BOARD OF CONTRACT APPEALS U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON, DC 20401 In the Matter of ) ) the Appeal of ) ) NEW SOUTH PRESS & ASSOC., INC. ) Docket No. GPO BCA 14-92 Program D278-S ) Purchase Order 90483 ) Print Order 40000 ) DECISION AND ORDER I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE This appeal, timely filed by New South Press (Appellant or Contractor), 3885 North Palafox Street, Pensacola, Florida 32505, is from the final decision of Contracting Officer Richard Weiss, of the U.S. Government Printing Office's (Respondent or GPO or Government) Printing Procurement Department, Washington, DC 20401, dated January 8, 1992, rejecting two settlement claims submitted by the Contractor totaling $29,367.49, after the convenience termination of its contract identified as Program D278-S, Purchase Order 90483, Print Order 40000, and allowing only total charges of $2,749.28 (R4 File, Tabs M, N and T).1 An evidentiary hearing in the appeal was conducted by the Board on March 1, 1994, at which both parties were represented by counsel, who, thereafter, filed timely briefs on the issues involved.2 Board Rules, Rules 17 through 24, 26 and 27. Based on the record in this case, the Contracting Officer's decision disposing of the Appellant's termination claims is MODIFIED, and the matter is REMANDED to the Contracting Officer for further action in accordance with this opinion. II. BACKGROUND A. The Termination Action 1. This dispute arises from a single-award "requirements" contract for the production and distribution of the Department of Health and Human Services, National Institutes of Health (NIH or customer-agency), Telephone and Service Directories (hereinafter referred as Directory (singular) or Directories (plural)), for a term beginning October 1, 1990 and ending September 30, 1991 (R4 File, Tab A, pp. 1, 5).3 As structured, the contract was a "direct-deal" arrangement under which the NIH would issue the print orders (R4 File, Tab A, p. 5). See Printing Procurement Regulation, GPO Publication 305.3 (Rev. 10-90), Chap. XII, Sec. 1, ¶ 2 (hereinafter PPR). 2. Among other things, the specifications stated that the contract would be governed by the applicable articles of GPO Contract Terms, Solicitation Provisions, Supplemental Specifications, and Contract Clauses, GPO Publication 310.2, Effective December 1, 987 (Rev. 9-88) (hereinafter GPO Contract Terms) (R4 File, Tab A, p. 2). Insofar as is relevant to this case, GPO Contract Terms contains a "Termination for Convenience" clause which provides, in pertinent part: (a) The Government may terminate performance of work in whole or in part if the Contracting Officer determines that a termination is in the Government's interest. The Contracting Officer shall terminate by delivering to the contractor a Notice of Termination specifying the extent of termination and the effective date. * * * * * * * * * * (c) After termination, the contractor shall submit a final termination settlement proposal promptly, but no later than 3 months from the effective date of termination, unless extended in writing by the Contracting Officer upon written request of the contractor within this 3-month period. . . . (d) Subject to paragraph (c) above, the contractor and the Contracting Officer may agree upon the whole or any part of the amount to be paid because of the termination. The amount may include a reasonable allowance for profit on work done. However, the agreed amount, whether under this paragraph (d) or paragraph (e) below, exclusive of costs shown in subparagraph (e)(3) below, may not exceed the total contract price as reduced by (1) the amount of payments previously made, and (2) the contract price of work not terminated. The contract shall be amended and the contractor paid the agreed amount. Paragraph (e) below shall not limit, restrict, or affect the amount that may be agreed upon to be paid under this paragraph. (e) If the contractor and the Contracting Officer fail to agree on the whole amount to be paid because of the termination of work, the Contracting Officer shall pay the contractor the amounts determined by the Contracting Officer as follows, but without duplication of any amounts agreed on under paragraph (d) above: (1) The contract price for completed supplies or services accepted by the Government . . . not previously paid for, adjusted for any savings of freight and other charges. (2) The total of- (i) The costs incurred in the performance of the work terminated, including initial costs and preparatory expenses allocable thereto, but excluding any costs attributable to supplies or services paid or to be paid under subparagraph (e) (1) above; (ii) The cost of settling and paying termination settlement proposals under terminated subcontracts that are properly chargeable to the terminated portion if not included in subdivision (i) above; and (iii) A sum, as profit on subdivision (i) above, determined by the Contracting Officer to be fair and reasonable; however, if it appears that the contractor would have sustained a loss on the entire work had it been completed, the contracting Officer shall allow no profit under this subdivision (iii) and shall reduce the settlement to reflect the indicated rate of loss. * * * * * * * * * * (g) The cost principles and procedures of article 45, Contract Clauses in effect on the date of this contract, shall govern all costs claimed, agreed to, or determined under this clause.4 (h) The contractor shall have the right of appeal, under article 5 "Disputes" from any determination made by the Contracting Officer under paragraph (c), (e), or (j), except that if the contractor failed to submit the termination settlement proposal within the time provided in paragraph (c) or (j), and failed to request a time extension, there is no right of appeal. If the Contracting Officer has made a determination of the amount due under paragraph (c), (e), or (j), the Government shall pay the contractor (1) the amount determined by the Contracting Officer if there is no right of appeal or if no timely appeal has been taken, or (2) the amount finally determined on an appeal. * * * * * * * * * * (k)(1) The Government may, under the terms and conditions it prescribes, make partial payments and payments against costs incurred by the contractor for the terminated portion, if the Contracting Officer believes the total of these payments will not exceed the amount to which the contractor will be entitled. (2) If the total payments exceed the amount finally determined to be due, the contractor shall repay the excess to the Government upon demand, together with interest computed at the rate established by the Secretary of the Treasury under 50 U.S.C. App. 1215(b)(2). . . . See GPO Contract Terms, Contract Clauses, ¶ 19 (Termination for the Convenience of the Government). See also PPR, Chap. XIV, Sec. 2, ¶¶ 1-3.q(4). The Board has previously observed that the above-quoted language is essentially a verbatim adoption of the "long-form" clause in the Federal Acquisition Regulation (hereinafter FAR), 41 C.F.R. 1.000 et seq. (1994), relating to convenience terminations of fixed-price contracts.5 See R.C. Swanson Printing and Typesetting Co., GPO BCA 15-90, Supplemental Decision (July 1, 1993), slip op. at 18, 1993 WL 526638 (citing FAR, 52.249-2) (hereinafter R.C. Swanson). 3. Because the "Termination for Convenience" clause incorporates by reference the "Contract Cost Principles and Procedures" clause of GPO Contract Terms, see GPO Contract Terms, Contract Clauses, ¶¶ 19(g), 45, the contract is also subject to relevant provisions of the GPO Cost Directive.6 In that regard, two such provisions of Section 3 of the GPO Cost Directive are particularly pertinent to this dispute-the instructions for idle facilities and idle capacity costs (¶ 25) and the directions relating to termination costs (¶ 49). Insofar as relevant here, the GPO Cost Directive provides: 25. Idle facilities and idle capacity costs. (a) "Costs of idle facilities or idle capacity," as used in this subsection, means costs such as maintenance, repair, housing, rent, and other related costs; e.g., property taxes, insurance, and depreciation. "Facilities," as used in this subsection, means plant or any portion thereof (including land integral to the operation), equipment, individually or collectively, or any other tangible capital asset, wherever located, and whether owned or leased by the contractor. "Idle capacity," as used in this subsection, means the unused capacity of partially used facilities. It is the difference between that which a facility could achieve under 100 percent operating time on a one- shift basis, less operating interruptions resulting from time lost for repairs, setups, unsatisfactory materials, and other normal delays, and the extent to which the facility was actually used to meet demands during the accounting period. A multiple-shift basis may be used in the calculation instead of a one-shift basis if it can be shown that this amount of usage could normally be expected for the type of facility involved. "Idle facilities," as used in this subsection, means completely unused facilities that are excess to the contractor's current needs. (b) The costs of idle facilities are unallowable unless the facilities- (1) Are necessary to meet fluctuations in workload; or (2) Were necessary when acquired and are now idle because of changes in requirements, production economies, reorganization, termination, or other causes which could not have been reasonably foreseen. (Costs of idle facilities are allowable for a reasonable period, ordinarily not to exceed 1 year, depending upon the initiative taken to use, lease, or dispose of the idle facilities (but see 3.49)). (c) Costs of idle capacity are costs of doing business and are a factor in the normal fluctuations of usage or overhead rates from period to period. Such costs are allowable provided the capacity is necessary or was originally reasonable and is not subject to reduction or elimination by subletting, renting, or sale, in accordance with sound business, economics, or security practices. Widespread idle capacity throughout an entire plant or among a group of assets having substantially the same function may be idle facilities. (d) Any costs to be paid directly by the Government for idle facilities or idle capacity reserved for defense mobilization production shall be the subject of a separate agreement. * * * * * * * * * * 49. Termination costs. Contract terminations generally give rise to the incurrence of costs or the need for special treatment of costs that would not have arisen had the contract not been terminated. The following cost principles peculiar to termination situations are to be used in conjunction with the other cost principles in this section: (a) Common items. The costs of items reasonably usable on the contractor's other work shall not be allowable unless the contractor submits evidence that the items could not be retained at cost without sustaining a loss. The contracting officer should consider the contractor's plans and orders for current and planned production when determining if items can reasonably be used on other work of the contractor. Contemporaneous purchases of common items by the contractor shall be regarded as evidence that such items are reasonably usable on the contractor's other work. Any acceptance of common items as allocable to the terminated portion of the contract should be limited to the extent that the quantities of such items on hand, in transit, and on order are in excess of the reasonable quantitative requirements of other work. (b) Costs continuing after termination. Despite all reasonable efforts by the contractor, costs which cannot be discontinued immediately after the effective date of termination are generally allowable. However, any costs continuing after the effective date of the termination due to the negligent or willful failure of the contractor to discontinue the costs shall be unallowable. (c) Initial costs. Initial costs, including starting load and preparatory costs, are allowable as follows: (1) Starting load costs not fully absorbed because of termination are nonrecurring labor, material, and related overhead costs incurred in the early part of production and result from factors such as- (i) Excessive spoilage due to inexperienced labor; (ii) Idle time and subnormal production due to testing and changing production methods; (iii) Training; and (iv) Lack of familiarity or experience with the product, materials, or manufacturing processes. (2) Preparatory costs incurred in preparing to perform the terminated contract include such costs as those incurred for initial plant rearrangement and alterations, management and personnel organization, and production planning. They do not include special machinery and equipment and starting load costs. . . . . (d) Loss of useful value. Loss of useful value of special tooling, and special machinery and equipment is generally allowable, provided- (1) The special tooling, or special machinery and equipment is not reasonably capable of use in the other work of the contractor; (2) The Government's interest is protected by transfer of title or by other means deemed appropriate by the contracting officer; and (3) The loss of useful value for any one terminated contract is limited to that portion of the acquisition cost which bears the same ratio to the total acquisition cost as the terminated portion of the contract bears to the entire terminated contract and other Government contracts for which the special tooling, or special machinery and equipment was acquired. * * * * * * * * * (g) Settlement expenses. (1) Settlement expenses, including the following, are generally allowable: (i) Accounting, legal, clerical, an similar costs reasonably necessary for- (A) The preparation and presentation, including supporting data, of settlement claims to the contracting officer; and (B) The termination and settlement of contracts. (ii) Reasonable costs for the storage, transportation, protection, and disposition of property acquired or produced for the contract. (iii) Indirect costs related to salary and wages incurred as settlement expenses in (i) and (ii); normally, such indirect costs shall be limited to payroll taxes, fringe benefits, occupancy costs, and immediate supervision costs. * * * * * * * * * * See GPO Cost Directive, Sec. 3, ¶¶ 25(b),(c), 49. 4. The Appellant was awarded the contract on October 5, 1990, at a price of $156,678.77 ($159,876.30 less a two (2) percent discount) (R4 File, Tabs C and D).7 Approximately three and one-half months later, on January 23, 1991, the NIH issued the first print order under the contract-Print Order 40000-which the Contractor received the following day (Tr. 10, 15, 77; R4 File, Tabs E and O). The Print Order required the production of 19,000 copies of the Directory for shipment to the customer-agency by February 15, 1991 (Tr. 11; R4 File, Tabs E and O).8 The Government furnished material (GFM) to produce the books was given to the Contractor at the same time as the print order (Tr. 15). 5. The Appellant originally figured that Print Order 40000 was worth $54,792,81, including a profit of $4,981.16 (R4 File, Tab O, Cost Analysis).9 However, on receiving the print order the Contractor noticed that the contract specifications which had formed the basis for its bid contained an error which would have increased its production costs and the time required to perform the work. See Report of Prehearing Telephone Conference, dated March 26, 1993, pp. 2-3 (hereinafter RPTC-1); Complaint, ¶ 9. Specifically, the contract's "Determination of Award" figures for Items III(a), (b), and (c) indicate that an estimated 16,188,000 leaves of text paper would be needed to complete all work under the contract (R4 File, Tab A, p. 10; Appellant's Complaint, dated June 17, 1992, ¶ 2 (hereinafter Complaint); Respondent's Answer, dated July 17, 1992, ¶ 2 (hereinafter Answer)). Furthermore, the contract provided that three (3) orders a year (Winter, Spring and Fall) could be expected, with each order consisting of approximately 3,017 copies of an Item 1 book containing 252 pages, and approximately 16,000 copies of an Item 2 book containing 312 pages. See Complaint, ¶ 3; Answer, ¶ 3. Comparing the contract's figures for the anticipated orders with the "Determination of Award" numbers, the Appellant concluded that the latter were "vastly in excess of the requirements under the contract, being approximately double what the contract actually required."10 See Complaint, ¶ 4. Consequently, the Contractor estimated that its loss from this discrepancy would amount to approximately $20,000.00 (roughly the difference between its expected price of $54,792,81 and the actual price of $33,253.09 for the first print order) (R4 File, Tab F, Attachment, Tab O, Cost Analysis; Complaint, ¶ 14, Exhibit A (Memorandum, dated January 25, 1991, from Gerald Goldstein, the Appellant's President, to the Contracting Officer)).11 6. On January 25, 1991, the Appellant telephoned the Respondent to discuss the problem.12 See RPTC-1, p. 3; Complaint, Exhibit A. Later that same day, the Contractor sent the Contracting Officer a facsimile message which, inter alia, confirmed the understandings reached on the telephone, and stated, in pertinent part: . . . GPO authorizes New South Press to continue with Print Order 4000 [sic] and bill at the current price. New South Press is then to submit a claim for the difference between the current amount and what would be a fair price for Print Order 4000 [sic]. GPO will send auditors to New South Press to determine a fair amount for Print Order 4000 [sic] considering our costs and a fair profit margin. See R4 File, Tab O; Complaint, Exhibit A.13 Based on this understanding, the Appellant continued the pre-press work on Print Order 40000, and on January 28, 1991, sent the blueline proofs to NIH (Tr. 22, 45).14 7. Thereafter, on January 28, 1991, the Appellant sent a follow up letter to the Respondent (Tr. 46; R4 File, Tab F). In its correspondence, the Contractor said, in pertinent part: . . . There exists and has been acknowledged in the determination of award, calculation of determination of award are vastly inflated with regard to the number of leaves needed to produce the contract. The result of this over inflated figure and the actual production of what we received on [Print Order] 40000 amounts to approximately [a] $20,000.00 difference. A copy of our cost analysis to actually produce this book is being forwarded via fax as well as a copy of line item charges. You can see there is a significant difference between these two prices. In accordance with your instructions, this job has been put on hold pending the result of this information. Program 278-S[,] Print Order 40000 requires 1.4 million impressions; these hours cannot be filled with such short notice and would adversely affect the financial well being of New South Press and compensation must be considered if we are not to produce this job. You are further notified that paper amounting to an excess of $18,000.00 would require no less than a 25% restocking fee or purchase from New South Press plus a reasonable profit. . . . The severity of this situation requires immediate attention as we expected to go to press no later than January 31. In addition the delivery date must be altered to a negotiated delivery date. See R4 File, Tab F; Complaint, Exhibit B. 8. On January 29, 1991, confirming a telephone conversation with the Appellant on the previous day, Jack Scott, Assistant Superintendent of the Respondent's Term Contracts Division, sent a letter by facsimile transmission to the Contractor, which stated, in pertinent part: In our conversation you informed me that as a result of the Determination of Award figures in the contract being wrong, that you could not produce the order for your bid prices. My response was that I directed you to produce the order at your bid prices and then file a claim with the Contracting Officer, Mr. Richard Weiss, for any additional monies you feel entitled to. Or, if you refuse to produce this order, send it back to me and we would then terminate the contract. After much discussion you stated that you intended to produce the order and then file a claim. In addition, since the order was on hold from January 24, 199115 to January 28, 1991, the following new schedule was agreed to: Submit Dylux proofs by February 4, 1991. Proofs will be available for pickup by February 6, 1991. Complete production and delivery by February 25, 1991.16 See R4 File, Tabs G and O. 9. On receiving Scott's letter, the Appellant saw a need to clarify the understandings reached on January 28, 1991 (Tr. 83-84). Therefore, the Contractor immediately replied: . . . [Y]ou have accurately depicted the situation in reference to program D278-S, Print Order 40000, except I think it is important to state your intent to terminate the contract under the default provision if we do not proceed. It is because of that provision that New South Press will proceed as well as tremendous losses the Government would incur through loss of press time, paper and loss of profits. Finally we agreed upon a ship date of February 25, not a delivery date.17 See R4 File, Tabs H and O); Complaint, Exhibit C. [Emphasis added.] 10. While the above exchange of correspondence was taking place, GPO contacted the NIH about the proposed shipping date of February 25, 1991, and was informed by the customer-agency that it was unacceptable (R4 File, Tab I, pp. 1, 2). Instead, the NIH demanded delivery of 40 to 50 percent of the Directories by February 20, 1991, with the balance by February 25, 1991, and told the Respondent that if the Appellant could not meet that schedule it wanted the contract canceled so that the books could be reprocured elsewhere (R4 File, Tab I, pp. 1, 2). When advised of the NIH's position, the Contractor said that it might be able to meet the customer-agency's date if the Government would waive the contract's 50 percent waste requirement, since its supplier had not yet delivered the white offset paper stock (R4 File, Tab I, p. 1). However, the Contracting Officer refused to waive the waste requirement, and asked the Appellant to tell him by February 3, 1991, whether or not it could meet the delivery schedule of February 20, 1991 (R4 File, Tab I, p. 1). 11. On January 30, 1991, around 8:00 a.m., the Contracting Officer talked to the Contractor again about performing the contract (R4 File, Tab I, p. 3). The Contracting Officer told the Appellant that if it could not meet the delivery date of February 20, 1991, he would be compelled to terminate the contract because the NIH needed the Directories (R4 File, Tab I, p. 3). When the Contracting Officer asked if the Contractor could deliver 40 percent of the job by that date, the Contractor said that it could not meet that schedule (R4 File, Tab I, p. 3). 12. Accordingly, later that morning, at approximately 9:30 a.m., the Contracting Officer telephoned the Appellant to say that he was going to terminate the contract for the convenience of the Government because the delivery date could not be met (R4 File, Tab I, p. 4).18 The Contracting Officer confirmed his decision by letter dated the same day, which also instructed the Appellant to: (a) discontinue all work on Print Order No. 40000; and (b) return the GFM to the Respondent (R4 File, Tab J). 13. Also on January 30, 1991, the Contracting Officer, as required by the Respondent's procurement regulation, sought the approval of GPO's Contract Review Board (CRB) for the proposed convenience termination action (R4 File, Tab K). See PPR, Chap. XIV, Sec. 2, ¶ 3.(a)(1). In his memorandum, after reciting the relevant contract history, the Contracting Officer told the CRB that he believed it was "in the best interest of the Government to terminate [P]rint [O]rder 40000 and the balance of the contract due to the erroneous determination of award regarding the running rate and paper[.]" (R4 File, Tab K). By January 31, 1991, all members of the CRB had given their approval to the Contracting Officer to terminate the Appellant's contract for the convenience of the Government (R4 File, Tab K). 14. By letter dated January 31, 1991, expressly entitled "Notice of Termination (Termination for Convenience of the Government) (hereinafter Notice)," the Respondent officially notified the Appellant that Print Order 40000, and the balance of its contract, was terminated for the convenience of the Government, effective that date (R4 File, Tab L). See GPO Contract Terms, Contract Clauses, ¶ 19(a). Among other things, the Notice instructed the Contractor to submit its settlement proposal to the Respondent on GPO Form 911, which was enclosed, and "take such other action as may be required by the Contracting Officer or under the termination clause contained in your contract[.]" (R4 File, Tab L, p. 2, ¶ f). See GPO Contract Terms, Contract Clauses, ¶ 19(c); PPR, Chap. XIV, Sec. 2, ¶¶ 3.c.(viii),(x). B. The Termination Claim 1. By letter dated January 30, 1991, the Appellant filed a partial claim for $4,697.37 for the pre-press work performed on Print Order 40000 up to the date of termination (Tr. 16, 17, 27; R4 File, Tabs M and O; App. Exh. No. 2). The claim was comprised of six (6) line items: 1. Film: 344 pages @ $5.10= $1,754.00 (as per contract) 2. Stripping 84 flats @ $9.50= 798.1219 3. Bluelines (2 copies) 572 pages @ $3.50= 2,002.00 4. Federal Express charges for receipt of original documents 65.00 5. UPS second day shipping of bluelines to customer= 7.00 6. Federal Express charges for return of originals to GPO 71.25 See R4 File, Tabs M and O, p. 1; App. Exh. No. 2, p. 1).20 The Contractor's letter also told the Contracting Officer, in pertinent part: . . . there were charges . . . for the down time and idling of our plant. These charges will be worked up in a separate settlement proposal. Fortunately New South Press was able to save the GPO by cancelling [sic] in excess of $18,000.00 worth of paper and a minimum of 25% restocking fee or a 15% markup on paper. Unfortunately, we are not able to fill the press or bindery time due [to] the short notice of your cancellation. See R4 File, Tabs M and O, pp. 1-2, App. Exh. No. 2, pp. 1-2.21 2. Thereafter, by letter dated February 4, 1991, the Contractor submitted a claim for an additional $24,670.13, to cover its losses resulting from the convenience cancellation of the contract (Tr. 26, 57-58; R4 File, Tabs N and O).22 The reason for the claim, as explained by the Appellant, was: Due to the enormity of this printing project and the inability to fill manufacturing time on such short notice, we find it necessary to bill the government for the lost production time." See R4 File, Tab N. The Contractor also noted that it was asking reimbursement only for its costs, and that no profit was included in its claim (R4 File, Tab N). 3. The February 4, 1991, claim consisted of two (2) parts: (a) extra charges for makeready work; and (b) the projected costs for producing the Directories, including running time for the presses, the folding machines, hand collating, binding and trimming (Tr. 26-27; R4 File, Tabs N and O, Attachment). In summary, the breakdown of the claim was as follows: MAKEREADY: Calculated at 1/2 hour for two unit plate hang, register and run to color. For the two Directories covered by the Print Order, the Appellant stated that a total of 72 makeready's, at 1/2 hour each, or 36 total makeready hours, was necessary. At a budgeted hourly rate (BHR) of $90.04, the total makeready cost was $3,241.44.23 RUNNING: Calculated at an effective running rate of 6,500 impressions per hour, including loading and unloading tasks. Counting both Directories, the Contractor figured that it would have taken 115 hours at the effective running rate to print the 747,500 total impressions required by the Print Order. At a BHR of $90.04, the total running cost was $10,353.60, which yielded total press costs (makeready and running) of $13,596.04.24 FOLDING: Calculated at a machine rate of 8,500 sheets an hour. The Appellant indicated that it would have taken 88 hours to fold 747,500 sheets. At a BHR of $44.25, the total folding cost was $3,891.40. COLLATING: Calculated at a hand collating rate of two (2) books per minute, or 120 per hour. To collate 19,000 books, the Contractor allowed 158 hours at a BHR of $24.13, for a total cost of $3,820.58. PERFECT BINDING: Calculated at a rate of 250 books per hour. The Appellant claims that it would have taken 76 hours to bind the 19,000 Directories, at a BHR of $24.13, for a total binding cost of $1,833.88. TRIMMING: Calculated at a rate of 300 sheets an hour for trimming three (3) sides. The Contractor said that it would take 63 hours to trim the 19,000 books, at a BHR of $24.13, for a total trimming cost of $1,528.23, yielding total binder costs (folding, collating, perfect binding, and trimming) of $11,074.09. See R4 File, Tab N, Attachment.25 Subsequently, by letters dated March 12, 1991, and March 13, 1991, respectively, the Appellant transmitted additional supporting information, and certified its claim (R4 File, Tabs O and P).26 4. On February 28, 1991, the Contracting Officer asked GPO's Office of the Inspector General (OIG) to evaluate the Appellant's claim (Tr. 119, 122, 133; R4 File, Tab Q). The record indicates that, on May 20, 1991, in response to an OIG request, the Appellant sent additional supporting information to the assigned auditors, including all of its original estimates and the cost summaries for its printing operations (Tr. 137-38; GPOBCA Exh. No. 1). 5. On January 3, 1992, the OIG issued its audit report on the Appellant's claim (R4 File, Tab R). In its analysis of the Contractor's first (January 30, 1991) claim, the OIG approved all film costs and return costs for the GFM ($1,754.00 and $143.00, respectively), but questioned most of the stripping claim (only $76.00 of the $798.00 claim was allowed), and all of the blueline claim ($2,002.00); i.e., overall 42 percent of the claim ($1,973.00) was allowed and 58 percent ($2,724.00) was questioned (Tr. 134, 136; R4 File, Tab R, Attachment D).27 As for the second (February 4, 1991) claim, the OIG questioned the entire $24,670.13 as contrary to the cost principles governing GPO contracts, especially the provisions relating to the recovery of idle capacity and idle facilities (Tr. 129, 133-34; R4 File, Tab R, Attachment E). See GPO Cost Directive, Sec. 3, ¶¶ 25(b),(c). Noting that those costs principles state that "[c]osts of idle capacity are costs of doing business and are a factor in the normal fluctuations of usage or overhead rates from period to period[.]," the auditors concluded that the Appellant's lost production time claim was not peculiar to the contract, but rather those "costs should be included in New South Press' overhead from prior years[.]" (R4 File, Tab R, Attachment E, fn. 1, citing GPO Cost Directive, Sec. 3, ¶ 25(c)). 6. Although the Contracting Officer reviewed the audit report and relied heavily on it in making his final decision on the claim, the record also indicates that he did not completely agree with the OIG's findings (Tr. 117-19, 122, 128, 130; R4 File, Tab S). Therefore, using the audit findings as a base, Weiss made his own calculations which allowed an additional recovery of nearly all of the stripping charges and some blueline costs (R4 File, Tab S). Thus, the Contracting Officer believed the Appellant was entitled to total compensation of $2,749.28 computed as follows: (a) $1,754.00 for the film work; (b) $852.28 for the stripping and bluelines; and (c) $143.00 for Federal Express charges (Tr. 117, 124; R4 File, Tab S, p. 2).28 While there was no set procedure for pricing the contract in this case, the record clearly shows that the guiding principle followed by the Contracting Officer was that the Contractor was entitled to be paid only for the work actually performed (Tr. 119, 121).29 7. The Appellant rejected the Contracting Officer's offer to settle the matter for $2,749.28 (R4 File, Tab T, p. 1). Therefore, on January 8, 1992, the Contracting Officer issued his final decision on the claim, stating in pertinent part: . . . [I]t is the decision of the Contracting Officer that the charges for the 344 films produced are in accordance with the contract schedule of prices and allowable. The stripping and blueline charges totalling $2800.00 are not covered in the contract schedule of prices and are not allowable. An average per page cost for bluelines was done on 38 contractor [sic] performing on the A814-S Program. This cost came to $1.49 per page. This figure multiplied by 572 pages comes to [$]852.28. The shipping charges totaling $143.00 are allowable. The total of allowable charges comes to $2749.28. See R4 File, Tab T, p. 1.30 The final decision letter did not specifically address the claim for lost production time, but clearly the Contracting Officer rejected it by implication. 8. By letter dated April 6, 1992, the Appellant timely appealed the Contracting Officer's decision to the Board. Board Rules, Rule 1(a). 9. At the hearing on March 1, 1994, the Appellant's evidence, almost exclusively, concerned its idle press time claim.31 Aside from the documentary evidence already referred to in this opinion, the Contractor also introduced: (a) a listing of the machine and employee hours lost because of downtime on the Miller Press for the month of February 1991, along with the supporting shop logs;32 (b) a summary analysis of its idle time based on the 112 hours of actual press time which could not be filled, and calculated at a utilization rate of 80 percent;33 and (c) financial statements for the months of January, February, and March 1991 (Tr. 42, 44, 52-53, 60, 61, 67-68, 70-71, 80; App. Exh. Nos. 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9).34 Moreover, during the hearing the Appellant also revised and lowered its unabsorbed overhead claim to $14,460.04 to account for the actual number of unfilled hours of press time-a reduction of nearly 41 percent from its original idle time claim ($24,670.13) ((Tr. 60, 74-5; R4 File, Tabs N and O; App. Exh. No. 6; App. Brf., p. 1).35 To summarize, relying on the documentation it submitted at the hearing, as revised by oral testimony,36 the Contractor now seeks termination compensation as follows: MAKEREADY AND RUNNING: The Appellant originally calculated that the job would take 36 hours of makeready and 115 hours of running time to print all of the 747,500 sheets required for both Directories, or 151 total hours. However, the Contractor has reduced its combined claim for makeready and running to a total of 112 hours, figured at a BHR of $56.68 (70 percent utilization) for a total of $6,348.16.37 PRESS HELPER: The Appellant omitted the cost of the press helper on the Miller Press, who was idled by the termination of the contract, from its initial claim. The press helper is compensated at the rate of $9.45 an hour. Therefore the cost to the Contractor for the press helper's downtime is $1,058.40 (112 hours times $9.45).38 FOLDING: The Appellant originally estimated that at a machine rate of 8,500 sheets, folding would take 88 hours to complete. As revised, the Contractor has reduced its claim to 46.88 hours computed at a BHR of $45.72, or a total cost of $2,143.35. COLLATING: The Appellant initially calculated that collating would take 158 hours, accomplished in part by hand labor. The revised claim deletes the hand collating charge, and narrows the Contractor's request to compensation for the unfilled machine time of the Collator.39 In that regard, the Contractor calculated that it would take 30.5 hours to collate both Directories, which at a BHR of $44.47, yielded a collating cost of $1,356.34. PERFECT BINDING: The Appellant still estimates that it would have taken 76 hours to bind both Directories. However, the Contractor now computes that operation at a BHR of $34.20, for a total binding cost of $2,599.20. TRIMMING: The Appellant figures that it would have taken 63 hours to trim both Directories. However, the Contractor now calculates that task at a BHR of $31.09, for a total trimming cost of $1,958.67. See Tr. 60-63, 74-75; App. Exh. No. 6. III. ISSUES PRESENTED Based on the record as a whole, including the prehearing conference discussions, the evidence presented at the hearing, and the briefs of the parties, this appeal presents three issues for the Board's consideration: 1. Did the Contracting Officer err by using another GPO contract-Program A814-M-to determine that the Appellant's stripping and blueline claim was too high, and to develop a new per page rate for those costs? 2. Was the Contracting Officer correct in denying all of the Appellant's claim for post-termination downtime costs based on the OIG's interpretation of GPO Cost Directive, Sec. 3, ¶ 25(c) contained in the audit report? Stated otherwise, what is the proper cost basis for considering the Appellant's unabsorbed overhead claim in this case? 3. Is the Appellant entitled to any recovery for post- termination costs under the circumstances of this case, and if so, how much? III. POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES A. The Appellant's Argument The Appellant presents the Board with two different claims-a small claim for the pre-press work which it actually performed prior to termination, and a large unabsorbed overhead claim, consisting primarily of idle press time costs resulting from the termination action itself. With respect to the pre-press claim, the Appellant asserts that its charges were reasonable and normal for the work in question, and thus it is entitled to full payment for those costs under the express terms of the contract (App. Brf., p. 2, citing GPO Contract Terms, Contract Clauses, ¶¶ 19(e)(2)(i),(iii)). The Contractor also contends that the Respondent erred in denying the claim on the ground that the contract's schedule of bid prices lacked a line item for stripping and bluelines. Id. Furthermore, the Appellant says that the Contracting Officer wrongfully relied on the line item structure of another GPO contract-Program A814-M-to establish the prices for stripping and bluelines because: (1) the low rates in Program A814-M are the result of the extremely high volume of work called for under that contract and involves multiple orders throughout the year; and (2) line item prices usually reflect the contractor's belief that he or she will be producing a finished product, not just a portion of it (App. Brf., pp. 2-3). Consequently, to apply Program A814-M prices to just the pre-press work on the smaller contract in this case is "grossly unfair" (App. Brf., p. 3). Finally, the Contractor observes that GPO's interpretation could damage many contractors who bid pre-press production functions at "no charge," and include those costs elsewhere in the job, only to find when the contract is subsequently terminated that such work would not be compensated at all-a result contrary to the provisions of GPO Contract Terms. Id. Accordingly, the Appellant urges the Board to find that its charges for the pre-press work actually performed prior to termination were reasonable, and that it is entitled to the full amount of its claim ($4,697.37) (App. Brf., pp. 3, 7). As for its downtime claim, the Contractor does acknowledge the general rule which says that such indirect costs incurred after a termination for convenience are not recoverable (App. Brf., pp. 3, 5, 7, citing Chamberlain Manufacturing Corp., ASBCA No. 16877, 73-2 BCA ¶ 10,139; Sun Electric Corp., ASBCA No. 13031, 70-2 BCA ¶ 8371). However, the Appellant also points out that in a few cases post-termination idle facilities and idle capacity costs have been allowed when there is a "particular showing" that the termination was simply more than routine (App. Brf., pp. 4-5, citing Raquette River Construction, ASBCA No. 26486, 82-1 BCA ¶ 15769; Southland Manufacturing Corp., ASBCA No. 16830, 75-1 BCA ¶ 10,994, reconsid. denied, 75-1 BCA ¶ 11,272). See also RPTC-1, p. 6. The Contractor believes that it has made such a showing in this case by demonstrating that the contract was canceled one day before the job went to press, and at a time when a major portion of the work was already in progress (App. Brf., p. 5; App. Exh. No. 5). On the other hand, the Appellant argues that since the source of the general rule is found in decisions of contract appeals boards and courts interpreting the FAR, and specific convenience termination clauses of other agencies, while these decisions are instructive, they are not binding on the Board in GPO procurements (App. Brf., pp. 3, 4). Instead, the Contractor believes that the Board must look to the "Termination for the Convenience of the Government" clause in GPO Contract Terms and the GPO Cost Directive for guidance in deciding the issues in this case (App. Brf., pp. 3-4, citing GPO Contract Terms, Contract Clauses, ¶ 19; GPO Cost Directive, Sec. 3, ¶ 25 (Idle facilities and idle capacity costs), ¶ 49 (Termination costs)). In that regard, the Appellant contends that since nothing in GPO Contract Terms or the GPO Cost Directive requires the disallowance of downtime costs upon a termination for convenience,40 the solution to this controversy primarily lies in the GPO Cost Directive, since the termination clause is silent on the matter. First, the Contractor notes that recovery for idle facilities and idle capacity costs is expressly covered by GPO Cost Directive, Sec. 3, ¶ 25, and also points out that reimbursement for idle capacity costs in particular, is allowed under certain circumstances; i.e., the capacity was necessary or originally reasonable to the production of work, and are not otherwise subject to a reduction by rent or sale, in accordance with sound business practices (App. Brf., p. 4). See GPO Cost Directive, Sec. 3, ¶ 25(c). Second, the Appellant says that while the provisions of the GPO Cost Directive expressly dealing with termination costs do not address recovery of unabsorbed overhead one way or the other, it does incorporate the idle facilities and idle capacity rules by reference (App. Brf., p. 4). See GPO Cost Directive, Sec. 3, ¶ 49. Furthermore, although it does not describe such costs with particularity, the termination provisions of the GPO Cost Directive state that a contractor can recover costs which were incurred after termination that could be immediately discontinued through reasonable efforts (App. Brf., p. 4). See GPO Cost Directive, Sec. 3, ¶ 49(b). Finally, relying on the works of several authors on the subject of cost accounting for Government contracts, the Appellant contends that the Board should allow the post- termination unabsorbed overhead claim because that is the only fair and equitable means of compensation for its costs in this case (App. Brf., pp. 5-6, citing A. Joseph & N. O'Donnell, Termination of Government Contracts, at X-36 to X-41 (Fed. Pub. 1987) (hereinafter Joseph & O'Donnell); J. Bedingfield and L. Rosen, Government Contract Accounting, at 15-16 to 15-20 (1st ed. 1984); P. Trueger, Accounting Guide for Government Contracts, at 745-760 (8th ed. 1985) (hereinafter Trueger)). The Contractor anchors this argument for reimbursement of idle facilities and capacity costs in commonplace notions of fairness and justice, and criticizes the majority of cases applying the general rule against recovery of unabsorbed overhead as mere rigid adherence to prior decisions (App. Brf., p. 6).41 Where, as here, an actual downtime loss results from a convenience termination, says the Appellant, case law which denies recovery of these costs is clearly inequitable or unjust. Thus, the Contractor urges the Board to follow the path suggested by these enlightened commentators, and allow the reimbursement in the interest of providing adequate and fair compensation to the contractor (App. Brf., p. 6). Accordingly, for these reasons, the Appellant asks the Board to rule that it is entitled to recover post-termination unabsorbed overhead costs in the amount of $14,460.04, particularly since it has shown the requisite "unusual circumstances" (App. Brf., pp. 6-7).42 B. The Respondent's Argument Contrary to the Appellant, the Respondent believes that the Contracting Officer was correct in only partially allowing the Contractor's claim for pre-press costs, while denying the unabsorbed overhead claim in its entirety. The Government does not dispute that the Appellant was entitled to recover certain direct costs incurred in beginning production on the first print order as part of the termination settlement (R. Brf., p. 7). Rather, the issue dividing the parties concerns whether the stripping and blueline costs submitted by the Contractor were reasonable-all other charges were allowed by the Government in the amounts claimed (R. Brf., pp. 7-8). In that regard, the Respondent says that when the Contracting Officer compared the Appellant's stripping and blueline claim with GPO's charges and the prices of other commercial printers, he concluded that they were too high (R. Brf., p. 8, citing Tr. 126-127). Consequently, to arrive at a reasonable price for stripping and bluelines in the absence of individual line items for those costs in the contract (they were included in the contract price for films), the Contracting Officer referred to a multiple award, general usage GPO contract- Program A814-M-and averaged the blueline prices of 38 printing contractors in order to estimate a fair and reasonable price for the those operations in this case (R. Brf., p. 8, citing Tr. 117-18; R4 File, Tab A, p. 11).43 The result was a price of $1.49 per page, or $852.28 total, which the Contracting Officer allowed against the Appellant's claim of $2,800.12 for stripping and bluelines (R. Brf., p. 8). The Respondent not only sees this approach as justified under the circumstances, but also contends that the Appellant, who had the burden of proof, failed to prove its stripping and blueline costs were reasonable (R. Brf., p. 8). Instead, the Government contends that the Appellant's own testimony at the hearing shows that its claim was based on its standard retail charges rather than its actual costs (R. Brf., p. 8, citing Tr. 24, 89). Accordingly, since the Contractor has not met its burden with respect to its pre-press claim, the Contracting Officer's decision should be allowed to stand (R. Brf., p. 8). Unlike the pre-press claim in which the only question is one of reasonableness, the unabsorbed overhead claim concerns the threshold issue of entitlement. The Respondent has steadfastly maintained that the Appellant is not legally entitled to recover unabsorbed overhead costs following a termination for convenience (R. Brf., p. 3). The reason that such costs in the form of idle press time are generally not allowed, according to the Government, is that they are indirect costs representing the cost of doing business (R. Brf., pp. 3-4, citing Nolan Brothers, Inc. v. United States, 194 Ct. Cl. 1 at 34-35, 437 F.2d 1371 (1971); Chamberlain Manufacturing Corp., supra; Pioneer Recovery Systems, ASBCA No. 24658; 81-1 BCA ¶ 15,059; Melvin Rishe, Government Contract Costs 23-29 (1983)). The Respondent contends that the precedents of courts and other contract appeals boards preclude a contractor from recovering any costs beyond actual costs incurred, plus a reasonable profit on work performed (R. Brf., pp. 4-5, citing William Green Construction Co., Inc. et al. v. United States, 201 Ct. Cl. 616 (1978)). As explained by GPO, unabsorbed overhead costs are not incurred as a result of contract work performed, are not directly related to the termination, and are not recognized continuing costs of the terminated contract, and thus they are unallowable (R. Brf., p. 5, citing Hewitt Contracting Co., ENGBCA No. 4596, 83-2 BCA ¶ 16,816; Technology, Inc., ASBCA No. 14083, 71-2 BCA ¶ 8,956; reconsid. denied, 72-1 BCA ¶ 9281; Fairchild Stratos Inc., ASBCA No. 9169, 67-1 BCA ¶ 6,225; reconsid. denied, 68-1 BCA ¶ 7,053; Chamberlain Manufacturing Corp., supra; Pioneer Recovery Systems, supra). Furthermore, the Respondent points out that other contract appeals boards have considered, and rejected, contractor claims that the general rule is unfair or inequitable, primarily on the grounds that: (1) overhead continues as long as the contractor exists as a ongoing organization; (2) the risk of unabsorbed overhead in termination cases is essentially no different than cases of a contractor's failure to obtain other anticipated business during the accounting period; and (3) paying such overhead costs without receiving any benefit for doing so would, in practical effect, amount to a Government guarantee of a contractor's overhead costs, more or less as a penalty for exercising its contractual rights (R. Brf., pp. 5-7, quoting Chamberlain Manufacturing Corp., supra, 73-2 BCA at 47,678-79; Pioneer Recovery Systems, supra, 81-1 BCA at 74,494). Finally, the Respondent contends that the Appellant's reliance on certain provisions of the GPO Cost Directive is misplaced (R. Brf., p. 3; RPTC-1, p. 7). The Government notes that the GPO Cost Directive is simply the agency's FAR Part 31, 48 C.F.R. 31.000 et seq. (1994), and both regulations establish contract cost principles and procedures to be utilized in determining what costs are allowable under Federal contracts (R. Brf., p. 3). However, it also believes that the GPO Cost Directive is not particularly relevant in the context of this appeal, but rather the central focus should be on the factors considered by the Contracting Officer in his decision, including the OIG's recommendations to disallow the claim for unabsorbed overhead costs. RPTC-2, p. 3; RPTC-1, p. 7. Regardless, the Respondent contends that the Appellant mistakenly relies on GPO Cost Directive, sec. 3, ¶ 25 to support its claim for idle facilities and idle capital costs, because that provision only applies to Federal cost reimbursement contracts (R. Brf., p. 3). GPO says that the Contractor has ignored the appropriate provision of the instruction-GPO Cost Directive, sec. 3, ¶ 49-which specifically defines those costs which are allowable in a termination for convenience claim (R. Brf., p. 3). The Respondent believes that the Appellant's exclusive remedy in this case is provided by the termination for convenience articles of GPO Contract Terms and the GPO Cost Directive (R. Brf., pp. 3-4, citing GPO Contract Terms, Contract Clauses, ¶ 19; GPO Cost Directive, sec. 3, ¶ 49). ). Accordingly, for all of these reasons, but especially the weight of case authority, GPO submits that the Board should affirm the Contracting Officer's denial of the Appellant's entire $14,460.20 claim for unabsorbed overhead costs (R. Brf., pp. 7, 9). IV. DECISION44 The Appellant believes that the main issue in this case, which tests the validity of its claim for post-termination unabsorbed overhead costs, is a matter of first impression for the Board (App. Brf., p. 7). While perhaps that precise question has never been presented before, the Board is certainly no stranger to termination for convenience problems. However, it is also true that both in this forum, as well as in the proceedings of the ad hoc panels which proceeded the Board,45 termination for convenience cases are extremely rare,46 probably because in most instances the parties are able to reach an amicable settlement regarding termination cost issues. See PPR, Chap. XIV, Sec. 2, ¶¶ 3.d(ii),(iii), 3.j(1). In that respect, the case history in GPO is no different than the experience of other boards established to hear contract appeals. See e.g., Pioneer Recovery Systems, supra, 81-1 BCA at 74,494 (". . . convenience terminations are relatively rare, . . ."). Regardless, the combined experience of this agency's contract appeals forums, plus the precedents of the Board's Executive Branch counterparts, provide ample guidance by which to examine all of the issues in dispute. Furthermore, it is clear to the Board that this appeal offers a proper and convenient vehicle to revisit its Supplemental Decision in R.C. Swanson, supra, and reiterate, explain and clarify the standards which govern convenience termination settlements for "requirements" contracts.47 At the outset, before addressing the specific issues raised by the parties, a few words need to be said about the nature, purpose, and philosophy behind terminations for convenience, so that the Board's approach in this case can be better understood. The principal treatise on Government contracts describes the nature of terminations for convenience as follows: The Termination for Convenience of the Government clause is one of the most unique provisions contained in Government contracts. In no other area of contract law has one party been given such complete authority to escape from contractual obligations. This clause gives the Government the broad right to terminate without cause and limits the contractor's recovery to costs incurred, profit on work done, and costs of preparing the termination settlement proposal. Recovery of anticipated profit is precluded. Thus, this mandatory provision confers a major contract right on the Government with no commensurate advantage to the contractor. See John Cibinic, Jr., & Ralph C. Nash, Jr., Administration of Government Contracts, 3d Ed., 1995, George Washington University, National Law Center, Government Contracts Program, p. 1073 (hereinafter Cibinic & Nash).48 See also Tom Shaw, Inc., ENG BCA Nos. 5540, 5541, 89-3 BCA ¶ 21,961 (the Government's right to terminate a contract for its own convenience without suffering the usual penalties for breach of contract, is an extraordinary right with a commensurate responsibility to be entirely fair in the exercise of the right). As the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals (ASBCA) has observed: [A] termination for convenience is a risk by which, by dint of the contractual relationship with the sovereign, is reasonably foreseeable whenever a contractor signs a Government contract. The contractor's recourse after such a termination is spelled out in the termination clause and the related regulations. If a contractor incurs losses which do not fall within these parameters, it simply has no contractual recourse. See J.W. Cook & Sons, Inc., ASBCA No. 39691, 92-3 BCA ¶ 25,053, at 124,865. Because of the extraordinary powers vested in the Government to terminate contracts for its convenience, the courts and contract appeals boards have placed some limits on its exercise. In the words of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the Government cannot use its convenience termination authority to "dishonor [its] contractual obligations." See Maxima Corp. v. United States, 847 F.2d 1549, 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1988); Torncello v. United States, supra, 681 F.2d at 772. The right to terminate a contract under the termination for convenience clause is usually triggered by a contracting officer's determination that the cancellation is in the Government's best interest.49 See GPO Contract Terms, Contract Clauses, ¶ 19(a); PPR, Chap. XIV, Sec. 2, ¶ 2. See also American Drafting and Laminating Co., supra; Cloverleaf Enterprises, Inc., supra. Furthermore, the contracting officer's election to terminate is conclusive in the absence of bad faith or a clear abuse of discretion.50 See Melvin R. Kessler, PSBCA Nos. 2820, 2972, 92-2 BCA ¶ 24,857, at 123,996 (citing John Reiner v. United States, 325 F.2d 438, 442 (Ct. Cl. 1963), cert. den. 377 U.S. 931 (1964)), mot. for reconsid. denied 92-3 BCA ¶ 25,092; Salisbury Industries v. United States, 905 F.2d 1518 (Fed. Cir. 1990)), mot. for reconsid. denied 92-3 BCA ¶ 25,092. See also, Seaboard Lumber v. United States, 19 Cl. Ct. 310 (1989); Robert K. Adams, ASBCA No. 34519, 92-3 BCA ¶ 25,165; Automated Services, Inc., DOTBCA No. 1753, 87-1 BCA ¶ 19,459; ITG Corp., ASBCA No. 27285, 85-1 BCA ¶ 17,935.51 As the Board has said on numerous occasions, an allegation of bad faith must be established by "well-nigh irrefragable" proof because there is a strong presumption that Government officials properly and honestly carry out their functions.52 See e.g., Asa L. Shipman's Sons, Ltd., GPO BCA 06-95 (August 29, 1995), slip op. at 12, fn. 16; Professional Printing of Kansas, Inc., GPO BCA 02-93 (May 19, 1995), slip op. at 43, fn. 58, 1995 WL 488488; Universal Printing Co., supra, slip op. at 24, fn. 24; Sterling Printing, Inc., GPO BCA 20-89 (March 28, 1994), slip op. at 34-35, fn. 46, 1994 WL 275104; B. P. Printing and Office Supplies, GPO BCA 14-91 (August 10, 1992), slip op. at 16, 1992 WL 382917; The Standard Register Co., supra, slip op. at 12-13. Accord Brill Brothers, Inc., ASBCA No. 42573, 94-1 BCA ¶ 26,352; Karpak Data and Design, IBCA No. 2944 et al., 93-1 BCA ¶ 25,360; Local Contractors, Inc., ASBCA No. 37108, 92-1 BCA ¶ 24,491. However, there are no "bad faith or a clear abuse of discretion" issues in this appeal.53 Properly exercised, a contracting officer's discretion to act pursuant to the "Termination for Convenience" clause is very broad. See Caldwell & Santmyer, Inc., supra, 94-2 BCA at 133,625 (citing ARDCO Inc., AGBCA Nos. 94-101-1, 94-102-1, 94-103-1, 1994 WL 45000 (Feb. 16, 1994); Michael J. Earl, PSBCA No. 3332, 93-3 BCA ¶ 26,234). Thus, apart from the typical situation involving a change in the Government's needs, see e.g., R.C. Swanson, supra, Supplemental Decision, slip op. at 5 (contract for the production of Department of Justice briefs from manuscript copy was terminated for convenience because it would not accommodate the customer-agency's additional requirement that briefs be produced from electronically transmitted data), a termination for convenience is also appropriate to preserve the integrity of the procurement system where it is determined that the Government's estimates have not been realistic, see Special Waste, Inc., ASBCA No. 36775, 90-2 BCA ¶ 22,935, at 115,129-30, to reprocure the contract if the contractor will not agree to a change in schedule, see Melvin R. Kessler, supra, to relieve a contractor of performance where its lack of success does not arise from any fault or negligence on its part, see American Drafting and Laminating Co., supra, or to end an improvident procurement, especially before performance commences, see Caldwell & Santmyer, Inc., supra, 94-2 BCA at 133,625 (citing KAL M.E.I. Manufacturing and Trade, Ltd., ASBCA No. 40597, 92-1 BCA ¶ 24,411).54 The Respondent's "Termination for Convenience" clause contains the general rule that once a contract is terminated, the contractor is entitled to recover its incurred costs plus a reasonable profit. See GPO Contract Terms, Contract Clauses, ¶ 19(d); PPR, Chap. XIV, Sec. 2, ¶ 3.n. See also R.C. Swanson, supra, Supplemental Decision, slip. op. at 17-18 (citing Humphrey Logging Co., AGBCA Nos. 84-359-3, 85-204-3, 85-3 BCA ¶ 18,433); Graphic Litho Co., Inc., supra, slip. op. at 10; Bay Ridge Press, supra, slip. at 3. Accord, Youngstrand Surveying, AGBCA No. 90-150-1, 92-2 BCA ¶ 25,017, at 124,694; Chamberlain Manufacturing Corp., supra, 73-2 BCA at 47,678. Recovery of anticipated profits is not allowed. See PPR, Chap. XIV, Sec. 2, ¶ 3.n. See also Bay Ridge Press, supra, Supplemental Decision, slip op. at 3. Accord Plaza 70 Interiors, Ltd., supra, 95-2 BCA at 137,939 (citing FAR 49.202,; Steelcare, Inc., GSBCA No. 5491, 81-1 BCA ¶ 15,143, at 74,901). See generally Cibinic & Nash, p. 1098 ("Perhaps the major impact of the termination for convenience procedure is that it relieves the Government from the obligation of paying anticipated profits for unperformed work if terminates the contractor's performance of the work." Citing Dairy Sales Corp. v. United States, 219 Ct. Cl. 431, 593 F.2d 1002 (1979), aff'g Dairy Sales Corp., ASBCA No. 20193, 75-2 BCA ¶ 11,613). Similarly, where a contractor is in a loss position on the terminated contract, it is not entitled to recovery of any profit.55 See GPO Contract Terms, Contract Clauses, ¶ 19(e) (2)(iii); PPR, Chap. XIV, Sec. 2, ¶ 3.o. See also Maitland Brothers Co., supra, 93-3 BCA at 129,304; Tom Shaw, Inc., ENG BCA Nos. 5540, 5541, 5620-5628, 93-2 BCA ¶ 25,742, at 128,082. The terminated contractor has the burden of establishing both that it actually incurred costs and the amount of its incurred costs. See R.C. Swanson, supra, Supplemental Decision, slip. op. at 19 (citing Building Maintenance Specialists, Inc., ENG BCA No. 5654, 90-3 BCA ¶ 23,032). Accord Lisbon Contractors, Inc. v. United States, 828 F.2d 759, 767 (Fed. Cir. 1987); J.W. Cook & Sons, Inc., supra, 92-3 BCA at 124,863 (citing Tubergen & Associates, Inc., ASBCA Nos. 34106, 34107, 90-3 BCA ¶ 23,058); Youngstrand Surveying, supra, 92-2 BCA at 124,694 (citing Roberts International Corp., ASBCA No. 15118, 71-1 BCA ¶ 8869). Indeed, actual incurrence of costs is a prerequisite to recovery under a termination for convenience; i.e., if the contractor has incurred no cost, there is no recovery. See R.C. Swanson, supra, Supplemental Decision, slip. op. at 19 (citing Seiler Instrument and Manufacturing Co., Inc., ASBCA No. 44380, 93-1 BCA ¶ 25,436). Accordingly, in these cases the contractor's cost, not the value of the performance to the Government, is the measure of recovery. See, e.g., Fil-Coil, ASBCA No. 23,137, 79-1 BCA ¶ 13,618 (1978), mot. for reconsid. denied, 79-1 BCA ¶ 13,683 (1979); Scope Electronics, Inc., ASBCA No. 20359, 77-1 BCA ¶ 12,404, mot. for reconsid. denied, 77-2 BCA ¶ 12,586 (1977); Arnold H. Leibowitz, GSBCA No. CCR-1, 76-2 BCA ¶ 11,930 (1976). In short, the reimbursement formula for convenience terminations permits the recovery of allowable costs incurred, plus profit, subject to the overall limitation of the contract price and the possible application of the loss adjustment provisions. See Cibinic & Nash, p. 1098. The conventional wisdom, often expressed in "boilerplate" language in court and board decisions, is that when a fixed- price contract is terminated for the convenience of the Government, it is converted into a cost reimbursement contract, which entitles the contractor to recover the allowable costs incurred under the terminated contract, to the extent that they are reasonable, allocable and not specifically designated as unallowable by regulation. See Richerson Construction, Inc., GSBCA Nos. 11161, 11263(11045)- REIN, 11430, 93-1 BCA ¶ 25,239, at 125,704; Youngstrand Surveying, supra, 92-2 BCA at 124,694; Raquette River Construction, supra, 82-1 BCA at 78,051 (citing Paul E. McCollum, ASBCA No. 23269, 81-2 BCA ¶ 15,311). See also Riverport Industries, Inc., ASBCA No. 30888, 87-2 BCA ¶ 19,876; Southland Manufacturing Corp., supra; International Space Corp., ASBCA No. 13883, 70-2 BCA ¶ 8519; Caskel Forge, Inc., supra. See generally Cibinic & Nash, p. 1098. While this principal may be technically correct as a general proposition, on closer examination the rule is not entirely accurate.56 As the Corps of Engineers Board of Contract Appeals (ENGBCA) has observed, in pertinent part: . . . [M]any of the BCA cases refer to termination of a fixed-price contract as tantamount to converting it to a cost reimbursable contract. This is an oversimplification. While the cost principles applicable to cost reimbursable contracts do come into play in a termination for convenience, the principles that the contract price serves as a ceiling on recovery, that a profit allowance is partially or totally eliminated on a loss contract, and that recovery of actual costs may be reduced by a loss factor, also come into play. These principles are not consistent with treating the fixed-price contract as actually converted to a cost reimbursable contract. Of particular note is the fact that the contract price ceiling is not at all related to the use of a Limitation of Cost or similar clause in a cost reimbursable contract, . . . . [T]he contract price as a ceiling is logically related to the fact that payments under a fixed price contract would amount to the contract price if the work were completed. There is no automatic justification for paying more than the contract price for doing less than fully completing the work. A fixed-price contractor has not, in incurring performance costs, relied to its detriment on the fact that the Government, after performance has ended, has made payments exceeding the contract price. There is even less logic to an argument that making payments that exceed the contract price is an act that totally forfeits or waives any further ceiling on payments. Paragraph (j) of GP-18 (Termination for the Convenience of the Government (Construction) clause even provides for recapture of such excess payments. On the other hand, a cost reimbursable contractor largely controls the rate of expenditures and the total costs of its contract as the work proceeds, and is uniquely able to warn the Government that actual expenditures are approaching any preset funding limit, giving the Government the option of continuing to fund additional work or ending the contract. That is the primary purpose of a Limitation of Costs clause. When such a warning has been given, whether formally or constructively, the Limitation of Costs clause has served its purpose. If the Government then permits the work to continue, the cost reimbursable contractor continues to incur costs in reliance that it otherwise could have avoided, so the waiver theory has a logical application. The case law on waiver of Limitation of Costs and similar clauses deals strictly with cost reimbursable contracts that are such from their inception. A terminated fixed-price contract is not converted to a true cost reimbursable contract, and there is no reasonable basis to extend the waiver concept to this case. See Tom Shaw, Inc., supra, 93-2 BCA ¶ 25,742, at 128,073. [Original emphasis.] Another immutable convenience termination rule is that the "total contract price" sets the boundaries of the contractor's recovery.57 See R.C. Swanson, supra, Supplemental Decision, slip. op. at 19 (citing GPO Contract Terms, Contract Clauses, ¶ 19(d); FAR 52.249-2(e)). Accord Alta Construction Co., PSBCA Nos. 1463, 2820, 94-3 BCA ¶ 27,053, at 134,816; Tom Shaw, Inc., supra, 93-2 BCA at 128,073. Apparently, the theory is that the contractor should not receive more than the contract price for doing less than the full amount of work required by the contract. Id. The "total contract price" concept encompasses three things: (1) it sets the maximum amount a contractor may recover under a termination for convenience; (2) it is important when considering the recovery of costs continuing after termination; and (3) the rules for setting the "total contract price" vary depending on the type of contract terminated. See R.C. Swanson, supra, Supplemental Decision, slip. op. at 19-20 (citing Nolan Brothers, Inc. v. United States, supra; Alta Construction Co., PSBCA No. 1463, 92-2 BCA ¶ 24,824; Celesco Industries, Inc., ASBCA No. 22460, 84-2 BCA ¶ 17,295; Pioneer Recovery Systems, Inc., supra; Okaw Industries, Inc., ASBCA Nos. 17863, 17864, 77-2 BCA ¶ 12,793; Chamberlain Manufacturing Corp., supra). Basically, the "total contract price" establishes the value of the contract (cost plus profit) for the purpose of compensating the terminated contractor. See R.C. Swanson, supra, Supplemental Decision, slip. op. at 20. GPO's "Termination for Convenience" clause provides that the convenience termination settlement may not generally exceed the "total contract price" as reduced by: (1) the amount of payments previously made; and (2) the contract price of work not terminated. See GPO Contract Terms, Contract Clauses, ¶ 19(d). Finally, a significant number of contract appeals forums stress that the Government must not ignore the underlying philosophy of the procedure when compensating a terminated contractor. In that regard, contracting officers are instructed that "fairness," rather than strict adherence to principles of cost accounting, should guide their settlement calculations. See Richerson Construction, Inc., supra; Youngstrand Surveying, supra; Industrial Refrigeration Service Corp., VABCA 2532, 91-3 BCA ¶ 24,093, at 120,595; Arctic Corner, Inc., VABCA No. 2393, 86-3 BCA ¶ 19,278; American Electric, Inc., ASBCA 16635, 76-2 BCA ¶ 12,151. Thus, the General Services Administration Board of Contract Appeals GSBCA) recently explained: Under applicable Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR), the objective of a termination for convenience settlement is to provide the contractor with "fair compensation" both for the work that has been completed prior to termination and for preparations made for terminated portions of the contract, including a reasonable allowance for profit. FAR 49.201. . . . To this end, the cost standards of the FAR, in part 31, are applied in accordance with principles of business judgment and fairness, Codex Corp. v. United States, 226 Ct. Cl. 693, 699 (1981), with the ultimate objective of making the contractor "whole." See Industrial Refrigeration Service Corp., VABCA 2532, 91-3 BCA ¶ 24,093, at 120,595; American Electric, Inc., ASBCA 16635, 76-2 BCA ¶ 12,151. See Richerson Construction, Inc., supra, 93-1 BCA at 125,704. See also General Electric Co., ASBCA No. 24111, 82-1 BCA ¶ 15,725, reconsid. denied 83-1 BCA ¶ 16,207. Furthermore, several years ago, in Arctic Corner, Inc., the Veterans Administration Board of Contract Appeals (VABCA), gave its view of the "fairness" concept in extensive detail: The FPR, in Subpart 1-8.3, also contained, "Additional Principles" to be applied in settling fixed-price contracts which had been terminated for the convenience of the Government. The following Section, because of its significance, is herein set forth in its entirety: § 1-8.301 General. (a) A settlement should compensate the contractor fairly for the work done and the preparations made for the terminated portions of the contract, including an allowance for profit thereon which is reasonable under the circumstances. Fair compensation is a matter of judgment and cannot be measured exactly. In a given case, various methods may be equally appropriate for arriving at fair compensation. The application of standards of business judgment, as distinguished from strict accounting principles, is the heart of a settlement. (b) The primary objective is to negotiate a settlement by agreement. The parties may agree upon a total amount to be paid the contractor without agreeing on or segregating the particular elements of costs or profit comprising this amount. (c) Cost and account data may provide guides, but are not rigid measures, for ascertaining compensation. In appropriate cases, costs may be estimated, differences compromised, and doubtful questions settled by agreement. Other types of data, criteria, or standards may furnish equally reliable guides to fair compensation. The amount of recordkeeping, reporting, and accounting, in connection with the settlement of termination claims, shall be kept to the minimum compatible with the reasonable protection of the public interest. Section 1-15.104 of the FPR, makes it clear that the cost principles and procedures set out in Subpart 1-15.4 "Construction and Architect-Engineer Contracts" are mandatory and are incorporated by reference to such contracts as the basis for, among other things, negotiating or determining costs under terminated fixed-price contracts. Subpart 1-15.4(b)(3) cross references the following provision: § 1-8.213 Cost principles. The cost principles and procedures set forth in the applicable subpart of Part 1-15 shall, subject to the general policies set forth in § 1-8.301(a), be used in claiming, negotiating, or determining costs relevant to termination settlements under fixed-price and cost-reimbursement type contracts with other than educational institutions; . . . In a situation involving an identical Section 1-8.301 of the Armed Services Procurement Regulation, the Court of Claims, in Codex Corporation v. United States, 226 Ct. Cl. 693 at 698-699 (1981), issued its Order, while stating the following: The proper reconciliation of the strict standard of allowable costs in section 15.205-30 and the fairness concept in section 8.301 is a matter primarily within the discretion of the Board of Contract Appeals. The Board did not decide the question. In its opinion on reconsideration, it stated that it "expresses no opinion as to whether the disputed costs concerned in this appeal would or would not be allowable as a part of the termination settlement if allowability were to be governed by paragraph 8.301." 75-2 B.C.A. ¶ 11,554, pp. 55,149-50. Our holding is not that section 8.301 governs the plaintiff's claim for the field case costs, but that the application of the cost principles in part 2 of section 15 to that claim must be made "subject to the general policies set forth" in section 8.301. We will likewise approach the various disputed cost elements in this appeal with an eye toward fair compensation rather than imposing strict accounting principles upon the Appellant. . . . See 86-3 BCA at 97,456-57. [Original emphasis.] See also Industrial Refrigeration Service Corp., supra, 91-3 BCA ¶ 24,093, at 120,594-95. Although a convenience termination settlement should compensate a contractor fairly, this is not to say that the concept has no boundaries. Certainly, a contractor may not use "fairness" as a "sword to dispense with its obligation to prove its monetary claim," whether a termination claim, or an equitable adjustment claim for that matter. See J.W. Cook & Sons, Inc., supra, 92-3 BCA at 124,863. Moreover, in contrast to the opinions expressed by other contract appeals boards, the ASBCA takes a narrower view of "fairness" as a concept in termination settlements: . . . It is not our province to fashion equitable or extracontractual relief on the grounds of fairness, or otherwise. In this context, "fairness" to the parties is the realization of the benefit of each party's bargain through the contractual instrument they signed. We exercise "fairness" through the reasonable interpretation of that contractual instrument and the related regulations, with due regard to all relevant circumstances. Id., 92-3 BCA at 124,865.58 While the few convenience termination decisions issued by the Board and the ad hoc panels have mentioned that a termination settlement should compensate the contractor fairly, see e.g., R.C. Swanson, supra, Supplemental Decision, slip. op. at 19; Bay Ridge Press, supra, slip op. at 3, none of them has discussed the "fairness" concept, or given any indication as to how it should be applied to terminations for convenience taken by this agency. However, the Board notes that the GPO Cost Directive provides the following guidance: 3. Fixed-price contracts. The applicable paragraphs of this instruction shall be used in the pricing of fixed-price contracts, subcontracts, and modifications to contracts and subcontracts whenever (a) costs analysis is performed, or (b) a fixed-price contract clause requires the determination or negotiation of costs. However, application of cost principles and subcontracts shall not be construed as a requirement to negotiate agreements on individual elements of cost in arriving at agreement on the total price. The final price accepted by the parties reflects agreement only on the total price. Further, notwithstanding the mandatory use of cost principles, the objective will continue to be to negotiate prices that are fair and reasonable, cost and other factors considered. See GPO Cost Directive, Sec. 2, ¶ 3, p. 6. [Emphasis added.] The underscored sentence is also found in the "Contract Financing" chapter in GPO's printing procurement regulation: 3. Applicability a. Fixed-prices contracts. Cost principles shall be used (1) in pricing negotiated fixed-price contracts, subcontracts, and modifications to contracts and subcontracts for supplies or services whenever cost analysis is performed, or (2) when a fixed-price contract clause requires the determination or negotiation of costs. However, application of cost principles to fix-priced contracts and subcontracts shall not be construed as a requirement to negotiate agreement on individual elements of cost in arriving at agreement on the total price. The final price accepted by the parties reflects agreement only on the total price. Further, notwithstanding the mandatory use of cost principles, the objective will continue to be to negotiated prices that are fair and reasonable, cost and other factors considered. See PPR, Chap. VIII, Sec. 1, ¶ 3.a., p. 83. Indeed, except for minor word differences in the first sentence in each of the above-quoted paragraphs, they are identical.59 Furthermore, insofar as is relevant here, the GPO Cost Directive states: 4. Contracts with commercial and other organizations. * * * * * * * * * * (b) In addition, the contracting officer shall incorporate the cost principles and procedures in section 3 [of the GPO Cost Directive] by reference in contracts with organizations as the basis for- * * * * * * * * * * (3) Proposing, negotiating, or determining costs under terminated contracts; See GPO Cost Directive, Sec. 2, ¶ 4(b)(3), p. 6. Again, although much briefer, the PPR tells Contracting Officers the same thing: b. Additional. The Contracting Officer shall also use the cost principles as a basis for: (1) Proposing, negotiating, or determining costs under terminated contracts; . . ." See PPR, Chap. VIII, Sec. 1, ¶ 3.b., p. 83.60 See also R.C. Swanson, supra, Supplemental Decision, slip. op. at 5, fn. 5. Suffice it to say, that the last ingredient in the cost principle mix for GPO contracts which are terminated for convenience, are the implementing provisions in GPO Contract Terms, which incorporate the GPO Cost Directive by reference. See GPO Contract Terms, Contract Clauses, ¶¶ 19(g), 45. As the Board reads the GPO scheme for using cost principles in convenience termination cases, the overall philosophy appears to be similar to and in harmony with the approach taken by the Court of Claims in Codex Corp. v. United States, and adopted by the GSBCA in Richerson Construction, Inc., and the VABCA in Industrial Refrigeration Service Corp., and Arctic Corner, Inc. In that regard, the above-quoted paragraphs from the GPO Cost Directive and the PPR appear to be simply condensed versions of the regulatory provisions at issue in Arctic Corner, Inc., supra, 86-3 BCA at 97,456. The Board has said several times in the past, that where GPO adopts the regulatory language followed by other agencies as its own, in this case the cost principal rules governing contracts which are terminated for convenience, we must presume that the uniform interpretation given to those words has also been accepted. See Sterling Printing, Inc., GPO BCA 20-89, Decision Denying Second Motion for Consideration (August 12, 1994), slip op. at 3 (procedural rules); Banta Co., GPO BCA 03-91 (November 15, 1993), slip op. at 34, 1993 WL 526843 ("Changes" clause); McDonald & Eudy Printers, Inc., supra, slip op. at 11-12 ("Requirements" clause); Shepard Printing, supra, slip op. at 21-22 ("Requirements" clause). Consequently, the Board will administer the cost principles in the relevant regulations of this agency-the GPO Cost Directive, the PPR, and the implementing provisions of GPO Contract Terms-consistent with the meaning and philosophy of the parallel provisions in the FAR, as interpreted by the Claims Court, the GSBCA and the VABCA in the above cited cases. Accordingly, the Board ". . . will likewise approach the various disputed cost elements in this appeal with an eye toward fair compensation rather than imposing strict accounting principles upon the Appellant."61 See Industrial Refrigeration Service Corp., supra, 91-3 at 120,594; Arctic Corner, Inc., supra, 86-3 BCA at 97,457. The Board has thoroughly examined the record, including the testimony and exhibits presented at the hearing and the parties' briefs, and has carefully weighed the evidence against the termination for convenience principles set forth above. From that review, it has reached the following conclusions regarding the issues in this appeal: A. Neither the Appellant's use of its standard stripping and blueline charges, nor the Contracting Officer's reliance on GPO Program A814-M to develop a new page rate for such costs, was the appropriate method for calculating those incurred and allowable direct costs. Therefore, the Board shall determine the amount of recovery by use of the "jury verdict" method. The Contractor submitted two separate monetary claims following the termination of its contract-one on January 30, 1991, in the amount of $4,697.37, for direct costs on work actually performed on Print Order 40000 before the contract was terminated, and the other on February 4, 1991, in the amount of $24,670.13 (subsequently reduced to $14,460.04 at the hearing) for indirect costs accounted for as unabsorbed (idle time) following termination (R4 File, Tabs M, N and O). The Board will address each claim seriatim. It should be noted at the outset that since the propriety of the termination for convenience is not an issue in this case, the Appellant's recovery is limited to that available under the contract's "Termination for Convenience" clause. See Plaza 70 Interiors, Ltd., supra, 95-2 BCA at 137,939 (citing Manuals, Inc., ASBCA No. 24123, 80-2 BCA ¶ 14,579). That clause, as previously noted, entitles a terminated contractor to recover its incurred costs plus a reasonable profit, subject, of course, to the overall limitation of the contract price. See GPO Contract Terms, Contract Clauses, ¶ 19(d); PPR, Chap. XIV, Sec. 2, ¶ 3.n. See also R.C. Swanson Printing Co., supra, Supplemental Decision, slip. op. at 17-18; Graphic Litho Co., Inc., supra, slip. op. at 10. Here, the Appellant is asking only for costs, omitting any profit figure from its claims. It seems apparent that the Contractor would not be entitled to a profit allowance in any event, because, by its own admission, it was in a loss position on Print Order 40000 by nearly $20,000.00 (R4 File, Tab F, Attachment, Tab O, Cost Analysis; Complaint, ¶ 14, Exhibit A). See GPO Contract Terms, Contract Clauses, ¶ 19(e)(2)(iii); PPR, Chap. XIV, Sec. 2, ¶ 3.o. Cf. Banta Co., supra, slip. op. at 26-28 (an equitable adjustment cannot be used to convert a loss contract into one for profit). Accord Maitland Bros. Co., supra. That the Appellant incurred some costs under the contract is not in dispute. Still, as previously mentioned, the Contractor has a dual burden in this case. First, the Appellant is responsible for showing the total amount of its costs. See R.C. Swanson Printing Co., supra, Supplemental Decision, slip. op. at 19. Accord Lisbon Contractors, Inc. v. United States, supra, 828 F.2d at 767; J. W. Cook & Sons, Inc., supra, 92-3 BCA at 124,863; Youngstrand Surveying, supra, 92-2 BCA at 124,694. Also cf. Banta Co., supra, slip op. at 43, fn. 53 (citing Lawrence D. Krause, AGBCA No. 76-118-4, 82-2 BCA ¶ 16,129, at 80,073; Onetta Boat Works, Inc., ENGBCA No. 3733, 81-2 BCA ¶ 15,869; Click Co., Inc., GSBCA No. 3007, 70-1 BCA ¶ 8335; Campbell Co., General Contractor, Inc., IBCA No. 722, 69-1 BCA ¶ 7574). Second, the Contractor must demonstrate that its costs were reasonable. Cf. Banta Co., supra, slip op. at 43 (citing Celesco Industries, ASBCA No. 22251, 79-1 BCA ¶ 13,604; Triple "A" Machine Shop, Inc., ASBCA No. 21561, 78-1 BCA ¶ 13,065 (1978); Cal Constructors, ASBCA No. 21179, 78-1 BCA ¶ 12,992 (1977)). See also Universal Printing Co., supra, slip op. at 40 (citing Michael-Mark, Ltd., IBCA Nos. 2697, 2890, 2891, 2892, 2893, 2894, 2895, 94-1 BCA ¶ 26,453; Lemar Construction Co., ASBCA Nos. 31161, 31719, 88-1 BCA ¶ 20,429; Lawrence D. Krause, supra; Onetta Boat Works, Inc., supra; Globe Construction Co., ASBCA No. 21069, 78-2 BCA ¶ 13,337). Whether a contractor's costs are reasonable is a question of fact depending on the circumstances. See Universal Printing Co., supra, slip op. at 42 (citing Nager Electric Co., Inc. and Keystone Engineering Corp. v. United States, 194 Ct. Cl. 835, 442 F.2d 936 (1971) (hereinafter Nager Electric) ). In that regard, the "reasonable cost" concept: . . . includes both `objective' and `subjective' elements . . . The objective focus is on the costs that would have been incurred by a prudent businessman placed in a similar overall competitive situation . . . However, unless it also takes into account the subjective situation of the contractor, a test of `reasonable cost' is incomplete. See Nager Electric, supra, 194 Ct. Cl. at 851-53, 442 F.2d at 945-46. The Appellant's direct cost claim is comprised of six (6) line items-film costs, stripping charges, blueline costs, Federal Express charges for receipt of original documents, and another for the return of the originals, and UPS charges for sending the blueline proofs to the NIH (R4 File, Tabs M and O; App. Exh. No. 2, p. 1). Only two of those items-stripping and blueline costs-are at issue here, since the Contracting Officer has allowed the other charges in full.62 Furthermore, the parties agree that the source of the problem is the fact that stripping and blueline production costs were not separate line items in the contract's schedule of prices, but rather were part of the contract's line item for the makeready and/or setup charges (Tr. 88, 117, 124; R4 File, Tab S, p. 1). Since makeready and setup also included plate-making and setting up the press, which were never performed, the conundrum facing the parties when the contract was terminated was to figure out how to isolate the costs of stripping and bluelines from the price bid by the Appellant for makeready and/or setup ($11.82 per page) (R4 File, Tabs B, p. 3, and S, p. 1). The Contractor's solution was simple-it merely applied its standard charges for stripping ($9.50 per flat) and bluelines ($3.50 per page), to the operations in question, which resulted in a bill for stripping costs of $798.12 and blueline costs of $2,002.00, respectively, or a total claim of $2,800.12 for these tasks ((Tr. 18-21, 24-25). The Respondent, on the other hand, believing that the Appellant's stripping and blueline charges were unreasonably high when compared with the rates of other commercial printers, calculated a wholly new price per page of $1.49 for both tasks by averaging the bids of 38 printing contractors on an unrelated GPO general use program-Program A814-M-in which almost all prices were separate line items (Tr. 117-19, 122, 124, 126-28, 130, 134; R4 File, Tabs R, Attachment D, fns. 2 and 3 and S). The Government's price of $1.49 per page, when multiplied by a total page count of 572 pages for both books, yielded a recovery for the Appellant of $852.28 for these items (Tr. 117, 124; R4 File, Tab S, p. 2). Thus, the amount in controversy regarding stripping and blueline costs is only $1,947.84 ($2,800.12 (Appellant's claim) [-] $852.28 (Government's settlement offer)). Since both parties believe their respective approaches were reasonable under the circumstances, while the other's was either unreasonable or patently unfair, the Board is left to untie their Gordian knot. In the Board's view, neither party's solution is satisfactory. On the one hand, the Appellant's simple expedient of merely applying its standard charges for stripping and bluelines to the operations in question, is analogous to figuring the costs for those tasks on the basis of some arbitrary formula. The Board has previously noted that claims prepared on such a basis are uniformly rejected by boards of contract appeals. See Universal Printing Co., supra, slip op. at 36 (citing Ordnance Materials, Inc., ASBCA No. 32371, 88-3 BCA ¶ 20,910). Rather, in order to avoid a windfall for either party, what is usually required of a contractor is a showing of its actual costs. See Universal Printing Co., supra, slip op. at 41 (citing Dawco Construction, Inc. v. United States, 930 F.2d 872, 882 (Fed. Cir. 1991), rev'g 18 Cl. Ct. 682 (1990); Cen- Vi-Ro of Texas v. United States, 210 Ct. Cl. 684 (1976); Buck Brown Contracting Co., IBCA No. 1119-7-76, 78-2 BCA ¶ 13,360; Engineered Systems, Inc., DOTCAB No. 75-5, 76-2 BCA ¶ 12,211; Bregman Construction Corp., ASBCA No. 15020, 72-1 BCA ¶ 9,411). As a rule, actual costs are proved through the introduction of the contractor's accounting records, which will be accepted if they have been audited by the Government and are unrebutted.63 Celesco Industries, supra, 79-1 BCA ¶ 13,604. In this case, the OIG auditors found the Appellant's records inadequate to support its stripping and blueline claim (R4 File, Tab R, Attachment D, fns. 2 and 3). However, the Board believes that for termination settlements, the "reasonable cost" concept's subjective elements are merged into the basic thrust of the "fairness concept," and the contractor is not required to document each and every cost item, so long as some credible evidence (whether documentary, testimonial, or both) is presented to establish the validity of the claimed costs, as well as assure that the Government is not being charged for services or products which were not provided. See Industrial Refrigeration Service Corp., supra, 91-3 BCA at 120,595. On the other hand, the Board finds itself in agreement with the Appellant's objection to the Respondent's use of the line item structure of Program A814-M to establish the prices for stripping and bluelines. The Government does not refute the Contractor's contention that because Program A814-M contemplates a high volume of work, averaging line item costs for stripping and bluelines in that contract results in an artificially low per page rate for such work in the context of this agreement (App. Brf., p. 3).64 More importantly, Program A814-M involves many contractors (at least 38), and there is no proof that the Appellant is one of them. Without such privity of contract, the Contractor cannot be bound by the range of prices in Program A814-M.65 See Universal Printing Co., supra, slip op. at 26, fn. 27 (citing Atlantic Electric Co., GSBCA No. 6016, 83-1 BCA ¶ 16,484); Sterling Printing, Inc., supra, slip op. at 8, 47, fns. 13, 35. See also RD Printing Associates, Inc., supra, slip op. at 13, fn. 15 (revised pricing specification from the succeeding contract); Merchant's Service Co., [No GPOCAB Docket Number] (February 11, 1980), slip. op. at 18-20, 1980 WL 81262. Certainly, if the Board had been asked in the first instance to factor Program A814-M into its decision in this case, it would not have done so because its jurisdictional mandate bars consideration of matters pertaining to contracts unrelated to the one under review. See e.g., Universal Printing Co., supra, slip op. at 2, fn. 3; Shepard Printing, supra, slip. op. at 9, fn. 8; RD Printing Associates, Inc., supra, slip op. at 9, 13, fns. 9, 15; The Wessel Co., Inc., GPO BCA 8-90 (February 28, 1992), slip. op. at 32, 1992 WL 487877; Automated Datatron, Inc., GPO BCA 20-87 (March 31, 1989), slip op. at 4-5, 1989 WL 384973; Bay Printing, Inc., GPO BCA 16-85 (January 30, 1987) slip op. at 9, 1987 WL 228975; Peak Printers, Inc., GPO BCA 12-85 (November 16, 1986), Sl. op. at 6, 1986 WL 181453. See generally Matthew S. Foss, U.S. Government Printing Office Board of Contract Appeals: the First Decade, 24 Pub. Cont. L. J. 579 (1995), at 584-86. Under GPO Contract Terms, the GPO Cost Directive, and the PPR, the Respondent's contracting officers have more latitude in cases of this sort, except that their decisions are expected to be fair and reasonable under the circumstances. In the Board's view, the employment of Program A814-M as the settlement baseline for stripping and blueline costs was neither fair or reasonable. Where, as here, the Board finds itself without a bench mark by which to determine the reasonableness of the Contractor's costs for performing the work, but nonetheless knows that some cost impact is involved, it will resort to the "jury verdict" method in order to arrive at a fair reimbursement. See Universal Printing Co., supra, slip op. at 49; Banta Co., supra, slip. op. at 46-47. See also Maryland Composition, [No GPOCAB Docket Number] (December 30, 1974), slip op. at 6 (citing, Johnson, Drake & Piper, Inc., ASBCA Nos. 9824, 10199, 65-2 BCA ¶ 4,868). Accord Industrial Refrigeration Service Corp., supra, 91-3 BCA at 120,595. Under the "jury verdict" technique, where a board or court finds entitlement to some recovery clear but the evidence is incomplete, or the amount cannot be determined with any degree of mathematical precision, it may exercise its discretion to resolve conflicting evidence concerning the claim and arrive at a fair amount of compensation.66 See Assurance Co. v. United States, 813 F.2d 1202, 1205 (Fed. Cir. 1987); S.W. Electronics & Manufacturing Corp. v. United States, 228 Ct. Cl. 333, 655 F.2d 1078 (1981); Electronic & Missile Facilities, Inc. v. United States, 189 Ct. Cl. 237, 416 F.2d 1345, 1358 (1969). See also Dawco Construction, Inc., ASBCA No. 42120, 92-2 BCA ¶ 24,915; Gricoski Detective Agency, GSBCA Nos. 8901(7823), 8922(7824), 8923(7825), 8924(7826), 8925(7827), 8926(7828), 90-3 BCA ¶ 23,131; E.W. Eldridge, Inc., ENGBCA No. 5269, 90-3 BCA ¶ 23,080; Harvey C. Jones, Inc., IBCA Nos. 2070, 2150, 2151, 2152, 2153, 2467, 90-2 BCA ¶ 22,762. The key to the use of the "jury verdict" method is the presence of sufficient evidence to permit the determination of a fair and reasonable approximation of damages.67 See J.E.T.S., Inc., ASBCA No. 28083, 88-2 BCA ¶ 20,540, at 103,859 (citing, Schuster Engineering, Inc. ASBCA Nos. 28760, 29306, 30683, 87-3 BCA ¶ 20,105). Thus, a trier of fact may allow recovery if it determines that: (1) clear proof of injury exists; (2) there is no more reliable method for computing damages; and (3) there is sufficient evidence to make a fair and reasonable approximation of damages. See Dawco Construction, Inc. v. United States, supra, 930 F.2d at 880 (citing, WRB Corp. v. United States, 183 Ct. Cl. 409, 425 (1968)). See also Gricoski Detective Agency, supra; Harvey C. Jones, Inc., supra; J.E.T.S. Incorporated, supra; Lawrence D. Krause, supra. In the Board's judgment, all of the elements necessary for a "jury verdict" award are present with respect to the Appellant's claim for direct costs on work actually performed on Print Order 40000. Consequently, that approach is the appropriate method for resolving this dispute. Universal Printing Co., supra; Banta Co., supra; Maryland Composition, supra. Accord Industrial Refrigeration Service Corp., supra. While there are many "jury verdict" techniques, one well- accepted device is simply to "split the difference" between the amount claimed by each party. See Sentry Insurance, A Mutual Company, VABCA No. 2617, 91-3 BCA ¶ 24,094 (50 percent of the contractor's invoiced costs, plus 15 percent for markup); Gricoski Detective Agency, supra (amount which was midway between the contractor's original demand and the final bargaining position of the agency); Parkdale Building Maintenance, ENGBCA No. 5232, 90-1 BCA ¶ 22,319 (average of the contractor's and Government's estimates); Second Growth Forest Management, Inc., AGBCA No. 88-153-3, 89-1 BCA ¶ 21,569 (average of the contractor's and Governments production rates); Delfour, Inc., VABCA Nos. 2049, 2215, 2539, 2540, 89-1 BCA ¶ 21,394 (50 percent of the amount claimed by the contractor); The Morrison Co., ASBCA Nos. 26746, 26920, 26921, 83-1 BCA ¶ 16,417 (equitable adjustment was midway between the amount which each party claimed). It seems to the Board that a "jury verdict" which sets the Appellant's recovery for stripping and bluelines midway between its claim for that work and the amount offered by the Respondent for those tasks is the best way to break the deadlock between the parties and resolve this aspect of the termination dispute reasonably and fairly. See Universal Printing Co., supra, slip op. at 53. Accord Gricoski Detective Agency, supra, 90-3 BCA at 116,138-39; Parkdale Building Maintenance, supra, 90-1 BCA at 112,094; The Morrison Co., supra, 83-1 BCA at 81,675. Therefore, the Board will allow the Appellant's claim for stripping and bluelines to the extent of $1,826.20, calculated as follows: Appellant's total claim for stripping and blueline costs $2,800.12 Government's settlement offer 852.28 $852.28 Difference between claim and offer 1,947.84 50 percent of difference $ 973.92 973.92 Total allowance for stripping and bluelines $1,826.20 Thus, the overall recovery of the Appellant for the work actually performed on Print Order 40000 before it was terminated is $3,723.45, figured as follows: Film costs $1,754.00 Federal Express and UPS charges 143.25 Stripping and bluelines 1,826.20 Total recovery $3,723.45 Although this compromise verdict awards the Appellant somewhat less for its direct costs than the $4,697.37 claimed, but somewhat more than the Respondent's offer of $2,749.28, see R4 File, Tabs M, O, S and T, the Board has no doubt that the result is one which best satisfies its goal of approaching ". . . the various disputed cost elements in this appeal with an eye toward fair compensation rather than imposing strict accounting principles upon the Appellant." See Industrial Refrigeration Service Corp., supra, 91-3 at 120,594; Arctic Corner, Inc., supra, 86-3 BCA at 97,457. B. The Contracting Officer mistakenly denied the Appellant's unabsorbed overhead claim based, in part, on the OIG's erroneous interpretation of GPO Cost Directive, Sec. 3, ¶ 25(c). The cost principles applicable in convenience termination cases allow the recovery of certain continuing costs following termination, including costs resulting from idle capacity of tangible capital assets such as plant machinery. Furthermore, where, as here, a "requirements" contract is terminated for convenience, a contractor is entitled to be reimbursed for certain costs which cannot reasonably be discontinued immediately after termination. See GPO Cost Directive, Sec. 3, ¶ 49(b). The principal dispute in this case involves the Contractor's claim for idle time costs following termination of the contract, and nearly all of the evidence presented at the hearing concerned this claim (R4 File, Tabs M, N and O). To recapitulate, the Contractor is asking to be reimbursed for the following idle time costs: (1) makeready and running costs for the Miller Press (112 hours); (2) labor costs for the press helper (112 hours); (3) folding charges (46.88 hours); (4) collating costs (machine time only) (30.5 hours); (5) perfect binding charges (76 hours); and (6) trimming costs (63 hours) (Tr. 60-63, 74-75; App. Exh. No. 6). These idle hours were accumulated over 18 workdays in the month of February 1991 (App. Exh. No. 5).68 Furthermore, the Appellant's claim only covers the performance period for Print Order 40000, despite the fact that this "requirements" contract was not due to expire until October 1991 (Tr. 66, 70, 72; R4 File, Tabs C, D and L; App. Exh. No. 8). In that regard, the Contractor's financial losses resulting from the termination of the contract were confined to February 1991-its records show that by March 1991, it had booked enough work for the Miller Press to completely replace the NIH job and was once again operating at a profit, thus mitigating the Government's potential liability (Tr. 60-61, 66-68, 70-71; App. Exh. No. 9). In disallowing the Appellant's claim for lost production time, the Contracting Officer essentially concurred in the OIG's findings that: (1) the claim was governed by GPO Cost Directive, Sec. 3, ¶ 25(c) (Idle facilities and idle capacity costs); and (2) that cost principle barred the claim on the ground that the idle time in question was not peculiar to the contract, but resulted from normal periodic fluctuations in usage of equipment, and hence was simply a cost of doing business which should be included in the Contractor's overhead from prior years (Tr. 129, 133-34; R4 File, Tab R, Attachment E, fn. 1, citing GPO Cost Directive, Sec. 3, ¶ 25(c)). Furthermore, by obtaining the Contractor's admission at the hearing that the Miller Press-the principal press set aside for the NIH job-was about three years old when termination occurred and was not acquired specifically for work on the contract, Counsel for GPO was tacitly suggesting that recovery for idle time was also barred because the Appellant's machinery were "common items" and such costs are generally not allowable under the termination accounting rules (Tr. 78-79, 107-08). See GPO Cost Directive, Sec. 3, ¶ 49(a). The Board disagrees. In our view, the temporary downtime of the Appellant's equipment following termination is more properly seen as a continuing cost which could not be discontinued immediately, and as such is allowable. See GPO Cost Directive, Sec. 3, ¶ 49(b). The Board has previously considered the "idle facilities and idle capacity costs" provisions of the GPO Cost Directive in equitable adjustment cases. See e.g., New South Press, GPO BCA 45-92 (November 4, 1994), 1994 WL 837425; Banta Co., supra. See also Editors Press, Inc., GPO BCA 3-90 (September 4, 1991), 1991 WL 439271. This appeal represents the first time that the Board has been asked to consider those provisions in the context of a termination for convenience. The Board's research, however, indicates that the Appellant is entitled to recover certain downtime costs in this situation. The Board begins its analysis by rejecting any suggestion that the Appellant's press and other plant machinery should somehow be deemed "common items" for the purposes of this contract. In that regard, the relevant provision of the GPO Cost Directive states: (a) Common items. The costs of items reasonably usable on the contractor's other work shall not be allowable unless the contractor submits evidence that the items could not be retained at cost without sustaining a loss. The contracting officer should consider the contractor's plans and orders for current and planned production when determining if items can reasonably be used on other work of the contractor. Contemporaneous purchases of common items by the contractor shall be regarded as evidence that such items are reasonably usable on the contractor's other work. Any acceptance of common items as allocable to the terminated portion of the contract should be limited to the extent that the quantities of such items on hand, in transit, and on order are in excess of the reasonable quantitative requirements of other work. See GPO Cost Directive, Sec. 3, ¶ 49(a).69 However, the customary interpretation of "common items" for the purposes of this provision is limited to supplies and other inventory items associated with production which can be utilized by the contractor in its other work. See Fiesta Leasing and Sales, Inc, supra, 87-1 BCA at 99,286. Here, on the other hand, the Appellant's production machinery are tangible capital assets and not the kind of inventory to which the provision most appropriately applies.70 See Anderson, § 13.03[4], p. 13-6. Since the equipment in question are tangible capital assets, post-termination costs associated with them are treated as idle capacity costs.71 See GPO Cost Directive, Sec. 3, ¶ 25(c). See also Fiesta Leasing and Sales, Inc, supra, 87-1 BCA at 99,287-88. Such costs include, inter alia, repair, rent, property taxes, insurance, and depreciation, see GPO Cost Directive, Sec. 3, ¶ 25(a)-all of which are cost factors used by the Appellant in formulating the BHR for each piece of machinery in its plant.72 While the Contracting Officer rejected the Appellant's claim in reliance on the general rule which considers idle capacity costs a normal cost of doing business, the Board also observes that the relevant cost principle also provides that such costs are allowable ". . . provided the capacity is necessary or was originally reasonable and is not subject to reduction or elimination by subletting, renting, or sale, in accordance with sound business, economics, or security practices." See GPO Cost Directive, Sec. 3, ¶ 25(c). There is no dispute that the Appellant had dedicated the Miller Press and its other production machinery to the contract, and that the equipment was clearly necessary for performance. Therefore, in the Board's view, the Contractor's inability, despite its best efforts, to completely eliminate the downtime which resulted when the contract was terminated, entitles it to a recovery for idle capacity costs for that portion of the time that the machinery went unused. See Fiesta Leasing and Sales, Inc, supra, 87-1 BCA at 99,288. The Board believes that the result would be the same if the downtime of the Appellant's tangible capital assets was considered idle facilities costs. See GPO Cost Directive, Sec. 3, ¶ 25(b). In that regard, the costs of idle facilities, like idle capacity costs, are generally unallowable. Id. However, such costs are allowable if the tangible capital assets were necessary when acquired and are now idle because of, inter alia, a ". . . termination," although only for a "reasonable period" (ordinarily not exceeding one year, depending upon efforts taken by the contractor to use, lease, or dispose of the idle facilities). See GPO Cost Directive, Sec. 3, ¶ 25(b)(2). Nothing in the language of this cost principle requires the contractor to show that the equipment was purchased solely for performance of the terminated contract; all that is needed is a showing that the machinery was set aside especially for use in performance. See Fiesta Leasing and Sales, Inc, supra, 87-1 BCA at 99,289. If the latter is the case, then certain costs such as depreciation, insurance, repair, etc., are not considered indirect costs or overhead items, and recovery is allowed based on a finding that a clear connection exists between the costs claimed and the terminated contract, and that those costs, as will be discussed infra, could not be reasonably immediately discontinued upon termination. Id (citing, Metered Laundry Services, Inc., ASBCA No. 21573, 78-1 BCA ¶ 13,206; Bailfield Industries, Division of A-T-O, Inc., ASBCA No. 20006, 76-2 BCA ¶ 12,096). Even more importantly in the context of this case, as the Board has already observed, is the implication in the Contracting Officer's rejection of the Contractor's idle time claim that the regulations only entitled the Appellant to reimbursement for work actually performed under Print Order 40000 (Tr. 119, 121; R4 File, Tab T, p. 1). Stated otherwise, the Respondent's theory is tantamount to an argument that the convenience termination of the Appellant's requirements contract in effect converted it into a fixed price contract (Print Order 40000) for termination settlement purposes. Such a viewpoint, however, has already been rejected by the Board because it deprives the parties of the benefit of their bargain. See R.C. Swanson, supra, Supplemental Decision, slip. op. at 21, 26. Accord Tom Shaw, Inc., supra, 93-2 BCA at 128,073. Furthermore, the cases indicate that certain features of a "requirements" contract can comprise the special circumstances in convenience termination situations which the Appellant says can overcome the general rule barring recovery of unabsorbed overhead as a continuing cost (App. Brf., pp. 3-5). See Cloverleaf Enterprises, Inc., supra, slip op. at 16-17.73 Accord Albano Cleaners, Inc. v. United States, 197 Ct. Cl. 450, 455 F.2d 556 (1972); Aviation Specialists, Inc., supra. See also Henry Angelo & Co., ASBCA No. 43669, 94-1 BCA ¶ 26,484 (although not a termination for convenience case, the board ruled that the Government's failure to order within 15 percent of estimated quantities under requirements contract can lead to increased costs, entitling contractor to recover both direct and indirect costs, including unabsorbed overhead. Citing Les Killgore's Excavating, ASBCA No. 32261, 86-3 BCA ¶ 19,117). See generally Cibinic & Nash, pp. 1130-31. In R.C. Swanson, the Board adopted the reasoning of the DOTBCA in Aviation Specialists, Inc., supra, in ruling that the "total contract price" under GPO Contract Terms, Contract Clauses, ¶ 19(d) for a terminated requirements contract is the "estimated contract price," as established by the Government's pre-award estimates of its requirements in the solicitation. See R.C. Swanson, supra, Supplemental Decision, slip op. at 21-25 (citing, Aviation Specialists, Inc., supra, 91-1 BCA at 117,994). The proper formula for measuring "total contract price" is not an issue in this appeal. However, the Board's opinion also accepted the DOTBCA's rationale that the very nature of a requirements contract authorizes recovery of certain post-termination costs, including depreciation, overhead and profit (where applicable), which is at the heart of the Appellant's idle time claim.74 See R.C. Swanson, supra, Supplemental Decision, slip op. at 26-27, fn. 22. See Aviation Specialists, Inc., supra, 91-1 BCA at 117,992, 117,994. Aviation Specialists, Inc. involved a one-year requirements contract for use of a particular aircraft which was terminated for convenience by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) with six months remaining in the contract term. In ruling that the contractor was entitled to recover its costs of depreciation, insurance, maintenance, facilities capital, advertising and overhead, as well as a measure of profit, for the remainder of the contract period, the DOTBCA held that the FAA's decision not to allow the contract to expire without any further use of the aircraft or expense to the Government, but to terminate it for convenience instead, changed the relationship between the parties and triggered the provisions of the "Termination for Convenience" clause.75 See Aviation Specialists, Inc., supra, 91-1 BCA at 117,992. As explained by the DOTBCA, depreciation, insurance, maintenance, overhead, etc., continued to be incurred by the contractor despite its reasonable efforts to sell the aircraft or otherwise mitigate its costs, and the termination regulations clearly provide that costs which cannot reasonably be immediately discontinued upon termination of the contract are recoverable. See Aviation Specialists, Inc., supra, 91-1 BCA at 117,992-93. The DOTBCA reasoned, in pertinent part: Upon termination of the contract [by means of the "Termination for Convenience" clause] the rights and obligations of both parties were altered. The parties specifically provided by contract that in such an eventuality appellant would receive payment for certain costs, notwithstanding whether these costs would have been reimbursed if the contract was fully performed. It is this agreement of the parties which controls the payment, if any, to be made to appellant, irrespective of the rights and obligations of the parties prior to such termination. * * * * * * * * * * The provisions of the "Termination for Convenience" clause are to be enforced in these circumstances even if the resulting payments to Aviation Specialists are greater than they might have been if the contract were not terminated. See Albano Cleaners, Inc. v. United States [17 CCF ¶ 81,144], 455 F.2d 556, 197 Ct. Cl. 450 (1972). * * * * * * * * * * . . The contract specified the type and amount of costs which appellant could recover in the event of a termination for convenience. Appellant has claimed its continuing costs, those that it incurred subsequent to termination. . . . The "Termination for Convenience" clause of the contract provided that the cost principles of Part 31 of the Federal Acquisition Regulation would govern all costs claimed in the event of such a termination. Part 31 provides that costs which cannot be discontinued immediately after termination are allowable. After termination, appellant made reasonable, though unsuccessful, efforts to promptly dispose of the plane. Aviation Specialists also acted reasonably in attempting to mitigate damages. It was able to lease the plane during some of the period and apply the profits received from these operations against its continuing costs. Thus, under the contract provisions, Aviation Specialists is entitled to be reimbursed for its continuing costs after termination. * * * * * * * * * * . . . We find that, . . . , Aviation Specialists is entitled to recover its costs relating to the aircraft which continued after the date of termination. These costs are recoverable, pursuant to the plain language of the contract including Part 31 of the Federal Acquisition Regulation. The costs which appellant had claimed were incurred as a direct result of obligation Aviation Specialists undertook to perform the contract. These costs could not reasonably be discontinued during the remaining contract term. . . . * * * * * * * * * * In this case we find that appellant incurred expenses of depreciation, insurance, maintenance, facilities capital, overhead, and advertising following termination. These costs are recoverable as continuing costs under the Federal Acquisition Regulations since, as we have found, they could not be reasonably discontinued immediately. . . . * * * * * * * * * * See Aviation Specialists, Inc., supra, 91-1 BCA at 117,991-93.76 The Board believes that the teachings of Aviation Specialists, Inc. are as applicable to this appeal as they were in R.C. Swanson. Like the FAA in Aviation Specialists, Inc., GPO did not simply allow the contract to expire on its own. Nor did the Respondent default the contract, as it apparently once contemplated doing and discussed with the Appellant (Tr. 83-84; R4 File, Tabs G, H and O; Complaint, ¶ 21). See GPO Contract Terms, Contract Terms, ¶ 20 (Default). Instead, the Government invoked the "Termination for Convenience" clause, which effectively changed the relationship between the parties. See Aviation Specialists, Inc., supra, 91-1 BCA at 117,991. The Respondent is bound by that decision, and it is the convenience termination clause which ". . . controls the payment, if any, to be made to appellant, irrespective of the rights and obligations of the parties prior to such termination." Id. Furthermore, in our view, the DOTBCA's comment that the cost principles of Part 31 of the FAR are part and parcel of the convenience termination clause, see Aviation Specialists, Inc., supra, 91-1 BCA at 117,992, is no different from the Board's own observation that the standard cost principles applicable to Government contracts apply to GPO contracts which are also terminated for convenience, see R.C. Swanson, supra, Supplemental Decision, slip op. at 5, 23, fns. 5, 18. Stated otherwise, as the Respondent suggests, the GPO Cost Directive and FAR Part 31 are mirror images of one another, and they have the same purpose and effect (R. Brf., p. 3).77 Accordingly, the Board will look to the relevant provisions of the GPO Cost Directive for a solution to this dispute. The key cost principles applicable to this case are not hidden or ambiguous. They are contained in the GPO Cost Directive, especially the provisions expressly denominated "Termination costs." See GPO Cost Directive, Sec. 3, ¶ 49. Like Part 31 of the FAR, the GPO Cost Directive also allows the recovery of costs which cannot be discontinued immediately after termination despite all reasonable efforts by the contractor. See GPO Cost Directive, Sec. 3, ¶ 49(b). Furthermore, it is significant in the context of this dispute that the very first paragraph of the provisions relating to termination costs states that the "cost principles peculiar to termination situations are to be used in conjunction with the other cost principles in [Section 3][.]" See GPO Cost Directive, Sec. 3, ¶ 49. Thus, even though the Board has said that an independent basis exists to support the Appellant's recovery of certain post-termination costs under the "idle facilities and idle capacity costs" provisions of the GPO Cost Directive, this language, at the very least, is broad enough to encompass some of those idle time precepts by reference, including, inter alia, the rules that: (1) idle capacity costs are allowable if the original capacity was necessary or reasonable and not subject to reduction or elimination by following sound business, economic or security practices; and (2) idle facilities costs are allowable if they were incurred, inter alia, by changes in requirements, termination, or other causes which could not have been reasonably foreseen, see GPO Cost Directive, Sec. 3, ¶¶ 25(b)(2),(c).78 It is uncontroverted that following termination the Appellant bid on other Government and private sector work in an effort to reduce its downtime claim, and indeed, succeeded in mitigating its losses by 30 percent (of the 160 hours press hours available in February 1991, the Contractor was able to fill 48 hours with other work) (Tr. 45, 50, 54, 61, 66, 110, 114; App. Exh. No. 5). Furthermore, as previously mentioned, by its efforts the Appellant was not only able to reduce the amount of idle time, but also limit the extent; i.e., the time period over which its downtime costs were incurred is confined to 18 workdays in February 1991-by March 1991, the Appellant had completely replaced the terminated job with enough other work to again be running at a profit (Tr. 60-61, 66-68, 70-72; App. Exh. Nos. 5, 8 and 9). Thus, in the Board's view, the record amply supports the conclusion that after termination, the Contractor acted reasonably in attempting to mitigate damages. Consequently, under the plain language of the contract including GPO Cost Directive, Sec. 3, ¶ 49(b), the Appellant is entitled to be reimbursed for its indirect costs which continued after termination through the end of February 1991.79 See Aviation Specialists, Inc., supra, 91-1 BCA at 117,992. Also cf. J.W. Cook & Sons, Inc., supra, 92-3 BCA at 124,863 (the Government was not liable for the terminated contractor's fixed general and administrative (G&A) expenses where the contractor admitted that it could have bid on other jobs, but failed to do so, because it is well settled that a contractor must show that the fixed G&A expenses could not have been reasonably absorbed by other work. Citing CBC Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 24 Cl. Ct. 187 (1991); Charles G. Williams Construction, Inc., ASBCA No. 42592, 92-1 BCA ¶ 24,635). Specifically, such costs as maintenance, repair, rent, and other related costs, such as property taxes, insurance, and depreciation are recoverable as continuing costs under the GPO Cost Directive, since it seems clear that they could not have been totally discontinued immediately upon termination. Id., 91-1 BCA at 117,993. Finally, although the Respondent will probably disagree, the Board believes that its entitlement decision in this case is not inconsistent with the general rule that unabsorbed overhead expenses are considered a "cost of doing business" and are not recoverable under a termination settlement. See Nolan Brothers v. United States, supra; J.W. Cook & Sons, Inc., supra; Chamberlain Manufacturing Corp., supra; Technology, Inc., supra. In the first place, construction contracts aside (Nolan Brothers, Inc. v. United States, supra; William Green Construction Co., Inc. et al. v. United States, supra; Hewitt Contracting Co., supra), all of the cases cited to the Board by the Respondent in support of its position involve some variation of a fixed price contract, see Chamberlain Manufacturing Corp., supra (fixed price incentive manufacturing contract); Pioneer Recovery Systems, supra (fixed price supply contract); Technology, Inc., supra (cost plus fixed fee contract); Fairchild Stratos Corp., supra (fixed price supply contract). A "requirements" contract was not involved in any of the cases. Secondly, one of the principal reasons given by the ASBCA in Chamberlain Manufacturing for the general rule, namely that if unabsorbed overhead claims were allowed "the Government would be guaranteeing a contractor's overhead costs, without receiving any benefit therefore, as a `penalty' for exercising its contractual rights," see Chamberlain Manufacturing Corp., supra, 73-2 BCA at 47,679, was expressly rejected by the DOTBCA in Aviation Specialists, see Aviation Specialists, Inc., supra, 91-1 BCA at 117,991 ("The FAA alleges that it should not be penalized for terminating the contract for convenience. [¶] While this argument has initial appeal, the argument also has flaws. . . ."). To the extent that Aviation Specialists represents a difference in philosophy with the ASBCA's ruling in Chamberlain Manufacturing Corp., the Board favors the DOTBCA's thinking because it better harmonizes with the "fairness" concept in termination cases involving requirements contracts. Accord Industrial Refrigeration Service Corp., supra, 91-3 at 120,594; Arctic Corner, Inc., supra, 86-3 BCA at 97,457. Third, even in Chamberlain Manufacturing, the ASBCA recognized that despite the general rule, certain specific indirect costs might be allowable in termination cases, see Chamberlain Manufacturing Corp., supra, 73-2 BCA at 47,679, and indeed, in Fairchild Stratos, the case which foreshadowed its holding in Technology, Inc., the ASBCA indicated that ". . . there may be instances where allowance of unearned or unabsorbed dollar overhead would be appropriate[,]" especially unabsorbed overhead directly related to the performance of the contract; e.g., involving the specific plant and equipment set aside for performance of the contract, see Fairchild Stratos Corp., supra, 67-1 BCA at 28,798. In short, it seems clear the real problem with unabsorbed overhead concerns its allocability and difficulties in separating risks of a business continuing to obtain business or fill a void when the Government exercises its contractual right to terminate a contract for convenience. See Southland Manufacturing Corp., supra, 75-1 BCA at 52,360. However, such matters are appropriate for resolution in this case by applying the general principles set forth in GPO Contract Terms and the GPO Cost Directive to the facts, while being mindful that the goal is fair compensation rather than the imposition of strict accounting rules. See Industrial Refrigeration Service Corp., supra, 91-3 at 120,594; Arctic Corner, Inc., supra, 86-3 BCA at 97,457. Accordingly, for all of these reasons, the Board concludes that the Appellant's termination claim for idle time costs was erroneously denied by the Contracting Officer, who relied, in part, on the OIG's incorrect interpretation of GPO Cost Directive, Sec. 3, ¶ 25(c). Furthermore, the Board finds, contrary to the Respondent's view, that the applicable cost principles allow the Appellant to recover certain of its continuing costs which cannot reasonably be immediately discontinued for a limited period of time following the termination. See GPO Cost Directive, Sec. 3, ¶¶ 25(c), 49(b). C. Applying the "jury verdict" method to the Appellant's idle time claim, the Board concludes that the Contractor is entitled to recover post-termination costs of $7,683.62 as fair compensation under the circumstances of this case. The Board has found that the Appellant is entitled to be reimbursed for its post-termination idle time costs through the end of February 1991. That the Contractor temporarily incurred such costs as a result of the termination of its contract is not in dispute. Therefore, the last task confronting the Board is to decide what amount of recovery will fairly compensate the Contractor under the circumstances of this case. Looking at the six parts of the Appellant's claim for post- termination costs, it is apparent that only one-the press helper claim-involves personnel costs, while the remaining five concern machinery downtime. There is no doubt that the Miller Press was temporarily shut down because the Respondent terminated the NIH contract, and as a result the press helper, Larson, was idled (Tr. 80-81, 99). Therefore, the Contractor now seeks compensation of $1,058.40, calculated at a labor rate of $9.45 an hour multiplied by 112 hours of unfilled time for the Miller Press. This claim is easily disposed of. As a rule, employee idle time charged to a termination claim is generally allowable. See Hugo Auchter GmbH, ASBCA No. 39642, 91-1 BCA ¶ 23,645 at 118,443 (citing Edward v. Campbell, LBCA No. 82-BCA-4, 84-3 BCA ¶ 17,657 at 88,011; American Electric, Inc., ASBCA No. 16635, 76-2 BCA ¶ 12,151). The theory is that the wages and salaries of idle employees are considered in the nature of preparatory costs which are allocable, inter alia, to terminated work. See Hugo Auchter GmbH, supra, 91-1 BCA at 118,443 (citing Teague Industries & Technical Services Co., ASBCA Nos. 29230, 29642, 86-2 BCA ¶ 18,790). See also Arctic Corner, Inc., supra, 86-3 BCA at 97,458-59. The only problem with the Appellant's labor claim in this instance is a minor one-during the hearing doubts were raised about whether or not the press helper was in fact idle and unpaid on February 1, 1991, the first day of downtime for the Miller Press following the termination of the contract, or whether he was gainfully employed elsewhere in the plant (Tr. 82-83, 100-01). Consequently, since the Contractor has failed to show that it actually incurred idle time labor costs for that one day, the Board will deduct eight (8) hours, or $75.60 from the Appellant's press helper claim. Accordingly, the Appellant's press helper claim is allowed to the extent of 104 hours at the labor rate of $9.45 an hour, or a total of $982.80. Considered as a whole, the remaining five items predicated on machinery downtime-makeready and running costs for the Miller Press; (3) folding charges; (4) collating costs; (5) perfect binding charges; and (6) trimming costs-which amount to $13,401.64 of the $14,460.04 claim, present an entirely different problem. Each of those claims is based on the number of unfilled machine hours times the Appellant's standard charges, or BHR, for the machine involved (Miller Press, MBO Folder, Collator, Perfect Binder, Wollenberg Cutter). However, the Board has already rejected the BHR as a basis for resolving the Appellant's direct cost claim in this case on the ground that it would tantamount to applying an arbitrary formula. See Universal Printing Co., supra, slip op. at 36 (citing Ordnance Materials, Inc., ASBCA No. 32371, 88-3 BCA ¶ 20,910). Likewise, the BHR is not a valid basis for resolving the Contractor's claim for indirect costs. Although the Board could remand the matter to the Contracting Officer for reconsideration in light of the rule of Aviation Specialists, Inc., which the Board has adopts for this forum, see R.C. Swanson, supra, slip op. at 25-26,80 it believes that it has a responsibility to put an end to this controversy, see Universal Printing Co., supra, slip op. at 37; Banta Co., supra, slip op. at 24. See also Lawrence D. Krause, supra, 82-2 BCA at 80,073; Johnson, Drake & Piper, Inc., supra, 65-2 BCA at 23,073. Therefore, the Board will also apply the "jury verdict" technique to determine a fair and reasonable recovery for the Contractor's post-termination idle time costs since all of the elements necessary for such an award are present. See Universal Printing Co., supra, slip op. at 49; Banta Co., supra, slip. op. at 46-47. Accord Industrial Refrigeration Service Corp., supra, 91-3 BCA at 120,595. Furthermore, for the sake of consistency, the amount of reimbursement will be determined on the same "split the difference" basis used to calculate the Appellant's reimbursement for the work it performed on Print Order 40000 prior to termination. See Universal Printing Co., supra, slip op. at 53. Accord Gricoski Detective Agency, supra, 90-3 BCA at 116,138-39; Parkdale Building Maintenance, supra, 90-1 BCA at 112,094; Delfour, Inc., supra, 89-1 BCA at 107,862; The Morrison Co., supra, 83-1 BCA at 81,675. Accordingly, the Board will allow the Appellant's claim for machinery downtime to the extent of $6,700.82, calculated as follows: Appellant's claim for machinery downtime $13,401.64 Government's settlement offer -0- Difference between claim and offer 13,401.64 50 percent of difference $ 6,700.82 Consequently, the Appellant is due a total recovery for its post-termination costs of $7,683.62; i.e., press helper claim of $982.80 and machinery downtime of $6,700.82. Overall, the Contractor is entitled to a total reimbursement of $11,407.07 (pre-termination costs of $3,723.45 plus post-termination costs of $7,683.62). Again, the Board is firmly convinced that this compromise verdict best satisfies its goal of awarding fair compensation rather than imposing strict accounting principles. See Industrial Refrigeration Service Corp., supra, 91-3 at 120,594; Arctic Corner, Inc., supra, 86-3 BCA at 97,457. V. CONCLUSION For the above reasons, the Board finds and concludes that: (1) both the Appellant and the Respondent used erroneous methods for calculating the appropriate recovery due the Contractor for work performed under the contract prior to its termination; (2) both the OIG and the Contracting Officer misinterpreted GPO Cost Directive, Sec. 3, ¶ 25(c) in disallowing the Appellant's claim for post-termination idle time costs; (3) properly applying the relevant cost principles in this case, the Appellant is entitled to reimbursement for certain costs, such as depreciation and overhead, which cannot reasonably be discontinued after termination, see GPO Cost Directive, Sec. 3, ¶¶ 25(c), 49(b); (4) the "jury verdict" technique is the best method for determining fair compensation for the Contractor's costs resulting from the Government's convenience termination of the contract; (5) applying the "jury verdict" method to the Appellant's claim for work performed under the contract before it was terminated, the Contractor is entitled to an additional $973.92 above the Contracting Officer's offer of $852.28 for stripping and blueline costs, for a total recovery on those items of $1,826.20-all other elements of the pre-termination claim are approved as determined by the Contracting Officer, so that Appellant's pre-termination claim is allowed in the amount of $3,723.45; (6) applying the "jury verdict" technique to the Contractor's claim for post-termination costs, the Appellant is entitled to reimbursement in the amount of $982.80 in press helper costs and $6,700.82 in machinery downtime costs, for a total recovery of $7,683.62; and (7) overall, the Contractor is entitled recover costs in the amount of $11,407.07 as fair and reasonable compensation for the convenience termination of its contract by the Government. THEREFORE, the Board MODIFIES the Contracting Officer's decision and REMANDS the case with instructions that appropriate arrangements be made to pay the Contractor in accordance with this opinion. See Universal Printing Co., supra, slip op. at 56; Banta Co., supra, slip. op. at 62. It is so Ordered. January 31, 1996 STUART M. FOSS Administrative Judge _______________ 1 The Contracting Officer's appeal file, assembled pursuant to Rule 4 of the Board's Rules of Practice and Procedure, was delivered to the Board on May 21, 1992. GPO Instruction 110.12, Subject: Board of Contract Appeals Rules of Practice and Procedure, dated September 17, 1984, Rule 4(a) (Board Rules). It will be referred to hereafter as the R4 File, with an appropriate tab letter also indicated. The R4 File, consists of twenty-one (21) documents identified as Tabs A through T, including a tab labeled "Mc." 2 The court reporter's transcript shall be referred to hereinafter as "Tr." with an appropriate page number thereafter. The Respondent's brief will be referred to hereinafter as "R. Brf.," with an appropriate page citation thereafter. The Appellant's brief will be cited as "App. Brf." with an appropriate page number thereafter. Furthermore, at the hearing the Contractor introduced additional documentary evidence. The Appellant's exhibits shall be referred to as "App. Exh. No.," with an appropriate number thereafter. In addition, the Board introduced an exhibit which shall be referred to as "GPOBCA Exh. No. 1." 3 The contract identifies two types of Directories, one with a "Yellow Pages" section (an Item 2 book) and one without (an Item 1 book) (R4 File, Tab A, p. 6). 4 Article 45 simply provides: "When required, contracts shall be subject to section 3 of Procurement Directive 306.2, Contract Cost Principles and Procedures, dated April 1, 1988." See GPO Contract Terms, Contract Clauses, ¶ 45 (Contract Cost Principles and Procedures). Procurement Directive 306.2 shall hereinafter be referred to as the GPO Cost Directive. 5 Unlike the FAR, GPO Contract Clauses does not contain a "short-form" convenience termination clause. See FAR 52.249-4. The "short-form" clause limits recovery in convenience terminations to the costs of services rendered before the date of termination. See Laboratory Systems Services, Inc., ASBCA No. 47901, 95-1 BCA ¶ 27,527; Arrow, Inc., ASBCA Nos. 41330, 41338, 94-2 BCA ¶ 26,353. Before using the "short-form" clause as a contract provision for termination for convenience, the contracting officer must first determine that, because of the nature of the contract, the contractor would not incur substantial start-up costs, and that a convenience termination will not result in a claim for other than services rendered. See Carrier Corp., GSBCA No. 8516, 90-1 BCA ¶ 22,409, at 112,557. Improper use of the clause is subject to reversal on the grounds that the contracting officer abused his discretion, in which case the "long-form" "Termination for Convenience" clause will be substituted by operation of law. See DWS, Inc., Debtor-in- Possession, ASBCA Nos. 29742, 29865, 90-2 BCA ¶ 22,696, at 113,987; Carrier Corp., supra, 90-1 BCA at 112,557-58; Guard-All of America, ASBCA No. 22,167, 80-2 BCA ¶ 14,462, at 71,300. 6 Accordingly, one question which surfaced at the prehearing conference on November 23, 1993, namely, whether or not the GPO Cost Directive applied to the contract in dispute, see Report of Prehearing Telephone Conference, dated February 2, 1994, pp. 2, 4 (hereinafter RPTC-2), is really not an issue at all. Clearly, the GPO Cost Directive applies to this case because the "Termination for Convenience" clause expressly requires it, and the "Contract Cost Principles and Procedures" clause mandates the use of the GPO Cost Directive "when required," as here. Rather, the real issue in this appeal is which of two competing cost principles-GPO Cost Directive, Sec. 3, ¶ 25 (Idle facilities and idle capacity costs) or GPO Cost Directive, Sec. 3, ¶ 49 (Termination costs)-or both, governs the parties' dispute over the Appellant's unabsorbed indirect costs. 7 The record indicates that approximately 80 percent of the Contractor's income is derived from Government work (Tr. 106). Furthermore, the Appellant testified that its typical markup for Government work is 20 percent (Tr. 28). 8 As indicated on the Print Order, the 19,000 copies consisted of 16,000 with yellow pages (Item 2 Directory), and 3,000 without yellow pages (Item 1 Directory) (Tr. 11; R4 File, Tab E). Attached to the Print Order, and part of it, were the detailed specifications for both books, including the sequence of colored pages for each book, the number of quality assurance samples (32), and distribution instructions (Tr. 13, 14; App. Exh. No. 1). 9 The Contractor computed the total cost of this job at $49,811.65 based on the following estimates: (a) $2,152.92 for pre-press (stripping and platting); (b) $18,736.91 for paper stock; (c) $15,076.92 in total press charges (makeready, ink, and running charges); (d) $13,844.90 for bindery work (folding, collating, binding, trimming, and shipping). Adding a ten (10) percent profit to these costs brought the value of the contract to $54,792.81. See R4 File, Tab O, Cost Analysis. The Appellant continued to use its original estimates in pursuing its termination claim (Tr. 32). 10 The Respondent disagrees with this assessment. See Answer, ¶ 4. 11 In its Complaint, the Appellant also asserted that the large variance between the "Determination of Award" figures and the scope of anticipated orders in the contract, showed that the Government estimates were negligently prepared. See Complaint, ¶ 5. Furthermore, the Contractor said that it (and all other offerors) relied to its detriment on the Respondent's estimates in calculating and submitting its bid. See Complaint, ¶¶ 6, 7, and 8. GPO denies these allegations. See Answer, ¶¶ 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9. Negligent Government estimates can furnish the basis for a contractor's recovery on a claim under a "requirements" contract. See McDonald & Eudy Printers, Inc., GPO BCA 40-92 (January 31, 1994), slip op. at 18-19, 1994 WL 275096; Shepard Printing, GPO BCA 37-92 (January 28, 1994), slip op. at 26, 1994 WL 275077. Accord Crown Laundry & Dry Cleaners, Inc. v. United States, 29 Fed. Cl. 506 (1993); Pruitt Energy Sources, Inc., ENG BCA No. 6134, 95-2 BCA ¶ 27,840; Dynamic Science, Inc., ASBCA No. 29510, 85-1 BCA ¶ 17,710; Huff's Janitorial Service, ASBCA No. 26860, 83-1 BCA ¶ 16,518)). Also cf. Medart, Inc. v. Austin, 957 F.2d 579, 581 (Fed. Cir. 1992) ("Where a contractor can show by preponderant evidence that estimates were `inadequately or negligently prepared, not in good faith, or grossly or unreasonably inadequate at the time the estimate was made[,]' the government could be liable for appropriate damages resulting." Citing Clearwater Forest Industries, Inc. v. United States, 227 Ct. Cl. 386, 650 F.2d 233, 239 (1981).); Operational Service Corp., ASBCA Nos. 37059, 37466, 38461, 38703, 93-3 BCA ¶ 26,190, at 130,381 (". . . where the estimate is negligently prepared so that it misleads the bidder, an equitable adjustment can be made to the contract because it is relied upon to the bidder's detriment."). Here, apart from the above-referenced paragraphs in its detailed Complaint, the "negligent estimates" issue was not discussed during the prehearing conference on January 5, 1993, or the meeting on November 23, 1993, was not litigated at the hearing on March 1, 1994, and was not argued in the parties briefs. Instead, throughout the entire litigation history of this appeal, the parties have been focused on the "unabsorbed overhead" issue. See e.g., RPTC-2, pp. 2-4; RPTC-1, pp. 6-7; Tr. 26-27, 92-93 (Goldstein); 119-20, 128-29 (Weiss); 133-34 (Office of the Inspector General (OIG) Supervisory Auditor, Joseph Verch); R. Brf., pp. 3-7; App. Brf., pp. 3-7. Therefore, it is clear that the Appellant has abandoned its "negligent estimates" claim, and that matter is not before the Board in this proceeding. See Shepard Printing, supra, slip op. at 23, fn. 26. 12 The evidence of record says that the Appellant first discussed the problem with the Respondent by telephone on January 21, 1991. See RPTC-1, p. 3; R4 File, Tab F (first paragraph, first sentence); Complaint, ¶ 13. However, the NIH did not issue Print Order No. 40000 until January 23, 1991, which is the date on which the Contractor says it "first learned of the error." See R4 File, Tab E; Complaint, ¶ 9. Therefore, the Board assumes that the Appellant is simply confused about January 21, 1991, as being the date on which the Contractor first informed GPO of the mistake in the contract specifications. Instead, the Board believes that the earliest possible date on which such a conversation could have taken place was January 23, 1991. 13 The Appellant's message contained two lines-"Confirm Above" and "Not Confirmed"-as well as a signature line at the bottom. Although the Contracting Officer was asked to check the appropriate line, sign the message, and return a copy to the Contractor, there is nothing in the record to indicate that he did so. 14 Bluelines are proofs which are prepared to look exactly like the book or publication being ordered, including being trimmed and bound the same way (Tr. 24-25). 15 The order was held at Weiss' direction since January 24, 1991 (R4 File, Tab G). At that point, however, the Appellant had already begun the pre-press work under the contract-e.g., filming, stripping, blueline editing and proofing-while awaiting word from GPO on resolution of the problem concerning its bid (Tr. 15). 16 The Appellant had originally planned to start running the job by February 1, 1991 (Tr. 45). 17 The type of termination was a critical part of the discussion between the parties on January 28, 1991. In that regard, while the Respondent raised the specter of a default termination, the record shows that the Appellant agreed to produce Print Order 40000, but expected the remainder of the contract to be terminated for convenience (R4 File, Tab G). See Complaint, ¶ 21. 18 The record indicates that the parties also had a discussion earlier in the morning, and that in response to a question from the Contracting Officer, the Appellant told Weiss that no paper stock for the job had been received because the Contractor had canceled the order with its supplier (R4 File, Tab I, p. 3). This information was confirmed by the Appellant in their second conversation, as well (R4 File, Tab I, p. 4). 19 As explained by the Appellant at the hearing, this charge was $9.50 per flat, not 84 flats for $9.50 (Tr. 24). 20 Each of these charges was explained in detail by Goldstein at the hearing (Tr. 17-25). Among other things, he briefly testified that: (a) the film work included the blanks and covers for a 328 page book (Tr. 17); (b) the $1,754.00 charge for the films was based on normal charges for that work (Tr. 23); (c) stripping is a manual operation requiring a very skilled operator (Tr. 18-19); (d) the stripping charge of $9.50 per flat is the average charge for such work (Tr. 24); (e) except for differing media, blueline proofs are made by the same process as plates (Tr. 19-21); (f) the blueline charge of $3.50 per page is also standard (Tr. 24-25); and (g) the costs of UPS and Federal Express shown on the claim were amounts actually incurred for those shipping services (Tr. 21). 21 At the hearing, Goldstein testified that he canceled the paper stock sometime between January 24, 1991, and January 31, 1991, although could not remember the exact date (Tr. 78). Furthermore, he said that the 25 percent restocking fee is the standard practice within the industry (Tr. 22). 22 The record indicates that on February 5, 1991, but before it received this letter, the Respondent made a follow up inquiry regarding the Appellant's initial claim of January 30, 1991 (R4 File, Tab Mc). Specifically, GPO wanted to know if there would be any more charges, because the Government wanted to take only one action on the canceled contract. The Appellant advised the Respondent that the additional claim had already been mailed. 23 The Appellant utilizes a computerized cost estimating system, which it applies to both Government and private procurements (Tr. 30, 33-34, 39, 84; App. Exh. No. 3). The system was originally developed by McIntosh Press of Newman, Georgia, and was adopted by the Contractor (Tr. 34). The key concept in the system is the BHR-a cost figure which is derived for each piece of machinery in the plant by totalling actual fixed costs (rent, depreciation, property taxes, insurance, and the square footage allocation of the machine), variable costs (direct and indirect wages, and electricity), other labor and miscellaneous costs (supplies, social security taxes, workman's compensation and unemployment insurance, other employee insurance, repairs), general factory expense, and selling overhead (Tr. 35-37, 114-15; App. Exh. No. 4). When those items are added together and factored with the total number of hours the machine can be expected to be in use during the year, the result is the BHR for that particular machine (Tr. 38, 41, 66; App. Exh. No. 4). It should also be noted that the BHR is a mixture of both allowable and unallowable costs. For example, while some BHR components such as rent, depreciation, repairs and insurance are normally be allowable, see GPO Cost Directive, Sec. 3, ¶¶ 19(c), 27(a), 32(a), other elements such as selling overhead (to extent it includes indirect selling efforts) and property taxes, are not, see GPO Cost Directive, Sec. 3, 11(f) 48(b)(5). Furthermore, in a convenience termination situation, such as here, common items such as supplies and other materials in the contractor's inventory are not allowable if they can be used in the contractor's other work. See GPO Cost Directive, Sec. 3, ¶ 49(a). However, it is clear that the BHR reflects an accepted method of accounting for indirect costs, and under GPO's cost principles it may not be fragmented by removing its individual elements. See GPO Cost Directive, Sec. 3, ¶ 9(c). 24 At the hearing, Goldstein testified that although the Miller Press was purchased either in 1987 or 1988, and thus was not especially acquired for this contract, it nonetheless was scheduled to be the primary press for the NIH job (Tr. 42, 44, 78-79, 108-09). Furthermore, Goldstein said that there are basically two rates for the Miller Press-the BHR and the actual cost of running the machine (Tr. 112). The Appellant's February 4, 1991, claim appears to use the actual rate-$90.04-for the Miller Press (Tr. 112). On the other hand, Goldstein also expressed his belief that it was reasonable to expect the machine to run 70 percent of the time; i.e., based on a maximum usage of 2,008 hours, the Contractor thought the Miller Press would be in use for 1,406 hours during the year because allowances had to be made for breakdowns, holidays, etc. (Tr. 37-38, 64, 90; App. Exh. No. 4). Thus, the BHR for the Miller Press at a 70 percent usage rate is calculated by dividing those 1,406 hours into the total annual center cost for the machine, which results in a BHR for the machine of $56.68, the figure it used in its estimate of the NIH job (Tr. 38, 42, 44, 64, 67; App. Exhs. No. 4 and 6). Similar BHR estimates were made for the MBO Folder, the Perfect Binder, Wollenberg Cutter, the other machines which would be needed to perform the contract (Tr. 34, 41, 74-75). Goldstein also testified that the procedure followed by the Contractor, which is based on Appellant's actual cost figures as compiled with the assistance of an accountant, is the standard acceptable accounting practice for establishing BHR's in the industry, and is necessary wherever a computerized estimating system is used (Tr. 38-39, 40, 66). Finally, he believed that the Appellant's charges based on this system were reasonable, and should mirror the costs of other printing plants in the southeastern United States using similar estimating systems (Tr. 39, 40, 113). 25 When the Appellant's separate claims of January 30, 1991, and February 4, 1991, are considered together, it is clear that two different types of recovery are involved in this proceeding; i.e., (a) reimbursement for work actually performed prior to termination; and (b) compensation for post-termination indirect costs (idle time) (Tr. 26-27, 92; R4 File, Tabs M and N). Indeed, the parties stipulated that there are no post-termination direct costs because the Contractor performed no work on the contract after it was terminated (Tr. 92-93). 26 Most of the 18 documents submitted on March 12, 1991, are duplicates of other documents elsewhere in the appeal file. See e.g., R4 File, Tabs E, F, G, H, and M; Complaint, Exhibit A. 27 In the audit report, the OIG agreed with the Contracting Officer that the film and GFM return costs were reasonable (Tr. 136; R4 File, Tab R, Attachment D, fns. 1 and 4). However, the OIG found no support for the entire blueline claim (although the bluelines were in fact received by the NIH), and nearly all of the claim for stripping charges, and recommended that they be disallowed (Tr. 134; R4 File, Tab R, Attachment D, fns. 2 and 3). 28 At the hearing, Weiss testified that even though he thought the Contractor's film charges were high ($5.10), he had no problem with them, and also found the shipping costs to be fair and reasonable (Tr. 117, 124, 126). However, an analysis of the Appellant's claim for stripping and blueline production costs was difficult because, as the parties agree, those tasks were not separate line items in the contract's schedule of prices, but rather were part of either the makeready and/or setup charges (Tr. 88, 117, 124; R4 File, Tab S, p. 1). Since plating and setup were not performed before the contract was terminated, the Weiss believed that only a portion of the Contractor's price for this line item ($11.82 per page) was reimbursable (R4 File, Tabs B, p. 3, and S, p. 1). Accordingly, the Contracting Officer looked to another GPO general usage program-Program A814-M-in which almost all prices were separate line items, to develop a new per page rate for stripping and blueline costs (Tr. 117-18, 124, 126; R4 File, Tab S, p. 1). The result was a charge of $1.49 per page, which when multiplied by a total page count of 572 pages for both books, yielded a recovery for the Appellant of $852.28 for these items (Tr. 118, 124; R4 File, Tab S, p. 1). 29 In Weiss' view, the Appellant's claim was actually higher than the contract price; i.e., the Appellant was asking for more money on termination than it would have been entitled to if the work had been performed with or without the use of paper (Tr. 119-20). However, as previously noted, paper costs are not involved in this claim because the Contractor was able to cancel the order from its supplier before it was delivered (Tr. 22; R4 File, Tabs M and O). 30 The Contracting Officer's reference to Program A814-S appears to be an inadvertent typographical error. Throughout these proceedings the parties have referred to the program in question as A814-M. See Tr. 118, 124, 126; App. Brf., pp. 2-3; Res. Brf., p. 8. See note 29 supra. 31 In a way, this should not be surprising since the Contracting Officer had offered to settle the Appellant's initial claim for the pre-press work actually performed on the contract prior to termination for 58 percent of the amount billed (Tr. 16, 17, 27, 117, 124; R4 File, Tabs M, O and S; App. Exh. No. 2). That is, Weiss had agreed that all of the Contractor's charges for film and shipping, and 34 percent of its stripping and blueline costs ($852.28 of the $2,800.12 claimed), were justified. This meant that only $1,948.09 ($4,697.37-2749.28) remained in dispute between the parties on the first claim-a figure which was less than 8 percent of the idle time claim submitted on February 4, 1991 ($24,670.13) (R4 File, Tab N). 32 The Appellant's original idle press claim (R4 File, Tab N) was based on the 151 hours it had estimated would be required to produce the job (Tr. 47, 48, 49, 60). However, the Contractor was subsequently advised by its Counsel that downtime could only be claimed for press hours which were not actually filled during the established contract performance period, in this case February 1991 (Tr. 60). The record shows that while the Appellant attempted to reduce its downtime claim by bidding for other Government and private sector work during February 1991, and in fact was partially successful (the Miller Press was completely shutdown on just seven (7) of the 20 workdays that month; i.e., February 1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 12, 1991), it nonetheless was unable to find press work for 112 hours of scheduled time, and bases its idle time claim on that figure (Tr. 45, 50, 54, 61, 66, 110, 114; App. Exh. No. 5). 33 The Appellant testified that this summary analysis was based principally on the information in its downtime listing, and represented the costs directly attributable to the termination action (Tr. 60-61, 93; App. Exh. Nos. 5 and 6). However, at the hearing the Contractor also said that the summary listing's 80 percent utilization was inaccurate, and 70 percent should be used instead since that figure was more realistic (Tr. 64-65, 74, 90; App. Exh. No. 6). Indeed, the Appellant indicated that it was no longer willing to accept the 80 percent rate (Tr. 75). A 70 percent utilization rate assumes that the machinery will be idle 30 percent of the time (Tr. 90-91). 34 The Appellant testified that the termination action which left it with 112 hours of unfilled press time was directly responsible for the financial loss it experienced in February 1991 (Tr. 66, 72). In that regard, although somewhat inflated because shipments made around Christmas and New Year's are normally not billed until early January, the Contractor's income statement for January 1991 shows that it made a $60,343.30 profit (52 percent) for that month (Tr. 67-70; App. Exh. No. 7). Similarly, the Appellant also showed a profit in March 1991 ($28,549.88 or 14.52 percent) (Tr. 71; App. Exh. No. 9). However, in contrast, its financial statement for February 1991-the month during which contract performance was to occur-indicates that the Appellant suffered a net loss of $18,991.67 (26.97 percent) that month (Tr. 70; App. Exh. No. 8). 35 As the Board reads the record, the total of the Appellant's revised unabsorbed overhead claim is $15,464.12, not $14,460.04. Nonetheless, even the Board's figures represent a reduction of approximately 37 percent from the claim submitted by the Contractor in February 1991. The difference between the Board's computations and the Contractor's is only $1,004.08, a 6 percent variation, which in the context of this case is de minimis. 36 The record shows that the Contractor prepared its revised claim-App. Exh. No. 6-using BHR figures for 80 percent utilization. However, Goldstein testified at the hearing that he was no longer willing to accept an 80 percent BHR, but rather now based his claim on a 70 percent figure (Tr. 74-75). The effect of this revision is to change the BHR amounts on App. Exh. No. 6 as follows: (a) on the Miller Press from $49.62 to $56.68; (b) on the MBO Folder from $40.03 to $45.72; (c) on the Perfect Binder from $29.94 to $34.20; (d) on the Wollenberg Cutter $27.21 to $31.09; and (e) the Collator from $38.93 to $44.47 (Tr. 74-75). 37 The handwritten figure of $56.78 in App. Exh. No. 6 is an obvious inadvertent error. The evidence of record shows that the BHR for the Miller Press at a 70 percent usage rate is $56.68 (Tr. 38, 74; App. Exh. No. 4). See note 23 supra. Indeed, $6,348.00 is the result of 112 hours multiplied by $56.68. 38 Although it is not entirely clear, the Board assumes that the press helper in question is Douglas Larson, who Goldstein testified is the employee assigned to the Miller Press (Tr. 54, 80). Larson, an hourly paid worker, was idled when the Miller Press was shut down because of the cancellation of the NIH job (Tr. 80-81, 99). Furthermore, Goldstein was not sure if Larson was paid for February 1, 1991, the first day the Miller Press went unused because of GPO's termination action, of if he performed other plant tasks like sweeping the floor (Tr. 82-83, 100-01). 39 The reason for this revision is that the Appellant did not incur any hand collating expense; i.e., the three (3) temporary employees who were hired to do the collating were terminated when the contract was canceled before any such work was performed (Tr. 61-62, 64, 91-92). 40 Indeed, during the prehearing telephone conference on January 5, 1993, the Appellant stated that in past convenience termination cases GPO itself has paid for unabsorbed overhead costs; e.g., where a contractor made reasonable efforts to utilize the idle capacity but was unable to do so despite best efforts, or where it could not absorb the overhead costs because they were legitimately allocable to specific contracts. RPTC-1, p. 6. However, the Contractor also said that the Respondent had recently begun disallowing unabsorbed overhead costs on the ground that the contractor was unable to meet one or more of the requirements prescribed in the GPO Cost Directive. RPTC-1, pp. 6-7. Consequently, the Appellant wanted to know if there had been any change in language of the GPO Cost Directive or its application, which precluded recovery of unabsorbed overhead costs by contractors as a blanket rule. RPTC-1, p. 7. The Contractor's question was never answered, and no evidence on the matter was introduced at the hearing. Thus, there is nothing in the record to show if the Respondent had interpreted the relevant provisions of the GPO Cost Directive differently in the past, or whether there was agency precedent for paying the sort of unabsorbed overhead costs submitted by the Appellant. 41 The Appellant advances several arguments advanced by Joseph & O'Donnell for allowing unabsorbed overhead costs, "particularly where the terminated contract represents a substantial portion of the contractor's work, or where the obtaining of contracts in the industry requires substantial lead time," including: (a) recovery is not prohibited by regulation or law; (b) the regulatory objective of fairly compensating the contractor is thwarted when denial of the unabsorbed overhead results in a substantial loss to the contractor; (c) recovery of unabsorbed overhead is permitted by the government in analogous contexts such as partial terminations and delay; and (d) recovery of unabsorbed overhead incurred after contract termination is permitted in all commercial practices, including those governed by the Uniformed Commercial Code (UCC 2-708-2) (App. Brf., pp. 5-6, citing Joseph & O'Donnell, at X-36). Similarly, the Contractor says that Trueger holds that idle facilities and idle capacity costs should be compensable for at least "a reasonable period" after the termination because: (a) a contractor, who deployed people, space and facilities in order to complete a government contract, may not be able to "swing into new business on the day after the abrupt government action;" and (b) from an accounting standpoint, there is simply no basis to charge these costs to any cost objective other than the terminated contract (App. Brf., p. 6, Trueger, at 745-60, 805-06). 42 The Appellant also asks the Board to award it interest at the statutory rate from the date it certified its claim (App. Brf., p. 3). See 50 U.S.C. App. § 1215(b)(2). The Contractor candidly admits that nothing in the contract authorizes the requested interest payment, although it notes that there is a specific provision in the "Termination for the Convenience of the Government" clause requiring a contractor receiving partial payments to repay the Government the amount in excess of the actual value of the work performed, with interest, upon termination of the contract (App. Brf., p. 3, citing GPO Contract Terms, Contract Clauses, ¶ 19(k)(2)). The crux of the Appellant's argument is that since there is no explicit prohibition against the payment of interest on its claim, the Board, by administrative fiat, should add interest to any recovery because: (a) the claim has been pending for a long time; and (b) interest awards operating as "a one-way street" from contractors to the Government are patently unfair, and cry out for a balancing of the equities by the creation of an entitlement flowing the other way; i.e., what's "sauce for the goose" should be "sauce for the gander" (App. Brf., p. 3). While the Contractor's contention has a certain surface appeal, the simple fact is that the Board has no authority to award interest under GPO regulations. See Universal Printing Co., GPO BCA 9-90 (June 22, 1994), slip. op. at 55, fn. 54, 1994 WL 377586. See also Chavis and Chavis Printing, GPO BCA 20-90 (February 6, 1991), slip. op. at 7, n. 7, 1991 WL 439270 (Prompt Payment Act of 1982, 31 U.S.C. § 3901 et seq. (1988)). It is well-settled that a contractor cannot recover interest on a claim against the United States unless there is an express provision in the contract or a relevant statute permitting such payment. See Maitland Brothers Co., ASBCA No. 40388, 93-3 BCA ¶ 26,007, at 129,305, motion for reconsid. denied 94-1 BCA ¶ 26,285. See also Fidelity Construction Co. v. United States, 700 F.2d 1379 (Fed. Cir. 1983), cert. denied 464 U.S. 826 (1984); Reese Industries, ASBCA No. 36077, 89-1 BCA ¶ 21,255. Accordingly, the Appellant's request for interest on any recovery awarded by this decision, at the statutory rate from the date it certified its claim, must be denied. 43 See note 28 supra. 44 The Board bases its decision on the following record: (a) the Appellant's Notice of Appeal, dated April 6, 1992; (b) the R4 File (Tabs A-T); (c) the Complaint, dated June 17, 1992; (d) the Answer, dated July 17, 1992; (e) the Report of Prehearing Telephone Conference, dated March 26, 1993; (f) the Report of Prehearing Telephone Conference, dated February 2, 1994; (g) the transcript of the hearing held on March 1, 1994, including App. Exh. Nos. 1-9, and GPOBCA Exh. No. 1; (h) the brief submitted by the Respondent on April 4, 1994; and (i) the brief submitted by the Appellant on April 7, 1994. 45 Prior to the establishment of the Board in 1984, see GPO Instruction 110.10C, Subject: Establishment of the Board of Contract Appeals, appeals from decisions of GPO Contracting Officers were considered by ad hoc contract appeals boards. Decision of these ad hoc boards are hereinafter cited as GPOCAB. While the Board is not bound by their decisions, its policy is to follow the rulings of the ad hoc panels where applicable and appropriate. See e.g., Shepard Printing, GPO BCA 23-91 (April 29, 1993), slip op. at 14, fn. 19, 1993 WL 526848; Stephenson, Inc., GPO BCA 2-88 (December 20, 1991), slip op. at 18, fn. 20, 1991 WL 439274; Chavis and Chavis Printing, supra, slip op. at 9, fn. 9. 46 Of the 235 published appeals decisions issued by the Board and the ad hoc panels since 1974, only four (4) involved "pure" termination for convenience issues. See R.C. Swanson Printing and Typesetting Co., supra, Supplemental Decision; Graphic Litho Co., Inc., GPO BCA 17-85 (February 23, 1988), 1988 WL 363329; The Standard Register Co., GPO BCA 4-86 (October 28, 1987), 1987 WL 228972; Cloverleaf Enterprises, Inc., [No GPOCAB No.] (May 9, 1980), 1980 WL 81267. In one other case, the termination for convenience question was merely a disguise for the contractor's breach of contract claim, and hence there was no jurisdiction. See Microform Data Systems, Inc., GPOCAB 3-79 (February 1, 1980), 1980 WL 81258. Excluded from this count are those cases which were converted to convenience terminations pursuant to GPO Contract Terms, Contract Clauses, ¶ 20(g) (Default), when the original defaults were found improper and overturned. See e.g., Graphics Image, Inc., GPO BCA 13-92 (August 31, 1992), 1992 WL 487875; Pennsylvania Printed Products, GPO BCA 29-87 (January 22, 1990), 1990 WL 454977; American Drafting and Laminating Co., GPO BCA 6-85 (April 15, 1986), 1986 WL 181459; Graphic Litho, GPOCAB 11-83 (May 25, 1984), 1984 WL 148105; Bay Ridge Press, GPOCAB 4-82 (January 12, 1983), 1983 WL 135369, Supplemental Decision (September 15, 1983), 1983 WL 135370; Norm Hodges and Associates, Inc., GPOCAB 2-82 (April 12, 1982), 1982 WL 122517. 47 It should be noted that the Board's final decision in R.C. Swanson Printing Co. has been appealed by the contractor to the United States Court of Federal Claims, where it is now pending. See Richard C. Swanson and Larry A. Ford, d.b.a. Swanson Printing & Typesetting Co. v. United States, Civil Action No. 94-185(C). In that regard, after the Board explicated and applied the principles relating to the recovery of costs where "requirements" contracts are terminated for convenience, see R.C. Swanson Printing and Typesetting Co., supra, Supplemental Decision, GPO asked for reconsideration on the ground that the contract in question was not a true "requirements" contract because it was a multiple- award type of agreement, which did not create an exclusive relationship between the contractor and the Government-an essential element for a "requirements" contract, see R.C. Swanson Printing and Typesetting Co., GPO BCA 15-90, Decision on Motion for Reconsideration and Order (December 20, 1993), slip op. at 6, 1993 WL 668317. GPO's position was based on a prior decision of the United States Claims Court which expressly held that this agency's multiple-award agreements were not requirements contracts, as that concept is understood in the law of Government contracts. See Media Press, Inc. v. United States, 215 Ct. Cl. 985, 986 (1977). After reviewing that court decision, the Board agreed with the Government, and granted the motion for reconsideration. See R.C. Swanson Printing and Typesetting Co., supra, Decision on Motion for Reconsideration and Order, slip op. at 15. The contractor's appeal essentially challenges the Claims Court's holding in Media Press, Inc. However, the issues in the Claims Court are not relevant in this case. Here, the agreement in question, unlike the one in R.C. Swanson Printing and Typesetting Co., is a single-award "requirements" contract, which clearly establishes the necessary exclusive relationship between the parties. 48 Historically, the power of the Government to terminate its contracts in the absence of a breach by the non- governmental party arose in order to limit the Government's liability during the unpredictable circumstances of war, and to shift some of the risk of changing conditions to the non- governmental party. See Plaza 70 Interiors, Ltd., HUD BCA No. 94-C-150-C9, 95-2 BCA ¶ 27,668, at 137,938 (citing G.L. Christian & Associates v. United States, 160 Ct. Cl. 1, 312 F.2d 418, cert. denied 375 U.S. 954 (1963)). See also Cibinic & Nash, pp. 1073-74. The right to terminate contracts for the convenience of the Government was later expanded to civilian and peacetime contracts. See Torncello v. United States, 231 Ct. Cl. 20, 681 F.2d 756, 764-6 (1982). 49 Application of the "best interests of the Government" standard is a sine qua non in convenience termination cases. Thus, even if a termination might be beneficial to the contractor because, for example, it is performing at a loss, the Government has no duty to terminate for convenience just for the contractor's sake. See Contract Management, Inc., ASBCA No. 44885, 95-2 BCA ¶ 27,886; Rotair Industries, Inc., ASBCA No. 27571, 84-2 BCA ¶ 17,417. 50 For example, where a fixed-price indefinite quantities contract is involved, the Government may not retroactively terminate a fully performed contract in an effort to limit its liability for failing to order the contract's minimum amount of services. See PHP Healthcare Corporation, ASBCA No. 39207, 91-1 BCA ¶ 23,647. See also Montana Refining Company, ASBCA No. 44250, 94-2 BCA ¶ 26,656 (a convenience termination did not relieve the Government of its obligation to pay for the portion of the guaranteed minimum quantity of jet fuel that it failed to purchase because the clear language of the contract's "Termination for Convenience" clause, which was an approved deviation from the standard clause, did not permit the Government to terminate any portion of the guaranteed minimum quantity. Citing PHP Healthcare Corporation, supra). 51 In Torncello v. United States, note 48 supra, the United States Court of Federal Claims crafted a stricter standard for invoking the "Termination for Convenience" clause, saying that there must have been a change in circumstances in order to properly invoke the clause. See 681 F.2d at 771-72. However, subsequent decisions clearly show that the Torncello holding has been restricted in its application, see e.g. Operational Services Corp., ASBCA No. 37959, 93-3 BCA ¶ 26,190; Fiesta Leasing and Sales, Inc., ASBCA No. 29311, 86-3 BCA ¶ 19,045, mot. for reconsid. denied 87-1 BCA ¶ 19,622; Drain-A-Way Systems, GSBCA No. 7022, 84-1 BCA ¶ 16,929 (citing Adams Manufacturing Co. v. United States, Appeal Nos. 49[-]82, 51-82 (Fed. Cir. May 12, 1983) (Unpublished)), and the traditional "bad faith or a clear abuse of discretion" test continues to dominate, see Caldwell & Santmyer, Inc. v. Secretary of Agriculture, 55 F.3d 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1995), aff'g 94-2 BCA ¶ 26,854, 1994 WL 45000; Salisbury Industries v. United States, supra, 905 F.2d 1518, 1521 (Fed. Cir. 1990); C.F.S. Air Cargo, Inc., ASBCA No. 36113, 91-3 BCA ¶ 23,583. See generally Cibinic & Nash, pp. 1079-80. 52 The key to such evidence is that there must be a showing of a specific intent on the part of the Government to injure the contractor. See Stephenson, Inc., supra, slip op. at 54. Accord Kalvar Corp. v. United States, 543 F.2d 1298, 1302 (Ct. Cl. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 830 (1977). See also Solar Turbines, Inc. V. United States, 23 Cl. Ct. 142 (1991). 53 The Appellant does not contest the termination of its contract by the Respondent or allege bad faith or abuse of discretion on the part of GPO. See Plaza 70 Interiors, Ltd., supra, 95-2 BCA at 137,938. Indeed, the record shows that the Contractor desired such a termination for convenience. See note 17 supra. Moreover, the Board sees nothing in the record before it which would amount to "irrefragable" proof of bad faith. 54 Although the Appellant challenged the Government's estimates as unrealistic, see Special Waste, Inc., supra, this case appears to be a Caldwell & Santmyer, Inc. situation. In Caldwell & Santmyer, Inc., an improper award involving ambiguous specifications was terminated for convenience by the contracting officer who acknowledged the Government's error. Likewise, the Contracting Officer here exercised his discretion to terminate the contract for convenience because of the erroneous "Determination of Award" figures regarding the running rate and paper (R4 File, Tab K). 55 On the other hand, the rule is that in determining the amount due a contractor as a convenience termination settlement, the Government may not deduct for defective work because that would be tantamount to treating the termination as one for default. See Richerson Construction, Inc., GSBCA Nos. 11161, 11263(11045)-REIN, 11430, 93-1 BCA ¶ 25,239; Youngstrand Surveying, supra, 92-2 BCA at 124,694 (". . . Absent information establishing that the unsatisfactory work results from the contractor's fault or folly, . . . the general rule is that contractors are compensated as part of a convenience termination even for effort resulting in defective work." Citing Morton-Thiokol, Inc., ASBCA No. 32629, 90-3 BCA ¶ 23,207; Caskel Forge, Inc., ASBCA No. 7638, 1962 BCA ¶ 3318.). 56 In the past, the Board has referred to this theory as "an accepted fiction." See Graphic Litho Co., Inc., supra, slip. op. at 9. 57 The bulk of termination for convenience cases that are reported in court and board decisions do not involve questions of the contract price as a ceiling on recovery, or loss contracts. See Tom Shaw, Inc., supra, 93-2 BCA at 128,073. Indeed, we are told that in routine cases not involving such issues, unrecognized or unresolved changes or similar matters that may, or may not, justify a contract price increase can be ignored, since the costs of such alleged changes or other events are automatically recovered as part of the total costs. Id. 58 If the Board is reading the above-quoted passage from J. W. Cook & Sons, Inc. correctly, it seems that the ASBCA is respectfully disagreeing with the interpretation of the "fairness" concept enunciated by the Court of Claims in Codex Corp. v. United States, the ASBCA decision cited with approval by the GSBCA in Richerson Construction, Inc. and the VABCA in Arctic Corner, Inc. 59 Those slight differences are purely cosmetic and inconsequential. The GPO Cost Directive refers to "[t]he applicable paragraphs of this instruction], while the PPR substitutes the words "[c]ost principles." In addition, the PPR inserts the words "for supplies or services" between the words "subcontracts" and "whenever" in the sentence. Other than those changes, the two paragraphs are mirror images of each other. 60 As the Government indicated in its brief, the above- quoted cost principles simply adopt FAR Part 31, 48 C.F.R. 31.000 et seq. (1994). R. Brf., p. 3. Specifically, in that regard, GPO Cost Directive, Sec. 2, ¶ 3 is the equivalent of FAR 31.102, while GPO Cost Directive, Sec. 2, ¶ 4(b)(3) is the same as FAR 31.103(b)(3). 61 The Board is doing so in full recognition that some other contract appeals boards, such as the ASBCA, have different ideas about the choice between "fairness" and strict adherence to accounting rules than the Claims Court, the GSBCA and the VABCA. See J.W. Cook & Sons, Inc., supra, 92-3 BCA at 124,865. However, in the Board's view, the philosophy espoused by those three forums is more in harmony with the underlying purposes of a convenience termination settlement. 62 Thus, as of this moment the Appellant is clearly entitled to reimbursement for its film costs ($1,754.00) and for the Federal Express and UPS charges ($143.25). However, the record indicates that the Contractor has not been paid the undisputed amount as yet, most likely because it has not invoked the partial payment procedures of the "Termination for Convenience" clause and the Respondent's printing procurement regulation. See GPO Contract Terms, Contract Clauses, ¶ 19(k)(1); PPR, Chap. XIV, Sec. 2, ¶ 3.m.(1)(a). On the other hand, the Board also notes that the chapter on "Contract Claims and Litigation" in the regulation provides: "In the event of an appeal, the amount, if any, determined to be payable in the decision of the Contracting Officer, less any portion previously paid, should be paid in advance of any decision by the board without prejudice to the rights of either party or the appeal. [Emphasis added.]" See PPR, Chap. X, Sec. 1, ¶ 5.g. 63 If the accounting records are not available due to no fault of the contractor, the costs may be established on the basis of estimates, if they are supported by detailed, substantiating data. See e.g., R. G. Robbins & Co., ASBCA No. 27516, 83-1 BCA ¶ 16,420; Leopold Construction Co., ASBCA No. 23705, 81-2 BCA ¶ 15,277; Bailey Specialized Buildings, Inc., ASBCA No. 10576, 71-1 BCA ¶ 8,699. However, the use of estimates does not change the burden of proof. Cf. Lagarelli Brothers Construction Co., Inc., ASBCA No. 34793, 88-1 BCA ¶ 20,363; Clary Corp., ASBCA No. 19274, 74-2 BCA ¶ 10,927. 64 To the extent that the Contractor also argues that GPO's interpretation could bar recovery of pre-press production costs by terminated contractors who bid those tasks at "no charge" and include the work elsewhere in the job, see App. Brf., p. 3, the Board declines to engage in such speculation. See Univex International, GPO BCA 23-90 (July 31, 1995), slip. op. at 35, 1995 WL 488438; Sterling Printing, Inc., supra, slip op. at 82. 65 Indeed, even if the Contractor was a participant in Program A814-M, that contract would be inapposite here. The substantial differences between the type of work under Program A814-M and the agreement in dispute would preclude finding a commonality or course of dealing between the parties with respect to stripping and blueline costs. Cf. RD Printing Associates, Inc., GPO BCA 02-92 (December 16, 1992), slip op. at 35-36, fn. 33, 1992 WL 516088. Accord Gresham & Co., Inc. v. United States, 200 Ct. Cl. 97, 470 F.2d 542 (1972). 66 The reason the "jury verdict" technique is usually viewed as an evidentiary tool, rather than as a method of proof of the amount itself, is simple enough. As explained by the ASBCA: "There is neither a single nor a precise method of arriving at the dollar amount of an equitable adjustment. In general we seek to reach a figure as an equitable adjustment which represents the cost to a reasonably efficient contract[or] of performing the changed work under his contract. Evidence of this amount may be found in the actual costs of the particular contract, to the extent that those costs are not shown to be other than reasonable, and in engineering estimates of reasonable cost made by experts who bring into play their experience and knowledge to attempt to visualize the price at which that reasonably efficient contractor could perform. Neither estimating nor accounting are such exact arts that either can produce figures which will be agreed to by all parties without legitimate argument. We recognize that often, despite protestations to the contrary, extreme positions on monetary entitlement are taken during litigation. . . . [We must determine] . . . a figure as the amount of an equitable adjustment . . . [which] . . . ordinarily is . . . some place between the amount contended for by each party to the litigation. . . . This is a figure which in the view of the trier of the facts is fair in light of all the facts of the case, or, put another way, is supported by consideration of the entire record." Johnson, Drake & Piper, Inc., supra, 65-2 BCA at 23,073. Similarly, the Department of Agriculture Board of Contract Appeals has observed that: "It is not essential that the amount be ascertainable with absolute exactness or mathematical precision. [Citations omitted.] It is enough if the testimony and evidence adduced is sufficient to enable the court or board (acting as the jury) to make a fair and reasonable approximation of the amount recoverable. [Citations omitted.]" Lawrence D. Krause, supra, 82-2 BCA at 80,073. See also Greenwood Construction Corp., Inc., AGBCA No. 75-127, 78-1 BCA ¶ 12,893. See generally Cibinic & Nash, pp. 716-23. 67 In essence, notwithstanding the requirement for proof of costs, the cases disclose a hesitancy to completely deny recovery where it is reasonably certain that an injury did, in fact, occur. See Meva Corp. v. United States, 206 Ct. Cl. 203, 220-21, 511 F.2d 548 (1975) (where the court allowed a "jury verdict" recovery because it was "equally clear" that the contractor suffered substantial monetary damage in direct consequence of the Government's breach of contract). See also Harold Benson, AGBCA No. 384, 77-1 BCA ¶ 12,490 (where the evidence did not support the amount claimed by the contractor but did indicate that the amount allowed by the contracting officer was too low); Custom Roofing Co., ASBCA No. 19164, 74-2 BCA ¶ 10,925 (where the board granted a "jury verdict" recovery based on "rough estimates"); and Rocky Mountain Construction Co., IBCA No. 1091-12-75, 77-2 BCA ¶ 12,692 (where the board applied the "jury verdict" method to an item whose cost was "totally unclear"). Indeed, under the "jury verdict" technique, a board may even go so far as to make its own calculations of an equitable adjustment if it is not satisfied with the computations of either the contractor or the Government. See Steve P. Rados, Inc., AGBCA No. 77-130-4, 82-1 BCA ¶ 15.624; Varo, Inc., ASBCA No. 15000, 72-2 BCA ¶ 9,717. In short, the teaching of the cases is that it is an error for a trier of fact to totally deny a contractor's claim when entitlement is clear and there is some evidence upon which to base a "jury verdict" recovery. See Assurance Co. v. United States, supra; S.W. Electronics & Manufacturing Corp. v. United States, supra; Electronic & Missile Facilities, Inc. v. United States, supra. See also Eagle Paving, AGBCA No. 75-156, 78-1 BCA ¶ 13,107. Thus, the "jury verdict" method works in harmony with two purposes of the equitable adjustment procedure in general, namely to recognize and give appropriate consideration to the special circumstances of each case, and to avoid blind computations of additional costs or cost savings. See G.M. Company Manufacturing Inc., ASBCA No. 2883, 57-2 BCA ¶ 1,505, at 5,234. 68 Of the 20 workdays in February 1991, the record shows that the Appellant procured other work which fully occupied the Miller Press on February 15, 1991, and February 18, 1991, respectively, and hence there is no claim for those days (App. Exh. No. 5). Indeed, as previously noted, the Miller Press was completely shutdown on just seven (7) of the 20 workdays that month; i.e., February 1, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 12, 1991. See note 32 supra. 69 It should be noted that this provision, by its terms, does not preclude recovery merely because a "common item" is "reasonably usable on the contractor's other work." To be unrecoverable, the item must be both "reasonably usable" and capable of being retained without loss to the contractor. Furthermore, the provision clearly apportions the burden each party bears with respect to establishing the proper classification of residual equipment. Thus, the contractor is responsible for initially coming forward with evidence to demonstrate it could not retain the equipment at cost for use on other work without sustaining a loss. Once this is done, the burden shifts to the Government to show that there has been an evaluation of the contractor's current and planned production to determine if such residual equipment is in fact reasonably usable by the contractor or in excess of the latter's reasonable needs. The extent to which these requirements are met determines the proper classification of residual equipment. See Fiesta Leasing and Sales, Inc, supra, 87-1 BCA at 99,287 (citing Essex Electro Engineers, Inc., DOTCAB Nos. 1025, 1119, 81-1 BCA ¶ 14,838 at 73,250, reconsid. denied 81-1 BCA ¶ 15,109, aff'd 702 F.2d 998 (Fed. Cir. 1983)). 70 By definition, a tangible capital asset has three essential characteristics: (a) it is acquired for use in operations and not for resale; (b) it is long-term in nature, yielding services over a number of years; (c) it has physical substance. See Lane K. Anderson, Accounting for Government Contracts: Cost Accounting Standards, Matthew Bender Accounting Series, 1981, § 13.03[4], pp. 13-6, 13-7 (hereinafter Anderson). 71 "Tangible capital assets" are expressly included within the definition of "facilities" in the cost accounting rules relating to "idle facilities and idle capacity costs." See GPO Cost Directive, Sec. 3, ¶ 25(a). "Idle capacity," is simply defined as "the unused capacity of partially used facilities." Id. 72 See note 23 supra. 73 In Cloverleaf Enterprises, Inc., the ad hoc contract appeals panel affirmed the contracting officer's award of depreciation and administrative costs pursuant to the Government's convenience termination of the contract. See Cloverleaf Enterprises, Inc., supra, slip op. 18. In doing so, the ad hoc panel relied on the decision of the ASBCA in Ted J. Grimsrud and Claude Carr, ASBCA No. 7971, 1962 BCA ¶ 3562. Similarly, in Aviation Specialists, Inc., the Department of Transportation Board of Contract Appeals (DOTBCA) awarded the terminated contractor a small profit (1.3 percent) on its continuing costs because of the special circumstances of that case, despite the general rule prohibiting anticipatory profits in convenience terminations. See Aviation Specialists, Inc., DOT BCA No. 1967, 91-1 BCA ¶ 23,534, at 117,993. Both Cloverleaf Enterprises, Inc. and Aviation Specialists, Inc. are "pure" convenience termination cases. In cases where the convenience termination of a "requirements" contract is the result of a default being overturned, recovery seems to be strictly limited to unreimbursed costs of the actual work performed on the contract before termination. See e.g., Bay Ridge Press, supra, Supplemental Decision, slip op. at 3. 74 As a matter of contract law, a requirements contract is: ". . . a contract by which one party, the seller, agrees to satisfy all of the buyer's requirements for services and/or items for a specified period of time. That contract is violated if either the buyer does not purchase all of its requirements from the seller, or, if the seller fails to satisfy all of the buyer's needs. The consideration that makes such a contract binding is the buyer's promise to purchase all of its requirements from the seller and the seller's promise to satisfy those requirements." See R.C. Swanson, supra, Supplemental Decision, slip op. at 22 (quoting Aviation Specialists, Inc., supra, 91-1 BCA at 117,991). 75 The termination clause in question was FAR 52.249-2, "Termination for Convenience of the Government (Fixed-Price) (April 1984)," which was incorporated by reference in the contract. See Aviation Specialists, Inc., supra, 91-1 BCA at 117,989. As previously indicated, GPO's convenience termination clause, GPO Contract Terms, Contract Clauses, ¶ 19, is essentially a verbatim adoption of FAR 52.249-2. See R.C. Swanson, supra, Supplemental Decision, slip op. at 18. 76 In reaching the conclusion that the terminated contractor was entitled to recover its continuing costs relating to the aircraft after the date of termination, the DOTBCA relied on two earlier cases decided by the ASBCA-Fiesta Leasing and Sales, Inc., supra and Ted J. Grimsrud and Claude Carr, supra. See Aviation Specialists, Inc., supra, 91-1 BCA at 117,992. In Fiesta Leasing and Sales, Inc., which the Board has cited with approval in this case, an Air Force fixed price definite quantities contract for the lease of buses was terminated for convenience. After termination, the contractor attempted but was unable to lease the buses elsewhere. The ASBCA found that under the "Termination for Convenience" clause the contractor was entitled to its depreciation expense and to its insurance and other continuing costs on certain buses following the termination. Ted J. Grimsrud and Claude Carr, which was cited in the ad hoc panel's ruling in Cloverleaf Enterprises, Inc., see note 73 supra, involved a requirements contract under which the Air Force agreed to purchase all of its snow removal needs for approximately six months from the contractor. In order to fulfill the contract, the contractor purchased a snow plow. After about two and a half months, the contract was terminated for convenience when the military base involved ceased to be an active installation. The contractor claimed entitlement to fuel and insurance costs and sought reimbursement for the original cost of the snow plow. The ASBCA found that the contractor was entitled to depreciation expenses on the plow and the insurance costs for the two and one-half month period of contract performance. There was no indication whether the contract contained a clause providing for continuing costs, and the ASBCA made no allowance for the period following termination. Fuel costs were not allowed since there was no proof that these costs were associated with the contract. 77 See note 60 supra. 78 Indeed, GPO Cost Directive, Sec. 3, ¶ 25(b)(2) cross- references GPO Cost Directive, Sec. 3, ¶ 49. 79 In the Board's view, the 18 workdays affected by this ruling is analogous to a reasonable wind-up period following the convenience termination of the Appellant's contract. See Southland Manufacturing Corp., supra, 75-1 BCA at 52,361. 80 As the Board indicated in remanding the claim in R.C. Swanson, it expected that recomputing the terminated contractor's allowances under the rule of Aviation Specialists, Inc. would have the greatest impact on overhead, capital acquisition, and G & A expenses. However, the record in that case did not provide the Board with a sufficient factual record to resolve the claim de novo. See R.C. Swanson, supra, slip op, at 26-27, fn.22.