Summary
In October 2001, coalition forces forcibly removed the Taliban regime from Afghanistan, responding to their protection of al Qaeda terrorists who attacked the United States. Congress subsequently passed the Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002 authorizing funds to help Afghanistan rebuild a stable, democratic society. The act directed GAO to monitor the implementation of U.S. humanitarian, development, and counternarcotics assistance. This report analyzes, for fiscal year 2004, (1) U.S. obligations and expenditures, (2) progress and results of assistance efforts, (3) assistance management and coordination, and (4) major obstacles that affected the achievement of U.S. goals.
The United States spent $720 million on nonsecurity-related assistance to Afghanistan in fiscal year 2004. Approximately 75 percent paid for reconstruction activities, with the remainder supporting humanitarian and quick-impact projects. Conversely, in 2002-2003, humanitarian and quick-impact assistance accounted for more than three-fourths of U.S. spending. The United States continued to be the largest donor, contributing about 38 percent of the $3.6 billion pledged by the international community. U.S. humanitarian assistance benefited vulnerable populations in fiscal year 2004. Further, the United States increased reconstruction assistance to Afghanistan and made notable progress in several sectors through its "Accelerating Success Initiative". Although progress varied among sectors, the United States did not meet all of its targets due to security and other obstacles. For example, USAID intended to rehabilitate or build 286 schools by the end of 2004. However, owing to poor contractor performance and security problems, by September 2004 it had completed only 8. As in 2002-2003, complete financial information was not readily available, and USAID lacked a comprehensive strategy to direct its efforts. Further, USAID did not consistently require contractors to fulfill contract provisions needed to ensure accountability and oversight. USAID also did not systematically collect information needed to assess the progress of its major projects. Moreover, measures provided by the embassy to decision-makers in Washington did not comprehensively portray progress in each sector or the overall U.S. program. Deteriorating security, increased opium production, and delayed funding continued to obstruct U.S. reconstruction efforts in fiscal year 2004 and threatened the achievement of U.S. goals. Deteriorating security rendered large areas inaccessible to the assistance community, and the continued rise in opium production undermined legitimate economic activity. In addition, most assistance funds were not available until nearly 6 months into the fiscal year, preventing USAID from accelerating reconstruction efforts.
Recommendations
Our recommendations from this work are listed below with a Contact for more information. Status will change
from "In process" to "Implemented" or "Not implemented" based on our follow up work.
Director:
Team:
Phone:
Charles M. Johnson Jr
Government Accountability Office: International Affairs and Trade
No phone on record
Recommendations for Executive Action
Recommendation: To improve on existing efforts to measure and assess the progress of U.S. reconstruction projects toward achieving U.S. policy goals, and to provide a basis for planning future reconstruction projects, the Administrator of USAID should establish a performance management plan that complies with USAID directives.
Agency Affected: Department of State: Agency for International Development
Status: In process
Comments: In commenting on a draft of this report, AID concurred with the report's recommendations. Update pending.
Recommendation: To improve on existing efforts to measure and assess the progress of U.S. reconstruction projects toward achieving U.S. policy goals, and to provide a basis for planning future reconstruction projects, the Administrator of USAID should clearly stipulate in all future reconstruction contracts that contractors are to develop performance management plans specific to the work they are conducting.
Agency Affected: Department of State: Agency for International Development
Status: In process
Comments: In commenting on a draft of this report, AID concurred with the report's recommendations. Update pending.
Recommendation: To improve on existing efforts to measure and assess the progress of U.S. reconstruction projects toward achieving U.S. policy goals, and to provide a basis for planning future reconstruction projects, the Administrator of USAID should more completely communicate the performance information obtained from the performance management plans to executive branch decision makers in Kabul and Washington.
Agency Affected: Department of State: Agency for International Development
Status: In process
Comments: In commenting on a draft of this report, AID concurred with the report's recommendations. Update pending.
