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Report to the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, House of 
Representatives: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 

GAO: 

September 2008: 

USAID Acquisition And Assistance: 

Actions Needed to Develop and Implement a Strategic Workforce Plan: 

USAID Acquisition and Assistance: 

GAO-08-1059: 

GAO Highlights: 

Highlights of GAO-08-1059, a report to the Committee on Oversight and 
Government Reform, House of Representatives. 

Why GAO Did This Study: 

The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) over the years 
has shifted from conducting its own activities to managing acquisition 
and assistance (A&A) instruments—contracts, grants, and cooperative 
agreements—awarded to and implemented by mainly nongovernmental 
entities. For fiscal years 2002 through 2007, USAID’s A&A obligations 
doubled from about $5 billion to $10 billion. A&A staff—contracting 
officers (CO) and A&A specialists—are primarily responsible for 
managing A&A instruments. GAO was asked to examine (1) USAID’s capacity 
to develop and implement a strategic A&A workforce plan and (2) the 
extent to which USAID has implemented a mechanism to evaluate its A&A 
function. GAO analyzed USAID documents and data, interviewed officials, 
visited missions in seven countries, and administered a survey to A&A 
staff. 

What GAO Found: 

USAID lacks the capacity to develop and implement a strategic A&A 
workforce plan because it is missing two key elements: (1) sufficiently 
reliable and up-to-date data on its overseas A&A staff levels and (2) 
comprehensive information on the competencies of its overseas A&A 
staff. Data on the number of overseas A&A specialists collected by two 
USAID offices—the Office of Acquisition and Assistance (OAA) and the 
Office of Human Resources (OHR)—are unreliable or out of date. GAO 
found significant discrepancies between these offices’ data sets, and 
officials acknowledged that their A&A staff level data are neither 
reliable nor up-to-date. In addition, USAID has not collected 
comprehensive competency information on its overseas A&A specialists. 
GAO’s model of strategic human capital planning notes the importance of 
these data in developing a strategic A&A workforce plan that could 
enable the agency to better match staff levels to changing workloads. 
At the missions GAO visited, GAO found that the numbers and 
competencies of A&A staff did not match A&A workloads. The number of 
A&A staff with the necessary competencies was less than adequate at 
some missions, while at others it was more than adequate, according to 
agency officials. For example, officials at the mission in Mali said 
they have delayed time-sensitive projects because key A&A staff were 
not available when needed to approve contracts, while officials at the 
mission in Indonesia said the current number of A&A staff may be more 
than adequate. Most of the A&A survey respondents overseas also 
reported difficulty in altering staffing patterns to meet A&A workload 
demands. Although USAID has made some efforts to address its A&A 
workforce issues, these efforts do not constitute a strategic A&A 
workforce plan that takes into account the entire A&A workforce. 
Without accurate and reliable A&A staff data, USAID does not have 
adequate information to address current workload imbalances. 

USAID has not implemented an evaluation mechanism to provide oversight 
of its A&A function. OAA’s Evaluation Division is responsible for 
providing oversight to ensure that A&A operations follow USAID 
policies, primarily by assessing the agency’s A&A operations worldwide. 
However, for fiscal years 2003 through 2005, it conducted on-site 
evaluations at only 9 of its targeted 85 missions. In fiscal year 2007, 
the Evaluation Division developed a new evaluation mechanism that is 
expected to use scorecard evaluations, in which COs self-assess their 
A&A operations, and a risk-based approach to determine locations for 
further on-site visits. The division has completed piloting these 
scorecard evaluations at four missions and identified weaknesses in A&A 
operations. For example, the division found that 1 mission lacked 
resources to adequately monitor contractor performance. The division’s 
goal is to implement this evaluation mechanism, including on-site 
visits to at least 5 missions, within 2 years. However, agency 
officials informed GAO that the Evaluation Division currently does not 
have the staff level needed to fully implement this evaluation 
mechanism. Without implementing the evaluation mechanism, USAID cannot 
certify the overall adequacy and effectiveness of management controls 
for the A&A function. 

What GAO Recommends: 

GAO recommends that the Administrator of USAID develop and implement a 
strategic A&A workforce plan that matches resources to priority needs, 
such as the evaluation of the A&A function. Specifically, GAO 
recommends that the strategic A&A workforce plan includes a process to 
collect, analyze, and maintain sufficiently reliable and up-to-date 
data on USAID’s A&A staff levels, and comprehensive information on the 
competencies of the A&A staff. GAO received written comments from USAID 
acknowledging that improvements are needed in the areas recommended. 

To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on 
[http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-08-1059]. For more information, 
contact Thomas Melito at (202) 512-9601 or melitot@gao.gov. 

[End of section] 

Contents: 

Letter1: 

Results in Brief: 

Background: 

USAID Lacks Human Capital Data Needed for a Strategic A&A Workforce 
Plan That Could Help Address Its Overseas Workload Imbalances: 

USAID Has Not Implemented the Evaluation Mechanism of Its A&A Function: 

Conclusions: 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

Appendix II: Overseas Locations with Authorized USAID Contracting 
Officer Presence as of July 2008: 

Appendix III: Comments from the U.S. Agency for International 
Development: 

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

Table: 

Table 1: Overseas Locations with Authorized USAID Contracting Officers: 

Figure: 

Figure 1: Total A&A Obligations Managed by OAA Headquarters and 
Overseas Missions, Fiscal Years 2002 through 2007: 

Abbreviations: 

A&A:acquisition and assistance: 

CO: contracting officer: 

CTO: cognizant technical officer: 

GLAAS: Global Acquisition and Assistance System: 

NGO: nongovernmental organization: 

OAA: Office of Acquisition and Assistance: 

OHR: Office of Human Resources: 

OIG: Office of Inspector General: 

USAID: U.S. Agency for International Development: 

United States Government Accountability Office: 

Washington, DC 20548: 

September 26, 2008: 

The Honorable Henry A. Waxman: 
Chairman: 
The Honorable Tom Davis: 
Ranking Member: 
Committee on Oversight and Government Reform: 
House of Representatives: 

The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) is primarily 
responsible for managing U.S. humanitarian and development assistance 
efforts worldwide. Over the last few decades, as the U.S. government 
has increasingly come to rely on the private sector to perform various 
functions, USAID has shifted from conducting its own activities to 
managing acquisition and assistance (A&A) instruments,[Footnote 1] 
which are awarded to and implemented by mainly nongovernmental 
organizations (NGO).[Footnote 2] For fiscal years 2002 through 2007, 
USAID's total annual A&A instruments increased from about 6,000 to 
about 11,000, while obligations for the instruments doubled from about 
$5 billion to about $10 billion. USAID staff are responsible for 
monitoring the activities of A&A recipients to provide reasonable 
assurance that the funds provided are used in accordance with 
applicable regulations, policies, and sound business 
practices.[Footnote 3] Effective oversight within the agency is key to 
ensuring that USAID staff are carrying out their responsibilities. 

USAID's A&A staff, including contracting officers (CO) assisted by A&A 
specialists,[Footnote 4] have primary responsibility for managing A&A 
instruments. In headquarters, these staff are part of USAID's Office of 
Acquisition and Assistance (OAA); abroad, they are part of USAID's 
missions. Cognizant technical officers (CTO), who work in USAID 
functional or geographic bureaus or overseas missions,[Footnote 5] also 
design and manage assistance activities. They also share some of the 
responsibility of managing A&A instruments.[Footnote 6] 

Several GAO and USAID Office of Inspector General (OIG) reports have 
emphasized the importance of strategic workforce planning to ensure 
that an agency's workforce is adequately supporting the agency's 
mission.[Footnote 7] For example, a strategic workforce plan should 
include a definition of the critical skills and competencies needed to 
meet the agency's strategic program goals, and top management should 
ensure that the agency has sufficient financial and staff resources to 
accomplish these goals. Within USAID, the Office of Human Resources 
(OHR) is the primary office that defines and manages the agency's 
workforce planning process, including managing the human resources 
databases and directing the workforce planning program. 

You asked us to assess USAID's management of its A&A function.[Footnote 
8] Specifically, we examined (1) USAID's capacity to develop and 
implement a strategic A&A workforce plan and (2) the extent to which 
USAID has implemented a mechanism to evaluate its A&A function. 

To address these objectives, we focused on USAID's administration of 
the A&A process. We analyzed USAID's staffing, planning, workload, 
strategy, training, and agency evaluation documents related to the A&A 
function. We also reviewed assessments of USAID A&A workforce and 
evaluation efforts, including prior GAO and USAID OIG reports. In 
addition, we reviewed GAO's Key Principles for Effective Strategic 
Workforce Planning,[Footnote 9] and Standards for Internal Controls in 
the Federal Government.[Footnote 10] We conducted audit work at USAID 
headquarters in Washington, D.C., as well as at missions in Cambodia, 
Indonesia, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz Republic, Mali, Peru, and Thailand. 
We selected these countries to obtain geographic diversity and ensure 
representation of various A&A processes and organizational structures 
for the A&A function. We met with USAID officials at all of these 
locations, and officials from organizations that implement USAID 
activities under A&A instruments in some of the locations. Furthermore, 
to obtain the views of USAID staff with key A&A responsibilities, we 
administered a survey to all USAID COs in headquarters and overseas, as 
well as A&A specialists in headquarters. We received a response rate of 
95 percent--150 respondents out of a total of 158. Given the high 
response rate and no indications of nonresponse bias, we considered 
estimates from this survey to be generalizable to the population 
surveyed. 

We conducted this performance audit from February 2007 to September 
2008 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 
standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit 
to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable 
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 
We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for 
our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. Appendix I 
contains a more detailed description of our scope and methodology. 

Results in Brief: 

USAID lacks the capacity to develop and implement a strategic A&A 
workforce plan because it is missing two key elements: (1) sufficiently 
reliable and up-to-date data on its overseas A&A staff levels and (2) 
comprehensive information on the competencies of its overseas A&A 
staff. Although two offices within USAID--the Office of Acquisition and 
Assistance (OAA) and the Office of Human Resources (OHR)--have 
separately collected A&A staffing data, the data on the number of 
overseas A&A specialists are either unreliable or out of date. We found 
significant discrepancies between OAA's and OHR's end of fiscal year 
2005 overseas A&A staff level data (the most current data made 
available to us by OAA). Agency officials also acknowledged that the 
agency does not systematically collect reliable and up-to-date A&A 
staff level data. In addition, USAID has not collected information on 
the competencies, including knowledge, skills, abilities, and 
experience levels, of its overseas A&A specialists. GAO's model of 
strategic human capital planning notes the importance of these data in 
developing a strategic A&A workforce plan that could enable the agency 
to better match staff levels to changing workloads. During fieldwork, 
we found that the numbers and competencies of A&A staff did not match 
A&A workloads. Agency officials at some missions told us they did not 
receive adequate and timely A&A support at times--in part because the 
numbers of A&A staff were insufficient or because the A&A staff lacked 
necessary competencies--whereas agency officials at other missions told 
us that the numbers and competencies of A&A staff were more than 
adequate. For example, officials at the mission in Mali told us that 
they have delayed time-sensitive projects because key A&A staff were 
not available when needed to approve contracts, while officials at the 
mission in Indonesia said the current number of A&A staff may be more 
than adequate. Furthermore, about 70 percent of our A&A survey 
respondents at overseas locations reported difficulty in altering 
staffing patterns to meet A&A workload demands. Although USAID has made 
some efforts to address its A&A workforce issues, these efforts do not 
constitute a strategic A&A workforce plan that takes into account the 
entire A&A workforce. Without accurate and reliable A&A staff data, 
USAID does not have adequate information to address current workload 
imbalances. 

USAID has not implemented an evaluation mechanism to provide adequate 
oversight of its A&A function. OAA's Evaluation Division is responsible 
for providing this oversight to ensure that A&A operations follow USAID 
policies, primarily by assessing the agency's A&A operations worldwide. 
GAO's internal control standards emphasize the importance of 
evaluations--whether in the form of self-assessments or other means--to 
ensure an agency's operational effectiveness and compliance with 
applicable policies. USAID's OIG reported in 2006 that for fiscal years 
2003 through 2005, the Evaluation Division did not meet its target of 
evaluating A&A operations at USAID missions every 3 fiscal years, 
conducting evaluations at only 9 out of approximately 85 missions. 
According to the OIG report, resource constraints and the increased 
number of A&A operations adversely impacted the division's ability to 
meet its target. In addition, about 40 percent of the A&A staff who 
responded to our survey reported that there is insufficient oversight 
to assure the quality of the A&A process. In fiscal year 2007, in view 
of past resource constraints, the Evaluation Division developed an 
annual scorecard evaluation, intended to be completed by all COs as a 
self-assessment of their A&A operations. The Evaluation Division was to 
review the scorecard evaluations and use a risk-based approach to 
determine locations for further on-site visits. The Evaluation Division 
has finished piloting the scorecard evaluations at four missions and 
identified weaknesses in A&A operations. For example, the division 
found that one mission lacked resources to adequately monitor 
contractor performance. The division has set a goal of implementing the 
evaluation mechanism, including on-site visits to at least 5 missions, 
within a 2-year period. However, agency officials informed us that the 
Evaluation Division currently does not have the staff needed to fully 
implement the evaluation mechanism. In addition, officials told us that 
the agency currently lacks a system that contains all missions' A&A 
files, which could facilitate the evaluation process. Without 
implementing the evaluation mechanism it has developed, USAID cannot 
certify the overall adequacy and effectiveness of management controls 
for the A&A function. 

To improve the agency's management and oversight of its A&A function, 
we are recommending that the Administrator of USAID develop and 
implement a strategic A&A workforce plan that matches resources to 
priority needs, such as the evaluation of the A&A function. 
Specifically, we recommend that the strategic A&A workforce plan 
includes a process to collect, analyze, and maintain (1) sufficiently 
reliable and up-to-date data on the agency's A&A staff levels and (2) 
comprehensive information on the competencies of the A&A staff. 

Commenting on this report, USAID acknowledged that it needs to rebuild 
core A&A management capacity in key areas such as workforce planning 
and evaluation in order to sustain effective management of A&A 
functions (see app. III). In addition, USAID noted several agency-wide 
initiatives to identify staffing needs and increase staff resources to 
meet the agency's goals. USAID also stated that enhancements must be 
made to the evaluation function that could strengthen the oversight of 
its A&A function. Furthermore, USAID provided technical comments, which 
we incorporated as appropriate. 

Background: 

USAID is headquartered in Washington, D.C., and has field locations in 
approximately 90 countries to provide economic, development, and 
humanitarian assistance worldwide in support of U.S. foreign policy 
goals.[Footnote 11] Its activities include technical assistance, 
research, policy advice, and infrastructure assistance. 

USAID's Organizational Structure for Designing and Managing Its 
Assistance Activities: 

In headquarters, USAID is organized into three functional and five 
geographic bureaus. The functional bureaus are aligned with the 
agency's three strategic goals--(1) economic growth and trade, (2) 
democracy and governance, and (3) global health. The bureaus design and 
manage activities that support their specific strategic goal. However, 
each activity is typically implemented in multiple countries around the 
world. The five geographic bureaus are responsible for oversight of 
overseas missions that design and manage activities that support 
USAID's strategic goals. 

Overseas, USAID designs and manages its foreign assistance activities 
and A&A instruments at several types of missions. These include: 

* bilateral missions that design and manage assistance activities and 
A&A instruments in the countries in which they are located, such as the 
mission in Indonesia; 

* regional missions that design and manage assistance activities and 
A&A instruments in the countries in which they are located and also for 
other countries in the region, such as the mission in Kazakhstan; and: 

* regional missions that provide administrative support, such as 
acquisition and assistance, legal and financial, to missions in their 
region, such as the mission in Thailand. 

USAID's Office of Acquisition and Assistance (OAA) has overall 
responsibility for the administration of A&A instruments in 
headquarters. Its A&A staff provide professional advisory and technical 
support to USAID's functional and geographic bureaus for developing and 
managing A&A instruments. OAA also provides periodic guidance to A&A 
staff at overseas missions. OAA is located within USAID's Management 
Bureau, and its director reports to the Deputy Assistant Administrator 
of the Management Bureau. 

USAID A&A staff at overseas missions provide advice and support to 
mission staff who design and manage assistance activities; they also 
have overall responsibility for the administration of A&A instruments 
at overseas missions. A&A offices are typically headed by a contracting 
officer (CO) who reports to the mission director or deputy mission 
director. At most bilateral missions, COs are co-located with A&A 
specialists and CTOs. However, under USAID's regional mission 
structure, COs often provide A&A support to more than one mission and 
are not necessarily co-located with either the CTOs or all of the A&A 
specialists who assist them. Some missions with no on-site CO may 
instead have on-site A&A specialists who provide A&A support to CTOs. 
Appendix II lists missions with authorized on-site COs as of July 2008, 
as reported by OAA. 

A&A Workload Trends for Fiscal Years 2002 through 2007: 

USAID's total obligations for A&A instruments doubled from about $5 
billion to about $10 billion from fiscal year 2002 through fiscal year 
2007. While total A&A obligations and number of A&A instruments 
increased only slightly at headquarters over this time period, A&A 
obligations overseas increased by nearly 600 percent, from about $1 
billion in fiscal year 2002 to about $6 billion in fiscal year 2007. In 
fiscal year 2007, A&A obligations managed by overseas missions made up 
the majority--nearly 60 percent--of total A&A obligations. Figure 1 
illustrates the A&A obligations managed by OAA headquarters and 
overseas missions for fiscal years 2002 through 2007. 

Figure 1: Total A&A Obligations Managed by OAA Headquarters 
and Overseas Missions, Fiscal Years 2002 through 2007: 

This figure is a combination bar graph showing total A&A obligations 
managed by OAA headquarters and overseas missions, fiscal years 2002 
through 2007. The X axis represents the fiscal year, and the Y axis 
represents A&A obligations (in billions of dollars). One bar represents 
headquarters, and the other represents overseas. 

Fiscal year: 2002; 
Overseas: 1; 
Headquarters: 4. 

Fiscal year: 2003; 
Overseas: 4; 
Headquarters: 4. 

Fiscal year: 2004; 
Overseas: 4; 
Headquarters: 4. 

Fiscal year: 2005; 
Overseas: 3; 
Headquarters: 5. 

Fiscal year: 2006; 
Overseas: 4; 
Headquarters: 4. 

Fiscal year: 2007; 
Overseas: 6; 
Headquarters: 4. 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: USAID. 

[End of figure] 

USAID's total number of A&A instruments from fiscal years 2002 through 
2007 also increased substantially, from about 6,000 to about 11,000. In 
fiscal year 2007, around 71 percent of the total number of A&A 
instruments was managed by overseas missions. 

Key Elements of a Strategic A&A Workforce Plan: 

GAO has developed a model of strategic human capital planning to help 
agency leaders effectively use their personnel and determine how well 
they integrate human capital considerations into daily decision making 
and planning for the program results they seek to achieve. Under the 
principles of effective workforce planning, an agency should determine 
the critical skills and competencies that will be needed to achieve 
current and future programmatic results. Then, the agency should 
develop strategies tailored to address gaps in number, deployment, and 
alignment of human capital approaches for enabling and sustaining the 
contributions of all critical skills and competencies. 

USAID Lacks Human Capital Data Needed for a Strategic A&A Workforce 
Plan That Could Help Address Its Overseas Workload Imbalances: 

USAID lacks the capacity to develop and implement a strategic A&A 
workforce plan because it lacks two key elements: (1) sufficiently 
reliable and up-to-date overseas A&A staff level data and (2) 
comprehensive information on the competencies of its overseas A&A 
specialists, who play a critical role in assisting COs and CTOs in 
overseas missions. During our fieldwork, we found that the numbers of 
A&A staff with the necessary competencies did not match A&A workload. 
Although various USAID has launched some ad hoc attempts to address the 
agency's A&A workforce issues, these efforts lack critical elements of 
a strategic A&A workforce plan, particularly comprehensive information 
on its A&A specialists overseas. 

USAID Lacks Sufficiently Reliable and Up-to-Date Data on A&A Staff 
Levels: 

Although USAID's Office of Human Resources (OHR) systematically 
collects data on A&A specialists' staff levels, these data are not 
sufficiently reliable. OHR officials acknowledged they had concerns 
about the reliability and accuracy of the overseas A&A staff level 
data, particularly with regard to the number of overseas A&A 
specialists. These officials stated that they receive staffing data 
from missions but do not know whether mission staff validate the 
data.[Footnote 12] In addition, they told us that mission staff who 
prepare these data may not receive adequate guidance for classification 
of different overseas staff positions, and as a result, 
misclassification and inaccurate reporting of A&A staff levels may 
occur. Furthermore, OHR officials do not validate or confirm the data 
they collect from missions, according to these officials. 

The Office of Acquisition and Assistance (OAA) does not systematically 
track the number of overseas A&A specialists, and its data on overseas 
A&A staff levels are out of date. According to OAA officials, the 
office's most recent data on the agency's entire A&A workforce are the 
result of a fiscal year 2005 survey of all overseas missions to analyze 
workload and staffing within OAA. While OAA's data are not current, the 
Office of Human Resources (OHR) officials told us that OAA's data may 
still be more accurate than the data collected by OHR in fiscal year 
2005. 

Our analysis of OAA's and OHR's separately collected data on overseas 
A&A staff levels for the end of fiscal year 2005 (the most current data 
made available to us by OAA) revealed substantial discrepancies. For 
example, comparing the two sets of data showed that OAA's reported 
total overseas A&A staff levels for that year were more than 78 percent 
higher than those reported by OHR--OAA reported 264 overseas A&A staff, 
and OHR reported 148. In addition, we found that, at certain missions, 
OHR's data showed no A&A specialists, whereas OAA's data indicated 
several A&A specialists. 

Although ready access to the Office of Human Resources' databases would 
allow other USAID offices to identify and resolve discrepancies in 
their staffing data, the offices lack such access. To date, according 
to OHR officials, OAA has not specifically requested OHR staffing data 
in order to compare them to its own. 

USAID Lacks Comprehensive Information on A&A Staff Competencies: 

Although A&A obligations have increased significantly at overseas 
missions, USAID has not collected comprehensive information on the 
competencies, including knowledge, skills, abilities, and experience 
levels, of its overseas A&A staff. According to the principles of 
effective workforce planning, an agency should determine the critical 
skills and competencies needed to achieve current and future 
programmatic results. In May 2008, the Office of Acquisition and 
Assistance (OAA) and the Office of Human Resources (OHR) jointly 
conducted competency assessments for A&A staff in headquarters and COs 
in overseas missions as part of an effort to implement the President's 
Management Agenda.[Footnote 13] However, these assessments did not 
include A&A specialists at overseas locations. For staff included in 
this effort, OAA and OHR conducted a capability assessment that 
identified key A&A staff competencies, such as decision making and 
written communication skills; assessed competency levels; identified 
competency gaps; and established strategies to reduce staff vacancies 
and skill gaps through recruitment, retention, and training. According 
to OHR officials, USAID expects to implement a similar assessment for 
A&A specialists overseas but will likely not begin implementation until 
fiscal year 2011 at the earliest. Without sufficiently reliable data on 
its entire A&A workforce--including A&A specialists overseas--USAID 
cannot collect comprehensive competency information, identify gaps in 
the numbers, skills, and competencies of its A&A workforce, and develop 
strategies to address them. 

USAID Has Not Matched A&A Staff to Workload at Missions We Visited: 

At the USAID missions we visited, we found that the numbers and 
competencies of A&A staff did not match A&A workload. While at some 
missions the numbers of A&A staff with the necessary competencies were 
considerably less than adequate, at other missions they were more than 
adequate, according to mission officials. 

Officials at five missions we visited--Thailand, Cambodia, Kazakhstan, 
the Kyrgyz Republic, and Mali--told us that their A&A staff at times 
could not provide adequate and timely support, such as providing 
guidance to CTOs and approving A&A documents, primarily because the 
numbers of A&A staff with the necessary competencies to manage their 
workloads were insufficient. We found several such examples, including 
the following: 

* A CO at the regional mission in Thailand--where three COs manage A&A 
activities in 12 countries--stated that she sometimes could not address 
some missions' needs in a timely manner because of competing workload 
demands. Staff at one of the missions for which the regional mission 
provides A&A support--Cambodia--told us that while their A&A workload 
has increased, they have at times not received adequate A&A support. 
These staff attributed this lack of support to a decline in A&A 
specialist staff levels from three in 2007 to one at the time of our 
visit, as well as the inexperience of the mission's one remaining on- 
site A&A specialist. This A&A specialist only works on A&A activities 
part-time because she has other responsibilities. The mission director 
told us that as a result, she has had to perform tasks that are 
normally considered among A&A staff's responsibilities, such as 
revising A&A documents. 

* The mission director and A&A staff in Kazakhstan--a regional mission 
responsible for A&A activities at missions in Kazakhstan and four other 
Central Asian countries that do not have on-site A&A specialists--told 
us that they could not adequately support A&A activities at the four 
missions that do not have on-site A&A specialists. Staff at one such 
mission, in the Kyrgyz Republic, noted that when they needed A&A staff 
on site to provide more guidance to their less experienced CTOs, the 
A&A staff were not available. Officials noted that without such 
guidance from A&A staff, CTOs may be more likely to incorrectly manage 
A&A instruments. A&A staff in Kazakhstan told us their ability to visit 
and support A&A activities at such missions was hindered by a heavy 
workload and competing demands from the other missions in the region. 

* Officials at the mission in Mali, which had two on-site A&A 
specialists and received A&A support from COs at the regional mission 
in Ghana, told us that these remotely located COs were sometimes not 
available to assist them in meeting their activities' goals. For 
example, they said they had delayed time-sensitive seasonal 
agricultural projects because the CO was not available when needed to 
approve contracts. 

In contrast, officials at the other two missions we visited--Peru and 
Indonesia--told us they had more than adequate numbers of A&A staff 
with the necessary competencies to manage their workload. Some staff 
even indicated that these missions may not need all of their assigned 
COs to adequately manage their A&A work. For example, one CO who will 
soon be leaving the mission in Indonesia may not need to be replaced, 
according to some A&A mission staff. A CO at the mission in Peru told 
us that because the mission had so many experienced or competent A&A 
staff, the A&A workload was more easily managed, and staff even had 
sufficient time to volunteer the mission as a location for USAID to 
pilot a new system through which USAID A&A instruments will be awarded. 

Our survey of A&A staff overseas generally supported these findings 
from our fieldwork. For example, about 70 percent of A&A respondents 
overseas reported that it was somewhat or very difficult to alter 
staffing patterns to meet the demands of changing workloads. Most 
notably, one respondent reported a disparity between the workload, 
numbers and competencies of A&A staff levels at the missions to which 
she was previously and currently assigned. While the respondent found 
the workload to be less manageable at her prior mission with 
inexperienced A&A staff, she found the workload at her current mission 
more easily manageable because it had more experienced A&A staff. 

USAID's Recent Planning Efforts Do Not Comprehensively Address Its 
Strategic A&A Workforce Planning Needs: 

In recent years, USAID has launched some ad hoc attempts to address the 
agency's A&A workforce issues. However, as the following indicates, 
these efforts lack critical elements of a strategic A&A workforce plan, 
particularly comprehensive information on its A&A specialists overseas: 

* Proposal to increase OAA staff levels. In May 2008, OAA officials 
proposed to the Management Bureau an increase in staff from 133 to 218 
in OAA headquarters. According to Management Bureau officials, OAA has 
been approved for 154 positions for fiscal year 2008. This proposal 
only addresses A&A staff levels in headquarters, however, and does not 
consider A&A staff levels overseas. 

* Development Leadership Initiative. This agencywide, multiyear effort 
is intended to recruit U.S. staff to be placed overseas. Under this 
initiative, USAID plans to hire 120 staff, including 15 COs, in fiscal 
year 2008. However, this initiative only seeks to increase the levels 
of overseas COs, not the levels of A&A specialists. 

* A&A Workforce Capability Assessment. As mentioned earlier, this was a 
May 2008 effort to identify and assess the competencies of all COs, as 
well as A&A specialists in headquarters. Competency assessments of A&A 
specialists overseas are not expected to begin until fiscal year 2011 
at the earliest. 

* Workforce planning model. This agencywide management tool projects 
the number, type, and location of staff needed to accomplish the 
agency's mission, based on expectations for future program funds as 
well as the size and location of overseas missions. The model does not, 
however, incorporate data on either the current A&A staffing levels or 
the competencies of existing A&A staff. 

Taken together, these efforts do not constitute a strategic A&A 
workforce plan that takes into account the entire A&A workforce. USAID 
has yet to take an integrated approach to developing and implementing 
such a workforce plan. 

USAID Has Not Implemented the Evaluation Mechanism of Its A&A Function: 

USAID has not implemented an evaluation mechanism to provide oversight 
of its A&A function. OAA's Evaluation Division is responsible for 
providing this oversight to ensure that A&A operations follow USAID 
policies, primarily by assessing the agency's A&A operations worldwide. 
In 2006, USAID's OIG found that the division had not met its previously 
set target of conducting on-site evaluations of A&A operations at all 
missions within a 3-year period, due to resource constraints within the 
division.[Footnote 14] The division has since developed a new 
evaluation mechanism, the scorecard evaluation, that relies on COs' 
annual self-assessments of A&A operations and is followed by on-site 
reviews at selected missions, conducted by division staff. However, the 
division has yet to implement this evaluation mechanism. 

OAA's Evaluation Division Is Responsible for Evaluating the A&A 
Function but Did Not Meet Its Previous Target for A&A Evaluations: 

Among other responsibilities, OAA's Evaluation Division is to conduct 
evaluations of worldwide A&A operations to ensure USAID's compliance 
with an executive order and certify the effectiveness of USAID's A&A 
function.[Footnote 15] GAO's internal control standards state that 
evaluations-- whether in the form of self-assessments or other means--
are necessary to ensure an agency's operational effectiveness and 
compliance with applicable policies. Furthermore, the President's 
fiscal year 1995 Executive Order on Federal Procurement Reform[Footnote 
16] included a requirement that every U.S. agency evaluates its A&A 
function against the agency's approved criteria. To comply with the 
order, OAA developed an evaluation program to assess USAID's A&A 
function. This evaluation program was also designed to enable USAID's 
Management Bureau to annually certify the adequacy and effectiveness of 
management controls for the A&A function, as required by USAID 
directives. 

Prior to fiscal year 2007, the evaluation program required Evaluation 
Division staff to make on-site visits to assess A&A operations at OAA 
offices in headquarters and missions. Evaluations were designed to be 
performed at each mission by teams of two Evaluation Division staff 
over a period of about 2 or 3 weeks. After each team had completed its 
fieldwork, the OAA director reported to the mission director on 
deficiencies that the team had identified in the mission's A&A 
operations and provided recommendations to address those deficiencies. 

In fiscal year 2006, the OIG found that OAA's Evaluation Division had 
not met its target of conducting evaluations of all A&A operations to 
ensure that the agency had responded to the executive order on federal 
procurement reform. Although the division had set a goal of conducting 
evaluations at all of the approximately 85 missions every 3 years, the 
OIG found that for fiscal years 2003 through 2005, the division had 
evaluated A&A operations at only 9 missions--about 11 percent of the 
number of missions at the time. The OIG report noted that a staffing 
shortage, as well as a significant increase in USAID's A&A operations 
in Iraq and Afghanistan, had adversely impacted the division's ability 
to meet its target during that time frame. OAA's Evaluation Division 
was unable to certify to the Management Bureau the overall adequacy and 
effectiveness of management controls at the missions on the basis of 
such a small number of completed evaluations. The division also could 
not provide reasonable assurance that USAID was effectively 
implementing the executive order. As a result, the OIG recommended in 
2006 that the director of OAA develop a plan for verifying and ensuring 
that the agency was effectively implementing the executive order. 

New Evaluation Mechanism Relies on COs' Self-Assessment of A&A 
Operations: 

In fiscal year 2007, in view of the resource constraints that had 
hampered its ability to meet its prior evaluation targets, OAA's 
Evaluation Division developed a Web-based self-reporting mechanism for 
evaluating the A&A function, referred to as the scorecard evaluation. 
According to Evaluation Division officials, the division previously 
lacked a mechanism to review all locations every year for systemic 
problems in A&A operations. With the scorecard evaluation, all USAID 
COs who manage A&A offices are to assess their own operations and 
thereby assist OAA in identifying areas of vulnerability in 
headquarters and missions each year. The scorecard methodology follows 
GAO's Standards of Internal Control to achieve effectiveness and 
efficiency of acquisition operations; ensure fiscal integrity of the 
agency's acquisition system; and ensure that applicable acquisition 
laws, regulations, guidance, and principles are being followed. Areas 
identified in the scorecard are to include COs' reporting of staffing 
patterns, assessment of the A&A operations' management systems, and the 
extent to which A&A award solicitations, negotiations, and 
administration comply with USAID guidelines. 

The Evaluation Division is expected to follow up on the scorecard 
evaluations with on-site reviews of a risk-based selection of offices 
and missions, followed by evaluation reports that make recommendations 
for mitigating risks associated with A&A operations at these locations. 
After reviewing the COs' submitted scorecards--certified by the 
appropriate mission director or other management official--the 
Evaluation Division is to determine the risk levels associated with all 
A&A activities in the COs' self-reported scorecard evaluation 
responses. Next, the division expects to select certain missions for on-
site visits, using a risk-based approach based on the scorecard 
evaluation results and informal, internally generated criteria, such as 
COs' reliance upon less-experienced COs, number of years lapsed since 
the last evaluation at the location, high funding levels, and country- 
specific issues that might raise concerns in the division about A&A 
operations. During the on-site visits, which are expected to last 
approximately 1 week, the Evaluation Division staff will conduct a 
hands-on review of mission documents--including the CO's work products 
and all supporting documents in the A&A file--hold discussions with 
mission staff to verify the submitted scorecard responses, and follow 
up on any issues mentioned in the scorecards. Finally, on the basis of 
its findings from the scorecards and the on-site reviews, OAA is 
expected to develop an evaluation report with recommendations on the 
missions' A&A operations that missions are required to address prior to 
the following year. 

As of August 2008, the Evaluation Division had completed pilot 
scorecard evaluations--including on-site visits--at four locations with 
USAID A&A operations: the East Africa regional mission and missions in 
Kenya, Peru, and Sudan. In its evaluation reports for these pilot 
locations, the evaluation team assigned risk levels based on the COs' 
self-assessments of A&A areas. For example, at various locations, the 
evaluation team identified the following high-risk issues or weaknesses 
in A&A operations: 

* a mission lacked resources to monitor contractor performance, and the 
CO could not ensure that contractor performance reports were prepared, 
as required by USAID policy; 

* a regional structure was providing insufficient mentoring and 
oversight of junior contract officers; and: 

* a regional mission had experienced a sixfold workload increase in the 
past 3 years, despite resource constraints. 

Evaluation Division Has Not Implemented New Evaluation Mechanism: 

Although the Evaluation Division has developed the new scorecard 
evaluation, it has yet to implement it. Approximately 40 percent of the 
A&A staff who responded to our survey reported that there is 
insufficient oversight to ensure the quality of the A&A process. 
According to Evaluation Division staff, in fiscal year 2007 the 
division set a goal of ensuring a scorecard review of all A&A 
operations in headquarters offices and all of the approximately 80 
missions within a 2-year period, and at least one on-site visit of a 
mission in each of the five regions of the world. However, agency 
officials informed us that the Evaluation Division currently lacks the 
staff level and systems needed to implement the scorecard evaluation to 
meet its goal. According to Evaluation Division officials, the number 
of procurement analysts in the division has declined from 12 in fiscal 
year 1992 to 4 in fiscal year 2008. However, according to these 
officials, the division needs at least 8 procurement analysts to make 
the appropriate number of on-site evaluation visits to missions per 
year. As of August 2008, the Evaluation Division was authorized to hire 
3 additional procurement analysts. However, the division has not yet 
finalized plans for full implementation of the scorecard evaluations 
based on this increase in staff. 

In addition, according to Evaluation Division staff, USAID headquarters 
and missions lack an electronic A&A data system that would facilitate 
the evaluation process. Currently, the Evaluation Division reviews the 
available A&A documents provided by COs worldwide; while some A&A units 
utilize an electronic filing system, A&A operations in many missions 
continue to maintain hard-copy A&A documents. Evaluation Division staff 
told us they would ideally be able to access a digital repository of 
A&A documents remotely while reviewing COs' completed scorecard 
evaluations. Such access would allow the Evaluation Division staff to 
review A&A documents in headquarters and reduce their need to conduct 
on-site visits, thereby saving resources and time. As of July 2008, 
USAID was analyzing information technology options for the OAA 
Evaluation Division to achieve its needs, including the implementation 
of the Global Acquisition and Assistance System (GLAAS), a new globally 
accessible system intended to standardize and automate USAID's 
management of A&A instruments. However, GLAAS has not yet been 
implemented at all missions, and the Evaluation Division continues to 
lack the technology to access all A&A files electronically in order to 
conduct scorecard reviews remotely. 

Conclusions: 

As USAID increasingly relies on nongovernmental organizations to 
implement its activities, the agency's responsibility to effectively 
manage the implemented activities gains in importance. Critical to its 
success in this area is its management of the A&A function. As the 
amount of its A&A obligations and the number of A&A instruments 
continue to increase, especially at overseas missions, USAID should 
work to ensure that the appropriate number of staff with the requisite 
competencies and skills are available to manage A&A operations. Despite 
a past USAID OIG recommendation calling for USAID to develop an A&A 
workforce plan, the agency has yet to analyze the relation of staffing 
patterns to existing workload with the goal of better matching its 
staff to its workload. Specifically, the agency currently lacks 
sufficiently reliable and up-to-date data on its overseas A&A staff 
levels and comprehensive information on the competencies of the A&A 
staff. With these data, which are key elements of federal workforce 
planning models, USAID could better identify its critical staffing 
needs and adjust its staffing patterns to meet those needs. 

A critical component of USAID's oversight of its A&A operations is the 
successful implementation of its new evaluation mechanism. The 
mechanism is designed to ensure that A&A operations follow USAID 
policies, primarily by assessing A&A operations that manage about $10 
billion worldwide. Although the agency is in the process of hiring 
additional staff for the division, much time has elapsed since USAID's 
OIG noted in 2006 that the division's resource constraints hampered its 
ability to conduct evaluations. Until USAID has the capacity to 
implement the evaluation mechanism, the agency lacks the ability to 
ensure that potential weaknesses in the A&A process are quickly 
identified and corrected. 

Recommendations for Executive Action: 

To improve the agency's management and oversight of its A&A function, 
we are recommending that the Administrator of USAID develop and 
implement a strategic A&A workforce plan that matches resources to 
priority needs, such as the evaluation of the A&A function. 
Specifically, we recommend that the strategic A&A workforce plan 
includes a process to collect, analyze, and maintain (1) sufficiently 
reliable and up-to-date data on the agency's A&A staff levels and (2) 
comprehensive information on the competencies of the A&A staff. 

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation: 

We requested and received comments on a draft of this report from 
USAID. These comments are reprinted in appendix III, along with our 
responses to specific points. USAID did not specifically comment on our 
recommendations but acknowledged that it needs to rebuild core A&A 
management capacity in key areas such as workforce planning and 
evaluation in order to sustain effective management of A&A functions. 
USAID noted several agencywide initiatives such as the development of a 
new Human Capital Strategic Plan and Workforce Plan to address the 
agency's staffing requirements from 2009 to 2013, as well as a 
competency management system and a Learning Management System to 
improve staff competency information. In addition, USAID stated that 
enhancements must be made to the evaluation function that could 
strengthen the oversight of its A&A function. We acknowledge USAID's 
agencywide efforts to enhance workforce planning, but maintain that the 
agency currently lacks sufficiently reliable staff-level data and 
comprehensive competency information on its overseas A&A specialists, 
which are key elements of a strategic workforce plan. USAID also 
provided technical comments, which we incorporated as appropriate. 

We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional 
committees and the Administrator of the U.S. Agency for International 
Development. We will also make copies available to others on request. 
In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web 
site at [hyperlink, http://www.gao.gov]. 

If you or your staffs have any questions about this report, please 
contact me at (202) 512-9601 or melitot@gao.gov. Contact points for our 
Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on 
the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to 
this report are listed in appendix IV. 

Signed by: 

Thomas Melito: 

Director, International Affairs and Trade: 

[End of section] 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology: 

To examine the United States Agency for International Development’s 
(USAID) capacity to develop and implement a strategic acquisition and 
assistance (A&A) workforce plan, we used GAO’s guidance on human 
capital management[Footnote 17] and GAO’s Framework for Assessing the 
Acquisition Function at Federal Agencies.[Footnote 18] We also reviewed 
prior assessments of USAID’s workforce planning efforts by GAO and 
USAID’s Office of Inspector General (OIG).[Footnote 19] To determine 
A&A staff levels, we analyzed and compared staffing data that USAID’s 
Office of Acquisition and Assistance (OAA) and the Office of Human 
Resources (OHR) made available to us. We also interviewed OHR officials 
to determine the reliability of their data. We obtained and analyzed 
data on the number of A&A instruments and the obligated amounts of A&A 
instruments for fiscal years 2002 through 2007. We assessed the 
reliability of these data by reviewing information about the data and 
the system that produced them and by interviewing agency officials 
knowledgeable about the data. We found USAID’s data sufficiently 
reliable for representing the A&A obligations and instruments. To 
report on USAID’s efforts in A&A workforce planning, we reviewed agency 
documents and interviewed agency officials, as well as evaluated these 
efforts according to key principles for strategic workforce planning 
identified in our prior work. 

To examine the extent to which USAID has implemented a mechanism to 
evaluate its A&A function, we analyzed USAID documents and interviewed 
relevant USAID agency officials. Documents we examined include the 
President’s 1995 Executive Order on Federal Procurement Reform, 
applicable agency policies and directives, a past OIG report that 
audited USAID’s A&A evaluation program, and documents related to the 
Global Acquisition and Assistance System (GLAAS). We also analyzed past 
A&A evaluation reports, documents pertaining to the scorecard 
evaluation methodology, as well as the scorecard evaluations and on-
site evaluation reports conducted for the piloted locations. In 
addition, we met with USAID officials in Washington, D.C., to discuss 
the A&A evaluation mechanism. 

To assess the A&A function overseas, we conducted fieldwork in the 
following seven countries: Cambodia, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz 
Republic, Mali, Peru, and Thailand. We selected these countries to 
obtain geographic diversity and ensure representation of various A&A 
processes and organizational structures for the A&A function. In all of 
these countries, we met with USAID officials. In some of these 
countries, we also met with representatives of nongovernmental 
organizations (NGO) that implement A&A activities for USAID under A&A 
instruments. Although the findings from our fieldwork in each country 
are not generalizable to the population of USAID A&A activities, we 
determined that the selection of the countries and activities reviewed 
was appropriate for our design and objectives. 

To obtain views from USAID staff with key A&A responsibilities, we also 
conducted a survey of USAID’s A&A staff between October 2007 and June 
2008. The survey was sent to all USAID contracting officers (CO) in 
headquarters and missions, as well as all A&A specialists in 
headquarters. The survey contained questions related to work 
experience, staffing, workload, and the administration of acquisition 
and assistance instruments. We pretested the survey with three COs. 

Our survey of A&A staff received a 95 percent response rate—150 
responded out of 158 surveyed. We compared the responding A&A staff 
with the nonresponding A&A staff and found no significant differences 
between the two groups on several variables. Based on this analysis and 
the 95 percent response rate, we assumed that the nonrespondents were 
missing at random and generated statistical estimates of the population 
of A&A staff from the 95 percent of respondents. Given the high 
response rate and no indications of nonresponse bias, we considered 
estimates from this survey to be generalizable to the population 
surveyed. Because we treated our respondents as a random sample of A&A 
staff, our results are estimates of the population and thus are subject 
to sampling errors that are associated with samples of this size and 
type. Our confidence in the precision of the results from this sample 
is expressed in 95 percent confidence intervals, which are expected to 
include the actual results in 95 percent of the samples of this type. 
All percentage estimates in this report have a margin of error of no 
more than plus or minus 3 percent. 

We conducted this performance audit from February 2007 through 
September 2008 in accordance with generally accepted government 
auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform 
the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a 
reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 
objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable 
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

[End of section] 

Appendix II: Overseas Locations with Authorized USAID Contracting 
Officer Presence as of July 2008: 

According to USAID’s Office of Acquisition and Assistance (OAA), the 
following bilateral and regional missions were authorized to have at 
least one on-site contracting officer (CO) present as of July 2008. 
These missions do not include locations with on-site acquisition and 
assistance specialists who work with a remotely located CO. Countries 
are grouped by regions, as determined by OAA. 

Table 1: Overseas Locations with Authorized USAID Contracting Officers: 

Region: Africa; 
Country: Africa. 

Region: Africa; 
Country: Ethiopia. 

Region: Africa; 
Country: Ghana. 

Region: Africa; 
Country: Kenya. 

Region: Africa; 
Country: Liberia. 

Region: Africa; 
Country: Mozambique. 

Region: Africa; 
Country: Nigeria. 

Region: Africa; 
Country: Senegal. 

Region: Africa; 
Country: South Africa. 

Region: Africa; 
Country: Sudan. 

Region: Africa; 
Country: Tanzania. 

Region: Africa; 
Country: Uganda. 

Region: Africa; 
Country: Zambia. 

Region: Asia; 
Country: Asia. 

Region: Asia; 
Country: Bangladesh. 

Region: Asia; 
Country: India. 

Region: Asia; 
Country: Indonesia. 

Region: Asia; 
Country: Pakistan. 

Region: Asia; 
Country: Philippines. 

Region: Asia; 
Country: Thailand. 

Region: Europe and Eurasia; 
Country: Georgia. 

Region: Europe and Eurasia; 
Country: Hungary. 

Region: Europe and Eurasia; 
Country: Kazakhstan. 

Region: Europe and Eurasia; 
Country: Russia. 

Region: Europe and Eurasia; 
Country: Ukraine. 

Region: Latin America and the Caribbean; 
Country: Latin. 

Region: Latin America and the Caribbean; 
Country: Bolivia. 

Region: Latin America and the Caribbean; 
Country: Colombia. 

Region: Latin America and the Caribbean; 
Country: Dominican Republic. 

Region: Latin America and the Caribbean; 
Country: El Salvador. 

Region: Latin America and the Caribbean; 
Country: Haiti. 

Region: Latin America and the Caribbean; 
Country: Peru. 

Region: Near East; 
Country: Afghanistan. 

Region: Near East; 
Country: Egypt. 

Region: Near East; 
Country: Iraq. 

Region: Near East; 
Country: Jordan. 

Region: Near East; 
Country: West Bank/Gaza. 

[See PDF for image] 

Source: QAA. 

[End of figure] 

[End of section] 

Appendix III: Comments from the U.S. Agency for International 
Development: 

Note: GAO comments supplementing those in the report text appear at the 
end of this appendix. 

USAID: 
From The American People: 

September 16, 2008: 

Mr. Thomas Melito, Jr., Director: 
International Affairs and Trade: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office: 
441 G Street, N.W.: 
Washington, D.C. 20548: 

Dear Mr. Melito: 

I am pleased to provide the U.S. Agency for International Development's 
(USAID) formal response on the draft GAO report entitled, "USAID 
Acquisition and Assistance: Actions Needed to Develop and Implement a 
Strategic Workforce Plan." 

Enclosed is a detailed response to the draft report. Thank you for the 
opportunity to respond to the GAO draft report and for the courtesies 
extended by your staff in the conduct of this review. 

Sincerely,

Signed by: 

Sean R. Mulvaney: 
Assistant Administrator: 
Bureau for Management: 

USAID Response to the Draft GAO Report entitled "USAID Acquisition and 
Assistance: Actions Needed to Develop and Implement a Strategic 
Workforce Plan":  

We are pleased to receive the recommendations in your report. We 
provided technical comments to you previously. Our broader comments are 
set forth below. 

I. General:  

The report correctly notes that USAID's business model has evolved over 
many years to the point that at present, the Agency's primary means of 
implementing foreign assistance programs is through the use of Federal 
contract, grant and cooperative agreement instruments. The report also 
notes that the Agency's acquisition and assistance (A&A) workload 
doubled from FY 2002 to FY 2007. It is significant, for the purposes of 
this report, that this dramatic expansion of the Agency's program 
responsibilities took place without a commensurate increase in the 
Agency's staffing or administrative resources. As a result, the staff 
and resources that were available were prioritized to support the 
expansion of USAID's program responsibilities in critical countries 
(such as Iraq and Afghanistan) and in support of U.S. Government 
priorities (such as HIV/AIDS programs). On the issue of staffing, we 
note that efforts initiated by the Office of Acquisition and Assistance 
(OAA) and the Office of Human Resources (OHR) during the past year are 
yielding results in terms of increasing A&A staffing levels in 
Washington. Also, the Development Leadership Initiative (to increase 
the size of USAID's Foreign Service workforce) will place additional 
Contracting Officers in the field in FY 2009 and FY 2010. This report 
is timely because it highlights the Agency's need, after a period of 
notable programmatic growth, to rebuild core A&A management capacity in 
key areas such as workforce planning and evaluation in order to sustain 
effective management of A&A functions in support of these greatly 
expanded responsibilities. 

II. Scope:  

In February 2007, when GAO notified USAID that it would conduct an 
engagement on USAID Management of Procurement Practices, there were 
four stated objectives of GAO's review: "Assess the management of the 
USAID acquisition function by reviewing whether USAID's acquisition and 
grant practices are in line with best practices, such as having (1) 
proper organizational alignment of procurement and leadership, (2) 
processes for determining whether the agency has effective procurement 
policies and procedures in place, mechanisms for the periodic 
monitoring and evaluation of such processes, and processes for the 
timely implementation of recommendations, (3) strategic human capital 
practices, and (4) knowledge and information systems for collecting and 
analyzing procurement data." 

The draft report GAO-08-1059 states the objective of the study to be 
two-fold: "To examine (1) USAID's capacity to develop and implement a 
strategic A&A workforce plan and (2) the extent to which USAID has 
implemented a mechanism to evaluate it's A&A function." USAID notes 
that the report focuses only on a portion of the originally stated 
scope. We agree that the Agency's prior efforts to improve its ability 
to develop and implement a strategic A&A workforce plan and to evaluate 
its A&A function have fallen short of what they should be and require 
renewed emphasis, including an appropriate level of resources. We 
interpret the report's attention to these areas and not the others 
initially identified for review to permit a conclusion that USAID's A&A 
function, while requiring actions to rebuild core management capacity 
in response to unprecedented growth, nonetheless is largely in sound 
condition as the result of the conscientious work of the Agency's 
dedicated A&A and technical program management professionals. 

See comment 1. 

III. Strategic Workforce Planning: 

A number of GAO and USAID Office of Inspector General (OIG) reports 
have emphasized the importance of strategic workforce planning to 
ensure that an agency's workforce is adequate to support the agency's 
mission. Accordingly, USAID has aggressively pursued the development of 
a strategic workforce plan that includes mission critical occupations 
and competencies needed to meet the agency's strategic program goals. 
Through its Development Leadership Initiative (DLI), top management is 
also ensuring that the agency has sufficient financial and staff 
resources to accomplish these goals. Within USAID, the Office of Human 
Resources (OHR) is the primary office that defines and manages the 
agency's workforce planning process, including managing the human 
resources databases and directing the workforce planning program. OHR 
has developed both a new Human Capital Strategic Plan has been approved 
and Workforce Plan to address the agency's staffing requirements from 
2009 to 2013 is pending approval by senior management. The plans are 
linked to the new Foreign Assistance Framework and Joint State- USAID 
Strategic Plans. 

In addition, in 2003, the Agency began a strategic workforce planning 
effort and reviewed the critical skills and competencies needed to meet 
the Agency's programmatic goals. The Agency soon realized that the most 
urgent requirement was to have the right number of employees in the 
correct skill areas to be able to then evaluate their competency. The 
first stage of the Agency's comprehensive workforce planning process 
was to create an analytical workforce planning model which would 
provide the optimal demand for all types of personnel: Foreign Service 
officers, civil service officers, foreign nationals and other American 
non-direct hires. With such a model, we have been able to convince 
stakeholders of the need to increase the Agency's operating expense 
(OE) funds. As a sign of success, the Agency received the largest 
increase in OE in FY 2008 that it had received in decades. We 
anticipate an even greater increase in FY 2009. This should allow us to 
go to the second stage in developing a competency management system 
which will provide a more detailed analysis and linkages necessary to 
optimize the competency of our increasing numbers. This work will be 
supported by the use of the WebPass post personnel system, which tracks 
information on locally hired staff at post and will assist in making 
available accurate information on mission staffing, including A&A 
specialists. 

IV. Management Of Overseas Staff:  

We agree that the Agency should continue with plans to implement a 
central data base that will include relevant information on all Agency 
staff. This data base will provide organization-wide visibility to 
inform resource and staffing considerations and decisions. However, 
with regard to the management of A&A staff overseas, it would be useful 
for the report to specifically summarize and acknowledge some of the 
factors that affect the manner in which the Agency staffs and manages 
its A&A function overseas. The draft report correctly states that 
USAID's Office of Acquisition and Assistance (OAA) has overall 
responsibility for the administration of A&A instruments in 
headquarters. OAA management has direct influence in the assignment of 
USDH Contracting Officers to overseas missions and has had some success 
in increasing the number of USDH Contracting Officers overseas. Locally 
engaged foreign nationals employed in missions overseas make up nearly 
the entire Agency cadre of A&A specialists overseas. The Agency firmly 
believes that the benefits derived from using locally hired staff as 
A&A specialists — knowledge of country culture and business conditions, 
local language ability, continuity in contrast to rotating Foreign 
Service Officers, and cost savings — far outweigh the limitations of 
their use. The main limitation is that making adjustments in the 
locally hired workforce, especially for professionals such as A&A 
specialists, is not always as responsive to evolving program needs as 
we would like. While Contracting Officers in the field are responsible 
for managing their A&A offices, their budgets are established under the 
direction of the Mission Director. It is the role of the Mission 
Director to determine how to best allocate programmatic and operating 
expense resources provided to the mission. Given that it can take 
upwards of 5 years and tens of thousands of dollars to train a host 
country A&A Specialist, there can be periods during which the staffing 
plan does not precisely match the anticipated workload. OAA management 
and individual Contracting Officers at the missions actively advise 
Mission Directors on the resource requirements to operate an efficient 
acquisition and assistance program. However, overseas programs and 
funding can change from year to year and mission management can often 
be hesitant to make abrupt hiring or staff reduction decisions in the 
short term. While the Agency has had some success recently in making 
local national A&A specialists available to USAID missions located in 
other countries, the Agency does not possess the authority to simply 
transfer locally engaged staff to other missions to meet the demands of 
missions with greater workloads. 

See comment 2. 

The draft report also should acknowledge the formal assignment process 
for Foreign Service officers, which is governed by the Foreign Affairs 
Manual and is developed in consultation with HR, the Department of 
State and the Foreign Service union, AFSA. While the process is managed 
by HR, OAA actively supports the assignment of Contracting Officers to 
field posts, seeking to place staff with appropriate experience in the 
right locations. 

As requested by the field missions, OAA provides routine assistance to 
missions to provide surge support and fill gaps in A&A support. Indeed, 
OAA routinely receives requests from the missions for additional 
assistance in order to meet workload requirements and regularly 
provides TDY support to the missions. These important facts were not 
reflected in the draft report. In addition, OAA has utilized the 
skilled foreign national staff from the missions to assist with end of 
the fiscal year workload issues in OAA/Washington. OAA is able to do 
this given that its USDH Contracting Officers regularly communicate to 
OAA information about the local staff in the missions and their 
competencies. 

See comment 3. 

The draft report also noted that the A&A workforce plan was missing 
comprehensive information on the competencies of its overseas A&A 
staff. Over the last three years, OHR— with the support of OPM—has been 
developing and implementing a Learning Management System (LMS) that 
contains robust competency management functionality. To implement this 
system for contracting officers, OHR and OAA have teamed to configure 
the competency management system with OAA's competency definitions. The 
competency management system allows OAA to define the knowledge, 
skills, abilities and behavioral anchors needed to assess competencies 
both in Washington and the field. OHR seeks to use OPM-approved HR Line 
of Business (HR LOB) automation tools that will synchronize OAA 
staffing levels between OHR and the field, and better match staffing 
levels to changing workloads. We acknowledge that much remains to be 
done to deploy these important tools. We look forward to completing 
implementation of the competency management and HR LOB tools during FY 
2009 and FY 2010. 

V. Evaluation Of The A&A Function: 

As mentioned, the dramatic growth of USAID's A&A workload has not been 
matched by increases in A&A staffing and as a result areas such as 
Evaluation have not been given enough priority. Staffing and 
administrative resource shortages impeded USAID's ability to implement 
an effective evaluation mechanism to provide oversight of its A&A 
function. We agree that enhancements must be made to the Evaluation 
function that will increase the oversight provided. We would note that 
one such enhancement that has been implemented successfully by USAID is 
the Contract Review Board (CRB). The CRB, which reviews all major 
Agency procurements ($10 million and above) at the solicitation, 
competitive range and award stages, is an important evaluation tool 
that has improved the quality of USAID procurements. The CRB deserves 
mention in the report. 

See comment 4. 

We thank you for the opportunity to respond to the draft report. 
09/16/08: 

The following are GAO’s comments on the U.S. Agency for International 
Development’s letter dated September 16, 2008. 

1. USAID noted that our final reporting objectives differed from the 
original objectives we provided to the agency when we commenced our 
review in early 2007. In its comments, the agency misinterpreted our 
reporting only on certain aspects of the A&A function as an indication 
that other aspects of the A&A function are largely in sound condition. 
During the course of GAO engagements, the final reporting objectives 
and the scope of the review are sometimes refined based upon 
information obtained during the planning and design phase. For example, 
we did not report on the proper organizational alignment of USAID’s A&A 
function because USAID officials were unable to adequately demonstrate 
significant impediments as a result of its placement within USAID’s 
Management Bureau. 

2. USAID stated that the agency does not possess the authority to 
simply transfer locally engaged staff to other missions to meet the 
demands of missions with greater workloads. It also noted that overseas 
programs and funding fluctuate and mission management can be hesitant 
to make abrupt hiring or staff reduction decisions in the short term. 
We recognize that mission management determines how to allocate 
resources within missions and some of the staffing decisions pertaining 
to overseas A&A specialists are made outside of OAA. Our report 
emphasized that key elements of an agency’s strategic workforce plan 
include determining the critical skills and competencies of its staff, 
addressing gaps in staff numbers and deployment, and aligning human 
capital approaches regardless of location. A past OIG report also 
recommended the development of an A&A workforce plan that includes a 
mechanism for collecting and analyzing A&A data to allow managers to 
compare current staffing patterns to developing trends, match staff to 
workloads, and adjust quickly when unbalanced workloads develop. We 
maintain that without accurately identifying the number of overseas A&A 
staff, the agency can neither determine the appropriate levels of staff 
with requisite competencies to manage missions’ A&A workloads, nor 
explore ways of making necessary adjustments to gaps in mission A&A 
staff levels and competencies as well as imbalances in workloads. 

3. USAID commented that when requested by missions, OAA provides 
routine assistance such as temporary duty staff for end-of-fiscal-year 
surges. In our report, we cite several instances of USAID not 
addressing staffing imbalances at its overseas missions. We maintain 
that OAA’s approach of providing temporary assistance is not a 
substitute for strategic workforce planning that includes key elements 
such as reliable and up-to-date data on the number and competencies of 
its overseas A&A workforce. Without this information, USAID cannot 
systematically address its critical staffing needs and adjust its 
staffing patterns to meet those needs. 

4. USAID commented that it had already begun to enhance the evaluation 
function by establishing the Contract Review Board, which reviews all 
procurements of $10 million or more at the solicitation, competitive 
range, and award stages. Although we agree that this mechanism is an 
important oversight mechanism during the early phases of the A&A 
process, our review focused on the oversight of the A&A function at the 
administration stage, which commences after the awarding of the A&A 
instrument and entails USAID’s monitoring of contractor performance for 
the A&A instruments.

[End of section] 

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments: 

GAO Contact: Thomas Melito, (202) 512-9601 or melitot@gao.gov: 

Staff Acknowledgments: In addition to the contact named above, Zina 
Merritt (Assistant Director), James Ashley, Debbie Chung, Mark Dowling, 
Joel Grossman, Tracy Guerrero, Clarette Kim, John Krump, Victoria Lin, 
James Strus, and William Woods made key contributions to this report. 

[End of section] 

Footnotes: 

[1] Acquisition instruments are contracts for goods and services, while 
assistance instruments include grants and cooperative agreements. 

[2] A nongovernmental organization (NGO) is any nongovernmental 
organization or entity, whether nonprofit or profit-making, receiving 
or providing USAID-funded assistance under an A&A instrument. 

[3] Federal regulations and agency policy directives and procedures 
provide guidance for managing these A&A instruments. Federal 
regulations include the Federal Acquisition Regulation and USAID 
Acquisition Regulation, while policy directives and procedures include 
the Automated Directives System and A&A Policy Directives. 

[4] For the purposes of this report, we use the term “contracting 
officers” (CO) to mean both contracting officers and agreement officers 
who are responsible for awarding and managing USAID acquisition and 
assistance instruments. We use the term “A&A specialists” to mean 
specialists in headquarters and at overseas missions who assist COs. We 
use the term “A&A staff” to include both COs and A&A specialists. 

[5] USAID’s three functional bureaus are (1) Economic Growth, 
Agriculture, and Trade; (2) Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian 
Assistance; and (3) Global Health; in support of USAID’s strategic 
goals. USAID’s five geographic bureaus are (1) sub-Saharan Africa, (2) 
Asia, (3) Latin America and the Caribbean, (4) Europe and Eurasia, and 
(5) the Middle East. Overseas mission staff are responsible for 
assistance activities in support of USAID’s strategic objectives. 

[6] CTOs’ responsibilities include verifying that the activities 
conform to the terms and conditions of the instrument, administering 
financial management responsibilities, and monitoring the performance 
of the A&A instrument through site visits and report reviews. 

[7] For example, see GAO, Foreign Assistance: Strategic Workforce 
Planning Can Help USAID Address Current and Future Challenges, GAO-03-
946 (Washington, D.C.: Aug, 22, 2003); GAO, Human Capital: Key 
Principles for Effective Strategic Workforce Planning, GAO-04-39 
(Washington, D.C.: Dec. 11, 2003); and USAID Office of Inspector 
General, Audit of USAID’s Workforce Planning for Procurement Officers, 
Audit Report Number 9-000-03-001-P (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 13, 2002). 

[8] This report focuses on the A&A function to implement USAID’s 
foreign assistance activities and does not include activities that 
support the agency’s internal operations, whether funded from USAID’s 
operating expense account or program accounts, such as personal 
services contracts. 

[9] GAO-04-39. 

[11] GAO, Standards for Internal Controls in the Federal Government, 
GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1 (Washington, D.C.: November 1999). 

[11] These foreign policy goals, outlined in the State Department and 
USAID Strategic Plan for fiscal years 2007-2012, include achieving 
peace and security, governing justly and democratically, investing in 
people, promoting economic growth and prosperity, providing 
humanitarian assistance, promoting international understanding, and 
strengthening consular and management capabilities. 

[12] To send these data to OHR, overseas missions use the Post 
Personnel System, a State Department system that tracks U.S. and local 
staff who work for the U.S. government overseas. 

[13] Started in 2001, the President’s Management Agenda is a strategy 
for improving the management and performance of the federal government, 
and strategic human capital management is one of its five 
governmentwide areas of focus. USAID has designated the acquisition 
profession as a mission-critical occupation. 

[14] USAID Office of Inspector General, Audit of USAID’s Procurement 
Evaluation Program, Audit Report Number 9-000-06-007-P (Washington, 
D.C.: May 11, 2006). 

[15] OAA’s Evaluation Division has other responsibilities, including 
administering USAID’s Procurement Management Certification Program. 

[16] Executive Order 12931 (Federal Procurement Reform); 10/13/1994. 

[17] GAO, Human Capital: Key Principles for Effective Strategic 
Workforce Planning, GAO-04-39 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 11, 2003). 

[18] GAO, Framework for Assessing the Acquisition Function at Federal 
Agencies, GAO-05-218G (Washington, D.C.: September 2005). 

[19] These include GAO, Foreign Assistance: Strategic Workforce 
Planning Can Help USAID Address Current and Future Challenges, GAO-03-
946 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 22, 2003); USAID Office of Inspector 
General, Audit of USAID’s Workforce Planning for Procurement Officers, 
Audit No. 9-000-03-001-P (Washington, D.C., Nov. 13, 2002). 

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