

FINAL EVALUATION
OF THE
OFFICE OF TRANSITION INITIATIVES' PROGRAM
IN SIERRA LEONE

FINAL REPORT

August 2002

Prepared by:

Art Hansen, Consultant and Evaluation Team Leader, CARE
Julie Nenon, Consultant and Evaluation Team Member, CAII
Joy Wolf, Consultant and Evaluation Team Member, CARE

and

Marc Sommers, BEPS Youth at Risk Specialist and Sierra Leone Evaluation Project Manager
CARE

CARE, Inc.

151 Ellis Street, NE
Atlanta, GA 30303-2439

and

Creative Associates International, Inc.

5301 Wisconsin Avenue, NW
Suite 700
Washington, DC 20015

Prepared for:

Basic Education and Policy Support (BEPS) Activity
US Agency for International Development
Contract No. HNE-I-00-00-00038-00
Creative Associates International, Inc., Prime Contractor

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

First and foremost, the evaluation team acknowledges the many Sierra Leoneans who participated in OTI programs for their hard work and commitment to bringing peace to their country. Without their dedication, OTI activities would not have been successful, and Sierra Leone would not be transitioning towards peace. Secondly, we acknowledge the dedication of the Sierra Leonean staff of the implementing partners, Management Systems International and World Vision, to OTI activities and to peace building, and the courage to continue in the face of adversity. In particular, we thank the World Vision staff for their hospitality, logistical arrangements, and safe transportation across the country as we collected information. We also thank the international staff of Management Systems International and World Vision for their dedication, collaboration, and the provision of necessary information. Special thanks go to the many people we interviewed; they provided important information and great insight on the country, the conflict, and OTI's response. Special thanks also go to the administrative staff at Creative Associates International, Inc. and CARE for their logistical support, to the BEPS CTO, Jim Hoxeng, for his support of this evaluation, and to Marc Sommers, the activity manager, for his guidance and commitment. We thank OTI and USAID for their support, collaboration, and information, and for their commitment to assisting Sierra Leone on the road to peace. Dr. Hansen also extends special thanks to his students¹ at Clark Atlanta University who assisted his extended study of Sierra Leone.

¹ Malaika Cheney-Coker, John Chirwa, Montello Gibson, Paedia Mixon, Abdullahi Nur, and Orazie Denise Slayton.

CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS.....	ii
INDEX OF KEY TERMS.....	v
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	
I. INTRODUCTION	1
A. Purpose	1
B. Goals.....	1
D. Team Members	2
E. Methodology.....	2
II. SIERRA LEONE AND THE CIVIL WAR	5
III. OTI IN SIERRA LEONE, 1997-2002	7
A. OTI	7
B. Before the Lome Accord: OTI in Sierra Leone, 1997-1999.....	7
C. Post-Lome: OTI in Sierra Leone, 2000-2002	9
IV. THE DIAMOND MANAGEMENT PROGRAM (DMP).....	11
A. Background: Problems Associated with Diamonds in Sierra Leone	11
B. The Social Dynamics of Alluvial Mining: Diggers and Licensed Miners	13
C. OTI DMP Strategy and Objectives	14
D. OTI DMP Design and Activities.....	14
E. Findings: Evaluating the Impact of OTI's DMP.....	18
V. THE YOUTH REINTEGRATION TRAINING AND EDUCATION FOR PEACE PROGRAM (YRTEP).....	22
A. Objectives and Design of YRTEP.....	22
B. Organization and Implementation of YRTEP	25
C. Findings: Evaluating the Impact of OTI and YRTEP	28
D. Replicability.....	37
VI. EVALUATING OTI'S COUNTRY PROGRAM IN SIERRA LEONE.....	39
A. Strategic Focus: Goals and Objectives.....	39
B. Achieving Peace.....	39
C. Supporting Reintegration and Reconciliation.....	40
D. Promoting Participation and Empowerment.....	41
VII. RECOMMENDATIONS	43
A. Recommendations for the Diamond Management Program	43
B. Recommendations for YRTEP	44
C. Recommendations for OTI.....	45

CONTENTS – Continued

APPENDICES

A.	List of Contacts: Organizations and People.....	46
B.	Itinerary in Sierra Leone: February 12 Through March 2, 2002.....	51
C.	Sites Visited.....	53
D.	Comparing the Goals and Curricula of Three Educational Approaches: REFLECT, EP, and YRTEP Goals and Curricula	54
E.	Discussion Guides for YRTEP Interviews.....	69
F.	War and Peace Chronology for Sierra Leone.....	73
G.	Licensing Diamond Miners.....	76
H.	Resources Required for YRTEP and Nation-Building Curricula.....	78
I.	References.....	82

INDEX OF KEY TERMS

CDF	Community Development Fund
CMC	Community Management Committee
CMDACDF	Coalition for the Management of Diamond Area Community Development Fund
DACDF	Diamond Area Community Development Fund
DMP	Diamond Management Program
GGDO	Government Gold and Diamond Office
GOSL	Government of Sierra Leone
LFs	Learning Facilitators
MMR	Ministry of Mineral Resources
MRDLG	Ministry of Rural Development and Local Government
MSI	Management Systems International
MTs	Master Trainers
NCDDR	National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration
NGO	Non Governmental Organization
OTI	Office of Transition Initiatives
RUF	Revolutionary United Front
SLIMM	Sierra Leone Indigenous Miners Movement
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development
WV	World Vision
YRTEP	Youth Reintegration Training and Education for Peace

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Purpose and Objectives of the Evaluation

The purpose of the evaluation was to assess whether OTI had achieved its country program goals of positively affecting the Sierra Leone peace process and supporting reconciliation and reintegration. Particular attention was paid to two activities: the Diamond Management Program (DMP); and the Youth Reintegration and Education for Peace Program (YRTEP). The focus was on OTI's experience following the Lome Peace Accord, which was signed in July 1999.

The objectives of the evaluation were as follows:

- Assess OTI's overall influence, its partnerships, and its strategy for positively effecting change within the context of a highly volatile war and post-war situation in Sierra Leone.
- Evaluate the impact and effectiveness of the Youth Reintegration Training and Education for Peace Program (YRTEP).
- Evaluate the impact and effectiveness of the DMP, with special attention to OTI's contribution to preventing the distribution of conflict diamonds.
- Assess how the DMP and YRTEP might be adjusted for the post-OTI phase, now that OTI has handed over its Sierra Leone programming to Africa Bureau colleagues in USAID.
- Assess whether, and in what form, the youth program model (YRTEP) is adaptable to other transitional contexts and countries.

Team Members and Implementing Partners

The evaluation team consisted of two consultants from the Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere, Inc. (CARE) and an employee from Creative Associates International, Inc. (CAII). The three team members were: Dr. Art Hansen, Demobilization-Reconciliation Specialist and Team Leader; Ms. Julie Nenon, Peace and Reconciliation Specialist; and Dr. Joy Wolf, Nonformal Education Specialist. The team was managed by Dr. Marc Sommers, the Youth-at-Risk and Countries-in-Crisis Specialist for CARE who serves as the Youth-at-Risk Specialist for the BEPS Activity.

OTI's two primary implementing partners for YRTEP were Management Systems International (MSI) and World Vision. Both partners had collaborated with OTI in designing the YRTEP program and divided responsibilities for implementation. MSI, a Washington-based consulting firm, designed the YRTEP curriculum, trained the master trainers, produced the educational materials, and continues to support and monitor the training component of the program. World Vision (WV), an NGO with a large on-the-ground presence in Sierra Leone, implemented the program at the community level, and its nationwide community-level monitoring of YRTEP continues to the present. MSI also designed and continues to direct the DMP.

Assessment Methodology

The team conducted a two-part assessment: Washington and Sierra Leone. The Washington part included the full team and consisted of interviews with key actors from USAID and the implementing partners. The Sierra Leone part of the evaluation lasted for three weeks and was conducted by Dr. Hansen and Ms. Nemon. Traveling throughout the country, they interviewed and collected qualitative and quantitative data from a wide variety of stakeholders, including Government of Sierra Leone (GOSL) ministries and commissions, participants and trainers, international organizations, and NGOs.

THE DIAMOND MANAGEMENT PROGRAM

Diamond Management Program Strategy and Objectives

In late 1999 OTI began working with the Government of Sierra Leone (GOSL) to develop new diamond policies and establish new mining and exporting operations, with special attention paid to the problem of conflict diamonds. The two primary objectives of OTI diamond-related activities in Sierra Leone (the DMP) remained fairly constant over the years:

- Bring diamonds (and other valuable mineral resources) under GOSL control so that the government and people of Sierra Leone could benefit from the revenues that a greater legal trade would generate.
- Cut the trade in conflict diamonds to diminish the financing of warfare.

OTI considered the first objective to be most important for the long term. In the short term, the second objective had to be addressed first to help end the war and promote peace building.

Diamond Management Program Design and Activities

Management Systems International is the sole implementing partner for OTI's DMP. The DMP seeks to collaborate with GOSL and NGOs involved in diamond reform, and the nature of the program is largely advisory and tightly interwoven with GOSL and other partners. Thus, it has proven difficult to isolate and evaluate OTI's influence.

There are three broad program areas:

- Help reform diamond policy and operations by addressing the problems of corruption and non-transparency in GOSL decision making, and increasing the participation of civil society.
- Provide a series of short-term, usually high-level, technical assistance DMP advisers offering policy advice to GOSL at the ministry or Presidential levels.
- Contribute to an international effort (developing the Kimberly Process) that involves many international and bilateral agencies, corporate interests, and NGOs.

Findings: Evaluating the Impact of the OTI Diamond Management Program

The DMP is innovative and risk-taking and directly attacks a very important, perplexing, and complex problem that is intimately related to continued warfare and peace building. OTI should be commended for assuming this risk instead of playing it safe with traditional projects. Progress has been made in achieving both of OTI's objectives for the DMP.

The major findings regarding the DMP are:

- OTI made a unique contribution by working with and positively influencing the GOSL.
- OTI was successful in its efforts to increase the participation of civil society.
- OTI advisers actively participated in the ongoing effort to establish the Kimberly Process, an international process designed to certify and verify exported diamonds and limit the importation of smuggled diamonds.
- OTI helped establish a Certificate of Origin procedure for Sierra Leone.
- OTI provided assistance in the ongoing attempt to establish a clean channel, minimize corruption, and help GOSL improve the speed and reliability of the legal process.
- OTI provided training for Mines Monitoring Officers.
- OTI promoted and assisted the establishment of the Diamond Area Community Development Fund (DACDF), an innovative, community-based approach to controlling the illicit diamond trade.
- The flawed procedure for allocating the first disbursement of DACDF funds revealed widespread continuing problems of corruption, lack of accountability, and social disenfranchisement at the community level.
- The best indicator of success is an increase in the value of legally exported diamonds, and the short-term (1999-2001) trend is clearly positive.

Recommendations for the Diamond Management Program

- Continue the DMP.
- Establish a credit or small grant program for indentured, exploited “diggers” and miners.
- Continue training MMR staff (Mines Wardens).
- Establish appropriate DACDF disbursement procedures.
- Coordinate YRTEP and Nation-Building programming with DACDF disbursements.

Replicability of the Diamond Management Program

The concept, general design, and some of the methodology of the DMP may be replicated in other countries confronting similar problems of the smuggling mineral resources and corruption. The innovation of applying the community-based natural resource management model to mineral resources (the DACDF) could be replicated elsewhere.

THE YOUTH REINTEGRATION TRAINING AND EDUCATION FOR PEACE PROGRAM (YRTEP)

Concept of YRTEP

The concept of the OTI Youth Reintegration Training and Education for Peace Program (YRTEP) evolved with the goal of helping to bring closure to a debilitating civil war and supporting the process of reconciliation and reintegration. To achieve this ambitious goal, OTI looked at the different factors that fueled the conflict and noted how disenfranchised youth were the most important potential source of destabilization in the post-conflict period. If nothing was done, there was a definite risk that the youth would become more susceptible to negative and violent influences.

Recognition of this potential problem was the inspiration for the conceptualization of YRTEP. Through a facilitative planning process, the concept emerged as a nationwide, community-based, nonformal education initiative for ex-combatant and other war-affected young adults. The complex and ambitious range of activities addressed by YRTEP combines several elements in one program:

- Reintegration of ex-combatants into their communities, orientation of war-affected youth and ex-combatants on issues necessary for reintegration, and psychosocial counseling.
- Training in functional literacy and life skills, vocational counseling, and agricultural skills development.
- Civic education (also called education for peace).

Findings: Evaluating the Impact of YRTEP

YRTEP is an impressive and innovative approach to addressing the critical role of youth in Sierra Leone's conflict. It appeared to have had a positive impact on Sierra Leone's peace process, proved successful in a variety of ways, and achieved most of its original objectives (reintegration, the strengthening of peace-building initiatives, and public support for demobilization). YRTEP is a qualified success, however, with trade-offs and concerns that need to be addressed in order for YRTEP to reach its full potential.

The major findings regarding the YRTEP Program are:

A. *Design*

- **Integration of Youth:** By mixing ex-combatants and war-affected youth in the same program, YRTEP assisted the reconciliation and reintegration process and diminished potential conflicts that arise when services are provided only to ex-combatants.
- **Curriculum, Participation, and Literacy:** The curriculum was stimulating, (covering self, healing mind, body, and spirit, the environment, health and wellbeing, and democracy, good governance, and conflict management), but also directive, with few opportunities for participatory interaction, and low literacy gains. It was also very resource-intensive, making production and distribution difficult.

- **Sustainability: Unmet Community Expectations for Program Followup:** The major weakness of the YRTEP design is the lack of attention paid to closure and how this affects the communities. Repeatedly, participants reported a sense of frustration over how the trainings ended, and they feel only partially prepared to implement lessons learned.

B. Implementation

- **A Notable Impact on the Peace Process:** The quick start-up was impressive, and several observers of the war-to-peace transition believed that the rapid response helped secure peace. Repeatedly, it was stated that YRTEP got youth off the street and engaged them in something that was meaningful and beneficial for the community.
- **Organization and Implementation Challenges:** The push to implement during the early, uncertain post-war transition resulted in a lack of time to field-test materials or approaches. Several early “cracks” in the program were never overcome by OTI and its implementing partners, MSI and WV.
- **Access and Managing from Afar:** Security requirements frequently made it difficult or impossible for expatriate staff to visit program sites. Only recently have staff members been allowed to travel freely. This made program management difficult, and limited the ability of managers to address some of the concerns raised above.

C. Impact on Communities

- **Behavioral Change and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants into Communities:** The most impressive finding is the degree to which participants and community members report that YRTEP results in improving youth behavior.
- **Promoting Peace Building and Reconciliation:** YRTEP is as much emotional as social. Participants vividly and consistently demonstrate great enthusiasm when describing experiences and the changes in their lives.
- **Unanticipated Community Development:** YRTEP provides a solid foundation for initiating additional community development programs. The message is positive, and participants see it as an impetus to create positive change.
- **Gender Considerations: Empowering Women When Women Are Involved:** Where there was sufficient participation by women, there was an increase in women’s sense of empowerment. Participants reported having greater confidence and felt less victimized.
- **Community Ownership: Halfway There:** Most communities still refer to YRTEP as a WV activity. This perception is caused by inadequate orientation and training, prior experience with other OTI programs, and the high level of resources needed for the current curriculum.

D. Coordination

- **Missed Opportunities with Complementary Projects:** YRTEP inspired an impressive degree of community activism, a potential asset to other developmental activities. Unfortunately, the evaluation team found little evidence that other agencies were taking advantage of the community potential created by YRTEP.

- **Potential Opportunities for USAID Activities:** OTI established through YRTEP a network of trainers and community-level organizations that offer important resources that USAID should utilize in future development programs. The Sierra Leoneans in this network are trained, enthusiastic, and organized people who are linked together and accustomed to responding to initiatives. This network could be used for a variety of future large-scale nonformal education programs (literacy, education for peace, agricultural extension, health, etc.).

Replicability of YRTEP

YRTEP can and should be replicated. The theme of inclusion in this model – targeting thousands of ex-combatant as well as marginalized, out-of-school youth – makes YRTEP a potentially critical contributor to other peace-building efforts. YRTEP in Sierra Leone successfully reached tens of thousands of youths, energizing the transition from war to peace by involving out-of-school and ex-combatant youth in productive activities. It also reached them in remarkably short order. The trade-offs caused by a swift start-up were considerable, however, and lessons arising from this evaluation should be drawn from when YRTEP is hopefully adapted elsewhere. The roles and relationships of OTI and its partners will have to be adjusted according to the expertise and capacity of each agency. YRTEP’s curriculum should be customized to meet local contexts and requirements. It may be useful to reconsider the program’s reliance on a large number of materials that proved difficult to reproduce and transport. The mostly directive nature of teaching methods also should be reconsidered, to the degree it is possible. Finally, a revised curriculum should be field tested and evaluated, with findings used to make improvements, before the program becomes a potentially nationwide, or even regionwide, endeavor.

Recommendations for YRTEP

- Expand the YRTEP program.
- Improve closure and address sustainability.
- Provide training and orientation for WV staff and Community Management Committee members.
- Monitor relationships among field staff.
- Explore ways to better address sexual violence issues.
- Improve the monitoring and mentoring of Learning Facilitators.
- Enhance coordination with other programs.
- Improve access to micro-credit schemes.

OTI’S COUNTRY PROGRAM IN SIERRA LEONE

In addition to assessing two specific programs (YRTEP and DMP), the mission was requested to evaluate OTI’s influence, partnerships, strategy, overall impact, and effectiveness in Sierra Leone, and to assess whether OTI achieved its country program goals and objectives.

OTI started working in Sierra Leone in 1996. From the beginning, OTI’s goal was to help bring closure to the war and support the process of reconciliation and reintegration. The objectives of OTI’s country program remained constant from late 1999 through 2002:

- Enable effective control and monitoring of "conflict" diamonds and increase the benefits of diamond mining to the communities involved in their production.
- Assist the reintegration of ex-combatants into war-torn communities and provide remedial education for youth by-passed by schooling during ten years of war.
- Strengthen civil society's peace-building initiatives.
- Build public support for demobilization, reconciliation, and reintegration efforts.

Findings: Evaluating the Impact of OTI in Sierra Leone

OTI is to be commended for its performance in Sierra Leone. The team observed some problems in the design and implementation of programs, but these were minor in comparison to the overall effectiveness of an innovative, risk-taking, and very successful country program that had a major impact.

The major findings regarding OTI's country program are:

- OTI made a significant contribution to achieving peace in Sierra Leone. OTI programs effectively focused on social, economic, and political themes that were critically important to the peace process.
- The OTI YRTEP Program's contribution in support of reintegration and reconciliation was well-recognized in Sierra Leone.
- OTI increased civil society participation in decision-making and helped empower civil society to become more effective.

Recommendations for OTI

Two overarching recommendations for OTI are:

Enhance Coordination with Other Programs.

Include YRTEP and DMP Models in OTI's Global Repertoire.

I. INTRODUCTION

In November 2001, the Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) requested a final independent evaluation of their program in Sierra Leone. This mission is in response to that request. It is supported by the Basic Education and Policy Support (BEPS) Activity. The BEPS evaluation team is comprised of two consultants from the Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere, Inc. (CARE), an employee from Creative Associates International, Inc. (CAII), and the BEPS Youth at Risk and Countries in Crisis Specialist. The team carried out field research in Washington, DC and West Africa in January and February 2002.

A. Purpose

The purpose of this mission is to assess whether OTI has achieved its country program goals and objectives, with particular attention paid to two specific activities: the Diamond Management Program (DMP); and the Youth Reintegration and Education for Peace (YRTEP) Program. This mission is also tasked to summarize lessons learned and provide recommendations both for maintaining and extending activities initiated in Sierra Leone and developing OTI programming in other countries.

B. Goals

OTI's Sierra Leone program extended over more than five years (1997-2002) and, due to the varying conditions of warfare, insecurity, and early steps towards post-war peace, had several phases of activity. Given the complexity of the situation on the ground, it would have been difficult to assess the effectiveness of the entire program in one final evaluation. Accordingly, OTI instructed this mission to focus its review on OTI's experience following the Lome Peace Accord, which the Sierra Leonean Government and the rebel Revolutionary United Front (RUF) signed in July 1999. Essentially this has meant evaluating activities taking place from August 1999 through February 2002.

Instead of evaluating all of the components of the OTI program, this mission was instructed to review three primary areas of inquiry. The first was to distill broad lessons learned from the OTI program and consider whether OTI has met its goals of positively affecting the Sierra Leone peace process and supporting reconciliation and reintegration. The other areas of investigation concentrated on evaluating two specific programs (DMP and YRTEP).

C. Objectives

The objectives of this mission were as follows:

- Assess OTI's influence, partnerships, and strategy to positively affect change within the context of a highly volatile war and post-war situation in Sierra Leone.
- Evaluate the impact and effectiveness of the Diamond Management Program (DMP), with special attention to OTI's contribution to preventing the distribution of conflict diamonds.

- Evaluate the impact and effectiveness of the Youth Reintegration Training and Education for Peace (YRTEP) Program.
- Assess how the Diamond Management and YRTEP Programs might be adjusted for the post-OTI phase, now that OTI has handed over its Sierra Leone programming to Africa Bureau colleagues in USAID.
- Assess whether, and in what form, the youth program model (YRTEP) is adaptable to other transitional contexts and countries.

D. Team Members

The evaluation team consisted of the following three people:

- Dr. Art Hansen, Demobilization/Reconciliation Specialist (Team Leader) (a CARE Consultant).
- Ms. Julie Nenon, Demobilization/Reconciliation Specialist (a Creative Associates staff member, working with its Countries in Transition Division).
- Dr. Joy Wolf, Nonformal Education Specialist (a CARE Consultant).

The team was managed by Dr. Marc Sommers, the Youth-at-Risk and Countries-in-Crisis Specialist for CARE, who serves as the Youth-at-Risk Specialist for the BEPS Activity. He also wrote the background section of this report (Section II). Dr. Hansen and Ms. Nenon conducted the field portion of the evaluation while Dr. Wolf conducted the assessment of the YRTEP curriculum. Dr. Sommers and Cynthia Prather, BEPS Technical Writer/Editor, edited this report.

E. Methodology

1. Work Plan and Research Schedule

The mission began with an orientation in Washington, DC during the week of January 14, 2002. During that time, the team finalized schedules for the trip to Sierra Leone, collected available relevant documents, met with key OTI officials and OTI's two primary implementing partners for the youth and diamond programs (Management Systems International and World Vision), and interviewed USAID, State Department, and NGO officials who have been directly involved with OTI's programming in Sierra Leone. Management Systems International (MSI) is a consulting firm, and World Vision (WV) is an NGO. Finally, the team worked with OTI officials to develop a preliminary list of organizations and officials that the field evaluation team should interview in Sierra Leone.

The trip to Sierra Leone was originally scheduled to begin the week of January 28th. During the Washington meetings in mid-January, however, the evaluation team learned that the trip to Sierra Leone had to be delayed for two weeks, due to the shortage of available secure housing for the team in Freetown.

Delaying the Sierra Leone fieldwork from late January to mid-February meant that one member of the team, Dr. Joy Wolf, could not journey to Sierra Leone, due to prior commitments. A specialist in nonformal education, Dr. Wolf was instead tasked with assessing the text of

YRTEP's nonformal educational curriculum and comparing it with another nonformal educational approach (REFLECT) and with Education for Peace. Dr. Wolf produced this assessment before her colleagues, Dr. Art Hansen and Ms. Julie Nemon, went to Sierra Leone. Her findings are incorporated into this report, while her complete report is attached as Appendix D.

Dr. Hansen and Ms. Nemon conducted the research for two and a half weeks (February 12 to March 1) in Sierra Leone. The team interviewed and collected qualitative and quantitative data from a wide variety of stakeholders, including Government of Sierra Leone (GOSL) ministries and commissions, international organizations, and NGOs. The team also visited and interviewed many people at YRTEP learning sites around the country (See Appendix A for the complete list of people and organizations contacted in Washington, DC and Sierra Leone).

The evaluation team interviewed national and regional officials in the Ministry of Mineral Resources, Mines Division, as well as other NGO stakeholders about OTI's involvement with the diamond industry. The methodology used for studying YRTEP is discussed at length below.

The team briefed OTI and other relevant stakeholders on the team's preliminary findings and recommendations before leaving Sierra Leone on March 1, 2002. The team submitted its preliminary report to OTI and presented an informal debriefing on its findings and recommendations to stakeholders in Washington, DC on April 3. Feedback from that debriefing was incorporated into this final report. The final debriefing took place in Washington, DC on April 23.

2. *Security and Opportunity*

The tentative work plan anticipated that security concerns in Sierra Leone would limit the team to overnighting only in Freetown and Bo, the two largest cities in Sierra Leone, and travelling only during daylight hours. This would have limited the team's ability to collect regionally diverse information. The rapidly improving security situation after disarmament and demobilization, however, encouraged the U.S. Embassy to open the door for almost complete access across Sierra Leone.

The field evaluation team took full advantage of this new environment. For six days (February 21-26), they traveled by road through all four provinces, stopping at many sites (including Makeni, Kabala, Magburaka, Bo, Kenema, Daru, Mile 91, Tikonko, Koribondo, and Moyamba) to interview people about the YRTEP and diamond programs. In addition, the team interviewed people in the Freetown area, and made a one-day helicopter trip to Koidu for interviews. World Vision planned all of the visits to YRTEP sites and provided the logistical support (vehicles, drivers, and guides) that made the road trip possible. USAID facilitated the helicopter trip to Koidu. The complete Sierra Leone travel itinerary is listed in Appendix B. A list of the sites visited is included as Appendix C.

3. *YRTEP Evaluation and Questions*

MSI conducted an impact assessment of the YRTEP program in July 2001, only six months before this mission went to the field. The MSI assessment utilized a formal questionnaire that was translated into five Sierran Leonean languages and administered to a stratified random sample of 482 YRTEP participants considered representative of those who had completed at least part of the YRTEP curriculum. The team assessed the data collection methodology used in that earlier study and did not want to duplicate those results. The mission also wanted to assess a broader set of issues with a variety of people at the community level.

To accomplish this, the evaluators used a semi-structured set of questions to gather information about the YRTEP Program in a focus group format from a large sample of community leaders, trainers, and participants throughout the country. The team members decided on a general list of questions based on the Scope of Work to ask people who were participating at different levels of YRTEP (see Appendix E). This list guided the interviews. Sometimes the same information was asked for in different ways because the team realized that there were barriers to communication (trust, language, dialect, education, and experience). The team also collected quantitative data about the socio-demographic composition of the YRTEP trainer and participant populations.

II. SIERRA LEONE AND THE CIVIL WAR

In March 1991, a ragtag band of former Sierra Leonean soldiers and mercenaries entered Kailahun District in Sierra Leone. Led by Foday Sankoh, a former officer in the Sierra Leonean army, supported by Liberia's current President, Charles Taylor, and calling itself the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), this tiny, fledgling group eventually overran vast areas of Sierra Leonean forest, twice assaulted the capital, and dominated the country's vast diamond fields for a decade. Commanding a group of 5,000 to 10,000 child soldiers, the RUF's terrifying and remarkably effective military tactics succeeded in bringing a country the size of Ireland to its knees.

Critical to the success of the RUF was its deadly combination of child and diamond exploitation. Children and youth stocked its fighting forces, looted, raped, and terrified local populations, and amputated innocent civilians. They also labored as domestics, concubines, spies, and, perhaps most important, miners of diamonds and other valuable minerals. Battles with government forces were sporadic, and the national army proved mostly ineffective throughout much of the war. Local civil defense units fared comparably better against the RUF. All three military groups used child soldiers to some degree. Diamonds bankrolled the RUF insurgency and helped underwrite President Taylor's military rule in nearby Liberia.

Following two failed peace treaties, a third was negotiated in Lome in July 1999 between the RUF and the Government of Sierra Leone, led by President Ahmad Tejan Kabbah. The steps leading from war to peace since that time have been slow, arduous, and rife with disappointment. Yet slowly, peace in Sierra Leone has taken shape. Child soldiers are being disarmed. Tension surrounding the diamond fields has fallen. A tenuous political dance between President Kabbah's government and his RUF counterparts has begun. National elections are scheduled, and the RUF has put up a candidate to challenge the President. Zones of insecurity have replaced zones of war, and even those are in serious decline.

The prospects for peace have sadly blurred memories of the causes of conflict in Sierra Leone. Yet its roots are deep, long-standing, and tragic. Justice and the idea of an accountable state are emerging ideas. It remains difficult for many observers of Sierra Leone's war to realize and accept that if the RUF had not come along, another form of armed rebellion – perhaps one not as diabolical as the RUF but a rebellion nonetheless – probably would have surfaced at some point.

The roots of conflict reach down to the colonial era, when British colonial administrators co-opted some local leaders as "friends" and collaborated against shared local opponents. The result was a politically weak colony, but one where local chiefs serving as British allies became wealthy and powerful, particularly in Kono District, where they controlled alluvial diamond and gold mining. Reno characterized the British colonial power as emanating "from their abilities to control markets and their material rewards" (1995: 3). In the end, the British colonials got their diamonds and other minerals, favoring chiefs that dominated their areas (revealingly, the positions they assumed are called Paramount Chiefs to this day), and most Sierra Leoneans got next to nothing.

The colonial trend towards government exploitation of both people and natural wealth from the countryside, carried out by leaders isolated in the coastal capital of Freetown, together with an impoverished and restive populace, extended long into the independence era, and to some degree extends up to the present. It reached its heights under Siaka Stevens, who ruled Sierra Leone as President from 1968 until 1985. Under Stevens, patronage thrived while the national government withered, and poverty rose to alarming levels. Reno argues that Stevens both “starved” most state institutions, undermining their ability to be effective, and developed “an extensive patronage network” that directed wealth from resource extraction to Stevens and his multitude of supporters (1998: 116). The Stevens era was one characterized by “material payoffs, not sacrifices” by the government (Cartwright 1978: 266).

With public service devalued and corruption and nepotism nurtured, it cannot be particularly surprising that the government’s capacity to serve its people remains largely threadbare. Indeed, complaints from foreign actors in Sierra Leone about the government’s inability to carry out its work are legion.² At the same time, the economy has repeatedly veered on the brink of collapse. The country’s average Gross Domestic Product (GDP) fell from 3.7 percent in 1965-73 to 1.8 percent in 1974-84, and then to –3.6 percent in 1995 (during the civil war).³ The United Nations’ Human Development Report has regularly ranked Sierra Leone last among all nations in their Human Development Index (HDI). Their 2001 report lists Sierra Leone as having the lowest HDI (162nd out of 162 countries), with the world’s lowest life expectancy at birth (38.3 years) and GDP per capita (\$448 dollars a year) (UNDP 2001: 144).

After nearly a decade of conflict, and with considerable support from Western donor nations and the United Nations, peace is finally on Sierra Leone’s horizon. Yet the detritus of the nation’s terrifying and destructive war is embodied in its youthful population. Exploited and discarded by military groups, particularly the RUF, Sierra Leone’s youth became virtual commodities during the war. Burdened by a tortuous past and limited educational experience, they now face an uncertain future with limited resources and opportunities. At the same time, transforming diamond mining into an industry that supports peace, rehabilitation, and development is a difficult and critically significant challenge.

A chronology of war and peace in Sierra Leone is provided in Appendix F.

This evaluation thus addresses the Office of Transition Initiatives’ involvement in two of Sierra Leone’s most pressing and important concerns: the dangers of conflict diamonds, and the needs of ex-combatant child soldiers and out-of-school youth.

² See, for example, Sommers 2000, where, during the civil war years, some international humanitarian officials considered their government counterparts as “frequently inept or corrupt, or both” while government officials seethed at how, in their view, many NGOs in their midst “trampled on their authority and government sovereignty” (pp. 28-29).

³ World Bank, cited in the Economist Country Profile: Guinea, Liberia, Sierra Leone 1997-98, p. 44 and in Sommers 2000: 11.

III. OTI IN SIERRA LEONE, 1997-2002

A. OTI

An increasing percentage of U.S. foreign aid goes to relieve the humanitarian emergencies that are being caused by civil strife. Countries experiencing complex crises resulting from internal conflict and civil war have special needs that are often not addressed by traditional emergency assistance programs. Fledgling governments in newly established democracies often need direct, targeted assistance to adequately identify and address the tremendous political and economic challenges facing them. Likewise, other sectors and segments of society within new democracies require positive engagement and managed assistance.

In response to this perceived need, the USAID Administrator created OTI (in the Bureau for Humanitarian Response, now the Bureau for Democracy, Conflict, and Humanitarian Assistance) in 1994 to help countries successfully transition from crisis to recovery and stability. OTI's strategic objectives are based on the assumption that fast, direct development assistance that takes the political ramifications and potential leverage of such assistance into consideration can serve as a catalyst for moving countries towards post-crisis stability. OTI is uniquely placed among development agencies and international organizations to do this work, as it is one of the first offices that addresses the gap between relief and development. When a crisis occurs, OTI can design a country strategy that is intended to target constraints that inhibit governance and economic functioning. OTI is expected to carry out this work for limited time periods, after which OTI hands over its role to the USAID mission.

B. Before the Lome Accord: OTI in Sierra Leone, 1997-1999

OTI considered Sierra Leone a special case for two reasons. First, Sierra Leone is not a country of high strategic importance for the USA. The country has nonetheless received special attention from the U.S. government because of the presence of “conflict diamonds” in the country, a legacy of extreme violence and brutality carried out against Sierra Leonean civilians, and dense interconnections with neighboring Liberia, another country struggling to transition from civil war. Second, OTI is supposed to operate only for a short period of time during a transition – often only about two years. OTI has been involved in Sierra Leone for more than five.

OTI officials instructed the BEPS evaluation team to limit its review of OTI activities to the past two years (or activities following the Lome Accord, signed in July 1999) and focus on two prominent OTI activities – the Youth Reintegration Training and Education for Peace Program (YRTEP) and the Diamond Management Program (DMP). While this timeframe and project limitation guided this mission, the team also sought to place YRTEP and DMP into a historical context that revealed how the two programs evolved from earlier assessments and plans.

Sierra Leone has oscillated between war and peace for years. National presidential elections were held in 1996, and a transition from war to peace seemed underway. OTI developed programs in 1996 for implementation in 1997. Unfortunately, Sierra Leone suffered a return to warfare in June 1997. OTI responded by suspending its operations and evacuating its expatriate personnel.

After a regional military force reinstated Sierra Leone's democratically-elected government in March 1998, OTI resumed operations. Following widespread disarmament and demobilization activities in the country, OTI phased out its operations in March 2002 while USAID began re-establishing its presence in Sierra Leone.

When OTI began assessing the situation in Sierra Leone and proposing interventions in 1996, an end to the war seemed at hand and a newly elected government had taken office. The goal of OTI (which remained constant over the years) was to help bring closure to the war and support the reconciliation and reintegration process. At that time, OTI had four objectives in the country:

- Move the peace process towards consolidation.
- Accomplish the transition from emergency relief to supporting the resettlement and reintegration of demobilized ex-combatants, while maintaining a capacity for emergency readiness in case conflict broke out again.
- Empower civilians to help prevent the recurrence of violence.
- Set the agenda and begin the process of long-term reform to address the causes of the conflict.

The 1996 assessment stated that the first two objectives were already supported by other groups – the first by the new civilian government and civic leaders, and the second by the international relief community - and probably could be accomplished without OTI intervention. OTI thought that the last two objectives -- empowering civilians and long-term reform -- might not be attained without OTI support.

The OTI program was to support a transformation of Sierra Leone:

“OTI is prepared to make a serious commitment of support...for a serious process of transition. This is not simply a transition out of a humanitarian crisis. Sierra Leone presents the possibilities of making a large qualitative leap from a society of economic and political domination...to a society in the process of economic, social, and political development for the majority of its citizens.”

(OTI Concept Paper, 1996, page 3).

Renewed warfare in 1997 disrupted these plans. When OTI returned to Sierra Leone in June 1998, USAID updated its strategy for OTI assistance. The updated strategy emphasized helping the Government and civil society to design and create new institutions (with an emphasis on civilian engagement) to provide security in the post-conflict period.

The first references to a youth program similar to what would become YRTEP occurred in 1998 when USAID announced that “OTI will launch a national campaign to provide basic literacy and numeracy to young people ages 12-25 who have been marginalized from schooling” (USAID 1998 Summary). This was “a nonformal education campaign targeted at disenfranchised, war-affected children and youth” (USAID 1998 Situation Report).

An OTI report even noted that disenfranchised youth were “probably the single most important source of destabilization in the post-conflict period.” If nothing was done to help these youth, they could become more susceptible to negative and violent influences and potentially disrupt the peace process. A primary reason for establishing the nonformal education program was to enfranchise and empower youth and break the potential movement towards violence.

Reintegration of ex-combatants was not included as a component of this campaign. A 1998 strategy statement by the Inter-Agency Humanitarian and Transition Task Force on Sierra Leone (TFSL) noted that experience in Liberia and elsewhere indicated that post-disarmament assistance to ex-combatants had not proven to be a critical violence prevention strategy. The decisions made by leaders of the armed groups were thought to be more important, whether or not there were benefits for ex-combatants (Inter-Agency Humanitarian and Transition Task Force on Sierra Leone, 1998:4-5).

C. Post-Lome: OTI in Sierra Leone, 2000-2002

The beginning of the period covered by this assessment was late 1999 to early 2000. The goal of OTI during this period remained the same: helping to bring closure to the war and support the process of reconciliation and reintegration among Sierra Leoneans. The objectives of OTI’s program for Sierra Leone had been updated:

- Enable effective control and monitoring of "conflict" diamonds and increase the benefits of diamond mining to the communities involved in their production.
- Assist the reintegration of ex-combatants into war-torn communities and provide remedial education for youth by-passed by schooling during ten years of war.
- Strengthen civil society’s peace-building initiatives.
- Build public support for demobilization, reconciliation, and reintegration efforts (OTI 2001d:76-79).

Two components (YRTEP and DMP) of the OTI program during FY2000 were the focus of this mission’s assessment. Other components (not included in this mission) included a small-grants program to support civil society initiatives, a media program to support reconciliation and reintegration, the Nation Building program, and components that were added later such as NDI, election assistance, and the STEP/STEG programs with WV and CCF.

The design of the youth-oriented educational campaign had been modified (or perhaps clarified) to explicitly include both ex-combatants and non-combatant (war-affected) young adults. It was now called the Reintegration Training and Education for Peace Program. Whereas the FY1999 OTI report emphasized that this was a “remedial education program, focusing on basics such as reading, writing, and simple math” (OTI 2000e, Report:40), the FY2000 report noted that the program combined “reintegration orientation and counseling with training related to life-skills, vocational counseling, agriculture skills development, civic education, health, and functional literacy” (OTI 2001d, p. 77). Remedial education was now last on the list.

The small-grants program was designed to support civil society’s role in peace building. World Vision implemented this, selected three local NGOs, and provided them with grant funds. The

media and mass communications program funded (other donors were also involved) Search for Common Ground's Talking Drum Studio to produce and distribute to local radio stations news and messages promoting reconciliation.

IV. THE DIAMOND MANAGEMENT PROGRAM (DMP)

The Diamond Management Program (DMP) addresses a complicated series of problems in Sierra Leone and the world trade of “raw” unpolished diamonds. The program itself is interwoven into a larger international effort to help the Sierra Leonean government both reduce the trade in diamonds that spur warfare and increase the proportion of diamonds that flow through official, government-controlled channels. What follows is both descriptive, to explain key aspects of the overall effort and suggest OTI’s role where it surfaces, and evaluative, to assess OTI’s impact wherever possible.

A. Background: Problems Associated with Diamonds in Sierra Leone

Diamonds are glamorous and dangerous. While diamonds in the West are associated with love and beautiful people, in Sierra Leone diamonds are associated with smuggling, war, corruption, abusive labor practices, persistent poverty, and the occasional opportunity for a windfall of wealth (the equivalent of winning the lottery).

Numerous reports by UN agencies, NGOs, scientists, and journalists have documented and analyzed the importance of illegal diamonds in financing warfare in Sierra Leone, Liberia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Angola (Hirsch 2001; Opala 1998). The problem of “conflict diamonds” or “blood diamonds” has become well known in the U.S. and other Western countries. The UN has initiated boycotts and other activities to combat this problem. For example, UN Resolution 1306 (2000) banned the import of conflict diamonds from Sierra Leone. In addition, the potential for a public relations nightmare (essentially equating diamonds with blood and mutilated children) that could devastate Western consumers’ appetite for diamonds has galvanized major international corporate interests and actions as well (see discussion of the Kimberly Process below).

Another fundamental problem with the diamond industry in these countries is less well publicized. In all of the African countries mentioned above, many more diamonds are exported illegally (smuggled) than are exported legally. The diamonds that are illegally sold to finance warfare (the conflict diamonds) are only a fraction of the total quantity of diamonds that are smuggled. In terms of the global trade in diamonds, smuggled diamonds were estimated to account for 20 to 30 percent of the carat weight of all exported diamonds. Conflict diamonds, on the other hand, were estimated to account for only four percent of world trade (or 13 to 20 percent of all smuggled diamonds).

OTI reports noted that legal diamond exports from Sierra Leone in 1999 were valued at \$1.2 million, while the total value of all diamonds exported was conservatively estimated to be \$70 million. This means that less than two percent of the value of all exported diamonds was exported legally in 1999.

Conflict diamonds directly contribute to the warfare that plagues these countries, whereas diamond smuggling directly contributes to fundamental weaknesses in the national economic and

political systems. Smuggling drains a significant revenue stream from governments that could be used to finance development programs. It also encourages and feeds widespread corruption.

Both of these problems (financing conflict and smuggling) reflect a natural feature of diamond mining in these African countries. The mining of diamonds in most countries requires a capital-intensive operation to reach the buried diamond-bearing veins of rock. Widespread alluvial mining is possible in only a few countries (see the African countries noted above). It is possible because in these countries, veins of diamonds in the earth reach to the earth's surface. Erosion of these veins gradually allowed loose diamonds to slide down hills and into streambeds and low-lying areas. In alluvial mining, all that is needed is a shovel and a wire sieve to search for diamonds in valleys and streams.

The presence of large quantities of alluvial diamonds means that it is much harder for anyone to control diamond extraction. When diamond operations are focused on capital-intensive mines and run by large corporations, much tighter oversight is more easily enforceable by both the mining companies and the government. In the case of Sierra Leone, the historic trend under previous colonial and national administrations has been to loosen government control over the diamond trade and increase the local autonomy of illegal miners and dealers. Accompanying this situation is the fact that diamonds and official corruption have been closely associated in Sierra Leone for decades. These trends have caused large corporations to withdraw from the mining industry in Sierra Leone, leaving the field to smaller and often less savory actors. This trend has increased because of instability caused by active warfare.

Other socioeconomic problems also are associated with alluvial diamond mining. In addition to the previously noted problems of smuggling, which undermines government revenues, financing conflict, and encouraging corruption and general lawlessness, abusive labor (including child labor) practices and the equivalent of indentured labor are also prevalent in the mining areas. As a result, the majority of laborers involved in mining remain relatively powerless and mired in poverty. The issue of abusive child labor in mining was not mentioned as frequently in Sierra Leone as it was in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Reports from Sierra Leone, however, highlight the problem of disenfranchised youth entrapped as impoverished laborers in mining areas. Conditions such as this provide fertile ground for social disruption and even a potential return to conflict.

Although diamond mining occurs over a broad geographical area in Sierra Leone, there are three major market towns: Koidu, Bo, and Kenema. Koidu was essentially destroyed in the war in 1998, leaving Bo and Kenema as the remaining primary diamond outlets. Warfare also caused an exodus of governmental administrators from contested zones, accentuating the loss of order and control in diamond-mining areas.

The responsibility for diamonds within GOSL has changed over time. The Lome Peace Accord, signed on 7 July 1999, called for establishing a Governmental Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction and Development (CMRRD) that would take charge of managing diamonds as well as other important natural resources. The Accord also called for Corporal Fodah Sankoh (the leader of the RUF) to become the director of this new Commission. After the CMRRD became operational, there would be a ban on exploiting, selling,

exporting, or other transactions of gold and diamonds except for those that were sanctioned by the new Commission. The CMRRD was not supposed to take the place of the other GOSL offices involved in monitoring the diamond trade, but to serve instead as an independent regulatory agency. Changes in Corporal Sankoh's status and other political events diminished the CMRRD's authority over the diamond trade. Currently, the GOSL ministries and offices with direct operational authority over different aspects of the diamond trade are the Ministry of Mineral Resources (MMR), the Ministry of Rural Development and Local Government (MRDLG), and the Government Gold and Diamond Office (GGDO).

B. The Social Dynamics of Alluvial Mining: Diggers and Licensed Miners

The chronic problems of poverty and abusive labor practices reflect the organization of land, labor, and capital in alluvial diamond mining. At the bottom of the social and economic hierarchy are the so-called "diggers," who are the laborers (primarily men and boys) who actually mine the diamonds. "Digger" is a derogatory term. Diggers are employed by "miners," who are those who either own the land or have received permission to mine the land from landowners or local chiefs who control the utilization and allocation of rights to land. Diggers live on credit advanced to them by miners or dealers (or "supporters") and work in the hope of finding diamonds, getting out of debt, and making a profit. Diggers do not have access to reliable scales to weigh diamonds nor any solid information about the value of the diamonds they find. The supporters who advance credit require that the indebted diggers, when they find diamonds, sell the diamonds to the supporter at a discounted price set by the supporter. In essence, this system of credit ensures that most diggers remain in debt forever.

Miners are supposed to be licensed by the government, whereas diggers fall below the level of governmental recognition or supervision. The license is essential for working a mine because the licensed miner or a designated mine manager has to be physically present at mining sites every day when the mine is being worked. Ministry of Mineral Resources (MMR) officials noted that miners who are chiefs, elderly people, or women commonly hire a mine manager to be at the site daily. If a mines monitoring officer (MMO) comes to inspect a mine, someone with authority (the miner or manager) and a license must be there. Whenever a digger finds a diamond, he must turn that diamond over to a miner because only a licensed miner or designated manager may legally possess raw diamonds away from the mine or legally sell raw diamonds to a licensed dealer for export. Dealers are also licensed by the government and are the only people who are legally allowed to export raw diamonds from the country. The financial requirements for receiving a miner's license mean that ordinary people (including "diggers") cannot become miners.

The licensing procedure highlights places where local and official corruption and favoritism may occur. Local and town chiefs have a commanding position in verifying local land tenure and the rights to mine local land. There is no place in this procedure for community participation or monitoring, and youth and other non-elders remain marginalized and disenfranchised. Although only Sierra Leoneans may become licensed miners, many suspect that foreigners use landowners to obtain licenses. Miner's licenses may be issued in the regional offices (such as Bo, Kenema, and Koidu), while dealer's licenses are issued only in Freetown (see Appendix H for more details on how miners obtain licenses).

Two important labor and human rights issues surface from this situation. The first concerns whether diggers should be called miners, register with the government, and receive reasonable compensation for their work. The second concerns whether those who dig for diamonds should become eligible for loans to purchase machinery to help them escape from indentured conditions. Without such changes, diggers will remain locked in a state of poverty and powerlessness.

C. OTI DMP Strategy and Objectives

The first mention of the DMP occurred in a 1998 OTI report on its strategy for helping to spur better governance and economic recovery in Sierra Leone. The strategy called for OTI to provide technical assistance to the Government to evaluate its mineral resources (particularly diamonds, gold, and rutile) and improve systems for gaining maximum fiscal benefit for the government from the legitimate exploitation of minerals. The strategy emphasized assisting the Government of Sierra Leone (GOSL) and civil society to design and create new institutions to provide security during the post-conflict period, with an emphasis on civilian engagement in preventing the recurrence of violence.

In late 1999 OTI began working with the GOSL to develop new diamond policies and establish new mining and exporting operations, with special attention paid to the problem of conflict diamonds. The two primary objectives of OTI diamond-related activities in Sierra Leone (the DMP) seem to have remained fairly constant over the years:

- Bring diamonds (and other valuable mineral resources) under GOSL control so that the government and people of Sierra Leone could benefit from the revenues that a greater legal trade would generate.
- Cut the trade in conflict diamonds to diminish the financing of warfare.

Together, these two interdependent objectives exemplify OTI's transitional role between peace-building and development. But there is some disagreement over which objective is more important. OTI considered the first objective to be most important for the long term. In the short term, however, OTI realized that addressing the second objective had to be addressed first, in order to help end the war and promote peace building.

It is important to acknowledge that the GOSL environment has significantly changed since the 1999 Lome Accord. As was noted above, that Accord established the Governmental Commission for the Management of Strategic Resources, National Reconstruction and Development (CMRRD) to serve as a regulatory agency managing diamonds as well as other important natural resources. The Accord put Corporal Foday Sankoh (the leader of the RUF) in charge of that Commission. Subsequent political events have diminished the importance of that GOSL agency.

D. OTI DMP Design and Activities

The DMP seeks to operate in collaboration with GOSL and NGOs involved in diamond reform. The general strategy has been to mobilize and support a wide range of domestic partners (including GOSL and RUF) to form a coalition of stakeholders and to rely on a series of short-term visits by specialized technical assistance (TA) experts who have addressed various issues.

The activities (often funded by OTI) of these stakeholders have provided a multiplier effect to the input OTI has had through its TA advisers. Management Systems International (MSI) is the sole implementing partner for OTI's DMP.

The nature of the program is largely advisory and tightly interwoven with GOSL and other partners. It has thus proven difficult to consistently isolate and evaluate OTI's influence, since the team was unable to gauge whether the same progress would have been made without OTI's influence.

There are three broad areas of program concern that will be examined here. First, an integral part of OTI's strategy is to help reform diamond policy and operations by addressing the problems of corruption and non-transparency in GOSL decision making, and increasing the participation of civil society. To do this, OTI has urged the formation of a broad-based coalition of stakeholders that would serve to plan, direct, and monitor reforms in national mining and exporting procedures. The first visible manifestation of this was a strategic planning workshop that OTI sponsored in Freetown in March 2000. Participants ranged from GOSL and RUF representatives to representatives from civil society, NGOs, and the international diamond industry. The extent to which this coalition functions, has influence on GOSL decisions, and is sustainable will eventually serve as an indicator of the impact of OTI's efforts.

Second, a fundamental feature of the OTI diamond program has been a series of short-term, usually high-level, technical assistance DMP advisers offering policy advice to GOSL at the ministry or Presidential levels. Reports from DMP advisers document many meetings with GOSL officials, note ways in which GOSL policies and procedures seem to have improved, and suggest that DMP's influence is important to the reform process.

Third, OTI contributes to an international effort (developing the Kimberly Process) that involves many international and bilateral agencies, corporate interests, and NGOs. Again, it is difficult to isolate and assess the contribution made by OTI.

The complexity and inter-relatedness of diamond-related initiatives in Sierra Leone (and internationally) in which OTI and DMP are involved can be illustrated by reviewing six primary initiatives for diamond reform. These are described separately because many people are unaware of the specific components of this reform effort, and a better understanding of the process is important when considering the possibility of replicating this in other countries. In some of these initiatives, the influence of OTI is more evident than in others, an issue that will be noted throughout. The six initiatives are:

- (1) The Kimberly Process.
- (2) The "Clean Channel" in Sierra Leone.
- (3) Export certification (of origin) and licensing in Sierra Leone.
- (4) Training and equipment for MMR monitoring staff.
- (5) The Diamond Area Community Development Fund in Sierra Leone.
- (6) The Media sensitization campaign in Sierra Leone.

Activity #1: The Kimberly Process. OTI is one of the smaller actors involved in this effort. The Kimberly Process is a major international effort involving the United Nations, diamond exporting and importing countries (including the US), NGOs, and diamond processing and major retailing corporations such as De Beers. The goal is to establish an international program that certifies and verifies the country of origin and legal status of all exported raw diamonds and permits (in fact, requires) importing countries to reject imports from sanctioned conflict areas. This is a major change in a long-established pattern of world trade.

Once established, this process will require that (a) diamond-producing (or diamond-exporting) countries establish procedures for officially certifying the origin of all raw diamonds; (b) all raw diamonds be accompanied by these certificates; and (c) diamond-importing countries require that all imported raw diamonds show their origins to be legal and not from conflict zones. This process is designed to enable international organizations and importing countries to effectively prohibit the importation of all smuggled (including conflict) diamonds. To be effective, however, the Kimberly Process has to be established in all diamond-exporting countries. Otherwise, for instance, if Sierra Leone established the process, but Guinea and Gambia did not, diamonds from Sierra Leone (including those financing armed groups) could be smuggled to Guinea or Gambia and exported from there.

Activity #2: The “Clean Channel” for Diamond Exports. The concept of a “clean channel” means establishing legal and bureaucratic procedures for tracing and documenting the flow of raw diamonds from the time they are dug from the ground until they are legally exported. DMP advisers have been working with GOSL ministries and at higher levels to modify policies and reform procedures so that existing dealers are encouraged to trade legally, and respected dealers and mining corporations are encouraged to return to operating in Sierra Leone. The strategy has been to attract legal trade and reduce the incentive to smuggle.

Activity #3: Export Certification and Licensing in Sierra Leone. UN Resolution 1306 (2000) banned diamond-importing countries from accepting diamonds from Sierra Leone (as of July 5, 2000) until an effective certification (of origin) of diamonds was fully operational in Sierra Leone. This meant that the country had to establish the same certificate of origin that is called for in the Kimberly Process. The Diamond High Council (HRD) of Belgium and the Government of Angola (GRA) had already established such a certification program for Angola, which became a model for Sierra Leone. By October 2000, the major components of this certification system were operational in Sierra Leone, and the UN approved an exception to Resolution 1306, which gave the GOSL permission to resume legal exports. The GOSL Certificate of Origin attests that the diamonds to be exported were legally mined and that all of the transactions were legal and documented. The certification process is complicated and includes digital photographing of the diamonds, overlays of different evaluators estimating the value of the diamonds, and an electronic tracking system. Currently, the only importing destination that is linked into this system is Antwerp in Belgium.

In December 2000, the GOSL adopted a new diamond export licensing policy and authorized eight export licenses, each one costing \$50,000 a year. Unlike licensed miners, licensed dealers do not have to be Sierra Leoneans, and only one of the licensees represents Sierra Leonean

citizens. GOSL policy is to distribute licenses among people who have traditionally been dealers and who come from diamond-importing countries.

Activity #4: Training and Equipment for MMR Monitoring Staff. Establishing and maintaining a clean channel requires good performance from the MMR staff responsible for monitoring. MMR staff are not always paid in a timely manner, and the Mines Monitoring Officers (MMOs) are appointed through a political process. DMP has begun training and equipping MMR staff. OTI sponsored a training workshop for several days in December 2000 for all MMOs and followed that by distributing radios and motorbikes to allow the MMOs to travel around their areas and communicate more efficiently.

Activity #5: The Diamond Area Community Development Fund (DACDF). The DACDF is an important new legal entity in Sierra Leone. The concept of such a Community Development Fund (CDF) is widespread around Africa as a means of improving natural resource (wildlife or timber) management by mobilizing local people to help protect the resources. A problem inhibiting preservation is that local communities living in close proximity to natural resources that the government wishes to preserve often receive no immediate benefit and suffer significant losses from the preservation of resources. Local people thus need to feel that they have a stake in preserving the resources. This has inspired Community-Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) programs worldwide, which emphasize community participation in the determination of how resources are managed and funds are invested.

The DACDF was established by GOSL in 2000 and is a community management program. The fund receives one-quarter of the GOSL tax revenues from official diamond exports. The tax is three percent of the value of the exports. The fund is to be used to finance visible public works in the local communities where diamonds are mined. After some disagreement over procedures for disbursing funds to the DCFs (see findings below), the first disbursement took place in July 2001. Thirty-two chiefdoms in eastern and southern Sierra Leone (Bo, Kenema, and Pujehun Districts) received funds. The second disbursement of funds was originally scheduled for January 2002, but has been delayed until the GOSL works out better procedures to ensure that the funds are utilized appropriately. As of the time this report was written, the revised procedures had not been adopted and the second disbursement had not occurred.

Activity #6: The Community and Media Sensitization Campaign. OTI and members of this campaign co-hosted a workshop in January 2002 in Freetown to examine problems in implementing the DACDF and to work on solutions. OTI and the Coalition established a media campaign spearheaded by Talking Drum Studios to inform the public (especially in diamond-mining areas) about GOSL policies and procedures regarding diamond mining and exporting, to publicize the existence and purpose of the DACDF, to investigate what had happened with the funds from the first disbursement, and to improve the operation of the process through public exposure and discussion.

The campaign included several rounds of community meetings in the diamond-mining areas in October and December 2001. The purpose of the meetings was to share information. One bit of information received by the Coalition in these meetings was that MMR staff members (MMOs and mines wardens) were collecting fees that were not called for in the official schedule.

A related effort aims to train community members (especially members of the Chiefdom Development Committees) to take active roles in making decisions and allocating funds.

E. Findings: Evaluating the Impact of OTI's DMP

OTI's DMP is innovative and risk-taking and directly attacks a very important, perplexing, and complex problem that is intimately related to continued warfare and peace building. OTI should be commended for taking this risk instead of playing it safe with traditional projects.

Any evaluation of DMP has to acknowledge that OTI has had to cope with a variety of obstacles and constraints. Conflict, instability, and the exodus of GOSL administrators from war-affected areas disrupted many activities, especially any attempt to control the diamond trade. Warfare and insecurity also restricted access: expatriate advisers sometimes were not allowed into the country, and advisers in country were often restricted to Freetown.

Given all of these constraints, OTI seems to have made a unique contribution in its decision to work with and try to positively influence the operation of GOSL, although the British and the World Bank seem now to be moving in this direction as well. One specific expression of this work was the presentation by OTI in May 2000 of a working paper that was adopted by GOSL as its policy framework and published by GOSL as "Guidelines for the Mining and Exporting of Diamonds in Sierra Leone."

OTI advisers have been actively involved in the international effort to establish the Kimberly Process. The concept and framework have been accepted by the UN, many countries, and the international diamond trading corporations, but the system is not yet established worldwide. It is impossible to isolate DMP's influence and evaluate its effectiveness in comparison with all of the other actors involved, but OTI is to be commended for becoming involved and pushing this critically important effort to control the trade in conflict diamonds. The case of Sierra Leone and the brutality associated with its conflict have been important in promoting this global effort.

At the same time, it should be noted that the essentially exploitative nature of the diamond extraction process has not yet become a component of OTI's objectives and programming. The plight of the indentured "diggers" remains serious, and seriously overlooked, particularly in light of their socio-economic entrapment. Such circumstances could again give rise to violence in the mining areas.

Establishing a Certificate of Origin procedure in Sierra Leone is a significant success for OTI and the GOSL. This must be considered a positive indicator of DMP success, although, once again, it is difficult to isolate OTI's influence.

The primary OTI objective is to bring the diamond trade under GOSL control. The single best indicator of the impact of OTI and other actors' activities on reforming the mining and exporting of diamonds will be seen in changes in the value of legally exported diamonds. Larger values of legally exported diamonds will demonstrate that miners and dealers were shifting from illegal to legal channels and that corruption is having less impact.

It is too early to clearly evaluate the long-term impact, although the short-term trend is clearly positive. The total value of legally exported diamonds from Sierra Leone has increased from a low of \$1.2 million in 1999 to \$10.0 million in 2000 and \$ 26.0 million in 2001(GGDO).

Another major OTI objective was to cut the trade in conflict diamonds. As of the time this report was written (April 2002), the war in Sierra Leone appears to be over, which renders the issue of conflict diamonds somewhat moot for Sierra Leone. Peace has been attained in Sierra Leone. Unfortunately, the Mano River Region (Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Guinea) is not yet peaceful and stabilized, so sustained peace in Sierra Leone is not yet assured.

Corruption is another critical indicator, but it is difficult to determine whether corruption has diminished at the societal and governmental levels and whether the GOSL is seriously committed to prosecuting illegal mining and exporting. Probably the best proof will be when shipments of illegal diamonds are confiscated and the guilty are tried, prosecuted, and convicted.

DMP's technical advisers have focused a great deal of their attention on the need to establish a clean channel and help GOSL improve the speed and reliability of the legal process. OTI is to be commended for addressing this important issue, but it is difficult at this stage to evaluate the program's success. There are promising signs because there has been a significant increase in the value of legally exported diamonds. The team agrees with the strategy of not relying on law enforcement officials because legal sanctions remain unreliable in Sierra Leone's historic climate of corruption. To date, no one has been prosecuted and convicted for illegally exporting diamonds.

Interviews with MMR staff in Freetown, Bo, and Kenema revealed that the MMOs appreciated receiving the training and wanted more, and all other members of staff (especially the mines wardens) also wanted to receive training. One of the responsibilities of the MMOs is to inspect outgoing passengers to curtail smuggling. Our experience with the MMO at the airport indicates that his performance still leaves a lot to be desired. It appeared that he might never have known how to discover whether passengers were carrying kilos of diamonds with them.

Information received from community meetings during the media campaign indicated that MMOs and mines wardens were collecting fees that were probably for their personal use. It remains to be seen whether further staff training will diminish this tendency.

There are problems with the current procedure for issuing export licenses. Restricting the number of licensees and making the selection subjective means that this is a vulnerable point for corruption. Another problem is that each license may be shared, or subdivided, without GOSL knowledge or control. The licenses have been subdivided so that many more than eight actors are really eligible to export diamonds, while legal jurisdiction to sanction any of these multiple actors for any misbehavior seems to be lacking.

The procedure for allocating the first disbursement of Diamond Area Community Development Fund (DACDF) funds was flawed. The MMR wanted a slower, more bureaucratic procedure with more safeguards, but the US embassy insisted on a rapid disbursement. There was

widespread mismanagement of that first disbursement, which is why the MMR is now trying to design a better procedure for subsequent disbursements.

The experience with the first disbursement of DACDF funds indicates that widespread corruption and major problems of accountability and societal disenfranchisement still exist at the community level. Communities were supposed to agree on their priorities and then utilize the funds for stated purposes. Instead, the disbursements mirrored problems that were said to have contributed to the rapid expansion of warfare during the 1990s. Similar to conditions existing before the war, youth and women were excluded from the decision-making process. Chiefs and elders acted as if they were untouchable and could not be penalized by community members. They allocated funds received from the DACDF in completely nontransparent ways with limited community involvement. In some cases, chiefs who no longer lived in the community made decisions from their urban homes. Many communities lacked the ability to prioritize their needs and manage funds. Communities often did not even know that they had been promised funds, let alone that funds had already been received and spent.

Despite these problems, the establishment of the DACDF is a clear indicator of the impact of OTI advice. Although Community Based Natural Resource Management is not a new concept, applying it to mineral resources constitutes an important innovation.

The DACDF also provides a clear indication of OTI's success in increasing civil society's participation in decision making. OTI's influence is clearly evident in the composition of the Coalition for the Management of the Diamond Area Community Development Fund (CMDACDF). This broad-based Coalition incorporates two GOSL ministries (MMR and MRDLG), the Anti Corruption Commission, and three NGOs: the Network Movement for Justice and Development (a human rights organization), the Sierra Leone Indigenous Miners Movement (SLIMM), and Search for Common Ground (through their Sierra Leone office, Talking Drum Studio).

While interviewing MMR officials and NGO representatives, the team noted that the interviewees accepted the importance of meeting and working with what had been considered "the opposition." NGO representatives were more positive in their views about working together, while government representatives were more careful about reserving those areas where they thought only the GOSL should be making decisions. MMR representatives did distinguish NGOs that they felt more comfortable working with, which is another good sign of steady, if slow, progress.

F. Replicability

The Diamond Management Program (DMP) addresses general issues (illegal export of mineral resources and corruption) that are important in many countries and a specific issue (the conflict diamond trade) that is important in several other African countries. Since the DMP is specifically designed for the diamond trade, it is clearly most applicable to the other African countries (Liberia, DRC, and Angola) confronting this problem. However, the concept, general design, and some of the methodology of the DMP may be replicated in other countries that face a problem of

smuggling and corruption. Expanding the program to incorporate a method for working to reform exploitative labor practices should also be considered.

One especially promising program innovation that asks to be replicated is applying the community-based natural resource management model to mineral resources (the Diamond Area Community Development Fund).

V. THE YOUTH REINTEGRATION TRAINING AND EDUCATION FOR PEACE PROGRAM (YRTEP)

A. Objectives and Design of YRTEP

1. *The YRTEP Concept*

The concept of the OTI Youth Reintegration Training and Education for Peace Program (YRTEP) evolved around the time of the 1999 Lome Peace Accord, when Sierra Leone appeared to be ending years of war. OTI's goals for this new project were to help bring closure to a debilitating civil war that had begun in March 1991 and to support the process of reconciliation and reintegration among Sierra Leoneans.

In order to achieve these ambitious goals, OTI looked at the different factors that fueled the conflict. OTI noted how disenfranchised youth were the most important potential source of destabilization in the post-conflict period. If nothing was done to help these youth, there was a definite risk that they would become more susceptible to negative and violent influences. In the Sierra Leonean context, "youth" refers to a relatively broad age category that includes people in their 30s and even 40s. As it was explained to the evaluators, a youth is someone whose father is still alive.

Recognition of this potential problem was the inspiration for the conceptualization that ultimately led to YRTEP. Through a facilitative planning process in which many stakeholders participated, the concept emerged as a nationwide, community-based, nonformal education initiative for ex-combatant and war-affected young adults. The broad and ambitious range of activities addressed by YRTEP combines in one program:

- Reintegration of ex-combatants into their communities, orientation of war-affected youth and ex-combatants on issues necessary for reintegration, and psychosocial counseling.
- Training in functional literacy, life-skills training, vocational counseling, and agricultural skills development.
- Civic education (also called education for peace).

The program's rationale is to aggressively target those issues that would otherwise strengthen existing feelings of disenfranchisement among the youth. It is clear from reviewing 1998-99 OTI reports that YRTEP emerged from different interpretations of the best way to achieve peace-building objectives. At times, OTI emphasized war-affected youth and wanted a nonformal educational program to educate and give hope to disenfranchised youth who had been denied the opportunity for formal education. This format specified the importance of literacy, did not specify targeting ex-combatants, and sometimes downplayed the importance for peace-building of reintegration programs targeting ex-combatants. At other times, OTI emphasized the importance of reintegration and reconciliation (sensitization and education for peace) without specifically noting who was the target (war-affected youth, ex-combatants, or society in general). This helps to explain why, when YRTEP finally evolved in late 1999, its mandate included a range of targets – war-affected youth and ex-combatants, sites with the highest concentrations of

ex-combatants, and instruction in literacy, numeracy, self-reliance, health, democracy and governance, education for peace, and community-based reconciliation and reintegration.

2. *OTI YRTEP Goals and Objectives*

OTI's primary goal for establishing YRTEP was to provide immediate and appropriate activities that would support the enfranchisement and empowerment of youth and thus help break the potential cycle of violence in the country. To reach these goals, OTI devised four interlinked objectives:

1. Assist the reintegration of ex-combatants and war-torn communities.
2. Provide remedial education for youth by-passed by schooling during ten years of war.
3. Strengthen civil society's peace-building initiatives.
4. Build public support for efforts in demobilization of ex-combatants, reconciliation between war-affected youth and ex-combatants, and reintegration of ex-combatants back into society.

2. *The Design of YRTEP and NCDDR*

The design for YRTEP can best be described as a cross between nonformal education and humanitarian assistance. It is developmental in nature in that it addresses longer-term issues, such as self-reliance and education. At the same time, YRTEP's implementation is reminiscent of a humanitarian food distribution program in that it is emphatically a front-line, rapid-response effort. This model of delivering development-based activities on a proactive, humanitarian time frame is intentional, as OTI wanted to immediately engage and sensitize communities across the country while soldiers were still in the process of being demobilized and were beginning to be reintegrated into cities and villages.

YRTEP is one of two nationwide reintegration programs of any significant size. The other is the national reintegration program implemented by the National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (NCDDR). The YRTEP design differs from the national reintegration program in several ways. NCDDR is combatant-based, begins in the armed groups (armies and militias) when people are still combatants, and targets and recruits only ex-combatants. NCDDR is also tied to the demobilization process and occurs as part of that process. This means that delays in disarmament and demobilization inevitably delay launching the reintegration program. NCDDR reintegration programs usually feature vocational (skills) training and some sort of re-entry package (severance pay, tools, clothes, etc.). Other than skills training, there is little education.

YRTEP is community-based, recruits its trainers and trainees from communities, and conducts all of the training in communities. YRTEP deliberately targets and recruits both ex-combatants and war-affected youth (war-affected but non-combatants) to facilitate reintegration and reconciliation occurring as part of the educational program. It is related to, but not dependent on, demobilization, which permits the more flexible YRTEP program to begin and expand into more communities whether or not the full-scale demobilization process stutters or stops. The complex YRTEP curriculum is more detailed and involves more hours of intensive training (two to six

hours a week for six months to a year). The YRTEP curriculum also orients trainers and trainees toward community activism.

4. *The YRTEP Curriculum*

Many of the concepts and priorities for the YRTEP curriculum came from a series of focus groups in late 1999 involving a broad coalition of Sierra Leoneans representing GOSL, RUF, NGOs, and experts on war-related issues and other representatives from the UN and other agencies.⁴ For several weeks, the group discussed and debated Sierra Leone, the war, and factors that would promote peace. MSI facilitated these sessions and, based on these sessions, previous experience in other countries, and the REFLECT methodology, designed the five modules that became the curriculum for YRTEP.

The result is a nonformal education program that involves youth while covering subjects that are grouped into five modules.⁵ Each module represents an issue or series of issues that the focus groups considered critical components for building peace in Sierra Leone.

- **Who Am I?:** Module 1 is a course for improving self-awareness, designed to facilitate the movement of youth from a world of warfare to an environment promoting values related to peace.
- **Healing Mind, Body, and Spirit:** Module 2 is a life-skills course designed to enable youth to improve their ability to manage their daily lives, improve their ability to take calculated risks, make sound judgments, communicate effectively, manage their emotions, and solve day-to-day problems.
- **Our Environment – What It Is, Preserving It, Conserving It, and Using It Effectively:** Module 3 is a course aimed at raising participant awareness of the need to reclaim the environmental foundation of Sierra Leone, provide knowledge of ways to prevent/reduce environmental hazards, promote good farming practices, and increase awareness about judicious use of the environment.
- **Health and Well Being:** Module 4 provides information on the symptoms and treatment of common local diseases, the medicinal use of local herbs and roots, methods for clean drinking water, prevention, identification and treatment of sexually transmitted diseases (including HIV/AIDS), and maternal and child health.
- **Democracy, Good Governance, and Conflict Management:** Module 5 focuses on democracy as a form of government, the basic principles of democracy and how they work in action, the causes, costs, and control of corruption, conflict management, and how citizens can contribute to rebuilding Sierra Leone.

⁴ Unfortunately, the proceedings were not written up. Due to the fact that it was several years ago, it was difficult to get very detailed information on the focus group sessions.

⁵ Award Letter to MSI, March 30th, 2001, under “Program Description”

B. Organization and Implementation of YRTEP

1. Two Complementary Implementing Partners

YRTEP is jointly implemented by two U.S. organizations: Management Systems International (MSI), a Washington-based consulting firm, and World Vision (WV), an NGO based out of Los Angeles with a large field office in Freetown. MSI is responsible for conceptualizing the curriculum, producing educational materials, and conducting the training of and providing oversight for the MTs. This was to capitalize on MSI's experience in training, analysis, and curriculum design. World Vision's role, due to its extensive community-level presence throughout Sierra Leone (even during wartime), was to implement the program in the field. World Vision personnel were responsible for introducing YRTEP to communities, facilitating implementation in communities, and monitoring progress. Combined, the two organizations are complementary because each provides technical expertise in different but important areas: training and design, and the ability to implement large activities rapidly in Sierra Leone.

MSI and WV are supposed to coordinate their efforts and monitor the progress of YRTEP and each other's performance. MSI trains and monitors the Learning Facilitators and the communities through the regular monitoring visits of the MTs. This would give them an opportunity to see how WV was working. World Vision was to monitor MSI in the same fashion since World Vision's connection with the communities would give insight as to the performance of the MTs and issues that arose from the training. The system of dual monitoring was to ensure that both did a good job.

2. The Organization of YRTEP at the Community Level

MSI and World Vision take charge of different levels of YRTEP staffing and community organization. The following clarifies the different levels and responsibilities of YRTEP people and defines the terms used in the program. A "community" in YRTEP terms may be an urban neighborhood, a town or village, or a collection of small villages.

- (1) MSI selects and trains the MTs, who are the only Sierra Leoneans in this sequence to become salaried employees. **Master Trainers** have high levels of formal education and fluency in English, are trained extensively in the modules, and are responsible for training the next level of trainers. The training of MTs (in groups of twenty) is centralized and directed by the MSI expert who designed the curriculum, but the training of all other Sierra Leoneans occurs around the country in community sites. These twenty MTs will form ten training teams (of two people each).
- (2) In each selected community site, WV identifies and selects ten community leaders to form a **Community Management Committee (CMC)**. The CMC members, who are volunteers, serve in a local management role. World Vision orients the CMC members about the YRTEP program and the responsibilities of the CMC, but the CMC members do not receive any YRTEP training or compensation.

- (3) In each community, the CMC identifies and selects (on the basis of criteria provided by YRTEP) twenty people to be trained as **Learning Facilitators (LFs)**. The LFs are supposed to have a basic level of formal education and comprehension of English. Two MTs come to each community and train the LFs (in groups of twenty) in how to teach the modules. The LF training session lasts one month, after which the LFs begin training the participants. LFs are volunteers but (when they are training) receive a small stipend from WV to help cover some of their expenses. These twenty LFs will form ten training teams (of two people each).
- (4) In each community, the CMC identifies and selects (on the basis of criteria provided by YRTEP) people to be trained as **Participants**. These are the war-affected youth and ex-combatants who are the primary target of this program. Two LFs form a teaching team and establish a “training center” in the community where they start weekly (sometimes twice a week) training sessions on the five modules for a group of twenty participants. Each training session covers one lesson and lasts about two or three hours. The entire training lasts six months to a year.

Implementing the program required the selection of community sites where training would occur. According to the original plan, communities across the country would be chosen as sites for YRTEP training based on the intensity of demobilization, focusing on impact areas where ex-combatants were reintegrating in greater numbers. This meant the program would concentrate where the need for assistance with reconciliation and reintegration would be greatest. Another factor in choosing sites was that a preference was given to those communities where WV had already been working and had identified some community-level organizations and leaders. This was important to facilitate the rapid take-off of the program.

This plan was based on the anticipation in late 1999 that disarmament and demobilization would soon take place, and there would be a large-scale reintegration of ex-combatants. This had to be modified with the resurgence of warfare and insecurity in 2000, and the earliest sites were selected in those areas of the country that were controlled by the GOSL or CDF forces. This meant that site selection was based more on access and security than on demobilization.

The original plan also called for each group of twenty participants to be composed of half ex-combatants and half war-affected youth (non-combatants) as part of the reintegration and reconciliation effort. This was difficult to achieve. The resurgence of warfare meant that there was less demobilization and, therefore, fewer ex-combatants than anticipated. Another factor was that ex-combatant status was supposed to be verified by an official card showing that the person had gone through demobilization. It is believed that many combatants demobilized unofficially and, thus, did not go through official demobilization and did not have a card. Observers of the program also believed that some of the ex-combatant trainees denied their ex-combatant identity because of fear and shame. For these reasons, the early phases of training had many more war-affected youth than documented ex-combatants.

Community leaders (CMC members) identify and select people from the local community to be LFs and participants. Participants were selected for the training according to whom the CMCs thought would benefit from the program, which was an important criteria due to the high level of

assistance needed for youth and the lack of programs that address psychosocial issues⁶. Some participants were recruited and enrolled by family or community members, who brought people to the program who they thought needed this type of intervention.

Speed and Extent of Implementation. The emphasis on the speed of program implementation and reaching many people and on common objectives in humanitarian assistance programs such as food distribution, is reflected in the program's objective of reaching 40,000 youth in only two years.⁷ The original goal even called for reaching 60,000 participants. The table below shows the extent of the YRTEP program.

Table 1. YRTEP Numbers of Learning Facilitators and Participants⁸

Location	Learning Facilitators	Participants	Total
Northern Region	1,040	8,400	9,440
Southern Region	1,000	10,000	11,000
Eastern Region	1,060	8,600	9,660
Western Area	1,320	13,200	14,520
Total	4,420	40,200	44,620 **

*** This number does not include groups that have been discontinued due to displaced populations and other unforeseen circumstances. It also does not include 220 "extra" participants from YRTEP sites or the 2,760 new participants.*

Given the length of the training (one month each) for each cohort of twenty MTs and twenty LFs, the emphasis on speed and numbers required a highly advanced timetable for MSI and WV staff. MTs had to be selected and trained, sites selected, CMCs identified and oriented, materials printed and distributed, and LFs chosen and trained – all in a very timely manner in order to be ready to begin training participants in large numbers. Because of the need for quick deployment, the YRTEP curriculum was not pilot tested.

Furthermore, although there were problems with this (noted earlier), YRTEP continued to try to select communities according to the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration process as established by the NCDDR. As regions of the country opened up, YRTEP moved in with the other humanitarian assistance organizations to start programming immediately. The combination meant that YRTEP had to be on the front lines with rapid response.

⁶ YRTEP was the only program we found that addressed such a cross section of issues, with emphasis on the psychosocial aspects. Other programs stuck to more traditional and needed topics like vocational training or civic education.

⁷ OTI Field Report: Sierra Leone, June 2001

⁸ OTI: Field Report: SIERRA LEONE, February 2002

C. Findings: Evaluating the Impact of OTI and YRTEP

YRTEP is a novel, innovative approach to addressing the critical role of youth in Sierra Leone's conflict. The fact that it targeted a large number of out-of-school and ex-combatant youth was one of the program's central strengths. Unlike programs that merely target ex-combatant youth, YRTEP's designers recognized that the masses of marginalized youth who did not fight were equally important groups to target. Overlooking them might have strengthened their outcast status, leading them towards dangerous and violent activities, and perhaps eventually undermine peace efforts. For this alone, OTI should be applauded.

YRTEP appears to have had a significant and positive impact on Sierra Leone's peace process, has proven successful in a variety of ways, and has achieved most of its original objectives (reintegration, strengthened peace-building initiatives, and public support for demobilization). The success of this complex and ambitious program, however, has come with trade-offs. In part, this is due to the fact that YRTEP was implemented under very difficult circumstances. The recurring conflict and instability disrupted many activities and restricted access. At times expatriate advisers were not allowed into the country or were restricted to Freetown, despite the fact that activities were occurring throughout the country. In addition to the security issues, the design and implementation created expectations about future sustainability and development that the program cannot satisfy in its current form. These added expectations are critically important in terms of the post-OTI phase of the program in Sierra Leone as well as any replication in other countries.⁹ OTI, MSI, and WV are to be commended for their dedication and perseverance that led to YRTEP's success. Nevertheless, concerns need to be addressed in order for YRTEP to reach its full potential.

The following are the evaluation team's main findings regarding the YRTEP Program:

1. *Design*

- **Integrating Youth**

One of the design elements was that YRTEP training groups were to be half ex-combatants and half war-affected youth. These exact proportions have not been met for reasons noted earlier, and it is difficult to know exactly how many ex-combatants participate. What is known is that the decision to mix ex-combatants and war-affected youth was wise and assisted the reconciliation and reintegration process. It also differed from NCDDR activities, which are only for ex-combatants. A frequent complaint about such activities is that they unfairly benefit those who perpetrated violent acts against communities. They elicit comments like, "I should have become a rebel so I would also be able to benefit from these programs." Because YRTEP stressed the combination of the two groups, it averted these types of issues and presented a more integrated approach that is important to facilitate and speed reconciliation and reintegration.

⁹ Please refer to the "Major Weakness: Sustainability" section below.

- **Analysis of the Curriculum: Popular but Directive with Low Literacy Gains**

According to MSI, the YRTEP curriculum was based on the REFLECT methodology, although our analysis of the YRTEP text shows that it borrows more from peace education models (see Appendix D for a more detailed analysis). REFLECT is supposed to be a participatory, bottom-up approach that emphasizes literacy, but the analysis of the YRTEP curriculum found it to be directive, with few opportunities for participatory interaction between instructors and students.

The style of YRTEP instruction is based upon introducing new concepts – such as post-traumatic stress disorder and environmental degradation – and explaining what they mean. Many of these concepts are new and difficult to understand. This sentiment was echoed by the Learning Facilitators (LFs) who teach the modules. They described parts of the curriculum as tedious. They required hours of studying to understand concepts that they were subsequently expected to teach. This problem was more pronounced for LFs whose level of education and English facility was low. Not surprisingly, the development of the participants' literacy and numeracy was generally very low. Success stories about gains in literacy tend to be more about the self-confidence that comes with learning how to spell one's name or make short shopping lists instead of becoming functionally literate. YRTEP cannot be considered a literacy program.

The amount of resources (flipcharts, papers, etc.) needed to carry out the training was also not in keeping with the REFLECT methodology, which encourages the use of local materials (see E for examples of the quantities of materials required by YRTEP). The YRTEP training is very resource intensive, requiring significant involvement from Freetown for production and distribution. Lastly, the analysis found that the cultural context of the curriculum was Western-based and not rooted in the cultures and

Community Activism in IDP Camps: Partial Success

Dauda was a CMC member in an IDP camp in Kenema. A former Head Teacher from Koidu, he fled when the city was attacked and his house burned.

Actively involved in YRTEP for his camp, Dauda saw dramatic results from the program like sharp declines in crime rates and drug use. YRTEP provided the youth with a constructive activity and kept them from being idle, and the IDP camp reaped the benefits.

The participants were so motivated by YRTEP that they decided to start their own vocational training center to teach skills to youth throughout the camp.

They identified skilled IDPs to be trainers, got raw materials from residents and plastic sheeting from IRC, and set up five skills training centers within the camp. The only missing pieces were tools and supplies needed to teach.

The CMC members were not deterred. Forming the Eastern Region Community Management Committee, they wrote a total of eight proposals asking for as little as \$100 to buy tools and supplies. Unfortunately, the CMC members did not receive even one reply for their attempts. Eventually, the camp disbanded and people went back to being idle. Dauda does believe that, if they had received just a little bit of funding, the members could have sustained the skills centers and kept the participants engaged.

languages of Sierra Leone.

These inherent weaknesses notwithstanding, it should be noted that LFs and participants spoke highly of the modules, especially modules 1 and 2 (Who Am I and Healing Mind, Body, and Spirit).

- **Sustainability: Unmet Community Expectations for Program Followup**

The major weakness of the YRTEP design is the lack of attention paid to program closure and how this affects the communities. Repeatedly, participants reported their frustration over how the trainings ended and the fact that they feel only partially prepared to implement what they have learned. The training steadily progresses through the five modules until the end, where it leaves participants hanging. This raises questions regarding the sustainability of the progress made during the training and to what extent communities can maintain the enthusiasm and behavioral change that resulted from YRTEP (See Implementation Findings for more details). There is an attitude that end-of-program issues did not require the same level of attention as the start-up and implementation phases. Sustainability is viewed more in terms of hand over for the post OTI-time period.

The reality is that Sierra Leonean communities evaluate YRTEP with an eye to how it can support community stability and future goals. Participants go through a six-month to year-long training that raises their hopes and expectations. When the trainings end, many new skills are gained but expectations for the future usually are not met. The contradiction between expectations and skills learned has the potential to impact the sustainability of YRTEP because communities are left with a sense of wanting more and being prepared for more. As one LF said, “You cannot sensitize people and then have them live in the streets.”

This is a crucial issue because YRTEP has established an otherwise solid footing for furthering community development programming. Although YRTEP was not envisioned as a development program, it has created communities and people who are excellent candidates for further development programs. Unmet expectations and any resulting frustration threaten to undermine the gains made.

These shortcomings had been identified previously, and in response, MSI developed a manual entitled, “What Next?” to address the problem. Unfortunately, after teaching self-reliance and the importance of local resources throughout the first three modules, the program leaves people focusing on their need for vocational skills-training workshops and small grants. This is reflected in the manual and in how the LFs teach the manual. The LFs put heavy emphasis on proposal writing and fundraising. Communities responded enthusiastically, coming up with income-generating ideas and writing proposals. Unfortunately, current micro-credit schemes in Sierra Leone do not support this level of community activism.

The end result is a few success stories but more frequent reports of increasing frustration. There were several stories of participants using the little cash they have to hire a proposal writer or pay for computer time. The proposals are often asking for only a few hundred dollars, a small amount given the proportion of time and resources that go into generating the proposals. Unfortunately,

most proposals do not receive any responses, leaving the participants frustrated with their lack of success.

Participants feel that they have been diligent in changing their behavior and working towards peace. As a result, they would like to see an improvement in the quality of their lives. Unfortunately, most have access to few opportunities to escape poverty. This is not the fault of YRTEP, which has achieved its original peace-building and reintegration objectives. YRTEP has generated expectations that have exceeded the original intent outlined in the objectives, however. People look towards YRTEP or some other outside program to do more.

If the issue of closure and the shortfall between raised expectations and limited follow-up possibilities is not addressed, there is the possibility that the participants will end up more frustrated than they were before entering YRTEP.

2. *Implementation*

• A Notable Impact on the Peace Process

The speed with which YRTEP was implemented and expanded was impressive. In two years, during intermittent civil unrest and insecurity, YRTEP trained over 45,000 youth. The fact that training lasts from six months to a year makes the process particularly noteworthy. This was due principally to the very dedicated staff of both MSI and WV – particularly the Sierra Leonean staff – who expended a high level of effort to make this program work.

There is no way to quantifiably measure the impact of YRTEP’s rapid implementation and direct involvement of tens of thousands of youths. However, several well-placed observers who watched the war-to-peace transition believe that YRTEP met an immediate need and helped Sierra Leoneans secure peace in their country. Repeatedly, it was expressed that YRTEP got youth off the street and engaged them in something that was meaningful and beneficial for the community. It also resulted in quicker behavioral changes and less hostility as ex-combatants re-oriented themselves to community norms and values. In addition to the direct impact on the participants, the existence of the program clearly made other community members more optimistic. The enormity of the program suggests that this had a widespread impact, which would not have happened if there had not been such emphasis on responding quickly and on reaching so many people.

• Problems in Organization and Implementation

The speed of implementation meant, as indicated earlier, that there was no time to field-test any of the materials (see section on curriculum). The emphasis on a quick response also caused several early “cracks” in the program that were never overcome by OTI, MSI, or WV. The first major “crack” occurred with the program design and an oversight regarding not training WV staff about the program modules and philosophy. In combination with WV management issues (explained in detail below), this resulted in WV staff not becoming part of the spirit of the program or oriented about the content.

This proved to be a significant program weakness because it meant that WV staff had to introduce YRTEP to communities and orient CMC members while understanding very little

about the orientation of the program. Essentially, WV was asked to implement a program in which they had little intellectual ownership. This was compounded by the fact that YRTEP had not been thoroughly analyzed from an implementation perspective. As a result, the responsibility placed on WV was partially unrealistic. For example, WV staff often had to transport impractical amounts of documents and equipment by motorcycle to remote areas of Sierra Leone and were criticized when this was not done in a timely manner. (See Appendix E for a full list of items needed for each training program.).

Similarly, the MSI field staff had problems related to the large amount of materials needed, since they had to photocopy thousands of pages quickly while relying on a single photocopier. This helped to foster poor communication between the implementing partners as there was a tendency to blame each another when there were problems matching the expected speed for implementation of the program.

The second early crack in the program was due to high turnover of senior WV staff in Sierra Leone. The repercussions of this institutional instability meant that the linkages WV had to YRTEP by being part of the initial conceptualization were lost as the institutional memory left. This compounded the problem of WV staff not being trained and contributed to some confusion about WV's responsibility.

Taken together, these factors created field-based tensions among the three YRTEP partners (MSI, OTI, and WV) that manifest themselves in a variety of ways and still exist today. The mission clearly recognizes the existence of an MSI-WV "fault line" in the field that approaches a class opposition. We express this using an educational analogy that the MSI-related staff (MTs) consider themselves to be school teachers and the WV staff to be bus drivers. Similarly, the MTs emphasize the lesser educational qualifications of many of the community-based YRTEP personnel (CMC members, LFs, and participants).

There is an opportunity for better communications between MSI and WV field staff. MSI has relocated from offices in the US Embassy to the WV Freetown office, which will mean more frequent contact and, hopefully, increased communication.

- **Access and Managing from Afar**

Because of security requirements for US government staff and contractors, it has been difficult for OTI and MSI expatriate staff to visit program sites for much of the life of YRTEP. It has only been in the past several months that YRTEP staff could safely travel outside Freetown.

OTI's mode of dealing with its partners requires close coordination, which was not always optimal because of access issues. Compounding the situation was the frequent WV turnover at the senior level and the fact that MSI's senior person in Sierra Leone was a program manager. Senior OTI staff did attempt to address some of the pressures that were creating tensions, but limited access made this very difficult. It was also difficult for the MSI senior staff to travel, which meant that they had to rely on second-hand information on the program's success.

To compensate, part of the original design was to have WV and MSI monitor each other (as noted earlier). With both MTs and WV staff in the field, they would be able to provide oversight

for each other. In reality, this did not work well because of the field-based tensions and because the MTs did not monitor to the extent originally designed. The push for meeting the training numbers meant there was little time dedicated by MTs for monitoring.

Despite the difficulty in providing senior oversight on the part of OTI and MSI, and despite the turnover at WV, the program has met its target goal of number of people trained and has done so admirably. However, several of the implementation issues discussed above would have been better addressed if senior staff had been better able to access the program in the field and play more of a management role.

3. *Impact on Communities*

- **Behavioral Change and the Reintegration of Ex-Combatants into Communities**

The most impressive finding is the degree to which participants and community members report that YRTEP has improved youth behavior. Communities believe that the YRTEP training experience helps youth become less violent and rude after completing the program. The most common response that the evaluation team heard is that YRTEP gets youth off the streets and into productive and educational activities. Youth participants report that they are able to function better within their communities because the YRTEP training gave them an improved understanding of cultural norms and helped them control their tempers. Ex-combatants who were involved in the program provided examples of positive behavioral change. They commented that they no longer committed violent acts such as rape and murder because the training lent them a better understanding of such actions. YRTEP helped them realize that such

behavior was wrong. As simplistic as such commentary sounds, this was a frequent assessment shared by ex-combatant trainees and echoed how little ex-combatants understood traditional community values versus their lifestyle in the bush. Their years during the war and the young age at which they became combatants had usurped their knowledge of traditional community values and replaced it with something based on violence and drug use. Community members backed up these claims with statements referring to an improved sense of decorum and decreased violence in their lives.

Abdu's Little Brother, Sackville.

Abdu's little brother was five when the rebels took him from his family in Makeni. Shy and soft spoken, he did not give his name as his brother, Abdu, helped tell his story. When he returned to his village, after ten years as a rebel, he was not accepted into his home. An uncle brought him to Sackville, outside Freetown, and enrolled him in the YRTEP program. Having grown up in the bush with the social values brought by the war, Abdu's little brother could not comprehend how to function within the bustling community of Sackville. Normal values and understandings were lost as he struggled to find a fit. YRTEP provided a guide for the little brother. He stopped doing drugs and learned the social implications of violent actions like rape, understanding that he cannot go back to the bush, where violence was a way of life. As his big brother Abdu said, before the YRTEP, he had no one to guide him to know what is good and what is bad. Now he knows.

YRTEP has left an indelible mark on youth and ex-combatants. When this program first came, we had problems getting people together. Without YRTEP, we would not have been able to bring ex-combatants and youth and the community together.

Interview with Prince Amomoh and Alan I. Magbity, CMC Members, Daru.

- **Promoting Peace Building and Reconciliation**

The impact of YRTEP has proven to be as much emotional and spiritual as social. Participants vividly and consistently demonstrate great enthusiasm for the program when describing their experiences and the changes in their lives. Such evidence demonstrates how YRTEP deals with the emotional world of peace and post-war reconciliation. It asks people to face themselves and their community. Participants go through exercises of self-discovery in which they take turns confessing their actions during the war and asking for forgiveness. These emotional exercises are combined with the message of peace and reconciliation.

Peace Ambassadors in Koidu

Koidu was one of the major diamond trading centers before the war. Destroyed completely by fighting, rows of walls stand where there were once houses, and pits are everywhere as residents desperately try to find an illusive diamond worth enough to get them out of poverty.

In December 2001, tensions rose in the area between the Kono Youth, the RUF, and the local miners. A violent uprising followed that caused many to fear a return to the war. Luckily, the situation dissipated.

During this period, however, YRTEP participants from the nearby village of Kamadu wasted no time putting their newly learned skills of conflict resolution to work. Calling themselves “Peace Ambassadors,” they went door to door between the different sides and the police, mediating the conflict. Although their exact impact is unknown, what is clear is that the people from Kamadu saw it as their responsibility to put an end to violence before it got out of hand. They saw their role as ambassadors of peace and took it very seriously.

As a result, a tremendous amount of emotion is generated, which manifests itself in enthusiasm and activism. YRTEP has a strong message and it has gotten into the hearts and minds of community members. The dynamic spirit has motivated trainers and participants to revitalize their own lives and their communities and to preach reconciliation and peace. Specific examples of community activism include numerous accounts of participants and trainers acting as “peace ambassadors” to resolve conflicts and assist reconciliation and reintegration.

- **Unanticipated Community Development**

The impact of YRTEP has gone beyond the anticipated peace building and reintegration and provides a solid foundation for initiating additional community development programs. The YRTEP program has created a level of community enthusiasm, activism, and social organization that community

development agents seldom see. The YRTEP message is positive, and participants see it as an impetus to create positive change. Participants and trainers have carried out such community improvement projects as community gardens, cobbler stands, sewing cooperatives, and road maintenance, and have preached about better cooperation among community members. This

impact was not foreseen in the original design and is a fortunate side effect that should be taken into account in USAID's post-OTI development planning.

- **Gender Considerations: Empowering Women When Women are Involved**

YRTEP provided a form of education in an education-deprived country. This fact was not lost on female participants, who reported a greater sense of confidence, thought of themselves more as being community leaders and having options, and, in essence, felt less victimized. Women who were illiterate were very happy to be gaining some literacy skills, even if it was only learning how to spell their name. This provided a huge level of self-confidence and enthusiasm. It should be noted that women are well represented at most YRTEP sites.

- **Community Ownership: Halfway There**

The success of any community-based peace-building activity is rooted in the extent to which the community takes ownership of the activity and sees peace-building and reconciliation as its own fundamental responsibility. This has occurred with YRTEP. As reported above, YRTEP has created a tremendous amount of enthusiasm for peace-building within communities where it has been implemented. Most communities, however, still refer to YRTEP as a WV activity and are not always sure of how to apply skills learned towards their other needs. For example, there is a huge demand for skills training and small grants and an expectation that YRTEP or WV should and can fill these demands. Three sets of factors seem to contribute to this disjuncture between program objective and participant expectations: (1) orientation and training; (2) prior history and experience; and (3) level of resources.

The first issue is that not all communities receive adequate orientation about the purpose of YRTEP (self-reliance and peace-building). This is compounded by the fact that there is no training or substantial orientation for the CMC members, who are tasked with overseeing a program which, in reality, excludes them. In some communities, this has created a division and, in general, it has detracted from the general spirit of the program. CMC members complained that they were not included in the training and did not always understand the nature of the program (a common complaint about CMCs from the MTs, as well). In some instances, CMCs

The War and Women: The Life of a Bush Wife

Mary* is a Learning Facilitator (LF) for YRTEP. Perhaps her most meaningful experience has been the fact that, as a LF, she has been better able to deal with the horrors she experienced as a "bush wife".

"Bush wife" is the term for women abducted and forced into sexual servitude. Their stories are graphic and horrifying, and, unfortunately, the abuses have not ended with the war. Often considered outcasts, bush wives are not accepted back into society easily because of the stigma rape carries. This only compounds the traumas these women feel as they cannot readily escape their past.

Mary, like other bush wives, was afraid to go out in public and was shy in crowds because she felt rejected and ashamed. YRTEP helped Mary deal with these feelings by helping her to redefine who she was. Module 1 deals with self-identity asking the question: Who Am I? For Mary, the answer was much more positive and reaffirming than her bush wife identity. Module 2, which focuses on stress and trauma, also helped as Mary found that she could start to move on. She decided to focus on the future with a new, positive identity and a realization that she could put the past behind her.

*not her real name

did not want to continue to participate because they thought they were volunteering their time and energy but receiving nothing in return. One CMC member in Kamadu did not understand why she was involved and wanted to know what she was going to get out of it. She spoke with some resentment over the fact that she was appointed but felt she received nothing. This is in contrast to other CMC members who are very dedicated and see YRTEP as a means to achieving their own objectives of peace and stability. For CMC members who did not really grasp the program, however, YRTEP is encouraging participants to adopt new attitudes and behaviors without any change in how leadership functions.

The second factor is that WV is widely known throughout Sierra Leone and previously handled OTI-funded skills training and small grants programs. When WV brought the idea of YRTEP to communities, it was easy for them to confuse it with earlier programs. YRTEP communities also receive other WV assistance, which makes it easier to think of the program as an NGO activity instead of a community-directed project. This frequently came up as communities often considered YRTEP to be a WV activity. It also came up in conversations about CMC orientation and difficulties in getting people to understand that YRTEP was different from traditional WV programs, which had more tangible resources.

The final factor is that the YRTEP curriculum is dependent on training materials. To carry out the training of twenty participants, over a hundred kilos of paper are used as well as materials such as a flipchart, notebooks, and special colored markers. There has been no effort to produce a cheaper, more affordable version of the curriculum for local distribution. The resource-intensive nature of the training has meant that the communities cannot replicate it despite large demand and interest. In places like Kamadu, LFs say they cannot start new training on their own because they do not have the proper handouts.

4. Coordination

• Missed Opportunities with Nation-Building and Other Complementary Projects

YRTEP has created an impressive degree of community activism. The evaluators' opinion is that other developmental activities could benefit greatly from the enthusiasm and structure created. Unfortunately, we found very little evidence that other projects were taking advantage of the community activism created under YRTEP. The exception is WV, which has natural links with other projects, and Talking Drums Studio, which used YRTEP stories as part of its programming. Another possible exception is Christian Children's Fund (CCF), which is in the initial stages of implementing the STEG project (an income generating activity) and hopefully plans to coordinate with YRTEP members.

Other activities, such as MSI's Nation-Building Program and the Entrepreneurial Development Program, have no connection to YRTEP despite linkages referenced in OTI documents.¹⁰ This is especially disconcerting for the Nation-Building Program, since OTI utilized MSI and the MTs as a platform to establish the Nation-Building Program, which is often working in the same communities as YRTEP but with unrelated audiences. This lack of integration has frustrated CMC members who have been very active as volunteers for YRTEP and want very much to

¹⁰ OTI Memorandum, October 12, 2001, To: Jean C. Horton, From: Greg Gottlieb and Sierra Leone: Youth Reintegration Training and Education for Peace, OTI Program Description, Draft 1, November 2001

participate in the Nation-Building Program. The reason given for the lack of participation is that CMC members do not have the proper qualifications. Many of the CMC members that were interviewed, however, were qualified and saw that training as a natural outcome of their YRTEP work.

- **Coordination with the National Commission on Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration and Other Donors and NGOs**

In the beginning, an effort was made to place YRTEP sites in areas with large concentrations of demobilized ex-combatants in order to facilitate reintegration. Reportedly, efforts were made to coordinate with NCDDR and to capitalize on the services offered by each program. For unclear reasons, collaboration between NCDDR and YRTEP never really occurred at any significant level. This is despite the fact that YRTEP has a similar mandate (assisting the peace process and reintegration) and works extensively with demobilized soldiers. NCDDR used a shorter revised version of the YRTEP curriculum as a re-entry module that was taught by some Learning Facilitators from Lungi to combatants in a demobilization camp near Port Loko. For reasons that were not made clear to the evaluators, however, collaboration between the two programs has never reached its potential.

- **Potential Opportunities for Future USAID Activities**

OTI established through YRTEP a network of trainers (MSI, MTs, and LFs) and community-level organizations (CMCs and Learning Centers with LFs and participants) that offer important resources that USAID should utilize in future development programs. The Sierra Leoneans in this network are already linked together and accustomed to responding to initiatives. This network could be used for a variety of future large-scale nonformal education programs (literacy, education for peace, agricultural extension, health, etc.).

D. Replicability

YRTEP can and should be replicated. The theme of inclusion in this model – targeting thousands of ex-combatant as well as marginalized, out-of-school youth – makes YRTEP a potentially critical contributor to other peace-building efforts. The model proved generally effective in Sierra Leone, sparking community enthusiasm and even activism, and generating hope and energy in youth lives formally bereft of such considerations. The system for identifying and integrating the roles, presence, and expertise of the three institutional partners – OTI, WV, and MSI – proved mostly successful, and is likely adaptable to other contexts. YRTEP in Sierra Leone successfully reached tens of thousands of youths in positive ways, and did so in remarkably short order – one of the program’s achievements was its ability to get started in communities quickly.

The trade-offs caused by the swift start-up were considerable, however, and lessons arising from this evaluation should be drawn from when YRTEP is hopefully adapted elsewhere. The roles and relationships of OTI and its partners will have to be adjusted according to the expertise and capacity of each agency, although the system established in Sierra Leone is a useful starting place for organizing, training and supervising MTs and LFs, and implementing the program on a very large scale.

YRTEP's curriculum, in addition, should be customized to meet local contexts and requirements. The literacy and numeracy components are weak, for example, and should be noted and improved. It may be useful to reconsider the program's reliance on a large number of materials that proved difficult to reproduce and transport. The mostly directive nature of teaching methods should also be reconsidered, to the degree it is possible. Dr. Wolf's evaluation of the curriculum in Appendix D constitutes an excellent resource for the process of shoring up curriculum weaknesses and enhancing its strengths. Finally, a revised curriculum should be field tested and evaluated, with findings used to make improvements, before the program becomes a potentially nationwide, or even regionwide, endeavor.

Keeping the program's strengths and weaknesses in mind, as noted in this evaluation, YRTEP is a youth program worthy of adaptation to other contexts.

VI. EVALUATING OTI'S COUNTRY PROGRAM IN SIERRA LEONE

In addition to assessing two specific programs (YRTEP and DMP), the mission was requested to evaluate OTI's influence, partnerships, strategy, and overall impact and effectiveness in Sierra Leone, and whether OTI has achieved its country program goals and objectives. Although OTI has been operating in this country for more than five years and has planned and implemented a wide range of activities, the scope of this overall evaluation was to concentrate on the period from late 1999 through early 2002. The team has extended its analysis to include a longer historical evolution of programs in order to better understand and assess OTI's performance.

OTI is to be commended for its performance in Sierra Leone. The goal and strategy are focused on major problems of transition, and both elements of the goal have been achieved. The team observed some problems in the design and implementation of programs, but these are minor in comparison to the overall effectiveness of an innovative, risk-taking, and successful country program that has had a major impact.

A. Strategic Focus: Goals and Objectives

From the beginning, OTI's goal in Sierra Leone has consistently recognized the primary obstacle preventing the development of Sierra Leone. The goal has been clearly stated – help bring closure to the war and support the reintegration and reconciliation process. USAID strategy for OTI since 1998 has consistently emphasized helping GOSL and civil society design and create new institutions to provide improved security.

OTI's objectives and programming have stayed focused on this goal from the beginning and have not become sidetracked. The specific objectives have changed over the years, reflecting a monitoring of changes in the peace process, shifting priorities, and the activities of other actors. Although there have been changes, the themes of the objectives have been consistent. From the beginning, OTI has recognized the importance of coordinating its efforts with other actors, both national and international, and has concentrated on the empowerment of civil society and on long-term social and political reform, or transformation (OTI 1996a and b; (OTI 2001d).

The team cannot credit any single individual for maintaining this strategic focus. Based on the documentary evidence, credit is spread among the participants in the Inter-Agency Humanitarian and Transition Task Force on Sierra Leone, which was chaired jointly by State/Af/W and USAID/BHR and included people from the US State Department, USAID, OTI, and perhaps other agencies (see Inter-Agency Humanitarian and Transition Task Force on Sierra Leone 1998a; 1998b).

B. Achieving Peace

One part of OTI's goal (closure of the war) has been achieved. A general disarmament and demobilization has occurred, and Sierra Leone is now peaceful.

In terms of war, peace, and continuing US assistance to Sierra Leone, we want to note that the current peace is not necessarily permanent or sustainable. The team does not want to appear too skeptical, but Sierra Leone's recent history and our experience in other countries lead us to question the stability of the current peace and to emphasize the need to guard against a resurgence of civil unrest and warfare. This need for caution is especially true because of the following:

- (1) The Mano River region (Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Guinea) is still not entirely peaceful.
- (2) There are few barriers to the ebb and flow of combatants and unrest across national boundaries in the region.
- (3) Some underlying social, economic, and political conditions that fanned the original warfare in Sierra Leone have not yet been transformed, as became evident in the first DACDF disbursement.

A question remains to be answered in terms of our mission: To what extent may OTI claim credit for the current peace? It is impossible to quantify or isolate OTI's contribution to achieving peace, since OTI is only one of many actors, both national and international, who have been active in the peace-building process.

But it is clear that OTI's contribution has been important and has been recognized. OTI programs focus on stifling conflict diamonds (a key source of funding for the war), empowering civil society, enfranchising and giving respect to youth, and reintegrating and reconciling ex-combatants and war-affected youth. These social, economic, and political themes are critically important to the peace process, and OTI has concentrated significant resources in these areas.

As stated previously, several well-placed observers who watched the war-to-peace transition believe that YRTEP met an immediate need and helped Sierra Leoneans secure peace in their country. The quick start and rapid expansion of the program to reach so many people had a widespread impact. Repeatedly, it was expressed that YRTEP got youth off the streets and engaged in something that was meaningful and beneficial for the community. YRTEP also facilitated a decrease in communal hostility as ex-combatants re-oriented themselves to community norms and values. In addition to the direct impact on the participants, the existence of the program clearly made other community members more optimistic.

Everyone we interviewed in Sierra Leone (including GOSL and NGO representatives, other donors, and people in communities across the country) is positive about the impact of OTI on the peace-building process. Except for other donors, people in Sierra Leone generally think about specific OTI programs, such as YRTEP or DMP, rather than the overall country program, and their comments usually refer to those specific programs. To avoid being redundant, we will not repeat comments here that are noted under the evaluations of those two specific programs.

C. Supporting Reintegration and Reconciliation

The other part of OTI's goal (supporting reintegration and reconciliation) has been achieved through the YRTEP Program that directly reaches more than 40,000 individuals in many

communities throughout the country. The goal states that OTI will support reconciliation and reintegration, not that these processes will be completed. Both reintegration and reconciliation are underway, but these are social, economic, psychological, and political processes that people will be dealing with for many years to come.

The YRTEP Program addresses reintegration and reconciliation by changing people's behavior and attitudes, involving both Learning Facilitators and participants in mixed (i.e., integrated) groups, teaching people about the need for peaceful reintegration, and stimulating LFs and participants to become peace ambassadors in their communities (see YRTEP section for more details). The OTI media and mass communications program (not a focus of our evaluation) features campaigns by Talking Drum Studio, which also contribute to the reconciliation effort.

The process of reintegrating large numbers of ex-combatants began in 2001 and is still occurring. Most combatants have been demobilized, although an unknown number may still be mobilized inside or outside the country. Oftentimes reintegration is seen as a short-term issue of transporting ex-soldiers back to their communities and giving them something (rations, money, training, counseling, etc.) to help them through the first months or year of adjustment. Short-term programs do help dissolve the population of ex-combatants into the general society, but do not ensure successful longer-term reintegration.

The need for reintegration extends to many more people than only ex-combatants. Many other people, including war-affected (but non-combatant) youth and victimized girls and women, also need to reintegrate themselves into post-conflict society because they have been socially and psychologically displaced by their wartime experiences. The reintegration of all these people (ex-combatants and non-combatants) and reconciliation, or learning to live and work together, will affect community development efforts for years to come. It is important that USAID continue to provide assistance to these longer-term processes.

A question remains to be answered in terms of our mission: To what extent may OTI claim credit for supporting reintegration and reconciliation? With its large-scale YRTEP Program, OTI is clearly one of the major players that has been active in supporting these processes, and its contribution has been important and is well-recognized in Sierra Leone.

D. Promoting Participation and Empowerment

We commend OTI for its consistent emphasis and successful performance in increasing civil society participation in decision-making and in empowering civil society to become more effective. This focus permeates the programs we assessed, including the national-level coalitions formed to work on diamonds, the focus groups that provided direction to the original YRTEP design, the community-level CMCs and training, and the Nation-Building training for leaders.

The DACDF is another instance of OTI's innovativeness in promoting civic participation. Community Based Natural Resource Management (CBNMR) is not new, but it has previously been applied to wildlife and timber resources, not to minerals. This is a valuable effort to motivate and reward communal participation in governance and communal monitoring of a clean

channel. It is too early to tell whether the DACDF will succeed, as there are significant problems confronting its implementation.

The DACDF serves another function as well. As the “canary in the mine” is a good early indicator of toxic gas, the implementation of the DACDF is a good indicator of continuing corruption and disenfranchisement at the community level, both of which have been cited as underlying reasons for the expansion of warfare. The diamond communities may be seen as a laboratory where GOSL or USAID may control the periodic input and monitoring of traceable funds and work out procedures to improve local level democracy and governance procedures.

VII. RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Recommendations for the Diamond Management Program

Recommendation #1 – Continue the DMP. The DMP has been addressing many important aspects of the complex problems related to illicit diamonds. Although all of the activities seemed to be making progress, the objectives of the program had not yet been fully achieved. The DMP should also continue to raise some of the more difficult subjects such as the status of the Digger and advocate for substantive change to ensure that adjustments go beyond the superficial level to address potentially explosive issues.

Recommendation #2 – Establish a Credit or Small Grant Program. The Diamond Area Community Development Fund puts money back into mining communities, but only for infrastructural improvements. But the lowest-level workers are toiling in exploitative conditions. Diggers and miners need a source of credit or small grants to enable them to improve their working conditions and escape from their indentured status. Other forms of possible support should be investigated.

Recommendation #3 – Continue Training MMR Staff (Mines Wardens). Training the MMR staff members that are involved in monitoring diamond mining, dealing, and exporting will not prevent corruption, but will improve the expertise and morale of the staff and permit those who are not corrupt to do a better job. The mines wardens are best positioned to grasp the situation at mining sites. Establishing a “clean channel” has to start with them.

Recommendation #4 – Establish Appropriate DACDF Disbursement Procedures. Currently, the MMR is working on revising procedures for the second disbursement of DACDF funds so that there will be more accountability than during the first disbursement. The process of revising and agreeing on these procedures needs to be accelerated, or else the second disbursement will be indefinitely deferred, and the DACDF might become an empty shell instead of an effective reform effort.

Recommendation # 5 –Coordinate with YRTEP and Nation-Building for DACDF Disbursements. The first disbursement of DACDF funds revealed signs of significant corruption and a lack of community preparedness. Communities that will receive DACDF funds should be trained to participate in the decision making-process and manage their own affairs by YRTEP and Nation-Building Programs.

Five specific steps are recommended to improve coordination:

- (1) In selecting their sites for training, the YRTEP and Nation-Building Programs should include diamond-producing areas (those communities that will be receiving DACDF funds).
- (2) YRTEP and Nation-Building staff working in diamond-mining communities should prepare and encourage their trainees to involve themselves in DACDF affairs.

- (3) YRTEP and Nation-Building should coordinate and train the members of the Community Management Committees (YRTEP) and Chieftainship Development Committees (DACDF).
- (4) The curriculum for the third YRTEP module (environment and local resources) in these communities should directly refer to the opportunities and problems associated with diamond mining.
- (5) The second disbursement of DACDF funds should be coordinated with the YRTEP and Nation-Building Programs, to insure that communities receiving funds have access to YRTEP and Nation-Building programming.

B. Recommendations for YRTEP

Recommendation #6 – Expand the YRTEP Program. YRTEP is popular and is making a significant impact. The program should be extended into newly opened territories.

Recommendation #7 – Improve Closure and Address Sustainability. The issue of community sustainability and closure needs to be better addressed to curb the frustrations of participants, LFs, and CMC members. Trainings should end in such a way that the participants are confident and clear on how to move forward with their newfound skills so that gains made are not subsequently lost. The “What Next?” component should thus be retooled to better reflect realistic options for YRTEP communities and reinforce the self-reliance themes and tools explained in earlier modules.

Recommendation #8 – Provide Training and Orientation for World Vision Staff and CMC Members. Although the program has been in existence for two years, World Vision staff and CMC members both need to be properly oriented about YRTEP. An orientation program would enhance their ability to introduce YRTEP to communities and address any implementation “cracks” that may surface.

Recommendation #9 – Monitor Relationships Among Field Staff. Many existing field-based communication problems between MSI and WV promise to be rectified after MSI moves into WV’s Freetown office. However, MSI and WV headquarter office staff need to jointly enhance collaboration between their respective field staffs, an issue which calls out for improvement.

Recommendation #10 – Explore Ways to Better Address Sexual Violence Issues. More can and should be done to promote the participation of women in YRTEP programming. Among the improvements that might be considered are: sensitizing CMC members to be more responsive to the sexual violence issue; insuring that women’s voices are recognized and appreciated during trainings; and experimenting with single-sex sessions for women (based on the FAWE/Moyamba model). Training sessions that only include men should be avoided, since our findings indicate that male youth learn more when they interact with women participants.

Recommendation #11 – Improve the Monitoring and Mentoring of Learning Facilitators. Master Trainer monitoring remains erratic and insufficient, due in large part to their own heavy training schedule. This leaves them little hands-on time to supervise and assist Learning Facilitators (LFs). As a result, the educational quality of the program is negatively affected.

Some way needs to be found to address this significant deficiency. Two possibilities can be suggested here: hiring more MTs, or increasing the supervision and support responsibilities of some MTs, so they can devote more time to the needs of Learning Facilitators.

Recommendation #12 – Improve Coordination with Other Programs. YRTEP is a nationwide resource that has inspired a considerable amount of community activism. This energy and enthusiasm constitutes a development resource that has yet to be tapped. Improved linkages between OTI and other USAID programs, particularly the Nation-Building project, promise to yield positive results. USAID might also explore with NGOs and other donors ways to develop projects with communities that have been energized by their YRTEP experience.

Recommendation # 13 – Improve Access to Micro-credit Schemes. Although there are several programs for micro-credit in Sierra Leone, some of them USAID funded and linked to YRTEP, they do not meet the overwhelming public demand for credit access. The number of communities targeted for micro-credit schemes is far less than the number of communities participating in YRTEP, who are generating ideas and are anxious to develop new business opportunities. Indeed, the evaluation team found that members of every YRTEP community visited sought to increase their access to credit. Community members have ideas, time, and a willingness to work. Yet many efforts flounder because they lack sufficient capital to get many of their initiatives off the ground. Some do not qualify for a loan because they do not meet established criteria. Loans are more often available to women’s groups or ex-combatant groups. Some don’t qualify because they lack a bank account. Still others are simply unaware of where credit opportunities exist. Sadly, in some cases all that is sought is a US \$100 loan. Enhancing community members’ access to credit is thus strongly recommended.

C. Recommendations for OTI

Recommendation # 14 – Enhance Coordination with Other Programs. Good coordination between programs and among donors allows existing activities to feed off the strengths of other efforts. Having generated unexpected, far-reaching, and generally positive results, the gains that YRTEP has achieved have the potential to directly impact other USAID activities aimed at strengthening civil society. It would be unfortunate to lose opportunities for synergy because of a lack of coordination.

But coordinating with other programs is difficult, even when they are OTI programs. Different mandates, personalities, and other factors impact decision making. Our recommendation is to make coordination a higher priority. One practical suggestion in this regard is to gauge how local leaders are already pursuing development funds at community and regional levels, and then use this information to enhance coordination with both donors and recipients.

Recommendation #15 – Include YRTEP and DMP Models in OTI’s Global Repertoire. Both of the major programs that were assessed by this team have considerable potential to be replicated elsewhere. We strongly recommend that OTI include these models as part of its repertoire of potential programs that might be adapted to other situations, with our suggestions for replication taken into account.

APPENDIX A.**LIST OF CONTACTS: ORGANIZATIONS AND INDIVIDUALS****1. CONTACTS IN THE USA****Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) and Africa Bureau**

United States Agency for International Development (USAID)

1300 Pennsylvania Avenue NW, Ronald Reagan Building, Washington, DC 20523

Website: www.usaid.gov/hum_response/oti/index.html

Atteberry, David - Program Officer for Sierra Leone, based in Guinea
Cobham, Kury, Former Acting OTI Country Representative to Sierra Leone
Fletcher, Sylvia, Former OTI Country Director
Isralow, Sharon, Former Sierra Leone Desk Officer, Africa Bureau
Langlois, John
Leary, Terry, Former OTI Country Representative to Sierra Leone
Lee, Anne, OTI Program Development Team
Stewart, Mary, OTI Program Development Team
Wingate, Patrick R., Program Manager, Africa Team, USAID/DCHA/OTI

United States Department of State

Washington DC 20520

Eastham, Alan, Special Negotiator for Conflict Diamonds, Bureau of Economic and
Business Affairs, EB/CBA – Room 2318
Melrose, Ambassador Joseph (Joe), former U.S. Ambassador to Sierra Leone
Ryan, Timothy, Sierra Leone Desk Officer

Management Systems International (MSI),

600 Water Street SW, Washington DC 20024, USA

Phone: (202)-484-7170 Fax: (202)-488-0754

Website: www.msiworldwide.com

Daniels, Bonnie, Director, Outplacement & Entrepreneurial Development Programs,
YRTEP, Nation-building, Diamonds, MSI

Fauth, Gloria, Senior Associate
Renzi, Mark, Diamond Management Program
Warren, Roberta (B.J.), Senior Associate

World Vision (WV)

220 "I" Street NE, Suite 270, Washington DC 20002-4373

Phone: (202)-547-3743 Fax: (202)-547-4834

Website: www.worldvision.org

Anderson, Rory E., Government Relations Manager (Diamonds)
Hoskins, Ben, Senior Program Officer West Africa

Search for Common Ground (SFCG), Website:

1601 Connecticut Avenue NW, Suite 200, Washington DC 20009

Phone: (202)-265-4300 Fax: (202)-232-6718

www.sfcg.org

Helmich, Phil Bob, West Africa Regional Director

Creative Associates International, Inc. (CAII)

5301 Wisconsin Avenue NW, Suite 700, Washington DC 20015

Phone: (202)-966-5804 Fax: (202)-363-4771

Website: www.caii-dc.com

Graybill, Donald, Deputy Director, Education, Mobilization and Communication

Division, and Director, Basic Education and Policy Support (BEPS) Project

Tate, Sean A., Senior Associate, Basic Education and Policy Support (BEPS) Activity,

Education, Mobilization and Communication Division

Dauphinais, Denise, Communities in Transition Division

Cooperative for Relief Everywhere, Inc. (CARE)

151 Ellis Street, Atlanta GA 30303-2439

Phone: (404)-681-2552 Fax: (404)-589-6662

www.care.org

Benbow, Jane, Director, Basic and Girls' Education

InterAction

1717 Massachusetts Avenue NW, Suite 701

Washington, DC 20036

Phone (202) 667-8227

ia@InterAction.org

Ohlbaum, Diana, Director of Public Policy, former Deputy Director of OTI

Partnership Africa-Canada

Smillie, Ian (phone interview)

2. CONTACTS IN SIERRA LEONE**Action Aid Sierra Leone**

36A Freetown Road, Lumley, Freetown aasl@sierratel.sl www.actionaid.org
P.M.B. Bag 1058
Phone: (232-22)-231392, 232246, 234197 Fax: (232-22)-232352

Musa, Sam, Country Director for Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Guinea

Centre for Coordination of Youth Activities

55 Campbell Street, Freetown

Katta, Ngolo, National Coordinator

Christian Children's Fund

PMB 910, Freetown Phone: (232-22)-223873 Fax: (232-22)-229365

Jonah, Davidson O., Country Director
Taray, Abu Bakaru, Representative for Kabala

Forum for African Women Educationalists (FAWE)

Moyamba, Moyamba District

Bangura, Margaret, Supervisor
N'Danema, Cecilia

Management Systems International (MSI), Sierra Leone

c/o US Embassy, Walpole Street, Freetown Phone: (232-22)-226481
www.msiworldwide.com

Benya, Edward (Eddy), Project Manager
Sarkis, Toufic, Logistics Manager
Williams-Bridgers, Jacquelyn L., DMP Consultant

Ministry of Mineral Resources, Mines Division

Youyi Building, Brookfields, Freetown Phone: (232-22)-240574

Wurie, Alimamy R., Director of Mines,
Kamara, Usman Boie, Deputy Director of Mines
Kabba, Lahai, Government Mining Engineer – South (Bo)

National Committee for Disarmament, Demobilisation, and Reintegration (NCDDR)

2 State Avenue, Freetown

Phone: (232-22)-229222, 220113 Fax: (232-22)-228368

Kai-Kai, Dr. Francis, Executive Secretary
Jakaranda, Raja, Program Operations Coordinator
Sesay, Sullay B., Information and Sensitisation Unit Manager

National Commission for Social Action

Phone: (232-22)-227703 Mobile: (030)-800096

Walker, Gary A., Senior Advisor

Network Movement for Justice and Development

Freetown

Kamara, Morlai, Economic Justice Officer
Kamara, Sallieu, Communication and Documentation Officer
Salrie, Sellir Rodney, Administrative Assistant

Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA-UN)

13 Bath Street, Brookfields, Freetown

Phone: (232-22)-220770, 220778 Fax: (232-22)-228720

Johnson, Dennis, Chief

Search for Common Ground

44 Bathurst Street, Freetown Phone: (232-22)-223082 Fax: (232-22)-223479

tdssl@sierratel.sl www.sfcg.org

Fortune, Frances, Country Director
Daramy, Kemoh, Assistant Producer
Sesay, Nancy, Producer

Sierra Leone Indigenous Miners Movement (SLIMM)

9 Humonya Avenue, Kenema

Phone: 042364

Sembah, John B., Vice Chairman
Sheriff, Mohamed, Public Relations Officer

United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF)

Government Central Medical Stores Compound, Jomo Kenyatta Road

P.O. Box 221, Freetown Phone: (232-22)-226825, 241422, 223865

Fax: (232-22)-242109

Van Gerpen, Joanna, Representative

World Bank

Africanus House, 13A Howe Street, Freetown

Phone: (232-22)-227555, 227488, 228377 Fax: (232-22)-228555

Ground, Richard Lynn, Country Manager

World Vision

39 Freetown Road, Lumley, Freetown PMB 59, Freetown

Phone: (232-22)-234205, 230725, 233663 Fax: (232-22)-230156

Olufowote, Dr. Johnson O., Regional Representative

Nesiah, Dr. Anita, Transition Initiatives Programme (TIP) Manager

Scott, Leslie A., National Director

Brima, Kekura, Assistant Manager, STEP

Brown, Edward, Program Manager

Fury, Edward, Assistant Manager TIP

Kargbo, Edward

Koroma, Ba-Challey, Program Officer South East

Koroma, Samuel Konkofa, Regional Coordinator West

Marah, Bockarie, District Coordinator, NW/TIP

Goba, Fred, Monitoring and Evaluation Officer

USAID/Sierra Leone

Walpole Street, Freetown, Sierra Leone

Telephone: (232-22)-226481 Fax: (232-22)-225471, 228191

Koenen-Grant, Julie, USAID Representative

US Embassy

Walpole Street, Freetown, Sierra Leone

Telephone: (232-22)-226481 Fax: (232-22)-225471, 228191

Michael Bajek, DCM

APPENDIX B.**ITINERARY IN SIERRA LEONE: FEBRUARY 12 THROUGH MARCH 2, 2002**

12-14 February. Team members Hansen and Nenon traveled from the USA through Guinea to arrive in Freetown.

14-18 February. The team was in Freetown and began the assessment by meeting with OTI and Embassy officials, interviewing NGO and UN staff members, and observing and interviewing YRTEP-related community leaders (Community Management Committee members), trainers (learning facilitators), and trainees (participants) in a Freetown urban neighborhood (Sackville). During this time the team learned that it would be permitted to travel by road around the country.

19 February. The team traveled to a nearby rural area (Makoibondo) to interview YRTEP-related community leaders, trainers, and trainees.

20 February. The team flew by helicopter to Koidu to interview YRTEP-related community leaders, trainers, and trainees in nearby villages of Bondor Fulahun and Kamadu. Stakeholders in Koidu were also interviewed about the diamonds issue, and diamond mines were observed.

21 February. The team began a six-day road trip to interview YRTEP-related community leaders (Community Management Committee members), trainers (both MTs and learning facilitators), and trainees throughout the country. YRTEP training centers were visited and people interviewed in Lungi, and then the team drove through Port Loko to Makeni, where they spent the night.

22 February. YRTEP training centers were visited and people interviewed in Makeni, and then the team drove to Kabala, where more YRTEP training centers were visited and people interviewed. Stakeholders in Kabala were also interviewed about the diamonds issue, and diamond mines were observed. The team drove back to Makeni, where they spent the night.

23 February. YRTEP training centers were visited and people interviewed in Magburaka and Mile 91, and then the team drove to Bo, where they spent the night.

24 February. The team stayed in Bo revising its notes and procedures.

25 February. YRTEP training centers were visited and people interviewed in Bo, Kenema, and Daru. Ministry of Mineral Resources and local NGO staff in these sites were interviewed about the diamonds issue, and diamond mines were observed. The team spent the night in Bo.

26 February. YRTEP training centers were visited and people interviewed in Tikonko, Koribondo, and Moyamba. Then the team returned to Freetown.

27-28 February. The team remained in Freetown interviewing and receiving additional information and documents from relevant GOSL ministries and commissions, international

organizations, and NGOs. The team briefed stakeholders about the team's preliminary findings and recommendations, and received additional feedback and clarification from the briefings.

1-2 March. Team members left Sierra Leone and returned to the USA.

APPENDIX C.**SITES VISITED**

Sierra Leone is divided into four provinces, which are subdivided into twelve administrative districts if the Western Area is not subdivided. There are fourteen districts if Freetown Urban and Freetown Rural are considered to be two separate districts within the Western Area.

The following list shows fourteen districts. The assessment mission visited all four provinces and YRTEP learning center sites in eleven of the fourteen districts. The sites that were visited are shown below.

For further information about districts in Sierra Leone, visit the following UN website:
http://www2.reliefweb.int/sle/gis_maps/districts.htm

PROVINCES (CAPITAL)	DISTRICTS	SITES VISITED
Western Area (Freetown)	Freetown Urban Freetown Rural	Sackville (urban) Makoibondo
Northern (Makeni)	Bombali Kambia (not visited) Koinadugu Port Loko Tonkolili	Makeni Kabala Lungi (1) Magburaka (2) Mile 91
Southern (Bo)	Bo Bonthe (not visited) Moyamba Pujehun (not visited)	(1) Bo (2) Tikonko (3) Koribondo Moyamba
Eastern (Kenema)	Kailahun Kenema Kono	Daru Kenema (1) Koidu (2) Bondor Fulahun (3) Kamadu

APPENDIX D.

COMPARING THE GOALS AND CURRICULA OF THREE EDUCATIONAL APPROACHES: REFLECT, EDUCATION FOR PEACE (EP), AND YRTEP

by Dr. Joy Wolf, Consultant and Evaluation Team Member, CARE

The YRTEP training materials (or curriculum) combine and modify features and themes from two different sources. One source is the work of Paolo Freire, whose ideas about educating and empowering communities are expressed in the well-established "REFLECT Mother Manual." The other source is the Education for Peace (EP) programs that have emerged relatively recently to guide post-conflict reconciliation and reintegration programs. These two sources have different orientations and emphases.

Briefly summarized, the REFLECT approach concentrates on community empowerment and participation and (for individuals) literacy and numeracy. Work in each community starts with a rapid participatory appraisal. Educational materials are developed in each locality and designed to fit the local culture. The act of creating the materials locally is itself seen to be empowering. Grants or other resources are supplied to support community self-help projects.

Briefly summarized, the EP approach concentrates on individuals learning concepts and skills. These individuals (often school children) do not necessarily have to be located or involved in a community. The EP curriculum focuses on universal principles (of human rights, for instance). The teaching/learning materials are prepared ahead of time (not adapted to each community or culture) and feature more of a lecture format of presentation.

This appendix is the full text of a report entitled "Youth Reintegration Training And Education For Peace (YRTEP) Program Training Materials" that was written by Dr. Joy Wolf as part of this mission. This review begins by describing and analyzing the purpose, features, and strengths of the REFLECT approach and then the EP approach. Afterwards, the two approaches are compared, and the YRTEP training materials are described and analyzed. The review ends by noting some questions and concerns about YRTEP, and some limitations of this evaluation. This analysis is based on a comparative textual review of documents from many different agencies and was made available to the other members of the mission before they went to Sierra Leone. Major features of this review are incorporated into the body of this report, but the full text of the review (below) highlights more dimensions and details.

1. THE REFLECT APPROACH

The contract specialist who is the primary author of the YRTEP curriculum states that the Youth Reintegration Training and Education For Peace (YRETP) program and training modules in Sierra Leone are based on an adaptation of the approach used by REFLECT (Regenerated Freirean Literacy Through Empowering Community Techniques). It is therefore important to understand what the REFLECT approach is, what its goals are, and what its impacts have been. The specific types of successes and problems reported among the evaluations of REFLECT can

help to guide the examination of the YRETP program to the degree that the two programs overlap in materials, training methodology, and their relationship to local communities.

A. Description

REFLECT was developed between 1993 and 1995 as a radical new approach to adult literacy. Its use has spread rapidly since then and there are now over 250 organizations working with REFLECT in over 50 countries. The current definition of REFLECT is:

A structured participatory learning process which facilitates people's critical analysis of their environment, placing empowerment at the heart of sustainable and equitable development. Through the creation of democratic spaces and the construction and interpretation of locally-generated texts, people build their own multi-dimensional analysis of local and global reality, challenging dominant development paradigms and redefining power relationship in both public and private spheres. Based on ongoing processes of reflection and action, people empower themselves to work for a more just and equitable society.¹¹

This idealistic and broad definition provides the flexibility that has allowed REFLECT to be adapted to meet the goals of many different implementing organizations and the needs of a wide range of local contexts. In a REFLECT program there are no textbooks or other pre-printed materials other than a guide for the facilitators. The theory is that, "As learners construct their own materials, they take ownership of the issues that come up and are more likely to be moved to take local action, change their behaviour or their attitudes¹²."

The program makes use of Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) techniques to link training in literacy and numeracy to analysis of the experiences of participants and local issues. The exploration of self and community provides a meaningful content for the literacy learning experience, while the focus on empowerment changes the participants in ways beyond the mastery of literacy and numeracy. The content of REFLECT, those things which it is attempting to teach, are inseparable from the participatory teaching style and materials utilized in conducting the program.

B. Impacts

In spite of the fact that REFLECT was built around the idea that empowerment will create uses for literacy and literacy will provide the practical skills for advancing development, in many of the programs examined there is a tension between the two primary goals of REFLECT: literacy and community development/empowerment. A substantial number of evaluations of the program conducted over the last few years¹³ indicate strong differences in both the relative emphases within the programs themselves and in what aspects of the program were considered

¹¹ Phnuyal, Archer and Cottingham, 1998.

¹² Archer and Cottingham

¹³ Okech, et al.2001; Riddel, 2001;

important to evaluate. The following chart¹⁴ indicates the types of achievements that have been found in both areas.

Other relevant findings include:

- The important role of the facilitators was mentioned in almost every evaluation – who they are, what skills they have, and how much they are supported by training and supervision.
- In a number of programs, facilitators with low skills, especially when combined with insufficient training, were found to use the REFLECT materials in a rather rigid manner that limited their effectiveness.
- In most of the programs, the participants' mastery of numeracy was better than that of literacy.
- The government of Uganda, with the assistance of World Bank, compared and contrasted the effectiveness of REFLECT programs and the government-run literacy program. The focus of this evaluation is on literacy itself, rather than empowerment, and, on overall average, participants in REFLECT performed considerably better than those in the government literacy program. The majority of REFLECT participants had attained a level of reading, writing, and numeracy higher than of primary 4 pupils. The large differences in the performance of participants in different areas of the country were related not only to cultural ideas about education, but also the amount of community support and commitment. This study has enough data that one is not forced to simply accept the evaluators' opinion.
- In Mozambique, a number of language issues surfaced: fluency of the facilitator in local language, differing attitudes about the appropriate language for instruction, skill of facilitators in Portuguese, etc.
- In Bangladesh, literacy testing of graduates of the program found that a higher percentage of adolescents than adults had achieved minimum competencies.
- In a post-civil-war situation in El Salvador, the perception of those implementing the program was that it would be more useful for empowerment than literacy teaching. In Ghana, it was recommended that the program should be scaled up solely on the basis of the progress made in initiating community development.
- In Malawi, the amount of cooperation from the village leaders had an impact on how active the participants became in community development.
- In Nepal REFLECT programs have been carried out in 28 districts, 13 languages, and among 15 ethnic groups. This rapid expansion has led to a number of weaknesses, among which was insufficient care being taken in the selection of facilitators, often choosing relatively well to do persons who, rather than serving as a bridge to empowerment, were seen as part of the oppressors.
- In India, variations among three programs using REFLECT demonstrated the impact of how the program is envisaged, some focusing on literacy and others empowerment. The most successful model appears to be when REFLECT is adopted as both a strategy for sustained community mobilization and for achieving literacy.
- All of the evaluations mention the problem of building commitment to community involvement and development without any funds available to carry out these plans.

¹⁴ Data taken from Riddel, 2001.

MAJOR IMPACTS OF REFLECT AS REPORTED IN EVALUATIONS		
Country	Literacy/Numeracy	Empowerment
Bangladesh	Estimated that 40% of participants achieved sustainable literacy.	Growth in assertiveness and confidence only for participants in the “good” groups.
El Salvador	N/A	Women less shy, more self-esteem.
Ghana	Some could write simple letters.	Energy and commitment to community development.
India	Literacy outcomes comparable to national literacy program plus wider impacts.	Different types of community actions detailed and number of collective actions per group enumerated.
Malawi	Two-thirds of participants literate and numerate.	Reported strong feelings of empowerment.
Mali	86-95% performed at average or good levels in reading, writing and arithmetic, although most had already been exposed to some literacy training.	Reinforcement of community development initiatives.
Mozambique	Participants say they have learned to read and write – unsubstantiated.	N/A
Nepal	Did not focus on literacy, unsatisfactory progress.	Participants have become vocal and in some case acted to address local issues; activities in savings and credit mostly.
South Africa	Participants could write their names and count.	Increased self-confidence; beginnings of ideas for small development projects.
Sudan	N/A	Literacy equated with empowerment.
Uganda	Most participants graduate with reading, writing, and numeracy skill equal to primary 4 th grade. Higher achievement in literacy than the government adult literacy program.	N/A

C. Facilitators

Almost all of the evaluations of REFLECT programs indicated that the facilitators are of crucial importance to the success of the program. Of key significance are:

- the criteria and process for their selection
- their personal skills
- their role in the local community
- the training they receive
- the supervision they receive

D. Participants

From an extreme of 27,000 participants of whom all but 500 were women in Bangladesh, to a low of 44% female participants in Ghana, in most of the REFLECT programs where data are available there are more female than male participants. The major reason participants give for joining REFLECT groups are reported¹⁵ as the desire to become literate and numerate, which means that almost all of the participants had low literacy skills when they began. Among the large number of REFLECT groups in Nepal, it was found that the training was more effective when the group was composed of more marginalized participants.¹⁶

E. Community

Central to the relationship between literacy and empowerment in the REFLECT program is involvement with the local community. Most of the PLA activities focus on understanding and analyzing the community within which the program is located, products including mapping of resources, census by relative wealth, analysis of ethnic and gender relationships, sources for development, calendars of work and hardship, etc. REFLECT has been shown to be more successful when community leaders support it.

2. THE EDUCATION FOR PEACE (EP) APPROACH

The basic goal of the YRETP training program in Sierra Leone is to transform the behavior and attitudes of ex-combatants through educational intervention designed to promote peace. It is therefore important to understand the peace education approaches that have been drawn upon for the content of the YRETP training. The specific goals, successes, and criticism associated with peace education can help to guide the examination of the YRETP program.

¹⁵ Okech, et al, 2001

¹⁶ Riddel, 2001

A. Description

Peace education as a field of endeavor is closely related to conflict resolution initiatives, both addressing the themes of peace, cooperation and reconciliation, plus training people in problem-solving skills. The significant difference lies how these issues are approached, conflict resolution training generally addressing specific, context-based conflicts that already exist, while peace education trains participants in how to prevent conflicts before they take place. In most peace education programs, individuals are the primary focus and training is directed toward changing the behavior and attitudes of individuals. The principles taught are assumed to be universal and, therefore, transcend the values inherent in specific cultures.

Peace education programs have taken many different forms, from emergency workshops in refugee camps to curricula to be interwoven within the existing subjects of national formal education. The range of programs is great; what they have in common is instruction, discussion and activities around the role of the individual in bringing about peace. The examples¹⁷ in the chart below illustrate the range of approaches, who has been targeted in these programs, and what specific materials and methodologies have been utilized.

B. Impacts

“No systematic evaluation has been carried out in order to assess the relevance of (peace education) experiences and the impact of their methodological approaches.¹⁸” Evaluation of peace education programs has generally meant self-evaluation of the training experience. For example, in the UNHCR programs in Kenya and Uganda, the individual participants were asked to complete written questionnaires asking about their attitudes concerning the workshop¹⁹. The major positive impact that has been reported is the strong, enthusiastic refugee support for the programs.

C. Facilitators

Most peace education programs target school aged children, which means that classroom teachers generally present peace education programs. Although there have been attempts to train teachers to interact with their pupils in a less authoritarian manner as part of the peace education process, the methodology for peace education programs has been shaped by the typical relationship between teachers and young school children in formal education settings. Using pre-prepared materials, teachers instruct and explain new concepts to students, although they are encouraged to stimulate discussion as part of the process. Even in the context of workshops, the facilitators who are selected are generally well educated, which is necessary to work with materials written in English, and successful individuals who can be seen as role models for the participants.

¹⁷ Sommers, 2001

¹⁸ Agkuilar and Retamal, 1998.

¹⁹ Sommers, 2001

ORGANIZATION	APPROACH TO PEACE EDUCATION
UNESCO	Peace Education Package consisting of the software and hardware required to provide 40 schoolchildren with a year's worth of activities, including an activity book and a songbook, both of which address broad, peace-related themes, and a book of stories directly related to Somali characters and concerns.
UNICEF	Curriculum, around themes such as communication, cooperation, and problem solving, and teacher training, in interactive and participatory methods, which are designed to be introduced into formal schools.
UNICEF	National peace campaigns, youth camps, groups and clubs, sports and recreation programs, training and workshops for community leaders and parents, and a variety of youth public awareness and advocacy initiatives.
Norwegian Refugee Council	Education of students and teachers about human rights, including a focus on how individuals can take part in the realization of human rights ideas and the development of skills to promote peaceful conflict management and protection of human rights.
US Dept of Justice	Program for Young Negotiators designed to address troubled youths to teach individuals how achieve their goals without violence.
All Africa Conference of Churches	Youth Peace Training Manual, which consists of a range of tools and training modules designed to assist youths in transforming themselves into agents of peace.
UNHCR	A skill-based approach to refugee training which uses a problem-solving framework with an orientation toward conflict prevention, assumed to be cross-cultural but adapted to local Kenyan and Ugandan priorities. Refugee leaders played an important role in the development of the program. Materials are written in English. Program is primarily taught by refugee teachers in the camp primary schools and by refugee facilitators in 12 half day session workshops for youths and adults. The training materials, developed by UNHCR experts, are highly structured due to the perception of teachers and facilitators as lacking training. Materials include activity books with lesson plans for 8 primary grades, other curriculum materials primary schools, lesson plans guide and training manual for workshop facilitators, and an assortment of supplementary materials such as songs, poetry, etc. Teachers are encouraged to used discussion and games rather than lecture. Although the adult workshops are said to focus on empowerment, the methodology for presenting the material is explanation by the facilitator.

D. Participants

To participate in the peace education workshops in the UNHCR²⁰ programs required knowledge of English, which limited participation to those with a fair amount of education. This has led to

²⁰ Ibid.

the limited involvement of female refugees and, in some workshops no women at all. The most marginalized youths, characterized as difficult and disturbed, also do not generally participate. Considering that one of the main types of violence in many communities and refugee camps is abuse against women and that frustrated, outcast youths are the most likely to perpetuate violence, their failure to participate is significant. Peace education is described as empowering, yet, by targeting male, educated leaders the programs only strengthen the existing power structure.

E. Community

Peace education programs have primarily been introduced in classrooms and refugee situations, both instances in which the participants are removed from community contexts. No simultaneous instruction in peace education concepts takes place among the community members with whom the children will interact when they return home and the refugees will become reintegrated when they return home. The underlying assumptions about making a difference by targeting individual attitudes and behaviors does not include the interaction of those individuals within community contexts.

3. BASIC DIFFERENCES BETWEEN REFLECT AND EDUCATION FOR PEACE

	REFLECT	PEACE EDUCATION
Goals	Learn literacy/numeracy and become empowered to act for the betterment of their community.	Learn skills for avoiding violent behavior and values supporting a peaceful environment.
Materials	ActionAid “mother” manual shows organizations how to construct guides for facilitators; guides show facilitators how to assist participants’ use of PLA techniques to create their own materials.	Pre-prepared, highly structured instructional materials such as activity books, class plans, songbooks, software, etc.
Facilitators	Literate, local language ability, non-elite from local community, selected by the participants.	Literate in English, leaders, peaceful role models.
Instruction Style	Participatory, use of PLA techniques; builds on existing knowledge of participants.	Facilitator led explanation of concepts and directed discussion; facilitator providing information.
Language of Instruction	Local	English.
Length of Course	100 hours for minimum literacy, 200 hours for more sustainable literacy.	36 hours workshop in UNHCD model; occasional curricula to be added to classroom schedule.
Participants	More women than men, non-literate.	Educated leaders, mostly men
Community Involvement	PLA techniques require participant involvement in local community; goal of training is for participant to engage in community development.	Approach based on role of individuals in establishing and maintaining peace. (“Community” sometimes used to indicate refugee camp or group of participants.)

Key: Participatory Learning and Action (PLA) is similar to Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA).

4. YRTEP MATERIALS

The materials for the YRTEP program consist of five Modules designed for 132 hours of training. Although these modules are described as based on the REFLECT approach, they borrow far more from the peace education approach.

A. Style of Instruction

Although the YRETP modules are described as rooted in the existing knowledge of participants, the actual style of instruction is based upon introducing new concepts – personality types, post traumatic stress disorder, goal statement, environmental degradation, etc. – and explaining what they mean. The participants’ contribution is usually to provide examples from their own experience that fit a concept or category introduced by the facilitator. This is a different type of learning experience than when participants begin with their experiences and then work with one another and the facilitator to create categories and descriptions for those experiences. The following examples further illustrate the style of these materials.

- The facilitator interacts with the participants in the style of a teacher in a traditional classroom – telling people when to do what, asking for discussion at appropriate times, asking them to repeat or copy material, assigning homework, etc.- or as in a Western workshop – time-limited discussion around pre-decided topics, summaries by facilitator on flip charts, etc.
- The impressively complete modules read almost like scripts: “Tell the participants...” “Say...” “Next you will...” “Tell them that now we will...”etc. The instructions are so long (one session has 7 pages of instructions, which does not include the pre-planned flip charts and handouts) and so directive that it would be difficult for anyone to remember them, which means that facilitators are likely to read them to the participants, generally considered a poor approach to teaching or facilitation. The density of the instructions could also create a problem for the facilitators if their level of literacy in English is low. Not only will they have to read the detailed scripts for each session, but they must then translate them into the local language in which the sessions are being conducted.
- In almost all cases the facilitator suggests and explains categories into which the participants place examples. While this may be necessary when dealing with new, Western psychological concepts, it seems unnecessary in most cases. For example, a pre-prepared agricultural calendar with categories of activities runs the risk of missing significant activities in some environments and introducing false ones in others, as well as limiting the ownership of the participants. In the YRTEP materials, the tasks given to participants involve moving from abstract concepts/categories to individuals’ list of experiences, rather than, as in PLA and REFLECT, from participants working out among themselves key concepts/categories that they agree upon based on their own personal experience.
- If a discussion precedes the introduction of a concept or category, then the phase “summarize their responses by giving these key points” frequently appears, followed by a list of messages

such as “avoid having to be right all the time,” “have a clear purpose for each day,” or “self-esteem is directly related to deserving success.” If there has been an honest discussion grounded in the experiences of the participants, it is unlikely that these pre-prepared “key points” will match what has been said.

- One of the basic instructions for PLA methodologies is to “pass the stick” – a facilitator may start an activity to show how it is done, but the “stick” (in this case marker or pen) is handed over to the participants to do the actual construction of the symbol, map, chart, matrix, etc. Throughout the YRTEP modules, the facilitator does most of the writing on the flip chart. The participants are then asked to copy what the facilitator has drawn or written into their exercise books. The analysis involved in figuring things out and the ownership involved in creating rather than copying is important to learning. For example, after the first few rows of a chart of the numbers 1-100 organized in columns of 1, 11, 21 etc. 2, 12, 22, etc, the participants could grasp the underlying structure and could finish on their own rather than copying the entire chart. There are also a great many pre-prepared handouts including symbols that have been decided upon without the involvement of the participants (see related discussion of these symbols below*). The participants are told what the symbol stands for rather than being asked to make up a symbol to stand for that thing.

B. Content of Materials

- The focus is always on the individual. The first word written is each person’s name, which means that the group does not begin with a shared word. Participants work on individual analysis – what they each think is right for them – rather than the negotiated, agreed upon group interpretation of events and circumstances, which is the basis of PLA and REFLECT. The word “community” is used to refer to the group of participants. No session addresses local community values, approved of behaviors, social organization, etc., only individual values, interests, problems, etc. Reintegration would seem to require a bridge between the two, which means both need to be made apparent. Unlike REFLECT, very few of the activities require analysis of the specific community in which the participants live.
- Some of the examples do not seem to be culturally appropriate, especially, the *pre-drawn symbols. For example, in Sierra Leone, as in any African country, it is highly unlikely that a picture of a man in a wig means “justice,” two people climbing with backpacks means “friendship,” a person lifting weights means “physical health,” a couple in wedding veil and top hat means “love,” a man playing golf means “sports,” a light bulb means an “idea,” etc. The realistic figures used for some of the symbols are clearly Western in dress, hair, features, etc., but with shaded skin. The REFLECT mother manual explicitly cautions that local artists should be used for any pre-prepared drawings. Even the verbal symbols often lack local relevance, for example asking participants to decide if they resemble a tortoise, hare, or race horse.

C. Level of Difficulty

- Because the REFLECT approach uses an examination of the participants’ local environment and community to generate the material for the sessions, most of the initial words are familiar

and frequently used – house, man, women, etc. The YRETP materials focus on the introduction of new, abstract concepts, which means that these are the first words for the participants to learn to read and write. Participants are faced with learning simultaneously the meaning of new words and how to read/write them rather than the simpler task of reading/writing familiar words.

- Most of the symbols developed in PLA activities or REFLECT programs are simple – house, money, yams, female child, etc. – and, consequently relatively easy to draw. The YRETP materials, because they are frequently dealing with abstract concepts, require participants to make what are difficult drawings for anyone – activities, attitudes, emotions, values, etc. Because the YRETP program seldom uses objects (seed, rock, leaf, etc.) as symbols, as in PLA and REFLECT, a great many drawings have to be made in every session. In the first module, composed of 11 sessions, the participants were asked to make an average of 6 drawings per session.
- A time estimate is provided for the facilitator for each activity. Some of these activities appear to be far too complex to be completed in the allotted time. For example, mapping the local village in one hour would only be possible if it is a very tiny place or if the detail needed for analysis is omitted (PLA village mapping frequently takes all day). In some instances a time limit is imposed for group decisions on the grounds that “the habit of timeliness is critical.” Acting out eight different stress management techniques - exercise, meditation, seeking social support, etc. - in 30 minutes would be enough to generate considerable stress in most people!

5. IMPACTS OF YRTEP

The impact evaluation of the YRTEP program conducted in August 2001 is very positive. Interviews were conducted with approximately 540 randomly selected participants at randomly selected sites. Participants almost unanimously responded that the training had left them better able to manage conflict, to support themselves, and solve problems, and had improved self-awareness, self-confidence, interpersonal skills, goal setting ability, and personal values. All of those interviewed said that they were more aware of environmental issues, almost all had acquired a better understanding of health issues, and most reported that they understood better democracy, corruption, and their rights and responsibilities as citizens. Almost everyone interviewed said that his or her literacy and numeracy had improved. YRTEP participants reported themselves to be very actively engaged in activities to benefit their communities.

All of which only tells us that the participants, when asked, said that they had improved in all of these ways. They haven't said how much or why. And there are no independent measures or indicators. As in the case of peace education, there appears to be strong enthusiasm for the YRTEP program. The “success stories,” also collected from participants, facilitators, and Community Management Committee members as part of the evaluation, include some details of what specifically is said to have changed and some mention of what it was about the YRTEP program that created these changes. Among those who discussed what impact the training has had on their lives, there were a few interesting differences in what participants chose to mention.

A. Literacy and Numeracy

By simply counting the frequency with which men and women mentioned either literacy/numercy or the information communicated by the program (knowledge about health, environment, etc.) as what had had an impact on their lives, it is clear that the acquisition of literacy and/or numeracy was more important to women than to men. One interpretation of this difference could be that fewer of the women were already literate when they entered the YRTEP program. The examples the women offered suggested that they achieved a greater mastery of numbers than letters and that numeracy had very real impacts on their lives. In the case of REFLECT, some evaluations have indicated that the participants' gained more numeracy skills than literacy.

B. Generating Income

Both men and women mentioning an increased ability to earn a living more than three times as frequently as any other improvement in their lives as an impact of the YRTEP training. Although Module 1 is described as titled "Who Am I?" the title on the actual module is "Exploring Opportunities for Generating Income." The title "Who Am I" and the emphasis in the summary description of the YRTEP program focus on self-understanding as a means for reintegration, while the actual material in Module 1 includes both sessions promoting self-understanding and sessions specifically devoted to income generation. The success stories demonstrate how these are not different, unrelated impacts but, rather, circular. As participants gain insight into themselves and change their outlook, then they are more able to focus on the task of earning a living; as the participants become able to support themselves and their families, they become more sure of who they are in a non-combatant situation.

C. Community Involvement

Although the descriptions of the YRTEP program and the actual material in the modules focus on psychological issues, such as self analysis, conflict management, problem solving, self confidence, and stress management, and information about health, the environment, and democracy/governance, the community development focus of REFLECT appears to have seeped through. This is important because three-fourths of the respondents involved in the evaluation where found to be living in their community of origin at the time of the survey. The success stories illustrated an increased involvement with rebuilding communities as an impact of the program. While both participants and facilitators mentioned increased participation in community development, generally only the facilitators talked about taking part in community peace activities such as acting as peace monitors, forming peace promoting groups, organizing peace events, etc. A number of facilitators mentioned taking on positions of community leadership or jobs in local NGOs working for peace and/or development.

7. CONCERNS ABOUT EVALUATING YRTEP

The YRTEP program presents difficulties for evaluation due, in part, to its goals. The goals for the actual training are primarily changes in the attitudes and behavior of the individual participants. The goals for the overall program are for changes in the society, to reintegrate the ex-combatants and encourage peace in the country. To actually say that the program fulfills these goals would require evaluating three different things: 1) the degree to which the training actually does change the attitudes and behavior of individual participants in the manner proposed, including achieving literacy and numeracy; 2) the degree to which those changes in individual attitudes and behavior add up to an impact on the society; and 3) what type of impact those individual changes have on society.

The REFLECT program has been constantly evaluated from its conception, both to demonstrate its impact and to explore what improvements can be made. In most of those evaluations three things are often measured: 1) literacy and numeracy, 2) empowerment – a form of attitude and behavior change, and 3) changes in the community. In addition, the REFLECT program exists within a larger set of evaluations which have taken place throughout the 1990s, studies that have demonstrated the link between changes in literacy/numeracy and larger societal goals such as drops in fertility, improved health, and increased education of children. The weakest part of the REFLECT evaluations involves the measurement of empowerment, which is, in the end, only demonstrated by the community level changes resulting from the behavioral changes of participants.

Peace Education programs appear to have evaluated their projects in the same manner that the YRTEP program was evaluated last summer, by asking participants if their attitudes and behavior have changed. In both cases the participants have responded with an enthusiastic “yes.” The problem is that self-reported change is not considered sufficient evidence of even the first goal, changes in attitude and behavior, and does not address the second goal for societal change or the linkage between the two. Directly measuring changes in attitude and behavior is extremely difficult except in a longitudinal study, which examines the consequences of those changes as demonstrated by a more productive life.

There are two levels upon which the appropriateness of the YRTEP materials could be questioned. One involves the psychological, individualistic concepts underlying the entire project. Concepts such as self-esteem or stress management come from our USA-European culture and there has been no work to explore the degree that these can be seen as useful conceptualizations in Africa. In addition, it is often assumed that the individual is the primary mover in a society, social change occurring through the addition of many individual acts. While this may not be true in our own society even with its emphasis on individuality, it is unlikely to be the case in other societies, especially when the individuals expected to make the change are marginalized members of traditional, rural communities.

The second area in which the materials may be inappropriate has to do with their content and style of instruction, a concern which is deepened by the lack of field testing for these materials. As noted above, the psychological concepts introduced as part of the content have been imported from a very different culture and may have no relevance in this context. The specific examples

and symbols used to explore these concepts have also been borrowed from outside the society and often can have only what meaning is provided by the explanations of the facilitator. While the “teacher” centered approach is similar to that found in schools throughout Africa, some of the techniques may also be inappropriate for non-literate participants, especially flip chart points that have not been created by the participants and time pressures to complete activities.

APPENDIX E.

DISCUSSION GUIDES FOR YRTEP INTERVIEWS

(Under each topic is a set of questions to guide the interview process and serve as cues for topics that need to be covered. Questions were either translated or phrased differently based on the audience, their comprehension levels, and the type of information given)

A. QUESTIONS TO ASK YRTEP PARTICIPANTS (MEN AND WOMEN)

1. Length and Depth of Experience with YRTEP
 - ✓ Which module are you studying now?
 - ✓ When did you start participating in YRTEP?
 - ✓ How many months have you been participating?

2. Selection and Composition of Participants
 - ✓ How many of your group are men, and how many women?
 - ✓ How many of your group are ex-combatants, and how many war-affected?

3. Educational Background, Previous Schooling, and Literacy
 - ✓ How many years of formal schooling did you have?
 - ✓ How many years have passed since you were in school?
 - ✓ How literate were you before participating in YRTEP? Could you read and write?
 - ✓ How literate are you now?

4. Ex-Combatant Status or War-Affected Youth (Non-Combatant)
 - ✓ Were you a combatant during the years of war? Did you carry a gun?
 - ✓ What did you do during the years of war?

5. Current Residence Versus Reintegration in Home Community
 - ✓ Where is your home? Are you living at home now?
 - ✓ Why are you not living at home now?
 - ✓ Do you intend to go back home? Why, or why not? When?

6. Perception and Evaluation of YRTEP
 - ✓ Why did you join YRTEP?
 - ✓ What is the most important benefit to you from participating in YRTEP?
 - ✓ What do you like the most about YRTEP?
 - ✓ Do you recommend to others that they should join YRTEP? Why, or why not?
 - ✓ What have you learned in YRTEP?
 - What have you learned about your health, about sickness, about keeping you healthy?
 - What have you learned about HIV/AIDS?
 - What have you learned about the government, about corruption, about the elections?
 - What have you learned about your responsibility to the community?

7. Changes in Behavior and Attitude, Including Gender-Related Behavior/Attitude

Have you changed your behavior in any way? Why?

Do you think that others in YRTEP have changed their behavior? How? Why?

- ✓ Are you angry or do you act angry or strong toward other people?
- ✓ (To Women) Do you think the men now treat their wives better? Why?
- ✓ (To Men) Do you think differently about women now? How? Why?

8. Community Reconciliation

- ✓ How does the community here treat you now?
- ✓ Has the community changed in how it treats you? Why?

9. Community Activities

- ✓ Are you engaged now in activities to help the community? What? Why?

10. Livelihood

- ✓ How do you earn your living/food now?
- ✓ Have you learned anything from YRTEP that helps you earn a living?
- ✓ What do you plan to do when you finish training?
- ✓ What have you learned about local resources?

11. Relationships with Other Programs

- ✓ What do you know about the DDR program?
- ✓ Is there a relationship between the DDR program and YRTEP?
- ✓ What is the relationship between YRTEP people and other NGOs and programs?

B. DISCUSSION GUIDE FOR LEARNING FACILITATORS (MEN AND WOMEN)

1. Educational Background, Previous Schooling, and Literacy

- ✓ How many years of formal schooling did you have?
- ✓ How literate were you before participating in YRTEP?

2. Ex-Combatant Status or War-Affected Youth (Non-Combatant)

- ✓ Were you a combatant during the years of war? Did you carry a gun?
- ✓ What did you do during the years of war?

3. Current Residence Versus Reintegration in Home Community

- ✓ Where is your home? Are you living at home now?
- ✓ Why are you not living at home now?
- ✓ Do you intend to go back home? Why, or why not? When?

4. Selection of Learning Facilitators

- ✓ How many of your group are men, and how many women?
- ✓ How many of your group are ex-combatants, and how many war-affected?
- ✓ How were you selected to become an LF?

5. Teaching the Modules
 - ✓ Which sections or modules are easier to teach? Easier for the participants to learn?
 - ✓ Which are harder to teach? Harder for them to learn?
 - ✓ Which are the sections or lessons where the participants have more trouble?
6. Status and Activities in community
 - ✓ What was your status in the community before becoming a LF?
 - ✓ What is your status now that you are a LF? Now that you are in YRTEP?
 - ✓ Are you engaged now in activities to help the community? What? Why?
7. Impacts of YRTEP
 - ✓ How has YRTEP affected the community? Affected the participants?
 - ✓ How has YRTEP affected you?
 - ✓ Has YRTEP affected the community's attitude and behavior toward ex-combatants?
 - ✓ Has YRTEP affected ex-combatants' attitudes and behavior towards others?
8. What Next for Participants and YRTEP
 - ✓ What do participants need after finishing YRTEP?
 - ✓ What do participants want to do after finishing?
9. Relationships with Other Programs
 - ✓ What do you know about the DDR program?
 - ✓ Is there a relationship between the DDR program and YRTEP?
 - ✓ What is the relationship between YRTEP people and other NGOs and programs?

C. DISCUSSION GUIDE FOR MEMBERS OF THE COMMUNITY MANAGEMENT COMMITTEES (MEN AND WOMEN)

1. Educational Background, Previous Schooling, and Literacy
 - ✓ How many years of formal schooling did you have?
 - ✓ How literate are you?
2. Ex-Combatant Status or War-Affected Youth (Non-Combatant)
 - ✓ Were you a combatant during the years of war? Did you carry a gun?
 - ✓ What did you do during the years of war?
3. Status and Activities in community
 - ✓ What was your status in the community before becoming a CMC member?
 - ✓ Are you engaged now in activities to help the community? What? Why?
4. Selection of Learning Facilitators and Participants
 - ✓ What criteria did you use to select LFs and participants?
 - ✓ Did you try to select ex-combatants? Problems? Success?
 - ✓ Did you try to select women? Problems? Success?

5. Impacts of YRTEP
 - ✓ How has YRTEP affected the community? Affected the participants?
 - ✓ How has YRTEP affected you?
 - ✓ Has YRTEP affected the community's attitude and behavior toward ex-combatants?
 - ✓ Has YRTEP affected ex-combatants' attitudes and behavior towards others?
 - ✓ What would the community be like if there had not been a YRTEP program here?
 - ✓ How has YRTEP contributed to the peace process and reconciliation?
6. What Next for Participants and YRTEP
 - ✓ What do participants need after finishing YRTEP?
 - ✓ What do participants want to do after finishing?
7. Other Programs in Community
 - ✓ What other programs or NGOs are operating in this community?
 - ✓ What do they do? How do they differ from YRTEP?
8. Relationships with Other Programs
 - ✓ What do you know about the DDR program?
 - ✓ Is there a relationship between the DDR program and YRTEP?
 - ✓ What is the relationship between YRTEP people and other NGOs and programs?

D. DISCUSSION GUIDE FOR COMMUNITY LEADERS AND MEMBERS WHO DO NOT PARTICIPATE IN YRTEP

1. Impacts of YRTEP
 - ✓ How has YRTEP affected the community? Affected the participants?
 - ✓ How has YRTEP affected you?
 - ✓ Has YRTEP affected the community's attitude and behavior toward ex-combatants?
 - ✓ Has YRTEP affected ex-combatants' attitudes and behavior towards others?
 - ✓ What would the community be like if there had not been a YRTEP program here?
2. What Next for Participants and YRTEP
 - ✓ What do participants need after finishing YRTEP?
 - ✓ What do participants want to do after finishing?
3. Other Programs in Community
 - ✓ What other programs or NGOs are operating in this community?
 - ✓ What do they do? How do they differ from YRTEP?
4. Relationships with Other Programs
 - ✓ What do you know about the DDR program?
 - ✓ Is there a relationship between the DDR program and YRTEP?
 - ✓ What is the relationship between YRTEP people and other NGOs and programs?

APPENDIX F.**WAR AND PEACE CHRONOLOGY FOR SIERRA LEONE****1991**

March 23. The Revolutionary United Front (RUF) invaded from Liberia.

August. Voters in national referendum approved a Multiparty Constitution, which became law.

1992

April 29. Military coup by National Provisional Ruling Council (NPRC) toppled President Joseph Momoh;

Valentine Strasser became chairman of the NPRC and head of state

November. Major NPRC offensive against RUF.

1993

March. ECOMOG troops relocated from Liberia to Freetown to assist NPRC against RUF.

December. President Valentine Strasser announced a unilateral cease-fire.

1994

January. Major NPRC recruitment drive increased size of army.

September. Sierra Leone and Nigeria agreed on a Mutual Defense Pact.

1995

January 17-19. RUF occupied Sierrromco aluminum and Sierra Rutile mines.

March. The NPRC hired Executive Outcomes to provide security.

August 15-19. Civil society conference at Bintumani Conference Center confirmed date for elections.

1996

January 16. NPRC palace coup, Julius Maada Bio became head of state.

February 26-27 and March 15. Elections were held, electing President Alhaji Ahmad Tejan Kabbah.

March 29. President Kabbah assumed power as elected President.

November 30. Abidjan Peace Agreement signed by President Kabbah and Foday Sankoh.

1997

January. Executive Outcomes left the country.

March 6. Sankoh arrested and detained in Nigeria; he remained in Nigeria until July 1998.

May 25. Military coup by Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) toppled President Kabbah; Johnny Paul Koroma became chairman of AFRC and head of state.

June. RUF forces joined with AFRC in Freetown.

May 25-June. Warfare in Freetown; many people became refugees or were evacuated.

October 23. Conakry Peace Plan signed by AFRC and ECOWAS.

1998

February 5. ECOWAS, or ECOMOG, troops attacked AFRC forces in Freetown.

February 18. ECOMOG forces gained control of Freetown.

March 10. President Kabbah returned to Freetown from Conakry.

July. Sankoh returned to Freetown from Nigeria to stand trial for treason.

1999

January 6. RUF attacked Freetown.

July 7. Lome Peace Agreement signed by President Kabbah and Foday Sankoh.

October 22. United Nations peacekeeping Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) established.

2000

May. RUF captured about 500 Kenyan and Zambian UNAMSIL troops.

May 8. Massive civil society protest demonstration; many killed by Sankoh's bodyguards.

July 5. UN imposed embargo on sale of rough Sierra Leone diamonds without certificate of origin.

August 14. United Nations voted to create a war crimes tribunal.

September. West Side Boys defeated by British troops.

November. Cease-fire agreement signed in Abuja.

2001

2002

May. Elections.

APPENDIX G.

LICENSING DIAMOND MINERS

The procedure for obtaining a miner's license was explained by MMR (Mines Division) officials in Bo. First, a person fills out an application and submits that to the regional office. The application includes a photograph and fingerprints of the applicant and is signed by the applicant and witnesses. The regional MMR officials also interview the applicant.

Each application is for a specific person (the miner) and a specific mining site. Mining sites used to measure 400 feet on a side (or 160,000 square feet), but the size has been reduced to 210 feet on a side (or 44,100 square feet). River or streamside plots are smaller (200 feet long by 50 feet wide, or 10,000 square feet). The application for a miner's license must be accompanied by written permission from the landowner (or local chief) and must be witnessed by the town chief.

The mines warden is the lowest-level employee of the MMR Mines Division and the only staff member whose work is based in the field. The mines warden locates plots, stakes out the mining site and draws a plan to delineate the shape and exact location of the mining site. That plan must be approved and signed by the senior mines warden and the area superintendent. These officials may choose to visit and inspect the site.

The applicant must pay a number of costs and have those payments witnessed before receiving a license. There is a surface rent to the chief; that amount is recommended to be 50,000 leones. (Note: at the time of the mission in February 2002, the exchange rate was 2,130 leones to the US Dollar.) An estimated income tax of 36,000 leones must be paid to another regional government office. (Note: instead of levying an income tax on the exact income earned, the government charges a fixed amount to be paid in advance.) Finally, three charges (for a total of 250,000 leones, or slightly more than \$US 117) are collected by the MMR. First, there is a government receipt of 100,000 leones. Second, there is a rehabilitation fee of 100,000 leones. This is supposedly paid to cover the cost of rehabilitating the environment after the mining is finished. The third charge is a monitoring fee of 50,000 leones to cover the cost of monitoring the mining.

After all of the requirements above have been completed and witnessed in writing, the government mining engineer must approve and sign the application for it to be approved. The approved applicant then receives a sheet on which to record all sales of diamonds to dealers. The license must be applied for and renewed annually.

The licensing procedure highlights places where local and official corruption and favoritism may occur. Local and town chiefs have a commanding position in verifying local land tenure and the rights to mine local land. There is no place in this procedure for community participation or monitoring, and youth and other non-elders remain marginalized and disenfranchised. The mines wardens are often the only MMR employees to actually visit any given mine site, know what size site is actually being worked, and recognize who works which site. There is no guarantee that wardens are intensively supervised in the field, or that MMOs actually visit most mining sites, especially given MMR's problems with transportation and lack of incentives for

government employees. A number of regional officials must sign off on various fees having been paid, and each sign-off is a possible point for corruption.

Given the conditions in Sierra Leone, what would we anticipate happening if MMR officials (from warden upward) were to encounter someone doing something illegal (mining, possessing, or selling diamonds)?

APPENDIX H.**RESOURCES REQUIRED FOR
YRTEP AND NATION-BUILDING CURRICULA**

ATTACHED ARE THREE CHECKLISTS (ONE PAGE EACH) THAT DEMONSTRATE THE LEVEL OF RESOURCES THAT ARE NEEDED TO SUPPORT THE CURRICULUM OF THE YRTEP AND NATION-BUILDING PROGRAMS. THE THREE LISTS ARE FOR THREE DIFFERENT TRAINING PROGRAMS.

The first is the “Learning Facilitators Checklist” that lists the materials that are needed for two MTs to use in training 20 Learning Facilitators.

The second is the “Village Training Checklist” that lists the materials that are needed for a Learning Facilitator to train 20 participants.

The third is the “Nation Building Checklist/Supply List” that lists the materials that are needed for training a group of their participants.

APPENDIX I.**REFERENCES**

- Aguilar, Pilar, and Gonzalo Retamal. 1998. "Educational Response in Complex Emergencies: A Discussion Document." Geneva: International Bureau of Education.
- Apfel, Roberta J., and Bennett Simon, eds. 1996. *Minefields in Their Hearts: The Mental Health of Children in War and Communal Violence*. New Haven NJ: Yale University Press.
- Archer, David, and Sara Cottingham. 1996. *Regenerated Freirean Literacy Through Empowering Community Techniques*. London: ActionAid.
- CARE Uganda Educational Development for Greater Empowerment (EDGE) Project Staff. 2002. "Semi-Annual Report: May to October 2002. CARE International in Uganda.
- Cartwright, John R. 1978. *Political Leadership in Sierra Leone*. Toronto, Buffalo: University of Toronto Press.
- Economist Intelligence Unit. 1997. *Country Profile: Guinea, Liberia, Sierra Leone 1997-98*. London: Economist Intelligence Unit.
- Fleshman, Michael. 2001. "Conflict Diamonds" Evade UN Sanctions: Improvements in Sierra Leone, but Continuing Violations in Angola and Liberia." *Africa Recovery* 15: 4: 15-17. New York: United Nations Department of Public Information.
- Fortune, Frances, and Ambrose James. 2001a. "Community Development Fund: Report on Stakeholder's Meetings," 7-17 October 2001. Freetown: Search for Common Ground.
- 2001b. Community Development Fund: Report on Second Phase of Activities, 8-23 December 2001. Freetown: Search for Common Ground.
- Government of Sierra Leone. 1995. Peace Education Curriculum: Teacher's Module for the Primary Schools (UP). Freetown: National Curriculum Development Centre, Department of Education, in collaboration with UNICEF.
- Hansen, Art, et al. 2001. Planning Educational Response Strategies for the Reintegration of Demobilized Child Soldiers in the Democratic Republic of Congo." Final Report. Washington DC: Creative Associates International, Inc.
- Henry, Doug. 2001. Refugee Medicine or "Medicalized" Refugees? The Sick Role and the Power of Voice. Paper presented at the annual meetings of the American Anthropological Association, Washington DC, 29 November.

---- 2002 (in press). "Diamonds Are Not a Boy's Best Friend: What Happened When Alhadji Met the Rebels." In *The Human Tradition in Modern Africa*, D. Cordell, ed. Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Press.

Hirsch, John L. 2001. *Sierra Leone: Diamonds and the Struggle for Democracy*. International Peace Academy Occasional Paper Series. Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers. (The author was the US Ambassador to Sierra Leone from 1995 to 1998.)

Inter-Agency Humanitarian and Transition Task Force on Sierra Leone. 1998a. "Sierra Leone: Assistance Strategy for the Transition to Peace 1998-99" (Updated Feb 19, 1998). Washington DC: State/Af/W and USAID/BHR.

---- 1998b. Sierra Leone: Assistance Strategy for the Transition to Peace 1998-99 (Updated June 12, 1998). Washington DC: State/Af/W and USAID/BHR.

Management Systems International (MSI). 2000. "Performance Monitoring Report, Contract No. AOT-C-00-00-00091-00, Education for Peace Program. Washington DC: MSI. Quarterly Reporting Period: January 24, 2000 to June 30, 2000.

---- 2000. YRTEP Program Curriculum (five modules). Module 1 – Who am I? Module 2 – Healing Mind, Body and Spirit. Module 3 – Our Environment, What it is, Preserving it, Conserving it and Using it Effectively. Module 4 – Health and Well Being. Module 5 – Democracy, Good Governance and Conflict Management. Washington DC: MSI.

---- 2000. Nation Building Program Curriculum (four modules). Module 1 – Healing Mind, Body and Spirit. Module 2 – Reaffirming Our Values. Module 3 – Leadership, Conflict Management and Negotiation. Module 4 – Rebuilding Good Government. Washington DC: MSI.

---- 2000-2001. Performance Monitoring Reports, Contract No. AOT-C-00-00-00091-00, Sierra Leone Youth Reintegration Training and Education for Peace Program. Washington DC: MSI. Quarterly Reporting Periods: July 1, 2000 to September 30, 2001 (4 quarterly reports).

---- August 2001. Final Report. Impact Evaluation: Youth Reintegration Training and Education for Peace (YRTEP) Program: Sierra Leone 2000-2001. Washington DC: MSI.

---- August 2001. YRTEP Success Stories. Freetown, Sierra Leone: Youth Reintegration Training and Education for Peace (YRTEP) Program.

Management Systems International (MSI) and World Vision – Sierra Leone. August 2001. "What Next? A Resource Guide to Training and Other Opportunities Available to Ex-Combatants, War-Affected Youth and Their Communities. Freetown, Sierra Leone: Youth Reintegration Training and Education for Peace (YRTEP) Program.

Miller, Vachel and Friedrich Affolter. 2001. "Understanding and Healing the Ecology of Learning: A Resource Guide for Educational Initiatives in Post-Conflict Settings. Center for International Education, University of Massachusetts: Amherst.

Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA). 2002. Situation Report #2, FY 2002. Mano River Countries (Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone) – Complex Emergency (01/14/2002). Washington DC: Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs (DCHA), United States Agency for International Development (USAID).

---- 1998. Situation Report #2, FY 1998. Sierra Leone – Complex Emergency (07/13/1998). Washington DC: Bureau for Humanitarian Response (BHR), United States Agency for International Development (USAID).

Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI). 1996a. First Periodic Report: OTI Assessment of Sierra Leone: May-June 1996. Washington DC: Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs, United States Agency for International Development (USAID).

---- 1996b. Second Periodic Report: OTI Assessment of Sierra Leone: May-June 1996. Washington DC: Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs, United States Agency for International Development (USAID).

---- 1996c. Concept Paper: OTI Support for Sierra Leone's Transition to Peace. Washington DC: Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs, United States Agency for International Development (USAID).

---- 1998. Summary USAID Emergency and Transition Assistance (Updated June 9, 1998). Washington DC: Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs, United States Agency for International Development (USAID).

---- 1999. Scope of Work for Private Consultant July 29, 1999. Nonformal Education Campaign: Strategy Design and Implementation Plan Development. Washington DC: Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs, United States Agency for International Development (USAID).

---- 2000a. Program Description (01/03/2000). "Sierra Leone: Youth Reintegration Training and Education for Peace." Washington DC: Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs, United States Agency for International Development (USAID).

---- 2000b. Workshop Summary. Strategic Planning Workshop for Sierra Leone's New Diamond Policy and Operations. Washington DC: Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs, United States Agency for International Development (USAID).

---- 2000c. Program Description (10/16/2000) "Sierra Leone: Education for Nation-Building." Washington DC: Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs, United States Agency for International Development (USAID).

---- 2000d. Concept Paper (12/26/2000) "FY01 Support for Reintegration of Ex-Combatants: Sierra Leone." Washington DC: Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs, United States Agency for International Development (USAID).

- 2000e. 1999-2000 Report. Washington DC: Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs, United States Agency for International Development (USAID).
- 2001a. Sierra Leone: "Conflict" Diamonds. Progress Report on Diamond Policy and Development Program (03/30/2001). Washington DC: Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs, United States Agency for International Development (USAID).
- 2001b. Discussion Draft (04/13/2001). Sierra Leone Diamond Policy and Operations: Priorities for USAID Technical Assistance. Washington DC: Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs, United States Agency for International Development (USAID).
- 2001c. Field Reports: Sierra Leone. Washington DC: Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs, United States Agency for International Development (USAID). June-December (7 monthly reports).
- 2001d. Results Review FY 2000 (06/22/2001). Washington DC: Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs, United States Agency for International Development (USAID).
- 2001e. Guide to Program Options in Conflict-Prone Settings (09/2001). Washington DC: Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs, United States Agency for International Development (USAID).
- 2002. Workshop Report: Management of the Diamond Area Community Development Fund, 17 January 2002. Washington DC: Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs, United States Agency for International Development (USAID).
- Opala, Joseph. 1998. Sierra Leone: The Politics of State Collapse. Paper presented at the SAIC Conference on Irregular Warfare in Liberia and Sierra Leone, 30 July – 1 August 1998, Denver.
- Phnuhal, Bimal, David Archer, and Sara Cottingham. 1998. Reflections on REFLECT. In PLA Notes, no. 32, International Institute for Environment and Development, 27-30.
- Reno, William. 1998. *Warlord Politics and African States*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- 1995. *Corruption and State Politics in Sierra Leone*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Richards, Paul. 1996. *Fighting for the Rain Forest: War, Youth & Resources in Sierra Leone*. Oxford: James Curry.
- Riddell, Abby. 2000. A Review of 13 Evaluations of REFLECT. Paper prepared for ActionAid.
- Smillie, Ian. 2002. Fire in the Ice: Benefits, Protection and Regulation in the Canadian Diamond Industry. Diamonds and Human Security Project Occasional Paper. Ottawa: Partnership Africa Canada.

Sommers, Marc. 2000. "The Dynamics of Coordination." Occasional Paper No. 40. Providence RI: Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies.

---- 2001. "Peace Education and Refugee Youth." In *Learning for a Future: Refugee Education in Developing Countries*, Jeff Crisp, Christopher Talbot, and Daiana B. Cipollone, eds. Geneva: UNHCR.

UNDP. 2001. *Human Development Report 2001: Making New Technologies Work for Human Development*. New York: UNDP, and Oxford: Oxford University Press.