U.S. Government Printing Office
Board of Contract Appeals
AMERICAN DRAFTING & LAMINATING CO.
GPO BCA 6-85
April 15, 1986
MICHAEL F. DiMARIO, Administrative Law Judge
OPINION
This appeal, timely filed on April 12, 1985, by American
Drafting and Laminating Company (hereinafter Appellant), P.O.
Box 62464, Virginia Beach, VA 23462 arises under the Disputes
Article of Government Printing Office Contract Terms No. 1,
GPO Publication 310.2.- Revised October 1, 1980, which such
publication was incorporated in and made a part of a certain
contract between Appellant and the U.S. Government Printing
Office (hereinafter Respondent), identified as Jacket No.
538-374, Purchase Order E-9652, dated January 29, 1985. The
appeal is from the final decision of the GPO Contracting
Officer, Douglas R. MacBride, of February 26, 1985,
terminating the contract "for default because your firm failed
to make progress on the contract and you are inexcusably
delinquent in providing the ordered products by the
contractual ship date." (Appeal File hereinafter R4 File, Tab
N) The decision of the Contracting Officer is reversed and the
case is remanded back to the Contracting Officer for
processing in accordance with this decision.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On January 29, 1985, Appellant was telephonically contacted by
a representative of Respondent's Hampton, VA Regional Printing
Procurement Office and invited to bid on a contract for the
acquisition and printing of some 15,000 +/- 4% mailing
envelopes requisitioned from Respondent by the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration (hereinafter NASA). The
Government was to furnish camera copy to the successful bidder
by February 1, 1985. The envelopes, themselves, were to be
furnished by the contractor and were to be constructed from
light brown Kraft paper with basis weight 28 lbs. per 500
sheets, size 17 x 22", trim size 9 1/2 x 12 1/2", open sided,
diagonal or center seamed with gummed flap (2 1/4" depth
min.). The completed product was to be boxed in units of 500
and shipped to NASA Langley Research Center by February 11,
1985.
Appellant by return telephone call gave its quotation of $988
for the given quantity with an added rate of $65 per
additional one thousand. Three other firms quoted prices to
the Government. Based upon the quotations, Respondent, by
Purchase Order E-9652 dated January 29, 1985, awarded the job
to Appellant. Appellant claims receipt of the Purchase Order
on February 4, 1985. Appellant claims that this late receipt
of the Purchase Order and materials gave it an "automatic
extention [sic] of delivery date to 13 February 1985 in
accordance with U.S. Government Printing Office Contract Terms
No. 1, Part 1-10(c) and 2-11(c)(1)."
Be that as it may, the facts in the record show that on
February 12, 1985, Penny Milladge, Procurement Assistant,
Hampton Regional Printing Procurement Office, GPO, telephoned
Appellant and spoke to its employee Debra Tase "on Jacket
538-374 due for 2/11." Tase's notes of that conversation
reflect the following: "ODPC [Old Dominion Paper Company]
misguided on envelopes required for job. Envelopes are a
special order and generally take 4 weeks to get. RIS [RIS
Paper Company] happened to have 13,500 9 1/2 x 12 5/8
envelopes due in today, remainder in 1 week. If we get
envelope on 2/12 will ship 2/13..
Tase's notes for 2/12/85 show a status check with RIS and
resultant advice that envelopes were not shipped from the mill
until 2/12/85 with anticipated delivery date to Appellant of
2/15/85. The notes further show that Tase called Milladge and
advised her of this information on 2/12/85.
Appellant by letter of February 13, 1985, was nevertheless
given notice of its failure to perform within the time
required by the terms of the contract and that the Government
was considering termination for default unless Appellant could
show by written response within 5 days of receipt of the
notice that the "failure to perform arose out of causes beyond
your control and without fault or negligence on your part."
On 2/14/85 Tase again checked with RIS and was assured that
the envelopes would be delivered on 2/15/85 as promised. On
2/15 at approximately 12:30 p.m. Milladge called Tase to see
if envelopes had been received. Tase advised her that they
had not been. Later that day Tase called one "Judy Rule,"
identified elsewhere as Judy A. Ruehle, Printing Officer, GPO
Hampton, about the acceptability of the change in envelope
size. Ruehle then checked with one "C. Pruitt" of NASA who
apparently accepted the change provided there was no
additional cost to the Government (Rule 4 file, Tab J). Tase
was so advised (Tase's telephone note of 2/15/84).
Subsequently that same day, Ruehle spoke to Tase (Rule 4 file,
Tab K) (the conversation taking place after the apparent
receipt of the envelopes from RIS) advising her that the
envelopes were in fact side seamed rather than diagonal seamed
as specified. Ruehle then told Tase that the envelopes were
not acceptable. She also advised her to answer the "Show
Cause" letter. Ruehle's note reflected that "[A]t this time
ADL has no env & don't know where they can get Diagonal [sic]
seam env to print job."
On February 15, 1985, Appellant responded to the "Show Cause"
letter stating in pertinent part that they had originally
ordered the paper stock "from Dillard Paper Company on
February 6, 1985. [And that] Dillard, among the several area
major paper distributors, was the sole supplier stating that
stock would be provided within the allotted time" and that
Appellant "had notified GPO by fastest means (telephone
conversation between Ms. Debra Tase/ADL and Ms. Penny
Milladge/GPO) on 12 February 1985 that delivery schedule
problems were being incurred due to the paper subcontractor's
inability to provide required stock as promised." Appellant
attached a letter from Dillard to support its contention that
"unforeseeable causes beyond control and without fault or
negligence on the part of American Drafting & Laminating are
the basis for the performance delay." Appellant gave further
assurance that delivery would be made "within two working days
of receipt of proper material from its subcontractor."
The referenced attached letter dated February 15, 1985, on
Dillard Paper Company stationery and bearing the signature
"Paul L. Sumner" in pertinent part states:
When you first contacted me for a quotation on the 9 1/2 x
12 1/2 brown Kraft 28# booklet envelopes, I contacted our
supplier and secured pricing and delivery information.
Those prices and delivery dates we then passed on to you.
Upon the award of the bid to your firm and your call to me
to order said envelopes, I then placed an order with the
manufacturer. At that time the manufacturer informed me
that the price they quoted me was incorrect and that the
envelopes they had in stock at the time of quotation had
been sold and they did not anticipate a delivery date any
sooner than four weeks.
Official File, Tab 1, Attachment 2
Respondent apparently rejected this explanation since on
February 26 GPO Hampton employee Dave Sever telephoned
Appellant and advised that GPO was going to default Appellant
and put the job back out for bid with a charge back to
Appellant of any excess reprocurement costs because the
requisitioning department, NASA, could not wait any longer for
delivery of the ordered envelopes. Appellant's President
Thomas Keith, Jr., telephoned back to Sever advising that
Articles 2-18 and 2-21 of GPO Contract Terms No. 1 indicate
that a subcontractor's failure is not grounds for default of a
prime contractor, that he still hadn't found a supplier to
furnish the envelope, and that he intended to appeal any
termination "because in his opinion the job should have been
canceled at no cost and returned to GPO." That same day the
"Notice of Termination" for default was sent to Appellant.
Prior to receipt of the "Notice of Termination" on February
28, 1985, Appellant apparently continued its effort to locate
the proper envelopes since its notes of 2/26/85 show receipt
of a telephone message for one Dick Lassiter from "[M]gr paper
sales Unijax Inc., Norfolk, Va 2:45 P.M. . . ." In addition
four undated notes of telephone conversations were furnished
by Appellant to support its contention that:
All efforts were made to locate proper specification envelopes.
None were available without lengthy special orders to
manufacturer's mill according to industry sources: Dillard - Old
Dominion Paper Division, RIS Paper, Unijax Inc, and Wilcox-
Walter-Furlong Paper Company. Assistance in this impossible
situation was needed due to the paper industry's inability to
provide the envelopes, clearly beyond the control of ADL or its
paper suppliers. An indefinite schedule extension would be
necessary while awaiting the envelopes from the subcontractor.
Official File, Tab 3
On March 6, 1984, Respondent reprocured the job from Union
Envelope Company, Box 27007, Richmond, VA, the firm which had
given the lowest quotation on the original solicitation but
had not been awarded the contract at that time because it
apparently was unable to meet the stated delivery schedule of
February 11, 1985, the earliest date it could ship being March
1, 1984. (Rule 4 File, Tab C) Under the reprocurement, a
delivery date of 4/12/85 was established. Union's price of
$871.50 per 15,000 +/- 4% and $58.10 per additional one
thousand, remained the same as its original quotation. This
was lower than the award price to Appellant. As a result,
there were no excess costs to be recovered from Appellant.
However, the default remained a matter of record and it is
from this judgment by the Contracting Officer that Appellant
has appealed.
ARGUMENTS
Appellant's complaint by way of argument states that:
1. The government charge that ADL "has failed to make progress
on the contract" is erroneous.
ADL's performance as the contractor was as could be commonly
and reasonably expected: Supplies were ordered from a major,
reliable source who had stated materials were available.
Supplies were quickly reordered from a second source when the
first subcontractor was unable to provide. When supplies that
did not meet specifications were delivered by the second,
other known suppliers were again queried as to availability of
the envelopes. None were found available. The government was
kept informed by telephone and letter of this progress.
2. The government charge that "you are inexcusably delinquent
in providing the ordered products" is erroneous.
ADL complied with contract provisions concerning schedule
delays and provided information which explained the cause and
justification for the delays. Considering that delinquency
was beyond control of ADL, an unspecified length extention
[sic] of delivery schedule was requested. The government was
kept informed by telephone and assured in writing that
delivery would be made as soon as possible. No schedule
extention [sic] decision was received.
3. Termination for Default and the governments decision that
"your firm shall be held liable to the government for any
excess costs" is unreasonable.
It is not reasonable in light of: (a) the paper industry's
inability to furnish the specified envelopes in sufficient
time, (b) the government's superior knowledge or suspicion
prior to contract award that the envelopes were not
immediately available, (c) Contract Terms No. 1, Part 2-18(2)
(c) which releases the contractor from liability in instances
of subcontractor default of this nature, (d) the contractors
verbal and written attempts to comply and cooperate with the
Government Printing Office, (e) and the contractor's proposal
for cancellation or termination with assurance that no costs
would be claimed of the government.
The reasonable contracting [sic] Officer would recognize the
spirit of the regulations and best interest of both government
and contractor to reduce time expended, paperwork, and
aggrevation [sic] to all involved, as well as the courtesy to
a government/ contractor team member of having a default on
his business record through no fault of his own. Contract
Terms No. 1, Part 2-18(e) may provide for a finding of
excusable circumstances for this termination as well as such
other relief the public printer may find appropriate. It is
so appealed.
Official File, Tab 1
GPO's telephone notes of 4/9/85 conversation with Appellant's
Mr, Keith, in response to the appeal letter states:
K [contractor] has some erroneous facts
Complaint para. #5 - GPO had 4 Bidders on job!
[complaint] para. #8 - No justification - bid means K has
material or reasonable assurance he can obtain envelope in time
to produce.
[complaint] para. #10 - Paper industry's - why only 4 suppliers.
Industry? Come on. Why no Double Env., Union Envelope, US [sic]
Envelope - Largest in industry.
Para 1 - K had failed to beginning [sic] printing the envelopes.
Had not recieved [sic] envelopes in plant and stated no plates or
negs made yet due to K waiting for envelopes coming in. (That's
no progress) 2-26-85 T. Keith JR to ME. DGS
para 2 - Inecusably [sic] delinquent. K couldn't even tell if or
when job would be completed.
para 3 - (a) Paper industries, RIS, Dillard, Unijax. Wilcox-
Walter do not constitute the paper INDUSTRY!
para 3 - (b) superior knowledge - of Gov't GPO rec'd 4 bids on
envelopes. No indication that envelopes were not available.
(c) K failed to read last clause in para 2-18 2(c) "unless the
supplies or services to be furnished by the subcontractor were
obtainable from other source in time to permit the contractor to
meet the required delivery schedule."
(e) not within authority of GPO to grant K's offer because he had
accepted order & notified GPO in writing he would not be able to
produce job for an indefinite and undeterminable period.
4/9/85 3:20 pm To 3:45
Tried to negotiate for a settlement of the dispute K says the
fact that no money is involved makes it attractive to drop the
appeal however ADL does not want a record of "DEFAULT" on its
name. Whenever they bid jobs for other agencies it asked [asks]
have you ever been defaulted? ADL does not want to say YES.
Willing to withdraw appeal if CO is willing to withdraw action of
default. Stambaugh/DGS
4/9/85 4:00
Per CO, no dice. K failed to comply with ship date. dmf/DGS
Rule 4 file, Tab P
Appellant's exceptions to GPO's assertions are set forth in a
letter to the Board dated 6/7/85, as follows:
1. Exhibit M, Paragraph 5 confirms that the GPO was kept
informed of the status of Purchase Order E-9652 by ADL and
knew that the orders would be delivered, although late, within
four weeks or approximately 20 March 1985. This delay was
termed unacceptable by the contracting officer. Exhibit O,
reprocurement of the order, allowed the new contractor, an
envelope manufacturer, in excess of thirty days or until 12
April 1985 to fill the same order. This date and 35 day
procurement period apparently was acceptable, although it
emphasized the unreasonableness of not allowing an extention
[sic] to the initial ten day period allowed ADL.
2. Exhibit P, Page 1, comments on complaint paragraph #8,
infers ADL has no justification for failure to perform within
time provided; further stating ". . . bid means contractor has
reasonable assurance he can obtain envelopes in time." ADL's
bid was submitted with this reasonable assurance from a paper
distrubutor [sic]. This is confirmed in Exhibit I by
subcontractor Dillard Paper Company, who explains their
default.
3. Exhibit P, Page 1, comment on complaint paragraph #10 and
Exhibit P, Page 2, paragraph 3(a) concern ADL's use of the
term "the paper industry." ADL's reference to the paper
industry is not meant to include the entire paper industry of
the United States. It refers only to that portion of the
industry that ADL has present business contacts with or is
able to establish business with to obtain envelopes. As the
GPO knows, most paper manufacturers sell directly only to very
large accounts; that is customers buying in repeated lots
approximating tens of thousands of dollars. This is standard
trade practice and cannot be changed by a small business in
Virginia Beach. Orders of the nature of the envelopes must be
reprocessed through a paper supply distributor. These
distributors are the "paper industry" contacted by ADL who
were unable to provide the envelopes in less than four weeks.
As an example; Union Envelope company., the reprocurement
supplier of the order, is very distributor oriented,
particularly in Southern Virginia. They will not sell
directly to small printing companies, but use as their prime
distributors Dillard Paper Company and Virginia Paper Company.
These are distributors that ADL routinely purchases from.
4. Exhibit P, Page 2, paragraph 1 states "no plates or
negatives made yet . . . no progress." ADL at no time recalls
stating no negatives were made. Plates are not made at ADL
until shortly before the order goes to press, i.e., one or two
days. This contributes to quality printing by reducing the
chance of plate degradation due to effects of handling, dust
and humidity. Negatives were made prior to 8 February in
anticipation of envelope delivery from the initial vendor and
are available to ADL. The government-furnished materials from
which the negatives were produced were returned to GPO Newport
News on or about 26 February 1985 when directed by the verbal
termination. This was prior to the complaint being
originated. FACT - Progress was made.
5. Exhibit P, Page 2, Paragraph 2 states the contractor
couldn't even tell if or when the job would be completed. ADL
stated in telephone conversations and paragraph 3 of its 15
February 1985 letter that the order would be delivered within
two working days of envelope receipt. This would put delivery
near mid-March. An exact date was not given because the
expected receipt date from the supplier was not exact. This
delivery timeframe was known to GPO as shown in GPO memorandum
Exhibit M.
6. Exhibit P, Page 2, Paragraph 3(b) states there was no
indication that envelopes were not available. Exhibit D
indicates that Union Envelope Company, possibly the most
knowledgeable of the original four offerers due to its
envelope manufacturing position, required a production time of
30 days. Was this not a tipoff to the GPO? ADL and other
offerers did not have this information, but relied on
assurances from paper distributors as to envelope
availability. It was unreasonable for GPO to require earlier
delivery with this knowledge.
Your consideration to the above exceptions is appreciated.
Respectfully,
/s/ Thomas L. Keith
President
dbt
Official File, Tab 7
CONTRACT TERMS NO. 1
The pertinent provisions of Government Printing Office
Contract Terms No. 1 referenced by Appellant and Respondent,
supra, are set forth hereinbelow as follows:
2-11. Notice of Compliance With Schedules.
(c) Extension of schedules.
(1) In the event a delay is caused by any action of the
Government, including failure to furnish purchase/print order,
copy and/or materials as scheduled, the shipping schedule will be
extended automatically by the total number of workdays that work
was delayed PLUS 1 workday for each day of delay; such period of
grace not to exceed 3 workdays. For example:
Order, etc., 1 workday late + 1 workday grace = 2 workdays
extension
Order, etc., 2 workdays late + 2 workdays grace = 4 workdays
extension
Order, etc., 3 workdays late + 3 workdays grace = 6 workdays
extension
Order, etc., over 3 workdays late: total number of workdays
late + 3 workdays grace = total number of workdays extension.
2-18. Default
(a) The Government may, subject to the provisions of paragraph
(c) of this article, by written notice of default to the
contractor, terminate the whole or any part of the contract in
any one of the following circumstances:
(1) If the contractor fails to make delivery of the supplies or
to perform the services within the time specified herein or any
extension thereof; or
(2) If the contractor fails to perform any of the other
provisions of the contract, or so fails to make progress as to
endanger performance of the contract in accordance with its
terms, and in either of these two circumstances does not cure
such failure within a period of 10 days (or such other period as
the Contracting Officer may determine to be reasonable and
authorize in writing) after receipt of notice from the
Contracting Officer specifying such failure.
(b) In the event the Government terminates the contract in whole
or in part as provided in paragraph (a) of this article, the
Government may procure, upon such terms and in such manner as the
Contracting Officer may deem appropriate, supplies or services
similar to those so terminated, and the contractor shall be
liable to the Government for any excess costs for such similar
supplies or services: Provided, That the contractor shall
continue the performance of the contract to the extent not
terminated under the provisions of this article.
(c) Except with respect to defaults of subcontractors, the
contractor shall not be liable for any excess costs if the
failure to perform the contract arises out of causes beyond the
control and without the fault or negligence of the contractor.
Such causes may include, but are not restricted to, acts of God
or of the public enemy, acts of the Government in either its
sovereign or contractual capacity, fires, floods, epidemics,
quarantine restrictions, strikes, freight embargoes, and
unusually severe weather; but in every case the failure to
perform must be beyond the control of both the contractor and
subcontractor, and without the fault or negligence of either of
them, the contractor shall not be liable for any excess costs for
failure to perform, unless the supplies or services to be
furnished by the subcontractor were obtainable from other sources
in sufficient time to permit the contractor to meet the required
delivery schedule.
. . .
(e) If, after notice of termination of the contract under the
provisions of this article, it is determined for any reason that
the contractor was not in default under the provisions of this
article, or that the default was excusable under the provisions
of this article, the rights and obligations of the parties shall,
if the contract contains a clause providing for termination for
convenience of the Government, be the same as if the notice of
termination had been issued pursuant to such article. If, after
notice of termination of the contract under the provisions of
this article it is determined for any reason that the contractor
was not in default under the provisions of this article, and if
the contract does not contain a clause providing for termination
for convenience of the Government, the contract shall be
equitably adjusted to compensate for such termination and the
contract modified accordingly. Failure to agree to any such
adjustment shall be a dispute concerning a question of fact
within the meaning of the article entitled "Disputes" in Part II,
Contract Terms No. 1.
(f) The rights and remedies of the Government provided in this
article shall not be exclusive and are in addition to any
other rights and remedies provided by law or under the
contract.
2-21. Delay in Deliveries. Damages shall not be applied
against the contractor for delays in delivery occasioned by
unforseeable causes beyond the control and without the fault
or negligence of the contractor as detailed in paragraph (c)
of the article entitled "Default" in Part II of these Contract
Terms No. 1; provided, that the contractor shall, within 10
calendar days (by telephone or telegraph, confirmed promptly
in writing, if the remaining production time is less than 10
days) from the beginning of such delay, notify the Contracting
Officer in writing of the cause of the delay; provided
further, that such notice to the Contracting Officer shall
contain the justification for such delay.
ISSUE
The question presented by this appeal is whether or not in
light of all the facts and circumstances hereinabove set forth
Appellant "had failed to make progress on the contract" and
was thus "inexcusably delinquent in providing the ordered
products by the contractual ship date."
DISCUSSION
We find in reviewing the submitted documentation that there
are no factual differences between the parties respecting the
sequencing of events. The purchase order itself (Rule 4 File,
Tab E) reflects that the contractor was "to receive furnished
material by February 1, 1985." The Appellant's uncontroverted
assertion is that it received such material on February 4,
1985. This is a period of 3 calendar days late. The original
"ship complete" date on the purchase order was February 11,
1985. Thus by operation of paragraph 2-11 of Contract Terms
No. 1, supra, the "ship complete" date was automatically
extended by 6 workdays. Examining a 1985 calendar for the
month of February we take judicial notice that such extension
date was February 19, 1985, rather than February 13 as
asserted by Appellant. Accordingly, when Tase telephoned
Milladge on February 12, 1985, to inquire as to the status of
the procurement, Appellant had 7 remaining days for
performance under the general terms of the contract.
Appellant, although not initiating the conversation with Tase
as implied by its Complaint, did, at that time, inform
Respondent that it had incurred difficulty in obtaining the
envelopes which it had timely ordered on February 6, 1985,
from its supplier. At that time (February 12, 1985) Appellant
told Respondent (1) that the envelopes were a special order
and generally required 4 weeks to obtain; (2) that RIS Paper
Company happened to have some 13,500 9 1/2 x 12 5/8 envelopes
due in that day, with the remainder in 1 week; and (3) that if
they received the envelopes from RIS by February 12 they would
ship them on February 13. Respondent was thus on notice as to
the difference in envelope size on that date.
They were also promptly made aware later that day that the
shipment would be delayed further because RIS, due to late
shipping by the mill, did not anticipate receipt until
February 15. Respondent erroneously issued its "Show Cause"
letter to Appellant on February 13, 1985, some 6 days before
the contractual ship date. Appellant checked with RIS on the
14th as a follow.up on the shipment. Respondent called
Appellant at 12:30 on the 15th but the envelopes had not been
received. That same day but before receipt of the envelopes,
Respondent called Appellant to advise that the size difference
was O.K. with NASA, the "ordering activity". This was some 4
days after being advised of the size change by Appellant.
When the envelopes arrived thereafter on the 15th, Appellant
immediately notified Respondent that they did not conform to
the specifications respecting seam location. It was at that
time that Respondent (Ruehle) advised her that the envelopes
were not acceptable and to answer the "Show Cause" letter.
Respondent was also aware that "[A]t this time ADL has no env
and don't know where they can get Diagonal [sic] seam env to
print job." Respondent answered the "Show Cause" letter that
same date, setting forth the reasons for delay and attaching
its supplier's letter corroborating its contention. Appellant
continued to look for envelopes thereafter until February 26,
not knowing that the Contracting Officer had requested
concurrence to institute termination for Default by memorandum
to Respondent's Contract Review Board of February 21, 1985,
some 3 days after the contractual ship date. (Rule 4 File,
Tab M) One of the reasons for the recommendations was that
"[T]he Contracting Officer has determined that the soonest
ship date by ADL would be approximately March 20, 1985. This
delay is unacceptable to the department." The contract was
thus terminated for Default on February 26, 1985, for failure
to make progress. The reprocurement undertaken thereafter
gave the contractor some 25 working days after receipt of
materials to ship the product (Rule 4 File, Tab O) in contrast
to the 8 working days after receipt of materials contemplated
in the original purchase order and 11 working days afforded
Appellant by the late receipt of materials. (These counts.of
days are based upon the traditional 5-day workweek, Monday
through Friday, using a 1985 calendar.)
DECISION
We think it abundantly clear from the foregoing discussion
that while it was within the discretion of the Contracting
Officer to terminate the contract and seek reprocurement
because at the time of termination Appellant had no reasonable
idea of when it would be able to deliver the product, the
termination should have been for the convenience of the
Government rather than Default, since the contractor had acted
as a reasonably prudent printing contractor in like
circumstances. Appellant went first to his usual supplier who
gave certain assurances which without fault or negligence of
either of them turned out to be erroneous. Appellant next
sought out another respected vendor and obtained a substitute
product which as it turned out did not meet acceptance.
Appellant continued its quest until Respondent advised that
the contract had been terminated.
We do not believe, however, that the extended terms of the
reprocurement give rise to any cause of action in Appellant.
Indeed, given Respondent's experience with the procurement up
to that time, we believe the extended term to be fully
justified.
Accordingly, we remand the case back to the Contracting
Officer for processing as a termination for convenience of the
Government.