BOARD OF CONTRACT APPEALS U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE WASHINGTON, DC 20401 In the Matter of ) ) the Appeal of ) ) PROFESSIONAL PRINTING ) Docket No. GPO BCA 02-93 OF KANSAS, INC. ) Jacket No. 325-149 ) Purchase Order 87604 ) DECISION AND ORDER This appeal, timely filed by Professional Printing of Kansas, Inc. (Appellant or Contractor), 315 Constitution, Empire, Kansas 66801, is from the final decision of Contracting Officer James L. Leonard, of the U.S. Government Printing Office's (Respondent or GPO or Government) Printing Procurement Department, Washington, DC 20401, dated December 14, 1992, rejecting the Contractor's equitable adjustment claim for reprinting forms initially produced under its contract identified as Jacket No. 325-149, Purchase Order 87604, and rejected by the Government (R4 File, Tab X).1 On October 13, 1993, and October 14, 1993, respectively, a hearing was conducted by the Board for the purpose of developing evidence on the issues involved in the case.2 At the hearing, both parties were represented by counsel, who, thereafter, filed timely briefs with the Board addressing the issues involved.3 Board Rules, Rule 23. From the record in this case, including the evidence developed at the hearing and the posthearing briefs of the parties, the Contracting Officer's decision rejecting the first shipment of forms is REVERSED and REMANDED. To the extent that the Appellant seeks payment for the undelivered forms in its plant which are from the same production run as the rejected forms, the appeal is DENIED. I. BACKGROUND A. Chronology of Events This dispute arises from a contract awarded to the Appellant on July 10, 1992, to print 600,000 pads of a "Security Prescription Form" (SPF)-a total of 60,000,000 SPFs-for the U.S. Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) at a contract price of $533,000.00 (R4 File, Tab E).4 Under the contract, 100,000 pads were to be shipped to the VA by July 27, 1992, with the remainder of the order delivered by August 17, 1992 (R4 File, Tab A, p. 3). The following contract specifications for the SPFs are relevant to this appeal: PRODUCT: Padded form. Numbering required. * * * * * * * * * * GOVERNMENT TO FURNISH: Offset film negatives for the black printing and a sample for use as a guide for the security tint background. One reproduction proof, Form 905 (R. 3/90) with labeling and marking specifications. Identification markings such as register marks, ring folios, rubber stamped jacket numbers, commercial identification marks of any kind, etc., except GPO imprint, form number, and revision date, carried on copy or film, must not print on finished product. CONTRACTOR TO FURNISH: All materials and operations, other than those listed under "Government to Furnish," necessary to produce the product(s) in accordance with these specifications. PROOFS: None required. * * * * * * * * * * PRINTING: Print head to head. Face prints in black and in a match of Pantone 287 blue ink and back prints in black ink only. On face, the black linematter overprints a blue background (background bleeds all sides). Background (printing media to be created by the contractor) is a security tint with a "VOID" dropout pattern. The word "VOID" (each letter to be approx. 5/8" high) must appear at least 3 times (vertically, horizontally and diagonally) and must not be visible on the printed sheet, but must appear when the sheet is reproduced by electrostatic means.5 NUMBERING: Number in a match of Pantone 185 red ink on face of form in a space 1-7/8 x 3/16", in the right portion of the form, approx. 1-3/4" from top edge, in numbers 3/16" high. Number from 36000001 through 96000000. No missing numbers. Numbering is parallel to the 5-1/2" dimension.6 * * * * * * * * * * QUALITY ASSURANCE LEVELS AND STANDARDS:7 The following levels and standards shall apply to these specifications: Product Quality Levels: (a) Printing Attributes-Level III. (b) Finishing Attributes-Level III. Inspection Levels (from MIL-STD-105): (a) Non-destructive Tests-General Inspection Level I. (b) Destructive Tests-Special Inspection Level S-2. Specified Standards: The specified standards for the attributes requiring them shall be: Attribute Specified Standard P-7. Type Quality and Uniformity Furnished Camera Copy P-9. Solid and Screen Tint Color Match Pantone Matching System QUALITY ASSURANCE RANDOM SAMPLES: The contractor may be required to submit quality assurance random copies to test for compliance against specifications. The purchase order/ specifications will indicate the number required, if any. When ordered, the contractor must divide the entire order lot into equal sublots and select a copy from a different general area of each sublot. The contractor will be required to execute a statement furnished by GPO certifying that copies were selected as directed. Copies will be paid for at the running rate offered in the contractor's bid and their cost will not be a consideration for award. A copy of the purchase/order specifications must be included. See, R4 File, Tab A, pp. 1-3 (Contract Specifications). In addition to these specifications, the contract was also governed by applicable articles of GPO Contract Terms, Solicitation Provisions, Supplemental Specifications, and Contract Clauses, GPO Publication 310.2, effective December 1, 1987 (Rev. 9-88) (GPO Contract Terms). See, R4 File, Tab A, p. 1 (Contract Specifications). In pertinent part, GPO Contract Terms contains the following relevant supplemental specification: 1. Quality. (a) The quality requirements indicated in the specifications represent the minimum acceptable level. (b) Notwithstanding the minimum acceptable level, the following shall also apply: (1) Printing and binding shall be held to a high standard of imposition; makeready; press running; clear, sharp printing; binding ; and good quality in every respect. * * * * * * * * * * (c) Contractors must have a quality control system that will assert product quality acceptable to the Government. See article 14 "Inspection and Tests" of Contract Clauses. (d) Specific quality requirements are further defined in [QATAP]. See, GPO Contract Terms, Supplemental Specifications-General, ¶ 1(a)-(d) (Quality). Furthermore, the following contract clauses are also relevant: 1. Contractual Responsibility. Awards by GPO for printing, binding, and related services are the sole responsibility of GPO and not of its customer agencies. Modifications shall have no force or effect unless addressed before the fact to and subsequently confirmed in writing by the Contracting Officer. Failure to comply with this article may be cause for nonpayment of additional costs incurred or rejection of the order. 2. Order of Precedence. In the event of an inconsistency, the inconsistency shall be resolved by giving precedence in the following order: (a) specifications; (b) supplemental specifications; (c) solicitation provisions; (d) contract clauses; and (e) other provisions whether incorporated by reference or otherwise. * * * * * * * * * * 7. Government Furnished Property (GPF). The contractor is required to examine the furnished property immediately upon receipt. If at that time there is disagreement with the description or the requirements as presented in the specification (or print order/GPO Form 2511), and prior to the performance of any work, the contractor shall contact the U.S. Government Printing Office, Central Office Printing Procurement Division, Washington, DC 20401, or the originating Regional Printing Procurement Office, and contest the description. (Failure to examine the GFP/specifications and bring any discrepancies to the attention of the Contracting Officer will not relieve the contractor of responsibility to perform.) The Contracting Officer will then investigate and make a determination which will be final. If the decision is reached that the original description is proper, the contractor will be required to proceed with the work. Failure to agree to the description shall be a dispute within the meaning of article 5 "Disputes.". . . [Original emphasis.] * * * * * * * * * * 14. Inspection and Tests. * * * * * * * * * * (b) The contractor shall provide and maintain an inspection system acceptable to the GPO covering supplies under the contract and shall tender to the Government for acceptance only supplies that have been inspected in accordance with the inspection system and have been found by the contractor to be in conformity with contract requirements. . . . (c) The Government has the right to inspect and test all supplies called for, to the extent practicable, at all places and times, including the period of manufacture, and in any event before acceptance. The Government shall perform inspections and tests in a manner that will not unduly delay performance and assumes no contractual obligation to perform any inspection and test for the benefit of the contractor unless specifically set forth elsewhere. * * * * * * * * * * (f) The Government has the right either to reject or to require correction of nonconforming supplies. Supplies are nonconforming when they are defective in material or workmanship or are otherwise not in conformity with requirements. The Government may reject nonconforming supplies with or without disposition instructions. See, GPO Contract Terms, Contract Clauses, ¶¶ 1 (Contractual Responsibility), 2 (Order of Precedence), 7 (Government Furnished Property (GPF)), 14 (Inspection and Tests). The record discloses that this was the Appellant's first "VOID" pantograph job, although it was familiar with the process (Tr. 51, 127-28). However, the Contractor was planning to have the films for the "VOID" security feature made by a company that buys the screen directly from Pantograph, and thus it was confident about its ability to perform (Tr. 55). Before the Appellant could begin performance, the prior contractor for the SPFs, Standard Register, informed the parties that it held the patent for the "VOID" dropout pattern, and that the Contractor would be guilty of patent infringement if it used the pattern (R4 File, Tabs B and C).8 Consequently, in order to produce the job, the Appellant had to acquire the right to use the patent, which it did by entering a licensing agreement with Standard Register in July 1992 (Tr. 128, 149, 151, 234-35). The licensing agreement only covered the use of the "VOID" security feature, and nothing else-e.g., screens or other support, identification of the reproduction standards, a warranty with respect to copying, etc.-was provided by Standard Register (Tr. 236-38). The record shows that 34 other companies also hold licenses to use the Standard Register "VOID" security pattern (Tr. 151, 235). See, R4 File, Tab B. Under the terms of the contract the Government-furnished material (GFM) included, inter alia, ". . . a sample for use as a guide for the security tint background". See, R4 File, Tab A, p. 1 (Contract Specifications). On July 10, 1992, when the Contractor picked up the GFM it discovered that instead of a sample of an old SPF, the Respondent had supplied a copy of a specimen check from an unrelated job (Tr. 12-13, 33, 56, 57, 137; 148; App. Exh. No. 1; R4 File, Tab F).9 Accordingly, John Gallagher, the Appellant's Production Coordination Manager, telephoned GPO and spoke to Anthony Hooks, a Printing Specialist in the Contracts Branch of the GPO's Purchase Division (Tr. 7, 15). Gallagher informed him that the sample provided to the Contractor for the SPF security background was a specimen check, and he asked Hooks to send a sample of the previous job (Tr. 16, 40).10 Hooks told Gallagher that the kind of sample he requested was not available, and that the Appellant should follow the specifications in performing the work (Tr. 18, 136). After talking to Hooks, Gallagher spoke to his boss, Cripps, about the matter. Gallagher told Cripps that he was confused by the sample received from the Government and wanting to know the Appellant was supposed to produce a check instead of a prescription form (Tr. 49, 57). Cripps was also bewildered by the sample check, especially with regard to the security background pattern, so he also called Hooks and asked for a clarification and a proper sample (Tr. 57-58, 148, 185, 334).11 Hooks repeated what he had told Gallagher, namely that no other sample was available and the Appellant should be guided by the specifications (Tr. 58, 229). See, GPO Contract Terms, Contract Clauses, ¶ 2 (Order of Precedence). In addition, Hooks instructed Cripps to use a parchment-type background, block letters and straight lines for the SPFs (Tr. 59). Although the contract specifications said that proofs were not required, the record shows that on or about July 15, 1992, after talking to Hooks, Cripps told Gallagher to prepare a proof of the job and send it to GPO (Tr. 21-23, 42; App. Exh. No. 3).12 However, the proof, which consists of: (1) an original glossy photograph of the SPF; (2) a photocopy of the glossy; and (3) an acetate overlay, was not sent to GPO because the Contractor was advised that no proof was required by the specifications and the Government did not want one (Tr. 24, 43, 274).13 After the Government declined to examine the proof, the Appellant proceeded to produce the job. Although the Contractor was in contact with the GPO's Quality Assurance (QA) staff while it was printing the original SPFs, the undisputed evidence shows that during this time it was never told of any equipment standards-i.e., the range, type or name of photocopiers -against which the forms would be measured (Tr. 125, 156).14 According to the Appellant, while the "PRINTING" specification would technically be met if the "VOID" pantograph appeared when tested on its plant photocopier, it did not believe that success on one copier would be enough to satisfy the Government (Tr. 164, 229-30).15 The Contractor knew that the SPFs would eventually be used on an entire range of photocopiers which are generally accessible to the public, so it tested the forms on several other copy machines prior to shipment (Tr. 157-59, 164, 165, 177).16 Once the Appellant was satisfied that the form would reproduce as required, it shipped the first lot of 100,000 SPF pads to the Government.17 On or about August 7, 1992, shortly after the first delivery was received, the VA complained to Ms. Barbara McBride, a Printing Specialist in GPO's Customer Service Division, that the SPFs were full of quality defects, including the one at issue here, "Does not void" (Tr. 261, 306; R4 File, Tab H). Subsequently, the VA prepared a "Notice of Quality Defects" (GPO Form 1815), and sent it to GPO along with random samples of the Appellant's SPFs and, for purposes of comparison, the forms previously produced by Standard Register (marked "Old") (Tr. 70-72, 289, 295). The sample forms were given to John Nowalk of QA's Contract Management Division, for testing. Although there were several defects in the VA's complaint, Nowalk only evaluated the forms for the reproduction quality of the "VOID" pantograph (Tr. 261).18 Nowalk tested the forms on two photocopiers in GPO-one in the Term Contracts Division (Room A-843) and the other in the General Counsel's Office (Room C-814). However, he could not get the word "VOID" to appear on either of them, and determined that the SPFs did not meet specifications (Tr. 261-62; R4 File, Tab K).19 After finishing his tests, Nowalk reported the results to Leonard. The Contracting Officer also tried copying samples of the SPFs on the Canon copier in his office, but could not get the word "VOID" to appear either (Tr. 262, 266). Therefore, on the morning of August 11, 1992, pursuant to directions received from Leonard, Hooks telephoned Gallagher to tell him about the VA's complaint, and instructed the Appellant to stop production and not ship the remainder of the forms (Tr. 24-25, 40, 43-44, 156, 221-22, 224-25; App. Exh. No. 4).20 In response to Gallagher's question asking what the problem was, Hooks said that he did not know (Tr. 25). However, later that day Hooks called back and told Gallagher that the Appellant should restart production of the forms but still not ship them (Tr. 25, 30, 40, 224-25, 226; App. Exh. No. 4). During this conversation, Hooks outlined, in general, the scope of the problem with the delivered SPFs, namely, that there were defects in the "VOID" pantograph, the numbers on the forms, and the ink color (Tr. 25-26, 45; App. Exh. No. 4). Notwithstanding Hooks' instructions to continue printing, Gallagher stopped the job until he could find out from the Respondent precisely what defects were involved, so the Appellant could correct them (Tr. 28, 45). At the same time, Gallagher informed Cripps that there was a serious quality problem with the job (Tr. 129). Specifically, he told Cripps that the VA had complained about three defects in particular; i.e., the sequential numbering, the "VOID" pantograph and the ink color (Tr. 129, 155). Therefore, Cripps checked the numbers and the ink on samples of the form, and was satisfied that both were in accordance with the specifications (Tr. 129-30).21 Furthermore, he tested the "VOID" dropout pattern again, and could not see anything wrong with its copying capability (Tr. 129-30). Since the forms had been tested on several copy machines prior to shipment and the "VOID" dropout pattern had reproduced as required, Cripps thought it important to find out what standard the Respondent was using to evaluate the forms; i.e., what photocopier(s) and what setting(s) (dark, light or normal) was the Government employing for its tests (Tr. 129-30, 156-57, 165). On August 17, 1992, Leonard telephoned Gallagher to tell him that the job had been rejected, and that the "number one reason" was because the "VOID" dropout pattern would not reproduce by electrostatic means on the Respondent's copy machines (Tr. 31, 46, 261, 266; R4 File, Tab J; App Exh. No. 4). 4. Thereafter, on August 27, 1992, GPO sent a letter to the Appellant which stated, in pertinent part: An examination of the forms your firm produced for [the] Department of Veterans Affairs has revealed the following defect: Failure to Follow Specifications-Background printing does not show the word "VOID" in three places or a dropout pattern as required in the specifications, when reproduced by electrostatic means. Based on the results of this inspection, the initial delivery of 100,000 pads has been determined rejectable, and will require reprinting. The reprinting will be accomplished at no additional cost to the Government with a change to the specifications as follows. The location of the numbering should be printed as per sample supplied.22 See, R4 File, Tab M.23 The letter also confirmed that the Contractor had agreed to pickup and destroy the rejected SPFs, and would deliver 12,240,000 reprinted ones by September 11, 1992 (R4 File, Tabs L and M; App. Exh. No. 4). The record discloses that also on August 27, 1992, Gallagher discussed the reprint with both Nowalk and Adams (App. Exh. No. 4). The upshot of these conversations was that GPO promised to send the Contractor a drawing of the preferred "VOID" dropout pattern and a sample of the SPF (Tr. 32, 34, 36-37, 82, 87-88; R4 File, Tab N; App. Exh. Nos. 5 and 6).24 It is undisputed that the drawing and sample form furnished by the Government for the reprint showed the Contractor, for the first time, what the "VOID" background was to look like and how it was to copy (Tr. 34, 37, 81, 87-88). Furthermore, the dropout pattern indicated in the drawing used a reverse image of the word "VOID," and was totally different from the one employed in the original printing; i.e., when photocopied, the background remained but the center of the letters disappeared (Tr. 82, 123; R4 File, Tab N; App. Exh. No. 5). By contrast, the background vanishes on the rejected SPFs, but the word "VOID" remains (Tr. 83, 87, 160; App. Exh. Nos. 9-18). In reprinting the SPFs, the Appellant used the "VOID" dropout pattern suggested on the sample form provided by GPO (Tr. 82, 89; App. Exh. No. 6). Accordingly, the Contractor made a new film for the changed background, and used block outline letters instead of the simple block letters employed on the original job (Tr. 83, 86). In addition, the Appellant added black to the ink color to make it darker and improve the copying capability of the image (Tr. 87, 160, 166, 255).25 The record discloses that in addition to asking for a reprint of the form, the VA also wanted a press-sheet inspection prior to the production run. The Appellant agreed that such a precaution was necessary in light of the circumstances involved in the rejection of the original job; i.e., while the "VOID" pantograph would reproduce on the Contractor's photocopiers and on other copy machines in town, it would not copy on the Government's photocopy machines (Tr. 84-85, 90, 153; App. Exh. No. 4).26 The press-sheet inspection was conducted at the Contractor's plant in Emporia, Kansas, on September 4, 1992, by Charles Lee, an employee of the VA (Tr. 89-90). Lee was accompanied throughout the press-sheet inspection by Cripps (Tr. 85-86). The record shows that before the press-sheet inspection began, Lee showed Cripps a yellow file folder containing about twenty (20) sample copies of the SPF with photocopies attached, and pointed out that the samples did not reproduce as required (Tr. 94, 192). Cripps took a sample from Lee, copied it on one of the Appellant's photocopiers, and saw that the "VOID" image did not reproduce (Tr. 94-96; App. Exh. No. 7). However, on closer examination of that form and the other samples as well, Cripps discovered that they were not the Appellant's work and so told Lee (Tr. 94-95, 190).27 In that regard, it seems that Lee had mistakenly brought samples of another contractor's SPFs with him to the press-sheet inspection (Tr. 191-92; R4 File, Tab W, p. 2).28 In the pressroom, Lee checked the placement of the sequential numbers on the press-sheet, made a photocopy of it which produced the "VOID" dropout pattern as required, and approved the job (Tr. 100-01; App. Exh. No. 8). Thereafter, the approved press-sheet became the quality control standard for the job, and the press operators constantly checked the reprinted forms against the press-sheet throughout the production run (Tr. 218, 252, 313, 324). The record shows that while they were engaged in the press- sheet inspection, Cripps mentioned to Lee that there were still 96,000 pads of the rejected order in the plant, and said he could demonstrate that those SPFs would copy just as well on the Appellant's Minolta Model 4950 photocopier (Tr. 99, 199-200).29 Indeed, Cripps proceeded to make a copy of one of the rejected forms on his copy machine and showed Lee that the "VOID" pantograph appeared as specified (Tr. 91). However, Lee replied that those SPFs were not usable because of an error in the contract specification itself, namely, the red prescription number was in the wrong place on the form (Tr. 100, 138-39, 167).30 Lee also admitted that the mistake was made by the VA when it drafted the specification, and that since it was their error the customer-agency would pay for it (Tr. 139-40, 167).31 As Lee was preparing to leave, Cripps asked him if he wanted to make any more copies of the reprinted SPFs on different photocopy machines (Tr. 102). Although Lee thought additional copies were unnecessary, Cripps was concerned that the reprint had been evaluated and approved on the basis of photocopies produced by the same Minolta copier which the Appellant had used to test the original forms only to have the shipment rejected. Therefore, Cripps insisted that he and Lee perform further tests of the reprinted forms on different copy machines outside the Contractor's plant (Tr. 102-03). Accordingly, the record discloses that pursuant to Cripps' suggestion, he and Lee visited several commercial establishments in Emporia, where they made copies of the reprint satisfactory to Lee and he left (Tr. 103). Following Lee's press-sheet inspection, the Contractor reprinted and delivered the SPFs and otherwise completed performance of the contract.32 However, a few days prior to Lee's plant visit, by letter dated August 31, 1992, Counsel for the Appellant confirmed the design changes made to the SPFs, the arrangements for a press-sheet inspection, and the revised delivery schedule for the reprinting,33 but also stated, in pertinent part: While Professional Printing has agreed to reprint the entire order to meet the needs of the agency, and to comply with the GPO's verbal reprint order, they initially felt that the product they produced was not rejectionable. As was discussed with yourself and Mr. Leonard, the contractor has the right to dispute any determination of the contracting officer regarding quality problems or rejectability of an order, unless there is an agreement to the contrary. In this particular instance, it was agreed that the most critical issue facing the GPO and the vendor was the prompt production of the job, to fill the needs of the agency, and to follow the contracting officer's instructions regarding the reprint. Professional Printing has devoted their efforts toward that goal, and I am not aware of whether they have completed review of the samples and the prior printed piece, compared those to the specifications, and determined whether or not they accept the position that the pieces produced initially were rejectable. Obviously, if they conclude that the product was properly rejected there will be no reason to dispute the rejection. If on the other hand, they conclude the originally produced product meets [specifications], and wish to dispute the rejection of the original printed product, they retain the right to do so. That issue, under contract terms, is totally separate from the requirement that they reprint the job based solely on the contracting officers determination of rejectability. See, R4 File, Tab O, p. 2. The record shows that Leonard met with the Appellant at GPO on September 11, 1992, and October 16, 1992, respectively, for the purpose of discussing his rejection of the original shipment of SPFs (R4 File, Tabs V and W). During these meetings, the Contractor, who was accompanied by Counsel, asserted that the first printing of the forms fully conformed to the specifications, and the real reason they were rejected was because the VA needed to fix the error it had made with respect to the placement of the prescription number on the form (R4 File, Tab W., p. 3). The Respondent, on the other hand, maintained that the original SPFs were defective, and that the only reason for the rejection was that the word "VOID" did not appear as required when the form was photocopied (R4 File, Tab V and W, p. 2). Furthermore, the record reveals that during the meeting on October 16, 1992, Cripps copied a sample of the rejected SPF on Leonard's office copier, and while the outline of the "VOID" pantograph could be seen, the image was very weak (Tr. 125; R4 File, Tabs V and X).34 Thereafter, on December 10, 1992, Counsel for the Appellant wrote a letter to Leonard which: (a) reaffirmed the Contractor's position that the SPFs initially delivered to the VA met the specifications in every respect; (b) contended that the Government's rejection of the original forms was improper; and (c) claimed payment for all of the 19.6 million forms which were produced before the Appellant was notified that the Government had rejected the first shipment (R4 File, Tab W, pp. 2-3).35 Among other things, Counsel for the Appellant argued, in pertinent part: There are no technical requirements in the specifications, the only requirement being that the product copy on an electrostatic copier. While you may possess a copier which does not copy the product, we have tested the product on at least 10 other photocopiers and found it to reproduce. Whether or not it reproduces as well as you would like is not the question, because you had no density standards for reproduction. The fact is it does copy, and you can read it. Had you wanted it to copy on "all electrostatic copiers" the specifications should have said so. See, R4 File, Tab W, p. 2. Accordingly, the Appellant asked the Contracting Officer for his final written decision concerning the dispute. Id. See, GPO Contract Terms, Contract Clauses, ¶ 5(a) (Disputes). On December 14, 1992, Leonard issued a final decision rejecting the Appellant's claim to be compensated for the 19.6 million original forms (R4 File, Tab X).36 In that regard, the Contracting Officer specifically stated, in pertinent part, as follows: All aspects of your claim have been carefully reviewed. The reprinting of this product was required do [sic] to your firm's failure to follow specifications. The specifications clearly state the following: The word "void" must appear at least three times (vertically, horizontally and diagonally) and must not be visible on the printed product, but must appear when the sheet is reproduced by electrostatic means. Testing by GPO's Quality Assurance Section could not get the word "void" to appear on any forms produced by your firm by electrostatic means. * * * * * * * * * * Also . . . you stated that there were no technical requirements in the specifications and that your company had tested the product on at least 10 other photocopiers and found that it reproduced. As far as the specifications are concerned, I see nothing wrong. Concerning the electrostatic copier, GPO tried several copiers in the building and could not get it to reproduce on any of our copiers nor could the Department of Veterans Affairs. See, R4 File, Tab X, pp. 1-2 [Original emphasis.] On January 11, 1993, the Appellant timely noted an appeal of the Contracting Officer's final decision with the Board. Board Rules, Rule 1(a). B. Demonstrative Evidence At the hearing, both parties introduced demonstrative evidence consisting of reproductions of samples of SPFs from the rejected production run.37 Each party used a slightly different methodology. The Appellant made single copies of randomly selected individual forms on various photocopiers in Emporia, Kansas, and grouped them together in nine separate exhibits ( Tr. 111-14, 166, 198; App. Exh. Nos. 10-18).38 The Respondent, on the other hand, tested the same ten SPFs on different copy machines within GPO, and introduced the copies as a single exhibit (Tr. 278; R. Exh. No. 1). The results of their respective tests are as follows. 1. Appellant's Exhibits The SPF copies comprising the Appellant's exhibits were made using the normal or average settings on the identified machines,39 and, in its view, all of photocopiers satisfactorily reproduced the "VOID" pantograph (Tr. 111-114, 115, 121, 122). For the most part, the Board agrees. Below is a listing of the Appellant's exhibits, showing: (1) the photocopier model used and its location; (2) the prescription number of the sample SPF; and (3) the Board's assessment of the quality of the copies in each exhibit (in parentheses). App. Exh. No. 10 [Minolta EP-450, Rebhels Store]. SPF Nos. 80597391, 80582872, 78784988, 78768667, 83591531, 80408802, and 78997391 (the word "VOID" is light, but is clearly visible in three places on the form); SPF No. 81397391 (the word "VOID" is extremely light, but nonetheless is visible in three places); and SPF No. 79480175 (the word "VOID" is extremely light and is barely visible in three places). App. Exh. No. 11 [Xerox 5028 (three different copiers), Dillons West]. SPF No. 8039150 (copies B and C-the word "VOID" reproduces with normal intensity and is clearly visible in three places on the form; copy A-the word "VOID" reproduces with normal intensity and is generally visible in three places on the form, but the diagonal and vertical words are partially obscured by a mottled background). App. Exh. No. 12 [Xerox 5018, Dillons East]. SPF No. 80541702 (the word "VOID" reproduces with normal intensity and is clearly visible in three places on the form); SPF No. 82825409 (the word "VOID" reproduces with normal intensity and is clearly visible in three places on the form, notwithstanding the mottled background); SPF Nos. 80670109, 84614652, 79743601 (the word "VOID" is light, but is clearly visible in three places on the form); and SPF No. 84159962 (the word "VOID" is extremely light, although still visible in three places). App. Exh. No. 13 [Xerox 5028 (copier B), Dillons West]. SPF No. 85208801 (the word "VOID" reproduces with normal intensity and is clearly visible in three places on the both copies of this form, although the second copy has a slightly mottled background); and SPF Nos. 82182872 and 81991530 (the word "VOID" is light, but is clearly visible in three places on the form, notwithstanding a slightly mottled background). App. Exh. No. 14 [Xerox 5028 (copier A), Dillons West]. SPF No. 82141702 (the word "VOID" is light, but is clearly visible in three places on the form); and SPF No. 82141802 (the word "VOID" is somewhat lighter, but is still clearly visible in three places on the form). App. Exh. No. 15 [Minolta EP-450, Country Mart]. SPF Nos. 78941901 and 82214652 (the word "VOID" reproduces with normal intensity and is clearly visible in three places on the form); and SPF No. 82142267 (the word "VOID" reproduces with normal intensity and is clearly visible in three places on the form, but the background is mottled). App. Exh. No. 16 [Xerox 5028, Dillons East]. SPF Nos. 79797325, 79782872, 81208801, 83782873, 85217292 and 79584988 (the word "VOID" reproduces with normal intensity and is clearly visible in three places on the form, but the background is slightly mottled); SPF Nos. 79566405, 81470109, 81225409 and 83584989 (the word "VOID" is lighter, but is still clearly visible in three places on the form, notwithstanding a slightly mottled background). App. Exh. No. 17 (Minolta EP-450].40 SPF No. 79741802 (the word "VOID" is light, but is still clearly visible in three places on the form). App. Exh. No. 18 [Appellant's Minolta EP-450]. SPF Nos. 82942904 and 82941802 (the word "VOID" reproduces with normal intensity and is clearly visible in three places on the form).41 2. Respondent's Exhibits As indicated above, R. Exh. No. 1 consists of copies of ten forms from the rejected first printing, namely SPF Nos. 86864101, 91656101, 94541701, 86146473, 91656043, 86146459, 93216556, 93888649, 93217301, and 94541766, made on various copiers in GPO. The forms were copied in a specific order using the machine's normal or average setting (Tr. 280-81). Furthermore, Leonard testified that in copying each of the ten samples, he was only looking for the word "VOID" to appear in three places, as required by the "PRINTING" specification (Tr. 293). Listed below, by photocopier model, are Leonard's findings. As with the Appellant's exhibits, the Board's observations are shown in parentheses. Konica 3290, in Regional Procurement, Room A-638. Leonard testified that mostly the "VOID" dropout pattern did not appear, except that the word "VOID" appeared lightly and was vaguely discernable in one place (horizontally) on the copy of SPF No. 9451701 (copy no.3) (Tr. 284-86). (The Board can also see the vertical word "VOID" on SPF No. 9451701. In addition, although very light, the Board can see the horizontal and vertical words "VOID" on SPF Nos. 94541701, 86146473, 86146459 and 93888649, but only the horizontal word "VOID" on SPF Nos. 93216556 and 94541766. SPF Nos. 91656101, 8684101, 91656043 and 93217301 are either blank, or the "VOID" pantograph blends so much into the background as to be practically invisible). b. Kodak Ektaprint 150, in the General Counsel's Office, Room C-826. Leonard testified that the "VOID" dropout pattern did not appear at all on any copy of the samples (Tr. 291). (The Board, by straining, can barely see the outlines of the horizontal word "VOID" on SPF Nos. 93217301, 93216556 and 91656043, but the word is so faint that, as a practical matter, the Contracting Officer's assessment is correct). c. Savin 7500, in the Customer Service Office, Room C-830. Leonard testified that the "VOID" pantograph appears exactly as specified on SPF Nos. 91656043, 91656101 and 93216556 (Tr. 291-92). In addition, Leonard said that he could read one of the "VOID" words on SPF No. 86864101, as well as se the shadow of a word on SPF No. 86146459 (Tr. 291-92). The remaining five forms did not reproduce at all. (Like Leonard, the Board clearly sees the word "VOID" in three places on SPF Nos. 91656043, 91656101 and 93216556. However, the Board can also read the "VOID" pantograph as specified on SPF No. 93217301, and although very light the three words are visible on SPF Nos. 8684101 and 94541766. As for the remaining forms, the word "VOID" is so faint that only parts of the three words, or even less than three, are barely visible (SPF Nos. 94541701, 93888649, 86146459 (horizontal and diagonal only ) and SPF No. 86146473 (diagonal only)). d. Savin 7230, located in T & D (Technology and Design), Room C-848. Leonard testified that the "VOID" dropout pattern failed to reproduce on each copy of the samples (Tr. 292). (Although very light, the Board can see the three words of the "VOID" pantograph on SPF Nos. 86864101 and 94541766. However, on other forms the words are so faint that only parts of less than three words are barely visible-SPF Nos. 93216556, 93888649, 93217301 and 86146473 (horizontal word "VOID" and some letters of the vertical word), SPF No. 94541701 (horizontal word "VOID" and some letters of the diagonal word) and SPF No. 91656101 (horizontal only). Nothing at all appears on SPF Nos. 91656043 and 86146459). e. Canon NP-8580, located in the Purchase Division, Room C-829. Leonard testified that the "VOID" dropout pattern did not appear on any copy of the samples at all (Tr. 292-93). (The Board can barely make out the three words of the "VOID" pantograph on SPF Nos. 86146473, 94541701 and 94541766. Nothing at all is visible on SPF Nos. 91656101, 86864101, 91656043, 86146459, 93216556, 93888649, and 93217301).42 The results of Leonard's tests only reenforced his opinion that the forms were clearly rejectionable "without question" (Tr. 293).43 II. ISSUES PRESENTED During the prehearing conference, the Board expressed its belief that three questions were raised by the facts in this appeal, namely: 1. Is the "PRINTING" specification in the contract ambiguous, and if so, is that ambiguity latent or patent? 2. Was the Contracting Officer in error in rejecting the first shipment of the SPFs on the ground that the forms failed to satisfy the "PRINTING" specification's requirement that the word "VOID" appear in three places when reproduced by electrostatic means? Stated otherwise, was his decision merely a subterfuge for the real reason, which was that the customer-agency could not use the forms because the prescription numbers were in the wrong place due to a Government error in the design of the "NUMBERING" specification? 3. Is the Appellant entitled to be compensated for all of the 19,600,000 SPFs, including the approximately 9,600,000 forms which it printed prior to the Respondent's rejection of the initial order that are still in its Emporia plant? See, RPTC, pp. 6-7. However, from the evidence taken during the hearing, the Board also sees two additional questions in this case: 4. Apart from the issue of ambiguity with respect to the "PRINTING" specification, was the contract otherwise defective because it failed to provide any objective standard by which to determine when, and if, the SPFs satisfied the requirement for "[t]he word `VOID' . . . [to] appear at least 3 times (vertically, horizontally and diagonally) . . . when the sheet is reproduced by electrostatic means? 5. In light of the Contracting Officer's finding that the Contractor's original SPFs forms did not reproduce the "VOID" pantograph as required in the specifications, is the Appellant entitled to the benefit of the "implied warranty of specifications" doctrine, which would shift the burden of nonperformance to the Government? Stated otherwise, is the true reason for the failure of the forms to copy in accordance with the specifications to be found in a defective design or in the Appellant's own production processes? III. POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES44 A. Appellant's Position At the prehearing conference, the Appellant maintained that the Contracting Officer's decision rejecting the initial shipment of SPFs was wrong for three reasons: (1) the contract's "PRINTING" specification was vague since it did not prescribe any standards with respect to the visual density of the word "VOID", or tell the Contractor that the dropout pattern had to reproduce on all electrostatic copiers; (2) the 19.6 million SPFs printed by the Appellant were equal to or of better quality than similar forms currently used by the VA produced by someone else; and (3) the Government's error with respect to the location of the prescription number was the real reason for the rejection of the initial shipment of SPFs because it needed to be corrected before the forms could be used. See, RPTC, pp. 5-6. However, in its posthearing brief, while the Appellant continues to press its "ambiguity" and "Government error" contentions,45 see, App. Brf., pp. 22-24, 27-28, it also raises several additional arguments. First, the Appellant states that the Respondent breached the so-called "superior knowledge" doctrine by not disclosing relevant information necessary to successful performance under the contract, including an acceptable design of the "VOID" pantograph, the correct ink color, and the proper placement of the prescription number. App. Brf., pp. 10-15. In this regard, the Appellant relies on a well-settled principle which holds that the Government has a duty to disclose information to a contractor, which is otherwise unavailable to it, where that information is essential for contract performance.46 App. Brf., p. 10 (citing, Helene Curtis Industries, Inc. v. United States, 312 F.2d 744 (Ct.Cl. 1963); Johnson Electronics, Inc., ASBCA No. 9366, 65-1 BCA ¶ 4,628). Here, the Contractor believes that the Government had "superior knowledge" with regard to the need for a darker ink than Pantone 287 blue if the "VOID" pantograph was to copy properly, the fact that the red prescription number was misplaced, and the fact that a sample of the previous printing of the form showing the correct security-tint background actually existed. App. Brf., p. 11-12. Nevertheless, the Government failed to disclose all of this information, especially the sample of the previous form, to the Appellant at its request, until problems arose.47 App. Brf., pp. 13-14. Indeed, the Contractor contends that by telling it that no sample of the previous SPF was available, and by implying that whatever "VOID" pantograph it designed in response to the Government's verbal description would be acceptable, GPO affirmatively mislead the Appellant to its detriment. App. Brf., p. 14. For these reasons, the Contractor asserts that the Respondent failed to meet its responsibilities under the "superior knowledge" doctrine, and thus has forfeited any contractual remedies it may have had because of the Appellant's nonperformance. App. Brf., p. 15 (citing, American Shipbuilding Company v. United States, supra; Hardeman-Monier-Hutcherson v. United States, 458 F.2d 1364 (Ct.Cl. 1972); The Kehm Corporation v. United States, 93 F.Supp. 62 (Ct.Cl. 1950). Second, the Appellant argues that the Government is equitably estopped from rejecting the original printing of the SPFs because of its failure to furnish an acceptable sample of the previous printing of the form, and its refusal to evaluate the Contractor's prior-to-production proof.48 App. Brf., pp. 15-20. The Appellant contends that the Respondent possessed a sample of the previously-printed form, which was absolutely critical to performance because it held the key to the proper placement of the prescription number, the ink color, and the correct "VOID" pantograph design, and failed to provide it to the Contractor. App. Brf., pp. 16-17. Furthermore, the Appellant argues that the combined impact of GPO's failure to furnish a sample of the previous product and its refusal to look at the proof was prepared in accordance with the Respondent's verbal description of the security-tint background, was to induce the Contractor to rely on incorrect information for the first production run.49 App. Brf., pp. 17-18 (citing, American Electronic Laboratories, Inc. v. United States, 774 F.2d 1110 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). By depending on the information it had, and following GPO's instructions, the Appellant produced SPFs that conformed to the specifications, as written, but which were not usable by the VA because the prescription number was misplaced and the ink color was too light for reproduction purposes. App. Brf., pp. 18-19 (citing, Colorado State Bank of Walsh v. United States, 18 Cl. Ct. 611, 633 (1989)). Finally, the Appellant contends that by relying on the specifications, the GFM, and the Respondent's verbal directions, it suffered a financial loss of approximately $176,000.00 when the forms it produced were rejected by GPO. App. Brf., p. 19 (citing, Simmonds Precision Products, Inc. v. United States, 546 F.2d 886, 892 (Ct.Cl. 1976)). Accordingly, the Contractor believes that equitable estoppel against the Government is appropriate in this case.50 App. Brf., pp. 19-20 (citing, Federal Crop Insurance Corporation v. Merrill, supra; OAO Corporation v. United States, supra). Third, even though the Appellant regards the "PRINTING" specification as vague and ambiguous, it also argues, in the alternative, that the language unambiguously supports the interpretation that for the specification to be satisfied, it is only necessary for the word "VOID" to appear in three places when the form is reproduced on one photocopier. App. Brf., pp. 20-22. The Contractor states that nothing in the express wording of the specification requires the "VOID" pantograph to copy on all or most machines, as contended by the Respondent, nor does the specification identify any photocopier brand or manufacturer on which the forms would be used or tested for compliance. App. Brf., p. 21. It says that in order to imply either the words "all" or "most" before the phrase "electrostatic means", as contended by GPO, there must be a finding that the specification is ambiguous. App. Brf., p. 21 (citing, Bayou Land and Marine Contractors, Inc. v. United States, 23 Cl. Ct. 764 (1991)). However, the Contractor is unaware of any case in which an adjudicative forum has supplied the word "all" where it did not exist before in an agreement, and thus changed the meaning of a contract. App. Brf., p. 21 (citing, cf., Thermal Electronic, Inc. v. United States, 25 Cl. Ct. 671, 673 (1992) (the court held that "all" means "all" and not something less, as contended by the contractor)). The Appellant notes that it has placed in evidence a number of electrostatic copies of sample SPFs from the rejected printing, made on different photocopiers in its plant and in local area stores, all of which show the word "VOID" in three places on the form. App. Brf., pp. 21-22. Similarly, tests of the SPFs during the hearing showed that they reproduced as required on some machines in GPO, but not on others. App. Brf., pp. 20, 22. In the Appellant's view, the fact that samples from the original press run were able to copy on any machine means that the clear and unambiguous requirements of the specifications have been met. App. Brf., p. 22.2 Finally, the Appellant contends that it is not liable for any problems with the "VOID" pantograph because it followed the Government's defective design of the product, and the outcome was a form that failed to meet the "PRINTING" specification. App. Brf., 24-29. The Contractor's argument is based on "black letter" law which states that where the Government drafts specifications for a desired product and creates a "design-type" contract, there is an implied warranty that if the specifications are followed, the resulting product will satisfy the contract's requirements. App. Brf., pp. 24-25 (citing, Spearin v. United States, 248 U.S. 132 (1918); J.L. Simmons Company Inc. v. United States, 412 F.2d 1360, 1363 (Ct.Cl. 1969)). Where, as here, a contract consists of mixed design and performance specifications,51 a contractor can defend on an implied warranty theory if the design specifications are defective to the degree that adherence to them would result in nonperformance.52 App. Brf., pp. 25-26 (citing, R.J. Crowley, Inc. v. United States, supra; R.E.D.M. Corporation v. United States, 428 F.2d 1304, 1310 (Ct.Cl. 1970)). Under this contract, the Appellant was responsible for the following performance aspects: (1) the parameters of the printing; (2) the creation of the background printing media; and (3) the requirement that the word "VOID" appear at least three times when the SPF was reproduced by electrostatic means. App. Brf., pp. 26-27. On the other hand, the Government controlled the following requirements on both the original printing and the reprint as well (a significant factor where the question of an implied warranty is involved): (1) the security-tint background; (2) the design of the "VOID" dropout pattern; (3) the location of the prescription number; and (4) the choice of ink color for the form. App. Brf., p. 27 (citing, Hol-Gar Manufacturing Corporation v. United States, 360 F.2d 634 (Ct.Cl. 1966)). The Appellant says that because it adhered to the Government's initial design specifications, which turned out to be defective, it produced a form which GPO now alleges did not meet the performance specifications. App. Brf., 28-29. However, given these circumstances, the Contractor states that under well-settled legal principles it is not responsible for the production of an unsatisfactory product on the original press run.53 App. Brf., p. 29 (citing, R.E.D.M. Corporation v. United States, supra; R.J. Crowley, Inc. v. United States, supra). Accordingly, for all of these reasons, the Appellant asks the Board to reverse the Contracting Officer's final decision and direct him to accept the entire first printing of 19.6 million SPFs at the contract price. App. Brf., p. 30. B. Respondent's Position The Respondent has maintained throughout these proceedings that the Contracting Officer properly rejected the initial shipment of forms because they failed to conform to the contract's "PRINTING" specification, and moreover, that he rightly denied the Appellant's claim for payment for 19.6 million SPFs. See, RPTC, p. 4; R. Brf., p. 3. In that regard, GPO denies the Appellant's allegation that the true reason for the rejection was the Government's error in the location of the prescription number on the form, which had to be corrected. See, RPTC, p. 5; R. Brf., p. 4. The Respondent also contends, contrary to the Contractor, that the unshipped SPFs in the Contractor's plant are not part of this case-only the 100,000 pads actually delivered to the VA, inspected and found rejectionable, are involved here. Id. Basically, the Respondent's posthearing argument boils down to the contention that the Appellant failed to meet its burden of proof on the essential ingredients of its claim; i.e., there is no credible evidence in support of the Contractor's allegations that: (1) the "PRINTING" specification was ambiguous and that it relied on its own interpretation of the specification in preparing and submitting its bid; (2) it produced the entire quantity of 19,600,000 SPFs in conformance with the specifications as it understood them; and (3) the Contracting Officer rejected the initial shipment primarily to correct the numbering error. R. Brf., pp. 2, 5. With regard to the "ambiguity" question, GPO notes that the Appellant did not object to the specifications prior to starting performance under the contract, and besides the Contractor seems to have abandoned that contention and is pursuing other defenses. R. Brf., pp. 5, 8. On the other hand, the Respondent believes that when considered in context, the plain meaning of the language in the "PRINTING" specification which says that the word "`VOID' . . . must not be visible on the printed sheet, and must appear where the sheet is reproduced by electrostatic means", is that the product must copy on all commercially available copiers. R. Brf., p. 10. GPO contends not only is this the logical interpretation of that provision, but also that the Appellant itself has admitted that the SPFs had to copy with some universality, and indeed, tested the product on a number of copiers during the initial production process just to make sure that the form performed as required. Id. Finally, the Respondent observes that the Contractor failed to introduce any evidence that it relied on its "one machine only" reading of the contract language when it prepared its bid, and, in fact, conceded that it would have produced the product the same way even if the words "all commercially available electrostatic copiers" had appeared in the specifications. R. Brf., pp. 10-11. Consequently, the Government asserts that the only reasonable interpretation of the specification is that the "VOID" dropout pattern was to reproduce on all electrostatic copiers, and that was the standard by which the forms were measured. R. Brf., p. 11. As for the Appellant's new arguments, the Respondent believes that while the Contractor has clearly explained the relevant law, it has failed to show where or how those principles apply to the facts in this case. With respect to the Appellant's "superior knowledge" claim, the Respondent says that the Contractor has failed to establish that the Government had superior knowledge of facts which were essential to the performance of the contract and were not disclosed by Respondent. R. Brf., p. 12. Furthermore, while the Appellant contends that GPO's failure to disclose vital information excuses its inability to produce an acceptable product, it has not demonstrated a cause and effect relationship between any act or omission of the Government and the Contractor's lack of performance. R. Brf., pp. 8-9 (citing, Baifield Industries, Division of A-T-O, Inc. v. United States, 706 F.2d 320 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Brantley Construction Company, ASBCA No. 27604, 84-3 BCA ¶ 17,532; Santa Fe Engineers, Inc. ASBCA No. 25549, 82-2 BCA ¶ 15,982; Meyer-Weddle Company, GSBCA No. 5736, 81-1 BCA ¶ 14,952; Felton Construction Company, AGBCA No. 406-9, 81-1 BCA ¶ 14,932). Thus, for example, the Respondent says that the Contractor has failed to show how either knowledge of a darker color ink or possession of a sample from the previous printing of the SPFs would have resulted in the production of an acceptable form.54 R. Brf., pp. 10, fn. 8, 11-12. First, GPO notes that the darker ink which was used for the new forms did not result in a product which satisfied the contract specifications; i.e., the reprints were only accepted because the approved press-sheet superseded the contract specifications as the quality standard for printing. R. Brf., p. 11. Second, GPO states that a sample of the previously printed form would not have assisted the Contractor, because there is no evidence to indicate that the prior product was tested, that it reproduced as required, and was accepted by the Government. Id. For that reason, the Respondent rejects the Appellant's arguments that a sample of the prior SPF was essential for the security-tint background, or was otherwise required for proper performance, on the ground that there is no factual support for either assertion. R. Brf., p. 12. Lastly, GPO points out that the Contractor has admitted that it had all the information it needed to produce the form. Id. The Respondent believes that the Appellant's "equitable estoppel" argument is also without merit. Noting that the Contractor's claim is premised upon allegations that Government concealed or misrepresented material facts, GPO flatly denies that it did so and says that the record is devoid of any such evidence. R. Brf., pp. 10, fn. 8, 12. The Respondent rejects the Appellant's notion that by making a sample from a prior printing available to the Contractor, the result would have been a form which complied with the specifications and was acceptable. R. Brf., p. 13. To the charge that its refusal to examine the Appellant's preproduction proof damaged the Contractor, GPO contends that not only was it acting within its rights, but observes that a visual inspection of the proof at the hearing demonstrated that it, too, was unacceptable. R. Brf., p. 12. In sum, the Respondent argues that there is no basis for an equitable estoppel against the Government, especially where, as here, the specifications gave the Appellant wide latitude in choosing its own process to perform the contract. R. Brf., p. 13. Finally, the Respondent states that the Appellant's "impossibility of performance" claim is without any foundation in the record. R. Brf., pp. 10, fn. 8, 13. First, GPO says that there is no evidence to support the Appellant's assertion that the Government's choice of Pantone 287 blue ink rendered the "PRINTING" specification so defective and flawed that adherence to it necessarily resulted in an unsatisfactory form, and hence made performance impossible. R. Brf., p. 13. Second, the Respondent rejects the Contractor's allegation that the design of the "VOID" pantograph, which it relied upon, was dictated by the Government, and contends instead that the real problem here was not the design, but rather the Appellant's method of performance. Id. In the Respondent's view, since there is nothing to establish that performance under the original specifications was impossible, the only conclusion is the Appellant alone is responsible for its failure to perform in this case. R. Brf., p. 13. Accordingly, for all of these reasons, the Respondent submits that the Contracting Officer's final decision was correct, and it asks the Board to deny the appeal. R. Brf., p. 14. IV. DISCUSSION55 Although this contract appeal, replete as it is with complex and novel issues, appears before the Board in the guise of a simple dispute over the rejection of the initial printing of SPFs, for all practical purposes the controversy is really about scrap paper. Because of the Government's design error with regard to the location of the prescription numbers on the original forms, the VA could not use them even if they had all reproduced the "VOID" pantograph perfectly. However, the parties stipulated that since the Contractor placed the numbers on the first SPFs where the specifications said they should be, but for the problem with the "VOID" dropout pattern, the Government would have accepted and paid for the forms.56 Indeed, the evidence of record shows that Lee, the VA representative who inspected and approved the press-sheet for the reprint, admitted his agency made a mistake in drafting the "NUMBERING" specification, and said that if the forms had reproduced as required the VA would have paid for them (Tr. 139-40, 167). In the Board's view, nothing in the record tends to cast doubt on the parties' stipulation.57 See, Banta Company, GPO BCA 03-91 (November 15, 1993), Sl. op. at 52-53, 1993 WL 526843. Therefore, to the extent that the Appellant joined in the stipulation, the Board believes that it has abandoned its argument that the real reason for the Government's rejection of the forms was the numbering error, and that issue is no longer in the case.58 See, RPTC, pp. 5-6. Even if there was a suggestion in the record that the VA was more interested in the proper placement of the prescription number than in the reproduction capability of the "VOID" dropout pattern, the customer-agency's motive for rejecting the forms is irrelevant in this case. The contract at issue is between the Appellant and GPO (Tr. 272-73). See, GPO Contract Terms, Contract Clauses, ¶ 1 (Contractual Responsibility). The Respondent's printing procurement rules expressly state that the only person authorized to make final determinations on whether products supplied by a contractor conform to contract specifications is the contracting officer, as this decision is within his discretion in administering a contract.59 See, PPR, Chap. XIII, Sec. 1, ¶ 4.f. See also, Sterling Printing, Inc., supra, Sl. op. at 34-35, fn. 46; Hurt's Printing Company, Inc., supra, Sl. op. at 10, fn. 13; Dependable Printing Company, GPO BCA 5-84 (September 12, 1985), Sl. op. 24, 1985 WL 154847; Graphic Litho, GPO BCA 21-84 (February 4, 1985), Sl. op. at 19-21, 1985 WL 154850. Accord, Thomas W. Yoder Company, Inc., VACAB No. 997, 74-1 BCA ¶ 10,424. In this case, there is no doubt that the rejection of the first shipment of SPFs was based on the Contracting Officer's own investigation of the VA's complaint, and the exercise of his independent judgment that the forms did not meet the specifications. The Board finds no evidence that the Contracting Officer was influenced in his decision by the customer-agency. Cf., Graphics Image, Inc., GPO BCA 13-92 (August 31, 1992), Sl. op. 27-28, 1992 WL 487875 (citing, Colorgraphics Corporation, GPO BCA 16-87 (March 31, 1989) Sl. op. at 24, 1989 WL 384970). From its careful review of the record, exhibits, and the parties' briefs in this case, the Board has reached the following conclusions: A. Contrary to the Appellant's belief, the disputed sentence in the contract's "PRINTING" specification is not ambiguous when read against the contract's quality assurance provisions. From the outset, the focus of this dispute has centered on the "PRINTING" specification in the contract. In a nutshell, the Appellant's position has been that the contract provision is vague and ambiguous, while the Respondent has insisted throughout that the language in the specification is "as clear as a bell."60 See, RPTC, pp. 5-6; App. Brf., pp. 20-21; R. Brf., p. 10. The ambiguity issue arises because the Appellant says that the principal sentence in controversy-"The word `VOID' (each letter to be approx. 5/8" high) must appear at least 3 times (vertically, horizontally and diagonally) and must not be visible on the printed sheet, but must appear when the sheet is reproduced by electrostatic means"-supports the interpretation that satisfactory performance only requires the word "VOID" to appear as specified when the form is reproduced on one photocopier. App. Brf., pp. 20. The Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the plain meaning of the disputed language is that the product must copy on all commercially available copiers.61 R. Brf., p. 10. Since the parties have drawn different meanings from the disputed specification, the Board's task is simple-it must decide which of the two conflicting interpretations is correct, or whether both readings may be reasonably derived from the contract terms; in other words, is the contract ambiguous? As the parties recognize, the answer to that question essentially involves an interpretation of the contract by the Board.62 See, Web Business Forms, Inc., GPO BCA 16-89 (September 30, 1994) Sl. op. at 16-17; McDonald & Eudy Printers, Inc., GPO BCA 25-92 (April 11, 1994), Sl. op. at 13, 1994 WL 275093; Shepard Printing, GPO BCA 37-92 (January 28, 1994), Sl. op. at 15-16, 1994 WL 275098. The focus of inquiry in this case is confined to the contract itself. See, Web Business Forms, Inc., supra, Sl. op. at 17; Universal Printing Company, supra, Sl. op. at 26, fn. 27, RD Printing Associates, Inc., supra, Sl. op. at 9, 13, fns. 9 and 15; B. P. Printing and Office Supplies, supra, Sl. op. at 15. Therefore, certain legal principles should be kept in mind at the outset. First, when the parties confront the Board with two different interpretations of the same contract language they raise the possibility that the specifications may be ambiguous. See, McDonald & Eudy Printers, Inc., supra, Sl. op. at 13; R.C. Swanson Printing and Typesetting Company, GPO BCA 31-90 (February 6, 1992), Sl. op. at 41, 1992 WL 487874, aff'd on other grounds, Richard C. Swanson, T/A R.C. Swanson Printing and Typesetting Company v. United States, Cl.Ct. No. 92-128C (October 2, 1992). Second, contractual language is ambiguous if it will sustain more than one reasonable interpretation.63 See, Webb Business Forms, Inc., supra, Sl. op. at 17; R.C. Swanson Printing and Typesetting Company, supra, Sl. op. at 41, fn. 22; General Business Forms, Inc., supra, Sl. op. at 16. See also, Neal & Company v. United States, 19 Cl. Ct. 463, 471 and fn. 4 (1990), aff'd 945 F.2d 385 (Fed. Cir. 1991); Edward R. Marden Corporation v. United States, 803 F.2d 701, 705 (Fed. Cir. 1986); Sun Shipbuilding & Drydock Co. v. United States, 183 Ct. Cl. 358, 372 (1968). Third, in analyzing disputed contract language, the courts and contract appeals boards place themselves in the shoes of a reasonably prudent contractor, and give the language of the contract that meaning which a reasonably intelligent contractor acquainted with the circumstances surrounding the contract would give it. McDonald & Eudy Printers, Inc., supra, Sl. op. at 14; General Business Forms, Inc., supra, Sl. op. at 18 (citing, Salem Engineering and Construction Corporation v. United States, 2 Cl. Ct. 803, 806 (1983)). See also, Norcoast Constructors, Inc. v. United States, 196 Ct. Cl. 1, 9, 448 F.2d 1400, 1404 (1971); Firestone Tire and Rubber Company v. United States, 195 Ct. Cl. 21, 30, 444 F.2d 547, 551 (1971). A dispute over contract language is not resolved simply by a decision that an ambiguity exists-it is also necessary to determine whether the ambiguity is latent or patent. Courts will find a latent ambiguity where the disputed language, without more, admits of two different reasonable interpretations.64 See, Web Business Forms, Inc., supra, Sl. op. at 18; Fry Communications, Inc./InfoConversion Joint Venture v. United States, supra, 22 Cl.Ct. at 503 (citing, Edward R. Marden Corporation v. United States, supra, 803 F.2d at 705); R.C. Swanson Printing and Typesetting Company, supra, Sl. op. at 41, fn. 22. On the other hand, a patent ambiguity would exist if the contract language contained a gross discrepancy, an obvious error in drafting, or a glaring gap, as seen through the eyes of a "reasonable man" on an ad hoc basis.65 See, Webb Business Forms, Inc., supra, Sl. op. at 19; Fry Communications, Inc./ InfoConversion Joint Venture v. United States, supra, 22 Cl. Ct. at 504 (citing, Max Drill, Inc. v. United States, supra, 192 Ct. Cl. at 626; WPC Enterprises, Inc. v. United States, 163 Ct. Cl. 1, 6 (1963)); General Business Forms, Inc., supra, Sl. op. at 17 (citing, Enrico Roman, Inc. v. United States, supra, 2 Cl. Ct. at 106). However, the rules governing ambiguous contract language come into play only if the meaning of the disputed terms are not susceptible to interpretation through the usual rules of contract construction. See, Webb Business Forms, Inc., supra, Sl. op. at 19; McDonald & Eudy Printers, Inc., supra, Sl. op. at 16; Shepard Printing, supra, Sl. op. at 19; R.C. Swanson Printing and Typesetting Company, supra, Sl. op. at 42. The most basic principle of contract construction is that the document should be interpreted as a whole.66 See, Hol-Gar Manufacturing Corporation v. United States, supra, 169 Ct. Cl. at 388, 351 F.2d at 975; Webb Business Forms, Inc., supra, Sl. op. at 19-20; General Business Forms, Inc., supra, Sl. op. at 16. Hence, all provisions of a contract should be given effect and no provision is to be rendered meaningless. See, Webb Business Forms, Inc., supra, Sl. op. at 20; General Business Forms, Inc., supra, Sl. op. at 16 (citing, Raytheon Company v. United States, 2 Cl. Ct. 763 (1983)). See also, Pacificorp Capital, Inc. v. United States, supra, 25 Cl. Ct. at 716; Fortec Constructors v. United States, supra, 760 F.2d at 1292; United States v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 713 F.2d 1541, 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Jamsar, Inc. v. United States, 442 F.2d 930 (Ct.Cl. 1971); Grace Industries, Inc., ASBCA No. 33553, 87-3 BCA ¶ 20,171; In other words, a contract should be interpreted in a manner which gives meaning to all of its parts and in such a fashion that the provisions do not conflict with each other, if this is reasonably possible. See, Webb Business Forms, Inc., supra, Sl. op. at 20. Accord, Granite Construction Company v. United States, 962 F.2d 998 (Fed. Cir. 1992); B. D. Click Company v. United States, 614 F.2d 748 (Ct.Cl. 1980). That is, an interpretation which gives a reasonable meaning to all parts of a contract will be preferred to one which leaves a portion of it "useless, inexplicable, inoperative, void, insignificant, meaningless, superfluous, or achieves a weird and whimsical result."67 Gould, Inc. v. United States, 935 F.2d 1271, 1274 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (quoting, Arizona v. United States, 216 Ct. Cl. 221, 235-36, 575 F.2d 855, 863 (1978)). See also, ITT Arctic Service, Inc. v. United States, 207 Ct. Cl. 743, 524 F.2d 680, 684 (1975) (contract interpretation should be "without twisted or strained out of context [and without] regard to the subjective unexpressed intent of one of the parties. . ."). In interpreting the disputed language here, the parties have staked out positions at the opposite ends of the spectrum-from the Appellant's "one machine" theory to the Respondent's "all commercially available copiers" view. However, as emphasized above, for an ambiguity to exist the differing interpretations of the contract language must be reasonable. See, Webb Business Forms, Inc., supra, Sl. op. at 17; R.C. Swanson Printing and Typesetting Company, supra, Sl. op. at 41, fn. 22; General Business Forms, Inc., supra, Sl. op. at 16. Against that standard, in the Board's view, the Appellant's interpretation is so unreasonable and bizarre that the Board cannot imagine any self-respecting contracting officer agreeing to such an absurd proposition. Consequently, if for no other reason, it must be rejected on that basis alone. See, Gould, Inc. v. United States, supra, 935 F.2d at 1274; Arizona v. United States, supra, 216 Ct. Cl. at 235-36, 575 F.2d at 863 (1978). At first blush, the Respondent's "zero" failure rate interpretation also seems to be unreasonable. See, Foster Construction, C.A. v. United States, 193 Ct. Cl. 586, 435 F.2d 873 (1970); Souter Construction Company, Inc., ENG BCA No. 5701, 93-3 BCA ¶ 26,175, at 130,264; Meredith Construction Company, ASBCA No. 41736, 93-2 BCA ¶ 25,864. However, the Board is required to interpret the contract so as to give meaning to all of its parts. Consequently, it is compelled to recognize that the disputed language in the "PRINTING" specification does not stand in isolation, but rather there is a natural transition between the requirement for perfect performance and the contract's detailed quality assurance provisions, especially QATAP.68 A brief glance at the QATAP manual discloses the following explanation, in pertinent part, about the program's evaluation standards: For all but four of the numbered attributes and some paper characteristics, evaluation is made on an absolute basis, with defects assessed on deviation from explicit or implicit nominal values, rather than on comparisons to a specified physical object called the specified standard. . . . Tolerances specify how far the product may deviate from the nominal and still be acceptable. * * * * * * * * * * . . .[T]he evaluation for attributes P-7 through P-10, and some paper characteristics are made relative to a specified standard while the other attributes and paper characteristics are evaluated on an absolute basis. See, QATAP, p. vi. [Emphasis added.] It seems to the Board that the "PRINTING" specification sentence in controversy, which expresses performance in absolute terms, merely echoes QATAP's evaluation philosophy, and is capable of being read against the contract's quality assurance provisions, taken as a whole, without negating the language of any part of the contract. See, Webb Business Forms, Inc., supra, Sl. op. at 21; R.C. Swanson Printing and Typesetting Company, supra, Sl. op. at 43-48. Accord, Granite Construction Company v. United States, supra; B. D. Click Company v. United States, supra. Thus, when properly read, the contract says that within the tolerances allowed by QATAP for defective SPFs at the Quality Level indicated, based on an appropriate sample, the word "VOID" must appear three times when the forms are reproduced by electrostatic means. This plainly advises the Contractor that while it is expected to produce an SPF which works every time, some leeway would be allowed because of the nature of "VOID" pantograph work, beyond which the form would either be rejected or a discount taken. The Respondent's interpretation is in complete harmony with this view, while the Appellant's de minimis approach effectively reads the quality assurance provisions out of the contract. See, DWS, Inc., Debtor-in-Possession, ASBCA No. 29743, 93-1 BCA ¶ 25,404, at 126,540; Falcon Jet Corporation, DOT CAB No. 78-32, 82-1 BCA ¶ 15,477, at 76,693. Obviously, in an ideal world all of the SPFs would reproduce as required; indeed, if the "PRINTING" specification is any example, Government contracts are usually drafted in absolute terms in the expectation that contractor's will aim for perfect performance. Cf., Thermal Electronic, Inc. v. United States, supra, 25 Cl. Ct. at 673. But common sense tells us that we do not live in an ideal world, so some reasonable allowance must be made for failure-not total failure, but some acceptable level of imperfect performance which the parties can live with-hence, the rule that performance specifications are not as strictly enforced as design specifications. See, e.g., Radiation Technology, Inc. v. United States, 177 Ct. Cl. 227, 366 F.2d 1003, 1005-06 (1966). See also, Fry Communications, GPO BCA 22-84 (February 20, 1986), Sl. op. at 20, 1986 WL 181462. Accordingly, the Board finds the above reading of the contract, which accepts the meaning ascribed to the disputed sentence in the "PRINTING" specification by the Respondent, as modified by the quality assurance provisions, is the only reasonable interpretation of the contract read as a whole. When a contract admits to only one construction, it is not ambiguous. See, Webb Business Forms, Inc., supra, Sl. op. at 21; R.C. Swanson Printing and Typesetting Company, supra, Sl. op. at 43-48. See also, Falcon Jet Corporation, supra, 82-1 BCA at 76,693 (citing, Martin Lane Company v. United States, 193 Ct. Cl. 203 (1970); General Dynamics Corporation, DOT CAB 76-29, 79-1 BCA ¶ 13,858). B. An inadequate or defective Government design was the real reason for the failure of the Appellant's original SPFs to reproduce the "VOID" pantograph as required in the "PRINTING" specification. Therefore, since the Contractor was entitled to rely on that specification in manufacturing the forms, under the doctrine of "implied warranty of specifications" the Government bears the responsibility for nonperformance. Having found that the "PRINTING" specification is not ambiguous, the answer to the next question raised by the Appellant requires an examination of that provision in detail. In that regard, the Contractor contends that the reason its first SPFs were rejectable was because it followed the Government's defective "VOID" pantograph design, and hence it is entitled to the protection of the "implied warranty of specifications" doctrine. App. Brf., pp. 24-25. The Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the design of the "VOID" pantograph was of the Contractor's own making, and moreover the real problem was not the design but the Appellant's method of performance, for which the Government cannot be held accountable. R. Brf., p. 13. An analysis of the record indicates that the Appellant's position has merit. When the Government requires a contractor to follow detailed plans and specifications, it is well-established that it impliedly warrants that if the specifications are followed, the result will be adequate. See, D.E.W., Incorporated, ASBCA No. 35896, 94-3 BCA ¶ 27,182, at 135,459 (citing, United States v. Spearin, supra; Blake Construction Company v. United States, 987 F.2d 743, 745 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Santa Fe Engineers, Inc., ASBCA No. 45228, 93-2 BCA ¶ 25,555). See also, Hol-Gar Manufacturing Corporation v. United States, supra, 360 F.2d at 638. As this Board has explained: The Government's implied warranty of the adequacy of its specifications is based on its responsibility for the specifications rather than any presumed "superior knowledge" in the sense of greater expertise. When one of the parties to a contract undertakes to prepare the specifications, that party is responsible for the correctness, adequacy and feasibility of the specifications, and the other party is under no obligation to check and verify the work product of the party who assumed responsibility for the preparation of the specifications, even though he may be as much or more of an expert than the party who prepared the specifications. Courts have held many times that a bidder need not verify the correctness and adequacy of Government specifications prior to bidding. Ithaca Gun Co. v. United States, 176 Ct. Cl. 477 (1966); Harvey-Whipple, Inc. v. United States, 169 Ct. Cl. 689 (1965). See, Colorgraphics Corporation, supra, Sl. op. at 22 (quoting, Consolidated Diesel Electric Corporation, ASBCA No. 10496, 67-2 BCA ¶ 6669, at 30,951-52).69 A contractor seeking to avail itself of this "implied warranty" principle has the burden of showing that the Government's specifications were somehow defective and that they were the cause of the problems it experienced. See, Printing Unlimited, GPO BCA 21-90 (November 30, 1993), Sl. op. at 17, 1993 WL 516844; Editors Press Incorporated, GPO BCA 3-90 (September 4, 1991), 1991 WL 439271. See also, Wornick Family Foods Company, ASBCA Nos. 41317, 41318, 41319, 94-2 BCA ¶ 26,808; Bradley Construction, Inc., ASBCA No. 39733, 91-2 BCA ¶ 23,974; AGH Industries, Inc., ASBCA Nos. 258, 26535, 85-1 BCA ¶ 17,784. Government contracts like this one often contain both performance and design specifications. See, Wornick Family Foods Company, supra, 94-2 BCA at 133,339; Falcon Jet Corporation, supra, 82-1 BCA at 76,691. The law makes a clear distinction between "design" specifications and "performance" specifications in determining the respective rights and obligations of the parties to a Government contract. Therefore, before applying the basic principle to the facts here, and in order to determine which requirement was the source of the Appellant's difficulties, if any, it is necessary to understand exactly what kind of specification we are dealing with in this case. See, Aleutian Constructors v. United States, 24 Cl. Ct. 372 (1992). Generally, design specifications explicitly state how the contract is to be performed and permit no deviations, while performance specifications focus on the results to be obtained, and leave it to the contractor to determine how to achieve that objective. See, Neal & Company v. United States, supra, 19 Cl. Ct. at 468. See also, Stuyvesant Dredging Company v. United States, supra, 834 F.2d at 1582; J.L. Simmons Company, Inc. v. United States, supra, 188 Ct. Cl. at 684, 412 F.2d at 1360. As the Board has explained: [There are] DESIGN specifications which set forth precise measurements, tolerances, materials, in process and finished product tests, quality control, inspection requirement, and other specific information. Under this type specification, the Government is responsible for design and related omissions, errors, and deficiencies in the specifications and drawings. PERFORMANCE specifications set forth operational characteristics desired for the item. In such specifications, design, measurements and other specific details are not stated or considered important so long as the performance requirement is met. Where an item is purchased by a performance specification, the contractor accepts general responsibility for design, engineering, and achievement of the stated performance requirements. The contractor has general discretion and election as to detail but the work is subject to the Government's reserved right of final inspection and approval or rejection. See, Colorgraphics Corporation, supra, Sl. op. at 23 (quoting, Monitor Plastics Company, ASBCA No. 14447, 72-2 ¶ 9,626 (1972)). [Original emphasis.] See also, Big Chief Drilling Company v. United States, 26 Cl. Ct. 1276, 1294 (1992) ("Design specifications set forth in detail the materials to be employed and the manner in which the work is to be performed, and the contractor is `required to follow them as one would a road map.' [Citation omitted.] Whereas, performance specifications simply set forth an objective or end result to be achieved, and the contractor may select the means of accomplishing the task. [Citation omitted.]"). This distinction is important because, while the Government is entitled to performance in strict compliance with design specifications, performance specifications are not as rigidly enforced since the contractor is expected to exercise his ingenuity and select the means for achieving the standard of performance required. See, Carmon Construction, Inc., GSBCA No 11227, 92-2 BCA ¶ 25,001, at 124,615; Falcon Jet Corporation, supra, 82-1 BCA at 76,691-92 (citing, J.L. Simmons Co., Inc., supra; R&M Mechanical Contractors, Inc., DOT CAB [No.] 75-51, 76-2 BCA ¶ 12,084; Santa Fe Engineers, Inc., ASBCA [No.] 22950, 79-2 BCA ¶ 14,084). See also, Centre Manufacturing Company v. United States, 183 Ct. Cl. 115, 392 F.2d 229 (1968); J.D. Hedin Construction Company v. United States, 171 Ct. Cl. 70, 347 F.2d 235 (1965). The "PRINTING" specification which is at the heart of this particular dispute is composed of both design and performance elements. Of the five sentences which make up the specification, three of them-"Print head to head," "Face prints in black and in a match of Pantone 287 blue ink and back prints in black ink only" and "On face, the black linematter overprints a blue background (background bleeds all sides)"-are wholly design in nature and totally the Government's responsibility; i.e., nothing in those requirements require the Appellant's input. The fourth sentence-"Background (printing media to be created by the contractor) is a security tint with a "VOID" dropout pattern- is a mixed specification containing design (the background pattern requirement) and performance (the creation of the printing media) elements. The fifth sentence-"The word "VOID" (each letter to be approx. 5/8" high) must appear at least 3 times (vertically, horizontally and diagonally) and must not be visible on the printed sheet, but must appear when the sheet is reproduced by electrostatic means-also has some design characteristics (the requirement for the word "VOID" to appear vertically, horizontally and diagonally on the form and the size of the letters in the word), but otherwise the language is purely one of performance. However, the fact that the "PRINTING" specification contains some performance aspects does not alter the conclusion that, by and large, it is a design specification; i.e., the design requirements predominate over the Contractor's discretion in performance. See, Neal & Company v. United States, supra, 19 Cl. Ct. at 468 ("Moreover, the inclusion of language requiring a completed project or assembly to pass certain performance tests or standards does not convert a design specification into one of performance." Citing, R.E.D.M. Corporation v. United States, supra, 192 Ct. Cl. at 901, 428 F.2d 1304); Harrison Western/Franki-Denys, Inc., ENG BCA [ No.] 5523, 92-1 BCA ¶ 24,582. See also, Falcon Jet Corporation, supra, 82-1 BCA at 76,691 ("When a technical proposal is submitted and accepted in a two-step procurement, the specific design parameters of that proposal control over the general performance specifications of the RFTP." Citing, Hydrospace Electronics & Instrument Corporation, ASBCA No. 17922, 74-2 BCA ¶ 10,682, at 50,805). No one disputes that the Appellant followed and completely satisfied the first three design requirements in the "PRINTING" specification on its initial press run of SPFs. Indeed, the only controversy involving those three elements which took place at the hearing concerned whether or not the Contractor used a color ink on its first printing which matched Pantone 287 blue, but in the end the parties stipulated that the Appellant had satisfied this requirement (Tr. 328).70 There also seems to be no question that the Contractor met the design requirements of the fifth sentence in the specification with respect to the height of each letter in the word "VOID" and the configuration of that word three times on the form). Rather, the point of contention on this issue involves the fourth sentence of the specification, which charged the Appellant with creating the printing media for the security tint background for the Government-designed "VOID" dropout pattern. This is not a typical "implied warranty" case. Here, the Contractor asserts that it did select the appropriate "printing media," which in the context of this appeal means the selection of inks, screens, other materials, etc., required to produce a security-tint background with the desired "VOID" dropout pattern, and successfully tested the SPFs on several photocopiers only to be told later that its handiwork was a failure. The Respondent, on the other hand, claims that since the design of the "VOID" pantograph was the Appellant's responsibility, and because the delivered forms would not copy as required, the source of the problem was obviously the Contractor's method of performance. However, there is nothing in the record to show that the Contractor's production processes were somehow deficient, nor is it clear why the Appellant should have been aware of problems in its printing processes when the results of its own quality control tests prior to shipment indicated that it had manufactured a workable form. See, Colorgraphics Corporation, supra, Sl. op. at 22-24. Nor is this a situation where there was a total failure of the forms, since the Contracting Officer found at least one GPO machine, in his limited test of the SPFs during the hearing, which reproduced the "VOID" pantograph on some prescription forms exactly as specified. R. Exh. No. 1 (Savin 7500, Room C-830). See, Wornick Family Foods Company, supra, 94-2 BCA at 133,339. The only suggestion in the record of possible process defects during the initial press run concerns the color of the ink and screens employed, but, as indicated, the parties stipulated that the Appellant used the correct ink, and the testimony about the screens is inconclusive. Moreover, the Board cannot ignore the contrast between the active participation of the Respondent in the manufacturing process for the reprinted SPFs when compared with its total noninvolvement during the production of the original forms. Thus, the record indicates that for the reprint process the Government not only furnished an exact replica of the SPF showing precisely the preferred "VOID" dropout pattern,71 but GPO also authorized a press-sheet inspection conducted by the customer-agency, and otherwise provided close advice and guidance to the Contractor. During the original press run, however, the Appellant was simply given a sample of a specimen check, not the actual form, to guide it in creating a security-tint background, received only perfunctory responses to its inquiries for information, and was otherwise left to fend for itself. In the Board's judgment, the Respondent's altered approach in dealing with the Contractor during the reprint process constitutes relevant and persuasive evidence that the design in the original specifications was defective. See, McNally Industries, Inc., ASBCA No. 43027, 93-3 BCA ¶ 26,130 (the Government's issuance of changes to "correct design errors" was held to prove the original specifications were defective). See also, Big Chief Drilling Company v. United States, supra, 26 Cl. Ct. at 1294; Hol-Gar Manufacturing Corporation v. United States, supra, 360 F.2d at 638; J.S. Alberici Construction Company, ENG BCA No. 4900, 90-1 BCA ¶ 22,320. In the final analysis, the Respondent's attempts to shift responsibility for the performance failures to the Appellant are unavailing. On this record, the Government's case amounts to little more than a claim of res ipsa loquitur, which is insufficient to convert what is essentially a design specification into a performance one. See, Wornick Family Foods Company, supra, 94-2 BCA at 133,339. Therefore, the Board holds that since the "PRINTING" specification was, overall, a design specification, the Respondent impliedly warranted that if the Appellant adhered to its terms the result would be a product which would reproduce the "VOID" pantograph exactly as specified. Furthermore, the Board finds that the failure of the SPFs to copy as required by the terms of the contract was due to an improper design in the specification, rather than any performance problems on the part of the Appellant. Moreover, the Board also concludes that when the forms failed to reproduce the "VOID" pantograph, despite the Contractor's strict adherence to the Government's design and using its best production efforts (which its quality control tests indicated were successful), it was entitled to rely on the Government's implied warranty of specifications. See, Colorgraphics Corporation, supra, Sl. op. at 22-24. Accordingly, the Board holds that the Respondent bears the responsibility for nonperformance in this case. C. The Contracting Officer's rejection of the initial shipment of SPFs was in error. Although he tested the forms and found that they did not satisfy the "PRINTING" specification's requirement that the word "VOID" appear in three places when reproduced by electrostatic means, the record fails to disclose what evaluation standards he employed in reaching that conclusion. In the absence of such testing or measurement criteria in the specifications, elsewhere in the contract, or GPO's quality assurance regulations, the basis for the rejection cannot be established. The ultimate question in this case is whether or not the Contracting Officer made an erroneous decision when he rejected the initial shipment of SPFs. Subsumed in this issue is another one which asks if the Contracting Officer's decisional process was somehow procedurally defective. As previously indicated, the performance requirements of the "PRINTING" specification must be read in harmony with the contract's quality assurance provisions, especially QATAP. Consequently, in order to answer the subsumed question, it is necessary to examine the test procedures and evaluation standards employed by the Contracting Officer in deciding that the forms did not comply with the contract specifications. From its review of the evidence, including the contract and GPO's quality control regulations, and relevant precedent, the Board concludes that the Respondent has failed to establish an adequate basis for the rejection because the standards for electrostatic reproduction are either imprecise or totally nonexistent, certainly none is shown in the record. Without such standards the Contracting Officer's decision rejecting the forms was erroneous. The starting point for the Board's analysis is the oft-cited "black letter" rule that the Government is generally entitled to strict compliance with its specifications, including those of fixed-price supply contracts. See, McDonald & Eudy Printers, Inc., GPO BCA 06-91 (May 6, 1994), Sl. op. at 20, 94 WL 377581; Shepard Printing, GPO BCA 23-92 (April 29, 1993), Sl. op. at 19, 1993 WL 526848; Chavis and Chavis Printing, GPO BCA 20-90 ((February 6, 1991), Sl. op. at 16, 1991 WL 439270; Rose Printing Company, GPO BCA 2-87 (June 9, 1989, Sl. op. at 6, 1989 WL 384982; Fry Communications, Inc., GPO BCA 1-87 (June 1, 1989), Sl. op. at 5, 1989 WL 384981; Stabbe Senter Press, GPO BCA Nos. 13-85 and 19-85 (May 12, 1989), Sl. op. at 48, 1989 WL 384977; Dependable Printing Company, Inc., supra, Sl. op. at 23-24. Accord, Mega Construction Company, Inc. v. United States, 25 Cl. Ct. 735, 741 (1992); S.S. Silberblatt, Inc. v. United States, 433 F.2d 1314 (Ct.Cl. 1970); Wholesale Tire and Supply Company, Ltd., ASBCA No. 42502, 92-2 BCA ¶ 24,960; Orlando Williams d/b/a Orlando Williams Janitorial Service, ASBCA Nos. 26099, 26872, 84-1 BCA ¶ 16,983. Strict compliance can be enforced either by rejecting the defective product, or accepting the work at a discount if that is in the Government's best interest. See, McDonald & Eudy Printers, Inc., supra, Sl. op. at 21 (citing, Automated Datatron, Inc., supra, Sl. op. at 4). However, when it insists on strict enforcement of the specifications, the Government must prove that the product does not meet the requirements of the contract; i.e., it bears the initial "burden of persuasion" of showing that the rejected work does, in fact, deviate from the specifications. See, McDonald & Eudy Printers, Inc., supra, Sl. op. at 23-24; Stabbe Senter Press, supra, Sl. op. at 49. See also, International Lithographing, GPO BCA 1-88 (December 19, 1989) Sl. op. at 20, 1989 WL 384986; Mid-America Business Forms Corporation, supra Sl. op. at 18-19. Accord, ABM/Ansley Business Materials, GSBCA No. 9367, 93-1 BCA ¶ 25,246; Goal Chemical Sealants Corporation, GSBCA Nos. 8627, 8628, 88-3 BCA ¶ 21,083; Churchill Chemical Corp., GSBCA Nos. 4321, 4322, 4346, 4353, 77-1 BCA ¶ 12,318, at 59,5000, aff'd, Churchill Chemical Corp. v. United States, 221 Ct. Cl. 284, 602 F.2d 358 (1979); Ramar Company, ASBCA No. 16060, 72-2 BCA ¶ 9644; Pams Products, Inc., ASBCA No. 15847, 72-1 BCA ¶ 9401; Hardeman- Monier-Hutcherson, ASBCA No. 11785, 67-1 BCA ¶ 6210. The Government usually meets this burden by advising the contractor of the results of the inspection it has conducted.72 See, McDonald & Eudy Printers, Inc., supra, Sl. op. at 24; Stabbe Senter Press, supra, Sl. op. at 49. The burden then shifts to the contractor to prove the Government's findings are invalid for one reason or another. See, McDonald & Eudy Printers, Inc., supra, Sl. op. at 24; Stabbe Senter Press, supra, Sl. op. at 49; International Lithographing, supra, Sl. op. at 21. Accord, Nuclear Research Corporation v. United States, 814 F.2d 647, 650 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Riverport Industries, Inc., ASBCA Nos. 28089, 28090, 28091, 29577, 86-2 BCA ¶ 18,835, mot. for reconsid. den., 86-3 BCA ¶ 19,050; Continental Chemical Corporation, GSBCA No. 4483, 76-2 BCA ¶ 11,948; Shamrock Industrial Maintenance, DOT CAB No. 72-11, 72-2 BCA ¶ 9482; C.W. Roen Construction Company, DOT CAB No. 75-43, 76-2 BCA ¶ 12,215. Otherwise, the presumption that the Government's tests are conducted correctly will prevail. See, Astro Science Corp. v. United States, 200 Ct. Cl. 354, 360, 471 F.2d 624, 627 (1973); Integrated Systems Group, Inc., GSBCA No. 11602-P, 92-1 BCA ¶ 24,762; Donald R. Stewart & Associates, AGBCA Nos. 84-226-1, 84-227-1, 84-228-1, 84-239-1, 84-240-1, 84-241-1, 85-168-1, 89-222-1, 89-223-1, 89-224-1, 89-225-1, 92-1 BCA ¶ 24,705; Goal Chemical Sealants Corporation, supra. See also, Horn Waterproofing Corporation, DOT CAB No. 73-24, 74-2 BCA ¶ 10,933. GPO's procurement regulation establishes the basic framework for the inspection and testing of procured products. Apart from providing the foundation for QATAP, and establishing the program as an integral part of most procurement contacts, the PPR also states that such inspection and testing "shall be performed in accordance with article 14 `Inspection and Tests' of Contract Clauses in GPO Contract Terms (Pub. 310.2)."73 See, PPR, Chap. XIII, Sec. 1, ¶¶ 3(a),(b), 4(c)(2),(g). Furthermore, the PPR, inter alia: (1) provides guidance for gathering inspection samples; (2) sets forth basic inspection procedures; (3) makes special provisions for the inspection of departmental random copies (blue label copies); and (4) requires that appropriate records and documentation of all quality assurance actions be maintained. See, PPR, Chap. XIII, Sec. 1, ¶¶ 4(g)(1)-(4), h. Reduced to its essentials, a reading of the PPR, the various QATAP manuals incorporated by reference therein, and the "Inspections and Tests" article of GPO Contract Terms, indicates clearly that the proper inspection and testing of procured products consists of three things: (1) a sample which is randomly selected and adequate enough to be representative of the lot; (2) the use of proper testing procedures and techniques; and (3) the presence of objective standards by which to measure the procured product. See, e.g., B. P. Printing and Office Supplies, GPO BCA 22-91 (February 5, 1993), Sl. op. at 18, 1993 WL 311371 (discussing sampling techniques and citing QATAP Technical Manual, GPO Publication 355.1 (March 1989) and GPO Technical Report No. 27, July 1, 1988, Subject: Acceptance Sampling); Matthew's Printing, Inc., GPO BCA 31-88 (March 14, 1990), Sl. op. at 4-5, 1990 WL 454983 (sampling); Sterling Printing, supra, Sl. op. at 8, fn. 13 (discussion of testing procedures for paper); Fry Communications, GPO BCA 22-84 (February 20, 1986), Sl. op. at 10-17, 1986 WL 181462 (discussion of techniques used for measuring the color match of paper under QATAP and the JCP Paper Specification Standards); McDonald & Eudy Printers, Inc., supra, Sl. op. at 24-25 (discussing how defects are measured under QATAP); Shepard Printing, supra, Sl. op. at 15-18 (discussing how defects are assessed under QATAP). As previously mentioned, a contracting officer who shows that he has adhered to the testing and inspection requirements of the contract is entitled to have his determination of product quality upheld. See, French/Bray, Inc., supra, Sl. op. at 17. In this case, the Appellant has not challenged the size of the sample or the method used by the Respondent to select the sample to insure that it was as representative as possible of the lot.74 Cf., B. P. Printing and Office Supplies, supra, Sl. op. at 18-19. Nor has the Contractor contested GPO's testing methodology. Cf., Shepard Printing, supra, Sl. op. at 15-18. Indeed, the only possible testing technique for discovering the alleged defect in this case-copying the SPF by electrostatic means and visibly checking to see if the word "VOID" appeared vertically, horizontally and diagonally on the form-is contained in the "PRINTING" specification itself, and was used by both the Contractor and the Government. However, the Appellant has expressly questioned the standards applied by the Respondent in rejecting the forms (Tr. 156-57).75 In the Board's view, that issue describes the crux of the problem in this case. The law is clear that before the Government can reject a contractor's product, either as a prelude to default or some lesser action, it must first establish specific, quantifiable, objective, and firm criteria indicating the level of quality which the product is expected to meet. See, Wornick Family Foods Company, supra, 94-2 BCA ¶ 26,808 (the Government improperly rejected pears that were pink, beige, brown, red, reddish brown, or gray following dehydration because the contract for freeze dehydrated fruit had no provision for rejecting the fruit for discoloration); John L. Hall dba Taiga Resource Consultants, AGBCA No. 92-217-1, 93-3 BCA ¶ 26,212 (the contract criteria were not specific enough to support a Government deduction based on the contractor's failure to provide sufficiently thorough briefings); Shirley Contracting Corporation and ATEC Contracting Corporation, ENG BCA No. 4650, 85-3 BCA ¶ 18,214 (the Government's rejection of a contractor's source of rock was improper because the contract did not set forth any objective performance criteria and the standards that the Government had insisted on were in excess of its own prevailing standards and those accepted in the industry); Chandler-Wilbert Vault Company, VACAB No. 1444, 80-2 BCA ¶ 14,682 (rejection of the contractor's grave liners for failure to prevent sinkage in graves was improper because there was no specified test or standard in the contract for "sunken graves"). Stated otherwise, the Government cannot leave a contractor "in the dark" with respect to the quality standards it is expected to strive toward, and then rely on unclear, subjective, or indefinite standards to reject a product, because such conduct is tantamount to setting a contractor up for failure. See, See, Mid-American Engineering and Manufacturing, ASBCA No. 20939, 78-1 BCA ¶ 12,870 (in a contract for the supply of electrical harnesses, where the Government, without showing a sample of an acceptable product to the contractor, rejected the contractor's first article submission because too many air bubbles were present in the potting compound encapsulating the cables, and then replied to the contractor's request for the establishment of some criteria as to the number of air bubbles allowed by stating that there should be no, or almost no, visible air bubbles, a default termination following the first article test failure was improper because the performance criterion thus established was too indefinite). One way to set such a standard, of course, is to provide the contractor with a sample of an acceptable product. Id., at 62,629. With respect to printing contracts, such as the one here, another way would be to require proofs or a press-sheet inspection prior to production, as the Government eventually did for the reprint in this case. The "indefinite standards" issue is not a question which the Board, or its predecessor the GPO Contract Appeals Board (GPOCAB), has faced very often.76 Consequently, there is a paucity of agency precedent precisely on point. However, at least one GPOCAB ad hoc panel decision-Elgin Business Forms, GPOCAB 10-84 (October 19, 1984), 1984 WL 148108-is closely analogous to the situation in this appeal and is particularly instructive on the issue. Elgin Business Forms was a default termination case involving a contract to print 270,000 marginally punched continuous forms for the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). The contract contained the usual specifications concerning paper color, dimensions, the number of parts, placement of the carbon paper, alignment and spacing of holes, etc., and a requirement that the forms run on the Honeywell PRU 1200 Printer, which was the only piece of equipment mentioned in the contract. The contractor was not furnished with a sample copy of the form by either NASA or GPO. Shortly after delivery of the forms, NASA complained that they were unacceptable because, inter alia, misaligned holes caused the printer to jam and the carbon paper ripped during the decollating process. In response to NASA's complaint, representatives of the customer- agency and the contractor conducted tests on two boxes of the forms, with the following results: (1) on forms from the first box, the printer jammed three times because of misaligned holes and twice because of improper stacking; and (2) forms from the second box only jammed three times because of improper stacking (no feeder or decollating problems were observed). GPO separately tested two boxes of the forms and found: (1) forms from half of the first box, which was tested on the Honeywell PRU 1200 Printer, jammed four times while there was one stacking problem; and (2) on forms from the second box, the printer jammed twice, again there was one stacking problem, and decollating was unacceptable at normal operating speed. Accordingly, GPO rejected the forms on the ground that they did not meet the minimum specifications, and then defaulted the contract when the contractor failed to replace them as instructed by the contracting officer. No excess reprocurement costs were assessed. The GPOCAB ad hoc panel held that GPO had not sustained its burden of proof of showing that the contractor's forms failed to meet the contract specifications, and overturned the contracting officer's default determination. See, Elgin Business Forms, supra, Sl. op. at 11. The panel used a three- pronged rationale to explain why the default was inappropriate under the factual situation in that case, namely: (1) neither the contract nor the specifications provided specific performance and testing standards or requirements; (2) a default cannot be based on unstated specifications; and (3) the inspection and tests conducted on the forms were not dispositive. See, Elgin Business Forms, supra, Sl. op. at 5-10. The reasoning of the panel with respect to the vagueness of the specifications is particularly illuminating in the context of this appeal, and is set forth in partial detail here: Section 2.20(c) of the contract provides that "special and performance tests shall be as described in the specifications." Section 301 of the contract provides: Forms produced under the contract must be of first class workmanship in materials suitable for their intended use. All operations and materials such as printing, collating, punching, perforating, registration, joining, splicing, paper, and carbon leaves shall be such as will ensure satisfactory continuous operation over makes, kinds of equipment, and usage specified. [Emphasis added.] The Panel agrees . . . that the criteria "satisfactory continuous operation" and "unsatisfactory performance" (section 2.20(e)) ". . . leave room for interpretation." [Record citation omitted.] The [contract] specifications do not establish any performance criteria usage tests or quality standards. While the contract is voluminous, the specifications are woefully vague and insufficient if their purpose was to ensure that NASA, the ordering agency, received a product which would meet its particular needs. The deficiency in the specifications in the contract is the glaring failure of the government to precisely state what its performance requirements were and how it would test to determine conformity with those requirements. While the specifications informed the Appellant that the forms would be run on a Honeywell PRU 1200 Printer they did not indicate the expected performance level. [Record citation omitted.] Likewise the specifications did not contain a performance standard for the decollator which is an integral part of the process. Although the specifications fail to contain a particular brand of decollating equipment, the Panel finds that the failure to state any performance level for the decollator is a critical deficiency on the part of the government. The Appeal File and the record indicate that the forms were subject to several tests. Unfortunately, except for the test ordered by the Panel, the reports contained in the Official Appeal File neither contain a statement of sampling nor performance criteria. For example, [a December 9, 1983, memorandum from NASA to the contracting officer] only states that [NASA] had received 540 cartons of forms ". . . which were unacceptable ." [Record citation omitted.] The memo does not state the number of boxes tested, how or when they were tested, or most importantly what were the acceptability criteria. Similarly, . . . on January 11, 1984, [representatives of NASA and the contractor] inspected two boxes and rejected them because "paper holes do not line up with carbon holes causing the printer to jam, paper appears to be shaded, and carbon rips when paper is decollated." [Record citation omitted.] The Panel finds that the inspection of two boxes out of 540 is not an adequate sample upon which to default this contract. Society Brand Hat Co., ASBCA [No.] 6904, 1962 BCA ¶ 3349. . . . Likewise, the Panel finds that the tests conducted on January 17 and 30, 1984, were defective because of the sample size and the failure to specifically state the expected performance level. The GPO did not sustain its burden of proving that the forms produced by Elgin did not meet the specifications. Pams Products, Inc., ASBCA [No.] 15847, 72-1 BCA ¶ 9401. The Panel was not presented with any evidence which proved that the Appellant had not met the standard of satisfactory continuous operation. In the absence of any definition by the government the Panel construes the requirement of "satisfactory continuous operation" to mean something less than continuous operation. If the forms were expected to run continuously without any stoppages, the contract should not have used the term "satisfactory." The term satisfactory implies to the Panel a contemplated standard of operation which expects some stoppages. The Panel is unaware of any product which runs continuously without ever stopping. The question then is how many stoppages constitute satisfactory? The Panel believes that "satisfactory" like "beauty" is in the eye of the beholder. It is an imprecise term which should have been defined exactly in the specifications. [Footnote omitted.] The record indicates that NASA . . . has used this type of form for approximately ten years. [Record citation omitted.] During this long period of time NASA should have established a specific performance standard by which it would measure acceptability. However, both the Official Appeal File and Hearing Record are devoid of any evidence of NASA's past experience. Such evidence or even common trade practice performance standards for this type of form would have given the Panel a basis of comparison with the existing test results. Gholson, Byars & Holmes Construction Co. v. United States, 173 Ct. Cl. 374 (1965). See, Elgin Business Forms, supra, Sl. op. at 5-8.77 See also, Electronic Composition, [No GPOCAB No.] (December 22, 1978), Sl. op. at 34, 1978 WL 22339 ("We have scrutinized the subject contract in vain for any stated requirements that [the electronic typography system] perform `economically', or that it have multi- reel or automatic restart capability or that it should produce pages at a specified rate. As we stated earlier, the contractor will not be bound by the unexpressed intent of the Government." Citing, Elgin National Watch Company, ASBCA Nos. 10421, 10589, 10698, 10730, 11721, 67-2 BCA ¶ 6400; ITT Arctic Services, Inc. v. United States, supra). The Board has no doubt that the holding in Elgin Business Forms was correct as a matter of law. Consequently, and its teachings can be applied to the facts in this case, which are substantially similar.78 The Appellant here, like the contractor in Elgin Business Forms, was not provided with a sample of the form it was expected to produce by either the VA or GPO, despite its request for one, but rather was told to follow the specifications. However, in contrast to Elgin Business Forms where the contract identified a specific make of printer (the Honeywell PRU 1200 Printer) as a measure of operational performance, the Contractor here was not told that the SPFs would have to copy on any particular photocopier or range of photocopy machines. Given this lack of guidance, the Appellant did the only thing a reasonably prudent contractor could do under the circumstances-test the forms on its own photocopier and several others to make sure that the forms copied as required before shipping them to the VA. As the record shows, those tests satisfied the Contractor that the word "VOID" would appear three times "when reproduced by electrostatic means." If the Respondent intended the "VOID" pantograph to reproduce on all photocopiers, it should have expressly told the Contractor so. Although, for reasons already explained, producing a "VOID" pantograph which will copy without fail on every copy machine manufactured is technologically impossible,79 no one doubts the Government's right to require complete or perfect performance in its specifications. See, Thermal Electronic, Inc. v. United States, supra, 25 Cl. Ct. at 673. On the other hand, if the Respondent, in giving full effect to the contract's quality assurance provisions, meant to indicate that product acceptability could be something less than total success with respect to copying, then it had an obligation to make that clear to the Contractor; e.g., identify which brand of photocopiers or range of machines would be used, or establish a failure rate for copying, based on VA's experience with the forms, which the customer-agency would tolerate. The Government did neither in this case. In Elgin Business Forms, the GPOCAB was dealing with performance specifications in the contract which were indefinite or vague. Here, the Board has diligently searched the four corners of the agreement, including QATAP and its supporting manuals and reports, in vain for some clue as to what reasonable standard the Contractor was expected to meet for its forms to be considered acceptable in copying the "VOID" pantograph. The problem, as the Board sees it, is that no QATAP category precisely fits the alleged defect in this case. The closest analogy for the word "VOID" not reproducing as required would seem to be the finishing attribute for loss of information (F-17), which is defined as "any omission of or damage to the printed image which impairs the transmission of the intended information."80 See, QATAP, p. 44. However, neither the VA nor GPO's inspector, Nowalk, considered or measured the failure of the word "VOID" to appear as a loss of information; i.e., the F-17 box is not checked on either the Notice of Quality Defects or the Inspection Report (R4 File, Tabs H and K). Perhaps, more importantly, Nowalk's report classifies the "VOID" pantograph problem as a "major" defect, whereas as QATAP clearly states that loss of information is always assessed as a "critical" defect (R4 File, Tab K). See, QATAP, pp. ix, 44. In short, unless there is an undisclosed standard somewhere which provided the yardstick for measuring the nonappearance of the word "VOID" when the form was photocopied, the quality problem at issue must be seen as sui generis and one without any established norm or tolerances. Therefore, when the Respondent rejected the forms under these circumstances and required the Appellant to reprint them, it was, in effect, making a constructive change in the contract; indeed, the reprint was practically a different product. See, Service Engineering Company, ASBCA No. 40275, 94-1 BCA ¶ 26,382; Gary Aircraft Corporation, ASBCA No. 21731, 91-3 BCA ¶ 24,122; Pinay Flooring Products, Inc., GSBCA No. 9286, 91-2 BCA ¶ 23.682; Harris System International, Inc., ASBCA No. 33280, 88-2 BCA ¶ 20,641; Kahn Communications, Inc., ASBCA No. 27461, 86-3 BCA ¶ 19,249; AGH Industries, Inc., supra, 85-1 BCA ¶ 17,784; McCrory Electric Company, GSBCA No. 5363, 80-2 BCA ¶ 14,686, Thus, the question remains-what standard did the Contracting Officer use to reject the forms? At the hearing, the Contracting Officer testified that he used a very simply litmus test-the word "VOID" either appeared or did not appear when the SPF was photocopied, was legible or not legible, was visible to the naked eye or not visible (Tr. 267-68). The Appellant applied the same standard in its pre-delivery tests of the forms (Tr. 126-27). However, by definition, such a standard is not an objective one, but rather is subjective and capable of creating great discrepancies in test results among individual evaluators in different locations, as occurred here. See, Wornick Family Foods Company, supra, 94-2 BCA at 133,341; Shirley Contracting Corporation and ATEC Contracting Corporation, supra, 85-3 BCA at 91,428-29. Consequently, the demonstrative evidence in this case is of great significance in resolving the standards issue. As one would expect, the demonstrative evidence submitted by the respective parties is in direct conflict. The Appellant's exhibits show that the "VOID" pantograph reproduced as specified when samples of SPFs from the rejected press run were tested on its photocopiers and seven other machines in Emporia, Kansas; i.e., there were nine successful evaluations of the forms (App. Exh. Nos. 10-18). The Respondent, on the other hand, tested the samples of the forms on five copy machines in GPO, and with one exception (the Savin 7500, Room C-830), the "VOID' pantograph did not copy; i.e., there was only one partial success out of the five photocopiers used (R. Exh. No. 1).81 Although the parties obtained different results from the tests they made at different locations, when their demonstrative evidence is considered as a whole, the Board finds that of the 14 photocopy machines used, the "VOID" pantograph reproduced as required on all of the samples forms, or on some of them, on 10 machines-a 71 percent success rate. It is not for the Board to determine whether reproduction of the "VOID" pantograph 71 percent of the time amounts to acceptable performance-that is a matter for the Contracting Officer in the exercise of his discretion. However, the demonstrative evidence does illustrate the underlying technical problem with respect to developing proper test procedures for the SPF, namely, different results may be achieved on different equipment. We are told by the authorities that photocopiers vary greatly in the quality of copies they produce. See, Beach, Shepro, and Russon, supra, p. 145. Such variables as the age of the machine, its frequency of use, the toner level, the cleanliness of the glass, and even the quality of the original to be copied, can affect the quality of the copies produced by any particular photocopier. Id., pp. 145-46. As the Appellant's witness, Cripps, indicated during the hearing, photocopying is not "foolproof," and the fact that the patent holder, Standard Register, did not provide any warranty with respect to the copying quality of the "VOID" pantograph lends some support to that conclusion (Tr. 230, 237-38). Apart from the practical considerations involved in testing the forms on different photocopiers, there are also legal consequences attached to the conflict in the demonstrative evidence. Where, as here, a contractor tests supplies from the same production run as the Government, and submits its own test results tending to disprove the results obtained by the Government, it raises a question as to whether the product conforms to the contract specifications or not, and places the validity of the Government's tests in issue. See, Donald R. Stewart & Associates, supra, 92-1 BCA ¶ 24,705; Goal Chemical Sealants Corporation, supra, 88-3 BCA ¶ 21,083; G. Santoro & Sons, Inc., VACAB No. 755, 68-2 BCA ¶ 7282. In such a case, because the Government has the burden of proof, a finding that it has failed to adduce sufficient probative evidence to persuade the contract appeals board that the product did not meet the contract requirements is warranted. See, Unlimited Supply Company, Inc., GSBCA No. 12371, 94-3 BCA ¶ 27,170, at 135,393 (citing, Praoil, S.r.L., ASBCA Nos. 41499, 44369, 94-2 BCA ¶ 26,840; Air-O-Plastik Corporation, GSBCA 4802, 4870, 4925, 4965, 81-2 BCA ¶ 15,338). See also, Communications, Ltd., ASBCA Nos. 23261, 80-1 BCA ¶ 14,368, at 70,836 (the proof offered by the contractor was sufficient to overcome the presumption that the tests conducted by the agency were proper, and agency failed to carry its burden of going forward with the evidence). Simply stated, the rule is: [W]here there is proof of differing tests results and no additional evidence is presented, the issue of conformity with specification must be decided against the party having the burden of proof. E.g., Lisbon Contractors [v. United States [34 CCF ¶ 75,358 ] 828 F.2d 759 (Fed. Cir. 1987)], [828] F.2d at 764-65 (the party with the burden loses if evidence on issue is evenly balanced); Arden Engineering Co., supra, at 82,553-54; Universal Steel Strapping Co., ASBCA No. 13686, 69-2 BCA ¶ 7799 at 36,212. See, Praoil, S.r.L., supra, 94-2 BCA at 133,502. In this case, the Respondent did introduce additional evidence in the form of further tests of sample SPFs which tended to confirm its original results, with one exception. However, the Board believes that these additional test results are insufficient to sustain the Government's burden of showing conclusively that the failure of the "VOID" pantograph to copy as required was due to defects in the form itself, rather than any differences in the Respondent's and the Appellant's copying equipment.82 Accordingly, the Board finds that the evidence of test results, overall, is inconclusive, and does not form a basis for rejecting the original SPFs. See, Shepard Printing, supra, Sl. op. at 19 (GPO's Inspection Report, standing alone, would not support the Government's decision, made in partial reliance thereon, to default the contract). In summary, when the Board considers the record evidence in this case, it finds that the absence of clear and objective standards for evaluating and measuring the copying capability of the ordered SPFs is a fatal defect in the contract. Without such criteria, testing performance against the specifications becomes untrustworthy, vague and inadequate for the principle purpose of the contract, providing the VA with a product which would meet its particular needs. Similarly, although the matter was not contested, the Board cannot ignore the fact that the Respondent decided that the first shipment of SPFs were rejectable after evaluating only 50 forms on three copy machines (R4 File, Tab K). The QATAP Manual provides guidance as to the appropriate size of the sample for particular order or lot sizes. See, B. P. Printing and Office Supplies, supra, Sl. op. at 20 (citing, QATAP Manual, pp. 5, 6). Applying the QATAP Manual guidelines to this case, the sample size for the first lot of 100,000 pads of forms should have been 400 pads (40,000 forms). See, QATAP Manual, pp. 5, 6. Therefore, the Board believes that it was unreasonable for the Respondent to base its decision to reject the original shipment on such a small sample as 50 forms. See, Elgin Business Forms, supra, Sl. op. at 6. Cf. B. P. Printing and Office Supplies, supra, Sl. op. at 20-21. Accordingly, for all of the foregoing reasons, the Board concludes that the Contracting Officer's decision rejecting the forms was in error and must be reversed.83 D. Although the Appellant is entitled to compensation for the rejected shipment of 10,000,000 SPFs, payment for the remaining approximately 9,600,000 forms still stored in its plant is not authorized under applicable law. The last issue before the Board basically concerns the remedy in this case, and is easily disposed of. There is no doubt that the Appellant is entitled to compensation for the rejected shipment of 10,000,000 SPFs both on the theory that the "implied warranty of specifications" shifted the responsibility for nonperformance to the Respondent, and the ground that the rejection was erroneous because the contract failed to provide specific, quantifiable, and objective standards indicating the level of quality which the product was expected to meet. See, Colorgraphics Corporation, supra, Sl. op. at 25; Elgin Business Forms, supra, Sl. op. at 11. However, the Contractor also seeks payment for the additional 96,000 pads of undelivered forms in its printing plant from the same production run as the rejected forms (Tr. 214). See, RPTC, p. 5. The Respondent, on the other hand, has maintained throughout these proceedings that the undelivered SPFs are not part of this case because they were never shipped to the VA or rejected by GPO; i.e., the Government's position is that only the 100,000 pads which were delivered to the customer-agency are involved in this appeal (Tr. 271, 309). See, RPTC, p. 6. The Board agrees with the Respondent. It is well-settled that if a sample from a lot is rejected only that lot is rejected. See, Kitco, Inc., ASBCA No. 31809, 91-3 BCA ¶ 24,190; Pierce Coal Sales International, Inc., ASBCA No. 33243, 87-1 BCA ¶ 19,667; Varo, Inc., ASBCA No. 25446, 86-1 BCA ¶ 18,531; Associate-Aircraft-Tool and Manufacturing, Inc., ASBCA No. 7255, 1963 BCA ¶ 3730. Also cf., Infotec Development, Inc., ASBCA Nos. 31809, 32235, 91-2 BCA ¶ 23,909; Henry Angelo & Company, Inc., ASBCA No. 30502, 87-1 BCA ¶ 19,619. The contract in this case clearly provided for shipment of the entire order of 600,000 pads of forms in two installments. The first delivery of 100,000 pads was to be sent to the VA by July 27, 1992. The remaining 500,000 pads were scheduled for shipment by August 17, 1992 (R4 File, Tab A, p. 3). Since it is undisputed that the only SPFs actually shipped, tested and rejected were the 100,000 pads of the first installment, under applicable principles only those forms are affected by the Board's ruling that the Government's rejection was in error. Consequently, there is no legal basis for the Board to direct the Respondent to pay for the approximately 96,000 pads of forms remaining in the Appellant's plant. Accordingly, to that extent, the Contractor's appeal is denied. V. CONCLUSIONS In summary, the Board concludes that while the relevant contract specifications are not ambiguous, the "PRINTING" specification is, by and large, a design specification authored by the Government. See, Neal & Company v. United States, supra, 19 Cl. Ct. at 468; R.E.D.M. Corporation v. United States, supra, 192 Ct. Cl. at 901, 428 F.2d 1304. Consequently, when the Respondent instructed the Appellant to follow the specifications in producing the SPFs, it impliedly warranted that the results would be adequate and acceptable. See, Blake Construction Company v. United States, supra, 987 F.2d at 745; Hol-Gar Manufacturing Corporation v. United States, supra, 360 F.2d at 638; D.E.W., Incorporated, supra, 94-3 BCA at 135,459. Since a defective Government design was the real reason that the Appellant's original SPFs failed to reproduce the "VOID" pantograph as required by in the "PRINTING" specification, the Government's implied warranty shifts the burden of nonperformance to the Respondent and entitles the Contractor to compensation for the rejected shipment of forms. See, Colorgraphics Corporation, supra, Sl. op. at 25. Accord, Wornick Family Foods Company, supra, 94-2 BCA at 133,340. Second, the Board concludes that the absence of specific, quantifiable, objective, and firm criteria indicating the level of performance which the SPFs were expected to meet, either in the specifications or elsewhere in the contract, invalidates the Respondent's rejection of the first shipment of forms. See, Elgin Business Forms, supra, Sl. op. at 5-8; Electronic Composition, supra, Sl. op. at 34. Accord, Shirley Contracting Corporation and ATEC Contracting Corporation, supra, 85-3 BCA at 91,428; Chandler-Wilbert Vault Company, supra, 80-2 BCA at 72,412; Mid-American Engineering and Manufacturing, supra, 78-1 BCA at 62,629-30. Although both the Respondent and the Appellant used the same test to measure the success of the ordered product-the word "VOID" either appeared when the SPF was photocopied or did not-that standard, by definition, is subjective rather than objective, and can create great discrepancies in test results among inspectors and locations. See, Wornick Family Foods Company, supra, 94-2 BCA at 133,341; Shirley Contracting Corporation and ATEC Contracting Corporation, supra, 85-3 BCA at 91,428-29. In that regard, the Appellant's demonstrative evidence was sufficient to raise a question as to whether or not the original SPFs conformed to the contract specifications, and placed the validity of the tests which the Respondent relied on to reject the forms in issue. See, Donald R. Stewart & Associates, supra, 92-1 BCA at 123,311; Goal Chemical Sealants Corporation, supra, 88-3 at 106,447. Therefore, the Government had the burden of going forward with the evidence, and while it did introduce additional test results, they were inconclusive and insufficient to carry its burden of showing that the form itself, and not equipment differences, was the cause of the failure of the "VOID" pantograph to copy as required. See, Unlimited Supply Company, Inc., supra, 94-3 BCA at 135,393; Praoil, S.r.L., supra, 94-2 BCA at 133,502; Communications, Ltd., supra, 80-1 BCA at 70,836. Furthermore, the size of the sample (50 SPFs) on which the Respondent relied in rejecting the original forms was too small to provide a valid basis for measuring their performance. See, Elgin Business Forms, supra, Sl. op. at 6. Cf. B. P. Printing and Office Supplies, supra, Sl. op. at 20-21. Therefore, the evidence of test results, overall, does not form a basis for rejecting the original SPFs. See, Shepard Printing, supra, Sl. op. at 19. Accordingly, an additional ground for sustaining the Appellant's claim as to the first shipment of forms is that the Contracting Officer's decision to reject them was in error. See, Elgin Business Forms, supra, Sl. op. at 11. Finally, the Board concludes that the scope of the remedy in this case must be limited to the first delivery of forms. Because the contract clearly provided for shipment of the entire order in two installments, and it is undisputed that the only SPFs shipped, tested and rejected were the 100,000 pads of the first installment, there is no legal basis for the Board to direct the Respondent to pay for the forms from the original press run which remain in the Appellant's plant.84 See, Kitco, Inc., supra, 91-3 BCA ¶ 24,190; Pierce Coal Sales International, Inc., supra, 87-1 BCA ¶ 19,667; Varo, Inc., supra, 86-1 BCA ¶ 18,531. Accordingly, since the 100,000 rejected pads of forms represents 1/6, or 16.7 percent, of the entire order of 600,000 pads, the Board concludes that the Appellant is entitled to a proportionate payment of the original contract price of $533,000.00 as compensation, or $89,011.00, and it will so order.85 ORDER From the foregoing analysis and for the reasons enunciated, the Board finds and concludes that the Appellant has shown that the Contracting Officer's rejection of the initial shipment of 100,000 pads of SPFs was erroneous, and it is entitled to compensation for those forms. Since the rejected shipment represents 1/6 of the entire order of forms, the Board finds that the Respondent owes the Contractor an equitable adjustment in the amount of $89,011.00, as a fair and reasonable compensation in this case. THEREFORE, the Board REVERSES the Contracting Officer's decision denying the claim and REMANDS the appeal with instructions that appropriate arrangements be made to pay the Contractor in accordance with this opinion. Universal Printing Company, supra, Sl. op. at 56; Banta Company, supra, Sl. op. at 62. On the other hand, the Contractor has not sustained its claim to be paid for the undelivered 96,000 pads at its plant. ACCORDINGLY, to that extent, its appeal is DENIED. It is so Ordered. May 19, 1995 STUART M. FOSS Administrative Judge _______________ 1 The Contracting Officer's appeal file, assembled pursuant to Rule 4 of the Board's Rules of Practice and Procedure, was delivered to the Board on February 16, 1993. GPO Instruction 110.12, Subject: Board of Contract Appeals Rules of Practice and Procedure, dated September 17, 1984 (Board Rules), Rule 4(a). It will be referred to hereafter as the R4 File, with an appropriate Tab letter also indicated. The R4 File consists of twenty-four (24) documents identified as Tab A through Tab X. 2 The court reporter's transcript shall be referred to hereinafter as "Tr." with an appropriate page number thereafter. 3 The Respondent's brief will be referred to hereinafter as "R. Brf.", with an appropriate page citation thereafter. The Appellant's brief will be cited as "App. Brf.," with an appropriate page number thereafter. Furthermore, at the hearing both parties introduced documentary evidence. The Appellant's exhibits will be referred to as "App. Exh. No.," with an appropriate number thereafter. The Respondent's exhibit will be referred to as "R. Exh. No. 1". 4 During the hearing, the Appellant introduced a number of exhibits relating to the previous printing of the SPFs. See, App. Exh. Nos. 2, 6 and 7. That job, Jacket No. 305-949, was issued on November 1, 1991, and was awarded to Standard Register (Tr. 66, 128, 145, 228). See, R4 File, Tab D. According to the record testimony, although the Appellant received a copy of the 1991 solicitation, it did not submit a bid because not enough time was left to prepare one, and besides it had no presses available for the work (Tr. 52-53, 54, 64, 145, 186; App. Exh. No. 2). However, it continued to maintain a file on the job, and when GPO solicited the work again, the Contractor submitted an offer and was awarded the contract (Tr. 17-18, 54, 228-29). 5 Unlike the previous job by Standard Register, which showed the word "VOID" once, the SPFs printed under this contract used the word three times (Tr. 41, 65-66, 301). The "VOID" pantograph required in the specifications is a security feature designed to deter persons from reproducing the document for unauthorized or fraudulent purposes, or at least make it more difficult to produce a forgery (Tr. 242). Essentially, it is a series of different size dots in a screen pattern with an image inserted, with the dots being lighter and smaller in size, so that when the document is photocopied the dots should disappear and expose the image (Tr. 232). The key security feature is the repetitive use of a word, in this case "VOID", in the background in such a way that the dots hide the image until it is reproduced by electrostatic means (Tr. 55-56, 164, 233). In printing industry parlance, the "VOID" pantograph would be a "dropout" pattern, i.e., one in which halftone dots are eliminated when overexposed. See, Mark Beach, Steve Shepro, and Ken Russon, Getting It Printed: How to Work with Printers and Graphic Arts Services to Assure Quality, Stay on Schedule, and Control Costs, (Coast to Coast Books, Portland, Oregon, 1986), p. 198 (hereinafter Beach, Shepro, and Russon). There is no single background pattern for the "VOID" pantograph (Tr. 233). See also, Pocket Pal: A Graphic Arts Production Handbook (International Paper Company, Memphis, Tennessee, 1989), p. 191 (defining a "dropout" as "[p]ortions of originals that do not reproduce, especially colored lines or background areas (often on purpose)." 6 The sequential numbering system and the requirement that the SPFs should have no missing numbers constitutes a second security feature, in addition to the "VOID" pantograph (Tr. 152, 163, 242). The sequential numbers are placed on the SPFs during the production process-the numbering machine is on the press and a separate stamping operation prints the numbers on the forms as they are passing through (Tr. 27, 52, 61; App. Ex. No. 3). These security features-the sequential number and the "VOID" pantograph- were required because the SPFs are used by VA physicians and others to dispense drugs (Tr. 152, 163). 7 GPO's Quality Assurance Through Attributes Program, GPO Publication 310.1, as revised in November 1989 (QATAP), was incorporated in the contract by reference (R4 File, Tab A, p. 1). 8 Standard Register has held the patent for the "VOID" since 1979 (Tr. 243). 9 The other GFM items, offset film negatives and a reproduction proof, were supplied as specified in the contract (Tr. 14, 56). 10 In this regard, the Appellant was following the GFM dispute resolution procedures established in the "Government Furnished Property (GFP)" clause of GPO Contract Terms. See, GPO Contract Terms, Contract Clauses, ¶ 7 (Government Furnished Property (GFP)). As explained by Richard Cripps, the Appellant's President, at the hearing, since the Appellant is in business to print the product which the customer wants, when it is confronted by two (2) different sets of guidelines to go by, namely, a specification and a sample, as here, it must clarify which one controls; i.e., does the customer want something that looks like the sample, or a product which is in accordance with the specifications (Tr. 136). 11 At the hearing, Cripps testified that he did not consider the copy of the specimen check to be the security background "sample" required by the contract (Tr. 147-48; App. Exh. No. 1). Instead, he thought that it was an "example", not a "sample"; a "sample" would have been an exact replica of the SPF the Appellant was expected to produce (Tr. 146, 147). 12 As explained by Gallagher at the hearing, notwithstanding the absence of a proofing requirement in the specifications, the Contractor deemed it advisable to offer the Respondent one anyway, in accordance with standard industry practice, because this was a half a million dollar contract (Tr. 23-24, 43). 13 At the hearing, Leonard testified that there was nothing unusual about GPO's refusal to evaluate the Contractor's proof, because the Government normally will not accept proofs when the contract does not require them (Tr. 274, 314). In this case, the VA did not ask for proofs, and GPO did not add a proofing requirement to the specification because not only would it add a cost to the contract, but it would also have shifted the burden of responsibility for the quality of the product to the Government (Tr. 274-75, 314). Furthermore, the Appellant's proofs were unnecessary because the Respondent had already furnished the negatives to the Contractor (Tr. 314). GPO's decision not to evaluate the Appellant's prior-to-production proofs was consistent with the agency's policy regarding unsolicited samples. See, Printing Procurement Regulation, GPO Publication 305.3 (Rev. 10-90), Chap. XII, Sec. 4, ¶ 3 (hereinafter PPR). See also, Hurt's Printing Company, Inc., GPO BCA 27-92 (January 21, 1994), Sl. op. at 23-28, 1994 WL 275098. On the other hand, the fact that proofs are not required does not alter a contractor's obligation to perform in accordance with the contract terms. See, Fry Communications, Inc./InfoConversion Joint Venture, GPO BCA 7-84 (July 9, 1986), Sl. op. at 12-13, 1986 WL 181458. 14 According to the Leonard's testimony at the hearing, the standard for measuring the job was the specification (Tr. 266-67). Insofar as the "VOID" pantograph is concerned, the only performance test for the pantograph is a simple one- photocopying either produces three legible and readable "VOIDs" or it doesn't (Tr. 267-68). 15 On the other hand, the Appellant does not believe that the only successful "VOID" pantograph would be one which copied on all photocopiers, because, in Cripps' view, such performance is simply not possible (Tr. 229-30). According to Cripps' testimony, there are many different "VOID" dropout patterns commercially available, and not all of them will copy on all copy machines; indeed, they may not even copy on most copiers (Tr. 241, 252-53). In fact, Cripps said he conducted an experiment with various "VOID" pantograph products and could defeat the security feature by moving the image down to the lightest setting on the copier (Tr. 243). 16 As required by GPO Contract Terms: "Contractors must have a quality control system that will assure product quality acceptable to the Government." GPO Contract Terms, Supplemental Specifications, ¶ 1.(c) (Quality); Contract Clauses, ¶ 14 (Inspection and Tests). Cripps testified that the Appellant photocopied samples of the form on several machines with varying degrees of success, but it would always copy; i.e, the word "VOID" would appear on all manipulations of the photocopier, including the darker and lighter settings, although on the darker settings the background tended to be mottled (Tr. 157). 17 Although the contract called for the Appellant to make the initial shipment by July 27, 1992, the record reveals that only 71,680 pads were received by the VA on that date (R4 File, Tab G). The balance-28,320 pads-was delayed because the Contractor's numbering machine had malfunctioned, and the error was not discovered until the pads had been packed for shipment (Tr. 9; R4 File, Tab F; App. Exh. No. 4). Consequently, those pads of SPFs had to be renumbered and repacked, and were not delivered to the VA until August 4, 1992 (R4 File, Tabs F and G; App. Exh. No. 4). Furthermore, it seems that the customer-agency wanted the SPFs shipped by a special type of delivery service called "signature service," but that requirement was inadvertently omitted from the original specifications (R4 File, Tab G; App. Exh. No. 4). Both of these problems were cured by Contract Modification No. 1, dated August 4, 1992, which extended the date for shipping the balance of the first lot of SPFs to August 4, 1992, and amended the contract to provide that the rest of the job, including the balance of the first shipment, should be sent by "signature service" (R4 File, Tab G). 18 Among other things, the VA also voiced its concern about the solid or screen tints color match (Printing Attribute No. 9), the use of darker blue ink; and the prescription numbers being printed in [the] wrong area (Tr. 261; R4 File, Tab H). In addition, the customer-agency made several minor complaints regarding the way the Appellant packaged the SPFs for delivery-e.g., cartons not sequential, carton numbers mixed on pallets, pallets not numbered, pallets not wrapped securely, etc.-but these were never seriously considered by GPO even though they might have been grounds for returning the shipment to the Contractor (Tr. 290). 19 With regard to the other defects, the VA's complaint about the ink color match is discussed in note 25 infra. As for the other problems mentioned by the customer-agency, Nowalk concluded that they were not enough to support rejection of the forms (R4 File, Tab K). This was confirmed by Leonard during his telephone conversation with Gallagher on August 17, 1992 (Tr. 31, 46; App. Exh. No. 4). See also, R4 File, Tab M. 20 In the opinion of the Contracting Officer, Hooks properly placed the Appellant on notice of the problem with the SPFs, but should not have told Gallagher to stop the job, leaving that decision to the Contractor (Tr. 306-07). On the other hand, Leonard also testified that if he was the Appellant: ". . . I would have pulled the job off the press until the problem was straightened out." (Tr. 307). 21 With respect to the ink, under the specifications the Contractor was allowed to pick whatever screen it wanted so long as the ink matched Pantone 287 blue (Tr. 132). A difference in the screens used can account for a color variation in the same Pantone ink (Tr. 133; App. Exh. Nos. 6 and 7). 22 As became clear during the hearing, there was a major design problem with the original printing of the SPFs, namely, the Government had made an error with respect to the placement of the sequential numbers on the form (Tr. 75-76). Leonard testified that the VA never specifically said anything to him about the erroneous location of the numbers, and he only became aware of the problem later (Tr. 263, 299). But see, R4 File, Tab H ("Numbers printed in wrong area"). Regardless, Leonard asserted that the numbering problem had nothing to do with rejection of the job (Tr. 299). However, the parties did stipulate that: (a) the Contractor had placed the numbers in the proper place on the original SPFs and the printed forms conformed to the specifications in that respect; (b) because the number was not where the VA wanted it on the original SPFs, the forms were not usable even if the "VOID" pantograph had copied correctly; and (c) nonetheless, if there had been no other problems-i.e., if the "VOID" dropout pattern had reproduced by electrostatic means, as required by the specifications-the Government would have accepted and paid for the forms (Tr. 63, 75, 79-80, 304-05). 23 The letter was signed by another Contracting Officer, John Adams (Tr. 277). 24 The drawing and the sample were sent to the Appellant both by facsimile transmission and overnight mail. In that regard, the record testimony discloses that App. Exh. No. 6, the sample of the prior SPF job, is probably the one which the Contractor had been told did not exist (Tr. 37, 39, 137). 25 At the outset of the hearing, the parties were at odds over whether the Appellant had used the proper ink color for the original printing of the SPFs. Like the previous contract performed by Standard Register, the Appellant's contract required "a match of Pantone 287 blue ink" (R4 File, Tab A, p. 2; App. Exh. No. 2, p. 2). Cripps testified that the Standard Register forms actually used a darker color ink, which was preferable because it allowed for better copying of the "VOID" pantograph (Tr. 134-35, 137, 139; App. Exh. Nos. 6 and 7). Cripps also stated that if the GFM had included a proper sample of the job, he would have questioned the ink color and sought a clarification from GPO (Tr. 135; App. Exh. No. 6). On the other hand, Leonard testified that his examination of the rejected SPFs clearly showed a color fluctuation in the product which inhibited proper copying of the forms (Tr. 286-88). As he saw it, while none of the forms met the specifications with respect to reproductive quality, the lighter colored SPFs copied better than the darker ones (Tr. 288). Leonard also testified that although the VA had complained to GPO about the ink color match on the original SPFs, Nowalk never bothered to test the quality of that printing attribute or make a determination concerning the color, inspecting the forms instead only for the failure of the "VOID" pantograph to copy as required, the most obvious defect (Tr. 289-90, 293-94; R4 File, Tabs H and K). Even so, notwithstanding what he saw as an obvious color difference in the samples of the rejected forms, Leonard was unable to say conclusively that the variation in the ink itself was the reason for the "VOID" pantograph not copying (Tr. 290. 291). In addition, although Nowalk did not testify, Gallagher's notes of his conversation with Nowalk on August 27, 1992, contains the following entry: "I told him (Nowalk) . . . that J. Leonard had indicated that even the ink color was wrong - John (Nowalk) said the ink color was OK and disputed that J. Leonard had told me it was wrong." See, App. Exh. No. 4. Finally, at the close of the hearing, the parties stipulated that the ink color of the original printing was close enough to Pantone 287 blue that the forms would not have been rejected because of failure to meet the color specifications for the job (Tr. 328). 26 Leonard testified that a simple press-sheet inspection was within the prerogative of the VA, but only GPO had the authority to make changes to the contract (Tr. 311). See, GPO Contract Terms, Contract Clauses, ¶ 1 (Contractual Responsibility). He also said that generally if a customer- agency approves the press-sheet at such an inspection, GPO does not hear about it (Tr. 312). 27 Cripps concluded that Lee's sample forms were not produced by the Contractor because, inter alia: (a) the ink color was darker than Pantone 287; and (b) they did not have a red sequential number on them, as did all of the SPFs shipped by the Appellant (Tr. 98). 28 The parties stipulated that it is unknown whether or not these SPFs were either accepted or rejected by the Government (Tr. 193). 29 These were the pads that were printed and ready for delivery when the Appellant was ordered to stop shipping the forms (Tr. 198). 30 The specification called for the number to be 1-3/4" from the "top edge" of the form (R4 File, Tab A, p. 2, "Numbering" specification). According to the Appellant, the VA's problem with the number placement stemmed from the fact that the location measurement was from the top and not the bottom of the form, which would have been consistent with printing industry practice (R4 File, Tab W, p. 3). Consequently, for the number to be exactly where the VA wanted it, namely, at the top of the number box, the measurements in the specification should have required the top and bottom of the number to be approximately 1-1/8 and 1-3/8 inches, respectively (R4 File, Tab W, p. 3). 31 See also, note 22 supra. 32 At the hearing, Leonard testified that unless a customer- agency complains, GPO assumes the product has met the specifications (Tr. 295). Thus, the samples of the original shipment of SPFs were only tested after the VA complained (Tr. 296-97, 298). Since the VA did not complain to the Respondent about the reprint, GPO presumed that those forms were satisfactory to the customer-agency. 33 As agreed by the parties, the Appellant was to begin delivery of the reprint order with 12.24 million forms being shipped on or before September 11, 1992 (R4 File, Tab O). Apparently, because of the press-sheet inspection, and the fact that Lee had to agree to the numbering system, the first shipment was not made until September 18, 1992 (R4 File, Tab U). For the same reason, the shipping schedule for the remaining four installments of the reprinted order was revised, as reflected in Contract Modification No. 2, issued by GPO on September 24, 1992 (R4 File, Tab R). Under the adjusted schedule, the Contractor was to deliver the rest of the reprinted SPFs as follows: (a) three separate shipments of 12.24 million forms (122,400 pads) each on October 1, 1992, October 8, 1992, and October 13, 1992, respectively; and (b) a final shipment of 11.04 million forms (110,400 pads) on October 16, 1992 (R4 File, Tabs R and U). 34 The R4 File contains copies of the form reproduced on three different photocopiers-a Kodak 90E, a Kodak Ektaprint 300, and an unidentified copier (R4 File, Tab V). The Kodak 90E copy shows the "VOID" pantograph clearly, while the copies from both the Kodak Ektaprint 300 and the unidentified copy machine are extremely light, although visible to the naked eye. There is nothing in the record to indicate if the unmarked copy was produced on the copy machine in Leonard's office, which he testified was a three or four-year old Canon photocopier (Tr. 262). Furthermore, the Board cannot tell if these copies were made from the original forms, or are copies of the reprinted SPFs which were tested at the meeting on September 11, 1992, and found satisfactory (R4 File, Tab X). 35 The 19,600,000 forms originally printed by the Appellant represents about 32.7 percent of the entire order of 60,000,000 SPFs. Thus, at the contract price of $533,000.00, the Contractor is claiming reimbursement from the Government of $174,291.00. Of this amount, $89,011.00 would be the price of the initial shipment of 10,000,000 forms, which was 16.7 percent of the entire order. 36 The Contracting Officer took issue with the Appellant's contention that the Government had rejected all 19,600,000 forms, stating instead that only 100,000 pads (10,000,000 forms) were covered by his letter of August 27, 1992 (R4 File, Tab X, p. 1). Furthermore, Leonard disagreed with the Contractor's understanding that the parties would test random samples from the 96,000 pads which were still at the plant, stating his belief that only forms which were delivered to the VA would be evaluated (R4 File, Tab X, p. 1). However, during the hearing, the Contracting Officer had a change of heart, and offered to examine the forms on the Appellant's premises. See, note 81 infra. 37 For obvious reasons, the Appellant's samples were drawn from the unshipped forms in its plant, while the Respondent's samples were taken from the rejected shipment itself (Tr. 111, 114, 212, 279-80). 38 Five of the Appellant's exhibits-App. Exh. Nos. 7, 9, 19, 20, and 21-are not relevant to these proceedings, and have not been considered by the Board. App. Exh. No. 7 is a copy of the sample form which Lee brought to the press-sheet inspection and which was originally printed by another contractor, while App. Exh. No. 19 is a copy of that form reproduced on the Board's Monroe photocopier (Tr. 94-96, 116, 190-92, 203). Apart from the fact that during the hearing both the Appellant and the Respondent discovered that the Board's copy machine is a poor one by anyone's standard (Tr. 124, 325), the simple truth is that App. Exh. Nos. 7 and 19 were not generated from copies of the SPFs rejected by the Respondent. Similarly, App. Exh. Nos. 9, 20 and 21 are copies of the press-sheet of the reprint approved by Lee (App. Exh. No. 8), made on different photocopiers at various locations in Emporia, and offices in GPO (Tr. 109, 118, 121, 196-97, 204, 253, 325-26). As the hearing testimony revealed, the approved press-sheet furnished the quality control standard for the reprinted SPFs (Tr. 218, 252, 313, 324), and thus, by definition, App. Exh. Nos. 9, 20 and 21 are unrelated to the issue in this case which deals with the rejected forms. For the same reason, the Board has not considered the copies of the approved press-sheet on App. Exh. Nos. 12, 13, 15 16 and 18, although it has examined copies of the rejected SPFs on those same exhibits. It should be noted that during the hearing both parties unsuccessfully attempted to reproduce the "VOID" pantograph from the approved press-sheet on photocopy machines in GPO (Tr. 325-26; App. Exh. No. 21). Indeed, the Respondent stipulated that App. Exh. No. 8-the standard for the reprint- would have been rejected by the Government if it had been subjected to the same quality control tests as the original printing of the SPFs (Tr. 326-27). In fact, the Contracting Officer could find no better reason than "incompetence" to explain why the VA accepted a reprint which was clearly rejectable according to his tests (Tr. 327). Regardless, for the reasons already stated, the Board believes that App. Exh. No. 21, is irrelevant to this appeal. 39 Cripps testified on cross-examination that although most copies of the SPFs were made on normal photocopier settings, a few were reproduced on lighter machine settings (Tr. 200-01). However, Appellant's Counsel stated that he had removed the manipulated copies and used only the ones from normal settings for exhibits (Tr. 202). 40 Although the location of the photocopier used to create App. Exh. No. 17 is not identified on the exhibit, the hearing record would seem to indicate that it, like App. Exh. No. 18, is a product of the Appellant's copy machine (Tr. 123). 41 During the hearing, the question arose as to the cause of the intensity variation in the "VOID" pantograph on the copies of the SPFs in App. Exh. Nos. 10-18 (Tr. 123). The Appellant believed that the variation was the result of differences in the photocopiers themselves (Tr. 124). The Respondent, on the other hand, thought that an obvious variation in the color density of the ink used during the production process caused the different intensities in the copies of the Contractor's forms; i.e., the lighter the color the better the reproduction (Tr. 286-88). Since the Appellant made just one copy of each SPF in the above exhibits, and the lack of uniformity in the color of the originals is, as Counsel for GPO suggests, clearly visible to the naked eye (Tr. 328), the Board tends to agree with the explanation offered by the Respondent. Regardless of the reasons for the intensity variation in the "VOID" pantograph on App. Exh. Nos. 10-18, the fact remains that the word "VOID" reproduces in three places on the form, and moreover, the parties stipulated that the color of the blue ink used in the original printing of the SPFs was a close enough match to Pantone 287 that the forms would not have been rejected for a failure to meet the color requirements of the specifications (Tr. 328). 42 From its review of R. Exh. No. 1, the Board's curiosity was piqued by the fact that for some reason a particular SPF sample would copy differently on different photocopiers. For example, on SPF No. 93216556 the "VOID" pantograph appeared clearly as specified on the Savin 7500, but only the horizontal word "VOID" reproduced on the Konica 3290 and Kodak Ektaprint 150, while just the horizontal word "VOID" and a few letters of the vertical word were visible on the Savin 7230, and nothing at all reproduced on the Canon NP-8580. However, it is not necessary to solve this puzzle in the context of this decision since the main issue in this appeal concerns the contract specifications themselves. See, Report of Prehearing Telephone Conference, dated September 23, 1993, pp. 6-7 (hereinafter RPTC). 43 The Board settled the record in this case on April 6, 1994. See, Professional Printing of Kansas, Inc., GPO BCA 02-93, Order Settling the Record, dated April 6, 1994. After the record was settled, the Appellant wrote to the Board and informed it of two changes which the Respondent made in the follow-on contract for the SPFs (Jacket No. 364-170), namely: (a) the "VOID" pantograph feature was eliminated and a different security device was specified; and (b) the Government now requires production samples as part of the terms of the contract. See, Letter from Rick Cripps, President, Professional Printing of Kansas, Inc. to the Board, dated November 30, 1994. The obvious purpose of the Contractor's letter was to support its contention that the "PRINTING" specification in its contract was defective, and that by changing the specifications the Government, in effect, had admitted as much. However, the settled rule is that, absent unusual circumstances, evidence proffered for admission after the record has been settled will not be accepted. See, Sterling Printing, Inc., GPO BCA 20-89, Decision on Motion for Reconsideration and Order (July 5, 1994), Sl. op. at 12 , 1994 WL 377592 (citing, Goetz Demolition Company, ASBCA Nos. 40605, 41346, 93-2 BCA ¶ 25,886; Pascal Redfern, PSBCA No. 1512, 87-3 BCA ¶ 19,1983; Polarad Electronics Corporation, ASBCA No. 20636, 79-1 BCA ¶ 13,777; Canadian Commercial Corporation, ASBCA No. 17187, 76-2 BCA ¶ 12,145. See also, Marshall Logging, Inc., ASBCA No. 87-283-1, 88-2 BCA ¶ 20,726; Jim Davis, AGBCA Nos. 86-103-1, 86-104-1, 86-1 BCA ¶ 18,634). This principle is specifically incorporated in the Board's procedural rules. See, Board Rules, Rule 13(b) ("Except as the Board may otherwise order in its discretion, no proof shall be received in evidence after completion of an oral hearing, nor in cases submitted on the record will proof be received after notification by the Board that the case is ready for decision."). Accord, Sunshine Cordage Corporation, ASBCA No. 38904, 90-1 BCA ¶ 22,572; USD Technologies, Inc., ASBCA No. 31305, 87-2 BCA ¶ 19,680 at 99,616, aff'd, 845 F.2d 1033 (Fed. Cir. 1988). As the Board has noted: "This well- established rule is really nothing more than a judicial proscription against a party having `two bites at the apple.'" See, Sterling Printing, Inc., supra, Decision on Motion for Reconsideration and Order, Sl. op. at 13 (citing, Goetz Demolition Company, supra, 93-2 BCA at 128,768). Accordingly, the Appellant's letter of November 30, 1994, has not been considered in deciding this appeal. 44 Both parties waived oral argument at the hearing (Tr. 336-37). However, as mentioned at the outset, each party filed a posthearing brief with the Board. The Appellant's brief was filed with the Board on December 9, 1993. The Respondent submitted a brief to the Board on January 5, 1994. Neither party filed a reply brief. Accordingly, the Board's understanding of the positions of the parties is based on: (a) the Appellant's Complaint, dated February 16, 1993; (b) the Respondent's Answer, dated March 16, 1993; (c) the Report of Prehearing Telephone Conference, dated September 21, 1993; (d) the evidence presented at the hearing on October 13 and 14, 1993; and (e) the formal briefs filed by the parties. 45 With respect to its allegation that the "PRINTING" specification is ambiguous, the Appellant's argues that the ambiguity is latent, not patent, and the doctrine of contra proferentum should be applied against the Government in this case. See, App. Brf., pp. 22-24 (citing, Newsom v. United States, 230 Ct. Cl. 301, 303, 676 F.2d 647, 650-51 (1982); Chris Berg, Inc. v. United States, 455 F.2d 1037, 1045 (Ct.Cl. 1972); Max Drill, Inc. v. United States, 192 Ct. Cl. 608, 626, 427 F.2d 1233, 1244 (1970); City Electric Anchorage, Inc., ASBCA Nos. 6570, 6675, 6856, 62 BCA ¶ 3,435; Brezina Construction Company, Inc., ASBCA No. 5750, 60-1 BCA ¶ 2,611). As for the "Government error" issue, the Contractor simply states that the "NUMBERING" specification was design in nature, and under prevailing law it was entitled to rely on it in printing the forms, so it cannot be held accountable for the fact that the rejected forms would have been worthless to the VA. See, App. Brf., p. 28. 46 For the "superior knowledge" doctrine to apply all of the following conditions must be present: (a) the Government has information which it knows or should know is required for the contractor's performance; (b) the Government does not disclose that essential information; (c) the Government knows or should know that the contractor lacks the information or knowledge and either has no reason to obtain it or is unlikely to do so; (d) the contract misleads the contractor, or fails to give notice that it is necessary to ask the Government about its specialized knowledge; and (e) the contractor's lack of knowledge or possession of the information causes increased costs or prevents performance of the contract. App. Brf., at p. 11 (citing, American Ship Building Company v. United States, 654 F.2d 75, 79 (Ct.Cl. 1981); ECOS Management Criteria, Inc., VABCA No. 2058, 86-2 BCA ¶ 18,885, at 78,579). 47 Petrofsky v. United States, 616 F.2d 494 (Ct.Cl. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 968 (1981). 48 The Appellant tells us that estoppel arises when the following four conditions are met: (a) the Government knows or has reason to know the material facts; (b) the Government either intends that its conduct or statements be acted upon or acts in such a manner as to give the contractor that impression; (c) the contractor must not have knowledge of the material fact known by the Government; and (d) the contractor detrimentally relies on the Government's conduct or statements. App. Brf., p. 16 (citing, Heckler v. Community Health Services of Crawford County, 467 U.S. 51 (1984); OAO Corporation v. United States, 17 Cl. Ct. 91, 104 (1989); Granite Construction Company, ENG BCA No. 4642, 89-3 BCA ¶ 21,946, at 110,395 (1989)). Whether or not these equitable estoppel elements have been satisfied is a question of fact. Id. (citing, Tidewater Equipment Company v. Reliance Insurance Company, 650 F.2d 503, 506 (4th Cir. 1981)). 49 The thrust of the Appellant's argument is that the process of correcting the proof would have provided the vehicle for informing the Contractor that it could have used an alternate ink and that the prescription number had been relocated on the form. App. Brf., p. 18. 50 The Appellant also observes that even if the four conditions supporting an estoppel are established, equitable relief cannot be granted unless it is also shown that the Government employee(s) who made the misrepresentations or concealed the material facts possessed the actual authority to deal with the contractor. App. Brf., p. 19 (citing, Federal Crop Insurance Corporation v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380 (1947); Manloading and Management Associates, Inc. v. United States, 461 F.2d 1299 (Ct.Cl. 1972)). The Contractor points out that here it dealt with two GPO Contracting Officers, Adams and Leonard, who are authorized by the PPR and GPO Contract Terms to make all determinations and decisions with regard to the contract. See, PPR, Chap. I, Sec. 3, ¶ 2(d); GPO Contract Terms, Contract Clauses, ¶ 1 (Contractual Responsibility). Furthermore, Hooks, the Contract Administrator for this contract, served as a conduit between the Appellant and the Contracting Officers from time-to-time. However, the authority of the Government's agents in this case has never been seriously questioned by any one. 51 As noted by the Appellant, the law makes a distinction between "design specifications" and "performance specifications". App. Brf., pp. 24-25 (citing, Johns Manville Corporation v. United States, 13 Cl. Ct. 72, 119 (1987); Aerodex, Inc., ASBCA No. 7121, 62 BCA ¶ 3492). "Performance specifications" are specifications which do not detail the materials and methods to be employed, but rather "set forth an objective or standard to be achieved" by the contractor, who assumes the responsibility for selecting the means to accomplish that objective or standard. App. Brf., p. 25 (citing, J.L. Simmons Company Inc. v. United States, supra, 412 F.2d at 1363. Basically, as the Contractor points out, under a pure performance contract, a contractor has "complete discretion to determine how it would perform that work." App. Brf., p. 25 (citing, R.J. Crowley, Inc. v. United States, 923 F.2d 871, 874 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (quoting, Stuyvesant Dredging Company v. United States, 834 F.2d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1987)). 52 Whether or not the contract is primarily design or performance can be determined by looking at both the original contract, the relationship of the parties, and the duties undertaken by each. App. Brf., p. 26 (citing, Mac Company v. United States, 467 F.2d 1323, 1325 (Ct.Cl. 1972)). 53 In addition, the Appellant argues that these same facts also allow it to avoid liability for the allegedly defective product by means of the so-called "impossibility of performance" doctrine. App. Brf., p. 29 (citing, Dynaelectron Corporation v. United States, 518 F.2d 594, 602 (Ct.Cl. 1975); Hol-Gar Manufacturing Corporation v. United States, supra). 54 Indeed, the Appellant's arguments to the contrary notwithstanding, the Respondent contends that the record evidence seems to suggest that a lighter color ink, rather than a darker one, reproduces better. R. Brf., pp. 11-12. To GPO, the Contractor's problems with regard to copying the forms stemmed from its own printing process which resulted in a visible color variation between pads. R. Brf., p. 12. 55 The record on which the Board's decision is based consists of: (1) the Notice of Appeal, dated January 11, 1993; (2) the R4 File (Tabs A-X); (3) the Complaint, dated February 16, 1993; (4) the Respondent's Answer, dated March 16, 1993; (5) the Report of Prehearing Telephone Conference, dated September 21, 1993; (6) the transcript of the hearing held on October 13-14, 1993; (7) the exhibits submitted by the parties' at the hearing with the exception of App. Exh. Nos. 7, 9, 19, 20, and 21; (8) the brief filed by the Appellant on December 9, 1993; and (9) the brief submitted by the Respondent on January 5, 1994. 56 See, note 22 supra. 57 As a rule, a party is bound by its stipulations, see, Morelock v. NCR Corporation, 586 F.2d 1096, 1107 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 906, 99 S.Ct. 1995 (1979), and such evidentiary agreements freely entered into are controlling and conclusive on all issues of fact, see, Bromley Contracting Company, Inc. v. United States, 14 Cl. Ct. 69, 74 (1987), aff'd, 861 F.2d 729 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (citing, Gersham & Company v. United States, 200 Ct. Cl. 97, 112, 470 F.2d 542, 551 (1972)). A court or board may reject a factual stipulation if it is "demonstrably false" or contrary to the facts in the record. See, Dillon, Read & Company, Inc. v. United States, 875 F.2d 293 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Bromley Contracting Company, Inc. v. United States, supra, 14 Cl. Ct. at 74 (citing, Kaminer Construction Corporation v. United States, 203 Ct. Cl. 182, 197, 488 F.2d 980, 988 (1973)). On the other hand, stipulations representing conclusions of law are not binding on the boards or courts. See, Bromley Contracting Company, Inc. v. United States, supra, 14 Cl. Ct. at 74 (citing, Swift & Company v. Hocking Valley Railroad, 243 U.S. 281, 289, 37 S.Ct, 287, 289-90, 61 L.Ed. 722 (1917)); Hegeman-Harris & Company v. United States, 194 Ct. Cl. 574, 581, 440 F.2d 1009, 1012 (1971); Sac and Fox Tribe of Indians v. United States, 161 Ct. Cl. 189, 198, 315 F.2d 896, 901, cert. denied, 375 U.S. 921, 84 S.Ct. 266, 11 L.Ed.2d 165 (1963)); Reynolds Construction, Inc., ASBCA No. 32047, 89-3 BCA ¶ 22,126. 58 In any event, the Appellant's contention is tantamount to an allegation that the Government was acting in bad faith. The Board has held on many occasions that because of the strong presumption that Government officials properly and honestly carry out their functions, an allegation of bad faith must be established by "well-nigh irrefragable" proof. See, e.g., Universal Printing Company, GPO BCA 09-90 (June 22, 1994), Sl. op. at 24, fn. 24, 1994 WL 377586; Sterling Printing, Inc., GPO BCA 20-89 (March 28, 1994), Sl. op. at 34-35, fn. 46, 1994 WL 275104; B. P. Printing and Office Supplies, GPO BCA 14-91 (August 10, 1992), Sl. op. at 16, 1992 WL 382917; The Standard Register Company, GPO BCA 4-86 (October 28, 1987), Sl. op. at 12-13, 1987 WL 228972. Accord, Karpak Data and Design, IBCA No. 2944 et al., 93-1 BCA ¶ 25,360; Local Contractors, Inc., ASBCA No. 37108, 92-1 BCA ¶ 24,491. The key to such evidence is that there must be a showing of a specific intent on the part of the Government to injure the contractor. Kalvar Corporation v. United States, 543 F.2d 1298, 1302 (Ct.Cl. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 830 (1977). See, Stephenson, Inc., GPO BCA 2-88 (December 20, 1991) Sl. op. at 54, 1991 WL 439274. In the Board's view, no such "irrefragable" proof of bad faith exists in this record. Certainly, there is absolutely nothing to show that the employees of two separate Government entities-GPO and the VA-set out to harm the Appellant or that they acted in concert to achieve that specific result. See, e.g., Universal Printing Company, supra, Sl. op. at 24, fn 24; Sterling Printing, Inc., supra, Sl. op. at 23, fn. 35; Stephenson, Inc., supra, Sl. op. at 57. 59 In French/Bray, Inc., the Board found "as a matter of contract interpretation, and thus of law," inter alia, that "the determination of whether or not such burden has been met lies solely with the [GPO], provided that the [GPO] does not render its determination arbitrarily or capriciously but rather does so objectively by adhering to the testing and sampling standards of QATAP. . . . Thus, if the [GPO] shows that it has adhered to the contractual standards for testing, inspection, and determination of product quality, its determination must be upheld. [Original emphasis.]" See, French/Bray, Inc., GPO BCA 18-85 (October 23, 1986), Sl. op. at 17, 1986 WL 181454. See also, Mid-American Business Forms Corporation, GPO BCA 8-87 (December 30, 1988), 1988 WL 363330; Geographics, Inc., GPO BCA 8-85 (January 8, 1987), 1987 WL 228966; Product of Information Systems, GPO BCA 7-85 (November 25, 1986), 1986 WL 216057; The Standard Register Company, supra. 60 Contrary to the Respondent, the Board does not believe that the Contractor has abandoned its argument that the contract is ambiguous. See, R. Brf., pp. 5, 8. Instead, the Board sees Counsel for the Appellant merely doing in his brief what most good advocates do in pursuing a claim-raising as many possible alternative theories for relief as the facts may support. FED. R. CIV. P. 10(b). 61 Such contrary interpretations often happen when parties become locked in litigation; i.e., extreme positions are taken which no party really believes as a practical matter. In that regard, the evidence clearly shows conduct by both parties which tends to contradict their position on the record. On the one hand, the record tells us that the Appellant believed it would be necessary for the form to copy on more than one photocopy machine to satisfy the Government (Tr. 164, 229-30). On the other, the evidence shows the Respondent was not looking for perfection; i.e, GPO tested samples of the SPFs on several different photocopiers before it concluded that the forms were unsatisfactory (Tr. 261-62, 266). 62 Contract interpretation is clearly a question of law. See, Fry Communications, Inc.-InfoConversion Joint Venture v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct. 497, 503 (Cl.Ct. 1991); General Business Forms, Inc., GPO BCA 2-84 (December 3, 1985), Sl. op. at 16, 1985 WL 154846 (citing, John C. Grimberg Company v. United States, 7 Ct. Cl. 452 (1985)); RD Printing Associates, Inc., GPO BCA 02-92 (December 16, 1992), Sl. op. at 13, 1992 WL 516088. See also, Fortec Contractors v. United States, 760 F.2d 1288, 1291 (Fed.Cir. 1985); P.J. Maffei Building Wrecking Company v. United States, 732 F.2d 913, 916 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Pacificorp Capital, Inc. v. United States, 25 Cl. Ct. 707, 715 (1992), aff'd 988 F.2d 130 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Ralph Construction, Inc. v. United States, 4 Cl. Ct. 727, 731 (1984) (citing, Torncello v. United States, 681 F.2d 756, 760 (Ct.Cl. 1982)); Hol-Gar Manufacturing Corp. v. United States, 169 Ct. Cl. 384, 386, 351 F.2d 972, 973 (1965). Any decision by this Board concerning such a matter is reviewable by the Courts under the Wunderlich Act, 41 U.S.C. §§ 321, 322. See, Fry Communications, Inc./ InfoConversion Joint Venture v. United States, supra, 22 Cl.Ct. at 501, fn. 6; General Business Forms, Inc., supra, Sl. op. at 16. 63 The United States Claims Court has observed that: "[a] mere dispute over the terms does not constitute an ambiguity, and an interpretation which is merely possible is not necessarily reasonable." Ceccanti, Inc. v. United States, 6 Cl. Ct. 526, 528 (1984). An ambiguity must have two or more reasonable interpretations and the intent of the parties must not be determinable by the normal rules of interpretation. McDonald & Eudy Printers, Inc., supra, Sl. op. at 14, fn. 12; R.C. Swanson Printing and Typesetting Company, supra, Sl. op. at 42. See also, International Business Investments, Inc. v. United States, 17 Cl. Ct. 122 (1989), aff'd, 895 F.2d 1421 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (contract terms are not rendered ambiguous by the mere fact that the parties disagree as to their meaning; there must be reasonable uncertainty of meaning); Perry & Wallis, Inc. v. United States, 192 Ct. Cl. 310, 315, 427 F.2d 722, 725 (1970) (quoting, Bishop Engineering Company v. United States, 180 Ct. Cl. 411, 416 (1967)). 64 In such cases, the doctrine of contra proferentem applies and the dispute language will be construed against the drafter, see, Fry Communications, Inc./InfoConversion Joint Venture v. United States, supra, 22 Cl. Ct. at 503 (citing, William F. Klingensmith, Inc. v. United States, 205 Ct. Cl. 651, 657 (1974)); Web Business Forms, Inc., supra, Sl. op. at 18, fn. 18; R.C. Swanson Printing and Typesetting Company, supra, Sl. op. at 41, fn. 22, if the non-drafter can show that he/she relied on the alternative reasonable interpretation in submitting his/her bid, see, Web Business Forms, Inc., supra, Sl. op. at 19, fn. 18; Fry Communications, Inc./ InfoConversion Joint Venture v. United States, supra, 22 Cl. Ct. at 510 (citing, Fruin-Colon Corporation v. United States, 912 F.2d 1426, 1430 (Fed. Cir. 1990)); Lear Siegler Management Services v. United States, 867 F.2d 600, 603 (Fed. Cir. 1989)). 65 Where there are such discrepancies, errors, or gaps, the contractor has an affirmative obligation to ask the contracting officer to clarify the true meaning of the contract language before submitting its bid. See, Interstate General Government Contractors, Inc. v. Stone, 980 F.2d 1433 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Fry Communications, Inc./InfoConversion Joint Venture v. United States, supra, 22 Cl. Ct. at 504 (citing, Newsom v. United States, supra, 230 Ct. Cl. at 303; Enrico Roman, Inc. v. United States, 2 Cl. Ct. 104, 106 (1983); S.O.G. of Arkansas v. United States, 212 Ct.Cl. 125, 546 F.2d 367 (1976); Beacon Construction v. United States, 314 F.2d 501 (Ct.Cl. 1963)). See also, Universal Construction Company, NASA BCA No. 83-1092, 93-3 BCA ¶ 26,173; Harwood Construction Company, NASA BCA No. 1165-45, 68-1 BCA ¶ 6768. 66 The purpose of any rule of contract interpretation is to carry out the intent of the parties. Hegeman-Harris & Company, supra, 194 Ct. Cl. 574, 440 F.2d 1009. The test for ascertaining intent is an objective one; i.e., the question is what would a reasonable contractor have understood, not what did the drafter subjectively intend. Corbetta Construction Company v. United States, 198 Ct. Cl. 712, 461 F.2d 1330 (1972). See also, Salem Engineering and Construction Corporation v. United States, supra, 2 Cl. Ct. at 806. The provisions of the contract itself should provide the evidence of the objective intent of the parties. 67 It is unnecessary to set forth in detail the rules of contract construction which apply when interpreting an agreement. Suffice it to say that, within the contract itself, ordinary terms are to be given their plain and ordinary meaning in defining the rights and obligations of the parties. See, Elden v. United States, 223 Ct. Cl. 239, 617 F.2d 254 (1980). Similarly, technical terms are given their technical meaning. See, Coastal Drydock and Repair Corporation, ASBCA No. 31894, 87-1 BCA ¶ 19,618; Industrial Finishers, Inc., ASBCA No. 6537, 61-1 BCA ¶ 3,091. Likewise, terms special to Government contracts will be given their technical meanings. See, General Builders Supply Company v. United States, 187 Ct. Cl. 477, 409 F.2d 246 (1969) (meaning of "equitable adjustment"). As for extrinsic evidence of the intent of the parties, the rules of construction allow, inter alia, custom and trade usage to explain or define terms. See, W. G. Cornell Company v. United States, 179 Ct. Cl. 651, 376 F.2d 199 (1967); Harold Bailey Painting Company, ASBCA No. 27064, 87-1 BCA ¶ 19,601 (used to define "spot painting"). However, custom and trade usage may not contradict clear or unambiguous terms. See, WRB Corporation v. United States, 183 Ct. Cl. 409, 436 (1968). 68 There are the contract specifications concerning "QUALITY ASSURANCE LEVELS AND STANDARDS" and "QUALITY ASSURANCE RANDOM SAMPLES," and, of course, QATAP is incorporated by reference (R4 File, Tab A, pp. 1-3). The Board notes that although the "QUALITY ASSURANCE RANDOM SAMPLES" specification told the Contractor that it might be required to submit quality assurance random copies to test for compliance against the specifications, there is no evidence in the record that the Government ever asked for such samples. 69 The Board has also observed that specifications serve the purpose of eliciting and defining the essential qualities necessary in the procured product, and that the Government has a right to get exactly what it asked for in the solicitation. See, Automated Datatron, Inc., GPO BCA Nos. 25-87 and 26-87 (April 12, 1989), Sl. op. at 3 (citing, Nichols & Co. v. United States, 156 Ct. Cl. 358 (1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 959 (1963); Rohr Industries, Inc., ENG BCA No. 4058, 82-1 BCA ¶ 15,732). 70 See, note 41 supra. 71 The sample was totally different from the rejected SPFs in that showed a reverse image for the word "VOID" and used block outline letters (Tr. 83, 86). 72 The rule is that contractual provisions with respect to inspection are for the exclusive benefit and protection of the Government and not the contractor. See, Hurt's Printing Company, Inc., supra, at Sl. op. 26; Custom Printing Company, GPO BCA 10-87 (May 10, 1988), Sl. op. at 14, 1988 WL 363328 (citing, Red Circle Corporation v. United States, 185 Ct. Cl. 1, 398 F.2d 836 (1968)); Geographics, Inc., supra, Sl. op. at 10 (citing, Kaminer Construction Company v. United States, supra, 203 Ct. Cl. at 182, 488 F.2d at 980. Furthermore, it is also settled that the Government can use a different test than the one specified in the contract so long as a more stringent standard is not imposed on the contractor, and the test used reasonably and accurately demonstrates compliance or noncompliance. See, Circle Construction Group, ASBCA No. 38844, 90-3 BCA ¶ 22,999, at 115,493 (citing, Solar Laboratories, Inc., ASBCA No. 19269, 74-2 BCA ¶ 10,897, mot. for reconsid. den., 75-1 BCA ¶ 11,049; Gibbs Shipyard, Inc., ASBCA No. 9809, 67-2 BCA ¶ 6499). 73 For all intents and purposes, the language of GPO's "Inspection and Tests" clause replicates the standard inspection clause found in most Government contracts. See, McDonald & Eudy Printers, Inc., supra, Sl. op. at 19 (citing, Mid-American Business Forms Corporation, supra, Sl. op. at 18). 74 The selection method preferred by GPO is random sampling. See, B. P. Printing and Office Supplies, supra, Sl. op. at 19 (citing, Report No. 27, Insuring that the Sample is Representative of the Lot, p. 3). The record indicates that random sampling was used for the test of the forms in this case (R4 File, Tab K). 75 As Cripps testified at the hearing, his reaction to being told that the word "VOID" would not photocopy on the forms shipped to the VA was: ". . .[W]e [didn't] understand because we [had] copied it on various machines, not just ours. And what standard-that was our question-what standard [was GPO] using. Was it on the normal setting, the dark setting, the light setting. What do we have to go with it on, a Minolta copier; was it on a Xerox. We didn't know." See, Tr. 156-57. 76 Prior to the establishment of the Board in 1984, appeals from final decisions of agency contracting officers were decided under a GPOCAB system in which cases were considered by three-member ad hoc panels operating under the overall supervision of GPO's General Counsel. 77 As for its conclusion that a default cannot be based on unstated specifications, the ad hoc panel believed that the Government's failure to present evidence of what constituted satisfactory continuous operation was fatal to its case, and it was "not persuaded that two or three brief stoppages in two boxes out of 540 constituted a failure to meet the requirements of the contract." See, Elgin Business Forms, supra, Sl. op. at 8-9. Furthermore, the panel refused to rely on GPO's tests of the forms, including an examination which it ordered, because of a problem it had with the acceptability standard utilized. See, Elgin Business Forms, supra, Sl. op. at 9. In its view, the forms were measured against subjective criteria based on personal opinion, rather than objective standards based on NASA's actual experience with the forms on the equipment to be utilized. See, Elgin Business Forms, supra, Sl. op. at 9-10. Accord, Shepard Printing, supra, Sl. op. at 18-19 (the Board concluded that the inspection report, by itself, would not support GPO's decision, made in partial reliance thereon, to default the contract, because the compliance officer had misapplied the QATAP requirements and the test findings were conflicting, confusing and inaccurate). 78 As the Board has said on numerous occasions, while it is not bound by the decisions of the GPOCAB, its policy is to follow their rulings where applicable and appropriate. See, Universal Printing Company, supra, Sl. op. at 11, fn. 9; R.C. Swanson Printing and Typesetting Company, GPO BCA 15-90 (March 6, 1992), Sl. op. at 28, fn. 30, 1992 WL 382924; Shepard Printing, supra, Sl. op. at 14, fn. 19; Chavis and Chavis Printing, supra, Sl. op. at 9, fn. 9. 79 As the Appellant demonstrated at the hearing, even the reprinted form could not meet such a standard (Tr. 325-27; App. Exh. No. 21). 80 The only printing attribute defect shown on the VA's Notice of Quality Defects is for a solid or screen tints color match (P-9) (R4 File, Tab H). However, by virtue of the parties' stipulation, that issue is removed from this case (Tr. 328). 81 These tests simply mirrored the parties' results prior to the rejection of the original shipment of forms; i.e., the Appellant's pre-delivery tests satisfactorily produced the "VOID" pantograph, and the Respondent's pre-rejection inspection, made on three copiers (two used by Nowalk and one by Leonard), produced only blanks. 82 The Board notes that except for the blank copies of the SPFs submitted to GPO by the VA with its original complaint (R4 File, Tab H), there is no evidence of any further tests being performed on the customer-agency's photocopiers. Compare, Elgin Business Forms, supra, Sl. op. at 3, ¶ 7. 83 The Board has also considered four other arguments made by the Appellant in the context of in this case, and rejects them. First, the Board does not believe that there is any basis for a finding that the Respondent breached its implied duty to cooperate with the Contractor and not hinder its performance. In that regard, as the Board has already found, GPO was within its rights under the PPR not to accept the Appellant's pre-production proof. See, note 13 supra. Furthermore, while not an exact replica of the SPF, the specimen check was a proper sample within the meaning of the contract. See, New South Press, GPO BCA 45-92 (November 4, 1994), at Sl. op. 23; Web Business Forms, Inc., GPO BCA 31-89 (July 22, 1994), Sl. op. at 14; Printing Unlimited, supra, Sl. op. at 11-15. Second, the doctrine of estoppel does not apply here. In other words, there was no Government conduct on which the Appellant could have reasonably relied in concluding that certain contract requirements had been waived. See, Automated Datatron, Inc., supra, Sl. op. at 6-8 and cases cited therein. Accord, Industrial Data Link Corporation, ASBCA No. 31570, 91-1 BCA ¶ 23,382. Third, contrary to the Appellant, the Board does not believe that the "superior knowledge" doctrine has any place in this case. In order to recover under the "superior knowledge" doctrine, a contractor must show, among other things, that the knowledge purportedly withheld was not reasonably obtainable from other sources. See, American Combustion, Inc., ASBCA No. 43712, 94-3 BCA ¶ 26,961, at 134,244-45 (citing, H.N. Bailey & Associates v. United States, 196 Ct. Cl. 166, 177-78, 449 F.2d 376, 382-83 (1971); Max Jordan Bauunternehmung v. United States, 10 Cl. Ct. 672, 679 (1986), aff'd, 820 F.2d 1208 (Fed Cir. 1987)); Helene Curtis Industries v. United States, supra. The rule of Helene Curtis is that the Government must share its superior knowledge which is vital to the successful completion of the contract. However, the corollary to this postulate is that the Government is under no duty to volunteer such information, if the contractor can reasonably be expected to obtain the facts from other sources. See, H.N. Bailey & Associates v. United States, supra. Accord, Dynamite Graphics, [No GPOCAB No.] (August 31, 1979), Sl. op. at 13, 1979 WL 28892. In this case, the record discloses that there were at least 34 other firms holding Standard Register licenses from which the Appellant could have gotten the information it was looking for, particularly with respect to the "VOID" pantograph. The Contractor has offered no reason, and none is apparent from the record, why it could not have contacted those firms. Thus, the Appellant has failed to demonstrate any lack of disclosure of knowledge not reasonably available elsewhere. Finally, the Board sees nothing in the facts here which would raise an issue of "commercial impracticability." To come within the limited doctrine of impossibility, which encompasses commercial impracticability, one must show actual impossibility or that performance could be achieved only at excessive and unreasonable cost; a showing of simple economic hardship is not sufficient. See, Jennie-O Foods, Inc. v. United States, 217 Ct.Cl. 314, 328-29, 580 F.2d 400, 409 (1978); American Combustion, Inc., supra, 94-3 BCA at 134,243. See also, Natus Corporation v. United States, 178 Ct. Cl. 1, 371 F.2d 450 (1967); Whitlock Corporation v. United States, 141 Ct. Cl. 758, 159 F.Supp. 602, cert. denied, 358 U.S. 815 (1958). The burden of proving impracticability lies with the contractor, who must also show that its difficulties were not attributable to its own subjective fault. See, Intercontinental Manufacturing Company, Inc. v. United States, 4 Cl. Ct. 591, 598-600 (1984); GLR Constructors, ENG BCA No. 6021, 94-3 BCA ¶ 27,216, at 135,653; Crown Welding, Inc., ASBCA No. 36107, 89-1 BCA ¶ 21,332, at 107,571; HLI Lordship Industries, Inc., VABCA No. 1785, 86-3 BCA ¶ 19,182, at 97,026. Accord, JR Composition, GPO BCA 8-86 (May 19, 1989), Sl. op. at 1, 1989 WL 384978 (citing, Koppers Company v. United States, 186 Ct. Cl. 142 (1968)). Moreover, a contractor can disprove its own claim of commercial impracticability by showing that to some extent it can successfully perform as expected under the contract. See, GLR Constructors, supra, 94-3 BCA at 135,653; American Combustion, Inc., supra, 94-3 BCA at 134,243. Here, the demonstrative evidence of both parties indicates that the Appellant was, indeed, able to produce a form which could reproduce the "VOID" pantograph on some photocopiers. See, App. Exh. Nos. 10-18; R. Exh. No. 1 (Savin 7500, Room C-830). For that reason alone, there is no basis for finding that a situation of commercial impossibility existed in this case. 84 During the hearing, the Contracting Officer offered to send a GPO inspector to the Appellant's printing plant to inspect a random sample of those forms, and said that the Government would purchase remaining pads if, based on that test, the forms complied with the contract specifications, as written (Tr. 309). In the Board's view, the Contracting Officer's offer is the appropriate route for the Contractor to take in pursuing payment for the 96,000 pads of forms which it never delivered to the VA. However, the parties are reminded that any subsequent evaluation of the product at the Appellant's plant should be made on a reasonable cross- section of photocopy machines, and follow the guidance in the QATAP Manual for randomly selecting samples of a sufficient size to ensure the statistical validity of the test. 85 See, note 35 supra.