 47; 
Available: 1,750; 
Percent: 47. 

Key equipment enablers by category: Analysis and control element; 
Design requirement (Number required): 34; 
All equipment: Available: 7; 
Design equipment[A]: Percent: 21; 
Available: 7; 
Percent: 21. 

Key equipment enablers by category: Battle command systems; 
Design requirement (Number required): 379,275; 
All equipment: Available: 71,133; 
Design equipment[A]: Percent: 19; 
Available: 64,520; 
Percent: 17. 

Key equipment enablers by category: Fire support sensor system; 
Design requirement (Number required): 1,007; 
All equipment: Available: 1,147; 
Design equipment[A]: Percent: 114; 
Available: 381; 
Percent: 38. 

Key equipment enablers by category: Firefinder radar; 
Design requirement (Number required): 204; 
All equipment: Available: 121; 
Design equipment[A]: Percent: 59; 
Available: 0; 
Percent: 0. 

Key equipment enablers by category: Joint network node; 
Design requirement (Number required): 2,713; 
All equipment: Available: 504; 
Design equipment[A]: Percent: 19; 
Available: 504; 
Percent: 19. 

Key equipment enablers by category: Long range advanced scout 
surveillance; 
Design requirement (Number required): 3,508; 
All equipment: Available: 1,103; 
Design equipment[A]: Percent: 31; 
Available: 1,103; 
Percent: 31. 

Key equipment enablers by category: Radios - high frequency; 
Design requirement (Number required): 23,434; 
All equipment: Available: 7,467; 
Design equipment[A]: Percent: 32; 
Available: 2,910; 
Percent: 12. 

Key equipment enablers by category: Radios - tactical; 
Design requirement (Number required): 543,501; 
All equipment: Available: 554,645; 
Design equipment[A]: Percent: 102; 
Available: 161,734; 
Percent: 30. 

Key equipment enablers by category: Tactical wheeled vehicles - light; 
Design requirement (Number required): 153,960; 
All equipment: Available: 111,056; 
Design equipment[A]: Percent: 72; 
Available: 72,740; 
Percent: 47. 

Key equipment enablers by category: Tactical wheeled vehicles - medium; 
Design requirement (Number required): 87,305; 
All equipment: Available: 78,307; 
Design equipment[A]: Percent: 90; 
Available: 25,989; 
Percent: 30. 

Key equipment enablers by category: Tactical wheeled vehicle - heavy; 
Design requirement (Number required): 57,924; 
All equipment: Available: 38,527; 
Design equipment[A]: Percent: 67; 
Available: 26,402; 
Percent: 46. 

Key equipment enablers by category: Trojan spirit; 
Design requirement (Number required): 388; 
All equipment: Available: 242; 
Design equipment[A]: Percent: 62; 
Available: 221; 
Percent: 57. 

Key equipment enablers by category: Unmanned aerial vehicle - Prophet; 
Design requirement (Number required): 252; 
All equipment: Available: 114; 
Design equipment[A]: Percent: 45; 
Available: 114; 
Percent: 45. 

Key equipment enablers by category: Unmanned aerial vehicle - small; 
Design requirement (Number required): 2,679; 
All equipment: Available: 834; 
Design equipment[A]: Percent: 31; 
Available: 834; 
Percent: 31. 

Source: GAO analysis of Army data. 

Note: Data reflect equipment levels as of April 23, 2007. We did not 
conduct an analysis of the Army's ability to provide equipment to units 
either deploying, about to be deployed or returning from current 
operations. Our analysis also excluded equipment items that the Army 
authorizes as substitutes because we assessed the Army's progress 
obtaining modern equipment items. 

[A] Design Equipment is more modern equipment. Some of the progress 
equipping the modular force is based on maintaining older equipment, 
and while this may allow the Army to have the equipment it needs 
overall, the Army still has shortfalls for specific types of modern 
equipment. 

[End of table] 

Table 7 illustrates, by key equipment enabler category, the projected 
available equipment at the design level for modular force units for the 
total Army--active and reserve components--in fiscal year 2012. This 
data includes an analysis at the aggregate level of all equipment 
projected on hand in a category and the design equipment, which 
represents the specific equipment items that are required in the 
design. 

Table 7: Key Equipment Enablers and Projected Shortages of Modern 
Equipment at the Design Level in Fiscal Year 2012: 

Key Equipment Enablers by Category: All-source analysis system; 
Design Requirement (Numbers required): 3,713; 
All Equipment: Available: 3,363; 
Design Equipment[A]: Percent: 91; 
Available: 3,363; 
Percent: 91. 

Key Equipment Enablers by Category: Analysis and control element; 
Design Requirement (Numbers required): 34; 
All Equipment: Available: 34; 
Design Equipment[A]: Percent: 100; 
Available: 34; 
Percent: 100. 

Key Equipment Enablers by Category: Battle command systems; 
Design Requirement (Numbers required): 379,275; 
All Equipment: Available: 164,674; 
Design Equipment[A]: Percent: 43; 
Available: 150,032; 
Percent: 40. 

Key Equipment Enablers by Category: Fire support sensor system; 
Design Requirement (Numbers required): 1,007; 
All Equipment: Available: 1,548; 
Design Equipment[A]: Percent: 154; 
Available: 782; 
Percent: 78. 

Key Equipment Enablers by Category: Firefinder radar; 
Design Requirement (Numbers required): 204; 
All Equipment: Available: 209; 
Design Equipment[A]: Percent: 102; 
Available: 34; 
Percent: 17. 

Key Equipment Enablers by Category: Joint network node; 
Design Requirement (Numbers required): 2,713; 
All Equipment: Available: 1,495; 
Design Equipment[A]: Percent: 55; 
Available: 1,492; 
Percent: 55. 

Key Equipment Enablers by Category: Longrange advanced scout 
surveillance; 
Design Requirement (Numbers required): 3,508; 
All Equipment: Available: 2,695; 
Design Equipment[A]: Percent: 77; 
Available: 2,627; 
Percent: 75. 

Key Equipment Enablers by Category: Radios - high frequency; 
Design Requirement (Numbers required): 23,434; 
All Equipment: Available: 15,191; 
Design Equipment[A]: Percent: 65; 
Available: 10,634; 
Percent: 45. 

Key Equipment Enablers by Category: Radios - tactical; 
Design Requirement (Numbers required): 543,501; 
All Equipment: Available: 623,672; 
Design Equipment[A]: Percent: 115; 
Available: 205,153; 
Percent: 38. 

Key Equipment Enablers by Category: Tactical wheeled vehicles - light; 
Design Requirement (Numbers required): 153,960; 
All Equipment: Available: 154,341; 
Design Equipment[A]: Percent: 100; 
Available: 86,486; 
Percent: 56. 

Key Equipment Enablers by Category: Tactical wheeled vehicles - medium; 
Design Requirement (Numbers required): 87,305; 
All Equipment: Available: 102,206; 
Design Equipment[A]: Percent: 117; 
Available: 27,103; 
Percent: 31. 

Key Equipment Enablers by Category: Tactical wheeled vehicles - heavy; 
Design Requirement (Numbers required): 57,924; 
All Equipment: Available: 53,194; 
Design Equipment[A]: Percent: 92; 
Available: 39,139; 
Percent: 68. 

Key Equipment Enablers by Category: Trojan Spirit; 
Design Requirement (Numbers required): 388; 
All Equipment: Available: 345; 
Design Equipment[A]: Percent: 89; 
Available: 322; 
Percent: 83. 

Key Equipment Enablers by Category: Unmanned aerial vehicle - prophet; 
Design Requirement (Numbers required): 252; 
All Equipment: Available: 573; 
Design Equipment[A]: Percent: 227; 
Available: 153; 
Percent: 61. 

Key Equipment Enablers by Category: Unmanned aerial vehicle - small; 
Design Requirement (Numbers required): 2,679; 
All Equipment: Available: 1,644; 
Design Equipment[A]: Percent: 61; 
Available: 1,629; 
Percent: 61. 

Source: GAO analysis of Army data. 

Note: Data reflect equipment levels as of April 23, 2007.We did not 
conduct an analysis of the Army's ability to provide equipment to units 
either deploying, about to be deployed or returning from current 
operations. Our analysis also excluded equipment items that the Army 
authorizes as substitutes because we assessed the Army's progress 
obtaining modern equipment items. 

[A] Design equipment is more modern equipment. Some of the progress 
equipping the modular force is based on maintaining older equipment and 
while this may allow the Army to have the equipment it needs overall, 
the Army still has shortfalls for specific types of modern equipment. 

[End of table] 

Key Personnel Enabler Categories: 

We identified nine key personnel enabler categories. Within a category, 
we selected military occupational specialties that are critical to the 
modular force design. 

Ammunition Personnel: 

Ammunition personnel manage and maintain armament, missile and 
electronic systems, conventional and nuclear munitions and warheads and 
the detection, identification, rendering safe, recovery, or destruction 
of hazardous munitions. 

Explosive Ordnance Disposal Officer: 

The Explosive Ordnance Disposal Officer is responsible for operations 
that include the location, rendering safe, removal, disposal, and 
salvage of unexploded conventional, nuclear, biological, and chemical 
munitions. Explosive ordnance officers are assigned to modular units 
such as the headquarters units within a combat support brigade 
(maneuver enhancement). The Army's goal is to fill this occupational 
branch at 100 percent or higher. To meet staffing goals, the Army 
offers several incentives to captains, such as choice of occupational 
branch, duty station, civilian graduate education, military school or 
cash bonuses in exchange for 3 additional years of obligated service. 
The Army also offers similar options to pre-commissioned cadets in 
exchange for extending their initial service obligations and bonuses to 
recruit active duty Air Force and Navy officers to transfer to the 
Army. 

Explosive Ordnance Disposal Specialist (Enlisted): 

Explosive Ordnance Disposal Specialists locate, identify, render safe, 
and dispose of conventional, biological, chemical or nuclear ordnance 
or improvised explosive devices, weapons of mass destruction, and large 
vehicle bombs. They also conduct intelligence gathering operations of 
foreign ordnance. Explosive ordnance specialists are assigned to 
modular units such as the headquarters units within a combat support 
brigade (maneuver enhancement). The Army's goal is to fill this 
occupational specialty at 100 percent or higher. Current operations 
have increased the need for explosive ordnance disposal specialists, a 
need which has led to a shortfall for this occupational specialty. 
Shortages are also because a high level of prerequisites needed for 
personnel to qualify for this specialty, a high attrition rate 
experienced in training, and low retention of career personnel due to 
competition from the private sector. To meet staffing goals, the Army 
has given this specialty a high recruiting priority and offers its 
second-highest enlistment bonus to new recruits and retention bonuses 
to personnel who re-enlist. Personnel from overfilled occupational 
specialties are also encouraged to convert to this one without 
extending their service obligations, or they can receive a retention 
bonus by re-enlisting. 

Armor Personnel: 

Armor personnel direct, operate, and employ tanks, armored vehicles, 
support infantry, and related equipment. 

Cavalry Scout (Enlisted): 

The cavalry scout leads, serves, or assists as a member of a scout unit 
in reconnaissance, security, and other combat operations. More 
specifically, the cavalry scout operates and maintains scout vehicles 
and weapons and engages enemy armor with anti-armor weapons; serves as 
a member of observation and listening posts; gathers and reports 
information on terrain features and enemy strength; and collects data 
for the classification of routes, tunnels and bridges. Calvary scouts 
are assigned to modular units such as the headquarters units of 
battlefield surveillance brigades and the special troop battalion and 
combined arms battalions of heavy brigade teams. The Army's goal is to 
fill this occupational specialty at 100 percent or higher. To meet 
staffing goals, the Army offers enlistment bonuses to new recruits and 
retention bonuses to personnel who re-enlist. 

Artillery Personnel: 

Artillery personnel provide fire support to Army units through the 
employment of field artillery systems. These personnel control, direct 
and perform technical firing operations, and coordinate the efforts of 
multiple fire support assets. 

Field Artillery Firefinder Radar Operator (Enlisted): 

The field artillery Firefinder radar operator is responsible for 
operating or providing leadership in the operation of field artillery 
radar systems. Specific responsibilities include establishing and 
maintaining radio and wire communications, operating and maintaining 
Firefinder radars, and constructing fortifications and/or bunkers used 
during field artillery operations. Field artillery Firefinder radar 
operators are assigned to modular units such as the fires battalion of 
a fires brigade. The Army's goal is to fill this occupational specialty 
at 95 percent or higher. To accommodate growth in staffing needs for 
field artillery Firefinder radar operators, the Army has significantly 
increased its recruiting requirements and training capacity. To meet 
staffing goals, the Army has given this specialty a high recruiting 
priority and offers its second-highest enlistment bonus for new 
recruits and retention bonuses for personnel who re-enlist. Personnel 
from overfilled occupational specialties are also encouraged to convert 
to this one without extending their service obligations, or they can 
receive a retention bonus by re-enlisting. 

Civil Affairs Personnel: 

Civil Affairs personnel support the commander's relationship with civil 
authorities, the local populace, nongovernmental organizations, and 
international organizations. These personnel must possess critical 
skills associated with a specific region of the world, foreign language 
expertise, political-military awareness, and cross-cultural 
communications. 

Civil Affairs Officer: 

The civil affairs officer prepares economic, cultural, governmental and 
special functional studies, assessments, and estimates. These personnel 
also coordinate with, enhance, develop, establish, or control civil 
infrastructure in operational areas to support friendly operations. 
Additionally, they develop cross-cultural communicative and linguistic 
skills that facilitate interpersonal relationships in a host country 
environment. Civil affairs officers are assigned to modular units such 
as the headquarters unit of the combat support brigade (maneuver 
enhancement) and heavy brigade combat team. The Army's goal is to fill 
this occupational branch at 100 percent or higher. To meet staffing 
goals, the Army offers several incentives to captains, such as choice 
of occupational branch, duty station, civilian graduate education, 
military school, or cash bonus in exchange for 3 additional years of 
obligated service. The Army also offers similar options to pre- 
commissioned cadets in exchange for extending their initial service 
obligations and bonuses to recruit active duty Air Force and Navy 
officers to transfer to the Army. 

Civil Affairs Specialist (Enlisted): 

Civil affairs specialists identify critical requirements needed by 
local citizens in combat or crisis situations. They also locate civil 
resources to support military operations, mitigate non-combatant injury 
or incident, minimize civilian interference with military operations, 
facilitate humanitarian assistance activities, and establish and 
maintain communication with civilian aid agencies and organizations. 
Civil affairs specialists are assigned to modular units such as the 
headquarters unit of the maneuver enhancement brigade and heavy brigade 
combat team. The Army's goal is to fill this occupational specialty at 
100 percent or higher. The Army only recruits personnel to fill this 
occupational specialty from current servicemembers. To meet staffing 
goals, the Army offers retention bonuses to personnel who re-enlist and 
critical skills retention bonuses targeted to senior noncommissioned 
officers with 17 or more years of service who remain on active duty. 

Mechanical Maintenance Personnel: 

Mechanical maintenance personnel perform repair functions on Army 
weapons systems and equipment that support maneuver forces in their 
preparation for and conduct of operations across the entire operational 
spectrum. 

Light-Wheel Vehicle Mechanic (Enlisted): 

The Light-Wheel Vehicle Mechanic supervises and performs field, 
intermediate, and depot-level maintenance and recovery operations on 
light and heavy wheeled vehicles, associated trailers and material 
handling equipment. Light-wheel vehicle mechanics are assigned to 
modular units such as the forward support company within a fires 
brigade and the brigade support battalion within an infantry brigade 
team. The Army's goal is to fill this occupational specialty at 95 
percent or higher. To meet staffing goals, the Army designated this 
specialty a high recruiting priority, offers enlistment bonuses to new 
recruits and retention bonuses to personnel who re-enlist. Personnel 
from overfilled occupational specialties are also encouraged to convert 
to this one without extending their service obligations, or they can 
receive a retention bonus by re-enlisting. 

Military Intelligence Personnel: 

Military intelligence personnel provide commanders with all-source 
intelligence assessments and estimates at the tactical, operations, and 
strategic levels dealing with enemy capabilities, intentions, 
vulnerabilities, effects of terrain and weather on operations, and 
predict enemy courses of action. In particular, they collect 
intelligence assets; produce threat estimates; ensure proper 
dissemination of intelligence information; conduct interrogation 
operations of enemy prisoners of war; interpret imagery; and perform 
counterintelligence operations. 

Intelligence Analyst (Enlisted): 

The intelligence analyst supervises, performs or coordinates the 
collection, management, analysis, processing and dissemination of 
strategic and tactical intelligence. Furthermore the intelligence 
analyst processes incoming information, determines its significance and 
reliability, and performs analyses to determine changes in enemy 
capabilities, vulnerabilities, and probable courses of action. 
Intelligence analysts are assigned to modular units such as the 
headquarters unit of a heavy brigade combat team and the military 
intelligence battalion of the battlefield surveillance brigade. The 
Army's goal is to fill this occupational specialty at 95 percent or 
higher. The Army expects staffing needs for this occupational specialty 
to increase due to the conversion to the modular force. To meet 
staffing goals, the Army designated this specialty a high recruiting 
priority, offers enlistment bonuses to new recruits, retention bonuses 
to junior personnel who re-enlist and critical skills retention bonuses 
to senior non-commissioned officers who remain on active duty. 
Personnel from overfilled occupational specialties are also encouraged 
to convert to this one without extending their service obligations, or 
they can receive a retention bonus by re-enlisting. 

Human Intelligence Collector (Enlisted): 

Human intelligence collectors supervise and conduct interrogations and 
debriefings in English and foreign languages and prepare and edit 
tactical interrogation reports and intelligence information reports. 
Additionally, they translate and use captured enemy documents and open 
source foreign language publications in support of promoting peace, the 
resolution of conflict and the deterrence of war. Human intelligence 
collectors are assigned to modular units such as the headquarter unit 
of heavy brigade combat teams and the military intelligence battalion 
of the battlefield surveillance brigade. The Army's goal is to fill 
this occupational specialty at 100 percent or higher. The Army expects 
staffing needs for this occupational specialty to increase because of 
conversion to the modular force. However, the Army is challenged to 
increase training capacity for this occupational specialty because of 
the need for a one-to-one student-teacher ratio. To meet staffing 
goals, the Army has temporarily suspended foreign language requirements 
for this specialty, offers enlistment bonuses to new recruits, 
retention bonuses to junior personnel who re-enlist and critical skills 
retention bonuses to senior non-commissioned officers with 14 or more 
years of service who remain on active duty. Personnel from overfilled 
occupational specialties are also encouraged to convert to this one 
without extending their service obligations, or they can receive a 
retention bonus by re-enlisting. 

Unmanned Aerial Vehicle Operator (Enlisted): 

The unmanned aerial vehicle operator supervises or operates unmanned 
aerial vehicles, to include mission planning, mission sensor/payload 
operations, launching, remotely piloting and recovering the aerial 
vehicle. Unmanned aerial vehicle operators are assigned to modular 
units such as the special troops battalion of heavy and infantry 
brigade combat teams. The Army's goal is to fill this occupational 
specialty at 95 percent or higher. The Army expects staffing needs for 
this occupational specialty to increase because of the conversion to 
the modular force. To meet staffing goals, the Army offers enlistment 
bonuses for new recruits and retention bonuses to personnel who re- 
enlist, and is increasing its training capacity to meet increased 
staffing needs. 

Psychological Operations Personnel: 

Psychological operations personnel plan, conduct, and evaluate 
operations that convey selected information and indicators to foreign 
audiences to influence their emotions, motives, objective reasoning, 
and ultimately the behavior of foreign governments, organizations, 
groups, and individuals throughout the entire spectrum of conflict. 

Psychological Operations Officer: 

This officer commands or serves on the staff of psychological 
operations units. Specifically, these officers advise United States 
military and/or civilian agencies on the use, planning, conduct, and 
evaluation of psychological operations. Additionally, they inform and 
train foreign governments and militaries on psychological operations. 
The Army's goal is to fill this occupational branch at 100 percent or 
higher. To meet staffing goals, the Army offers several incentives to 
Captains, such as choice of occupational branch, duty station, civilian 
graduate education, military school, or cash bonus in exchange for 3 
additional years of obligated service. The Army also offers similar 
options to pre-commissioned cadets in exchange for extending their 
initial service obligations and bonuses to recruit active duty Air 
Force and Navy officers to transfer to the Army. 

Psychological Operations Specialist (Enlisted): 

The psychological operations specialist supervises, coordinates, and 
participates in the analysis, planning, production, and dissemination 
of tactical and strategic psychological operations. These personnel 
assist in the collection and reporting of psychological operation data; 
assist in analyzing and evaluating current intelligence to support 
psychological operations; conduct research on intended psychological 
operation targets; and assist in the delivery of psychological 
operations products. Psychological operations specialists are assigned 
to modular units such as the headquarters unit within brigade combat 
teams. The Army's goal is to fill this occupational specialty at 100 
percent or higher. To meet staffing goals, the Army has given this 
specialty a high recruiting priority, and offers enlistment bonuses to 
new recruits and retention bonuses to personnel who re-enlist. 
Personnel from overfilled occupational specialties are also encouraged 
to convert to this one without extending their service obligations, or 
they can receive a retention bonus by re-enlisting. 

Signal Corps Personnel: 

Signals personnel manage all facets of Army and designated Department 
of Defense automated, electronic, and communication assets. More 
specifically, Signal Corps personnel are involved in the planning, 
design, engineering, operations, logistics, and evaluation of 
information systems and networks. 

Signal Corps Officer: 

This officer directs and manages the installation, operation, 
networking and maintenance of signal equipment. Furthermore, the 
general signal officer advises commanders and staffs on signal 
requirements, capabilities and operations. Signal officers are assigned 
to modular units such as the headquarters and support company units 
within heavy brigade combat teams and the signal company within the 
battlefield surveillance brigade. The Army's goal is to fill this 
occupational branch at 100 percent or higher. To meet staffing goals, 
the Army offers several incentives to captains, such as choice of 
occupational branch, duty station, civilian graduate education, 
military school, or cash bonus in exchange for 3 additional years of 
obligated service. The Army also offers similar options to pre- 
commissioned cadets in exchange for extending their initial service 
obligations and bonuses to recruit active duty Air Force and Navy 
officers to transfer to the Army. 

Nodal Network Systems Operator-Maintainer (Enlisted): 

The nodal network systems operator-maintainer supervises, installs, 
operates and performs field level maintenance on Internet protocol 
based high-speed electronic nodal systems, such as the Joint Network 
Node; integrated network control centers; network management 
facilities; Communications Security devices; and other equipment 
associated with network operations. These personnel also perform 
network management functions in support of maintaining, troubleshooting 
and re-engineering of nodal assets as needed in support of operational 
requirements. Nodal network systems operator-maintainers are assigned 
to modular units such as the signal company within a battlefield 
surveillance brigade and the brigade support battalion within a heavy 
brigade combat team. The Army's goal is to fill this occupational 
specialty at 95 percent or higher. The Army created this occupational 
specialty in part because of the conversion of the modular force and is 
reclassifying personnel from the network switching systems operator- 
maintainer specialty to this one. To meet staffing goals, the Army 
offers enlistment bonuses to new recruits and retention bonuses to 
personnel who re-enlist. 

Satellite Communication Systems Operator-Maintainer (Enlisted): 

The satellite communication systems operator-maintainer supervises, 
installs, operates and maintains multichannel satellite communications 
ground terminals, systems, networks and associated equipment. Satellite 
communication systems operator-maintainer are assigned to modular units 
such as the special troop battalion within an infantry brigade combat 
team and the signal network support company within a fires brigade. The 
Army's goal is to fill this occupational specialty at 90 percent or 
higher. To meet staffing goals, the Army offers its highest enlistment 
bonus to new recruits, retention bonuses to personnel who re-enlist, 
and critical skills retention bonuses for senior enlisted personnel who 
remain on active duty. 

Transportation Corps Personnel: 

Transportation personnel are responsible for the management of all 
facets of transportation including the planning, operating, 
coordination, and evaluation of all methods of transportation. 

General Transportation Officer: 

The general transportation officer functions as a logistical unit 
commander or as a staff officer responsible for the functional 
planning, coordination, procurement and control of the movement of 
materiel, personnel or personal property on commercial and military 
transport; and the coordination of all facets of transportation 
pertaining to water, air, and land transport systems. General 
transportation officer are assigned to modular units such as the 
headquarters unit of a sustainment brigade. The Army's goal is to fill 
this occupational branch at 100 percent or higher. To meet staffing 
goals, the Army offers several incentives to captains, such as choice 
of occupational branch, duty station, civilian graduate education, 
military school, or cash bonus in exchange for 3 additional years of 
obligated service. The Army also offers similar options to pre- 
commissioned cadets in exchange for extending their initial service 
obligations and bonuses to recruit active duty Air Force and Navy 
officers to transfer to the Army. 

Motor Transport Operator (Enlisted): 

The motor transport operator supervises or operates wheeled vehicles to 
transport personnel and cargo in support of operational activities. 
Motor transport operators are assigned to modular units such as the 
headquarters unit of a sustainment brigade and the headquarters unit of 
a maneuver enhancement brigade. The Army's goal is to fill this 
occupational specialty at 95 percent or higher. To meet staffing goals, 
the Army has given this specialty a high recruiting priority, offers 
its highest enlistment bonus to new recruits, retention bonuses to 
junior personnel who re-enlist and critical skills retention bonuses 
for senior enlisted personnel with 19 to 23 years of service who remain 
on active duty. Personnel from overfilled occupational specialties are 
also encouraged to convert to this one without extending their service 
obligations, or they can receive a retention bonus by re-enlisting. 

Table 8 illustrates the percentage of active component Army personnel 
on hand or projected to be on hand at the authorized level in fiscal 
years 2007 and 2012 by key enlisted and officer career field enabler 
category. 

Table 8: Percentage of Active Army Enlisted and Officer Personnel On 
Hand by Career Field at Fiscal Year 2007 and 2012 Authorized Levels: 

Key enabler enlisted career field: Field artillery; 
Percent of authorized level - 2007 actual: 103; 
Percent of authorized level - 2012 projected: 96. 

Key enabler enlisted career field: Armor; 
Percent of authorized level - 2007 actual: 105; 
Percent of authorized level - 2012 projected: 98. 

Key enabler enlisted career field: Communication and information 
systems operation; 
Percent of authorized level - 2007 actual: 90; 
Percent of authorized level - 2012 projected: 92. 

Key enabler enlisted career field: Military intelligence; 
Percent of authorized level - 2007 actual: 89; 
Percent of authorized level - 2012 projected: 94. 

Key enabler enlisted career field: Psychological operations; 
Percent of authorized level - 2007 actual: 90; 
Percent of authorized level - 2012 projected: 101. 

Key enabler enlisted career field: Civil affairs; 
Percent of authorized level - 2007 actual: 143; 
Percent of authorized level - 2012 projected: 103. 

Key enabler enlisted career field: Mechanical maintenance; 
Percent of authorized level - 2007 actual: 102; 
Percent of authorized level - 2012 projected: 93. 

Key enabler enlisted career field: Transportation; 
Percent of authorized level - 2007 actual: 93; 
Percent of authorized level - 2012 projected: 93. 

Key enabler enlisted career field: Ammunition; 
Percent of authorized level - 2007 actual: 91; 
Percent of authorized level - 2012 projected: 94. 

Key enabler officer career field: Signal corps; 
Percent of authorized level - 2007 actual: 103; 
Percent of authorized level - 2012 projected: 100. 

Key enabler officer career field: Military intelligence; 
Percent of authorized level - 2007 actual: 94; 
Percent of authorized level - 2012 projected: 101. 

Key enabler officer career field: Psychological operations; 
Percent of authorized level - 2007 actual: 108; 
Percent of authorized level - 2012 projected: 101. 

Key enabler officer career field: Civil affairs; 
Percent of authorized level - 2007 actual: 107; 
Percent of authorized level - 2012 projected: 100. 

Key enabler officer career field: Transportation corps; 
Percent of authorized level - 2007 actual: 96; 
Percent of authorized level - 2012 projected: 101. 

Key enabler officer career field: Ammunition; 
Percent of authorized level - 2007 actual: 87; 
Percent of authorized level - 2012 projected: 101. 

Source: GAO analysis of Army data. 

Note: Data reflect personnel levels as of April 30, 2007. We did not 
conduct an analysis of the Army's ability to provide personnel to units 
either deploying, about to be deployed, or returning from current 
operations. 

[End of table] 

Table 9 illustrates the percentage of active component Army personnel 
on hand or projected to be on hand at the authorized level in fiscal 
year 2007 by key enabler enlisted and officer occupational specialty 
and rank. 

Table 9: Percentage of Active Army Enlisted and Officer Occupational 
Specialties at Fiscal Year 2007 Authorized Levels: 

Key enabler enlisted occupational specialties: Cavalry scout; 
Enlisted rank E1-E4 (private-specialist): 113; 
Enlisted rank E5 (sergeant): 104; 
Enlisted rank E6 (staff sergeant): 93. 

Key enabler enlisted occupational specialties: Civil affairs 
specialist; 
Enlisted rank E1-E4 (private-specialist): N/A[A]; 
Enlisted rank E5 (sergeant): N/A[A]; 
Enlisted rank E6 (staff sergeant): 100. 

Key enabler enlisted occupational specialties: Explosive ordnance 
disposal specialist; 
Enlisted rank E1-E4 (private-specialist): 123; 
Enlisted rank E5 (sergeant): 111; 
Enlisted rank E6 (staff sergeant): 29. 

Key enabler enlisted occupational specialties: Firefinder radar 
operator; 
Enlisted rank E1-E4 (private-specialist): 99; 
Enlisted rank E5 (sergeant): 106; 
Enlisted rank E6 (staff sergeant): 93. 

Key enabler enlisted occupational specialties: Human intelligence 
collector; 
Enlisted rank E1-E4 (private-specialist): 84; 
Enlisted rank E5 (sergeant): 105; 
Enlisted rank E6 (staff sergeant): 39. 

Key enabler enlisted occupational specialties: Light-wheel vehicle 
mechanic; 
Enlisted rank E1-E4 (private-specialist): 95; 
Enlisted rank E5 (sergeant): 104; 
Enlisted rank E6 (staff sergeant): 102. 

Key enabler enlisted occupational specialties: Military intelligence 
analyst; 
Enlisted rank E1-E4 (private-specialist): 107; 
Enlisted rank E5 (sergeant): 101; 
Enlisted rank E6 (staff sergeant): 67. 

Key enabler enlisted occupational specialties: Motor transport 
operator; 
Enlisted rank E1-E4 (private-specialist): 82; 
Enlisted rank E5 (sergeant): 105; 
Enlisted rank E6 (staff sergeant): 107. 

Key enabler enlisted occupational specialties: Network nodal operator- 
maintainer; 
Enlisted rank E1-E4 (private-specialist): 68; 
Enlisted rank E5 (sergeant): 75; 
Enlisted rank E6 (staff sergeant): 83. 

Key enabler enlisted occupational specialties: Psychological operations 
specialist; 
Enlisted rank E1-E4 (private-specialist): 73; 
Enlisted rank E5 (sergeant): 108; 
Enlisted rank E6 (staff sergeant): 105. 

Key enabler enlisted occupational specialties: Satellite communication 
system operator-maintainer; 
Enlisted rank E1-E4 (private-specialist): 80; 
Enlisted rank E5 (sergeant): 101; 
Enlisted rank E6 (staff sergeant): 99. 

Key enabler enlisted occupational specialties: Unmanned aerial vehicle 
operator; 
Enlisted rank E1-E4 (private-specialist): 104; 
Enlisted rank E5 (sergeant): 131; 
Enlisted rank E6 (staff sergeant): 109. 

Key enabler officer occupational specialties: Civil affairs officer; 
Enlisted rank E1-E4 (private-specialist): 101; 
Enlisted rank E5 (sergeant): 95; 
Enlisted rank E6 (staff sergeant): 144. 

Key enabler officer occupational specialties: Explosive ordnance 
disposal officer; 
Enlisted rank E1-E4 (private-specialist): 80; 
Enlisted rank E5 (sergeant): 119; 
Enlisted rank E6 (staff sergeant): 95. 

Key enabler officer occupational specialties: General signal corps 
officer; 
Enlisted rank E1-E4 (private-specialist): 105; 
Enlisted rank E5 (sergeant): 88; 
Enlisted rank E6 (staff sergeant): 119. 

Key enabler officer occupational specialties: Psychological operations 
officer; 
Enlisted rank E1-E4 (private-specialist): 151; 
Enlisted rank E5 (sergeant): 73; 
Enlisted rank E6 (staff sergeant): 134. 

Key enabler officer occupational specialties: Transportation officer; 
Enlisted rank E1-E4 (private-specialist): 99; 
Enlisted rank E5 (sergeant): 79; 
Enlisted rank E6 (staff sergeant): 94. 

Source: GAO analysis of Army data. 

Note: Data reflect personnel levels as of April 30, 2007. We did not 
conduct an analysis of the Army's ability to provide personnel to units 
either deploying, about to be deployed, or returning from current 
operations. 

[A] Active Army civil affairs specialist authorizations are only at the 
grade of E6 and above because of the level of training and experience 
required to perform the civil affairs specialist's duties and 
responsibilities. 

[End of table] 

Table 10 illustrates the percentage of active component Army personnel 
available or projected to be available at the design level in fiscal 
years 2007 and 2012 by key enlisted and officer career field enabler 
category. 

Table 10: Percentage of Active Army Enlisted and Officer Personnel 
Available by Career Field at Fiscal Year 2007 and 2012 Design Levels: 

Key enabler enlisted career field: Field artillery; 
Percent of design level - 2007 actual: 44; 
Percent of design level - 2012 projected: 47. 

Key enabler enlisted career field: Armor; 
Percent of design level - 2007 actual: 59; 
Percent of design level - 2012 projected: 61. 

Key enabler enlisted career field: Communication and information 
systems operation; 
Percent of design level - 2007 actual: 42; 
Percent of design level - 2012 projected: 41. 

Key enabler enlisted career field: Military intelligence; 
Percent of design level - 2007 actual: 61; 
Percent of design level - 2012 projected: 45. 

Key enabler enlisted career field: Psychological operations; 
Percent of design level - 2007 actual: 23; 
Percent of design level - 2012 projected: 18. 

Key enabler enlisted career field: Civil affairs; 
Percent of design level - 2007 actual: 4; 
Percent of design level - 2012 projected: 5. 

Key enabler enlisted career field: Mechanical maintenance; 
Percent of design level - 2007 actual: 38; 
Percent of design level - 2012 projected: 53. 

Key enabler enlisted career field: Transportation; 
Percent of design level - 2007 actual: 28; 
Percent of design level - 2012 projected: 28. 

Key enabler enlisted career field: Ammunition; 
Percent of design level 
- 2007 actual: 42; 
Percent of design level - 2012 projected: 55. 

Key enabler officer career field: Signal corps; 
Percent of design level - 2007 actual: 58; 
Percent of design level - 2012 projected: 52. 

Key enabler officer career field: Military intelligence; 
Percent of design level - 2007 actual: 50; 
Percent of design level - 2012 projected: 52. 

Key enabler officer career field: Psychological operations; 
Percent of design level - 2007 actual: 56; 
Percent of design level - 2012 projected: 43. 

Key enabler officer career field: Civil affairs; 
Percent of design level - 2007 actual: 17; 
Percent of design level - 2012 projected: 19. 

Key enabler officer career field: Transportation corps; 
Percent of design level - 2007 actual: 31; 
Percent of design level - 2012 projected: 28. 

Key enabler officer career field: Ammunition; 
Percent of design level 
- 2007 actual: 69; 
Percent of design level - 2012 projected: 101. 

Source: GAO analysis of Army data. 

Note: Data reflect personnel levels as of April 30, 2007. We did not 
conduct an analysis of the Army's ability to provide personnel to units 
either deploying, about to be deployed, or returning from current 
operations. 

[End of table] 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Scope and Methodology: 

To assess the Army's plan to guide its efforts to equip and staff the 
modular force, we obtained and analyzed relevant Army plans and reports 
to Congress for equipping and staffing the modular force. Because the 
Army lacks a mechanism to measure progress equipping and staffing the 
modular force, we developed in conjunction with the Army an analysis of 
key equipment and personnel enablers of the modular force. Based on our 
review of key Army modularity studies and reports, we defined key 
enablers as those pieces of equipment or personnel that are required 
for the organization to function as planned, providing the modular 
design with equal or increased capabilities to the previous divisional 
structure in areas such as a unit's firepower, survivability, and 
intelligence-surveillance-reconnaissance performance. To develop a 
preliminary list of key equipment and personnel enablers, we reviewed 
key Army modularity reports using this definition and received input 
from Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), which is responsible 
for the design and evaluation of modular units, and Army Combined Arms 
Support Command. In addition, our selection methodology required that 
equipment and personnel must be assigned to at least two types of 
modular units (brigade combat teams, multifunctional support brigades, 
or functional support brigades) to qualify as a key enabler. We 
excluded certain types of equipment that are important to brigade 
combat teams, such as Abrams and Bradley tanks, because they are 
present in both the new brigade designs as well as the previous 
divisional structure. After we identified a preliminary list of key 
enablers, we submitted the list to the Headquarters, Department of the 
Army, for official input and held a follow-up discussion with an Army 
official to discuss the Army's responses. Based on our analysis and 
this discussion, we developed a final list of key equipment and 
personnel enablers of the modular force (See app. I for a list of key 
equipment and personnel enablers of the modular force). An Army 
procurement official identified the specific equipment line items 
associated with each of the key equipment enablers. Our analysis of key 
equipment enablers compares total Army (active, National Guard, and 
Reserve) equipment design requirements and authorizations for the 
operating and institutional forces against total Army on-hand 
quantities in fiscal year 2007 and planned equipment deliveries by 
fiscal year 2012.[Footnote 34] However, our analysis excludes planned 
procurements funded by emergency supplemental requests for fiscal year 
2008 because this data had not been entered into the Army equipment 
databases at the time of our request. Our analysis of key personnel 
enablers compares active Army personnel design requirements and 
authorizations for the operating and institutional forces against 
active Army on-hand personnel strength in fiscal year 2007 and 
projected personnel strength for fiscal year 2012. [Footnote 35] This 
analysis excludes about 13 percent of authorized end strength for the 
modular force because of military personnel who are in the transient, 
transfers, holdees, students category, according to Army personnel 
officials. The Army's fiscal year 2007 to 2012 equipment and personnel 
plans were the most recent data available to us when we developed this 
analysis. Data retrieved from Army databases reflect equipment levels 
as of April 23, 2007, and personnel levels as of April 30, 2007. We 
shared the data with Department of the Army officials and provided them 
an opportunity to identify actions the Army intends to take to address 
equipment and personnel shortfalls. To assess the reliability of 
relevant Army equipment and personnel databases, we discussed data 
quality control procedures with Army officials responsible for managing 
the relevant equipment and personnel databases. Although we did not 
independently test the data electronically, we determined the data were 
sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. The Army 
provided updated data on the status of the Army's equipment as compared 
to the design requirement as of June 29, 2008. We did not assess the 
reliability of this 2008 data. However, the 2008 data were generally 
consistent with the data we analyzed in 2007. 

To assess the extent to which the Army has developed a comprehensive 
plan to test and evaluate the design of the modular force, we analyzed 
TRADOC's modular force assessment process, including documents related 
to the doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leadership, 
personnel, and facilities evaluations, and the use of modular force 
observations teams and lessons learned from ongoing operations. We also 
met with officials at TRADOC analysis centers and subject-matter 
experts at Army proponents and centers, for example, the Signal Center, 
to understand their efforts to develop and assess the design of the 
modular force. Further, we visited the Future Force Integration 
Directorate and the Army Evaluation Task Force at Fort Bliss to examine 
the Army approach to assessing the future modular force. In addition, 
we also assessed the Army's plans to respond to recommendations from 
prior GAO work related to the evaluation of the modular force across 
the full-spectrum of conflict. Finally, we examined documents related 
to the combatant commanders' evaluation of the modular units assigned 
to the commands. 

To assess the extent to which the Army has developed a comprehensive 
and integrated plan to fund its transformation and expansion of the 
modular force, we reviewed DOD's fiscal years 2007 to 2009 base budget 
requests and fiscal years 2007 and 2008 supplemental Global War on 
Terror requests and met with Army budget officials. We also assessed 
the Army's plans to respond to recommendations from prior GAO work 
related to Army modular force and Grow the Force funding plans. 

We visited or contacted the following organizations during our review: 

Department of Defense: 

* Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition Technology and 
Logistics), Pentagon, Virginia: 

* Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), Pentagon, 
Virginia: 

* Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Personnel and Readiness), 
Pentagon, Virginia: 

* Office of the Director (Program Analysis and Evaluation), Pentagon, 
Virginia: 

* Office of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Force Structure, 
Resources, and Assessment Directorate (J-8), Pentagon, Virginia: 

Department of the Army: 

* Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (G-1), Pentagon, 
Virginia: 

* Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics (G-4), Pentagon, 
Virginia: 

* Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans (G-3/5/ 
7), Pentagon, Virginia: 

* Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Programs (G-8), Pentagon, 
Virginia: 

* Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Cost and 
Economics, Pentagon, Virginia: 

* Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and 
Reserve Affairs, Pentagon, Virginia: 

* Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army, Financial Management 
and Comptroller, Pentagon, Virginia: 

* Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation Management, 
Pentagon, Virginia: 

* Army Budget Office, Pentagon, Virginia: 

* U.S. Army Force Management Support Agency, Fort Belvoir, Virginia: 

* National Guard Bureau, Arlington, Virginia: 

* U.S. Army Reserve Command, Fort McPherson, Georgia: 

* U.S. Army Forces Command, Fort McPherson, Georgia: 

* U.S. Army Human Resources Command, Alexandria, Virginia: 

* U.S. Army Materiel Command, Fort Belvoir, Virginia: 

* U.S. Army Tank-automotive and Armaments Command, Warren, Michigan: 

* U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Fort Monroe, Virginia: 

* Major Subordinate Organizations: 

-Army Capabilities Integration Center, Fort Monroe, Virginia: 

* Future Force Integration Directorate, Fort Bliss, Texas: 

-Combined Arms Support Command, Fort Lee, Virginia: 

-Combined Arms Center, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: 

* Current Force Integration Directorate, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: 

* -Center for Army Lessons Learned, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: 

-TRADOC Analysis Centers: Fort Leavenworth, Kansas; White Sands Missile 
Range, New Mexico; Fort Lee, Virginia: 

* U.S. Army Proponents: 

-Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia: 

-Signals Center, Fort Gordon, Georgia: 

-Intelligence Center and Office Chief of Military Intelligence, Fort 
Huachuca, Arizona: 

* U.S. Army Schools: 

-U.S. Army Infantry School, Fort Benning, Georgia: 

-U.S. Army Signals School, Fort Gordon, Georgia: 

-U.S. Army Intelligence School, Fort Huachuca, Arizona: 

-U.S. Army Quartermaster School, Fort Lee, Virginia: 

Other Government Agencies: 

* Congressional Budget Office, Washington, D.C. 

* Congressional Research Service, Washington, D.C. 

We conducted this performance audit from April 2007 to September 2008 
in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 
Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 
conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: Comments from the Department of Defense: 

Office Of The Under Secretary Of Defense: 
3000 Defense Pentagon: 
Washington, DC 20301-3000: 

Acquisition Technology And Logistics: 

October 10, 2008: 

Mr. John H. Pendleton: 
Director, Defense Capabilities and Management: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, N.W.: 
Washington, DC 20548: 

Dear Mr. Pendleton:

This is the Department of Defense (DoD) response to the GAO draft 
report. "Force Structure: The Army Needs a Results-Oriented Plan to 
Equip and Staff Modular Forces and a Thorough Assessment of Force 
Capabilities," dated September 5, 2008 (GAO Code 351007/GAO-08-1066). 
Detailed comments on the report recommendations are enclosed. 

The Department concurs with two of the draft report's recommendations, 
non- concurs with one, and partially concurs with the other. The 
rationales for our position are included in the enclosure. 

We appreciate the opportunity to comment on the draft report. My point 
of contact for this effort is Ms. Anne Swanek, PSA/LW&M, 
Anne.Swanek@osd.mil, (703) 693-9879. 

Sincerely,

Signed by: 

David G. Ahern: 
Director: 
Portfolio Systems Acquisition: 

Enclosure: 
As stated: 

GAO Draft Report – Dated September 5, 2008 GAO Code 351007/GAO-08-1066: 

"Force Structure: The Army Needs a Results-Oriented Plan to Equip and 
Staff Modular Forces and a Thorough Assessment of Force Capabilities":  

Department Of Defense Comments To The Recommendations: 

Recommendation 1: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Secretary of the Army to develop and report to Congress a 
results-oriented plan that provides detailed information on the Army's 
progress in providing the modular force with key equipment and 
personnel enablers. The plan should show actual status and planned 
milestones through 2019 for each type of key equipment and personnel, 
including: 
* goals for on-hand equipment and personnel levels at the end of each 
fiscal year; 
* projected on-hand equipment and personnel levels at the end of each 
fiscal year, including planned annual investments and quantities of 
equipment expected to be procured or repaired, as well as key 
assumptions underlying the Army's plans; and: 
* an assessment of interim progress toward meeting overall Army 
requirements and the risks associated with any shortfalls. 

DOD Response: Non-Concur. Army Modularity is a strategy for having 
interchangeable units to support operations. It is not a program for 
equipping, manning, or modernizing the force that requires a plan 
separate from the Army's overall equipping and manning plans. The 
Department's budget, yearly acquisition reporting, and Congressionally 
required reporting such as the annual Army Report on Modularity provide 
information on the status and plans for equipping and manning the 
force. The Army management of equipment and personnel are tied to the 
Army's force generation model, growth of the Army, appropriated budget 
requests, and war time demands. The numbers and types of modular 
brigades, as well as the general manning and equipping needs for each 
type of brigade have been established and are continuously assessed to 
keep pace with the changing operational environment. This, in 
conjunction with unit readiness assessments, acquisition production 
plans, and strategic force analysis, provides the Department with 
adequate plans to inform capability and resourcing decisions. Projected 
on- hand equipment and personnel manning levels are forecasted semi-
annually by the Army. Detailing yearly goals and projections for on-
hand equipment and personnel is highly variable, given fluctuations 
attributed to unit position in the Army Force Generation cycle, 
equipment repair and reset plans, and planned modernization 
acquisitions. 

The Army's year to year equipping, staffing, and readiness plans, for 
all brigades, are considered Department resourcing priorities and are 
based on: (1) deployment needs to fulfill missions; (2) existing Army 
equipment and personnel; (3) planned upgrades and expansions; and (4) 
emerging needs. 

Recommendation 2: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Secretary of the Army to develop a plan, including 
timelines, for completing doctrine for modular support forces. 

DOD Response: Concur. The Army released an updated Field Manual 3-0, 
"Operations," on February 1, 2008. This includes the doctrine for the 
Modular Force and the support forces. 

Recommendation 3: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Secretary of the Army to establish an organizational focal 
point to ensure that integrated assessments of modular support units' 
designs are performed across the doctrine, organization, training, 
materiel, leadership, personnel, and facilities (DOTMLPF) domains. 

DOD Response: Concur. Army General Order #3 identifies the Deputy Chief 
of Staff, G-3/5/7, as the focal point for organization, integration, 
decision-making, and execution of the spectrum of activities 
encompassing requirements definition, force development, force 
integration, force structuring, combat development, training 
development, resourcing, and prioritization. These responsibilities 
include being the Department of the Army organizational focal point to 
ensure that integrated assessments of modular support units' designs 
are performed across the doctrine, organization, training, materiel, 
leadership, personnel, and facilities (DOTLMPF) domains. The Army 
Training and Doctrine Command and the Army Test and Evaluation Command 
support G-3/5/7 in this effort. 

Recommendation 4: The GAO recommends that the Secretary of Defense 
direct the Secretary of the Army to assess the capabilities of the 
modular force based on the amount and type of authorized equipment and 
personnel to identify capability shortfalls between authorized and 
design levels and take steps to revise authorized levels where 
appropriate. 

DOD Response: Partially concur. The Army assesses capabilities of the 
force in many ways. Key elements in unit capability assessment are the 
training of the brigades and the unit status reports. Additionally, the 
modular brigades are assessed based on the missions assigned and the 
ability to accomplish these missions given personnel, training, and 
equipment available. Unit readiness assessments frame both general unit 
readiness and readiness relative to a specific mission. Equipment 
readiness is a portion of this assessment. Due to the fact the Army is 
currently assessing its capabilities, additional Secretary of Defense 
direction is not required at this time.

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: 

John H. Pendleton (404) 679-1816 or pendletonj@gao.gov: 

Acknowledgments: 

In addition to the contact named above, Gwendolyn Jaffe, Assistant 
Director; Margaret Morgan, Assistant Director; Kelly Baumgartner; 
Hillary Benedict; Herbert Bowsher; Kurt Burgeson; Grace Coleman; 
Stephen Faherty; Barbara Gannon; David Hubbell; Jim Melton; Steve 
Pruitt; Steven Rabinowitz; Terry Richardson; Kathryn Smith; Karen 
Thornton; and J. Andrew Walker made major contributions to this report. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] In a 2004 study, the Army's Task Force Modularity Integrated 
Analysis Report identified a set of key enablers, including battle 
command, unmanned aerial vehicles, and intelligence-surveillance- 
reconnaissance capabilities that are required for modular brigade 
combat teams to function as planned. 

[2] See prior GAO work: GAO, Restructuring and Rebuilding the Army Will 
Cost Billions of Dollars for Equipment, but the Total Cost Is 
Uncertain, GAO-08-669T (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 10, 2008); GAO, Force 
Structure: Better Management Controls Are Needed to Oversee the Army's 
Modular Force and Expansion Initiatives and Improve Accountability for 
Results, GAO-08-145 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 14, 2007); and GAO, Force 
Structure: Need for Greater Transparency for the Army's Grow the Force 
Initiative Funding Plan, GAO-08-354R (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 18, 2008). 

[3] Pub. L. No. 109-364, § 323(d). 

[4] We grouped key enablers into broad equipment and personnel 
categories that include more specific equipment items and military 
occupational specialties that are critical to the modular force design. 
For example, "tactical radios" is a key equipment enabler category that 
includes multiple variants of the Single Channel Ground and Airborne 
Radio System. Similarly, "signals" is a key personnel enabler category 
that includes two occupational specialties: nodal network operator/ 
maintainer and satellite communication systems operator/maintainer. 

[5] GAO-08-145. 

[6] The full spectrum of conflict includes counter-insurgency, 
stability, and major combat operations. 

[7] GAO-08-354R. 

[8] Annual Report to Congress on the Progress of Army Modular Force 
Initiative, Reset, and Army Prepositioned Stocks, February 27, 2008, 
issued pursuant to Pub. L. No. 109-364, § 323(c). 

[9] Based on our review of key Army modularity reports and input from 
the Department of the Army, we defined key enablers as those pieces of 
equipment or personnel that are required for the organization to 
function as planned and that provide the modular design with equal or 
increased capabilities--such as a unit's firepower, survivability, and 
intelligence-surveillance-reconnaissance--compared with the previous 
divisional structure. 

[10] GAO-08-145. 

[11] GAO, Results-Oriented Cultures: Implementation Steps to Assist 
Mergers and Organizational Transformations, GAO-03-669 (Washington, 
D.C.: July 2, 2003) and Defense Transformation: Clear Leadership, 
Accountability, and Management Tools Are Needed to Enhance DOD's 
Efforts to Transform Military Capabilities, GAO-05-70 (Washington, 
D.C.: Dec. 17, 2004). 

[12] GAO-08-145. 

[13] Annual Report to Congress on the Progress of Army Modular Force 
Initiative, Reset, and Army Prepositioned Stocks, issued pursuant to 
Pub. L. No. 109-364, § 323(c)(4). 

[14] These assets are included in the equipment available total in 2007 
and the projected equipment total in 2012. 

[15] We have recently reported that between 2003 and 2007 the Army 
procured more than 240,000 Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio 
Systems than it had planned to meet the requirements of current 
operation using mostly supplemental funds. See GAO, Defense 
Acquisition: Department of Defense Needs Framework for Balancing 
Investments in Tactical Radios, GAO-08-877 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 15, 
2008). 

[16] The Army had not fully identified the types of units it intended 
to build as part of the Grow the Force initiative at the time the 
equipment and personnel data were retrieved. As a result, the 
additional equipment and personnel requirements were not included in 
Army databases. 

[17] GAO, Military Personnel: DOD Needs to Provide a Better Link 
Between Its Defense Strategy and Military Personnel Requirements, GAO-
07-397T (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 30, 2007). 

[18] Army equipment undergoing reset is included in the Army's 
projections of available equipment on hand through fiscal year 2012. 
Further information related to Army reset challenges can be found in 
GAO, Defense Logistics: Army and Marine Corps Cannot Be Assured That 
Equipment Strategies Will Sustain Equipment Availability While Meeting 
Ongoing Operational Requirements, GAO-07-814 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 
19, 2007); and GAO, Defense Logistics: Preliminary Observations on the 
Army's Implementation of its Equipment Reset Strategies, GAO-07-439R 
(Washington, D.C.: Jan. 31, 2007). 

[19] GAO, Military Personnel: DOD Needs Plan to Address Enlisted 
Personnel Recruitment and Retention Challenges, GAO-06-134 (Washington, 
D.C.: Nov. 17, 2005). 

[20] GAO, Military Personnel: Strategic Plan Needed to Address Army's 
Emerging Accession and Retention Challenges, GAO-07-224 (Washington, 
D.C.: Jan. 19, 2007). 

[21] The endstrength of the Army is composed of uniformed personnel in 
its operational or warfighting units, those assigned to infrastructure 
organizations, and personnel who are in training or hospitals and are 
unavailable for assignment to either operating forces or to meet 
infrastructure needs. 

[22] The Army has created special Warrior Transition Units to provide 
assistance to wounded warriors. 

[23] GAO, Future Years Defense Program: Actions Needed to Improve 
Transparency of DOD's Projected Resource Needs, GAO-04-514 (Washington, 
D.C.: May 7, 2004). 

[24] GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon 
Programs, GAO-08-467SP (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 2008). 

[25] GAO, 21ST Century Challenges: Reexamining the Base of the Federal 
Government, GAO-05-325SP (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 1, 2005). 

[26] TRADOC is responsible for analyzing whether modular combat and 
support units will be capable of successfully conducting operations 
required across the full spectrum of conflict. 

[27] GAO-05-325SP. 

[28] To manage within expected budgets and what it deems acceptable 
levels of risk, the Army authorizes equipment and personnel levels that 
may be significantly lower than the design requirement. Table 1 of this 
report describes our analysis of projected shortfalls of enablers 
against the authorized levels. 

[29] The Chief of Staff of the Army identified the need for the Army 
Modularity Task Force to design brigade combat teams to have the 
ability to rapidly take action at the tactical and operational level, 
which relies in part on improving the battlefield commander's 
capabilities to assess the situation on the battlefield. 

[30] Key enablers included the following equipment items: the all 
source analysis system, battle command systems, unmanned aerial 
vehicles, radars, the fire support, and the long-range advanced scout 
surveillance system. 

[31] The Army's objective is for the new modular combat brigade, which 
will include about 3,000 to 4,000 personnel, to have at least the same 
combat capability as a brigade under the division-based force, which 
ranged from 3,000 to 5,000 personnel. 

[32] We included in our analysis one key enabler category--the Fire 
Support Sensor System--that did not meet our selection criteria because 
this equipment system is only assigned to one of the three types of 
modular units (brigade combat team). We included this key equipment 
enabler category because a 2004 Army Task Force Modularity study 
specifically identified the need for units at all levels to have sensor 
equipment, which this enabler provides. In particular, this enabler 
category includes the M707 Knight, which the 2004 Army report 
specifically identified as a "key enabler" of the modular force. An 
Army official subsequently concurred that this enabler category is 
critical to the modular force. 

[33] The Analysis and Control Element is a sub-system of the All Source 
Analysis System that provides commanders above the brigade level with 
intelligence processing, analysis and dissemination capability. 

[34] We obtained data on Army equipment design requirements from the 
Army Force Management System database, Army authorized equipment levels 
from the Army Structure and Composition System database, Army on-hand 
equipment levels from Logistics Information Warehouse and projected 
deliveries from the Army EQUIPFOR Module and Force Developmental 
Investment Information System databases. 

[35] We obtained data on Army personnel design requirements from the 
Army Force Management System database, Army authorized personnel levels 
from the Army Personnel Authorization Module database, Army on-hand 
personnel levels from the Total Army Personnel Database and projected 
personnel levels from the Active Army Strength Forecaster. 

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