BOARD OF CONTRACT APPEALS U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON, DC 20401 In the Matter of ) ) The Appeal of ) ) ROSE PRINTING, INC. ) Docket No. GPO BCA 32-95 Program C37-S ) Purchase Order 94841 ) Print Orders 20001 and ) 20002 ) DECISION AND ORDER By letter dated October 26, 1995, Rose Printing, Inc. (Appellant or Contractor), 4382 Mount Carmel Tobasco Road, Cincinnati, Ohio 45244, timely appealed the final decision of Contracting Officer Jack Scott, of the U.S. Government Printing Office's (hereinafter Respondent or GPO or Government), Printing Procurement Department (PPD), Washington, DC 20401, dated July 26, 1995, terminating the Appellant's contract identified as Program C37-S, Purchase Order 94841, for default because of its inability to perform. GPO Instruction 1110.12, Subject: Board of Contract Appeals Rules of Practice and Procedure, dated September 17, 1994, Rules 1(a) and (2) (Board Rules). See R4 File, Tab X.1 For the reasons which follow, the Contracting Officer's default decision is hereby AFFIRMED, and the appeal is DENIED. I. BACKGROUND2 1. On May 8, 1995, the Respondent issued an Invitation for Bid (IFB) for Program C37-S, a single-award, fixed price "requirements" contract for the production of the "Joint Federal Travel Regulations, Volumes 1 and 2" (hereinafter JFTR) for the Department of the Navy (Navy). See R4 File, Tab A, at 1. The IFB was advertised as a "Small Disadvantaged Business" set aside contract under the provisions of GPO Printing Procurement Department Instruction 347.1C, and the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 1989, Pub. L. No. 100-456, § 843, as amended by § 806, Pub. L. No. 102-484. Id. 2. The procurement was publicly advertised and IFBs were sent to 35 prospective bidders. See R4 File, Tab B. The Government received four offers, including the Appellant's. See R4 File, Tabs C and I.3 3. After the bids were opened, the low bidder, T.A.M.'s Printing, claimed an error in bid. See R4 File, Tab E; Scott Declaration, ¶ 4. Specifically, T.A.M.'s Printing said that it had made a transcription error in preparing its offer, so that instead of a running rate price of $2.95 per 1,000 copies, its bid sheet showed a rate of $1.05 per 1,000 copies. See R4 File, Tab F. When the Contracting Officer reviewed the supporting documentation,4 he found that the contractor's mistake in bid claim had merit. See Scott Declaration, ¶ 4. Accordingly, the Contracting Officer notified GPO's Contract Review Board (CRB) of his findings,5 see R4 File, Tab G, and T.A.M.'s Printing was allowed to withdraw its offer, see R4 File, Tab H. See also Scott Declaration, ¶ 4. 4. The next lowest bidder was the Appellant. See Scott Declaration, ¶ 5 Prior to making the award to the Appellant, Michael J. Sebold, a PPD Printing Specialist, contacted John Dass, the Contractor's President, and asked him to review and confirm his bid prices. See R4 File, Tab J. In reply to Sebold's inquiry, Dass confirmed his bid prices both orally and in writing. See R4 File, Tab J and K. See also Scott Declaration, ¶ 5. 5. Thereafter, on June 8, 1995, the Contracting Officer himself spoke to Dass about the procurement in order to see if the Appellant could meet the production schedule. See R4 File, Tab L. See also Scott Declaration, ¶ 6. The record discloses that Dass told Scott that in addition to the Contractor's current printing capability, another press would be delivered within a few days.6 See R4 File, Tab L. Dass also referred the Contracting Officer to GPO's Columbus Regional Printing Procurement Office (CRPPO), which had just performed an on-site pre-award survey of the Appellant's facilities for an unrelated contract (Program 421-M). Id. Based on all the available information, including the CRPPO's favorable report, the Contracting Officer concluded that the Contractor was a responsible bidder and eligible for award of Program C37-S. See R4 File, Tab N. See also Scott Declaration, ¶ 6. Accordingly, on June 9, 1995, the Contracting Officer issued Purchase Order 94841 to the Appellant awarding it the contract to produce the JFTRs.7 See R4 File, Tab P. 6. The record indicates that on June 26, 1995, the Navy issued Print Orders 20001 and 20002 to the Appellant, the first two orders under the contract. See Notice of Filing, Scott Declaration, Attachments 1 and 2. Print Order 20001 required the production of 26,332 copies of JFTR, Volume 1, Change 104 (NAVSO P-6034-1-104), at an estimated cost of $23,277.00. See Notice of Filing, Scott Declaration, Attachment 1. Print Order 20002 was for the production of 20,644 copies of JFTR, Volume 2, Change 358 (NAVSO P-6034-2-358), at an estimated contract price of $6,340.00. See Notice of Filing, Scott Declaration, Attachment 2. The JFTRs covered by both of these print orders had a common ship/delivery date, July 12, 1995. See Notice of Filing, Scott Declaration, Attachments 1 and 2. 7. On June 23, 1995, the Appellant notified the Respondent that its paper supplier, Sabin Robbins (hereinafter Sabin), had reneged on its promise to provide the required paper stock at its previously quoted price, and instead had increased its prices 30%. See R4 File, Tab Q. See also Scott Declaration, ¶ 7. Moreover, the Appellant said its supplier had indicated that it would take at least four weeks to supply the large quantities of paper needed to perform the contract. See R4 File, Tab Q. The Appellant concluded: "[u]nder such sudden scarcity of paper, and increase in the cost, it is not possible to carry out the [contract]." Id. 8. The Contracting Officer interpreted the Appellant's letter as a claim of an error in bid, and invited it to submit proof in support of its claim.8 See R4 File, Tab R. See also Scott Declaration, ¶ 7. By facsimile transmission, dated June 27, 1995, the Contractor responded to the Contracting Officer's invitation by submitting an affidavit, signed by Dass, and copies of its worksheets for this purpose. See R4 File, Tab S. The Appellant justified its error in bid claim on three grounds: (a) a drastic increase in the cost of paper; (b) a limited availability of the needed required paper in the required quantities; and (c) an inability to hold the price due to a continuous rise in the cost of paper and its timely availability. Id. See also Scott Declaration, ¶ 7. Finally, the Contractor said because of these mistakes its original bid should have been nearly 50% higher; i.e., $605.059.52, not $405,404.62. See R4 File, Tab S. 9. When the Contracting Officer evaluated the evidence provided by the Appellant, he concluded that there was no error in bid, but rather the problem rested squarely with the paper supplier. See R4 File, Tab T. Specifically, in his memorandum to the CRB,9 the Contracting Officer explained, in pertinent part: * * * * * * * * * * Award was based on prices being considered fair and reasonable based on the current contract prices. In addition, during the certification process, on June 1, 1995[,] the [C]ontractor reviewed the bid specifications and confirmed his prices in writing. The terms and conditions of the contract and prices submitted were reviewed and confirmed for a second time with the [C]ontractor on June 8, 1995. * * * * * * * * * * In claims of mistakes in bid discovered after award, determinations favorable to the contractor, can be made only on the basis of clear and convincing evidence of the error claimed and of the bid actually intended, and that either the mistake was mutual or the unilateral mistake made by the contractor was so apparent as to have charged the Contracting Officer with constructive notice of the probability of mistake. In this case, although the price submitted was low, the contractor reviewed the bid specifications and confirmed the prices submitted twice before award. Therefore, the Contracting Officer was not on notice of an error. Id. 10. By letter dated June 30, 1995, the Contracting Officer denied the Appellant's post-award mistake in bid claim, and refused its request to correct the offer or withdraw it. See R4 File, Tab U. See also Scott Declaration, ¶ 8. The Contracting Officer also told the Contractor, in effect, that it was expected to perform the work at "the contract prices as awarded . . .". See R4 File, Tab U. 11. On July 12, 1995, the contract due dates for Print Orders 20001 and 20002, the Contracting Officer received a letter from Dass informing him that Appellant was unable to purchase sufficient quantities of paper to complete the work on those orders, and thus he was returning the Print Orders, along with the Government-furnished camera copy, to the Respondent. See R4 File, Tab V. See also Scott Declaration, ¶ 9. The Contractor stated, in pertinent part: . . . [W]e have only been able to get 212,000 of [the] sheets of 23 x 35 to start the completion of above print orders. The paper company has informed us that the balance of 240,000 sheets which will be required to complete both print orders will be delivered sometime in [the] next forty-five days. Even this approximate time of delivery of [the] paper is not a certain period of time. Further, I want to reassure you that we do wish to complete this program, but in [the] absence of required paper to be delivered to us on time we are just unable to carry out with this program. Moreover, you would notice our sincere efforts from the enclosed list of some new equipment that we have purchased within the past week just to comply with this program.10 Therefore, the failure to perform is caused by the absence of availability of required paper which is beyond our control or negligence, . . . . Consequently, we are unable to complete the above program, and regretfully return the above print orders and the manuscripts to your attention. See R4 File, Tab V.11 12. On July 18, 1995, the Contracting Officer sought the CRB's approval to terminate Print Orders 20001 and 20002, as well as the balance of the contract for default, because of the Appellant's stated inability to perform.12 See R4 File, Tab W. The Contracting Officer's memorandum also requested permission to reprocure the work without the small disadvantage business set aside, and to charge any excess reprocurement costs to the Contractor. Id. He received the CRB's concurrence on July 19, 1995. Id. 13. That same day (July 19, 1995), GPO issued Print Order 30854 to News Printing, Inc. (News Printing), reprocuring the work under Print Order 20002. See Notice of Filing, Scott Declaration,¶ 12, Attachment 3; Jones Declaration, ¶ 4. The Print Order 20001 job was repurchased the next day (July 20, 1995), by the issuance of Print Order 30853 to Braceland Brothers, Inc. (Braceland). See Notice of Filing, Scott Declaration, ¶ 12, Attachment 3; Jones Declaration, ¶ 2. The two defaulted print orders were reprocured under Program A814-M, an already existing "general usage" printing contract.13 See Notice of Filing, Scott Declaration, ¶¶ 11, 12. The reason for choosing Program A814-M as the reprocurement vehicle was because the Navy had an immediate need for the overdue JFTRs, and a reaward following readvertisement would have taken too long. See Notice of Filing, Scott Declaration, ¶ 11; Attachment 5. Indeed, the "Ship/Delivery Date" box on both Print Orders 30853 and 30854 were annotated "MUST!" See Notice of Filing, Attachment 3. 14. A week later, by letter dated July 26, 1995, and captioned "Notice of Termination-Complete," (Notice) the Contracting Officer notified the Appellant that its contract was terminated for default because of its inability to perform. See R4 File, Tab X. See also Scott Declaration, ¶ 10. The Notice also told the Contractor that if the Government exercised its right to repurchase the same or similar items, the Contractor would be liable for excess reprocurement costs. Id. GPO's Financial Management Service (FMS) was advised of the default the same day, and asked to recover any excess costs from the Appellant. See Notice of Filing, Scott Declaration, ¶ 12, Attachment 3. 15. On August 2, 1995, while the Respondent was in the process of readvertising Program C37-S, the Navy requested changes to the contract's specifications. See Notice of Filing, Scott Declaration, ¶ 13, Attachment 4. Although the customer agency was informed that alterations in the contract terms would terminate the Government's right to recover any future excess reprocurement costs, the Navy insisted that the changes be made, and Program C37-S be reprocured as amended. Id. Accordingly, the Contracting Officer canceled the reprocurement, rewrote the specifications, and rebid the contract. Id. The Navy's changes to the specifications for Program C37-S resulted in limiting the Appellant's liability for excess reprocurement costs to the JFTRs covered by Print Orders 20001 (Print Order 30853) and 20002 (Print Order 30854). See Notice of Filing, Scott Declaration, ¶ 14. 16. The record shows that after the work was completed on Print Order 30853, Braceland was paid $23,264.12 ($23,736.36 minus the prompt payment discount of two (2) percent) by Electronic Funds Transfer (EFT) on August 24, 1995, and that the excess reprocurement costs assessed against the Appellant for this print order was $167.20. See Notice of Filing, Scott Declaration, ¶ 14; Jones Declaration, ¶ 3. Similarly, when News Printing finished its job under Print Order 30854, it was paid $7,100.98 ($7,118.49 minus the prompt payment discount of one-quarter (1/4) percent) by EFT on September 5, 1995, and that excess costs recovered from the Contractor for this print order was $746.54. See Notice of Filing, Scott Declaration, ¶ 14; Jones Declaration, ¶ 5. Thus, the assessment of excess costs against the Appellant amounted to a total of $913.74. See SRPTC, at 5, n. 6. 17. By letter dated October 26, 1995, the Appellant timely appealed the Contracting Officer's termination and reprocurement decisions to the Board. II. POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES A. The Appellant The Appellant presents three arguments by way of a defense to the default. First, while it admits that it was unable to perform the contract, the Appellant places the onus for nonperformance on Sabin, its paper supplier, who could not furnish paper stock in the quantities and at the prices quoted to the Appellant during bid preparation. See Appellant's letter of December 12, 1995, at 1; Ressler Memorandum; Complaint, at 2; SRPTC, at 4. Since the paper subcontractor had no inkling that prices would rise, its inability to furnish printing stock was also beyond its control and without its fault or negligence.14 See App. R. Brf., at 4; Appellant's Letter of December 12, 1995, at 1; Ressler Memorandum; Complaint, at 2; SRPTC, at 4. Second, while the Appellant admits that it told the Contracting Officer it had the equipment and manpower to complete the work, it contends that award of the contract to it was still erroneous because the Contracting Officer knew, or should have known, that it was incapable of performing the job.15 See App. Brf., at 1-2; App. R. Brf., at 1-3; Complaint, at 1; SRPTC, at 4. Finally, the Appellant contends that the Respondent, in bad faith, literally forced the contract on it, knowing that paper costs would rise, for the sole purpose of driving it out of business. See App. Brf., at 2; App. R. Brf., at 5; SRPTC, at 4-5. Accordingly, the Appellant demands that the default termination be set aside, and that it be awarded damages in the amount of approximately $138,000.00 as compensation for the losses it suffered in connection with the contract, including the costs of paper and other materials, the price of leased and purchased machinery, and indirect losses such as equipment and labor downtime. See App. Brf., at 3; App. R. Brf., at 6; SRPTC, at 5. B. The Respondent The Respondent asserts that the Appellant's contract was properly terminated for default, and the Government was entitled to recover the excess reprocurement costs from the Appellant, as provided for under the terms of the contract. See R. Brf., at 5-6, 11; SRPTC, at 5. GPO states that as the Contractor's default is undisputed, thus entitling the Government to terminate the contract immediately, see R. Brf., at 5 (citing GPO Contract Terms, Contract Clauses, ¶ 20 (Default); Riggs Engineering Co., ASBCA No. 26509, 82-2 BCA ¶ 15,955; M.H. Colvin Co., GSBCA No. 5209, 79-2 BCA ¶ 13,981; National Farm Equipment Co., GSBCA No. 4921, 78-1 BCA ¶ 13,195), the only issue in this case is whether or not the reason given by the Appellant for its default is enough to forgive its nonperformance, see R. Brf., at 5; SRPTC, at 5. In that regard, the Government submits that the Contractor has failed to carry its burden of showing that its proffered excuse for the default-Sabin could not supply the required amount of paper at the prices quoted at the time the bid was prepared- occurred for reasons beyond the control of both the Appellant and its paper supplier, and without the fault or negligence of either, as required by the contract's "Default" clause, see R. Brf., at 6- 7, 11 (citing GPO Contract Terms, Contract Clauses, ¶¶ 20(c),(d); Beco, Inc., ASBCA No. 9702, 1964 BCA ¶ 4493; Woodside Screw Machine Co., ASBCA No. 6936, 1962 BCA ¶ 3308; Williams Drapery Co., ASBCA No. 5484, 61-2 BCA ¶ 3111, aff'd, 177 Ct. Cl. 776, 369 F.2d 729 (1966)), or that it could have performed on time but for the event claimed as an excusable delay, see R. Brf., at 7 (citing Lee K. Geiger Construction Co., GSBCA Nos. 2152, 2164, 67-1 BCA ¶ 6189; American Construction Co., GSBCA No. 1097, 65-2 BCA ¶ 4964). Instead, the Government believes that the real reason for the default was the Appellant's unwillingness or inability to buy the paper stock at the prices being asked by its supplier.16 See R. Brf., at 8-9 (citing R4 File, Tabs Q and S; Appellant's Letter of December 12, 1995, at 1; Ressler Memorandum). However, a contractor's poor financial condition will not excuse a default, see R. Brf., at 9 (citing Summitt Group, ASBCA No. 45138, 93-3 BCA ¶ 26,240; Karpak Data and Design, IBCA No. 2944, 93-1 BCA ¶ 23,360), since its financing is a matter solely within its control, and it is obligated to ensure that it has adequate financial resources to perform when it signs a contract with the Government, id. (citing Southeastern Airways Corp. v. United States, 230 Ct. Cl. 47, 673 F.2d 368 (1982); Marwel Engineering Co., ASBCA No. 17758, 74-2 BCA ¶ 10788; Schaecher-Kux Lumber Co., ASBCA No. 1390 (1953)).17 Indeed, the Government contends that contractors who submit bids when prices are volatile, assume the risks of increases in material costs. See R. Brf., at 10 (citing Aargus Poly Bag, GSBCA No. 4314, 76-2 BCA ¶ 11,927; So Ros Sahakij, Ltd., ASBCA No. 19238, 75-1 BCA ¶ 11,028. The Respondent states that the Appellant was ultimately responsible for obtaining the materials necessary to perform the contract, and the fact that paper could not be obtained except at a cost greater than the price on which its bid was based is not an excuse for the default. See R. Brf., at 10-11 (citing Environmental Devices, Inc., ASBCA No. 37430, 93-3 BCA ¶ 26,138; C & M Machine Products, Inc., ASBCA No. 43348, 93-2 BCA ¶ 25,748; Free-Flow Packaging Corp., GSBCA No. 3992, 75-1 BCA ¶ 11,105, reconsid. denied, 75-1 BCA ¶ 11,332; Betsy Ross Flag Co., ASBCA No. 12124, 67-2 BCA ¶ 6688). Consequently, GPO submits that the record is devoid of any evidence which would demonstrate that the Contractor's default was excusable for a legitimate or recognized reason. See R. Brf., at 11; SRPTC, at 5. As for the Contractor's other contentions-that the Contracting Officer's determination of responsibility was erroneous, and that the job was awarded in bad faith-GPO gives them no credence whatsoever. See R. R. Brf., at 2-4. In brief, the Respondent believes that the Contractor's challenge to GPO's "responsibility" finding reflects an inadequate understanding of the rules applicable to bidding on Government contracts, see R. R. Brf., at 1-3 (citing Ubique, Ltd., DOTCAB 71-28, 72-1 BCA ¶ 9340; Valveaire, Aircraft Division Abbotwares, ASBCA No. 8322, 1964 BCA ¶ 4177; Polytronic Research, Inc., ASBCA No. 5918, 1962 BCA ¶ 3548; Hunter Outdoor Products, 54 Comp. Gen. 276 (1974), 74-2 CPD ¶ 207; Paul Shnitzer, Government Contract Bidding, at 5-2 (3rd ed. 1992)), and its "bad faith" argument is not supported by the requisite "well-nigh irrefragable" proof showing that the Contracting Officer specifically set out to harm the Appellant, see R. R. Brf, at 4 (citing Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. United States, 847 F.2d 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Sanders v. United States, 801 F.2d 1328 (Fed. Cir. 1986); American General Leasing v. United States, Inc., 218 Ct. Cl. 367, 587 F.2d 54 (1979); Kalvar Corp. Inc. v. United States, 211 Ct. Cl. 192, 543 F.2d 1298 (1976), cert. denied 434 U.S. 830 (1977); Librach v. United States, 147 Ct. Cl. 605 (1959); Marine Construction & Dredging, Inc., ASBCA Nos. 38412, 38538, 38913, 39246, 39860, 39913, 40286, 42513, 95-1 BCA ¶ 27,286).18 Finally, the Government argues that the Appellant's objections to the recovery of excess reprocurement costs are equally unavailing, since the Notice expressly told the Contractor that it would be responsible for such costs, and besides the law mandates that the costs be recovered.19 See R. R. Brf., at 4-5 (citing Maryland Small Business Development Financing Authority v. United States, 4 Cl. Ct. 76 (1983); Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. United States, 526 F.2d 1127 (Ct. Cl. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 973, 96A S.Ct. 2172 (1976); SRPTC, at 5 (citing GPO Contract Terms, Contract Clauses, ¶ 20 (b) (Default); PPR, Chap. XIV, Sec. 1, ¶3(f)). Accordingly, for these reasons, the Respondent contends that it is entitled to judgment in its favor, and urges the Board to deny the appeal. See R. Brf., at 11; R. R. Brf., at 5. III. ISSUES PRESENTED20 1. Does the Board have jurisdiction over the Appellant's assertion that the Contracting Officer's determination that it was a responsible contractor was faulty, and therefore, his award of the contract to it was erroneous? Stated otherwise, has the Appellant shown that the Respondent awarded the contract in bad faith, with the specific intent to force the Contractor out of business? 2. Does the Board have jurisdiction to grant the Appellant's demand for damages in the amount of approximately $138,000.00 to compensate it for any losses it might have suffered in connection with the contract; e.g., the price of leased and purchased machinery? 3. Was the Contracting Officer's decision to terminate the contract for default proper and correct, or has the Contractor shown that its failure to perform arose from causes beyond its control and without its fault or negligence, or beyond the control and without the fault or negligence of its paper supplier, Sabin? 4. Was the Respondent's award of the reprocurement contracts to News Printing and Braceland prior to the date of default such a procedural defect as would forfeit the Government's right to excess reprocurement costs? 5. Has the Respondent proved its claim of entitlement to excess reprocurement costs in this case, and if so, in what amount? IV. DISCUSSION In this case, it is undisputed that the Appellant failed to perform the contract, and that there was adequate justification for the Contracting Officer to terminate the contract for default. The only question remaining, therefore, is has the Contractor presented a legally sufficient excuse so that the Board may hold it blameless for the default, and forgive its liability for excess reprocurement costs? At the outset, therefore, it is worthwhile to repeat the legal principles which apply to these issues. First, GPO's "Default" clause provides that a contracting officer may, upon written notice of default to the contractor, terminate a contract, in whole or in part, if the contractor fails to: (1) deliver the supplies or perform the required services within the time specified or any extension which may have been granted; (2) make progress on the work, so as to endanger performance of the contract; or (3) perform any of the other provisions of the contract. See GPO Contract Terms, Contract Clauses, ¶ 20(a)(1) (I),(ii),(iii). Furthermore, where a contract is terminated for default and the work must be reprocured, the contractor will be held responsible for excess procurement costs and possible liquidated damages. See GPO Contract Terms, Contract Clauses, ¶¶ 20(b), 22(d). However, the contractor is excused from paying such reprocurement costs or damages if the failure to perform or to deliver on time results from causes beyond its control and without its fault or negligence.21 See GPO Contract Terms, Contract Clauses, ¶¶ 20(c), 22(e), 23. Such causes include, but are not limited to, acts of God or of the public enemy, acts of the Government in either its sovereign or contractual capacity, fires, floods, epidemics, quarantine restrictions, strikes, freight embargoes, and unusually severe weather-but in each case, the failure to perform must be beyond the control and without the fault or negligence of the contractor. See GPO Contract Terms, Contract Clauses, ¶ 20(c). See also Gold Country Litho, GPO BCA 22-93 (September 30, 1996), slip op. at 14, 1996 WL _____; A & E Copy Center, supra, slip op. at 15; Big Red Enterprises, GPO BCA 07-93 (August 30, 1996), slip op. at 24, 1996 WL _____; Asa L. Shipman's Sons, Ltd., GPO BCA 06-95 (August 29, 1995), slip op. at 16, 1995 WL 818784, reconsid. denied, 1996 WL _____ (February 13, 1996); Univex International, supra, slip op. at 17; K.C. Printing Co., GPO BCA 02-91 (February 22, 1995), slip op. at 9, 1995 WL 488531; Printing Unlimited, GPO BCA 21-90 (November 30, 1993), slip op. at 16, 1993 WL 516844; Chavis and Chavis Printing, GPO BCA 20-90 (February 6, 1991), slip. op. at 11, 1991 WL 439270. Where the failure to perform is caused by the default of a supplier or subcontractor, the cause of the default must be beyond the control of both the contractor and subcontractor, and without the fault or negligence of either, in order for the contractor not to be liable for any excess costs for failure to perform, unless the subcontracted supplies or services could have been secured from other sources in sufficient time to meet the required delivery schedule. See GPO Contract Terms, Contract Clauses, ¶ 20(d). See also Gold Country Litho, supra, slip op. at 14-15; A & E Copy Center, supra, slip op. at 15; Big Red Enterprises, supra, slip op. at 24; Asa L. Shipman's Sons, Ltd., supra, slip op. at 16; Univex International, supra, slip op. at 17; K.C. Printing Co., supra, slip op. at 10; Chavis and Chavis Printing, supra, slip op. at 11. Second, a default termination is a drastic action which may only be taken for good cause and on the basis of solid evidence.22 See Gold Country Litho, supra, slip op. at 15; A & E Copy Center, supra, slip op. at 16; Big Red Enterprises, supra, slip op. at 24; Asa L. Shipman's Sons, Ltd., supra, slip op. at 16; Univex International, supra, slip op. at 17; K.C. Printing Co., supra, slip op. at 10; Shepard Printing, GPO BCA 23-92 (April 29, 1993), slip op. at 10, 1993 WL 526848; R.C. Swanson Printing and Typesetting Co., GPO BCA 31-90 (February 6, 1992), slip op. at 25, 1992 WL 487874, aff'd, Civil Action No. 92-128C (U.S. Claims Court, October 2, 1992) (unpublished);23 Stephenson, Inc., GPO BCA 2-88 (December 20, 1991), slip op. at 20, 1991 WL 439274 (citing Mary Rogers Manley d/b/a Mary Rogers Real Estate, HUDBCA No. 76-27, 78-2 BCA ¶ 13,519; Decatur Realty Sales, HUDBCA No. 75-26, 77-2 BCA ¶ 12,567). Consequently, the Government has the burden of proving the basis for the default, while the contractor has the burden of showing that its failure to perform was excusable. See Gold Country Litho, supra, slip op. at 15; A & E Copy Center, supra, slip op. at 16; Big Red Enterprises, supra, slip op. at 25; Asa L. Shipman's Sons, Ltd., supra, slip op. at 16-17; Univex International, supra, slip op. at 18; K.C. Printing Co., supra, slip op. at 10; Shepard Printing, supra, slip op. at 11; R.C. Swanson Printing and Typesetting Co., supra, slip op. at 28; Chavis and Chavis Printing, supra, slip op. at 11. Accord Lisbon Contractors v. United States, 828 F.2d 759 (Fed. Cir. 1987)); Switlik Parachute Co. v. United States, 216 Ct. Cl. 362 (1978); J.F. Whalen and Co., AGBCA Nos. 83-160-1, 83-281-1, 88-3 BCA ¶ 21,066; B. M. Harrison Electrosonics, Inc., ASBCA No. 7684, 1963 BCA ¶ 3,736. A failure by the Government to meet its burden of proof converts the default into a termination for convenience, and the contractor is allowed to recover for the work performed. See GPO Contract Terms, Contract Clauses, ¶ 20(g). See also Gold Country Litho, supra, slip op. at 16; A & E Copy Center, supra, slip op. at 16-17; Graphics Image, Inc., supra, slip. op. at 24-28. Cf. Big Red Enterprises, supra, slip op. at 25; Asa L. Shipman's Sons, Ltd., supra, slip op. at 17; Univex International, supra, slip op. at 18; K.C. Printing Co., supra, slip op. at 11; Stephenson, Inc., supra, slip op. at 17-18; Chavis and Chavis Printing, supra, slip op. at 9. Third, where the default termination is based on untimely performance, the contractor's burden of proof is four-fold: (1) to prove affirmatively that the delay was caused by or arose out of a situation which was beyond the contractor's control and that it was not at fault or negligent; (2) to show that performance would have been timely but for the occurrence of the event which is claimed to excuse the delay; (3) to show that it took every reasonable precaution to avoid foreseeable causes for delay and to minimize their effect; and (4) to establish a precise period of time that performance was delayed by the causes alleged. See Gold Country Litho, supra, slip op. at 16; Big Red Enterprises, supra, slip op. at 26; Asa L. Shipman's Sons, Ltd., supra, slip op. at 17; Univex International, supra, slip op. at 18-19; K.C. Printing Co., supra, slip op. at 11; Chavis and Chavis Printing, supra, slip op. at 12. This burden must be carried by substantial evidence-unsupported reasons by way of explanation are not enough-and the contractor must also show that the delay in contract performance was due to unforeseeable causes beyond its control and without any contributory negligence on its part. See Gold Country Litho, supra, slip op. at 16-17; Big Red Enterprises, supra, slip op. at 26; Asa L. Shipman's Sons, Ltd., supra, slip op. at 18; Univex International, supra, slip op. at 19; K.C. Printing Co., supra, slip op. at 11; Chavis and Chavis Printing, supra, slip op. at 12-13. Finally, a default termination is a discretionary act which can be challenged on an abuse of discretion standard. See Gold Country Litho, supra, slip op. at 17; A & E Copy Center, supra, slip op. at 17; Big Red Enterprises, supra, slip op. at 26; Asa L. Shipman's Sons, Ltd., supra, slip op. at 18; Univex International, supra, slip op. at 19; K.C. Printing Co., supra, slip op. at 12; Graphics Image, Inc., supra, slip op. at 24-25; Shepard Printing, supra, slip op. at 12. Accord Darwin Construction Co., Inc. v. United States, 811 F.2d 593 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Quality Environment Systems v. United States, 7 Cl. Ct. 428 (1985); Jamco Constructors, Inc., VABCA Nos. 3271, 3516T, 94-1 BCA ¶ 26,405, reconsid. denied, 94-2 BCA ¶ 26,792; Walsky Construction Co., ASBCA No. 41541, 94-1 BCA ¶ 26.264, reconsid. denied, 94-2 BCA ¶ 26,698. The burden is on the contractor to prove abuse of discretion. See Gold Country Litho, supra, slip op. at 17; A & E Copy Center, supra, slip op. at 18; Big Red Enterprises, supra, slip op. at 26; Asa L. Shipman's Sons, Ltd., supra, slip op. at 18; Univex International, supra, slip op. at 19; K.C. Printing Co., supra, slip op. at 12; Shepard Printing, supra, slip op. at 12. Accord Kit Pack Co., Inc., ASBCA No. 33135, 89-3 BCA ¶ 22,151; Lafayette Coal Co., ASBCA No. 32174, 89-3 BCA ¶ 21,963. Applying these principles to this record, the Board reaches the following conclusions: A. The Board has no jurisdiction over the Appellant's challenge to the Contracting Officer's "responsibility" determination. Moreover, the Contractor has not shown that the Contracting Officer was acting in bad faith when he awarded the contract. Aside from its allegations concerning the actual merits of the default action, the Appellant has raised two ancillary matters which need to be addressed beforehand because they relate to the Board's jurisdiction. The first is triggered by the Contractor's contention that the Contracting Officer's "responsibility" finding was erroneous, and therefore, his award of the contract to it was improper. Specifically, from the very outset the Appellant has maintained that the Contracting Officer knew, or should have known, that it did not possess the manpower or the equipment to do the work, notwithstanding its assurances to the contrary, and therefore it should not have been awarded the contract.24 See App. Brf., at 1-2; App. R. Brf., at 1-3; Complaint, at 1; SRPTC, at 4. In effect, the Contractor is challenging the Contracting Officer's responsibility determination in this case. However, the Board believes that it has no jurisdiction to decide such pre-award determinations. Id. See PPR, Chap. I, Sec. 5, ¶¶ 1-5; GPO Contract Terms, Contract Clauses, ¶ 5(a) (Disputes); Board Rules, Preface to Rules, ¶ I (Jurisdiction). The Respondent thinks that the Appellant's "responsibility" protest raises an issue of first impression with the Board. See R. R. Brf., at 1. However, in Big Red Enterprises, a GPO contractor made a similar challenge. In that case, a "Quality Level 4" contractor bid on and was awarded a "Quality Level 3" job,25 which it ultimately could not produce, and was defaulted. On appeal from the termination decision, it argued, inter alia, that as "Quality Level 4" contractor it could not be held liable for its inability to produce "Quality Level 3" work. The Board found the contractor's position "easily disposed of." See Big Red Enterprises, supra, slip op. at 36. In rejecting the contractor's contentions, the Board reasoned: . . . [T]he Contractor is basically asking the Board to review the Contracting Officer's responsibility determination. Stated otherwise, the Appellant is in effect protesting its own award. However, Federal Government contract appeals boards, as a rule, have no jurisdiction over bid protests, but rather are limited to hearing post-award and not pre-award disputes. [Footnote omitted.] See Carolina Oil Distributing Co., Inc., ASBCA No. 48093, 95-2 BCA ¶ 27,797; Dill's Star Route, Inc., PSBCA No. 3699, 95-2 BCA ¶ 27,608; C & J Associates, VABCA No. 3924, 94-2 BCA ¶ 26,628. This is especially true in this case because the Board is not a creature of statute, but rather derives all of its powers from the "Disputes" clause of the contract itself, and thus its jurisdiction is narrowly defined. See Graphicdata, Inc., [GPO BCA 35-94 (June 14, 1996)], slip op. at 57; R.C. Swanson Printing and Typesetting Co., GPO BCA 15-90 (March 6, 1992), slip op. at 26-27, 1992 WL 382924; The Wessel Co., Inc., GPO BCA 8-90 (February 28, 1992), slip op. at 32, 1992 WL 487877; Automated Datatron, Inc., GPO BCA 20-87 (March 31, 1989), slip op. at 4-5, 1989 WL 384973; Bay Printing, Inc., GPO BCA 16-85 (January 30, 1987), slip op. at 9, 1987 WL 228967; Peak Printers, Inc., GPO BCA 12-85 (November 12, 1986), slip op. at 6, 1986 WL 181453. See generally, Matthew S. Foss, U.S. Government Printing Office Board of Contract Appeals: The First Decade, 24 PUB. CONT. L. J. 579, 584-85 (1995) (hereinafter Foss, The First Decade). Specifically, as the Board interprets GPO Instruction 110.10C, Subject: Establishment of the Board of Contract Appeals, dated September 17, 1984-its "enabling statute"-and the jurisdictional provisions of its rules of practice and procedure, see Board Rules, Preface to Rules, ¶ I (Jurisdiction), it sees its authority as purely derivative and contractual, and has consistently confined the exercise of its remedial powers to the contract before it. See GraphicData, Inc., supra, slip op. at 57; Shepard Printing, Inc., supra, slip op. at 9, fn. 8; R.D. Printing Associates, Inc., GPO BCA 2-92 (December 16, 1992) slip op. at 9, 13, fns. 9, 15, 1992 WL 516088; Peak Printers, Inc., supra, slip op. at 6. See also Automated Datatron, Inc.,supra, slip op. at 4-5 ("The Public Printer has not under the provision of paragraph 5 of GPO Instruction 110.10C delegated authority to this Board to consider legal questions existing outside the contract itself."). Accord Wehran Engineering Corp., GSBCA No. 6055-NAFC, 84-3 BCA ¶ 17,614. See generally, Foss, The First Decade, at 585-86. Furthermore, the Respondent's printing regulations clearly state that protests of GPO contracts must be taken to either the agency's Office of the General Counsel or General Accounting Office-the Board has been assigned no role in this process. See PPR, Chap. X, Sec. 2, ¶¶ 1.(b), 2-3. . . . [T]o the extent that it can be said that the Appellant's allegation may be "related to" the contract, much like a "mistake in bid" claim, see e.g., Web Business Forms, Inc., GPO BCA 16-89 (September 30, 1994), slip op. 27,1994 WL 837423; Peak Printers, Inc., supra, slip op. at 6; Great Lakes Lithograph Co., GPO BCA 18-84 (May 22, 1985), slip op. at 18, 1985 WL 154849, the well- settled rule is that if a determination with respect to a contractor's reliability and dependability is made in good faith and is reasonable under the applicable law and regulations, it should be upheld. See Wright Industries, Inc., ASBCA No. 18282, 78-2 BCA ¶ 13,396, at 65,492 (citing Warren Brothers Roads Co. v. United States, 173 Ct. Cl. 714, 720-21 (1965); Coastal Cargo Co., Inc. v. United States, 173 Ct. Cl. 259 (1965); Brown & Son Electric Co. v. United States, 163 Ct. Cl. 465 (1963)). It has also been held with respect to determinations of responsibility and responsiveness that a contracting officer has authority, when acting in good faith and in a manner reasonable under the circumstances, to make a valid award to an otherwise unqualified bidder. See Wright Industries, Inc., supra, 78-2 BCA at 65,492 (citing John Reiner & Company v. United States, 163 Ct. Cl. 381 (1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 931 (1964); 46 Comp. Gen. 275 (1966); 44 Comp. Gen. 221 (1964)). The Board has just found that the record in this case contains no evidence of bad faith on the part of the Respondent in its dealings with the Contractor. Nor can it be said, under all of the circumstances in this appeal, that the Contracting Officer was arbitrary or capricious in deciding that the Appellant was qualified for award of the contract. Accordingly, for these reasons, the Board agrees with the Government that once the Contractor submitted its offer and accepted the contract, which clearly showed that it was expected to produce a Quality Level 3 product, it was obligated to perform in accordance with the specifications, and it is no excuse for the Appellant to now claim that it was only a Quality Level 4 contractor. See Big Red Enterprises, supra, slip op. at 37-39. [Emphasis added.] Here, as in Big Red Enterprises, the Board's limited jurisdiction prevents it from reviewing the Contracting Officer's determination that the Appellant was a responsible contractor. Similarly, as in that case, the Board also finds nothing in this record which would support the conclusion that the Respondent acted in bad faith in dealing with the Contractor, or that the Contracting Officer arbitrarily or capriciously decided that the Appellant was qualified for award of the contract. In that regard, the Board has said on numerous occasions that an allegation of bad faith must be established by "well-nigh irrefragable proof" because there is a strong presumption that Government officials properly and honestly carry out their functions.26 See Big Red Enterprises, supra, slip op. at 36-37; MPE Business Forms, Inc., GPO BCA 10-95 (August 16, 1996), slip op. at 27-28, fn. 34, 1996 WL_____; New South Press & Assoc., Inc., GPO BCA 14-92 (January 31, 1996), slip op. at 36, 1996 WL 112555; Asa L. Shipman's Sons, Ltd., supra, slip op. at 12, fn. 16; Professional Printing of Kansas, Inc., GPO BCA 2-93 (May 19, 1995), slip op. at 43, fn. 58, 1995 WL 488488; Universal Printing Co., GPO BCA 09-90 (June 22, 1994), slip op. at 24, fn. 24, 1994 WL 377586; B. P. Printing and Office Supplies, GPO BCA 14-91 (August 10, 1992), slip op. at 16, 1992 WL 382917; Stephenson, Inc., supra, slip op. at 54; The Standard Register Co., GPO BCA 4-86 (October 28, 1987), slip op. at 12-13, 1987 WL 228972. Accord Brill Brothers, Inc., ASBCA No. 42573, 94-1 BCA ¶ 26,352; Karpak Data and Design, supra; Local Contractors, Inc., ASBCA No. 37108, 92-1 BCA ¶ 24,491. The key to such evidence is that there must be a showing of specific intent on the part of the Government to injure the Contractor. See Big Red Enterprises, supra, slip op. at 37; MPE Business Forms, Inc., supra, slip op. at 27-28, fn. 34; New South Press & Assoc., Inc., supra, slip op. at 36, fn. 52; Stephenson, Inc., supra, slip op. at 54. Accord Kalvar Corp. Inc. v. United States, supra, 211 Ct. Cl. at 199, 543 F.2d at 1302. See also Solar Turbines, Inc. v. United States, 23 Cl. Ct. 142 (1991). In the Board's view, no such "irrefragable proof" of the Respondent's bad faith exists in this record. Certainly, there is absolutely no evidence which would show that GPO by itself, or in concert with the Navy, specifically set out to harm the Appellant. See Big Red Enterprises, supra, slip op. at 37; Asa L. Shipman's Sons, Ltd., supra, slip op. at 12, fn 16; Stephenson, Inc., supra, slip op. at 57. Accordingly, the Board concludes that its rationale in Big Red Enterprises is equally applicable to this appeal, and dispositive of the "responsibility" issue raised by the Appellant. Therefore, for the reasons expressed that case, the Board finds no merit in the Contractor's assertion that the Contracting Officer's decision to award it the contract was erroneous, and rejects its protest of his pre-award determination. B. The Board also has no jurisdiction to grant the Appellant's demand for damages in the amount of approximately $138,000.00 to compensate it for its losses in connection with the contract; e.g., the price of leased and purchased machinery, because it is a breach of contract claim. The second jurisdictional issue is wrapped up in the Appellant's demand for damages of $138,000.00 to reimburse it for the money it spent, inter alia, on purchasing and leasing machinery and equipment to perform the contract.27 See App. Brf., at 3; App. R. Brf., at 6; SRPTC, at 5. In effect, the very nature of the Contractor's demand makes it a "pure" breach of contract claim, that is, a claim for damages not redressable under a specific contract provision. See The Wessel Co., Inc., supra, slip op. at 27, n.29. However, it is settled law that this Board has no jurisdiction over such breach of contract claims. See Id., slip op. at 27-28 (". . . [T]he Board . . . lacks the authority to entertain 'pure' breach of contract claims where redress is sought in the form of damages." [Original emphasis]); R.C. Swanson Printing and Typesetting Co.,supra, slip op. at 41. See also Cloverleaf Enterprises, Inc., GPOCAB 79-12 (May 9, 1980), slip op. at 10-11, 1980 WL 81267; Microform Data System, Inc., GPOCAB 3-79 (February 1, 1980), slip op. at 11-12, 1980 WL 81258; Information Systems, Inc., GPOCAB 78-11 (January 18, 1979), slip op. at 5-7, 1979 WL 28889; Harbor Printing & Copy Service, Inc., GPOCAB 77-5 (November 4, 1977), slip op. at 1, 1977 WL 24257.28 See generally, Foss, The First Decade, at 587. The Board's inability to consider "pure" breach of contract claims is mainly based on the same reasoning which prevents it from reviewing pre-award determinations made by GPO contracting officers; i.e., as a creature of contract, not of statute, the Board's remedial authority is strictly limited, and confined to the contract before it.29 See Olympic Graphic Systems, supra, slip op. 36; Big Red Enterprises, supra, slip op. at 38; GraphicData, II, supra, slip op. at 57; R.D. Printing Associates, Inc., GPO BCA 02-92 (December 16, 1992), slip op. at 9, 13, ns. 9, 15, 1992 WL 516088; R.C. Swanson Printing and Typesetting Co., supra, slip op. at 26-27; The Wessel Co., Inc., supra, slip op. at 32; Automated Datatron, Inc., supra, slip op. at 4-5; Bay Printing, Inc., supra, slip op. at 9; Peak Printers, Inc., supra, slip op. at 6. As a forum of limited jurisdiction whose remedial powers are tied to the clauses in the contract, the Board functions essentially as a pre-CDA board of contract appeals. See Olympic Graphic Systems, supra, slip op. 37; GraphicData, II, supra, slip op. at 85; R.C. Swanson Printing and Typesetting Co., GPO BCA 15-90, Supplemental Decision (July 1, 1993), slip op. at 28, 1993 WL 526638 (hereinafter Swanson Supp.); The Wessel Co., Inc.,supra, slip op. at 34. See also H.L. Eikenberg Co., GPOCAB No. 76-13 (May 9, 1979), slip op. at 35, n. 21. Accord United States v. Utah Construction and Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394 (1966); Jet Services, Inc., DOT CAB No. 77-14, 78-2 BCA ¶ 13,223; Blake Construction Co., Inc,, GSBCA No. 2205, 67-1 BCA ¶ 6,311. This simply means that the Board must take the agreement as it finds it, and unless the Board can locate the relief granting source within the "four corners" of the contract, its hands are tied, and the contractor will have to seek its remedy in another forum. See Olympic Graphic Systems, supra, slip op. 37; R.C. Swanson Printing and Typesetting Co., supra, slip op. at 40-41; The Wessel Co., Inc., supra, slip op. at 45-46. In other words, even if the Board concluded that the default was excusable in this case, its remedial authority would not encompass awarding the Appellant $138,000.00 as damages. Instead, as previously mentioned, the traditional remedy in such a case is to convert the default into a termination for the convenience of the Government and allow the contractor to recover for the work performed plus a reasonable profit.30 See Graphics Image, Inc., supra, slip. op. at 28; American Drafting & Laminating Co., GPO BCA 6-85 (April 15, 1986), slip op. at 17, 1986 WL 181459. See also New South Press & Assoc., Inc., supra, slip op. at 37; Swanson Supp., slip op. at 17-18; Graphic Litho Co., Inc., GPO BCA 17-85 (February 23, 1988), slip. op. at 10, 1988 WL 363329; Bay Ridge Press, GPOCAB 4-82 (September 15, 1983), Supplemental Decision, slip. at 3, 1983 WL 135370 (convenience termination cases). Accord Youngstrand Surveying, AGBCA No. 90-150-1, 92-2 BCA ¶ 25,017; Humphrey Logging Co., AGBCA Nos. 84-359-3, 85-204-3, 85-3 BCA ¶ 18,433); Chamberlain Manufacturing Corp.,ASBCA No. 16877, 73-2 BCA ¶ 10,139. Accordingly, for these reasons, the Appellant's claim of compensation in the amount of $138,000.00 for its expenditures on purchased and leased machinery and equipment to perform the contract, must be, and is hereby, DENIED. C. The Contractor has not shown that its failure to perform arose from causes beyond its control and without its fault or negligence, or beyond the control and without the fault or negligence of Sabin, its paper supplier. Therefore, the Contracting Officer's termination of the contract for default was not in error. In this case, the basis for default-the Appellant's failure to perform in accordance with the contract specifications-is not in question. Instead, the crux of the dispute involves the Contractor's belief that its nonperformance is excusable because its paper supplier, Sabin, could not (or would not) furnish paper to the Appellant at the prices it quoted during the bid preparation stage, and in the quantities needed to complete the contract. See Appellant's letter of December 12, 1995, at 1; Ressler Memorandum; Complaint, at 2; SRPTC, at 4. Furthermore, the Contractor believes that Sabin is also faultless because it had no way to predict that paper prices would rise steeply. See App. R. Brf., at 4; Appellant's Letter of December 12, 1995, at 1; Ressler Memorandum; Complaint, at 2; SRPTC, at 4. However, the key condition raised as an excuse -rising paper prices-is not such a circumstance as would excuse the Appellant's failure to perform. See Gold Country Litho, supra, slip op. at 22. This appeal bears a strong resemblance to the situation confronting the Board in Gold Country Litho. There, the contractor was the low bidder on a contract to provide 10,200 pads of Data Descriptor Labels (hereinafter DDLs) for the General Services Administration (GSA). Among other things, the IFB required that the paper stock for the DDLs be "White Opaque Vinyl equal in all respects to Fasson's 'TamperFas' Destructive Vinyl, G-70651." Because of the gap between its bid, and the next lowest bidder, GPO asked the contractor two times to review and confirm its bid price before it was awarded the contract. The contractor did so, but shortly after award it returned the job to the Government, stating, inter alia, that it could not do the work. When GPO asked for an explanation prior to defaulting the contract, the contractor responded, in pertinent part: Originally, Gum Papers of America (Manuel Cordova) said they would give Gold Country Lithography (my company), "terms" with the cost of materials to produce [the] job. Therefore, I was able to bid on this job (& [it] was also awarded). I was then referred (by Mr. Cordova) to the credit department when I was awarded the contract. At that point, Juan (credit mgr.) denied my credit. I could not get the monies to do [the] job so I got another supplier to send samples of another material that was simular [sic] & sent samples to Charles Washington to be approved. * * * * * * * * * * I was relying on the second paper company (Zellerbach Paper Company) to issue credit & was waiting for approval of the paper (of simular [sic] or equivalent stock) which has still been unapproved. See Gold Country Litho, slip op. at 7. Meanwhile, GPO's quality control staff had tested a sample of the label stock which had been submitted by the Contractor for approval and determined that was not equal to the specifications because the paper was not equal to Fasson's "TamperFas" Destructive Vinyl. Id., slip op. at 8. Accordingly, GPO terminated the contract for default because of the contractor's "inability to perform per specifications (stock not equal to Fasson's S-730 Tampas [sic] Destructible Vinyl)[,]" and reprocured the contract from the next lowest original bidder. See Gold Country Litho, slip op. at 8-9. On appeal to the Board, the contractor argued that GPO's default action was erroneous because its failure to perform was the fault of its stock supplier, who could not "produce the stock to match specifications at the cost that was given on the original bid," and it was unable to find a "comparable substitute." See Gold Country Litho, slip op. at 9, n. 7. To the Board, the contractor's defense boiled to two contentions: (1) its paper supplier could not provide stock equivalent to Fasson's "TamperFas" Destructible Vinyl; and (2) its poor financial condition precluded it from purchasing the label stock itself elsewhere. However, neither of these reasons, in the Board's view, fell within the range of acceptable occurrences or events which would excuse the contractor's failure to perform. See Gold Country Litho, slip op. at 18 (citing Chavis and Chavis Printing, supra, slip op. at 13; Jomar Enterprises, Inc., GPO BCA 13-86 (May 25, 1989), slip op. at 3-5). First, it seemed to the Board that the contractor's description of its unsuccessful attempt to acquire the label stock was nothing more than an allegation that somehow the Government breached its implied warranty of commercial availability. See Gold Country Litho, slip op. at 18-19. As a rule, before the Government can express its specifications in terms of a "brand name or equal" product (here the relevant contract language was "equal in all respects to Fasson's "TamperFas" Destructible Vinyl"), it has an obligation ". . . to ascertain and assure bidders of the commercial availability of the component from its manufacturer . . . , or failing that, to provide bidders with a sufficient description of the physical specifications and performance characteristics so that it may be duplicated by the bidders either by in-house fabrication or by purchase from suppliers[,]" see Gold Country Litho, slip op. at 19 (citing Aerodex, Inc. v. United States, 189 Ct. Cl. 344, 354, 417 F.2d 1361 (1969); S & D Construction Co., VABCA No. 3885, 95-2 BCA ¶ 27,609; Ocean Electric Corp., NASABCA 371-8, 73-2 BCA ¶ 10,335; John Cibinic, Jr. & Ralph C. Nash, Jr., Administration of Government Contracts 3d ed., (The George Washington University, 1995), at 284-86 (hereinafter Cibinic & Nash)). The Government's duty to the contractor is a narrow one; i.e.: . . . the Government only warrants that the product existed at the time of solicitation, and the contractor assumes the risk that the product may become unavailable. See James Reeves Contractor, Inc., ASBCA No. 44065, 95-2 BCA ¶ 27,718; Parker's Mechanical Constructors, Inc., ASBCA No. 29020, 84-2 BCA ¶ 17,427; Omega Construction Co., ASBCA No. 22705, 78-2 BCA ¶ 13,425. Similarly, the Government does not thereby become an a insurer that the product will be available within the time period contemplated for performance under the contract, see Franklin E. Penny Co. v. United States, 207 Ct. Cl. 842, 524 F.2d 668 (1975), or at a price and location which is less costly for the contractor, see Callison Construction Co., AGBCA No. 88-309-1, 92-3 BCA ¶ 25,071. In no case, however, does the implied warranty rule extend to unspecified equal products; i.e., the Government makes no promise that acceptable substitutes are available. See M.S.I. Corp., IBCA 554-4-66, 68-1 BCA ¶ 6983. See also WRB Corp. v. United States, 183 Ct. Cl. 409 (1968); James Walford Construction Co., GSBCA No. 6498, 83-1 BCA ¶ 16,277 (no warranty of commercial availability for generically described products or products of listed manufacturers). Stated otherwise, the law places on the contractor's shoulders the responsibility for determining the availability of the supplies, materials, and products necessary for performance prior to bidding, see Interstate Coatings, Inc. v. United States, 7 Cl. Ct. 259 (1985); ACS Construction Co., ASBCA No. 33832, 87-3 BCA ¶ 20,138, aff'd, 848 F.2d 1245 (Fed. Cir. 1988); DeLaval Turbine, Inc., ASBCA No. 21797, 78-2 BCA ¶ 13,521; Datametrics, Inc., ASBCA No. 16086, 74-2 BCA ¶ 10,742; Therm-Air Manufacturing Co., ASBCA No. 17128, 74-2 BCA ¶ 10,652, and the risk is not shifted to the Government just because the contractor experiences difficulty in that regard, see Pioneer Enterprises, Inc., ASBCA No. 43739, 93-1 BCA ¶ 25,395; Toyad Corp., ASBCA No. 26785, 85-3 BCA ¶ 18,354. See also Alabama Dry Dock & Shipbuilding Corp., ASBCA No. 39215, 90-2 BCA ¶ 22,855 (Government only warranted that the supplier could manufacture a conforming item, not that it would do so, and thus it was not liable when the supplier delivered defect items). See Gold Country Litho, slip op. at 20-21. [Original emphasis.] However, on a record which showed that: (1) the contractor's first paper supplier had said that its product was equivalent to Fasson's "TamperFas" Destructible Vinyl, but would not extend credit to the contractor to buy it; (2) its second paper company assured the contractor that its stock was also equivalent to Fasson's "TamperFas" Destructible Vinyl, but its samples failed GPO's quality control tests; and (3) Fasson had told the contractor it could supply the required paper stock, but only at a price which was prohibitive as far as the contractor was concerned, the Board had little trouble concluding that GPO had met the requirements of the law. See Gold Country Litho, slip op. at 21 (citing James Reeves Contractor, Inc., supra; Parker's Mechanical Constructors, Inc., supra; Omega Construction Co., supra). As the Board observed: [GPO] was not obligated to promise that label stock equal to Fasson's "TamperFas" Destructible Vinyl would be available from other suppliers, see WRB Corp. v. United States, supra; James Walford Construction Co., supra; M.S.I. Corp., supra, or that Fasson would sell the named material to the Appellant at a price it was willing to pay, see Callison Construction Co., supra. Rather, it was the Contractor's duty to determine the availability of equal paper stock at a price it could afford (if it did not want to or could not purchase "TamperFas" Destructible Vinyl from Fasson) prior to submitting its bid. See Interstate Coatings, Inc. v. United States, supra; ACS Construction Co., supra; DeLaval Turbine, Inc., supra; Datametrics, Inc., supra; Therm-Air Manufacturing Co., supra. The Respondent is not responsible for any difficulties or frustrations experienced by the Appellant in its efforts to obtain label stock which would satisfy the requirements of the contract. See Pioneer Enterprises, Inc., supra; Toyad Corp., supra. See Gold Country Litho, slip op. at 21-22. [Emphasis added.] Therefore, in the Board's view, the contractor alone was responsible, under the circumstances, for its failure to obtain acceptable label stock prior to default. See Gold Country Litho, slip op. at 22. Next, the Board also rejected the contractor's claim that its failure to perform was due to the financial difficulty it was having at the time, which limited its options with respect to purchasing proper label stock. The Board thought that this second excuse identified the real reason the contractor was unable to perform the contract. However, the Board observed that: It is "black letter" law that a contractor is responsible for having the labor, plant, equipment, material and finances adequate for contract performance prior to making a contract commitment with the Government. See K.C. Printing Co., supra, slip op. at 15; Chavis and Chavis Printing, supra, slip op. at 14-15. The reason for this rule is simple-implicit in a contractor's promise to perform is its assurance that it has the ability to perform. See K.C. Printing Co., supra, slip op. at 15; Chavis and Chavis Printing, supra, slip op. at 14. See Gold Country Litho, slip op. at 22-23. In this regard, the basic rule with regard to contractor finances was stated by the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA) in Dependable Metal Products, Inc., ASBCA Nos. 41446, 41449, 94-3 BCA ¶ 26,963. In that case, the contractor's failure to provide evidence from its bank that the bank's negative financing decision was based on Government action or inaction, as contended by the contractor, resulted in the ASBCA's rejection of the contractor's attempt to excuse its default based on its financial problems. As the ASBCA observed: While we hear appellant argue that repudiation was compelled, in part, by a decision of a lender not to provide additional financing, the general rule is that a contractor assumes the risk of assuring adequate financing to perform the work. Southeastern Airways Corporation v. United States [29 CCF ¶ 82,261], 673 F.2d 368 (Ct. Cl. 1982); International Equipment Services, Inc., ASBCA Nos. 21104, 23170, 83-2 BCA ¶ 16,675. There is an exception where the contractor can show that financing was denied because of Government wrongdoing. TGC Contracting Corporation v. United States [32 CCF ¶ 73,655], 736 F.2d 1512 (Fed. Cir. 1984). See Dependable Metal Products, Inc., supra, 94-3 BCA ¶ 26,963, at 134,264. [Emphasis added.] See also K.C. Printing Co., supra, slip op. at 16. Compare Litchfield Manufacturing Corp. v. United States, 338 F.2d 94 (Ct. Cl. 1964) (bank vice president testified that bank declined financing because of the Government's failure to timely deliver necessary tooling). Similarly, as another contract appeals board noted: It is fundamental that the contractor assumes the risk of providing funds to perform the contract. Consequently, neither undercapitalization nor insolvency (actual or impending) will excuse a failure to perform. Consolidated Airborne Systems, Inc. v. United States [10 CCF ¶ 73,125], 172 Ct. Cl. 588, 597, 348 F.2d 941, 946 (1965); Willems Industries, Inc. v. United States [8 CCF ¶ 71,693], 155 Ct. Cl. 360, 295 F.2d 822 (1961); International Equipment Services, Inc., ASBCA Nos. 21104, 23170. 83-2 BCA ¶ 16,675; Medical Fabrics Company, ASBCA No. 1148, 66-2 BCA ¶ 5,887. See El Greco Painting Co., ENG BCA No. 5693, 92-1 BCA ¶ 24,522, at 122,379. [Emphasis added.] See also K.C. Printing Co., supra, slip op. at 17. Accord Sierra Tahoe Manufacturing, Inc., GSBCA No. 12679, 94-2 BCA ¶ 26,771; Centennial Leasing, GSBCA No. 12037, 94-1 BCA ¶ 26,398; Swiss Products, Inc., ASBCA No. 40031, 93-3 BCA ¶ 26,163; Local Contractors, Inc., ASBCA No. 37108, 92-1 BCA ¶ 24,491; Ralcon, Inc., ASBCA Nos. 38059, 38191, 40398, 41376, 92-2 BCA ¶ 24,971. In the Board's view, the general rule was dispositive of dispute in Gold Country Litho, where the undisputed facts warranted but one conclusion-the Appellant was undercapitalized.31 See Gold Country Litho, supra, slip op. at 24. The Board reasoned: It was the Appellant's obligation to have proper and adequate financial resources to perform the contract. See K.C. Printing Co., supra, slip op. at 17 (citing Ralcon, Inc., supra, 92-2 BCA ¶ 24,971, at 124,435). The Contractor's inability to acquire sufficient funds for performance is not such an excuse "beyond its control and without its fault or negligence" within the meaning of the "Disputes" clause, unless it could show that its financial incapacity was caused by the Government. Id. (citing Local Contractors, Inc., supra, 92-1 BCA ¶ 24,491, at 122,235-36). Furthermore, financial problems not caused by wrongful Government action do not form the basis to excuse a failure to deliver. Id. (citing Midwest Satellite Equipment, Inc., ASBCA No. 40713, 91-2 BCA ¶ 23,907, at 119,759; Unimach Manufacturing, ASBCA No. 39883, 90-3 BCA ¶ 22,968, at 115,348). Here, the Appellant has not shown any improper conduct on the part of the Government affecting its ability to acquire sufficient funds. See Gold Country Litho, supra, slip op. at 25. Accordingly, the Board found that the contractor had not met its burden of proof with respect to excusing its failure to make a timely shipment of the DDLs, and GPO was justified in terminating the contract for default. See Gold Country Litho, supra, slip op. at 25-26 (citing K.C. Printing Co., supra; Chavis and Chavis Printing, supra; Midwest Satellite Equipment , Inc., supra). In the Board's view, its reasoning in Gold Country Litho also applies to this dispute and is dispositive. First, to the extent that the Appellant's allegations raise, by implication, an issue regarding "commercial availability," the Board finds no evidence of a Government breach on this record. As indicated above, the Respondent's legal duty with respect to the paper required to perform the contract went no farther than a promise that white offset 50 lb. paper (JCP A60) existed at the time of solicitation. See Gold Country Litho, supra, slip op. at 20. The evidence of both parties clearly shows that JCP A60 paper was available when GPO issued the IFB for Program C37-S, and indeed, supplies of the stock existed when the first print orders were issued. See Appellant's letter of December 12, 1995, Ressler Memorandum; R. Brf., Moody Declaration, ¶¶ 3, 4, Kuhlman Declaration, ¶ 2. The risk that the paper would become unavailable after that, or would only be available at a price the Appellant was unwilling to pay, was strictly the Contractor's. See Gold Country Litho, supra, slip op. at 20. Accord James Reeves Contractor, Inc., supra; Callison Construction Co., supra; Parker's Mechanical Constructors, Inc., supra; Omega Construction Co., supra. Second, although the Board is not prepared to say on this record that, like the contractor in Gold Country Litho, the Appellant was undercapitalized, there seems no doubt but that the Contractor failed in its duty to have adequate financing to perform the work. See Gold Country Litho, supra, slip op. at 25; See K.C. Printing Co., supra, slip op. at 17. Accord Dependable Metal Products, Inc., supra; Ralcon, Inc., supra. In that regard, the undisputed evidence of record shows that: (1) although Sabin sold the Appellant a supply of the required stock (238,000 sheets of white offset 50 lb. paper (JCP A60)) at the bid price for the first print orders, additional quantities of paper were unavailable because of "paper market conditions and a change in price structure[;]" i.e., price increases, see Appellant's letter of December 12, 1995, at 1; Ressler Memorandum; R. Brf., Kuhlman Declaration, ¶ 2; (2) the Contractor did not have any firm agreement with Sabin before it accepted the award of Program C37-S under which Sabin would supply paper at a fixed price in the quantities needed, see R. Brf., Kuhlman Declaration, ¶ 3; SRPTC, at 4, n. 3; (3) instead, the Appellant, in accordance with its usual practice, intended to obtain paper from different suppliers or brokers for each print order, depending on who had the lowest prices; see App. R. Brf., at 4; SRPTC, at 4, n. 3; and (4) the defaulted contract did not contain a "Paper Cost (or Price) Escalation" clause. See SRPTC, at 4, n. 2. From these facts, it seems clear to the Board that the Appellant's chosen method of purchasing paper for this contract was the essential ingredient in its failure to perform. In a nutshell, the Contractor took a gamble that paper prices would at least remain constant for the contract term and lost. Stated otherwise, the Appellant was not financially prepared for the change in market conditions in which the price of white offset 50 lb. paper (JCP A60) would rise steeply, and had not taken steps to protect itself from such increases by entering a contract with a paper vendor to supply stock at a fixed price. Since the Appellant has not alleged or shown any improper conduct by the Government affecting its ability to acquire sufficient funds for performance, the Contractor itself must bear total responsibility for its inadequate financial resources in this case. See Gold Country Litho, supra, slip op. at 25; K.C. Printing Co., supra, slip op. at 17. Therefore, considering the record on this issue as a whole, the Board concludes that the Appellant has not presented as a reason for its default such an excuse "beyond its control and without its fault or negligence" within the meaning of the "Disputes" clause. See Gold Country Litho, supra, slip op. at 25; K.C. Printing Co., supra, slip op. at 17. Accord Local Contractors, Inc., supra; Midwest Satellite Equipment, Inc., supra; Unimach Manufacturing, supra. Likewise, the Contractor has not shown that the cause of its default was an act of its paper supplier which was beyond the control of both of them, and without the fault or negligence of either. See Gold Country Litho, supra, slip op. at 14-15; A & E Copy Center, supra, slip op. at 15; K.C. Printing Co., supra, slip op. at 10; Chavis and Chavis Printing, supra, slip op. at 11. Accordingly, for the reasons given, the board finds that the Contractor has not met its burden of proof in this case, and the Contracting Officer was justified in terminating the contract for default. See Gold Country Litho, supra, slip op. at 26; K.C. Printing Co., supra, slip op. at 18; Chavis and Chavis Printing, supra, slip op. at 15. Accord Midwest Satellite Equipment, Inc., supra, 91-2 BCA at 119,759. D. The Respondent's award of the reprocurement contracts to News Printing and Braceland prior to the date of default was not such a procedural defect as would forfeit its right to excess reprocurement costs. The final matter in this appeal involves the Respondent's assessment of $913.74 in excess reprocurement costs against the Appellant. However, before reaching the merits of the Government's claim, a threshold question must be answered first- one which, unlike the "responsibility" issue, truly involves a matter of first impression for the Board. Specifically, a question arises in this case concerning whether or not the Respondent has forfeited its right to excess costs by making a premature repurchase?32 Stated otherwise, did GPO commit a fatal procedural error by reprocuring the abandoned work before it terminated the contract for default? In that regard, the undisputed chronology in this dispute shows that although the Contracting Officer had received approval from the CRB to default the Appellant, he actually reprocured the work covered by Print Orders 20001 and 20002 before terminating the contract itself (the CRB concurred in the default decision on July 19, 1995, and Print Orders 30854 and 30853 were awarded on July 19-20, 1995, respectively, but the default notice was not issued for another week; i.e., on July 26, 1995). However, the "Default" clause language concerning a contractor's liability for excess reprocurement costs states, in pertinent part: If the Government terminates in whole or in part, it may acquire, under the terms and in the manner the Contracting Officer considers appropriate, supplies or services similar to those terminated, and the contractor will be liable to the Government for any excess costs for those supplies or services. . . . See GPO Contract Terms, Contract Clauses, ¶ 20(b). [Emphasis added.] Furthermore, the PPR provides, in pertinent part: f. Repurchase against contractor's account. (1) Where the supplies or services are still required after termination and the contractor is liable for excess costs, repurchase of supplies or services which are the same as or similar to those called for in the contract shall be made against the contractor's account as soon as possible after termination. . . . See PPR, Chap. XIV, Sec. 1, ¶ 3.f. [Emphasis added.] The plain and ordinary meaning of the word "after" in this context simply refers to something (a need or an action) which is "later in time," or "next." See WEBSTER'S NEW WORLD DICTIONARY 23 (3rd coll. ed. 1988). Therefore, it would seem that before a second contract can be construed a repurchase, the original agreement must be defaulted, and if the Government attempts to assess reprocurement costs under a contract awarded before termination, the excess costs must fail. Or, simply stated, there cannot be a repurchase unless there is first a default. Indeed, at one time that was the rule. See Chemical Compounding Corp., GSBCA No. 2476, 68-2 BCA ¶ 7388, aff'd on reconsid., 69-1 BCA ¶ 7525. However, it is now well-settled that issuance of the default notice is not a condition precedent to a reprocurement. See Olean Case Corp., GSBCA Nos. 4673, 4721, 78-1 BCA ¶ 12,905; Tilton Machine and Tool Co., GSBCA Nos. 4198, 4199, 76-1 BCA ¶ 11,750 (expressly overruling Chemical Compounding Corp., supra); Hyland Electrical Supply Co., ASBCA No. 19270, 75-2 BCA ¶ 11,466; Allied Paint Manufacturing Co., Inc., ENG BCA Nos. 2962, 3043, 71-1 BCA ¶ 8765. As one contract appeals board observed: In and of itself, there is nothing sacred in the date of award of the contract under which the Government repurchases supplies against the account of a defaulted contractor. See Tilton Machine and Tool Co., supra, 76-1 BCA at 56,087. Furthermore, the cases make clear that the rule allowing contracting officer's to initiate a reprocurement in face of an impending default, instead of waiting for actual termination of the contract, is nothing more than an extension of the Government's duty to act promptly to mitigate a defaulted contractor's damages. See Olean Case Corp., supra, 78-1 BCA at 62,860; Tilton Machine and Tool Co., supra, 76-1 BCA at 56,987. Indeed, the Government's interest against further delay is also protected by a prompt repurchase under such circumstances. See Allied Paint Manufacturing Co., Inc., supra, 71-1 BCA at 40,684. In the Board's view, this common sense approach trumps any narrow or technical reading of the words, underscored above, in the "Default" clause and the PPR. Accordingly, the Board holds that where, as here, all pre-default procedures (e.g., securing CRB approval) have been complied with, and the action is imminent but not yet effectuated, GPO does not forfeit its right to excess costs if a contracting officer initiates a reprocurement of needed supplies prior to terminating the original contract. E. The Government has proved its claim of entitlement to excess reprocurement costs in the amount indicated. In K.C. Printing, Co., the Board summarized the legal principles governing questions concerning excess reprocurement costs: The assessment of excess reprocurement costs is considered a Government claim. See Sterling Printing, Inc., supra, [slip op.] at 50-51 (and cases cited therein). [Sterling Printing, Inc, GPO BCA 20-89 (March 28, 1994),1994 WL 275104, reconsid. denied, July 5, 1994, 1994 WL 377592.] Consequently, the Government has the burden of demonstrating the propriety of the repurchase and proving its entitlement to the amount of excess costs it claims. Id., [slip op.] at 51 (and cases cited therein). In doing so, the Government must satisfy five criteria to establish an entitlement to recovery against a defaulting contractor, namely, it must show that: (a) the reprocurement contract was performed under substantially the same terms and conditions as the original contract; (b) it acted within a reasonable time following default to repurchase the supplies; (c) it employed a reprocurement method which would maximize competition under the circumstances; (d) it obtained the lowest reasonable price; and (e) the work has been completed and final payment made so that the excess costs assessment is based upon liability for a sum certain. [Footnote omitted.] Id., [slip op.] at 52-53 (and cases cited therein). Furthermore, the Government claim must be supported by evidence in the record as to each element of the claim. Id., [slip op.] at 53 (and cases cited therein). Failure to satisfy even one criterion may result in a reduction of the excess costs claimed. Id., [slip op.] at 53-54 (and cases cited therein). See K.C. Printing, Co., supra, slip op. at 18-19. [Original emphasis.] Whether the Government's repurchase was improper, and if so, what is the amount of reasonable excess costs under the circumstances, are questions of fact. See Gold Country Litho, supra, slip op. at 26-27; A & E Copy Center, supra, slip op. at 27; Big Red Enterprises, supra, slip op. at 41; Asa L. Shipman's Sons, Ltd., supra, slip op. at 28; Univex International, supra, slip op. at 33; K.C. Printing Co., supra, slip op. at 19, fn. 20; Sterling Printing, Inc, supra, slip op. at 50 (citing Cable Systems and Assembly Co., ASBCA No. 17844, 73-2 BCA ¶ 10,172, at 47,892). The Board finds that the Respondent has satisfied all of the necessary elements in this case. There is no question that GPO has met is evidentiary burden with respect to the matter of "timeliness." See Gold Country Litho, supra, slip op. at 29; Big Red Enterprises, supra, slip op. at 43; Univex Supp., supra, slip op. at 6; Asa L. Shipman's Sons, Ltd., supra, slip op. at 29-30; K.C. Printing Co., supra, slip op. at 20; Sterling Printing, Inc., supra, slip op. at 63-65. Accord Astro-Space Laboratories, Inc. v. United States, 200 Ct. Cl. 282, 470 F.2d 1003 (1972); Puroflow Corp., ASBCA No. 36058, 93-3 BCA ¶ 26,191; John L. Hartsoe, AGBCA No. 88-116-1, 93-2 BCA ¶ 25,614; Sequal, Inc., ASBCA No. 30838, 88-1 BCA ¶ 20,382; Disan Corp., ASBCA Nos. 21297, 22221, 79-1 BCA ¶ 16,677. Nor is there any doubt that the reprocurement is "finalized;" i.e., the work has been completed and paid for. See Gold Country Litho, supra, slip op. at 35; Big Red Enterprises, supra, slip op. at 49-50; Univex Supp., supra, slip op. at 13; Asa L. Shipman's Sons, Ltd., supra, slip op. at 37; K.C. Printing Co., supra, slip op. at 26. Cf. Sterling Printing, Inc., supra, slip op. at 83. Also cf. Patty Armfield, supra; Scalf Engineering, supra. The only open questions relate to the elements of "similarity," "reasonable method," and "reasonable price." In the Board's view, however, the Respondent has successfully carried its burden on those issues as well. As for whether the reprocurement print orders were performed under substantially the same terms and conditions as the originals, the Board's own comparison of both sets shows that Braceland and News Printing, the reprocurement contractors, were asked to produce and deliver the same JFTRs under essentially the same terms and conditions as the Appellant.33 Compare Notice of Filing, Attachments 1 and 2 with Attachments 3 and 4. Indeed, the Contractor does not allege otherwise. In fact, except for an adjustment in the delivery date to account for the repurchase and a few administrative changes (e.g., new contractor code, new jacket number, new area/state code, etc.), the two sets of print orders are identical. Certainly, these changes are not a material alterations because they have no pecuniary impact; i.e., they are not such as would cause a substantial increase in the price of the reprocurement contract.34 See Gold Country Litho, supra, slip op. at 27; Big Red Enterprises, supra, slip op. at 41; Sterling Printing, Inc., supra, slip op. at 59-60 (citing AGH Industries, ASBCA Nos. 27960, 31150, 89-2 BCA ¶ 21,637; Ace Reforestation, Inc., AGBCA No. 84-271-1, 83-2 BCA ¶ 20,218; T.M. Industries, ASBCA No. 21025, 77-1 BCA ¶ 12,545; Churchill Chemical Corp., GSBCA No. 4353, 77-1 BCA ¶ 12,318, aff'd, 221 Ct. Cl. 284, 602 F.2d 358 (1979); Solar Laboratories, Inc., ASBCA No. 19957, 76-2 BCA ¶ 12,115; Arjay Machine Co., ASBCA No. 16535, 73-2 BCA ¶ 10,179; Marmac Industries, ASBCA No. 12158, 72-1 BCA ¶ 9,249). Accord Schmalz Construction, Ltd., AGBCA No. 92-177-1, 94-1 BCA ¶ 26,423; Meyer Labs, Inc., ASBCA No. 19525, 87-2 BCA ¶ 19,810; Lester Phillips, Inc., ASBCA No. 20735, 77-1 BCA ¶ 12,447. See generally Cibinic & Nash, at 1007-09, 1011-12. Accordingly, the Board concludes that the Respondent has met its burden with respect to showing that the reprocurement contract purchased the same or similar items, and was performed under substantially the same terms and conditions as the original contract. See Gold Country Litho, supra, slip op. at 28; Big Red Enterprises, supra, slip op. at 42; Univex Supp., slip op. at 5-6; Asa L. Shipman's Sons, Ltd., supra, slip op. at 29; K.C. Printing Co., supra, slip op. at 19; Sterling Printing, Inc., supra, slip op. at 62-63. Accord B & M Construction, Inc., AGBCA No. 90-165-1, 93-1 BCA ¶ 25,431; Zan Machine Co., ASBCA No. 39462, 91-3 BCA ¶ 24,085; Boston Pneumatics, Inc., ASBCA Nos. 26188, 26190, 26825, 26984, 27605, 27606, 87-1 BCA ¶ 19,395. The Board also believes that the Contracting Officer's choice of Program A814-M as the vehicle for repurchasing the defaulted JFTRs was reasonable under the circumstances.35 See Gold Country Litho, supra, slip op. at 33; Big Red Enterprises, supra, slip op. at 43; Univex Supp., supra, slip op. at 6-7; Asa L. Shipman's Sons, Ltd., supra, slip op. at 30; K.C. Printing Co., supra, slip op. at 20-23. Cf. Sterling Printing, Inc., supra, slip op. at 73. In that regard, the Board places no particular significance in the fact that, unlike Program C37-S, Program A814-M is not a "Small Disadvantaged Business" set aside contract. See Stephen Own Dickhoener, AGBCA No. 85-275-1, 86-1 BCA ¶ 18,661. As a rule, a contracting officer has very broad discretionary powers in reprocuring items on a defaulted contract, and the choice of which procurement method to use is one of them. See Gold Country Litho, supra, slip op. at 29; Big Red Enterprises, supra, slip op. at 43; Univex Supp., supra, slip op. at 6-7; Asa L. Shipman's Sons, Ltd., supra, slip op. at 30; Sterling Printing, Inc., supra, slip op. at 17, fn. 25 (citing Astro-Space Laboratories, Inc. v. United States, supra; Old Dominion Security, Inc., GSBCA No. 9126, 90-2 BCA ¶ 22,745; Columbia Loose Leaf Corp., GSBCA Nos. 5805(5067)-REIN, 5806(5230)-REIN, 82-1 BCA ¶ 15,464). Furthermore, a contracting officer may select a method which limits competition for the repurchase if the situation demands it36 -e.g., the Government's need to assure a quick award to a firm which could begin work almost immediately-since a reprocurement is technically a purchase for the defaulted contractor's account.37 See Gold Country Litho, supra, slip op. at 30; Big Red Enterprises, supra, slip op. at 44; Univex Supp., slip op. at 7; Asa L. Shipman's Sons, Ltd., supra, slip op. at 31; Sterling Printing, Inc., supra, slip op. at 67. Accord William A. Hulett, AGBCA Nos. 91-230-3, 92-133-3, 92-196-3, 93-1 BCA ¶ 25,389, at 126,459; Old Dominion Security, Inc., GSBCA No. 9126, 90-2 BCA ¶ 22,745, at 114,165 (citing Camrex Reliance Paint Co., GSBCA No. 6870, 85-3 BCA ¶ 18,376; Century Tool Co., GSBCA No. 3999, 76-1 BCA ¶ 11,850); Sequal, Inc., supra, 88-1 BCA at 103,067. Ultimately, however, the test applied to determine the adequacy of a repurchase solicitation is one of reasonableness, and the burden is on the Government to prove that it acted reasonably in selecting the reprocurement method and in mitigating the contractor's excess costs. See Gold Country Litho, supra, slip op. at 30-31; Big Red Enterprises, supra, slip op. at 44; Univex Supp., supra, slip op. at 8; Asa L. Shipman's Sons, Ltd., supra, slip op. at 31; K.C. Printing, supra, slip op. at 21 (citing Sam's Electric Co., GSBCA Nos. 9359, 10044, 90-3 BCA ¶ 12,128; Fancy Industries, Inc., ASBCA No. 26578, 83-2 BCA ¶ 16,659); Sterling Printing, Inc., supra, slip op. at 67. In this case, the Contracting Officer placed the repurchase orders under an existing term contract, Program A814-M. The use of an existing term contract is an acceptable reprocurement method, particularly where, as here, there is an urgent need for the supplies. See Tilton Machine and Tool Co., supra, 76-1 BCA at 56,087; Hyland Electrical Supply Co., supra, 75-2 BCA at 54,619. Indeed, it has been held that in certain circumstances the Government's failure to use an existing term contract can be considered a failure to mitigate damages. See Century Tool Co., GSBCA No. 4007, 78-1 BCA ¶ 13,050, reconsid. denied, 78-2 BCA ¶ 13,345 (existing term contract had an item price identical to that of the defaulted contract). Obviously, the decision about whether or not to use an existing term contract is wholly within a contracting officer's discretion. Interroyal Corporation, supra, 83-1 BCA at 81,221; Tilton Machine and Tool Co., supra, 76-1 BCA at 56,087. See also American Kal Enterprises, Inc., GSBCA No. 4449, 76-2 BCA ¶ 11,929 (valid reasons may exist for not reprocuring against an existing term contract). Here, the Contracting Officer's decision to select Program A814-M was based principally on the Navy's immediate need for the overdue JFTRs, and his belief that a new solicitation would take too long. See Notice of Filing, Scott Declaration, ¶ 11; Attachment 5. The urgency of the repurchase was made clear to the reprocurement contractors on the face of Print Orders 30853 and 30854 by the annotation "MUST!" in the "Ship/Delivery Date" box of each of them. See Notice of Filing, Attachment 3. Moreover, the record makes clear that the vendors selected to participate in Program A814-M have already submitted bid prices for various printing and binding functions, and work is awarded only after GPO has individually abstracted each print order to determine the lowest price. See Notice of Filing, Scott Declaration, ¶ 11; Attachment 5, at 19. The Board believes that this process assured sufficient competitive prices for the repurchase, and in its opinion, further solicitation of other firms would not have resulted in lower prices and was unnecessary. See Gold Country Litho, supra, slip op. at 32-33; Big Red Enterprises, supra, slip op. at 46; Univex Supp., supra, slip op. at 9; K.C. Printing, supra, slip op. at 22-23 (citing Century Tool Co., supra, 78-1 BCA at 63,735; Sterling Printing, Inc., supra, slip op. at 73). Accordingly, the Board believes that the Respondent has met its burden with respect to the "reasonable method" element establishing the Appellant's liability for excess reprocurement costs. See Gold Country Litho, supra, slip op. at 33; Big Red Enterprises, supra, slip op. at 46; Univex Supp., supra, slip op. at 9; K.C. Printing, supra, slip op. at 23 (citing Sterling Printing, Inc., supra, slip op. at 73). Finally, the Government is also required to show that it obtained the lowest reasonable reprocurement price-the lowest reasonable price for the Government under circumstances, not the defaulted Contractor.38 See Gold Country Litho, supra, slip op. at 33; Big Red Enterprises, supra, slip op. at 46; Univex Supp., supra, slip op. at 10; Asa L. Shipman's Sons, Ltd., supra, slip op. at 35; K.C. Printing Co., supra, slip op. at 23-24. Accord Barrett Refining Corp., supra; Scalf Engineering, supra; Sequal, Inc., supra; Fancy Industries, Inc., supra. The record in this case reveals that the Respondent's estimated cost for Print Orders 20001 and 20002 was $23,277.00 and $6,340.00, respectively. See Notice of Filing, Attachments 1 and 2. On repurchase, the work was secured from Braceland (Print Order 30853) and News Printing (Print Order 30854) for $23,736.36 and $7,118.49, respectively. See Notice of Filing, Jones Declaration, ¶¶ 3, 5, Attachment 3. After the FMS took prompt payment discounts, it assessed excess reprocurement costs against the Appellant in the amount of $167.20 for Print Order 30853 (20001), and $746.54 for Print Order 30854 (20002). See Notice of Filing, Jones Declaration, ¶¶ 3, 5. By the Board's calculations, that means the contract price of defaulted Print Order 20001 was increased 0.7% by the repurchase, while there was an 11.7% increase in the cost of defaulted Print Order 20002. In the Board's view, neither of these increased prices can be deemed unreasonable; indeed, a 0.7% price rise is, by definition, de minimis. It is well-settled that even a significant price increase in the reprocurement does not render it unreasonable in the face of Government due care and diligence. See Gold Country Litho, supra, slip op. at 34; Big Red Enterprises, supra, slip op. at 47; Univex Supp., supra, slip op. at 11; K.C. Printing Co., supra, slip op. at 23. Accord Futura Systems, Inc., ENG BCA No. 6037, 95-2 BCA ¶ 27,654; Foster Refrigerator Corp., ASBCA No. 34021, 89-2 BCA ¶ 21,591; Boston Pneumatics, Inc., supra; Fancy Industries, Inc., supra. The Board has approved much higher reprocurement price increases in the past. See Gold Country Litho, supra (35%); Big Red Enterprises, supra (35%); Asa L. Shipman's Sons, Ltd, supra (39%); Univex Supp., supra (23%); K.C. Printing Co., supra (82%). Accordingly, the Board finds that GPO has carried its evidentiary burden and shown that the excess reprocurement costs assessed in this case mitigated the Appellant's liability and represented the lowest reasonable price for the Government under the circumstances. See Gold Country Litho, supra, slip op. at 34; Big Red Enterprises, supra, slip op. at 48; Univex Supp., supra, slip op. at 12; Asa L. Shipman's Sons, Ltd., supra, slip op. at 36; K.C. Printing Co., supra, slip op. at 25. Cf. Sterling Printing, Inc., supra, slip op. at 77. Therefore, the Contractor is obligated to the Government for excess costs in the total amount of $913.74. ORDER Considering the record as a whole, the Board finds and concludes that: (1) it lacks jurisdiction over both the Appellant's challenge to the Contracting Officer's "responsibility" determination and its demand for breach of contract damages; (2) the default was not in error because the Appellant has not shown that its failure to perform arose from causes beyond its control and without its fault or negligence, or beyond the control and without the fault or negligence of its paper supplier; (3) GPO's award of the reprocurement contracts prior to the date of the default was not such a procedural defect as would forfeit the Government's right to excess reprocurement costs; and (4) the Respondent has sustained its burden of proof with regard to the Contractor's liability for excess reprocurement costs. THEREFORE, the Contracting Officer's default termination decision, and his assessment of excess reprocurement costs in the amount of $913.74, are hereby AFFIRMED, and the appeal is DENIED. It is so Ordered. December 16, 1996 STUART M. FOSS Administrative Judge _______________ 1 The Contracting Officer's appeal file, assembled pursuant to Rule 4 of the Board's Rules of Practice and Procedure, was delivered to the Board on December 29, 1995. Board Rules, Rule 4(a). It will be referred to hereafter as the R4 File, with an appropriate Tab letter also indicated. The R4 File consists of twenty four (24) documents identified as Tab A through Tab X. 2 The Board's decision is based on: (a) the Appellant's Notice of Appeal, dated October 26, 1995; (b) the Contractor's letter, dated December 12, 1995, asking that the appeal be decided on the record, see Board Rules, Rules 8 and 11; (c) the R4 File; (d) the Appellant's letter, dated March 25, 1996, explaining the grounds for its failure to perform, asking the Board for relief, and otherwise meeting the requirements of a Rule 6(a) Complaint (hereinafter Complaint); (e) the Respondent's "general denial," dated April 22, 1996; (f) the Respondent's Notice of Filing, dated July 12, 1996, forwarding the declarations of Contracting Officer, Jack Scott, and Philip L. Jones, Chief, Examining and Billing Branch, Procurement Accounting Division, Office of the Comptroller (hereinafter Scott Declaration and Jones Declaration, respectively); (g) the Respondent's Brief, dated July 26, 1996 (hereinafter R. Brf.); (h) the Appellant's Brief, dated July 20, 1996, with supporting evidence (hereinafter App. Brf.); (i) the Appellant's Reply Brief, dated August 5, 1996 (hereinafter App. R. Brf.); (j) the Respondent's Reply Brief, dated August 9, 1996 (hereinafter R. R. Brf.); (k) the Appellant's letter, dated August 26, 1996; and (l) the Summary Report of Presubmission Telephone Conference, dated October 18, 1996 (hereinafter SRPTC). The facts, which are essentially undisputed, are recited here only to the extent necessary for this decision. 3 The four bids (undiscounted), from lowest to highest, were as follows: (a) T.A.M's Printing ($216,727.14); (b) Rose Printing ($401,350.57); (c) Gray Graphics (the incumbent contractor) ($530,294.09); and (d) Graphic Communications ($561,446.94). See R4 File, Tabs C and I. 4 The Respondent's printing procurement regulation provides, in pertinent part: "Whenever a mistake in bid is alleged or disclosed after award, the Contracting Officer shall advise the contractor to support the alleged error by sworn statements and by all pertinent evidence, such as the contractor's file copy of the bid, the original worksheets and other data used in preparing the bid, subcontractors' and suppliers' quotations (if any), published price lists, and any other evidence which will serve to establish the mistake, the manner in which it occurred, and the bid actually intended." See Printing Procurement Regulation, GPO Pub. 305.3 (Rev. 10-90), Chap. XI, Sec. 6, ¶¶ 4.e(i) (hereinafter PPR). 5 Attached to the Contracting Officer's memorandum were copies of all of the relevant evidence, as well as his proposed "Determination and Findings" (R4 File, Tab G). See PPR, Chap. XI, Sec. 6, ¶ 4.e(ii)(a)-(e). In that regard, the PPR states that "[w]here the contractor furnishes evidence in support of an alleged mistake, the case shall be referred through the Office of General Counsel to the Chairperson, CRB together with the following data: (a) [a]ll evidence furnished by the contractor[;] (b) [a] copy of the contract, including a copy of the bid and any specifications or drawings relevant to the alleged mistake, and any change orders or supplemental agreements thereto[;] (c) [a]n abstract or record of the bids received[;] (d) [a] written statement by the Contracting Officer setting forth: (1) [s] pecific information as to how and when the mistake was alleged or disclosed; (2) [a] summary of the evidence submitted by the contractor; (3) [a]n opinion whether a bona fide mistake was made in the bid and whether the Contracting Officer was, or should have been, on constructive notice of the mistake before award, together with the reasons or data upon which the opinion is based; (4) [a] quotation of a recent contract price for the supplies or services involved, or, in the absence of a recent comparable contract, the Contracting Officer's estimate of a fair price for the supplies or services, and the basis for such estimate; (5) [a]ny additional evidence considered pertinent, including copies of all relevant correspondence between the Contracting Officer and the contractor concerning the alleged mistake; (6) [t]he course of action with respect to the alleged mistake that the Contracting Officer considers proper on the basis of the evidence, and, if other than a change in contract price is recommended, the manner by which the item will otherwise be procured; and (7) [t]he status of performance and payments under the contract, including contemplated performance and payments[;] (e) [a] proposed Determination and Findings." See Olympic Graphic Systems, GPO BCA 01-92 (September 13, 1996), slip op. at 10, n. 7, 1996 WL _____. 6 Subsequently, by letter dated June 8, 1995, the Appellant confirmed its commitment to adhere to the contract terms, and deliver advance copies along with the furnished material within five (5) workdays, and make complete shipments to all destinations within ten (10) workdays. See R4 File, Tab M. 7 Since the print orders under the contract were to be placed by the Navy, see R4 File, Tab A, at 3, along with the Purchase Order the Contracting Officer sent the Appellant a letter, also dated June 9, 1995, specifically advising the Contractor, in pertinent part: "For this program, direct contact between your company and the ordering agency is authorized for transmitting print orders, copy and other required materials. Representatives of the ordering agency do not have authority to alter or change the specifications, contract terms, or the print orders, once issued. Changes and any resulting costs can only be authorized by a Government Printing Office contracting officer." See R4 File, Tab P. [Emphasis added.]. Under GPO's regulations, this sort of arrangement is called a "direct-deal term contract." See Printing Procurement Regulation, GPO Publication 305.3 (Rev. 10-90), Chap. XII, Sec. 1, ¶ 2 (hereinafter PPR). As defined in the regulations, a "direct-deal term contract" is one which: ". . . allow[s] the customer agency to place print orders (GPO Form 2511) directly with contractors rather than routing them through the GPO for placement." See GPO Agency Procedural Handbook, GPO Publication 305.1, dated March 1987, Sec. IV, ¶ 1, at 8 (hereinafter GPO Handbook). The purpose of this method of contract administration is: ". . . to ensure that agency printing needs are met in the most effective and efficient manner possible." Id. It should be noted, however, that an agency's direct-deal authority: ". . . extends only to the placement of print orders and to the transmission of copy and proofs. . . . All other authority rests with GPO's Contracting Officers." See GPO Handbook, Sec. IV, ¶ 2, at 9. {Emphasis added.] See also Graphicdata, Inc., GPO BCA 35-94 (June 14, 1996), slip op. at 60-61, n. 54, 1996 WL _____; B & B Reproductions, GPO BCA 09-89 (June 30, 1995), slip op. at 3, n. 5, 1995 WL 488447; McDonald & Eudy Printers, Inc., GPO BCA 40-92 (January 31, 1994), slip op. at 3, n. 4, 1994 WL 275096; Shepard Printing, GPO BCA 37-92 (January 28, 1994), slip op. at 2, n. 4, 1994 WL 275077. 8 See note 4 supra. 9 See note 5 supra. 10 Attached to the Notice of Appeal, dated October 26, 1995, and the Appellant's letter of December 12, 1995, is a "List of Equipment" owned by the Contractor, highlighting the machinery it claims was specially purchased for the purpose of performing the Program C37-S contract, namely: (a) a 42" Vijuk Programmable Cutter-Schneider Senator; (b) Ryobi 3200 MCD with Continuous Dampening System 13 x 18 print Area; (c) ITEK 9975 Perfector, 12 x 18 print area; (d) Stevenson Seal'n Shrink machine; (e) Interlake Stitcher 73A (3/4" Book Stitcher); and (f) Crown Pallet Mover. The Ryobi 3200 MCD, ITEK 9975 Perfecter, and the Stevenson Seal'n Shrink machine, are identified as new equipment. 11 Also attached to the Appellant's letter of December 12, 1995 were: (a) a memorandum signed by William Ressler of Sabin stating: " Rose Printing, Inc. bought 238,000 sheets of white offset 50 lb. [paper] on July 6th, 1995. Any additional quantity of similar number of sheets could not be provided immediately due to paper market conditions and a change in price structure[.]" (Appendix A); and (b) an article from "QP" magazine regarding "Paper Trends" and captioned "Skyrocketing Prices" (Appendix B). Ressler's memorandum was later confirmed by Mark Kuhlman, a Sabin Sales Representative. See R. Brf., Kuhlman Declaration, ¶ 2. However, Kuhlman also denied there was a contract under which Sabin would supply paper to the Contractor "at a fixed price and on a fixed delivery schedule" for the term of Program C37-S. See R. Brf., Kuhlman Declaration, ¶ 3. Kuhlman stated, in pertinent part: "Whenever our firm supplies a price quotation we make it clear that the sale is subject to prior sale and availability based on market conditions. . . .Given normal fluctuations in paper prices and availability it would have been impossible for our firm to have entered into an agreement with [the Appellant] to supply paper at a price which would have remained constant for a year." Id. Finally, at the presubmission conference, in response to a question from the Board, the Government stated that the defaulted contract did not contain a "Paper Cost (or Price) Escalation" clause. See SRPTC, at 4, n. 2. 12 Under the Respondent's printing procurement regulation, the Contracting Officer must submit a proposal to terminate a contract for default to the CRB for its review and concurrence. See PPR, Chap. I, Sec. 10, ¶ 4.b.(i). See also A & E Copy Center, GPO BCA 38-92 (September 25, 1996), slip op. at 16, n. 10, 1996 WL _____; Univex International, GPO BCA 23-90 (July 31, 1995), slip op. at 9; n. 12, 1995 WL 488438, reconsid. denied, February 7, 1996, 1996 WL 112554, Supplemental Decision, July 5, 1996, 1996 WL _____ (hereinafter Univex Supp.); Hurt's Printing Co., Inc., GPO BCA 27-91 (January 24, 1994), slip op. at 7, n. 10, 1994 WL 275098; Graphics Image, Inc., GPO BCA 13-92 (August 31, 1992), slip. op. at 9, n. 10, 1992 WL 487875. 13 Program A814-M is a multiple-award contract where many vendors have submitted bid prices for various printing and binding functions, and each order received for printing by an agency is individually abstracted to determine the lowest price. See Notice of Filing, Scott Declaration, ¶ 11; Attachment 5, at 19. 14 At the presubmission conference, the Appellant admitted that it did not have an actual contractual commitment from Sabin, principally because its practice was to "shop" for paper on a retail basis; e.g., the Appellant intended to obtain paper from different suppliers or brokers for each print order, depending on who had the lowest prices. See SRPTC, at 4, n. 3. See also App. R. Brf., at 4. In this case, however, because of market conditions, there was no low price available. When the Board asked how he arrived at a paper price for the Appellant's bid, Dass answered that he had surveyed the market and Sabin quoted the lowest price at the time. See SRPTC, at 4, n. 3. 15 The Appellant supported this argument by pointing out that several GPO officials and contracting officers had held its bids on other programs nonresponsive for various reasons, including that it lacked the equipment and sufficient personnel to perform the work. See App. Brf., at 2; App. R. Brf., at 1-2. However, the Board notes that the actions taken by Contracting Officers Robert G. Seibert (Program 2587-S), James T. Reingruber (Program 1227-S), Linwood Imlay (Program B210-S), and Douglas M. Faour (Program 2380-S), which the Contractor relies on, all occurred between August 21, 1985, and December 15, 1986, or approximately 10 years ago. 16 In so arguing, the Respondent rejects the Appellant's arguments that: (a) Sabin reneged on its prior agreement with the Contractor to supply paper at stated prices; and (b) in any event, 50 pound white offset paper (JCP A60) was unavailable at the time. See R. Brf., at 7-9. First, the Government states that not only did the Contractor fail to produce evidence of its agreement with the paper subcontractor, but the evidence indicates that no such arrangement ever existed. See R. Brf., at 7 (citing Kuhlman Declaration, note 11 supra). Consequently, GPO believes that the Appellant failed to meet its contractual responsibilities to ensure that it had a binding commitment from its paper supplier. See R. Brf., at 7-8 (citing Scale Electronics Development, Inc., ASBCA No. 21725, 77-2 BCA ¶ 12,615; Herbach & Rademan, Inc., ASBCA No. 12323, 67-2 BCA ¶ 6639). Second, the Respondent states that the Contractor's contention that the proper paper was unavailable is completely without merit. In that regard, the Government's own records show that JCP A60 paper-a commonly used printing stock-was available in normal quantities during June 1995. See R. Brf., at 8 (citing Moody Declaration, ¶¶ 3, 4). Furthermore, GPO contends even if the Appellant's paper supplier could not obtain the stock, the Contractor was still obligated to try to purchase the paper from other sources or show why it could not. Id. (citing Gatewood & Associates, Ltd. v. General Services Administration, GSBCA No. 9182, 93-1 BCA ¶ 25,247; Cryer & Parker Electronics, Inc., ASBCA No. 15150, 71-2 BCA ¶ 8943). However, the Appellant has failed to show that Sabin was the sole source for the required paper, or that it contacted other suppliers to buy it. Id. Instead, its evidence merely shows that Sabin changed its price structure, and that was the reason no paper was supplied. Id. (citing Appellant's Letter of December 12, 1995, at 1; Ressler Memorandum ). In the Respondent's view, the Appellant's failure of proof is fatal. Id. 17 As GPO reads the relevant legal principles, a contractor is not excused from default because its supplier will not ship the raw materials unless paid in advance, see R. Brf., at 9-10 (citing National Equipment, Inc., GSBCA Nos. 5643, (5104)-REIN, 5309, 81-2 BCA ¶ 15365; Boyd Tools, Inc., GSBCA Nos. 3804, 3805, 73-2 BCA ¶ 10148; National Export Packing Company of Virginia, GSBCA No. 2691, 69-1 BCA ¶ 7422; Mountain States Label Corp., GSBCA No. 2555, 68-2 BCA ¶ 7132), or will not extend credit, see R. Brf., at 10 (citing Douglas Chemical Division, DEICO Industries, Inc., ASBCA No. 15047, 70-2 BCA ¶ 8469; Geofabrics, Inc., ASBCA No. 13512, 69-1 BCA ¶ 7629). 18 As the Respondent observes, there is a legal presumption that Government officials carry out their duties in "good faith," which may only be rebutted by clear evidence to the contrary. See R. R. Brf., at 4 (citing Custom Drapery Service v. United States, 6 Cl. Ct. 811 (1984)). 19 GPO correctly notes that the Federal Government commonly collects excess reprocurement costs by means of a set off, as here. See R. R. Brf., at 5 (citing United States v. Munsey Trust Co., 332 U.S. 234 (1947); Cecile Industries, Inc. v. Cheney, 995 F.2d 1052 (Fed. Cir. 1993); United States v. American Surety Co., 158 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1946); 56 Comp. Gen. 264 (1977); 14 Comp. Gen 849 (1935)). 20 During the presubmission conference, the Appellant also raised a question concerning the Contracting Officer's denial of its mistake in bid claim. See SRPTC, at 4, n. 4. However, the Board informed the Appellant that while such a challenge is normally reviewable by the Board, it was barred from this proceeding because it was untimely; i.e., the Appellant's appeal letter of October 26, 1995, was more than 90 days after the Contracting Officer's final decision of June 30, 1995, rejecting the error in bid claim, even allowing five days for its receipt by mail. See GPO Contract Terms, Contract Clauses, ¶ 5(b) (Disputes); Board Rules, Rule 1(a). Besides, the fact that in response to the Government's inquiries, the Contractor verified its bid two times before is sufficient to undermine its mistake in bid claim at this point. See McClure Electrical Constructors, Inc., ASBCA No. 49711, 96-1 BCA ¶ _____, 1996 WL 549338 (September 26, 1996); Klinger Constructors, Inc., ASBCA No. 41006, 91-3 BCA ¶ 24,218. See also Turner-MAK (JV), ASBCA No. 37711, 96-1 BCA ¶ 28,208; Solor Foam Insulation, ASBCA No. 46921, 94-2 BCA ¶ 26,901. 21 While the excusable events listed in the "Default" clause, all of which must be beyond the control and without the fault or negligence of the contractor, are set forth in the context of relieving the contractor from responsibility for excess reprocurement costs, it is well-settled that the same occurrences extend the time available for performance and make termination prior to that time improper. See e.g., FKC Engineering Co., ASBCA No. 14856, 70-1 BCA ¶ 8,312. 22 Default terminations-as a species of forfeiture-are strictly construed. See D. Joseph DeVito v. United States, 188 Ct. Cl. 979, 413 F.2d 1147, 1153 (1969). See also Murphy, et al. v. United States, 164 Ct. Cl. 332 (1964); J. D. Hedin Construction Co. v. United States, 187 Ct. Cl. 45, 408 F.2d 424 (1969); Foremost Mechanical Systems, Inc., GSBCA Nos. 12335, 12384, 95-1 BCA ¶ 27,382. 23 Since October 29, 1992, the United States Claims Court has been known as the United States Court of Federal Claims. See Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-572, 106 Stat. 4506 (1992) (Title IX). 24 The Appellant's theory is that it is entitled to bid on all jobs regardless of its capacity to perform, and it is up to the Government to decide if it can perform or not. See SRPTC, at 4, n. 4. 25 These "Quality Levels" refer to those set forth in GPO Contract Terms, Quality Assurance Through Attributes Program for Printing and Binding, GPO Publication 310.1, Effective May 1079 (Revised November 1989), which is incorporated in GPO term contracts by reference. See R4 File, Tab A, at 2 (GPO Contract Terms). 26 "Irrefragable" proof simply means evidence which is incapable of being refuted; i.e., indisputable evidence. See Stephenson, Inc., supra, slip op. at 54 (citing Webster's New Work Dictionary (1988), at 714). 27 See note 10 supra. 28 The Board was created by the Public Printer in 1984. GPO Instruction 110.10C, Subject: Establishment of the Board of Contract Appeals, dated September 17, 1984. Before then, ad hoc panels considered disputes between contractors and GPO. Cloverleaf Enterprises, Inc., Microform Data System, Inc., Information Systems, Inc., and Harbor Printing & Copying Service, Inc. were decided by ad hoc panels. The Board cites the decisions of these ad hoc boards as GPOCAB. However, the Board has consistently taken the position that it is a different entity from the GPOCAB. See The Wessel Co., Inc., supra, slip op. at 25, n. 25. On the other hand, while the Board is not bound by GPOCAB decisions, its policy is to follow the rulings of the ad hoc panels where applicable and appropriate. See Olympic Graphic Systems, supra, slip op. at 14, n. 14; The George Marr Co., GPO BCA 31-94 (April 23, 1996), slip op. at 50, n. 40, 1996 WL ______; New South Press & Assoc., Inc., supra, slip op. at 32, n. 45; Shepard Printing (GPO BCA 37-92), supra, slip op. at 11, n. 10; 5077; Shepard Printing (GPO BCA 23-91), supra, slip op. at 14, n. 19; Stephenson, Inc., supra, slip op. at 18, n. 20; Chavis and Chavis Printing, supra, slip op. at 9, n. 9. 29 In summary, the reasons why the Board lacks breach of contract jurisdiction are: (a) unlike Executive branch contract appeals boards which draw their jurisdiction from the Contract Disputes Act of 1978, 41 U.S.C. § 601 et seq. (1994) (CDA), the Board's powers flow from the "Disputes" clause of the contract, see GPO Contract Terms, Contract Clauses, ¶ 5 (Disputes); (b) because the Board has derivative jurisdiction its remedies must be found within the provisions of the disputed agreement itself; (c) breach of contract is a question of law, and under the relevant statutes even if the Board could make the factual determinations necessary to support a breach it could only render an advisory opinion, so sound judicial policy justified withholding jurisdiction because it cannot provide appellants with a meaningful remedy; (d) Congress expressly excluded Legislative branch agencies from the coverage of the CDA, see Tatelbaum v. United States, 749 F.2d 729, 730 (Fed. Cir. 1984), and as such an agency GPO has to be mindful of Congress intent; and (e) nothing in 44 U.S.C. § 502 (1988), which spells out the Public Printer's procurement authority, discloses an intent by Congress to waive the Government's sovereign immunity. See R. C. Swanson Printing and Typesetting Co., supra, slip op. at 24-25. See generally, Foss, The First Decade, at 586-87. 30 Even in a termination for convenience situation, the Appellant could not recover the price it paid for purchased and leased equipment. At most, the Contractor would be allowed to collect idle capacity costs for the equipment dedicated to the contract and necessary for performance. See New South Press & Assoc., Inc., supra, slip op. at 61 (citing Fiesta Leasing and Sales, Inc., ASBCA No. 29311, 86-3 BCA ¶ 19,045, reconsid. denied, 87-1 BCA ¶ 19,622). See also GPO Procurement Directive 306.2, Subject: Contract Cost Principles and Procedures, dated April 1, 1988, ¶¶ 25(a), 49 (hereinafter GPO Cost Directive). Similarly, if it could be shown that downtime costs could not be reasonably immediately discontinued upon termination, there might be basis for recovering idle facility costs. See New South Press & Assoc., Inc., supra, slip op. at 62 (citing Fiesta Leasing and Sales, Inc., supra; Metered Laundry Services, Inc., ASBCA No. 21573, 78-1 BCA ¶ 13,206; Bailfield Industries, Division of A-T- O, Inc., ASBCA No. 20006, 76-2 BCA ¶ 12,096). See also GPO Cost Directive, Sec. 3, ¶ 25(b). Under either theory, such costs include, inter alia, repair, rent, property taxes, insurance, and depreciation. See New South Press & Assoc., Inc., supra, slip op. at 61-62 (citing GPO Cost Directive, Sec. 3, ¶ 25(a), (b). 31 Among other things, the evidence of record showed that: (a) even before the contract was awarded, the contractor asked GPO for a "letter of credit" to guarantee payment for the finished job, which in effect was a request for payment in advance; (b) the contractor bid on the contract after its first paper supplier had assured it of "terms" regarding the cost of the stock, and when the vendor reneged on its commitment for credit, the contractor admitted that it was without funds to do the job; (c) the contractor was relying on its second paper supplier for credit; and (d) the contractor rejected the option of purchasing "TamperFas" Destructible Vinyl from Fasson because the cost of the stock was as much as the contractor's bid for the entire job. See Gold Country Litho, supra, slip op. at 24-25. 32This issue is not to be confused with the problem of a premature assessment of excess reprocurement costs. In that situation the rule is well-settled that the Government is not entitled to recover excess costs unless it can show, inter alia, that the repurchased work has been completed and paid for. See Sterling Printing, Inc., supra, slip op. at 83. Accord Patty Armfield, AGBCA Nos. 91-185-1, 92-141-1, 92-142-1, 92-143-1, 93-1 BCA ¶ 25,235; C. Howdy Smith, AGBCA No. 90-154-1, 92-2 BCA¶ 24,884; Scalf Engineering Co. and Pike County Construction Co., A Joint Venture, IBCA No. 2328, 89-3 BCA ¶ 21,950 (hereinafter Scalf Engineering); Orlotronics Corporation, ASBCA No. 23287, 79-2 BCA ¶ 13,912. Furthermore, for "requirements" contracts, such as the terminated agreement in this case, the assessment of excess costs prior to the expiration date of the original contract is generally not allowed. See R.C. Swanson Printing and Typesetting Co., supra, slip op. at 52-53, n. 28. Accord American Photographic Industries, Inc., ASBCA Nos. 29272, 29832, 90-1 BCA ¶ 22,491, reconsid. denied, 90-2 BCA ¶ 22,728; The Hackett Corporation, GSBCA No. 4488, 80-1 BCA ¶ 14,200. In the latter case, however, the Government does not forfeit its right to prematurely assessed excess costs, but rather the question is set aside until it is ripe for appeal. See R.C. Swanson Printing and Typesetting Co., supra, slip op. at 52-53, n. 28. Accord American Photographic Industries, Inc., supra (matter left open for a further contracting officer's decision); McQuiston Associates, ASBCA No. 25484, 81-2 BCA ¶ 15,216 (premature appeal dismissed without prejudice); Canadian Commercial Corporation, ASBCA No. 20512, 76-2 BCA ¶ 12,054 (proceedings suspended while awaiting a determination of excess costs actually incurred). 33 The fact that the Appellant performed no work under the defaulted "requirements" contract is not an impediment to the assessment of excess reprocurement costs. The rule is that when such a contract is terminated and excess costs are incurred on the reprocurement contract, the Government is entitled to recover all excess costs; i.e., not only excess costs on the items already ordered but also on those items which the Government would have been entitled to order from the defaulting contractor. See Donahines Investment Co., ASBCA No. 23825, 82-1 BCA ¶ 15,791, at 78,219 (citing The Hackett Corporation, supra; Lucas Aircraft Supply Co., ASBCA No. 11167, 66-1 BCA ¶ 5671). In this case, of course, the Appellant's responsibility for future excess costs ended when the Navy changed the Program C37-S contract during the reprocurement period, limiting its liability to just the JFTRs covered by the two print orders it received while it was still the contractor. See Notice of Filing, Scott Declaration, ¶ 14. 34 This is true even though the reprocurement contracts slightly increased the numbers of copies ordered in each case. In that regard, Print Order 30853 requested the production of 26,681 JFTRs, compared to the 26,332 copies ordered under Print Order 20001, an increase of 349 copies. See Notice of Filing, Attachments 1 and 3. Similarly, 115 extra copies of JFTRs were procured under Print Order 30854 (20,759) than Print Order 20002 (20,644). See Notice of Filing, Attachments 2 and 3. However, these increases are marginal to the point of being inconsequential-1.3% for Print Order 20001 and 0.5% for Print Order 20002, respectively-and are appropriate candidates for application of the legal maxim de minimis non curat lex (the law does not take notice of trifles). See Big Red Enterprises, supra, slip op. at 48, n. 41; Univex Supp., supra, slip op. at 12, n. 8. In any event, the Appellant had the burden of proof of showing that the Respondent's changes made the reprocurement contract "materially different" from the one it received by demonstrating that any increases in quantity and/or performance time also caused an unreasonable increase of a specified amount in the repurchase price. See Sterling Printing, Inc., supra, slip op. at 61 (citing Theodore R. Korotie, AGBCA No. 86-245-1, 89-3 BCA ¶ 22,214; Ace Reforestation, Inc., supra; Solar Laboratories, Inc., supra); Knepper Press, GPOCAB Nos. 2-84 and 3-84 (October 2, 1984), slip op. at 4, 1984 WL 148107. The Contractor has not done so. 35 While in the past the Board has expressed its reservations about the use of Program A814-M for equitable adjustment purposes, see Swanson Printing Co., GPO BCA 27-94 and GPO BCA 27A-94 (November 18, 1996), slip op. at 50, n. 58, 1996 WL_____; New South Press & Associates, supra, slip op. at 52-54; Universal Printing Co., supra, slip op. at 26, n. 27; RD Printing Associates, Inc., supra, slip op. at 13, n. 15, it has no such qualms where, as here, the repurchase of a defaulted contract is concerned. 36 This duty may be satisfied by a variety of repurchase methods, including soliciting those firms which bid on the original procurement. See Gold Country Litho, supra, slip op. at 31; Big Red Enterprises, supra, slip op. at 45; Univex Supp., supra, slip op. at 8; Asa L. Shipman's Sons, Ltd., supra, slip op. at 32; K.C. Printing, supra, slip op. at 22 (citing American Marine Upholstery Co. v. United States, 170 Ct. Cl. 564, 345 F.2d 577 (1965); Mid-America Painters, Inc., supra). Indeed, such a mitigation step is considered presumptively reasonable, even if the reprocurement price itself seems unreasonable. See Univex Supp., supra, slip op. at 8; Asa L. Shipman's Sons, Ltd., supra, slip op. at 32; K.C. Printing, supra, slip op. at 22 (citing Mid- America Painters, Inc., ENG BCA No. 5703, 91-1 BCA ¶ 23,367, at 117,232); Sterling Printing, Inc., supra, slip op. at 69-70 (citing Zoda v. United States, 148 Ct. Cl. 49, 180 F.Supp. 419 (1980); United Microwave Co., ASBCA No. 7947, 1963 ¶ 3,701). Cf. American Photographic Industries, Inc., supra (the Government failed to mitigate damages because it did not contact the second low bidder on the original contract). See also Dillon Tool Maintenance, Inc. v. United States, 218 Ct. Cl. 732 (1978); AAA Janitorial Services, ASBCA No. 9603, 67-1 BCA ¶ 6,091 (the law creates a rebuttable presumption that the repurchase could have been completed at the price previously quoted by a lower bidder if an effort had been made to do so). Another way, if time allows, is to use sealed bid advertising to repurchase defaulted supplies and services. See e.g., H & H Manufacturing Co. v. United States, 168 Ct. Cl. 873 (1964); Lester Brothers, Inc. v. United States, 151 Ct. Cl. 536 (1960); Star Food Processing, Inc., ASBCA Nos. 34161, 34163, 34164, 34165, 35544, 35545, 35546, 35547, 90-1 BCA ¶ 22,390; Erickson Enterprises, AGBCA 77-168, 79-1 BCA ¶ 13,628. On the other hand, a contracting officer can use negotiation in lieu of formal advertising even when the supplies are not urgently needed. See, Interroyal Corporation, GSBCA No. 5439, 83-1 BCA ¶ 16,339; Orlotronics Corporation, supra. 37 GPO procedures are consistent with the general theory and practice in Government reprocurements. See PPR, Chap. XIV, Sec. 1, ¶ 3.f.(2). 38 In fulfilling the obligation to secure the best price for the Government, a contracting officer must follow the same standard of reasonableness and prudence under the circumstances which he/she exercised in the timing and selecting of the method of reprocurement. See William A. Hulett, supra; Barrett Refining Corp., ASBCA Nos. 36590, 37093, 91-1 BCA ¶ 23,566; Mid-America Painters, Inc., supra. However, the Government's obligation to mitigate costs "is not one of perfection, but one of reasonableness and prudence under the circumstances." See Barrett Refining Corp., supra, 91-1 BCA at 118, 145; Mid-America Painters, Inc, supra, 91-1 BCA at 117, 232. This duty is to be carried out within the confines of Federal procurement statutes, regulations, policies and directives, and in pursuit of the Government's own best interests, whether or not that results in a lower price for a defaulted contractor. See Barrett Refining Corp., supra, 91-1 BCA at 118,145.