In the United States Court of Federal Claims
No. 97-100
(Filed: July 29, 1999)
Wunderlich Act, 41 U.S.C. § 321;
MPE BUSINESS FORMS, INC., definition of the word "copy";
implied-in-fact contracts; remedy
Plaintiff, for breach of implied-in-fact
contracts; quantum meruit;
V. contract ambiguity; evidence to
consider in determining whether a
THE UNITED STATES, contract is ambiguous; trade usage
as evidence to aid in contract
Defendant. interpretation; contract
interpretation.
Frederic G. Antoun, Jr., Chambersburg, PA, counsel of record for
plaintiff
R. Alan Miller, Commercial Litigation Branch, Civil Division,
United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for
defendant, with whom were David G. Ogden, Acting Assistant
Attorney General; David M. Cohen, Director; Kathryn A. Bleecker,
Assistant Director; and Thomas T Kelly, United States Government
Printing Office, of counsel.
OPINION
DAMICH, Judge.
This case is before the Court based on cross motions for summary
judgment based on the administrative record and review of a
decision in MPE Business Forms, Inc., GPO BCA 10-95 (Aug. 16,
1996) [hereinafter "Decision"]. The case concerns the definition
of the term "copy," in context of a contract that provides for
payment per "copy." For example, when a form comprised of three
sheets is reproduced, should the printer be paid for one copy or
three copies?
FACTS
The facts are straightforward and relatively easy to understand.
The Plaintiff, MPE Business Forms, Inc. ("MPE"), submitted the
lowest bid1 under an invitation for bid issued by the Government
Printing Office ("GPO"). Under this contract, MPE was to provide
laboratory reports for the General Services Administration and
the Department of Veterans Affairs. The laboratory reports are
forms that consist of two and three parts, which are known in the
printing industry as "snap sets."
The disputed language comes from the section on pricing the bids.
The contract states:
COMPLETE PRODUCT: Prices offered shall include the cost of all
required materials and operations necessary for the complete
production and distribution (except as specified in item II)
listed in accordance with these specifications.
Films will be furnished on the majority of orders.
Black Ink or a Color Each additional
Other than Black Color of Ink
Makeready Per Makeready Per
and Setup 1,000 and Setup 1,000
Charges Copies Charges Copies
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(a) 2-part sets $ $ $ $
(b) 3-part sets $ $ $ $
R4 File, Tab A, at 11. See Decision, page 10. The disputed
language is what "Copies" means in the context of prices "per
1,000 Copies."
Because the contract officer had not had experience with MPE
before, the contract officer discussed the terms of the contract
with the company's president. The contract officer felt
comfortable that there was an agreement on how the contract was
to be billed. MPE's president also believed that the parties
agreed on how the contract was to be billed. Based upon the
apparent agreement, the GPO awarded the contract for fiscal year
1995 Program D201-S to MPE.
After the Plaintiff started performing the contract, the parties
disputed how the contractor could charge the government.
Essentially, the contract officer2 determined that a form that
contained either two or three sheets was a single "copy." The
Plaintiff, unsuccessfully, claimed that a form with three pages
required three "copies." Despite the dispute, the Plaintiff
continued to perform, while losing money, to avoid the
consequences of defaulting on a government contract.3
The Plaintiff challenged the decision of the contract officer to
the Board of Contract Appeals for the Government Printing Office
(Board). The Board ruled in favor of the government. The
Plaintiff, thereafter, filed the present case in the Court of
Federal Claims. Because the facts are not disputed, both parties
filed a motion for summary judgment.
Standard of Review
[A] contract with the GPO is not subject to the Contract Disputes
Act (CDA), 41 U.S.C. §§ 601-613. This is so because the CDA
applies to contracts entered into by executive agencies, 41
U.S.C. § 602(a), whereas here the GPO is not such, but rather is
an agency of Congress.... Nevertheless, the Claims Court has
jurisdiction over this case, inasmuch as plaintiff seeks money
damages for breach of an express contract with the United States,
under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1). This court will,
therefore, review the Board's decision under Wunderlich Act
standards.
Fry Communications, Inc, v. United States, 22 Cl. Ct. 497, 502-3
(1991) (Citations omitted).
The Wunderlich Act states:
No provision of any contract entered into by the United States,
relating to the finality or conclusiveness of any decision of the
head of any department or agency or his duly authorized
representative or board in a dispute involving a question arising
under such contract, shall be pleaded in any suit now filed or to
be filed as limiting judicial review of any such decision to
cases where fraud by such official or his said representative or
board is alleged: Provided, however, That any such decision shall
be final conclusive unless the same is fradulent [sic] or
capricious or arbitrary or so grossly erroneous as necessarily to
imply bad faith, or is not supported by substantial evidence.
41 U.S.C. § 321.
"No government contract shall contain a provision making final on
a question of law the decision of any administrative official,
representative, or board." 41 U.S.C. § 322.
These two statutes establish a two-tiered system of judicial
review for decisions by administrative boards. First, factual
determinations are conclusively binding on the district court
unless they are shown to be fraudulent, capricious, arbitrary or
lacking substantial evidence. Second, legal issues are reviewed
under a de novo standard. See Granite Const. Co. v. United
States, 962 F.2d 998, 1001 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
The Board's decision requires careful examination. It begins by
clearly reciting the facts, including the terms of the contract
that are in issue. The Board turns to a central question in the
case, whether the contract is ambiguous, and sets forth various
means to determine whether "copy" in this contract is ambiguous.
The Board also explains what happens if the contract is ambiguous
and describes the latent/patent distinction. The section on
latent and patent ambiguity is technically unnecessary because
the Board "holds" that the contract is not ambiguous and finds
that the terms are clear in the government's favor. Using a "belt
and suspender" approach, the Board also "finds" that the
government prevails even if the contract were ambiguous because
any ambiguity was patent. The Board may have felt obligated to
address whether any ambiguity was patent or latent because the
parties briefed that issue. Thus, the Court understands the
Board's desire to respond to the parties' arguments even when the
Board's answer is superfluous. Cf. Massie v. United States, 166
F.3d 1184 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (holding the contract was not
ambiguous and also stating that any ambiguity was latent).
The Board, however, goes far beyond what is necessary to its
holding and beyond the issues that the parties briefed. After
analyzing the various permutations of ambiguity, the Board on its
own initiative addresses whether a contract was formed. The Board
"finds" that the parties did not have a meeting of the minds.
Therefore, no express contract was formed. Having created a
conundrum, the Board then "finds" that there is a contract
implied in fact. (The Board correctly notes that it could not
find a contract implied in law.) Based upon this implied-in-fact
contract, the Board then "remands" to the parties for an award of
quantum meruit. This aspect of the Board's decision warrants the
Court's scrutiny.
Implied-in-Fact Contracts
Before addressing whether the contract was ambiguous, the Court
believes it is necessary to comment briefly on the Board's long
digression about implied-in-fact contracts.4 There are three
significant flaws in the Board's legal analysis. Although
strictly unnecessary to resolving the case at hand, the Court
believes it is important to discuss them: (1) whether an implied-
in-fact contract could be found, (2) whether quantum meruit is
the proper measure of recovery, and (3) assuming quantum meruit
is the proper measure of recovery, whether the Board correctly
applied it in this case.
An implied-in-fact contract arises when, in the absence of an
express contract, the parties' behavior leaves no doubt that what
was intended was a contractual relationship permitted by law.
Trauma Serv. Group v. United States, 104 F.3d 1321, 1326 (Fed.
Cir. 1997). Further, the same elements of express contracts, such
as mutuality of intent and lack of ambiguity in offer and
acceptance are required in implied-in-fact contracts. See Fincke
v. United States, 675 F.2d 289, 295 (Ct. Cl. 1987).
Here, even under the Board's analysis, a finding of an implied-
in-fact contract seems highly problematic if the parties did not
reach a meeting of the minds on price. If the parties did not
reach an express agreement with regard to price, then how could
the parties have reached an implied agreement?
The authorities cited in this part of the Board's decision (pages
75-80) are unsatisfactory. The Board relies heavily on Western
States Construction Co., 72-2 BCA T 9508 at 44,302. In Western
States, the Board ordered that the contract was made according to
the contractor's last offer, which was the Defendant's price
($1,098,300) plus certain other costs. In Western States, there
was no ambiguity of terms, only a disagreement about those terms.
Western States, therefore, does not stand for the precedent that
an implied-in-fact contract should be found when the express
contract contains ambiguous terms.
In Publishers Choice Book Mfg. Co., GPOBCA 4-84, 1986 WL 181457,
another case on which the Board relied, the Board found that the
contract was not ambiguous. The Board, without any citation to
legal authority whatsoever, determined that the contractor was
entitled to quantum meruit recovery. Publishers Choice is an
unpersuasive precedent.
Moreover, the cases that establish that implied-in-fact contracts
must have definate terms actually hold that no implied-m-fact
contract existed. See Fincke v. United States, 675 F.2d 289, 295
(Ct. Cl. 1987); Tree Farm Corp. v. United States, 585 F.2d 493,
500 (Ct. Cl. 1978); Russell Corp. v. United States, 537 F.2d 474,
481-82 (Ct. Cl. 1976). Therefore, the Board's determination that
an implied-in-fact contract existed seems doubtful.
The second legal point from the Board's decision that needs
attention is whether quantum meruit is appropriate as a measure
of damages. In United States v. Amdahl Corp., 786 F.2d 387, 393
(Fed. Cir. 1986), the Federal Circuit considered two measures of
damages: by one theory, the contractor is entitled to recover "on
a quantum valebant or quantum meruit basis for the value of the
conforming goods or services received by the government prior to
the rescission of the contract for invalidity"; by the other
theory, the contractor is entitled to "the cost of performance
plus a reasonable profit on those costs whether or not benefit
accrued to the government."
As a precedent, Amdahl, however, is questionable. This Court may
lack the authority to award recovery in quantum meruit, which
usually follows a contract implied at law. See Hercules, Inc. v.
United States, 516 U.S. 417, 423-24, 116 S. Ct. 981, 985, 134 L.
Ed. 2d 47 (1996). Whether quantum meruit is permitted as a form
of recovery remains undecided. Frank & Breslow, Lip, v. United
States, 43 Fed. Cl. 65, 69 (1999).5
The last issue from the Board's digression on implied-in-fact
contracts and quantum meruit is the amount of damages. The amount
of recovery was to be "not less than the next lower bid price or
contract then in being, nor more than the next higher bid price,
as applicable." See Decision, page 79. Under the quantum meruit
principles established in Amdahl, the award should be based on
either (1) the value of the services received by the government
or (2) cost of performance by the contractor plus reasonable
profit. Neither of these principles involve considering the value
of the competing bids. In recommending a scope of recovery to
MPE, the Board failed to follow Amdahl.
Accordingly, the Board's discussion of quantum meruit is not only
unnecessary (because it does not relate to whether the contract
is ambiguous) but also wrong (because of the three reasons
described above). Having clarified the Board's errors in the
course of its digression, the Court now turns to the main issue:
was the Board correct when it decided the contract unambiguously
states that "copy" means per "set."
Is the contract ambiguous?
"The issue of ambiguity is 'a question of law for the court to
decide.' John C. Grimberg Co., 7 Cl. Ct. 452, 456 (1985)."
Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc. v. United States, 24 Cl. Ct. 770,
773 (1991), ajy-d, 983 F.2d 1086 (Fed. Cir. 1992). As a question
of law, this Court reviews the decision (that the contract was
ambiguous) of the Board de novo.
"When a contract is susceptible to more than one reasonable
interpretation, it contains an ambiguity.... To show an ambiguity
it is not enough that the parties differ in their respective
interpretations of a contract term.... Rather, both
interpretations must fall within a'zone of reasonableness."'
Metric Constructions, Inc. v. National Aeronautics and Space
Adminstration, 169 F.3d 747, 751 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
In determining whether the contract is ambiguous, the Court must
confront what evidence to consider in making that decision.
Phrased differently, is the Court limited to only the four comers
of the contract? Fortunately, Metric Constructions, supra, which
endorsed the opinion in Western States Const. Co. v. United
States, 26 Ct. Cl. 818 (1992), instructs this decision-making
process. "Before an interpreting court can conclusively declare a
contract ambiguous or unambiguous, it must consult the context in
which the parties exchanged promises." Metric Constructions,
supra, 169 F.3d 752. "The commentaries agree that the courts
should use evidence of trade practice and custom not only to
determine the meaning of an ambiguous provision, but to determine
whether a contract provision is ambiguous in the first instance.
See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 220 curt. d
(1981)." Id., 753.
Like the Board, the Court is called upon to resolve the
definition of the word "copy" used in the "COMPLETE PRODUCT"
specification of the "Schedule of Prices." Like the Board, the
Court finds that "copy" is unambiguous. Unlike the Board,
however, the Court finds that MPE's interpretation is correct.
Metric Construction emphasizes that the context in which a
contract is made is significant in determining whether the
contract is ambiguous. The record in this case shows the context
in which the parties dealt with each other. The contract before
this contract was based on payment "per 1,000 sets." In 1994, the
General Terms, Conditions and Specifications indicate revision
from "ranning per 1,000 sets" to "Per 1,000 Copies." Rule 4 File,
Tab A, page 11. The change in the wording presumptively changes
the meaning. See Taracorp, Incv NL Industries, Inc., 73 F.3d 738,
744 (7th Cir. 1996); Consolidated Gas Supply Corp. v. FERC, 745
F.2d 281, 287 (4th Cir. 1985); Cf. Bausch & Lomb, Inc. v. United
States, 148 F.3d 1363, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (stating "a change
in the language of a statute is generally construed to import a
change in meaning."). This presumption, although rebuttable, is
especially strong because the government highlighted the change:
"These specifications have been extensively revised; therefore,
all bidders are cautioned to familiarize themselves with all
provisions of these specifications before bidding." R4 File, Tab
A, page 1.
Given the change in wording, MPE reasonably relied on industry
standards. Thomas R. Edwards, the person who prepared the initial
bid for MPE, testified that he saw the change and knew how the
industry defined both "sets" and "copies." See Transcript, Vol.
Il, pages 110-12, cited in Decision, page 14, note 13. MPE,
therefore, could presume that the change had some significance -
otherwise the change would have been unnecessary.6
The industry standard shows that "copies" and "sets" are not
synonymous.7 The Business Forms Glossar), a publication of the
National Business Forms Association and the International
Business Forms Association, states ... copy' can be a synonym
forpart orply. (Please see that definition.)" Exhibit A13, page
20. A "part," in turn, is defined as "one ply or copy within a
unit set or continuous form." Exhibit A13, page 62. The Business
Forms Handbook defines a "unit set" as a "loose or bound
carbonless, carbonized, or carbon-interleaved form with an
original and one or more copies, with or without stubs, not in a
continuous fonn." Exhibit Al, page 12 1.
In addition to this documentary evidence, MPE also presented the
testimony of three experts.8 These people testified that copies
and sets differ in meaning. See Transcript, Vol. 1, pages 26-33,
64 (testimony of Twyla S. Edwards, MPE's Vice President);
Transcript, Vol. 1, pages 99-104 (testimony of Thomas R. Edwards,
MPE's Vice President of Sales and Marketing); and Transcript,
Vol. 1, pages 205-206, 221-222 (testimony of Robert McCall).
Because of the trade usage9 and the change in specifications from
one contract to the next, the Plaintiff reasonably interpreted
"copy" to mean "part," not "set." This leads to a question of
whether the Defendant reasonably interpreted "copy" to mean
"set," not "part."
The Defendant argues that when "copy" is interpreted in the
context of the entire contract, its meaning as "set" is
apparent.10 The Defendant advances three principal arguments to
support its claim that the contract should be interpreted
according to its reading. They are: (1) the contract should be
interpreted as a whole; (2) the contract language is clear; and
(3) MPE is bound by its actions when it interpreted "copies" to
mean "sets." Although accepted by the Board,11 these arguments
are unconvincing.
Both the Defendant, in its briefs to this Court, and the Board,
in its decision, state the familiar principle that contracts
should be interpreted to give meaning to all terms and that no
term should be rendered meaningless or superfluous. See, e.g.,
Gould v. United States, 935 F.2d 1271, 1274 (Fed. Cir. 1991);
Fortec Constructors v. United States, 760 F.2d 1288, 1292 (Fed.
Cir. 1985). The Board states that to interpret "copies" as
proposed by MPE "would 'eviscerate' the entire contractual
scheme." Decision, page 63. The Board, however, fails to explain
its logic in reaching this legal conclusion. In the Defendant's
reply brief, the United States develops this argument a bit more.
According to the Defendant, if "copies" means "parts," then there
is no need for the contract to define "parts," as it does.
The Court disagrees with the Defendant's argument. In several
places, the contract uses the term "parts." "The printing on each
part must be properly aligned so that the printing on each form
will coincide when the forms are gathered into sets. The forms on
all parts must register with + I mm (1/32")." Decision, page 55.
Under the "BINDING' heading, the contract states "(2) Forced
gumming is defined as attaching the sets at the stub by adhesive
applied to the edge and penetrating between parts and carbons
after the sets have been assembled." Decision, page 55. In these
places, the contractor would look to the definition of "parts" in
Section Two of the contract to determine the meaning. Thus, the
definition has a meaning even when "copy," in the context of the
"COMPLETE PRODUCT" section means "parts." The Defendant's
argument on this point is unpersuasive.
The Defendant's second argument is that the contract language is
clear. To support its position, the Defendant repeats its claim
that the definition of "parts" is meaningful. The Defendant, by
citing Haelm Management Company v. United States, 15 Cl. Ct. 50,
59 (1988), also argues that custom and trade usage are to be
considered only to explain ambiguous terms. As explained above,
the Federal Circuit in Metric Constructions, Inc. v. National
Aeronautics and Space Adminstration, supra, 169 F.3d 747, has
settled this argument against the Defendant. Finally, the
Defendant also argues that the "COMPLETE PRODUCT"12 specification
requires that "copies" means "sets." The Defendant suggests that
MPE, by submitting a bid for 1,000 parts of a three-part set, has
agreed to produced 333 and 1/3 sets. The Defendant says this
result is "absurd."
The Court does not agree with the Defendant's argument. When
"copies" means "sets," the language in the "COMPLETE PRODUCT"
specification does not lead to an absurd result. The United
States could order as many sets as it wished. The "set," as a
"complete product," includes either two or three parts plus
additional materials such as binding and carbons. The price "per
set" depends on the number of parts in the set. If the United
States placed an order for 1,000 sets that contained three parts,
MPE expected to charge the government (and to have the government
pay) $27,690.00 ($9.23 per part X 3 parts X 1,000 sets). The
government would receive a "COMPLETE PRODUCT" of 1,000 sets, not
a fraction of a set. The results would not be "absurd."
The Defendant offers a third and final argument for finding that
the contract clearly means "sets" when the contract uses the term
"copies." The Defendant argues that during performance, MPE
interpreted "copy" to mean "set" when it produced random "copies"
for quality control.13 When MPE complied with this requirement
during performance, MPE submitted entire sets. See Transcript,
Vol. 1, page 224.
The Defendant takes a general principle too far. Although one
term is usually interpreted identically in a contract, that rule
is not absolute.14 Instead, the context of the usage matters.
Within the context of the requirement to produce random "copies"
for quality control, "copies" means sets. Within the context of
the pricing clause, a different definition is entirely possible.
Craft Mach. Works, Inc. v. United States, 926 F.2d 1110, 1115-16
(Fed. Cir. 1991). Accordingly, MPE's interpretation of how it
could comply with the random sample requirement does not control
how the price clause must be interpreted.
The Defendant fails to respond to MPE's most persuasive argument
- the change in the language from "sets" to "copies." The
Defendant points out that the Court should define language
according to the meaning given to the language by a reasonably
intelligent person familiar with the circumstances. Hol-Gar
Manufacturing Corp. v. United States, 169 Ct. Cl. 384, 388, 351
F.2d 972, 975 (1965). Here, the significant circumstance is that
the United States changed the language explaining how the
contract was priced. A reasonably intelligent person would
understand that "copies," in the context of the bidding, could
not mean "sets." Therefore, "copies" must mean "parts."
CONCLUSION
The Court holds, as a matter of law, that "copies" means "parts."
Plaintiffs motion for summary judgment is GRANTED. Defendant's
motion for summary judgment is DENIED. The case is remanded to
the Board for consideration of damages according to the Court's
interpretation of the contract. See Granite Constr. Co. v. United
States, 962 F.2d 998, 1008 (Fed. Cir. 1992); Teledyne Lewisburg
v. United States, 699 F.2d 1336, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
EDWARD J. DAMICH
Judge, U.S. Court of Federal Claims
_______________
1 Its bid was only about $1,000.00 less than the competitor
whose bid was second lowest. See Decision, page 16.
2 This contract officer had replaced the previous contract
officer who had reviewed the contract with a representative of
MPE.
3 The Board notes that representatives from the Plaintiff
testified that it requested the government to terminate the
contract for convenience. See Transcript, Vol. 1, page 56
(testimony of Twyla S. Edwards) and Transcript, Vol. 1, page
213-24 (testimony of Thomas R. Edwards). The contract officer
testified that he did not recall this request for termination.
See Transcript, Vol. 11, page 29 (testimony of Jack Scott).
Decision, page 26, note 32.
4 The parties have agreed that the Board's discussion about
implied-in-fact contracts was dicta. The Court agrees with this
assessment.
5 Frank & Breslow relied on American Telephone & Telegraph Co.
v. United States, 124 F.3d 1471, 1479 (Fed. Cir. 1997), revd en
bane, 177 F.3d. 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1999). The panel of the Federal
Circuit stated that "[a]s a general rule, it [quantum meruit]
falls outside the scope of relief available through the Court of
Federal Claims." After consideration en bane, the Federal Circuit
reversed its panel decision in a split decision.
The majority opinion of the en banc decision noted that when a
performed contract is in violation of the law, the courts have
"allowed recovery under an implied contract theory." Id., 1376.
The Federal Circuit, however, did not instruct on the proper
measure of damages.
6 The Board glances over the change in the language. According
to the Board, "there is nothing in the record to indicate why the
change from 'sets' to 'copies' was made muchless [sic] who
authored it." Decision, page 52.
In doing so, the Board seems to be giving more deference to the
government's interpretation than is appropriate. The contract is
interpreted from the standpoint of the reasonable contractor.
H.B. Mae, Inc. v. United States, 153 F.3d 1338, 1345 (Fed. Cir.
1998); PJ Maffei Bldg. Wrecking Corp. v. United States, 732 F.2d
913, 917 (Fed. Cir. 1984). A reasonable contractor would not be
concerned with who authored the change. In addition, as explained
in the text, a reasonable contractor is entitled to presume that
a change in language is meaningful.
7 The Board rejected the Plaintiff s argument about "trade
usage" because the Board believed that evidence of trade usage is
only considered when the contract fails to define the term. See
Decision, page 54. As discussed in the main text, Metro
Constructors, Inc. v. National Aeronautics and Space
Administration, supra, 169 F.3d 747, shows that the Board should
have evaluated this evidence. Therefore, because the Board erred
in how it considered the evidence before it, the Board's factual
findings are entitled to less deference.
8 The Board accepted that these people were qualified as
experts. See Decision, page 49, note 45. This Court will defer to
the Board's finding. See Accoustical Design, Inc. v. Control
Electronics Co., 932 F.2d 939, 942 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
9 The Board rejected the government's attempt to contradict
MPE's claim about "trade usage." See Decision, p. 50, note 47;
see, also, Decision, p. 64, note 55. Whether to accept or to
reject evidence of trade usage is a question of fact. See Capitol
Converting Equipment, Inc. v. LEP Transport, Inc., 965 F.2d 391,
395 (7th Cir. 1992) (applying Illinois law); D & S Universal
Mining Co., Inc. v. United States, 4 Ct. Cl. 96, 97 (1983). Under
the reviewing authority of this Court as set forth by the
Wunderlich Act, the Court will not examine this finding.
10 In conjunction, the government argues that the Court cannot
consider "trade usage." Metric Constructors has resolved this
argument against the government.
11 See Decision, pages 48-64.
12 This section states: "COMPLETE PRODUCT: Prices offered shall
include the cost of all required materials and operations
necessary for the complete production and distribution (except as
specified in Item 11) listed in accordance with these
specifications." Decision, page 10.
13 "Here, this rule cannot be absolute because "copy" is used
with several different meanings. The Board noted:
[T]he disputed contract uses "copy" (or its plural, 'copies')
at least three acceptably defined ways: (1) in its
traditional graphic arts sense, namely, as something used in
the production of printing (popularly called an "original");
e.g. camera copy ("GOVERNMENT TO FURNISH" specification); (2)
as describing the duplicate of a printed original; e.g.
random sample copies for the purposes of qualify control
("GOVERNMENT TO FURNISH ... .. DEPARTMENTAL RANDOM COPIES
(BLUE LABEL)," and "QUALITY ASSURANCE RANDOM COPIES"
specification), "legible copies" ("INTERVENING CARBONS"
specification); and (3) in its trade or forms industry sense
as another word for "part," "ply" or "leaf'; e.g. "Copy
designations (part-to-part changes)" ("PRINTING"
specification), and "duplicate copies (parts I and 2),"
("BIDDER'S NAME AND SIGNATURE" block).
Decision, page 52-53.
14 "DEPARTMENTAL RANDOM COPIES (BLUE LABEL): All orders must be
divided into equal sublots in accordance with the chart below. A
random copy must be selected from each sublot. Do not choose from
the same general area in each sublot. The Contractor will be
required to execute a statement furnished by GPO certifying that
copies were selected as directed. The random copies constitute a
part of the total quantity ordered, and no additional charge will
be allowed." Decision, page 8.
Reported at 44 Fed. Cl. 421 (1999)