BOARD OF CONTRACT APPEALS U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE In the Matter of ) ) the Appeal of ) ) V.N. PRODUCTS, INC. ) Docket No. GPOBCA 10-00 ) Jacket 547-076 ) Purchase Order G2337 ) For the Appellant: Neil Goldberger, President, V.N. Products, Inc., Foothill Ranch, California. For the Respondent: Roy E. Potter, Esq., Associate General Counsel, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC. Before KERRY L. MILLER, Administrative Judge. DECISION V.N. Products, Inc. (VNP) appeals a Contracting Officer's decision rejecting a shipment of goods due to improper packaging. Appellant contends that the Contracting Officer misinterpreted the contract's packaging specifications. For the reasons that follow, Respondent's motion for summary judgment is granted; Appellant's motion for summary judgment is denied and the appeal is denied. FINDINGS OF FACT 1. On April 10, 2000, the U.S. Government Printing Office (GPO) Chicago Regional Printing Procurement Office (RPPO), after following standard sealed bid procurement procedures, awarded a firm, fixed- price contract to Appellant for the production of 224,121 computer mouse pads for the U.S. Army. Rule 4 File, Tabs, C, D. The mouse pads were promotional items to be used by Army recruiters. 2. The contract specifications required Appellant to print a Government-furnished design on the pad's top polyester cloth laminate using a sublimation printing process. Rule 4 File, Tab B at 2, 3. 3. Under the terms of the contract, as modified by the Purchase Order, the contractor was to deliver 91 mouse pads to five destinations.1 Rule 4 File, Tab B at 6; Tab C. Ten mouse pads were to be mailed to each of the Army's 6,690 recruiters. Rule 4 File, Tab B at 7. Then, Appellant was required to make five large shipments of mouse pads to Fort Knox, Kentucky. The shipments were to be spaced approximately three weeks apart. The first four shipments were for 30,000 mouse pads each and the last shipment was for 36,900 mouse pads. Rule 4 File, Tab B at 6, 8. 4. The contract also contained the following provisions: PACKAGING, LABELING, AND MARKING: Noncompliance with the packing and marking instructions will be cause for the Government to take corrective action in accordance with GPO Pub. 310.2. Label in accordance with GPO Contract Terms. Shrink film wrap in units of 5 mouse pads per wrap. Shrink wrap process must not damage the pads. If necessary to protect the image or pad, slip sheet between pads. Pack suitably in shipping containers. Use only new corrugated or solid fiberboard containers with a minimum bursting strength of 275 psi. Containers must not exceed 45 lbs when fully packed. Reproduce shipping container labels from furnished repro, fill in appropriate blanks, and attach to each container. All containers must be marked with the jacket number, APA number title (RPI 986, eArmy Mouse Pad (APA00-664)), total quantity, quantity per unit (5), and number of units (number of shrink wraps of 5). Additionally, mailed copies must have a mailing label applied to each mailed container. Contractor must reproduce all additional labels required at their own expense. PALLETIZING: Contractor will be required to furnish pallets for bulk shipments to Fort Knox, KY, in shipping containers, when the containers fill two or more layers on the pallet. As an exception to GPO Contract Terms (GPO Pub. 310.2), the Government may choose to correct packaging and palletizing deficiencies without prior notice to the contractor and charge all costs to the contractor. Contractor must NOT palletize any shipments other than those to Fort Knox, KY. (Emphasis in original). Rule 4 File, Tab B at 4-5. In addition, GPO Contract Terms, incorporated into Jacket 547-076 by reference, contains the following provision: Palletizing. (a) When indicated in specifications, the contractor will be required to furnish pallets for bulk shipments, in shipping containers, when the containers fill two layers or more on the pallet. Supplemental Specification 8, GPO Contract Terms, GPO Publication 310.2 (Rev. 5-99). 5. The contract also contained a "Distribution" section that, inter alia, explained the requirement that 10 mouse pads be mailed to each of the Army's 6,690 recruiters: The number of recruiters at each particular recruiting station is handwritten on each of the 1,594 recruiting station labels. There are a total of 6,690 recruiters. Mail/ship 10 mouse pads (2 shrinkfilm wraps of 5 mouse pads per wrap) to each recruiter. Rule 4 File, Tab B at 7. 6. The Government rejected Appellant's first shipment of 30,240 mouse pads sent to Fort Knox because the pads were not shrink-wrapped. In a final decision dated July 26, 2000, the Government cited to the above- quoted contract requirement that the pads be delivered in shrink wrapped units of five. Rule 4 File, Tab F. 7. Appellant argued that the cited contract provision did not apply to "bulk shipments" to Fort Knox, such as the one rejected by the Government. Nonetheless, Appellant picked up the rejected mouse pads and re-packaged them in accordance with the Government's interpretation of the contract. 8. By letter dated August 5, 2000, Appellant challenged the Government's interpretation of the packaging specifications with a timely appeal to the GPO Board of Contract Appeals (GPOBCA). Appellant argued: It is our claim that the GPO's specifications regarding the packaging on this [contract] were misleading in two respects; (1) the manner in which they were written implied that the specs called for two distinct types of shipments, a "MAIL/SHIP" portion, and a "BULK SHIP" portion, and (2) the use of the term "BULK SHIPMENT" in the "Palletizing" section, without any mention of shrinkfilm wrap. It is our position that the specs misled the reader by separating discussion of "mailed copies", under the "Packaging "section, versus discussion of "bulk shipments", which is mentioned solely in the "Palletizing" section. It expressly states "Mail/ship 10 mouse pads (2 shrinkfilm wraps of 5 mouse pads per wrap) to each recruiter", but does not similarly specify such a requirement along with where they discuss the "BULK SHIPMENT" portion. Secondly, it is commonly understood in our industry that whenever "BULK" shipments are called for, it means that no special packaging is required. Under General Terms and Conditions of the factory catalog, in the packaging section (inside back cover), it expressly states the following: "Normal packaging is bulk (shrink-wrapping, polybags, tubes. .. are available... see page 50-51 for details... Call factory to discuss." Therefore, due to the misleading character of the GPO specs, and their non-qualification of the term of art "BULK SHIPMENT", we now have additional shrink-wrap expenses for all the bulk shipments, for which we seek only fair and just compensation. Letter from V.N. Products, Inc. to GPO Board of Contract Appeals, dated August 5, 2000. 9. Appellant's subcontractor sought $15,111 to compensate it for the cost of picking up, repackaging and re-delivering the rejected 30,00 pad shipment, as well as the cost of repackaging 30,000 mouse pads not yet shipped, plus the cost of shrink-wrapping the remaining 96,900 mouse pads. Letter from XJP Corp. to V.N. Products, Inc., dated September 5, 2000. DISCUSSION This case is before the Board on Appellant's Motion for Summary Judgment and Respondent's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment. Appellant argues it is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law because the Government misinterpreted the contract's packaging specifications and imposed a requirement to shrink-wrap all finished products. Respondent argues that it is entitled to judgment in its favor because the contract unequivocally required Appellant as a condition of performance to shrink-wrap the finished products for shipment and delivery to Government installations. Given the undisputed facts in this case, Respondent is entitled to summary judgment in its favor. Summary Judgment Standard In deciding summary judgment motions, the Board is guided by Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See The George Marr Co., GPOBCA No. 31-94, (April 23, 1996), 1996 GPOBCA LEXIS 43, 1996 WL 273662, slip op. at 35. Accord, Christie-Willamette, NASA BCA No. 283-4, 87-3 BCA ¶ 19,981 (citing Astro Dynamics, Inc., NASA BCA No. 476-1, 77-1 BCA ¶ 12,230); Automated Services, Inc., EBCA Nos. 386-3-87, 391-5-87, 87-3 BCA ¶ 20,157. Under Rule 56, courts are instructed to grant a motion for summary judgment if the pleadings and supporting affidavits and other submissions "show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c). See also, GPOBCA Rule 35(g), GPO Instruction 110.12A, Oct. 25, 1999. Thus, the principal judicial inquiry required by Rule 56 is whether a genuine issue of material fact exists. See The George Marr Co., supra, slip op. at 35-36; RBP Chemical Corp., GPOBCA No. 4-91 (Jan. 23, 1992), 1992 GPOBCA LEXIS 16, 1992 WL 487876, slip op. at 22. Accord, John's Janitorial Services, Inc., ASBCA No. 34234, 90-3 BCA ¶ 22,973 (citing, General Dynamics Corporation, ASBCA Nos. 32660, 32661, 89-2 BCA ¶ 21,851); Ite, Inc., NASA BCA No. 1086-6, 88-1 BCA ¶ 20,269. A material fact is one that will make a difference in the outcome of the case. McDonnell Douglas Services, Inc., ASBCA No. 45556, 95-1 BCA ¶ 27,333 at 136,229 (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986)). Stated otherwise, on a motion for summary judgment, a court cannot try issues of fact; it can only determine whether there are issues to be tried. See IBM Poughkeepsie Employees Federal Credit Union v. Cumis Insurance Society, Inc., 590 F. Supp. 769, 771 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (citing Schering Corp. v. Home Insurance Co., 712 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1983)). If no triable issues exist, the rule permits the immediate entry of summary judgment. See, e.g., Reingold v. Deloitte, Haskins and Sells, 599 F. Supp. 1241, 1261 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); United States v. ACB Sales and Service, Inc., 590 F. Supp. 561 (D. Ariz. 1984). Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has stated that summary judgment is mandatory in the absence of a genuine issue of any material fact. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986). The burden is on the party moving for summary judgment to demonstrate that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, supra, 477 U.S. at 322-23; Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970). That burden is an affirmative one, and is not met merely by disproving the unsupported claims of its opponent. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, supra, 477 U.S. at 323. On the other hand, while the nonmoving party also has an evidentiary burden, it is not a heavy one; it is simply required to go beyond allegations in the pleadings and designate specific facts in the record or by affidavits to show there is a genuine issue to be heard. See, e.g., McDonnell v. Flaharty, 636 F.2d 184 (7th Cir. 1980); United States v. Kates, 419 F. Supp. 846 (D. Pa. 1976); Upper West Fork River Watershed Association v. Corps of Engineers, 414 F. Supp. 908 (D. W.Va. 1976), aff'd 556 F.2d 576 (4th Cir. 1977), cert. denied 434 U.S. 1010 (1978). See generally, Vanier Graphics, Inc., GPOBCA No. 12-92 (May 17, 1994), 1994 GPOBCA LEXIS 39, 1994 WL 275102, slip op. at 32-38; RBP Chemical Corp., supra, slip op. at 17-26. The Federal summary judgment rule provides: "[A]n adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings, but his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against him." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e). See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, supra, 477 U.S. at 324; First National Bank of Arizona v. Cities Service Co., 391 U.S. 253, 289 (1968); Mingus Constructors, Inc. v. United States, 812 F.2d 1387, 1390-91 (Fed. Cir. 1987). See also, Do-Well Machine Shop, Inc., ASBCA No. 34898, 89-1 BCA ¶ 21,491, at 108,281; Ite Inc., supra, 88-1 BCA at 102,595. Contract interpretation is a matter of law and, as such, is amenable to disposition on summary judgment. See Textron Defense Sys. v. Widnall, 143 F.3d 1465, 1468 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Dalton v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 98 F.3d 1298, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 1996); ECC Intern. Corp. v. United States, 43 Fed. Cl. 359, 365 (1999). Decision on Summary Judgment In this appeal the Board is presented with two very different interpretations of the same contract provisions. Such a situation is not unusual in litigation and does not inevitably lead to the conclusion that the contract is ambiguous. To establish an ambiguity both contract interpretations must fall within a zone of reasonableness. Metric Constructions, Inc. v. National Aeronautics and Space Administration, 169 F.3d 747, 751 (Fed. Cir. 1999). The Board's primary task is to apply well-established rules of contract interpretation to ascertain the meaning and legal consequences of the disputed contract provisions. The purpose of any rule of contract interpretation is to carry out the intent of the parties, Hegeman-Harris & Co., 194 Ct. Cl. 574, 440 F.2d 1009 (1971); and to give effect to the "spirit and purpose" of the agreement. Julius Goldman's Egg City v. United States, 697 F.2d 1051 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Thanet Corp v. United States, 591 F.2d 629 (Ct. Cl. 1979). The Board must first seek to resolve a contract interpretation dispute by trying to determine the mutual intent of the parties as manifested in the contract itself. IBI Security Services, Inc. v. United States, ASBCA No. 3492, 88-1 BCA ¶ 20,364; Coastal Dry Dock & Repair Corp., ASBCA No. 31894, 87-1 BCA ¶ 19,618. The test for ascertaining intent is an objective one; i.e., the question is what would a reasonable contractor have understood, not what did the drafter or the bidder subjectively intend. Corbetta Construction Co. v. United States, 198 Ct. Cl. 712, 461 F.2d 1330 (1972). See also Salem Engineering and Construction Corp. v. United States, 2 Cl. Ct. 803, 806 (1983). The provisions of the contract itself should provide the evidence of the objective intent of the parties. In interpreting a contract, the Board's examination should begin with the plain language used in the contract. Textron Defense Sys., 143 F.3d 1465, 1469 (Fed. Cir. 1998); Gould, Inc. v. United States, 935 F.2d 1271, 1274 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Craft Mach. Works Inc. v. United States, 926 F.2d 1110, 1113 (Fed. Cir. 1991). The specific provisions of Jacket 547-076 that are in question are as follows: PACKAGING, LABELING, AND MARKING: Noncompliance with the packing and marking instructions will be cause for the Government to take corrective action in accordance with GPO Pub. 310.2. Label in accordance with GPO Contract Terms. Shrink film wrap in units of 5 mouse pads per wrap. Shrink wrap process must not damage the pads. If necessary to protect the image or pad, slip sheet between pads. Pack suitably in shipping containers. Use only new corrugated or solid fiberboard containers with a minimum bursting strength of 275 psi. Containers must not exceed 45 lbs when fully packed. Reproduce shipping container labels from furnished repro, fill in appropriate blanks, and attach to each container. All containers must be marked with the jacket number, APA number title (RPI 986, eArmy Mouse Pad (APA00-664)), total quantity, quantity per unit (5), and number of units (number of shrink wraps of 5). Additionally, mailed copies must have a mailing label applied to each mailed container. Contractor must reproduce all additional labels required at their own expense. PALLETIZING: Contractor will be required to furnish pallets for bulk shipments to Fort Knox, KY, in shipping containers, when the containers fill two or more layers on the pallet. As an exception to GPO Contract Terms (GPO Pub. 310.2), the Government may choose to correct packaging and palletizing deficiencies without prior notice to the contractor and charge all costs to the contractor. Contractor must NOT palletize any shipments other than those to Fort Knox, KY. (Emphasis in original). Rule 4 File, Tab B at 4-5. In addition, the contract also contained a "Distribution" section that, inter alia, required 10 mouse pads be mailed to each of the Army's 6,690 recruiters: The number of recruiters at each particular recruiting station is handwritten on each of the 1,594 recruiting station labels. There are a total of 6,690 recruiters. Mail/ship 10 mouse pads (2 shrinkfilm wraps of 5 mouse pads per wrap) to each recruiter. Rule 4 File, Tab B at 7. Appellant's argument rests on two interrelated premises. First, Appellant asserts that the above-quoted contract provisions establish two distinct categories of mouse pads, each having it's own packaging requirement. In Appellant's view the first category consists of those mouse pads to be shipped in quantities of 10 to individual Army recruiters located throughout the country. Appellant agrees the contract requires this category of mouse pads to be shrink-wrapped in quantities of five prior to shipment. However, Appellant claims the contract does not require the remaining five "bulk shipments" (of 30,00 to 36,850 pads per shipment) to the Army's warehouse in Fort Knox, Kentucky to be shrink-wrapped. Appellant's second premise is that when the Government used the words "bulk shipments" in the contract's "Palletizing" subsection it was using a term of art. Appellant claims "the use of the term 'bulk' is always interpreted to mean 'no special packaging required'" and therefore, no shrink- wrapping was required. The Board concludes that neither premise is supportable. A. Did the Contract Establish Two Categories of Mouse Pads? Appellant claims that the contract called for two categories of mouse pads, one category consists of mouse pads boxed and shrink-wrapped in units of five and the other category consists of mouse pads boxed, but not shrink-wrapped. In Appellant's view the provision "Mail/ship 10 mouse pads (2 shrinkfilm wraps of 5 mouse pads per wrap) to each recruiter" in the contract's "Distribution" section, coupled with the lack of a comparable parenthetical direction for the "bulk shipments" to Fort Knox mentioned in the "Palletizing" section, means that the shrink-wrapping requirement is limited to the recruiter shipments and excludes the "bulk shipments." Appellant's argument ignores the separate shrink-wrap requirement contained in the contract's "Packaging" section. The contract in the instant appeal sets out a shrink-wrap requirement in a contract provision labeled "PACKAGING, LABELING, AND MARKING" (hereinafter "Packaging"). The requirement to shrink wrap mouse pads contained in the "Packaging" provision is unequivocal. The contractor is required to "[s]hrink film wrap in units of 5 mouse pads per wrap." Rule 4 File, Tab B at 4. The shrink-wrapped units are required to be packed in corrugated or solid fiberboard shipping containers. Id. Each container is required to be marked with a shipping container label listing the "total quantity, quantity per unit (5), and number of units (number of shrink wraps of 5)." Rule 4 File, Tab B at 5. The "Packaging" specification makes no distinction between those mouse pads destined for Ft. Knox and those mouse pads to be delivered to other locations. In a separate contract provision labeled "Palletizing" the contractor was required to furnish pallets to hold the shipping containers if the boxes filled two or more layers on a pallet. This "Palletizing" provision was limited by its provisions to the 5 large shipments to Fort Knox. Rule 4 File, Tab B at 5. The contractor was further admonished not to use pallets for any of the other shipments. Id. Although the use of shipping containers is mentioned in each section, in the Board's view, the "Palletizing" section has no direct connection with the "Packaging" section of the contract. It was unreasonable for Appellant to conclude that a contract provision informing a contractor when it is required to use a shipping pallet, would negate the contract's "Packaging" specification and the shrink- wrap requirement found in that section of the contract. This is especially true since the Government required each shipping container to be labeled by the contractor to list the "total quantity, quantity per unit (5), and number of units (number of shrink wraps of 5)." Thus the specifications contemplated that each shipping container used to fulfill the contract would contain shrink-wrapped mouse pads. It is equally unreasonable for the contractor to conclude, based on the parenthetical explanation found in the phrase "Mail/ship 10 mouse pads (2 shrinkfilm wraps of 5 mouse pads per wrap) to each recruiter" that no other mouse pads were required to be shrink-wrapped. The five shipments to Fort Knox totaled 156,900 or approximately 70% of the contracted-for 224,121 mouse pads. Although the Government overstated the obvious when it explained that two units of five shrink-wrapped mouse pads were needed to make up a shipment of 10 mouse pads, there is nothing in this provision that would lead a contractor to reasonably conclude that the specific shrink-wrapping requirements were to be ignored for the remaining 70% of the mouse pads. Thus, contrary to Appellant's contention that the structure of the contract created two classes of mouse pads with a bifurcated shrink- wrapping requirement, the Board, reading the contract as a whole and giving effect to all provisions of the contract, finds a cohesive series of contract provisions that create an internally consistent shrink-wrapping requirement applicable to all mouse pads delivered under the contract. The most basic principle of contract construction is that the document should be interpreted as a whole. See Hol-Gar Manufacturing Corp. v. United States, 169 Ct. Cl. 384, 388, 351 F.2d 972, 975 (1965); The George Marr Co., GPOBCA No. 31-94, 1996 GPOBCA LEXIS 43, 1996 WL 273662 (April 23, 1996) slip op. at 43. A court or board must give reasonable meaning to all parts of the contract and not render portions of the contract meaningless. See McAbee Constr., Inc. v. United States, 97 F.3d 1431, 1424 (Fed. Cir. 1996), reh'g denied No. 96-5004 (Fed. Cir.) March 13, 1996; Fortec Constr. v. United States, 760 F.2d 1288, 1292 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (citing United States v. Johnston Controls, Inc., 713 F.2d 1541, 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1983)). In doing so the Board must also avoid surplusage or conflict. Granite Const. Co. v. United States, 962 F.2d 998, 1003 (Fed. Cir. 1992). See also Input/Output Technology, Inc. v. United States, 44 Fed. Cl. 65, 70 (1999). Hence, all provisions of a contract should be given effect and no provision is to be rendered meaningless. See The George Marr Co., supra, slip op. at 43-44; General Business Forms, Inc., GPOBCA No. 2-84, 1985 GPOBCA LEXIS 21, 1985 WL 154846 (Dec. 3, 1985), slip op. at 16 (citing, Raytheon Co. v. United States, 2 Cl. Ct. 763 (1983)). See also Pacificorp Capital, Inc. v. United States, 25 Cl. Ct. 707, 716 (1992), aff'd 988 F.2d 130 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Avedon Corp. v. United States, 15 Cl. Ct. 771, 776 (1988). An interpretation which gives a reasonable meaning to all parts of a contract will be preferred to one which leaves a portion of it "useless, inexplicable, inoperative, void, insignificant, meaningless, superfluous, or achieves a weird and whimsical result." Gould, Inc. v. United States, 935 F.2d 1271, 1274 (Fed. Cir. 1991), quoting Arizona v. United States, 216 Ct. Cl. 221, 235-36, 575 F.2d 855, 863 (1978). See also ITT Arctic Service, Inc. v. United States, 207 Ct. Cl. 743, 524 F.2d 680, 684 (1975) (contract interpretation should be "without twisted or strained out of context [and without] regard to the subjective unexpressed intent of one of the parties. . ."). An interpretation that effectively deletes a major portion of the contract cannot and will not be sanctioned. See Avedon Corp. v. United States, supra, 15 Cl. Ct. at 776 (citing W.G. Cornell Co. v. United States, 179 Ct. Cl. 651, 666-67, 376 F.2d 299, 309 (1967)). When the instant contract is read as a whole, Appellant's argument distorts the plain meaning of the specifications and eviscerates the specific shrink-wrap directive in the "Packaging" section. Such an unreasonable interpretation also ignores the explicit requirement that the labels for the shipping containers used for the palletized "bulk shipment" pads must list the "quantity per unit (5) and number of units (number of shrink wraps of 5)." See, Rule 4 File, Tab B at 5. B. Did the Government's Use of the Word "Bulk" Negate the Shrink- Wrap Requirement for the Shipments to Fort Knox? Appellant's second argument is that the word "bulk" in "both its common usage and as a term of art" means "no special packaging." Appellant's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment and in Opposition to Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment at 3. Contrary to Appellant's blanket assertion regarding this word, the Board has found that there is no "Lawyer's Paradise" where "all words have a fixed, precisely ascertained meaning." See JAMES B. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 390 (1898) at 428-29. It has been observed that "[a] word generally has several meanings, even in the dictionary." Oliver Wendel Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 Harv. L. Rev. 417 (1899). Appellant's contention about the word's meaning in common usage notwithstanding, the dictionaries consulted by the Board provide several meanings. The most common definitions of "bulk" are "a large mass" or "a large quantity." See THE OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY AND LANGUAGE GUIDE 121 (1999); see also, 1 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1164-65 (1933). Another dictionary defines "bulk" as "magnitude in three dimensions." See THE RANDOM HOUSE COLLEGE DICTIONARY REVISED EDITION 178 (1979). Another common definition is "the greatest part or number." See THE OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY AND LANGUAGE GUIDE 121 (1999). Thus, at least as to the most common definitions of the word "bulk," modern dictionaries do not support Appellant's position regarding the word's common usage. In construing a contract, the language of the instrument is given its ordinary and commonly accepted meaning, unless it is shown that the parties intended otherwise. Hol-Gar Mfg. Corp. v. United States, 169 Ct. Cl. 384, 351 F.2d 972, 976 (1965). Where the provisions of a contract are phrased in clear and unambiguous language, "the words of those provisions must be given their plain and ordinary meaning by the court in defining the rights and obligations of the parties. . . ." See The George Hyman Construction Company v. United States, supra, 832 F.2d at 579 (quoting Elden v. United States, 617 F.2d 254, 260-61 (Ct. Cl. 1980); accord American Science and Engineering, Inc. v. United States, 663 F.2d 82, 88 (Ct. Cl. 1981)); Julius Goldman's Egg City v. United States, 697 F.2d 1051, 1057 (Fed. Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 814, 104 S. Ct. 68, 78 L.Ed.2d 83 (1983). In construing a contract, technical terms are given their technical meaning. See Coastal Drydock and Repair Corp., ASBCA No. 31894, 87-1 BCA ¶ 19,618; Industrial Finishers, Inc., ASBCA No. 6537, 61-1 BCA ¶ 3,091. Likewise, terms special to Government contracts will be given their technical meanings. See General Builders Supply Co. v. United States, 187 Ct. Cl. 477, 409 F.2d 246 (1969) (meaning of "equitable adjustment"). "Outside evidence may not be brought in to create an ambiguity where the language is clear." HRE, Inc. v. United States, 142 F.3d 1274, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (quoting City of Tacoma v. United States, 31 F.3d 1130, 1134 (Fed. Cir. 1994). "Neither a contractor's belief nor contrary customary practice . . . can make an unambiguous contract provision ambiguous, or justify a departure from its terms.: Hoffman Constr. Co. of Ore. v. United States, 40 Fed. Cl. 184, 192 (1998) (quoting R.B. Wright Constr. Co. v. United States, 919 F.2d 1569, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1990). While evidence of trade practice and custom can play a role in contract interpretation by establishing the context and intention of the contracting parties. Evidence of trade practice does not trump other cannons of contract interpretation. Metric Constructions, 169 F.3d 747, 752-3. Appellant attempts to support its position that "bulk" is a term of art with four examples culled from "Internet sources." Appellant V.N. Product Inc.'s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment and in Opposition to Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment at 3. However, since none of the examples provided2 were of the disputed term "bulk shipments" they are irrelevant to the issues in this appeal. Appellant also advises that "among [the] definitions of 'bulk' in the Random House College Dictionary are: "loose goods or cargo, not in packages, boxes, bags, etc." and "unpackaged." Id. While it is true that "loose goods or cargo, not in packages, boxes, bags, etc." is one of the definitions in that dictionary, the quoted definition is the third one listed. The two most common definitions listed in that dictionary are "magnitude in three dimensions" and "the greater part; the main mass or body." See, RANDOM HOUSE COLLEGE DICTIONARY REVISED ED. 178 (1975). In addition, Appellant fails to disclose that the definition "unpackaged" quoted by Appellant from the Random House College Dictionary is not a definition of the word "bulk" but of the phrase "in bulk." Id. While a phrase such as "in bulk" can mean either "in large quantities" or "loose; not packaged"3 and the term "bulk cargo" can mean "a heap or pile"4 these phrases were not used in the instant contract. Finally, Appellant cites to the catalogue of its subcontractor. Once again, the example cited is not of the disputed term "bulk shipment." Rather Appellant's subcontractor's catalogue simply states that "[n] ormal packaging is bulk." Thus, Appellant' proffered evidence fails to prove trade usage or custom. In construing a disputed word, the Board must also take into consideration the context in which the word is used. The only instance in the contract specifications where the term "bulk" is used is in the previously quoted and discussed "Palletizing" section. In addition, GPO Contract Terms, incorporated into the instant contract by reference, contains the following provision: Palletizing. (a) When indicated in specifications, the contractor will be required to furnish pallets for bulk shipments, in shipping containers, when the containers fill two layers or more on the pallet. Supplemental Specification 8, GPO Contract Terms, GPO Publication 310.2 (Rev. 5-99). In both provisions the word "bulk" modifies the word "shipments" not the words "pack", "cargo" or "packaging." As Respondent correctly observes, the logical place in the contract to find packaging instructions is in the "Packaging" section of the contract, not the "Palletizing" section. The Board concludes that the specification's reference to "bulk shipments" is not an exception to the shrink-wrap packaging requirement but a term used to denote certain large shipments. Both the specifications and the Supplemental Specification in GPO Contract Terms explain that bulk shipments are those shipments where the number of containers shipped exceeds two layers on a pallet. Thus, "bulk" in this contract provision has the same meaning as "large" and does not modify the shrink-wrap requirement. CONCLUSION Having considered all of Appellant's arguments, whether or not expressly mentioned, the Board concludes that the Respondent is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Accordingly, Respondent's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment is granted and Appellant's Motion for Summary Judgment is denied. The appeal is denied. April 25, 2002 KERRY L. MILLER Administrative Judge __________ 1 These destinations were: the Army Recruiting Headquarters (75 pads), Young & Rubican Army Group (5 pads), Army Headquarters (5 pads), HQ TRADOC (1 pad), and OVSD(P&R) OASD(FMD)/AP (5 pads). Rule 4 File, Tab B at 6. 2 The examples provided were for: "bulk pack" (2 examples), "bulk freight" and "bulk cargo." Appellant V.N. Product Inc.'s Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment and in Opposition to Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment at 3. 3 THE NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 226 (2001). 4 THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1165 (1933).