

USAID

**Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance
Office of Transition Initiatives**

Final Evaluation of OTI's Program in Peru

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Section I. Introduction and Background

On November 30, 2000, President Fujimori voluntarily resigned from office and left Peru. His departure was preceded by a series of increasingly autocratic moves to centralize political power in the presidency, co-opt the national judiciary, and continue himself in power for a third term as president by means of an electoral process that in 2000, was judged to be not free nor fair. His resignation was triggered by a massive scandal in which his national security advisor was revealed to have engaged in a pattern of political and criminal bribery on behalf of the Presidency. Popular revulsion to these revelations brought down the government.

In the aftermath of the departure, the President of Congress, Valentin Paniagua, was sworn in as interim President. New elections for Congress and the Presidency were scheduled for April 2001, with the new government to take office in late July.

On January 8, 2001, the U.S. Ambassador to Peru determined that the political crisis in Peru warranted a short-term response from the USAID Office of Transition Initiatives. Other sources of discretionary funding from USAID were committed to support the all important elections process for a new government in Peru. While the USAID Mission in Peru had longer term plans to strengthen Peruvian democracy by financing projects in judicial reform, decentralization and modernization of congress, those projects were not projected to come on stream until 2003.

OTI designed a transition strategy in response to the political crisis. The strategy built on the long standing USAID Mission support for democratic participation and governance in Peru and the Mission's 40-year history of development assistance. That presence not only aided a rapid assessment of the main areas for OTI support, but also helped in the identification of key players and institutions. The OTI strategy was intended to support peaceful democratic transition in Peru and to visibly associate the U.S. Government with the effort. OTI identified five areas for programming in support of the Peruvian democratic transition.

- Support for the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which was established to review and report on the violence and atrocities committed by Peru's guerilla insurgency and the military in reaction to it.
- Support to the new Congress and its members, most of whom were new to government.
- Support for the Peruvian government's decision to decentralize governmental authority to its political regions.
- Support to improve the dialogue between the Peruvian government, civil society and the military.
- Support for anti-corruption efforts.

As part of the strategy, it was understood that USAID resources would be available to support decentralization and the Congress after OTI transition assistance ended. The Truth Commission had a limited mandate, with its final report due in June of 2003. In those areas, the outline of OTI's transition role (or terminal role in the case of the TRC) was visible when

the program began. The civil/military dialogue and anti-corruption efforts responded to critical issues in Peru's democratic transition, but the longer term context and implications of OTI's efforts were less foreseeable.

The OTI program began in February 2001 and was closed out in January 2003. During the period, OTI budgeted \$11 million for its program in Peru. It financed 245 grants to local civil society organizations, the private sector and the Peruvian Government, totaling \$6,575,963. Some 92 separate organizations received OTI grants. The program was coordinated by two OTI contracted professionals sitting in the USAID mission and a contractor implementation team from Creative Associates – housed separately.

Section II. The Changing Political Context of Peru

The political process leading to the Paniagua transition government in November 2000, began as early as 1996, when the Fujimori administration, allied with a Congressional majority, undertook a series of actions that jeopardized rule of law and weakened Peru's democratic institutions. Their goal was to guarantee Fujimori's second reelection in 2000. Unconstitutional laws were passed to permit this reelection; three judges of the Constitutional Tribunal were removed when they ruled against them; free press was curtailed through direct or indirect government pressure; smear campaigns on opposition members were carried out using tabloids financed by the National Intelligence System; a majority of the judges in the judicial system were made provisional and dependent on the executive branch; the traditional "culture of secrecy" prevalent in Peruvian public administration was furthered through Congress' abdication of its oversight responsibilities and lack of access to public information; local government lost many of its authorities which were centralized in the national government; state officials openly used public funds to support government party candidates and secure local popular support.

These and other actions combined to create a bleak panorama for free and competitive elections in April 2000. National and international pressure resulted in several electoral supervision processes, most of them allied with the Organization of American States (OAS) mission. Despite these efforts, the polling process was plagued with irregularities, most of which were publicly denounced before, during, and in the aftermath of the elections. Prior to the run-off elections, the OAS, the Office of the Ombudsman, and civil society oversight groups presented a list of conditions that had to be met in order to guarantee democratic polls. Most were not met and the OAS decided not to supervise the run-off. The opposition candidate – Alejandro Toledo—called for a boycott of the elections. They were held, however, and Fujimori was declared the winner.

The fraudulent electoral process aroused citizen indignation and protest. Pro-democracy demonstrations were held in many cities, including the massive march of the "Cuatro Suyos" ("Four Cardinal Points"), when close to a quarter million Peruvians marched into Lima from all regions to protest Fujimori's third term inauguration in July 2000.

During the OAS foreign minister assembly held in Windsor, Canada, the delicate political situation of Peru was discussed and it was agreed to send a high level commission to assess

its implications for Peruvian democracy. As a result of the visit, the OAS promoted the creation of a Dialogue Table (Mesa de Diálogo) comprised of the government and opposition parties, with the participation of civil society, the Catholic Church, business leaders, and the Ombudsman. The Dialogue Table agreed to discuss 29 issues including prioritizing free-press, the reform of the intelligence system, human rights, civil-military relationships, and judicial reform. This marked a “first transition scenario” with Fujimori still in government.

However, the public screening of the first “Vladi-video” in October was to rapidly change this scenario. Although corruption has permeated Peruvian political institutions since Colonial times, the videos clearly supported the growing suspicion that Montesinos and Fujimori had co-opted a good portion of political and state authorities through bribes. It was also clear that Montesinos had taped most of these transactions, probably for future extortion purposes. The whole corrupt power system was put in jeopardy and rapidly collapsed. Fujimori decided, presumably after searching for and seizing incriminating videos, to leave the country and resign from office.

This set the stage for a “second transition scenario” during the Paniagua government (November 2000 – July 2001). The government was bolstered by massive popular support but it had to face a two-fold challenge in order to establish the necessary conditions for the April 2001 elections and for paving the way for the new government: the dismantling of the Fujimori legacy and the re-institutionalization of democracy. The immediate response included the dismissal, investigation, and prosecution of many highly placed political authorities and officials, including high grade military officers. Legitimate institutions in sensitive areas also had to be reconstituted including the electoral office, the Constitutional Tribunal, the police and armed forces, the Ministry of the Presidency, and the judicial system. In some of these areas, civil society participation was crucial in order to guarantee transparency through citizen oversight and to promote longer-term sustainability of the initiatives. Significant events during this time period included:

- A new Congress was elected in April 2001 and close to 65% were first-time members, most with little political experience and/or support from a weakened political party system.
- A Truth and Reconciliation Commission was formed in June 2001 with the sensitive task of studying the genesis of political violence during 1980 to 2000, documenting acts of terrorist and human rights violations, establishing responsibilities, recording the sequence of violence, and developing proposals concerning reparations, national reconciliation, and violence prevention.
- Civilian-military relations were undergoing important changes, especially due to the incarceration of many high-ranking officers due to corruption charges and the appointment of a civilian as Defense Minister.
- The issue of corruption had acquired unusual importance due to its high-visibility during the Fujimori regime. A growing concern of civil society around the issue was evidenced in the formation of anti-corruption groups.
- After a decade of “hyper-centralization” during the Fujimori administration, regional movements had started to sprout all over the country and citizen demand for greater

say in their districts, provinces and departments was a central issue during the 2001 elections.

These challenges coincided with difficult fiscal conditions inherited from the Fujimori administration. Thus, international support for the transition process was essential.

Section III. The Objectives, Issues and Methodology of the Evaluation

The evaluation objectives were to: (a) determine the extent to which OTI/Peru met its program objectives and (b) assess OTI program management effectiveness in pursuing these objectives (see Annex B: Evaluation SOW). In order to adequately respond to these objectives, two principal lines of action were established. The first was the examination of the five program areas in terms of the appropriateness of their goals and strategies as means to effect change in Peru; their capacity to adapt to an evolving political context; the level of success in meeting each of the program goals; the level of institutionalization of the actions implemented and their sustainability, especially in terms of the continuance of the initiatives by grantees, USAID and other donors. The second was the analysis of management and implementation, focusing on program start-up issues (OTI/USAID Mission/Embassy relationships; identification of partners; grant evaluation and implementation); contractor effectiveness; grant and project management; monitoring and evaluation. An essential component of the evaluation was to arrive at recommendations and lessons learned for both the continuing USAID Mission activities and for future OTI programs.

The main characteristics of OTI development assistance (short term support, limited grant size, high impact activities) presented unique challenges for the evaluation team:

- OTI interventions were mostly based on training, dissemination, information campaigns, consensus building, and research and analysis, activities whose impacts were difficult to measure because: (a) it was difficult to segregate OTI effect from other donors and environmental catalysts; (b) attitudinal changes could only be appropriately verified in terms of mid- to long-term institutionalization; (c) adequate monitoring and evaluation mechanisms were not designed.
- Limitations concerning grant amount led to the support of a large number of projects (245) involving many private and public counterparts (approximately 100) in a considerable number of localities.
- Impact assessment of the five program areas had to be inferred from the aggregate results of the sub-grants. In this process, the relative merit of each project's contribution to program impact was not examined, except in particular anecdotal terms.

In order to respond to evaluation objectives and these challenges, the methodology designed combined quantitative and qualitative analysis. The principal quantitative information sources were the project and procurement data-base, baseline and exit surveys, final program reports on activities, attendance, number of materials and publications, and media monitoring reports. Qualitative sources were mainly in-depth interviews and group dynamics with selected informants (approximately 200), baseline and exit focus groups, and a detailed review

of selected grant documents, dissemination material, and publications. The evaluation work plan entailed the following actions:

- a. Initial coordination meetings and interviews with relevant OTI/Latin America and OTI/Peru staff and other key USAID and State Department Washington personnel.
- b. Documentation review, including the detailed examination of a sample of 30 grant documents covering the five program areas.
- c. Interviews with OTI/Peru, Creative Associates staff, USAID, and US Embassy personnel in order to discern programmatic, implementation, and management issues, especially in terms of start-up process; management of the grant cycle; use of management tools, coordination mechanisms, etc.
- d. Interviews with local grantees and other implementing partners. The interview contact list was coordinated with local OTI, CAII and USAID staff, although other interviewees were added following suggestions of key informants (see Annex A: People and Organizations Contacted). Most of the interviewees were major grantees. In order to conduct detailed assessments, the team divided the five themes among members permitting a greater number of contacts. However, for key organizations that carried out projects in more than one theme, two team members usually participated in the interviews.
- e. Interviews with grantees in the cities of Arequipa, Ayacucho and Piura. Since more than 70 percent of OTI activities were implemented outside of Lima, it was important to examine the national impact of the program and it also permitted contact with smaller grantees.
- f. Interviews with key observers and informants of Peruvian society. This included politicians, social scientists, representatives of international funding agencies, and the former Defensor del Pueblo (Ombudsman).
- g. Presentation of preliminary findings and recommendations to USAID Peru staff, which generated important feedback for the final report.

As a result of these efforts, close to 35 percent of all grantees were interviewed and the sample accounted for \$4.5 million or 70 percent of OTI funds. Although the sample was not strictly representative, it assured a solid base for assessment because of its weight in the fundings and their intervention in the most salient aspects of the OTI program.

Section IV. Program Objectives and Assessment

USAID/OTI began its Peru program in February 2001. The program ended in January 2003. The overall objective was to support the democratic opening created by the fall of President Alberto Fujimori's government in November 2000. OTI sought to support the transition government of Valentin Paniagua and later the newly elected government of Alejandro Toledo. Through a consultative process involving OTI/Peru, the USAID mission, the U.S. Embassy, Peruvian governmental representatives, and civil society representatives, five areas were identified as key to a successful democratic transition in Peru and in need of OTI short-term support. These areas were:

1. Increased Civilian Oversight of the Military and Improved Civilian Military Relations.
2. Support and Technical Assistance for the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC).
3. Strengthened Local Government and Decentralization Efforts.
4. Support and Strengthen the New Peruvian Congress.
5. Increased Civil Society Interest and Involvement in Combating Corruption.

Below follows an assessment of the goals, strategic objectives, expenditures, activities undertaken, and the findings for each of these five themes.

1. Increased Civilian Oversight of the Military and Improved Civilian Military Relations

OTI's goal was to increase civil society oversight and knowledge of the armed forces and to involve civil society in the decisions related to security and defense. The strategic objectives were to:

- 1) improve Congress' understanding of key national security and defense issues required to enact defense policy and to increase the willingness and capacity of civilians to make decisions related to security and defense in an informed and participatory fashion;
- 2) improve the quality and quantity of media coverage of defense and security matters;
- 3) increase the level of civil society's interest in and understanding of national security issues, and to create an awareness of the importance of civilian control of the armed forces.

A total of \$850,000 was spent on 50 specific civil military projects by 15 civil society organizations (including one private individual), three public institutions, and one for-profit private company. The activities took place throughout the country. Given the scarcity of civil society organizations specializing in the civil military matters, OTI approached groups working on human rights and democracy issues and encouraged them to work on civil military issues. In other cases, people interested in the issue were approached and asked to form an organization and develop activities.

The diverse activities undertaken to achieve the strategic objective one (see above) included training and technical assistance to congressional members and staff, particularly of the Defense Committee, and sponsoring public debates in which members of Congress and civil society groups discussed defense and security proposals. The activities undertaken to achieve strategic objective two (see above) included conducting media training and information campaigns, and conducting workshops and meetings between civilians and military, which focused on access to information and the role of the media in civil-military relations. Strategic objective three (see above) activities included sponsoring dialogues between civilians and military throughout the country, conducting training on defense and security related topics for civilians, and conducting information campaigns on civilian military relations.

| The Civil-Military Program in Numbers | | |
|--|-----------|-------------------------------------|
| Number of grants | 50 | |
| Total funding | \$880,098 | 100% |
| ▪ Civil society organizations (15) | \$613,596 | 69.5% |
| ▪ State institutions (3) | \$249,975 | 28.5% |
| ▪ Private firm (1) | \$16,527 | 2% |
| Major Results | | |
| ▪ # of laws with citizen participation | | 3 |
| ▪ # of civilians trained in security matters and participating in civil-military dialogues | | 7,000 |
| ▪ # of active military trained in security matters and participating in civil-military dialogue | | 991 |
| ▪ OTI funded research | | approx. 10 studies |
| ▪ OTI funded dissemination materials (information campaigns, posters, t-shirts, radio programs, magazines and books) | | Estimated 3 million. people reached |

OTI was very successful in achieving its strategic objectives with regard to civil military matters. Insights gleaned from individual interviews indicate that OTI’s support had a major impact upon civilian military matters. All those interviewed agreed that OTI’s support was instrumental in creating new civilian “interlocutors” on security and defense issues. OTI’s program had a substantive impact on the congressional debate on key defense-related laws, and in easing tensions between civilians and military, especially in the former emergency zones. The diverse events allowed for more than 7,000 civilians, 991 active-duty and 294 retired military to be trained in national security and defense issues. Finally, the project published several books and studies, and conducted information campaigns on defense and security issues.

“We held meetings and training workshops between civilians and military, which the editor of the newspaper El Comercio attended. Later we noticed an improvement in the quality and quantity of coverage by El Comercio, which has proposed we work together on a monthly supplement on civil military affairs. I am sure the editor’s interest resulted from his participation in our dialogues.” Enrique Obando, President, Instituto de Estudios Politicos v Estrategicos

OTI developed its initial goals and strategic objectives based on a March 2001 assessment. After a planning and evaluation meeting in November 2001, OTI fine-tuned its goals and

strategic objectives. As a result, OTI’s programs in the civil military area were very much in tune with the local political context and OTI’s staff and grantees responded effectively to the local demands and needs. For example, one OTI grantee, the Instituto de Estudios Políticos y Estratégicos, organized and contributed to public debates in preparation of a national security strategy (“The National Defense White Book”). Other grantees had input into defense-related legislation, e.g. Ministry of Defense Law, the Transparency and Access to Public Information Law. All these examples reflect the first time civil society organizations participated in decisions related to defense and security issues.

Regarding civilian military matters, it appears that little has been done by OTI to institutionalize work in this area. All of the area’s grantees, U.S. Embassy and outside observers interviewed agreed on the need to continue efforts to promote civilian expertise in security and defense matters and to gain full civilian authority over the armed forces. One expert, former Defensor del Pueblo, Jorge Sanstiestevan, considered the progress made in gaining civilian authority over the armed forces to be very fragile and too dependent upon the personality and leadership of the Defense Minister. He also said that civil military issues were the most crucial area of OTI’s work.

At this time, no bilateral donor or international donor support will be available for continued work in the civil military area. Only two of the Peruvian groups that OTI worked with have received limited foreign foundation funding (from the Open Society Institute and the Ford Foundation) to continue their work.

2. Support the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC)

OTI’s program goal was to support the Commission’s capacity to achieve its objective of establishing the truth and promoting reconciliation in Peru after 20 years of violence. Two strategic objectives were designed and 60 grants were implemented with \$1.8 million in funding.

The first objective was to support TRC capacity to implement its work plan and activities efficiently. The Commission was the largest single recipient of OTI/Peru funds, with 35 approved grants and little over \$1 million in funding. A majority of the grants (22) provided technical support through the purchase of IT equipment, data-base design and training, expert and consultant assistance for the elaboration of recommendations, work-plans, research; field-work equipment, interviewer training, and psychological support. The rest of the grants focused on communication and dissemination issues, strategy design; preparation and publication of materials, and the production and broadcasting of radio and TV programs. OTI funds were essential in providing the decentralized offices with resources for the appropriate handling of testimonies including training, recording and field equipment, forms, transcription and editorial support, and for regional TRC dissemination campaigns.

| The Truth and Reconciliation Program in Numbers | | |
|---|-------------|------|
| Number of grants | 60 | |
| Total funding | \$1,801,767 | 100% |
| ▪ Truth and Reconciliation Commission | 1,031,646 | 57% |
| ▪ Office of the Ombudsman - Peru | 67,543 | 4% |

| | | |
|---|---------------------------------|-----|
| ▪ Civil society organizations | 626,860 | 35% |
| ▪ Private firms | 75,717 | 4% |
| Major Results | | |
| ▪ Reach of OTI funded TRC activities | 19 regions/cities | |
| ▪ Training prior to TRC operations | 1,326 persons in 17 urban areas | |
| ▪ Internal TRC OTI funded training | 82 workshops | |
| ▪ TRC-civil society training workshops | 2,894 persons | |
| ▪ OTI funded research | 41 studies | |
| ▪ OTI funded dissemination material (posters, calendars, brochures, comics) | 350,000 (approx.) | |

The second objective focused on increased citizen awareness and knowledge of the TRC, on promoting appropriate citizen participation in its activities, and increased public confidence in the achievement of its intended result. A little over \$770,000 was destined to this objective in 25 grants, NGOs received 81percent, the Office of the Ombudsman 9 percent, and a film project 10percent. Although 14 NGOs received OTI support, five of them shared 83 percent of the funds, mostly for national dissemination campaigns and research. Before the TRC initiated its operations, 14 grants were implemented for increasing citizen awareness of the existence of the commission and its mandate. These projects were both of a national and regional reach, using radio and television broadcasts in four languages (Spanish, Quechua, Aymara, and Ashaninka), itinerant public fairs, and cultural activities (concerts, theatre). Once operations began, OTI agreed that all grants with civil society organizations would be coordinated with the Commission.

“I believe that the main issue behind TRC effectiveness is increasing citizen awareness of its existence and maintaining its high level of citizen trust. This will assure the legitimacy of the final report. The issue of citizen confidence in its capacity to change the country is secondary because it is not part of TRC mission... Rather, it is the responsibility of human rights groups and civil society to pressure and oversee government compliance with the recommendations.” Member of a Human Rights NGO

OTI met the stated program objectives and its support was critical in strengthening TRC capacity to carry out its mission. Two months before initiating operations (August 2001), the TRC president presented a bleak outlook to international donors. The estimated budget for the September-December period was \$1.2 million but available funds were only \$282,000 from the public treasury and \$50,000 from the UNDP. The quick reaction of the U.S. Embassy and OTI permitted an almost immediate backing of TRC in the start-up of operations. This meant changing the original OTI objectives of supporting civil society participation in dissemination of TRC activities, which only provided marginal direct support for the Commission itself. In November 2001, the strategic objectives were changed to the ones stated above and the OTI program became a direct and close TRC supporter.

It is interesting to note that OTI funding had both quantitative and qualitative impact on TRC activities. On the one hand, it permitted the TRC to create the necessary infrastructure and acquire equipment to receive and process close to 15,000 human rights violation testimonies. On the other, it contributed to the quality of testimony by training interviewers, supplying

them with psychological and emotional support, and supervising the editorial quality of the transcriptions of taped testimonies.

In terms of the effectiveness of the program as a means to effect change, all interviewed informants agreed that OTI support was essential to TRC activities because it was a flexible and rapid source of funds that permitted the uninterrupted collection of human rights abuse testimonies and their processing. Most observers considered, however, that the TRC failed to develop a consistent and coherent public and communication strategy. Exit surveys and focus groups financed by OTI tend to show that despite greater citizen knowledge and recognition of TRC and its mission, confidence in its capacity to find out the truth had actually dropped. The TRC was seen by many citizens as an attempt to bring back the past, which they prefer to ignore. Few efforts were made to link these past events with conditions that still exist in the present, a strategy that would have appealed to young citizens who only have vague memories of the period of political violence. Despite these observations, made by various interviewees before the TRC report was completed, the team believes that OTI's objectives were largely achieved. Citizen awareness and knowledge of the TRC increased, participation in the work of the Commission was broadened and confidence that the TRC was listening to and recording real human stories increased. There is an abiding cynicism in Peruvian society, however, that doubts whether the final TRC report will make a difference.

The institutionalization and sustainability of OTI efforts in this theme are not a major issue because the TRC mandate ends in July 2003 with its final report and recommendations. Due to the deep-rooted causes of Peru's political violence, it is expected that TRC recommendations will have a bearing on most of the country's political and democratic institutions: military and police; the judicial system; attorney general; penitentiary system; public finances (victim reparation); the educational system (reconciliation); among others. The Supreme Decree that created TRC only states that the final report will be presented to the President and the head of the legislative and judicial branches, and that all documents will pass to the Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman. It is expected that the latter institution, under its mandate, will act on some of the recommendations. Likewise, TRC recommendations will be an essential part of the human rights community's agenda for the coming years. Both the Ombudsman and human rights groups receive significant funding from international cooperation, an important fact considering the lukewarm support the TRC has received from Peruvian state institutions.

3. Decentralization and Local Government

The program goal was to support citizen participation in the decentralization policy-making process and local governance, as an element of functioning democracy in Peru. Two strategic objectives were designed to this effect.

The first one sought to have civil society and local governments be informed, participate, and define the legal framework of the decentralization process. Most of the grants under this objective were awarded to representatives of the executive and legislative branches, either directly, by funding public audiences of the Congressional Decentralization Commission or indirectly, by contracting the consultants, research, and massive public campaign requested

by the decentralization team of the Prime Minister’s Office (Presidencia del Consejo de Ministros). Spending on this objective accounted for close to 70 percent of funds allocated to this programmatic area.

| The Decentralization Program in Numbers | | |
|--|-----------|------------|
| Number of grants | 39 | |
| Total funding | 1,634,565 | 100% |
| ▪ Civil society organizations | 789,093 | 48% |
| ▪ State institutions | 275,380 | 17% |
| ▪ Private firms | 570,092 | 35% |
| Major Results | | |
| ▪ Best practices disseminated | | 12 |
| ▪ # of laws with citizen participation | | 6 |
| ▪ # of citizens participating in legal definition | | 17,631 |
| ▪ # Trained municipal personnel | | 4,617 |
| ▪ # Trained leaders and officials | | 19,642 |
| ▪ Estimated adult audience national campaign on decentralization | | 16,000,000 |

The second objective focused on local government and supporting increased citizen awareness of and participation in local governance and decision-making. The strategy of this objective was based on: (a) the long experience of civil society organizations, especially NGOs, in promoting local governance capability; and (b) the growing interest of local authorities (mayors, council persons) in fomenting participatory planning and budget mechanisms. A total of 21 grants were approved and most of them were under \$35,000 (78 percent). The emphasis was placed on training and dissemination in workshops, public forums, and other courses, of best practices of participatory democracy in local government, strategic planning, participatory local budgets, and local development commissions.

“Decentralization is an irreversible trend in Peruvian political reality, despite the multiple problems, contradictions, and confusion surrounding the process. It is impossible to adequately address democratic issues in Peru without questioning the highly centralized character of the state and bureaucracy”. Jorge Santistevan, ex Defensor del Pueblo(Ombudsman)

In general terms, the OTI decentralization program had the ability to meet its stated objectives. Its support was essential in broadening citizen input in important national legislation concerning decentralization and local governments. Interviewed informants in Congress clearly stated that there were no budget provisions for the decentralized public hearings such as those conducted under OTI grants. This success, however, was strongly dependent on the individuals who headed the Congressional Commissions. The Decentralization Commission was open to citizen input and actually introduced their initiatives in the proposed bills, while the Local Government Commission, despite public hearings, steadfastly stuck with the original proposal. In terms of supporting local democratic governance, OTI helped in disseminating and training on mechanisms for citizen participation in numerous district municipalities (641 or about 30 percent of total districts). In the process, it also contributed to the formation of citizen oversight networks in some of the poorer areas of the country. It is difficult to assess the mid-term impact of these actions since the only immediate appreciation is based

on the # of training sessions, # of persons trained, and # of networks formed and not on the level of comprehension, # of direct and concrete actions undertaken, and changes in attitudes.

OTI also adapted its strategy to changing sociopolitical conditions. Decentralization is a long awaited citizen demand and OTI funded polls showed that more than 65 percent of Peruvians defined themselves as “descentralistas”. However, the political context of decentralization changed radically in the first months of the Toledo government when regional governments were introduced and elections for regional authorities were scheduled for November 2002. This was a very tight time frame for the definition of a new legal framework. OTI’s original strategy was to promote civil society based proposals, which would later be presented to the legislature. This proved to be ineffective because it did not immediately involve the two sectors that had the capacity to turn proposals into policies: the executive and legislative branches. An important and appropriate strategy change was made to coordinate citizen participation with these sectors via joint assemblies, hearings, and workshops.

“Traditionally, Peruvian state initiatives on decentralization have been supply-driven with a strong inclination towards technical matters. OTI funded research permitted us (executive branch) to discover citizen demand on decentralization and to worry about the misconceptions and over-expectations that could eventually jeopardize even the best of technical proposals”. Member of Public Management Group in the Prime Minister’s Office

The OTI Decentralization program effect on democratic transition was two-fold. First, it demonstrated how to narrow the gap between different levels of the Peruvian state and the citizenry. As a result, key state officials have a better understanding of citizen demands concerning decentralization and how to appropriately respond to them in a democratic fashion. Second, it has contributed to the initial development of a responsible attitude towards decentralization. Baseline polls and focus group analysis funded by OTI showed unrealistic citizen expectations on decentralization, considering it as a sort of quick panacea for most of their region’s problems. As a result, a massive public campaign was designed, with OTI funds, to lower these expectations and generate responsible, gradual, and participative attitudes towards the process.

In terms of OTI institutionalization efforts in this program, work with local governments has a long tradition among NGOs and other civil society groups, and is part of the international cooperation agenda. OTI produced materials and has identified best practices that will surely enrich their outlooks and practices. The office in charge of decentralization in the executive branch (National Council on Decentralization) has incorporated the need to constantly “take the pulse” of citizens and not be solely limited to cabinet work around technical proposals. Finally, the USAID strategic plan will be supporting the decentralization process and the Peruvian Congress over the next five years. Most of these initiatives, however, are still strongly dependent on the political will of a limited number of individuals and initial positive changes are reversible. Civil society presence, partially supported by international funding, will still be the best bet for institutionalization and sustainability.

4. Support and Strengthen the New Peruvian Congress

OTI's goal in working with Congress was to improve its institutional, political and administrative operations, and to improve the citizen-legislator relationship. In November 2001, the strategic objectives were redefined and limited to: 1) strengthening the Congress' technical capacity (focusing on ethics and internal reforms) and the implementation by Congress of more participatory decision-making processes; and 2) increasing the level of citizen understanding regarding the roles and functions of the Peruvian Congress and increased citizen participation in the legislative process.

Some \$1.3 million was spent by 25 groups, including three congressional committees, on 36 projects. When the project began, there were almost no civil society organizations working on issues related to Congress and the process of selecting counterparts was not easy. OTI approached established civil society organizations and proposed that they include Congress in their agenda. OTI also helped to establish new actors to begin work on Congress. The lack of local counterparts and OTI expertise with legislative development projects probably hampered the success of Congressional program.

The specific activities undertaken to achieve strategic objective one (see above) included the training of staff and members of Congress, preparation of studies or diagnostic materials to provide key information in the congressional reform debate, and the organization of decentralized hearings and policy debates sponsored by the Congress. Activities undertaken towards strategic objectives two (see above) included holding workshops and training events on the role and functions of Congress, conducting information campaigns, and organizing town hall meetings so that citizens and elected representatives might interact.

| Support to Congress in Numbers | | |
|---|--------------------------|------|
| Number of grants | 36 | |
| Total funding | \$1,156,500 | 100% |
| ▪ Civil Society Organizations | \$1,002,051 | 99% |
| ▪ State Institutions | \$154,500 | 1% |
| | | |
| | | |
| Major Results | | |
| ▪ #of legislators and aides trained | 50 legislators/400 aides | |
| ▪ #of congressional commissions that carried out OTI activities in Lima and decentralized offices | 5 | |
| ▪ #people who participated in public audiences of other events sponsored by Congress and funded by OTI | 7000 persons | |
| ▪ #people who were trained on the role and functions of Congress (through workshops, citizens fairs, theatre, board games, information campaigns) | 10,000 persons | |
| ▪ #citizen oversight networks established as the result of OTI training | 5 | |
| ▪ #OTI funded studies | 15 (approx.) | |

Based on individual interviews and OTI documentation, OTI's congressional project was partially successful in achieving its strategic objectives. Obstacles were encountered in the effort to strengthen the technical capacity of the Congress and in implementing more participatory decision-making processes. This appears to be because it was difficult to plan activities with members of Congress given their political demands, members' reluctance to receive training, and in some cases, members' reluctance to interact with civil society. While 50 members of Congress and 400 congressional aides received training and five offices or commissions carried out public hearings outside of Congress, it is difficult to judge the impact of these activities. Some of the various studies and research on Congress were more successful, such as the widely used "Parliamentary Manual" produced by the Andean Commission of Jurists.

On the other hand, the effort to increase the level of citizen understanding regarding the roles and functions of Congress and increased citizen participation in the legislative process appears to be more successful at least in terms of sheer numbers of participation. Seven thousand people participated in activities that were sponsored by Congress and financed by OTI. These included the National Consultation on the General Education Law, the debate on constitutional reform, and training courses on the roles and functions of Congress. Although it is difficult to assess the impact of these activities, it is important to point out that five citizen oversight networks were established and are operating to monitor Congressional activity.

At least 10,000 Peruvians, including elementary, high school and university students, academics, and male and female leaders of grassroots groups were trained on the role and function of Congress, through workshops, videos, board games, and plays.

"Our participants are not like the typical participant in an OTI project. OTI usually works with leaders, but in our case, OTI worked with women at the grassroots level. Our members come from the "club de madres" and the "comedores populares auto-gestionadores." With OTI, we trained 1500 women on the role of Congress and, as a result, four citizen oversight committees were established." Maritza Barquero, Executive Director, Centro de la Mujer Amazonas

OTI developed its initial goals and strategic objectives in a March 2001 assessment. Following the election of a new Congress and a new congressional leadership in November 2001, OTI reassessed its efforts with Congress and focused on the strategic objectives mentioned above.

While OTI was in-tune with the changing political context, Congress itself presented several challenges that were outside of OTI's control. The greatest challenge was the lack of concrete support and participation by the Congress, with a few exceptions, in OTI's efforts to collaborate on a reform process and Congress' failure to take advantage of opportunities to interact with citizens.

“Overall I’m not too sure how effective OTI’s work with Congress was. It’s not easy to work with Congress. But OTI did introduce a new line of work- consultations with citizens on legislation – which was very important. OTI also experimented with different approaches, which will help us with our new program with USAID.” Antonio Gonzalez, Director, International Cooperation, Peruvian Congress

Regarding institutionalization of support to Congress, USAID/Office of Democratic Initiatives has made a multi-year commitment to support legislative development. According to OTI staff, the USAID mission did not consult with OTI before designing its new congressional project, although the USAID did consult with specific OTI grantees and has included some OTI grantees in its new legislative development program.

In addition to the confirmed USAID-financed legislative development program, the Interamerican Development Bank plans a major legislative program and several bilateral donors have occasional activities. The Peruvian Congress has opened a special office to coordinate international development assistance. This office may be useful in channeling and institutionalizing reform efforts.

5. Increase Civil Society Interest and Involvement in Combating Corruption

The anti-corruption theme had two objectives. The first was to increase civil society interest and involvement in the development and implementation of new national initiatives to combat corruption. OTI supported projects to train public officials and civil society organizations, supported debates on anti-corruption issues and supported information campaigns on combating corruption. Indicators of impact identified included: number of articles or programs in selected media; number of persons trained; number of initiatives by government to address corruption issues; and polling data on citizen understanding and attitudes towards corruption. The second objective was to establish citizen oversight groups and networks to effectively monitor and provide oversight of the management and use of public resources in selected areas. Information campaigns, technical assistance and institutional support, and leadership training and training of journalists were financed by OTI to achieve this objective. Indicators of success included: number of participants in training events and information campaigns; number of citizen oversight groups/networks in the areas; and number of people participating in citizen oversight groups.

OTI financed and implemented a total of 36 projects aimed at achieving the objectives. (An additional two projects were financed under this theme to pursue a special target of opportunity providing public defender services to prisoners). OTI approved a total of \$824,696 for the 36 anti-corruption projects. (An additional \$160,593 was approved, in two projects, for the special initiative with public defenders).

OTI financed project outputs have included: 148 workshops trained an average of 29 participants (total 4292); four radio campaigns reached an average of 600,000 people; anti-corruption fairs were attended by an estimated total of 50,000 people; and four information pamphlets were published and distributed to an estimated 10,000 people. Six local area vigilance networks were trained and other non-governmental organizations in six target areas

outside of Lima were trained in how to develop anti-corruption oversight activities. Several studies/analyses were produced on anti-corruption issues.

| The Anti-Corruption Program in Numbers | | |
|--|-----------|------|
| Number of grants | 38 | |
| Total funding | 1,011,863 | 100% |
| ▪ Civil society organizations | 791,797 | 48% |
| ▪ State institutions | 218,105 | 17% |
| ▪ Private firms | 1,960 | 35% |
| Major Results | | |
| ▪ 148 anti-corruption workshops (people trained) | 4292 | |
| ▪ 4 radio campaigns (average audience) | 600,000 | |
| ▪ anti-corruption fair attendance | 50,000 | |
| ▪ information pamphlet recipients | 10,000 | |
| ▪ local vigilance networks trained | 6 | |

The primary measure of anti-corruption impact used by OTI was a comparison of citizen attitudes and reported practices on corruption issues with a national sample survey baseline established in November of 2001 and a follow-up survey conducted in November 2002. No significant changes in citizen attitudes towards corruption issues were detected by the survey.

Objective one assumed strong leadership by Peru executive branch on anti-corruption front, which was not forthcoming. For a country the size of Peru, 26 million people and a land area that is twice the size of France, the expectation that an investment of less than one million dollars over 18 months could leverage measurable national level action on anti-corruption primarily driven by civil society organizations may have been unrealistic. A nation-wide survey, funded by OTI in December 2002, showed that 70 percent of those polled either had a high or medium tolerance for corrupt acts.

National level interest in anti-corruption activities is still largely focused on the pursuit of judicial remedies against the Fujimori/Montesinos administration. The ability of Peru's democratic institutions to deal with the trials, etc., will have an impact on citizen perceptions in the anti-corruption theme. There is some evidence of sustainability of civil society efforts to address corruption issues. The formation of the national consortium of NGOs, PROETICA, promises a continuation of a forum for debate on the issues. OTI supported this organization. PROETICA's Executive Director, Laura Puertas, noted that she expected financial support from other donors. "The Canadians feel that the U.S. is ahead of them in the anti-corruption area and we expect financing from them."

Continuing issues in the theme included: high levels of citizen tolerance of corruption in daily life; and low credibility given to public institutions (justice system) and perceived lack of responsiveness of those institutions to citizen concerns on corruption issues.

Section V. Programmatic Findings and Recommendations

1. OTI's Ability to Meet its Stated Program Objectives

OTI was able to meet its program objectives. In terms of meeting the strategic objectives, the support to the truth and reconciliation commission, strengthening local government and decentralization, and the civil military area were the most successful OTI programs. The area of support to the new Peruvian Congress and the anti-corruption program were not as successful as the previously mentioned OTI programs.

In terms of sustainability and institutionalization, work in the area of decentralization and support to Congress, and to a lesser extent anti-corruption, will continue with multi-year USAID-financed programs. Furthermore, the political commitment from the Peruvian government, people and Congress to continue decentralization bodes well for the institutionalization of decentralization and strengthening of local government. The reform commitment of the Peruvian Congress remains to be seen. Given a lack of funding and interest from USAID and other donors, the work on civil military matters does not appear sustainable. Furthermore, civilian authority over the armed forces and defense and security matters is still very fragile and not yet institutionalized despite the current civil defense minister's efforts. Regarding the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, it will present its final report in June 2003 and disband soon thereafter. There will be expectations to implement its recommendations and, undoubtedly, requests for donor support. USAID's new justice reform program may address either directly or indirectly some of the TRC's recommendations.

Recommendation:

USAID and the U.S. Embassy should look for ways to continue support for work on civil-military relations. The need for civilian expertise on security issues and the need for civil-military dialogue has increased with the passage of new regulatory norms, which give civilians more control over the military, the naming of key civilians in the Ministry of Defense, and the desirability of including civil society in the development of a new strategic plan on security issues (the National Defense White Book). An historic opportunity exists for civilians to develop knowledge and control over security issues and we recommend that this effort be supported. The OTI grantees report that no major bilateral donor or international organizations have plans to support work on civil-military issues. The Open Society Institute and the Ford Foundation are providing limited funding to two OTI grantees to continue activities.

2. OTI's Ability to Modify its Strategic Objectives and Activities to Accommodate Changes in the Local Political Context

For most of OTI's tenure in Peru, the institutional and political framework was in constant flux. In the face of these challenges, OTI assessed the situation, learned from its experiences, refocused its strategic objectives and activities where necessary, and mounted a large and di-

verse program. OTI was successful in working in a rapidly changing political environment and establishing itself as a transparent, credible actor.

“OTI assistance has been helpful because it landed on fertile ground and allowed us to make the most of the political moment” Enrique Obando, President, Instituto de Estudios Politicos y Estrategicos”

OTI benefited from USAID’s long-standing collaboration with a wide variety of Peruvian civil society organizations. As one result, OTI enjoyed easy access to and credibility with local counterparts. OTI also benefited from the especially dynamic, diverse and strong civil society organizations already operating in Peru. The OTI program did serve to introduce new themes and approaches in its work with established civil society organizations. In the case of newer organizations, collaboration with OTI assisted in the institutionalization of some of these groups. Furthermore, networks or coalitions on specific issues developed as a result of OTI’s work.

3. The Appropriateness and Effectiveness of OTI’s Themes and of its Program as a Means to Effect Change

All interviewees confirmed that OTI’s five programmatic areas were highly appropriate and relevant to the effort to support Peru’s democratic transition. These five themes responded to a real demand from civil society that was not being met by other international actors.

While the themes were relevant to the democratic transition, it is not clear whether OTI’s program was an effective means to effect change. OTI sought to bring about attitudinal changes regarding democracy and civil society participation, yet there are unique difficulties in measuring and evaluating the impact of OTI’s projects. First, it is difficult to segregate OTI’s impact from other environmental catalysts. Second, attitudinal changes can only be verified in terms of mid to long-term institutionalization and sustainability. Third, adequate monitoring and evaluation processes were not designed. Finally, attitudinal changes and changes in political culture occur over a long period of time, and its hard to imagine a two-year, \$6.5 million program bringing about lasting change in a large, complex country such as Peru.

Instead, we can confirm that OTI’s program served U.S. foreign policy and developmental goals. Specifically, OTI’s program is credited with helping to establish a constructive relationship between the U.S. government and the newly elected Toledo government by clearly and visibly demonstrating that US objectives in support of democracy coincided with the interests of the new government.

Section VI. Monitoring and Evaluation Findings

OTI gave considerable attention to the monitoring and evaluation needs of its program throughout the period of program design and implementation. Staff efforts were concentrated in three areas:

1. Specific objectives and indicators were included in each of the sub-grants that OTI financed.
2. OTI identified indicators of accomplishment at the theme level.
3. A final evaluation was planned to assess overall program accomplishments.

The evaluation team reviewed a sample of 30 of the individual grants and confirmed that the indicators were relevant and that grantees reported results against those indicators. Creative Associates program development officers monitored progress of each of the grants against those objectives and indicators.

OTI also developed specific objectives and results indicators for each of the program themes in which it was active. Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Decentralization, Support for the Congress, Civil Military Dialogue and Anti-Corruption. The initial sets of indicators were primarily drawn from the sub-grants. Since various grantees used similar techniques to achieve their individual grant objectives, such as training, seminars, workshops, etc. OTI staff aggregated those results in measuring progress at the overall theme levels. Similarly, significant individual grantee accomplishments, significant input into legislation, new or revised government regulation, influential publication etc. were identified as they related to relevant theme objectives. Media coverage of OTI funded civil society activities was also monitored as evidence of program accomplishment. Some initial efforts were made to assess changes in attitudes and knowledge of citizens targeted by OTI financed media programs.

OTI's operational model, however, presents some conceptual and operational difficulty in designing appropriate evaluation instruments at the theme level. Fundamentally, OTI's program responded to requests from civil society organizations and from certain public organizations for each grant. OTI was not in position to design grants specifically to achieve its theme objectives, but rather reviewed grant applications for consistency with its objectives and probable contribution to achieving indicators/targets. OTI staff control over the direct application of resources to the achievement of its objectives was imperfect.

In October 2001, OTI contracted a local polling firm (Imasen) to supplement its measurements of accomplishment in each of the themes. Using staff suggestions and then validating them in focus groups, the local firm designed and carried out a national sample survey designed to assess knowledge and attitudes on key issues in each of the program themes. The initial survey constituted a baseline for a subsequent survey. The focus group information and the initial survey results also were useful to OTI and contractor program staff in concentrating grantee efforts on key issues.

The national sample survey was repeated in November 2002. OTI project development officers analyzed the survey results and summarized the accomplishments against the theme-wide indicators as part of the contractor final reports on each of the programming themes. In general, no statistically significant changes in knowledge or attitudes on issues targeted by OTI programming were recorded in the second national survey in any of the five programming themes.

The evaluation team's assessment of the survey initiative, confirmed by interviews with the firm contracted for the work, is that it was inadequate for the intended purpose of assessing OTI's impact because:

- slightly different sampling methodology from one survey to the next limited the validity of comparisons;
- polling questions did not accurately reflect OTI strategic objectives, limiting the ability to establish a causal connection between OTI programs and changes in interviewee responses. According to the IMASEN director, the only thing the results could have been reliably used for would have been to assess a general change in attitudes among respondents. Even so, the time frame of one year between baseline and the second exit survey is too short to obtain solid results.

Another monitoring device used by OTI staff to track grantee activity was a year-long media tracking service. Since many of the grantees' activities resulted in media coverage in the theme areas and other grantees used media placements as part of their training efforts, OTI staff attempted to establish criteria for a contractor to count media messages by each of the programming themes. This media tracking effort was of some use recording intensity of media coverage among the five themes. However For program monitoring purposes, it was flawed because it could not discriminate between general news coverage (or coverage of other donor activities in a particular theme) and coverage specifically attributable to OTI activities.

Recommendation:

OTI should include a monitoring and evaluation expert in proposed activities from the beginning of the program. The expertise should continue to be made available at appropriate stages during the life of the project. Specifically, the development of each program objective should include identification of indicators that will help measure whether the objective has been achieved. If the program objective has to be changed, the indicators also should be reviewed to ensure that they continue to be appropriate.

Section VII. Management and Implementation Findings

The OTI program in Peru was both complex and active. From a management perspective, it presented several challenges. A summary quantitative analysis is useful to capture those challenges. During the two years of program activity, 245 grant projects were approved. Another 464 projects were reviewed by program development staff and rejected. Only 14 projects that were initially approved by OTI were cancelled or not completed for a variety of reasons. The pace of project approvals accelerated strongly over the two-year period. Some 90 projects were approved during the first year, with 155 approved during the last year of the program. Implementation for many of the initial year's approvals fell into the last year as well. Over 75 separate groups received OTI assistance, with many more participating indirectly. Because of the nature of the projects, each grant approval implied multiple implementation actions, which OTI and its contractor directly managed. The implementation staff dealt with over 2500 separate vendors during the course of the program.

Overall, given the uncertain environment and the nature of the short-term response designed to respond to the democratic evolution in Peru, the program was managed to a successful conclusion. Nevertheless, the team believes that OTI should learn from its management experience in Peru. Because the program has been closed and many data sources were not available to the team in Peru, our ability to precisely identify the learning agenda was somewhat limited. We believe OTI should focus on the following questions: How is the interface between program and implementation staff managed, what kind of management information system is needed to facilitate OTI and contractor adjustments in staffing and internal procedures, and how should OTI try to shorten the learning curve of its grantees in dealing with its implementation model.

1. Start-up Issues

The evaluation scope of work highlighted two questions on start-up issues: How did the OTI-Mission and OTI-Embassy relationships affect program start-up of the OTI/Peru program? And, Did OTI appropriately identify all start-up needs in a timely fashion, or are there lessons learned which could be useful for future OTI programs?

The OTI Peru program start-up was delayed because the USAID Mission had an active democracy support program in its portfolio and was interested in close coordination with OTI activities and the U.S. Embassy, which had been closely associated with the Fujimori government by Peruvian public perception, sensed a need to repair its image, and was concerned that OTI activities responded to that need. Consequently, both the Mission and the Embassy were intimately involved in reviewing and approving the initial grants which OTI proposed. While OTI staff reported that they learned a lot about the local environment and local NGOs as they reviewed potential grants with USAID staff, they also were frustrated at the slow initial pace of grant approvals. OTI staff arrived in Peru in February 2001 and the first grant was approved in May 2001. The OTI representative also participated in the Embassy "Democracy Committee" and spent considerable time keeping its members informed about OTI activities and potential activities. Managing the evolution of these essential relationships consumed far more OTI staff time than had been planned. It is a credit to the OTI staff that

within several months, a much more efficient relationship was established with both the USAID Mission and with the Embassy. John Hamilton, U.S. Ambassador said: “I started as a skeptic on OTI’s program in Peru, but as it progressed, I became a strong supporter.”

While OTI identified start-up needs quickly and mounted its presence in Peru within a very short period of time, the initial choice of contractor chief of party had to be changed and the design and operation of the contractor management information systems was cumbersome. A frustrating oversight of the initial organization left the Creative Associates contractor without tax exemption protection under the USAID bilateral agreement with the Government of Peru. The issue did not slow down OTI activities nor impede their effectiveness, but it increased costs of the activities.

Recommendation:

To facilitate project start-up in countries already hosting a USAID Mission, a formal agreement regarding the relationship and coordination between the Mission and OTI should be developed at the beginning of the project.

2. Management of the Grant Cycle

While the evaluation scope of work asked: How effective was OTI/Peru’s contractor in meeting OTI’s goals to be fast, flexible, and cost effective? The evaluation team tried to understand the implementation challenges faced by the contractor. Understanding the grant cycle is the key. The OTI project development officers (PDOs) were the initial point of contact between OTI and the grantees. They received the grant proposals then worked with the NGOs, private firms, or government institutions to shape the final grant agreements. Upon approval, the grants were handed off to the contractor implementation staff to support NGO implementation. Given the OTI model of direct procurement of goods and services required for implementation, each grant implied several different procurements. In the aggregate, the 245 approved grants caused the contractor implementation staff to deal with over 2,500 different vendors. The concentration of grant approvals in the last year of the two-year program caused a considerable bunching of implementation actions. While the contractor increased the implementation staff to meet increased transaction volumes, the PDOs also helped out in implementation actions. The increase in implementation work load should have been predictable, but the head of the implementation staff reported considerable overwork and stress during the last six months of the OTI program. Significant diversion of PDO time from monitoring grant accomplishments could have been costly to overall program objectives.

Recommendation:

OTI staff and the contractor chief-of-party should actively manage the interaction between program and implementation staff to ensure that approved programs are supported, not hampered, by the capacity to deliver assistance. Adequate information systems are needed to support OTI management.

4. Use and Effectiveness of the Data Base as a Management Tool

The evaluation team, OTI staff, and Creative staff did not find the programmatic database to be a fully useful management tool to monitor or evaluate project grants. It was useful only to report project activity and final expenditures. However, the procurement and financial databases were lauded as very useful by the procurement staff. While the programmatic database recorded project details, it could not be manipulated in any meaningful way. Given the number of grants, it would have been useful for monitoring and evaluation purposes to be able to aggregate grant activity by major recipient, by theme, by geographic location of intended grant activity, etc. Even the PDO's final reports comparing grant activity to strategic objectives appear to rely on manual summaries of program information. As part of its evaluation, the team manually prepared Annex C which characterizes the OTI Peru grant portfolio by type of recipient, size of grant and objective. The USAID chief of the Office of Democratic Initiatives said she had been asking for this kind of information, but the database could not produce it.¹

Recommendation:

OTI should develop and use a database that can be an effective management tool. The database should permit manipulation of program information. For example, sorting information by recipient, geographic location, grant objective and other variables would be useful to support management decisions. Such capability also would facilitate strategy reviews during program implementation and subsequent evaluation efforts. OTI contractors and staff should receive sufficient training on the database to take advantage of its capability to provide useful management information.

4. Advantages and Disadvantages of the In-kind Donation Mechanism.

Under the OTI in-kind assistance model, the grantees receive goods and services, as specified in the grant agreement, purchased by the contractor implementation staff. The OTI/Peru democracy support grants involved a variety of relatively small activities, seminars, workshops, training activities in rural and urban areas, limited equipment and a lot of in-country travel. All grantees offered opinions on the model. For most, it was a form of assistance with which they were not familiar. Most grantees learned to use the model and some thought it was useful because it obviated the need for them to worry about the need for financial accounting and auditing services. For some, however, it was a cumbersome mechanism. Generally, larger grantees, particularly those with non-OTI sources of money, had little difficulty using

¹ The OTI grant database support staff disagree with the assertion that "the database could not produce" information on grant recipients, size, and objectives. Upon return from Peru and after meeting with the grant database support staff, the chief evaluator agreed stating, "It appears that the database program captures much of the information that the [evaluation] team noted would have been useful." The chief evaluator added, "Inexplicably, the information was not used by OTI staff in the Peru project." The OTI grant database support staff further clarified this point, noting that OTI/Peru staff did not know how to fully utilize the database capability. They further pointed out that OTI has strengthened its commitment to database training for all OTI and implementing partner personnel.

the OTI assistance. In an illustrative case, when detailed grant planning omitted a key item for a workshop (flip charts), the grantee simply used its own resources to purchase them. Others coped with the OTI model differently. Servicios Educativos Rurales, (SER) designated one of its administrative staff to act as a full time liaison with the OTI implementation contractor to ensure that grant implementation needs were met. Over the course of the OTI program, the staff developed written instructions and explanatory materials designed to orient NGOs to make effective use of the in-kind assistance model. NGOs did adapt to the model.

For OTI, the in-kind assistance model reduces the risks of financial diversion and allows programs to be closed out without long lag times of grantee audits, recoveries and other administrative chores which could add to overhead. The model is not cost free to recipients. Many devoted considerable time to coordination with the OTI administrative staff. The need to specify precise items needed to implement each grant activity also may slow the grant preparation process. The model also can be inflexible. When changes are required such as a work shop has to be delayed because of bad weather, working with a variety of vendors to re-plan hotel space, travel arrangements, media representation, etc. puts stress on all involved.

Recommendation:

OTI should adapt the model to accommodate the kinds of projects being financed. While it does allow OTI to work with smaller groups, it is difficult for some groups to administer and is relatively inflexible in accommodating changes of dates or locale for events planned in approved projects.

5. OTI's Efforts in Situations of Democratic Transitions

OTI is particularly well suited to provide assistance in complex, fast-moving situations of democratic transition. Its rapid deployment mechanisms can provide assistance outside normal USAID programming cycle. OTI can establish a constructive relationship with transition and newly elected democratic governments by providing fast and flexible funding in the principal areas of concern to the new government and civil society. In this way, the U.S. government can effectively demonstrate and provide concrete support for democratic transitions. In situations of democratic transitions, OTI can be an effective tool for achieving U.S. foreign policy and development goals.

“US objectives in the post Fujimori period were to stabilize and facilitate the democratic transition and to recover the US image. OTI was very useful politically to the Embassy because it had quick funds available for projects for public diplomacy and for projects of interest to senior Peruvian government officials.” Willard Smith, Political officer, US Embassy, Peru

“We have heard on numerous occasions from President. Toledo and his leadership group that the US government has been very consistent in supporting the reestablishment of democracy. It's clear that he means that the US responded to specific government requests. It was OTI that was able to respond to specific requests when other USAID funds were already tied up. Good examples are support to the TRC and civil military affairs.” Ken Yamashita, USAID Deputy Director

Annex A: People and Organizations Contacted

U.S. Government Staff in Washington

Russell Porter, Americas Team Leader
USAID/Office of Transition Initiatives
(OTI)

Camara Garrett, Program Manager
USAID/OTI

Mary Stewart, Team Leader
USAID/OTI

Chris Phillips
Former OTI director

Tom Geiger
Former USAID Mission Director, Peru

Neil Levine
USAID, Democracy and Governance
Center

Tom Cornell
Former director, Office of South American
and Mexican Affairs

Bureau for Latin American and the Carib-
bean

Roberta Jacobson
Former DCM, US Embassy Peru

John Hamilton
Former US Ambassador, Peru

Madeline Williams
Former Democracy and Governance pro-
gram manager in Peru

Richard Miles
Peru Desk Officer, US Dept. of State

Keri Eisenbeis
Former OTI civil-military advisor

Richard McCall
Creative Associates International

Joel Jutkowitz
Development Alternatives International

Program Management and Implementation Staff in Peru

Sandra Shuster, Chief of Party
Creative Associates

Hugo Centurion, Camila Gianella, Soraya
Altabas, and

Monica Saravia, Program Development
Officers

Cecilia Delgado, Program Implementation
Director
Creative Associates

US Government Staff in Peru

Holly Flood, Program Director
USAID/OTI

Eurydice Rodrick, Program Manager
USAID/OTI

Patricia Buckles

USAID Mission Director

Ken Yamashita
USAID Mission Deputy Director

Kim Delaney

USAID Chief, Office of Democratic Initiatives (ODI)

Stephen Brager
USAID, Deputy Chief, ODI

OTI Grantees in Lima

Jose Antonio Gonzalez, Director
Ramon Perez, Advisor
International Cooperation Directorate
Congress of the Republic of Peru

David Lovaton, Executive Director
Ana Maria Tamayo, Director of Civil-Military Project
Instituto de Defensa Legal

Enrique Obando, President
Instituto de Estudios Politicos y Estrategicos

Ricardo Uceda, Executive Director
Jenny Cabrerias, Administrative Officer
Instituto de Prensa y Sociedad

Kela Leon, Projects Director
Consejo de la Prensa Peruana

Ivete Motin, Coordinator
Desiree Rubio de Marzo, Press Coordinator
Grupo Iniciativas de Proyectos en Comunicaciones

Alberto Otarola, Project Director
Comision Andina de Juristas

Juan Rodriguez Kelley, President
Centro de Estudios Estrategicos en Defensa y Seguridad

Percy Medina, Secretary General

Willard Smith
First Secretary, Political Section, US Embassy Peru

Colonel Bruce Yost
MAAG, US Embassy Peru

Jorge Salazar, Project Director
Asociacion Civil Transparencia

Maritza Barquero, Executive Director
Asociacion Centro de la Mujer "Las Amazonas"

Laura Puertas, Executive Director
PROETICA

Raul Callirgos, National Director
Ministry of Justice

Oscar Galdo and Liliana Alfaro
Donor Liaison Officer and Special Assistant to the Director
Controlaria

Javier Torres Seoane, Director
Servicios Educativos Rurales
Raul Tecco, Senior advisor
Friedrich Ebert Foundation

Monitoring and Evaluation Contacts in Lima

Javier Sirvas, Jose Soriano
Media Check

Giovanna Penaflor
General Manager
IMASEN

OTI Grantees outside of Lima

Ayacucho
Rocio del Pilar Vargas Morales,
Representative
Defensora del Pueblo

Jose Coronel, regional office director
Truth and Reconciliation Commission

Jeffery Gamarra
IPEZ

Arequipa
Gina Ramos, Jamie Paredes
Red Interquorum Arequipa

Hugo Ramirez
Amakella
Radio Yaravi

Alberto Munoz Najar
Macroregion Sur

Piura
Eugenia Fernan
Defensora del Pueblo

Enrique Gomez

Red Interquorum Piura

Belia Concha
Radio Cutivalu

Other Experts

John Youle
Former Director, American Chamber of
Commerce, Lima

Jorge Santiestevan
Former Defensor Del Pueblo de Peru

Maragrita Seminario, Director
Legislative Strengthening Program of
Peruvian Congress, State University of
New York

Michael Shifter
Inter-American Dialogue

Annex B: Final Evaluation of the OTI Peru Program

Scope of Work

I. Introduction

The Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) was established by USAID in 1994 to support peaceful democratic change in countries of strategic importance and humanitarian concern to the United States. As part of USAID's Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance, OTI provides rapid, flexible assistance to countries poised for or undergoing political transitions. It serves as a 'rapid deployment' agent addressing urgent transitional needs that cannot be conducted immediately by other USAID mechanisms.

OTI enables USAID to capitalize on 'windows of opportunity' where quickly deployed aid can make a critical difference to a country's transition to peaceful, democratic government. Interventions are tied to pivotal events, such as cease-fires, peace accords, or the advent of progressive leadership, often through key elections. OTI responds swiftly to these events with near-term, high-impact actions that target a country's most pressing transitional needs.

While OTI's interventions are fundamentally near-term, they lay the foundation for further long-term development assistance. While in-country, OTI works to bring new groups into the transition process, tests new activities for advancing democratic governance, and provides fast and flexible support for immediate transition needs. As appropriate and necessary, relationships and practices that prove productive may be handed off to the USAID mission or other donors for further development when OTI phases out. For more information on OTI, please visit the website at http://www.usaid.gov/hum_response/oti.

II. OTI/Peru

USAID/OTI launched its Peru Program in February 2001. The overall objective of the OTI program is to support the democratic opening created by the fall of President Alberto Fujimori's government in November 2000. OTI's work complements and reinforces the USAID mission's goal of encouraging greater citizen participation and engagement in the political process at all levels of government. OTI works to promote more participatory and transparent decision-making processes, with the goal of increasing responsiveness and accountability in all levels of government. OTI's Peru program grants have provided support for a wide range of activities including round-tables, information campaigns, technical assistance and training, and other short-term, high-impact activities that are primarily implemented by Peruvian governmental and non-governmental institutions. Since the inception of the program OTI/Peru has approved more than 200 grants, mostly under \$100,000 each. The total February 2001 – February 2003 budget for grants and overhead is approximately \$11 million.

III. Program Areas

Through a consultative process involving OTI/Peru and U.S. Embassy staff as well as numerous Peruvian civil society and governmental representatives, five key areas were identified as central to a successful democratic transition in Peru and in need of OTI short-term support. These are: increased civilian oversight of the military and improved civil-military relations; support and technical assistance for a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) established to address human rights abuses in Peru between 1980 and 2000; decentralization and local government strengthening; Congressional reform; and anti-corruption. A brief description of each area follows.

Civilian-Military Relations – OTI’s program focuses on three areas: strengthening Congressional capacity to enact defense policy and make informed, participatory decisions related to defense and security; improving the quality and quantity of media coverage of defense and security issues; and increasing the level of interest and understanding by civil society regarding defense and security issues and the importance of civilian oversight of the military. Civilian-Military Relations objectives are to:

- Improve civilian oversight of the military;
- Develop more informed, participatory decision-making processes related to defense and security; improve the quality and quantity of media coverage of military;
- Increase civil society's understanding of defense policy and the importance of civilian control over the military.

Truth and Reconciliation Commission – OTI’s program focuses on informing the Peruvian public (particularly affected populations) about the TRC and its work. OTI also supports training and technical support to the TRC and institutions with which it works to ensure that it has the technical capacity to fulfill its mission. Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) objective is to:

- Enhance the work of the TRC and of NGOs that work in coordination with the TRC to ensure that its impact is maximized.

Decentralization and Local Government – OTI’s program focuses on informing civil society and local governments about decentralization, facilitating citizen participation in the decentralization policy process, and increasing citizen engagement in local government decision-making. Decentralization and Local Government objectives are to:

- Inform civil society about new policy proposals;
- Facilitate broad public participation in the policy-making process;
- Strengthen participatory local governance.

Congressional Reform – OTI’s program supports training and technical assistance to Congress members and staff, informing Peruvian citizens about the role and functions of Congress to promote more effective oversight of Congressional performance, and facilitating the implementation of more participatory and responsive decision-making processes. Congressional Reform objective is to: facilitate Congressional accountability and responsiveness to the Peruvian electorate.

Anti-Corruption – OTI’s program in this area funds activities to increase civil society interest and involvement in the development and implementation of new national initiatives to combat corruption and to strengthen civil society capacity to monitor the management and use of public resources. Anti-Corruption objectives are to:

- Promote the development of national initiatives to combat corruption;
- Increase capacity of civil society and local institutions to monitor the management and use of public resources.

OTI/Peru has held strategy reviews approximately every six months to examine its program design and implementation strategies to ensure that they are in line with Peru’s constantly-changing political context and are consistent with other USAID support. These strategy review sessions have also facilitated the development of a plan for the transition of OTI’s activities, as appropriate, to USAID/Peru’s Office of Democratic Initiatives (ODI) and/or other donors. While adjustments and refinements have been made, OTI’s initial programmatic focus and subject areas have remained intact.

IV. Program Management

The ability to provide fast, flexible assistance is critical to OTI's work. OTI has developed innovative funding mechanisms to ensure that speed and flexibility do not come at the expense of accountability. One highly successful tool is the Support Which Implements Fast Transition (SWIFT) IQC (Indefinite Quantity Contract) mechanism, which OTI has used in a number of its programs, including Peru. Through SWIFT, OTI/Peru has worked with a variety of counterparts to implement its program, including governmental offices and institutions, newly-established NGOs, small associations and student groups.

V. Objectives of the Evaluation

The principal objectives of this evaluation are two-fold: to determine the extent to which OTI/Peru met its program objectives; and to assess OTI program management effectiveness in pursuing these objectives. The evaluation will examine all five areas of the program's work as well as assess program management including strategy development and revision, program implementation, administration, and monitoring and evaluation activities.

Program Questions

Was OTI/Peru's programmatic design appropriate as a means to effect change in Peru? (Were the five program areas selected the most salient to supporting Peru's transition to democracy?)

Did OTI/Peru meet its stated program objectives?

Was OTI/Peru sufficiently flexible to successfully adjust or modify its programmatic focus in response to the evolving political environment?

Which of OTI's five program areas were most/least successful and why?

How effective was OTI/Peru's monitoring plan in collecting useful information and using it to make program decisions?

What is OTI "leaving behind" for USAID, other donors, and its implementing partners? How is OTI's support expected to contribute to the effectiveness of longer-term ODI planned support.?

Management/Implementation Questions

How did the OTI-Mission and OTI-Embassy relationships affect program start-up of the OTI/Peru program?

Did OTI appropriately identify all start-up needs in a timely fashion, or are there lessons learned which could be useful for future OTI programs?

How effective was OTI/Peru's contractor in meeting OTI's goals to be fast, flexible, and cost effective?

Were mechanisms in place to ensure effective grants and project management, track and report spending?

Were steps taken to ensure that local groups all had equal access to OTI assistance?

Lessons Learned

What are the main programmatic lessons that can be learned from OTI's work with local government entities, local media and NGO groups, community-based reconstruction projects, and conflict prevention and mitigation efforts?

What were the main management and administrative lessons that can be learned, particularly in relation to OTI's ability to meet its programmatic goals?

What lessons can be learned from the planning for hand over and relations with the USAID Mission, other donors, the UN, and other partners?

Recommendations

Based on the evaluation findings and lessons learned, what are your programmatic recommendations for OTI's on-going work in other countries?

What recommendations can you make regarding more effective program management?

More effective M&E design and implementation for future OTI programs.

VI. Methodology

The evaluation team is responsible for developing a coherent evaluation methodology that uses both qualitative and quantitative approaches. The methodology should include, but not be limited to interviews, document review, including OTI past results reviews (R4s), monthly reports, the OTI Peru database, surveys, diagnostic reports, strategy session reports, and monitoring and evaluation reports. Methodologies, including how the team will conduct field visits to evaluate the program's management and implementation, will be developed in consultation with OTI. The evaluation team should be composed of three people, all of whom should be fluent Spanish-speakers.

VII. Timing

A proposed timeline for the evaluation follows, but OTI will work with the evaluation team upon award to further define the evaluation timeline and to determine deliverable due dates.

Washington, DC (maximum of 10 business days per team member): Review OTI documents, develop work plan, and interview relevant OTI staff including the Program Development Team and Latin America Team. Interview key non-OTI USAID/Washington personnel, and other relevant field partners with offices in the D.C. area. Meetings will be developed in coordination with OTI/Washington staff.

Peru (estimated 12 business days of fieldwork per team member): Meetings with OTI and CAII staff, USAID and US Embassy personnel, local grantees and other implementing partners, to be determined in coordination with local OTI staff. Members of the team will make a minimum of two field trips to areas outside of Lima where OTI has implemented its program.

Washington, DC (maximum of 10 business days): Final report writing.

VIII. Deliverables/Debriefings

The selected evaluation team will be expected to produce the following deliverables:

A work plan will be finalized by the evaluation team prior to departure for Peru, and cleared by the OTI Program Development Team, OTI/Latin America Team Leader in Washington, and the OTI/Peru Country Representative in Lima.

A six to eight page summary report of the major findings to be prepared and shared in the field.

A final report as described below.

The final evaluation report should include quoted comments from interviewees, including but not limited to beneficiaries, grantees, OTI/CAII local and expatriate staff, OTI Washington-based staff, Washington-based USAID staff, USAID/Peru and US Embassy staff. The evaluation team should make use of existing documents related to OTI's Peru program, which should be referenced, in the evaluation team's final report. The final reports will be comprised of at least the following sections:

- Executive summary
- Introduction and background;
- Summary of evaluation objectives and methodology;
- Significant successes and challenges;
- Programmatic and managerial lessons learned; and,
- Recommendations for other OTI programs.

In addition to the three deliverables, the evaluation team will be expected to provide briefings on its findings, including:

Based on the six to eight page summary report of the findings, a preliminary debriefing will be presented to the OTI/CAII management team and USAID/Peru staff in Lima prior to the evaluation team's departure.

A preliminary briefing of the team's findings and recommendations to OTI/Washington staff upon return from Peru; and,

A final briefing to be determined by the OTI Latin America Team in Washington, DC.

IX. Team Composition

The evaluation team shall consist of one team leader, and one additional field-experienced evaluation specialist. The team leader should have extensive experience designing and conducting evaluations. If required, an additional member of the evaluation team can be hired locally to provide logistical and facilitation support.

One team member must have proven knowledge of and experience related to democracy programs. Familiarity with Peruvian politics, democracy and human rights programs and previous experience conducting evaluations in these areas is preferred. Local OTI staff may be available to help facilitate the work and logistical arrangements of the evaluation team when in Peru but the evaluation team should be prepared to conduct its work and move independently. The team will be expected to make a minimum of two field visits within Peru, in consultation with local staff.

The team should demonstrate the following experience and skills:

Content expertise: Academic and/or practical experience in designing, managing, implementing, monitoring and evaluating democracy, and/or human rights programs in transition or post conflict settings;

Evaluation research: Academic experience in the social sciences evaluating programs, particularly in areas related to human rights and democracy building programs in transition or post conflict settings;

Rapid appraisal techniques: Academic training and experience with rapid appraisal techniques (survey development, direct observation, focus group interviews, community interviews and key informant interviews);

Survey and statistical analysis: Academic preparation and experience in survey research methods (survey design, sampling techniques and statistical computer applications);

Local knowledge: Specific knowledge of the Latin America (Peru strongly preferred) political, social, economic, and cultural environment; and,

Language abilities: All members of the team will have a demonstrated knowledge of the Spanish language.

Annex C: Major OTI Grantees - Civil Society

Total grant amounts \$100,000 and over

| Organization | Civil- Military | Truth Commission | Decentralization | Anti-corruption | Congressional reform | Total grant amounts |
|---|---|--|---------------------|--|--|---------------------|
| SER Servicios Educativos Rurales | | CA0020 62,422.62 CA0024 46,471.31 CA0078 12,820.32 CA0086 20,286.72 | | CA0023 67,702.93 CA0025 70,592.51 CA0136 68,474.24 CA0210 46,251.54 | | 395,022.19 |
| IDL Instituto de Defensa Legal | CA0045 12,821.35 CA0081 6,300.00 CA0130 18,248.91 CA0131 26,773.13 | CA0059 29,916.87 CA0060 61,965.12 CA0148 38,060.00 CA0165 40,722.74 | | | | 234,808.12 |
| IPEDEHP Instituto Peruano de Educación en Derechos Humanos y la Paz | | | | | CA0029 62,524.83 CA0099 62,414.41 CA0163 53,207.15 CA0243 21,195.76 | 199,342.15 |
| Proética | | | | CA0021 12,405.91 CA0102 4,603.39 CA0192 57,796.89 CA0193 104,195.34 | | 179,001.53 |
| Transparencia | CA0055 7,651.45 | | CA0075 51,465.54 | | CA0120 25,031.33 CA0142 59,183.84 CA0216 18,219.28 | 161,551.44 |
| Comisión Andina de Juristas | CA0185 37,015.69 CA0201 31,466.87 CA0208 21,152.04 | | | | CA0019 25,835.17 CA0085 5,303.23 CA0121 27,772.61 | 148,545.61 |
| Promoviendo Derechos | | | | | CA0084 11,313.75 CA0101 78,831.82 CA0226 23,651.03 CA0236 24,657.29 | 138,453.89 |
| Cuatro Tablas | | | | | CA0109 33,650.31 CA0174 | 131,576.39 |

| Organization | Civil- Military | Truth Commission | Decentralization | Anti-corruption | Congressional reform | Total grant amounts |
|--|---|--|--|--|----------------------------------|---------------------|
| | | | | | 29,458.41 CA0232 68,467.67 | |
| IPYS Instituto Prensa y Sociedad | CA0033 50,198.48 | | | CA0170 64,840.51 CA0215 13,876.35 | | 128,915.34 |
| IDEPE Instituto de Estudios Políticos y Estratégicos | CA0026 58,360.31 CA0105 4,223.74 CA0172 1,820.54 CA0188 37,773.14 CA0191 8,361.17 CA0197 10,561.28 | | | | | 121,100.18 |
| Instituto de Estudios Peruanos | | | CA0004 62,837.04 CA0112 58,175.63 | | | 121,012.67 |
| Red para el Desarrollo de las Ciencias SS. | | CA0096 59,520.72 CA0237 46,104.49 | | | | 105,625.21 |
| TOTAL | 332,728.10 | 418,290.91 | 172,478.21 | 510,739.61 | 630,717.89 | 2,064,954.72 |

**Other Important Civil Society OTI Grantees
Total grant amounts \$51,000 - 99,999**

| Organization | Civil- Military | Truth Commission | Decentralization | Anti-corruption | Congressional reform | Total grant amounts |
|---|--|------------------|------------------|-----------------|--|---------------------|
| Consejo de la Prensa Peruana | CA0110 12,739.99 CA0111 8,664.96 CA0126 26,076.85 CA0175 15,103.14 | | | | | 62,584.94 |
| CEEDS Centro de Estudios Estratégicos-- | CA0108 25,618.29 CA0162 17,867.28 CA0189 4,714.42 CA0190 12,824.20 CA0245 19,295.62 | | | | | 80,319.81 |
| Manuela Ramos | | | | | CA0087 12,502.75 CA0202 73,310.24 | 85,812.99 |

| Organization | Civil- Military | Truth Commission | Decentralization | Anti-corruption | Congressional reform | Total grant amounts |
|---|---------------------|---------------------|--|---|----------------------|---------------------|
| Suma Ciudadana | | | | | CA0132 77,168.81 | 77,168.81 |
| CEPEI Centro Peruano de Estudios Internacionales | CA0032 71,990.91 | | | | | 71,990.91 |
| Red Interquorum (IQ) | | | | CA0009 (AQP) 1,477.84 CA0135 15,913.90 CA0010 (Chicl) 1,482.46 CA0080 (RED) 4,014.58 CA0233 4,943.92 CA0093 (PIURA) 16,049.56 CA0092 659.62 CA0150 1,564.69 CA0180 20,569.91 | | 66,676.48 |
| APRODEH (Asociación pro derechos humanos) | CA0018 4,272.87 | CA0061 48,973.52 | | | | 53,246.39 |
| NDI. National Democratic Institute | | | | CA0027 63,273.00 | | 63,273.00 |
| EPAF. Equipo Peruano de Antropología Forense | | CA0028 54,510.98 | | | | 54,510.98 |
| Foro Ecológico del Perú | | | CA0041 52,333.00 | | | 52,333.00 |
| PROYAUYOS | | | CA0046 17,335.28 CA0203 29,558.93 | | | 46,894.21 |
| CNR | | | | | CA0050 61,616.37 | 61,616.37 |
| TOTAL | 219,168.53 | 103,484.50 | 99,227.21 | 129,949.48 | 224,598.17 | 776,427.89 |

**Other Civil Society OTI Grantees
Total grant amounts up to \$50,000**

| Organization | Civil- Military | Truth Commission | Decentralization | Anti-corruption | Congressional reform | Total grant amounts |
|---|-----------------|--------------------|------------------|-----------------|----------------------|---------------------|
| SIDEA, Seminario Interdisciplinario de Estudios Andinos | | CA0001 7,839.65 | | | | 7,839.65 |
| FEPUC. Facultad de Edu- | | | | | CA0002 3,643.78 | 3,643.78 |

| Organization | Civil- Military | Truth Com- mission | Decentralization | Anti- corruption | Congressional reform | Total grant amounts |
|---|-----------------|-----------------------|---|---------------------|-------------------------|------------------------|
| cación PUCP | | | | | | |
| AMMA. Asocia- ción de Mu- nicipalidades del Marañón Andino | | | CA0003 12,234.90 | | | 12,234.90 |
| ASODEL Aso- ciación para el desarrollo local | | | | | CA0006 12,326.04 | 12,326.04 |
| Red Perú | | | CA0007 39,640.41 | | | 39,640.41 |
| TRAMAS | | | | CA0013 38,320.01 | | 38,320.01 |
| CICAP (Centro de Investigación capacitación asesoría y pro- moción | | | CA0014 12,166.39 | | | 12,166.39 |
| IPAE (instituto peru- ano de adminis- tración de em- presas) | | | | | CA0015 9,626.90 | 9,626.90 |
| EMGM. Es- cuela mayor de gestión munic- ipal | | | CA0030 25,289.84 CA0198 3,270.42 | | | 28,560.26 |
| Mesa de Con- certación por el desarrollo del departamento de Ica | | | CA0031 10,523.24 | | | 10,523.24 |
| SDE Servicios para el de- sarrollo equi- dad. | | | | | CA0034 9,272.20 | 9,272.20 |
| Centro de Pro- moción de la Mujer Micaela Bastidas | | | | | CA0036 3,801.19 | 3,801.19 |
| Centro de For- mación apoyo y desarrollo ético cultural cris- tiano | | | | CA0039 5,361.72 | | 5,361.72 |
| Asociación cultural Atusparia | | | CA0042 15,429.59 | | | 15,429.59 |
| Agroacción Andina | | | CA0043 18,931.81 | | | 18,931.81 |
| Coordinadora Nacional de Derechos hu- manos | | CA0044 12,967.52 | | | | 12,967.52 |
| CODEIPA Comité de de- sarrollo integral de la provincia de Aymaraes | | | CA0047 9,920.90 | | | 9,920.90 |

| Organization | Civil- Military | Truth Commission | Decentralization | Anti-corruption | Congressional reform | Total grant amounts |
|--|--|--------------------|---------------------|--|---|---------------------|
| ALTERNATIVA | | | CA0048 20,668.38 | | | 20,668.38 |
| Comité Vicarial de derechos humanos del vicariato apostólico de pucallpa | | CA0049 3,410.38 | | | | 3,410.38 |
| DESCO | CA0051 10,343.38 | | | | | 10,343.38 |
| CECODEL. Centro de competitividad para el desarrollo local | | | CA0052 34,526.98 | | | 34,526.98 |
| Centro de Comunicación Amakella | | | | | CA0053 8,314.19 | 8,314.19 |
| Instituto democracia y desarrollo humano | | CA0054 5,836.56 | | | | 5,836.56 |
| Cáritas Chachapoyas | | | | | CA0057 10,786.44 | 10,786.44 |
| INTELTA Radio Cutivalú, instituto teleeducativo los tallanes | | | | CA0062 10,000.55 | | 10,000.55 |
| Foro ciudades para la vida | | | CA0063 48,813.35 | | | 48,813.35 |
| VIDES Asociación Vida y Desarrollo | | | | | CA0065 20,733.93 | 20,733.93 |
| Felix Luna Vargas | CA0068 13,067.18 | | | | | 13,067.18 |
| Asociación Nacional de jueces para la justicia y la democracia | | | | CA0076 1,283.96 CA0160 4,144.20 | | 5,428.16 |
| Asociación Centro de la mujer Las Amazonas | | | | | CA0083 6,315.19 CA0174 8,247.78 CA0242 10,788.68 | 25,351.65 |
| AMSAT. Asociación de municipalidades de la cuenca del río Santo Tomás | | | CA0094 30,897.70 | | | 30,897.70 |
| Iniciativa de proyectos en comunicaciones | CA0098 13,933.81 CA0196 21,761.82 | | | | | 35,695.63 |
| NPA National policy association | | | CA0107 19,515.02 | | | 19,515.02 |
| CALANDRIA | | | CA0113 | | | 34,972.01 |

| Organization | Civil- Military | Truth Commission | Decentralization | Anti-corruption | Congressional reform | Total grant amounts |
|---|--------------------|---------------------|----------------------------------|---------------------|--|---------------------|
| | | | 11,572.06 CA0229 23,399.95 | | | |
| Escuela para el Desarrollo | | | CA0114 36,624.37 | | | 36,624.37 |
| Colectivo Yuyarisum | | CA0127 5,787.63 | | | | 5,787.63 |
| ILLA | | | CA0128 43,641.61 | | | 43,641.61 |
| Parroquia Santiago Apostol de Urcos | | | CA0134 9,164.10 | | | 9,164.10 |
| Iniciativa Ciudadana | | | | | CA0140 18,004.25 CA0171 12,572.63 | 30,576.88 |
| Asoc. Cultural LA TARUMBA | | | | CA0145 5,278.19 | | 5,278.19 |
| CECODES. Centro de Comunicación para el desarrollo social. | | | | CA0152 9,873.31 | | 9,873.31 |
| Centro de Estudios regionales andinos Bartolomé de las Casas. | | | CA0156 29,090.29 | | | 29,090.29 |
| CARE PERU | | | CA0164 36,095.38 | | | 36,095.38 |
| Universidad Científica del Sur | CA0177 2,594.17 | | | | | 2,594.17 |
| IIDA. Instituto de investigación y Desarrollo Andino | | CA0194 10,451.75 | | | | 10,451.75 |
| APORVIDHA. Asociación por la vida y la dignidad humana | | CA0200 8,575.91 | | | | 8,575.91 |
| Escuela superior de pedagogía, filosofía y Letras Antonio Ruiz de Montoya. | | | | CA0227 46,506.25 | | 46,506.25 |
| Luz y Arte Asociación cultural | | CA0231 40,211.02 | | | | 40,211.02 |
| Asociación civil radio marañón del vicariato apostólico San Francisco Javier. | | | | CA0238 7,009.54 | | 7,009.54 |
| ETC Andes | | | | CA0244 14,623.97 | | 14,623.97 |
| Vicaria de solidaridad prela- | | CA0159 10,005.03 | | | | 10,005.03 |

| Organization | Civil- Military | Truth Commission | Decentralization | Anti-corruption | Congressional reform | Total grant amounts |
|----------------------------|------------------|-------------------|---------------------|-------------------------------|----------------------|---------------------|
| tura de Ayaviri. | | | | | | |
| Cámara de Comercio de Lima | | | | CA0035 8,706.00 | | 8,706.00 |
| Macro Región Sur | | | CA0005 25,970.62 | | CA0011 12,301.88 | 38,272.5 |
| TOTAL | 61,700.36 | 105,085.45 | 517,387.31 | 151,107.70 0 | 146,735.08 | 982,015.9 |

Private For Profit Grantees

| Organization | Civilian- Military | Truth Commission | Decentralization | Anti-corruption | Congressional reform | Total grant amounts |
|--------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|--|--------------------|----------------------|---------------------|
| LEO BURNETT | | | CA0181 126,371.78 CA0182 173,971.19 CA0183 166,005.22 CA0184 104,511.42 | | | 570,859.61 |
| Luna llena Films | | CA0161 75,717.58 | | | | 75,717.58 |
| M&d Seminarios y Eventos | CA0224 16,526.82 | | | | | 16,526.82 |
| Peru Monitor S.A. | | | | CA0209 1,960.60 | | 1,960.60 |
| Sub-Total | 16,526.82 | 75,717.58 | 570,859.61 | 1,960.60 | | 756,278.61 |
| MEDIA CHECK (CA0138) | | | | | | 91,214.00 |
| TOTAL | 16,526.82 | 75,717.58 | 570,859.61 | 1,960.60 | | 847,492.61 |

OTI Grantees – Peruvian State

| Organization | Civilian- Military | Truth Commission | Decentralization | Anti-corruption | Congressional reform | Total grant amounts |
|--------------|--|------------------|--|--|---|---------------------|
| CONGRESS | CA0056 3,288.63 CA0125 11,612.10 CA0157 21,365.62 | | CA0077 59,260.47 CA0133 20,326.18 CA0144 36,192.73 CA0146 81,125.01 | | CA0100 59,121.84 CA0103 7,725.19 CA0118 34,563.93 CA0153 6,117.77 CA0186 14,947.00 CA0235 12,593.13 CA0240 19,379.74 | 387,619.34 |
| EXECUTIVE | | | CA0017 9,343.66 (PRES) | CA0038 27,961.91 CA0073 92,742.07 | | 197,899.42 |

| Organization | Civilian- Military | Truth Commission | Decentralization | Anti-corruption | Congressional reform | Total grant amounts |
|---|---|---|--|---|----------------------|---------------------|
| | | | | CA0158 67,851.78 all in Min. of Justice | | |
| ATTORNEY GENERAL (Fiscalía) | CA0069 6,517.38 | | | | | 6,517.38 |
| COMPTROLLER'S OFFICE | CA0071 44,619.76 CA0122 2,210.00 CA0168 8,068.18 CA0205 41,604.67 | | | | | 96,502.61 |
| OMBUDSMAN | CA0040 7,898.00 CA0058 6,856.25 CA0070 1,669.55 CA0088 638.53 CA0123 37,360.46 CA0154 12,370.08 CA0176 7,717.88 CA0217 32,771.15 CA0239 3,406.29 | CA0022 4,442.68 CA0064 55,274.86 CA0079 7,825.30 | | | | 178,231.03 |
| TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION | | 35 GRANTS 1,031,736.70 | | | | 1,031,736.70 |
| Mesa departamental de concertación de lucha contra la pobreza de Arequipa | | | | CA0214 16,265.58 | | 16,265.58 |
| Comisión Nacional Anti corrupción | | | | CA0139 13,283.91 | | 13,283.91 |
| Municipalidad Provincial de Ilo | | | CA0037 3,259.52 CA0223 3,445.51 | | | 6,705.03 |
| Plan Binacional de Desarrollo de la Región Fronteriza Perú-Ecuador | | | CA0095 30,772.48 CA0178 31,655.34 | | | 62,427.82 |
| TOTAL | 249,974.53 | 1,099,279.54 | 275,380.90 | 218,105.25 | 154,448.60 | 1,997,188.82 |