

ASSESSMENT OF USAID CIVIL SOCIETY PROGRAMS IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

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LIST OF ACRONYMS*

ACALEN	Asociación Central de Agricultores Luz y Esperanza de Nagua <i>Central Agricultural Association Luz and Esperanza de Nagua</i>
ACC	Acción Contra la Corrupción <i>Action Against Corruption</i>
ADAE	Asociación Dominicana de Abogados Empresarios <i>Association of Dominican Business Lawyers</i>
ADEPE	Asociación para el Desarrollo de la Provincia de Espaillat <i>Association for the Development of the Espaillat Province</i>
ADOPI	Asociación Dominicana de Propiedad Intelectual <i>Dominican Association of Intellectual Property</i>
ANJE	Asociación Nacional de Jóvenes Empresarios <i>Dominican Association of Young Business Persons</i>
ASOJOP	Asociación de Jóvenes por la Paz <i>Association of Youth for Peace</i>
ATE	Asociación de Trabajadores del Estado <i>Association of State Workers</i>
BONGS	Bloque de Organizaciones No Gubernamentales <i>Nongovernmental Organization Block</i>
CAFESA	Campesinos Federados de Salcedo <i>Federated Campesinos of Salcedo</i>
CBO	Community-Based Organizations
CDC	Comité de Desarrollo <i>Development Committee</i>
CDSS	Declaración de la Estrategia para el Desarrollo del País <i>Country Development Strategy Statement</i>
CEAJURI	Centro de Educación y Asistencia Jurídica <i>Center for Education and Judicial Assistance</i>
CECPUAC	Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, Políticas Públicas and Acciones Colectivas <i>Center for Constitutional Studies, Public Policies and Collective Actions</i>
CESDEM	Centro de Estudios Sociales y Demográficos <i>Center of Social and Demographic Studies</i>
CIMUDIS	Círculo de Mujeres con Discapacidad <i>Organization for Handicapped Women</i>
CIPAF	Centro de Investigación para la Acción Femenina <i>Center of Investigation for the Women's Movement</i>
CNCE	Centro Nacional de las Cortes del Estado <i>National Center for the National Courts</i>
CNJ	Consejo Nacional Judicial <i>National Judicial Council</i>
CONEP	Consejo Nacional de la Empresa Privada <i>National Council for Private Enterprise</i>
CORDA	A Dutch development foundation
CSOs	Civil Society Organizations

* The Spanish acronym for Dominican organizations or proper nouns related to this assessment are used in all cases. Translations for these organizations included in this annex are not official translations of the organizations' names.

DR	Dominican Republic
ENPID	Encuesta del PID <i>Survey of the PID (Democratic Initiatives Project)</i>
FEDOMU	Federación Dominicana de Municipios <i>Dominican Federation of Municipalities</i>
FEGRUPO	Federación de Grupos Campesinos <i>Federation of Campesino Groups</i>
FINJUS	Fundación Institucionalidad y Justicia <i>Institutions and Justice Foundation</i>
FLACSO	Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales Latin American College of Social Sciences
FOSC	Fortalecimiento de la Sociedad Civil <i>Strengthening of Civil Society</i>
FUSABI	Fundación Salud y Bienestar <i>Health and Wellness Foundation</i>
GAD	Grupo de Acción por la Democracia <i>Group for Democratic Action</i>
IDB	Inter-American Development Bank
IDDI	Instituto Dominicano de Desarrollo Integral <i>Dominican Institute of Integral Development</i>
IDSS	Instituto Dominicano de Seguro Social <i>Dominican Social Security Institute</i>
IFES	International Foundation for Electoral Systems
IIDH/CAPEL	Instituto Inter-Americano para Derechos Humanos/Centro para Asistencia y Promoción Electoral <i>Inter-American Institute for Human Rights/Center for Electoral Promotion and Assistance</i>
ILANUD	Instituto Latinoamericano De Las Naciones Unidas Para La Prevención Del Delito Y Tratamiento Del Delincuente <i>Latin American Institute of the United Nations for the prevention of Crime and Treatment of Criminals</i>
INTEC	Instituto Tecnológico de Santo Domingo <i>Technology Institute of Santo Domingo</i>
IQC	<i>Indefinite Quantity Contract</i>
IR	<i>Intermediate Result</i>
JCE	Junta Central Electoral <i>United Electoral Central</i>
NCSC	<i>National Center for State Courts</i>
NDI	<i>National Democratic Institute</i>
NGOs	<i>Nongovernmental Organizations</i>
NJC	<i>National Judicial Council</i>
OAS	Organización de Estados Norte Americanos

ONAP	<i>Organization of American States</i> Oficina Nacional de Planificación <i>National Office for Planning</i>
PC	Participación Ciudadana <i>Citizen Participation</i>
PFED	Proyecto Fortalecimiento del Estado de Derecho <i>USAID Strengthening Rule of Law Project</i>
PFSC	Proyecto de Fortalecimiento de la Sociedad Civil <i>Strengthening Civil Society Project</i>
PID	Proyecto de Iniciativas Democráticas <i>Democratic Initiatives Project</i>
PLD	Partido de Liberación Dominicana <i>Dominican Liberation Party</i>
PMT	Proyecto De Modernización De Tribunales <i>USAID/NSC Court Modernization Project</i>
PRD	Partido de la Revolución Dominicana <i>Dominican Revolutionary Party</i>
PRSC	Partido Revolucionario Social Cristiano <i>Social Christian Revolutionary Party</i>
PUCMM	Pontificia Universidad Católica Madre y Maestra <i>Catholic University of our Mother and Teacher</i>
ROL	<i>Rule of Law</i>
SCJ	Suprema Corte de la Justicia <i>Supreme Court of Justice</i>
SCSP	<i>Strengthening Civil Society Program</i>
SFC	<i>Small Farmer Consortium</i>
SEA	Ministry of Agriculture
SEE	Ministry of Education
SEF	Ministry of Finance
SEOPC	Ministry of Public Works
SESPAS	Ministry of Health
SFM	San Francisco de Macorís <i>San Francisco of Marcoís</i>
SSID	Servicio Social de Iglesias Dominicanas <i>Social Service of the Dominican Churches</i>
SWOT	Strengths, Opportunities, Weaknesses and Threats
UASD	Universidad Autónoma de Santo Domingo <i>Autonomous University of Santo Domingo</i>
UCNE	Universidad Nordestana <i>Nordestana University</i>
UN	Naciones Unidas <i>United Nations</i>

UNPHU

Universidad Nacional Pedro Enrique Urenas
National University of Pedro Enrique Urenas

USAID

United States Agency for International Development

VONAPREC

Voluntariado Nacional De Prevención De La Corrupción
National Volunteers for the Prevention of Corruption

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Since the late 1980s, U.S. Agency for International Development's (USAID) Democracy and Governance assistance program gained importance as many countries in Latin America, Asia, Africa, and Eastern Europe democratized. With the purpose of reforming entrenched authoritarian practices in governmental institutions, international donors found in civil society many organizations eager to engage in democratic advocacy. Thus, in the process of transition to democratic rule, civil society organizations (whether civic groups or professional nongovernmental organizations — NGOs) played a key role in weakening authoritarian regimes and promoting democracy. Human rights groups, labor unions, and women's organizations were particularly important in these efforts. To carry out their activities, many of these organizations came to depend heavily on public and private international assistance. And as more were formed, and issues to be addressed expanded, the need for international assistance increased.

The USAID Mission in the Dominican Republic (DR) responded early on and provided critical and sustained support to key civil society organizations, creating the Democratic Initiatives Project (PID), housed in the *Pontificia Universidad Católica Madre y Maestra* (PUCMM), to channel funds to a wide range of NGO subgrantees; injecting substantial resources into *Participación Ciudadana* (PC); and underwriting Rule of Law activities related to civil society through Fundación Institucionalidad y Justicia (FINJUS).

In June 2001, the USAID/DR contracted Checchi & Company Consulting, Inc. and its subcontractor DevTech Systems, Inc. to conduct an assessment of the Strengthening Civil Society Project. The purpose of this assessment, as stated in the Scope of Work, was:

“...to measure the impact of the Democratic Initiative Project and the different programs that [the] USAID Mission in the Dominican Republic has implemented to promote the development of a politically active civil society in support of democracy.”

The objectives of the assessment were to:

- Provide, based on the 10 years of USAID/DR experience, an assessment of the impact of its investment in civil society;
- Offer input that will help the Mission shape its next five-year strategy (2002—2007);
- Share with USAID/DR's partners and colleagues lessons learned and best practices; and
- Provide lessons learned and best practices on how other Missions around the world might address issues of democratic development through civil society.

This report is divided into four sections of technical review. The first three sections review each of the principal projects (PID, PC and FINJUS). The fourth section is an institutional review of these three projects.

The Strengthening Civil Society Program (SCSP) owes its success in large part to USAID's strategy. This strategy worked for several reasons, and provides valuable lessons learned, not

only for civil society programs, but also in general. The four factors, or findings, that were critical are:

- **Long-Term Strategy.** USAID/DR’s foresight to support the initiative over a 10-year period was critical. It provided the necessary time to build the projects carefully, let them take hold, and eventually reach out to a broad and receptive public. USAID understood that it was vital for an initiative intended to change a political culture to have at least a decade in which to be implemented. Even now, old political habits and relationships die hard. The recent selection of three supreme court justices in secret revealed the constant need to support efforts to sustain civil society organizations in order to continue the campaign for a transparent, accountable, responsive, and democratic political system. USAID understands that developing and sustaining democratic processes is a work in progress.
- ***Medio Paso Atrás.*** USAID realized that an essential part of its strategy to promote democracy in the DR was to maintain a low profile, allowing its Dominican grantees to take the visible lead in pushing for democratic reforms. This *medio paso atrás* (or one step behind) strategy was able to confer legitimacy and credibility to the effort as a *Dominican* initiative and was key to its success.
- **Flexibility.** USAID understood the need to be flexible in carrying forward the SCSP. Given the fluidity of the political situation in the DR, it was essential for the Mission to support a “demand” rather than a “supply” driven initiative. This helped to build a momentum to sustain the initiative.
- **Image.** Perhaps the most interesting—and in certain respects most important—finding, was the impact the SCSP had on the image of USAID and the United States itself. A history of intervention in the DR created an understandable animosity toward the United States. However, in the course of the SCSP, this changed radically. In interviews with key Dominicans across sectors, it became evident that the SCSP had produced an unexpected result: The Mission’s support of the SCSP, including its “one step behind” strategy, reversed the image of the United States. It was no longer viewed as a self-interested bully, but as a country promoting the political as well as the economic welfare of the people of the DR. Interestingly, the evaluators initially did not ask any questions about the image of the United States in the interviews. These were unsolicited views.

In general, the impact of the SCSP has been positive and broad in scope. Although more needs to be done to consolidate the gains made to date, civil society has been strengthened and plays an increasingly important role in the political processes. Moreover, an institutional capacity to sustain civil society initiatives exists. The large majority of the civil society organizations (CSOs) and other NGOs visited in the course of preparing the assessment demonstrated an increasingly broad if still uneven ability to develop and manage programs. While most of these organizations are not CSOs per se, the areas of work they represent—e.g., environment, health, education, etc.—require them to be active participants at some point in the political/policymaking system. This has created a multiplier effect that was also part of USAID’s

strategy. In addition, the development of networks of CSOs and NGOs has helped expand and sustain civil society efforts.

Principal Findings (By Project)

Democratic Initiatives Project (PID)

- All of the evidence to date indicates that the PID has been exemplary in ensuring appropriate representation of organized segments of Dominican society at all levels: on the Advisory Board, among the groups of subgrantees, among the daily participants, and in other activities. More than that, the PID has helped to establish communication lines among many of these groups. For example, the Board has served as an important forum in which leaders of different sectors of the society can get to know each other better and work more collaboratively. As part of the emphasis on communication, the PID has organized meetings four times a year to enable beneficiaries to share experiences, lessons learned, and best practices.
- There has not been a perfect geographic and sectoral balance. There have been differences, which reflect to great extent weaknesses in civil society organizations in the different regions and sectors of the country.
- Many of the most important Dominican NGOs have been PID subgrantees, and this is how the PID has been able to provide crucial support to promote a reform agenda.
- The PID's support to subgrantee groups and institutions has, in many cases, helped in the establishment and/or support of NGO networks and grassroots organizations involved in important reform initiatives.
- There has been substantial synergy among the varied USAID programs such as the PID, Grupo de Acción por la Democracia (GAD) (in its time), PC, and FINJUS, and other civil society strengthening programs.
- The PID has played an important role in helping to attain, strengthen, and forge linkages among a variety of civil society groups. It has done this by several means, including its participation in the Advisory Board, contacts and ideas shared in the four annual meetings with the subgrantee institutions, and subsidized help provided by some subgrantees to new candidates for assistance
- Effective training in democratic values was crucial to the success of PID activities with its subgrantees and beneficiary population. This training covered several topics, such as rotation of leadership, promotion of participation in general, ethnic tolerance, understanding of gender issues, and tolerance of dissent.
- Although many community leaders have a long history of participation, most were never formally trained in group skills and procedures, such as codifying and managing internal

regulations, parliamentary procedures, preparing agendas and action plans, keeping minutes and maintaining financial accounts. Acquiring these abilities through the PID has strengthened the management of civil society organizations and improved the capacities of other subgrantee groups in achieving their goals. In addition, the training has created a more orderly and democratic environment within the organizations.

- CSOs have improved liaisons with other groups and have built coalitions. Administrative and organizational assistance, as well as support with external literature, is frequently crucial for CSOs. The establishment of horizontal liaisons through similar groups is also critical, encouraging them to exchange information among themselves and thus create an environment that improves collaboration. To the extent that the goals and purposes of these alliances are managed by the groups themselves (and these groups, in turn, have real roots in their communities) from bottom to top, the probability of being sustainable and mutually reinforced is enhanced.
- Subgrantees have committed to their public officials without being co-opted. The most effective commitment programs at the local level were those that were based on a prior community organization and on the discussion of the needs of the community, attempting intervention with public officials as an intermediate, instead of an initial step. At the same time, without an effective collaboration from the state, progress is difficult, and the risk of state interference continues to be a possibility.
- It has been especially effective to be able to integrate the staff and students of the Community Extension Department and Nordestana University's (UCNE) Legal Department into PID activities. The students and the extension program staff participate in teaching and supervising activities, free of charge, wishing to attain legal status. This also helps to attain sustainability.
- At the conclusion of the PID, establishment of four subgrantee groups with common interests represents the best model of alliances and the possibility of sustainability. The consortia reflect heterogeneity of interests within the civil society and the need for specific and continuous actions to achieve democratic participation and reforms from several viewpoints. The greater level of organization established by networks through the so-called Municipality Consortium seeks citizen participation through the local municipal governments. The other consortia are oriented towards civic education in schools, state institutionalism through promoting the civil and administrative careers within state entities and farmer organization to enact a law to protect farmers. Continuing the PID—or its efforts—is based on the support these consortia can be provided and the momentum they can achieve.
- There were initial important differences between the national population and the people who directly participated in the PID. Noticeable among PID participants were their higher educational level, their higher level of political activism, and their tendency to belong to grassroots associations. The data do not offer enough evidence to conclude that the PID population were wealthier than the general population.

- The differences between the PID and non-PID populations represent a problem in assigning impact to PID interventions based solely on the quantitative results of the surveys due to the absence of a baseline. However, it is possible to state that the differences in attitudes, values, and political practices are due to a synergy effect between the PID's interventions and a subpopulation that is more educated, political, and socially committed than the average voting population of the country.
- The vision of democracy among the general population is primarily one of enjoyment of freedom. Meanwhile for the population who participated in PID programs, the democratic vision of a distributive justice through a better distribution of wealth competes with this vision.
- Attitudes towards democracy differ. Among the PID population, fatalistic values significantly lower than the general population. The results reflect the effect the program has had in reducing paternalism and fatalism, and that this reduction is due not to the differences between the populations, which could have existed from PID's inception, but to the magnitude of the differences. The differences in attitudes remained when controlled by years of studies, area of residence, and gender of the person interviewed.
- Consistently, the population that participated in PID programs has a more critical view than the general population of the operation of Dominican democracy. A smaller proportion of PID participants perceive the existence of freedom of speech without fear of repression, and an even smaller proportion perceive the existence of equal opportunities. The great majority of the general population and the PID participants perceive that inequality among the rich and poor vis-à-vis the law represents the main threat to sustainability of the democratic system.
- Despite the high proportion of PID participants who belong to political parties, the perception of the role of the parties is rather negative. Almost two-thirds of both populations deem that parties only serve the purpose of participating in elections every four years and less than ten percent in both populations consider that the parties defend all groups of society.
- Being active in a political party does not depend on socio-economic variables such as educational level or household income among the PID population. Neither is such participation significantly associated with the profession of religious faith or lack thereof. However, the proportion of those active in a political party increases in the marginal areas and is higher among men. In both populations, political activism increases the proportion of people involved in political activities favoring democracy.
- The analysis of the populations' trust in governmental, political, and nongovernmental entities and institutions brings to light the latent issue of governance and the danger of the sustainability of democracy based on political parties. Individually, greater trust is assigned by the general population and the population participating in the PID to the Catholic Church and the media. On the other extreme, the institution perceived as the

least reliable is the political parties. Most of the general population has no level of trust in the key governmental institutions.

- The PID population shows an interest in politics beyond the national interest. Likewise, the proportion of the PID population that reads, discusses, listens to, or watches news on politics is substantially greater than the proportions found in the national population.
- The participation of beneficiaries of the PID in traditional political activities is much greater in the five activities researched, as is participation in meetings to solve community issues, attendance at political party meetings, attempting to convince other people to vote for the candidate of their preference, and participation in activities of the accountability type such as protests, manifestations, strikes, or lockouts.
- The levels of acceptance of traditional political activities are equally important in both populations for legal-type expressions, the scope of acceptance decreasing with the accountability nature of the activity, which are rejected by the majority of both the general and PID populations.
- The levels of trust in the electoral system is greater among the PID population than the rest of the population. The PID population trusted more generally in the results of the 2000 elections and trusts more that the JCE (Central Electoral Board) can guarantee free elections in the year 2002, and a greater proportion is thinking of voting in the next congressional and municipal elections.
- The PID population is more critical when evaluating governmental performance in the supply of services to the population than the national population. However, the assessment of governmental policies is similar in both populations, although a slightly larger proportion of PID beneficiaries perceive better governmental performance in all of the indicators observed. In both populations, the great majority perceives that the government almost never or never complies with the 36 laws, treats everyone equal, or delivers what it should. In addition, the majority perceives that the government almost never or never attempts to reduce differences between the wealthy and the poor or is sensitive to what the people want and need. In other words, little or no will is perceived to eradicate poverty and reduce social inequality.
- Despite the better assessment of governmental policies by the PID population, data reveal a greater rejection of corruption and abuse of power among the PID population than among the citizenship in general, expressed in rejection of clientelistic policies. However, paternalism remains and is accepted by the majority.
- The population's willingness to change power relations is expressed among the PID population as well as among the general population. The legislation that seeks to increase the representation of women in elective positions of the state apparatus has the support of more than four-fifths of both populations, and represents the most consensual reform. Reducing the power of the President of the Republic has the support of only a little more than half of the PID population and a minority of the general population.

- Among the beneficiaries of the PID, there is a greater proportion of people who wish to increase the power of neighborhood, community and farmer organizations than in the general population, but the proportion that wishes to strengthen the power of mayors and aldermen, as well as unions, has less support and is slightly lower than in the general population.
- The reform of the constitution through a Constitutional Convention, with the option of including, in addition to the persons elected for the purpose, congressmen, congresswomen, and senators, is reaching an almost generalized consensus in the PID-participating population and a very high level of support among the general population.
- Support for rejection of presidential reelection is high among beneficiaries of the PID, while it hardly exceeds half in the general population. The populations are divided and lack broad consensus on important issues on the political reforms agenda that have to do with election processes and ideal mechanisms to conduct the election of presidents and JCE judges.
- There is generalized acceptance of the political role of women among the population influenced by the PID, and the general population. This acceptance is based on an appraisal of women's capacity to rule that is widespread among the people who participated in PID programs, where nine out of each 10 persons deem that women have equal or more capacity to rule than men; that ratio is a little less than two-thirds of the general population.
- The perception of equal opportunities for women to obtain good jobs and receive the same salaries is lower among the PID population, although the difference is not very significant. A large proportion of both populations perceive equality in terms of achieving a good education.
- The PID had an important indirect impact on the associations to which PID participants belong. The scale of institutionality, constructed with eight indicators shows the majority of the groups in a high category. However, democratic participation within the groups themselves is still weak. In more than half of the associations, the vote to elect directors is not secret and a third of the executive committee is elected through collective nominations. Their leaders are always or frequently the same people, and their bylaws allow reelection more than once. In two of five associations, the important decisions are made by the leaders with no participation of the members.
- A third of the population of direct PID beneficiaries believes that it is possible to participate in open town hall meetings (*cabildos abiertos*), and a slightly smaller percentage has done so.
- The personal and subjective appraisal of the PID activities by those population directly benefiting from its programs is impressive. Eight of 10 participants report that their way of thinking changed as a result of their participation in the programs. Most of them say

the programs have had an impact on their family life. The impact inside the community organizations is mainly reported as an increase of internal democracy within the associations and the forming of alliances. Among political activists, one-third reports an important increase in democratic practices of political parties.

Participación Ciudadana (PC)

- The gradual engagement of civil society in the Dominican Republic and USAID funding to civil society organizations were based on the limited capabilities of government institutions, little credibility of public officials and politicians, and insufficient public accountability. Since government institutions were not appropriate choices in the 1990s for a political reform program, USAID opted to focus its attention and funding on key Dominican civil society organizations. PC was identified as one of them.
- Capacity in civil society grew in the 1980s during the early years of the democratic transition, and a significant achievement in the 1990s was the integration of this evolving civil society capacity into a focused political reform program that the USAID Mission in Santo Domingo prioritized for funding throughout the 1990s. This funding reached PC in 1995 and expanded in 1997.
- A decisive programmatic objective of USAID democracy strategy in the mid-1990s consisted of civil society advocacy for political reform largely based on high-profile issues of national interest. This was the case with election monitoring in 1996, 1998, and 2000. This part of the strategy relied heavily on the electoral work of PC and capitalized on the attention of the country in the 1996 electoral process as a result of the disputed general elections of May 1994 and the signing of the Pact for Democracy in August 1994.
- In 1995–96, USAID developed, with PC, a civil society-based election monitoring effort and allocated funding through the PID and GAD. The newly created *Red de Observadores Electorales* was highly effective in deploying electoral observers nationwide in 1996 and accurately predicting electoral results with its quick count.
- USAID has collaborated with a civil society leadership that is essentially a modernizing force from business, professional, and intellectual groups. They come primarily from a cross-section of the middle and upper-middle class. This civil society-based modernizing elite shares a commitment to democratic reforms, and its dialogue and negotiations with key political decision-making groups have been critical for the success of their activities. This is certainly evident in the area of electoral observation, where PC activities have been highly successful.
- In spite of the elite-based nature of the USAID-funded organizations like PC, they collaborate with organizations of diverse social backgrounds and regions in the country. For instance, PC relies heavily on many social organizations nationwide to establish the network of electoral observers. This provided the linkages between the USAID programs and organizations and larger segments of Dominican society.

- As a result of its electoral monitoring efforts, PC developed a following among many concerned citizens who wanted to participate politically but disliked traditional forms of participation through political parties. The large number of young people and women recruited as electoral observers serve as examples.
- PC, however, remained a relatively small organization in terms of formal membership. While many of those who participate in PC activities may feel that they are PC members, the reality is that only a small number of them are active, dues-paying members. In this regard, PC is an elite organization with the capacity to mobilize large numbers of volunteers.
- The technical capabilities and know-how achieved in great measure as a result of USAID financial support has been critical to the political legitimacy and credibility of PC.
- The training of electoral observers and the accuracy of the quick counts (both costly programs) have served to substantiate the nonpartisan nature of PC.

Fundación Institucionalidad Y Justicia (FINJUS)

- Civil society was seen as an important element in promoting and monitoring judicial reform.
- The Rule of Law (ROL) civil society activities were aimed at supporting the achievement of the general objectives of the USAID/Government of Dominican Republic Bilateral Agreement and USAID ROL Program results framework, but there was not a specific ROL civil society strategy under which activities were carried out. Besides, the fact that USAID did not use a conventional procurement mechanism (i.e., neither a grant nor a cooperative agreement) made it difficult to identify the activities primarily attributable to USAID support and to measure their level of impact.
- Civil society ROL initiatives were mostly successful, but their impact was often limited by their diffuse and sporadic nature, with the exception of those focused on criminal procedure reform.
- There is a perception that the impact of judicial reform to date only serves the elite and that the scope of the reform is decided by a very few.
- There is also a perception that USAID always works with the same ROL civil society organizations and that these organizations are elite (small clubs with limited access)
- FINJUS is perceived as a think tank, not representative, but with strong credibility in the political and legal communities. Nevertheless FINJUS is viewed as supportive of the democratic reform process.

- No women's groups are actively involved in the ROL civil society activities. Nevertheless, some activities focused on or benefited women. The Public Defense Program at FINJUS, for example, provided legal counsel to several women and some seminars focused on specific women's issues such as domestic violence and the implementation of the Law 24-97.
- The absence of a lead NGO in the anticorruption arena is a serious handicap in the fight against corruption. In this area, FINJUS, PC, *Asociación Dominicana de Abogados Empresarios (ADAE)*, *Asociación Nacional de Jóvenes Empresarios (ANJE)*, and others want to follow but not take the lead.
- USAID funding is perceived as very positive. It has allowed FINJUS to have a more active role in justice reform and has balanced the organization's agenda, which otherwise would have concentrated on defense of private-sector interests.

Institutional Capacity Review

- There exists a large and heterogeneous NGO community in the DR, ranging from virtually single-person entities to large and complex organizations with budgets in excess of US\$1 million.
- Many and perhaps most NGOs are "sustainable," at least on a subsistence level. With several notable exceptions, their individual impact is marginal, but as part of a network they have the institutional strength to be able to contribute measurably to the sustainability of democratic processes.
- The overwhelming majority of NGOs has a minimal resource base, but still continue to exist, however marginally.
- NGOs have mixed management and institutional capacities. Not surprisingly, the larger organizations tend to be much stronger and better managed, although not always. In general, however, only a handful has the institutional capabilities to manage significant donor-supported projects.
- A secure NGO financial base cannot necessarily be equated with effective management.
- Many NGOs receive government funding, but most do not. There is no official definition of an NGO, or of the different types that exist. In addition, as there are scarcely any criteria for government funding, this has made it easy for many self-proclaimed NGOs to qualify for state support.
- Most NGOs are characterized by a highly personalistic leadership style and tend to be single-issue groups. Even so, many are involved in civil society types of activities, attempting to influence public decisions that impact their issues and constituents.
- Extensive NGO networking exists, which has resulted in a much greater impact on developing civil society and the political processes than otherwise would have been the case.
- There remains a need to develop a workable alternative to sustain PID's activities after March 2002.

I. INTRODUCTION

Since the late 1980s, USAID’s Democracy and Governance assistance program gained importance as many countries in Latin America, Asia, Africa, and Eastern Europe democratized. With the purpose of reforming entrenched authoritarian practices in governmental institutions, international donors found in civil society many organizations eager to engage in democratic advocacy. Thus, in the process of transition to democratic rule, civil society organizations (whether civic groups or professional nongovernmental organizations—NGOs) played a key role in weakening authoritarian regimes and promoting democracy. Human rights groups, labor unions, and women’s organizations were particularly important in these efforts. To carry out their activities, many of these organizations came to depend heavily on public and private international assistance. And as more were formed, and issues to be addressed expanded, the need for international assistance increased.

Elections posed the first major test. The end of authoritarian regimes required, among other key steps, that free and competitive elections be held. Yet, no adequate civil society institutional infrastructure existed in many countries, nor was there much governmental willingness to provide for a fair electoral process. As a result, election monitoring became key in transitions to democracy, as well as in subsequent elections in countries where political polarization and mistrust were extreme. Institutions such as the United Nations (UN), the Organization of American States (OAS), the Carter Center, the National Democratic Institute (NDI), the Center for Electoral Promotion and Assistance (CAPEL), and the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES) provided technical assistance and sent observation delegations to various Latin American countries during the 1980s and 1990s.¹

In June 2001, the U.S. Agency for International Development/Dominican Republic (USAID/DR) contracted Checchi & Company Consulting, Inc. and its subcontractor DevTech Systems, Inc. to conduct an assessment of the Strengthening Civil Society Project. The purpose of this assessment, as stated in the Scope of Work, was:

“...to measure the impact of the Democratic Initiative Project and the different programs that [the] USAID Mission in the Dominican Republic has implemented to promote the development of a politically active civil society in support of democracy.”

A. Objectives

The objectives were to:


- Provide, based on the 10 years of USAID/DR experience, an assessment of the impact of its investment in civil society;
- Offer input that will help the Mission shape its next five-year strategy (2002–2007);
- Share with USAID/DR’s partners and colleagues lessons learned and best practices; and

¹ Kevin Middlebrook (ed.). *Electoral Observation and Democratic Transitions in Latin America*. La Jolla: Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, University of California, San Diego, 1998.

- Provide lessons learned and best practices on how other Missions around the world might address issues of democratic development through civil society.

For international donors, the options were to do nothing or to help bring about reforms that would make governments, electoral officials, and political parties more accountable. Some, including USAID, opted for the latter. In the midst of a process of economic globalization and transition from authoritarianism, it was important for major international players to secure relatively smooth political transitions to democracy. Domestically, pro-democracy groups faced the choice of accepting international funding to conduct their activities or rejecting it and most likely perishing. In this context, there were both demand and supply factors that accounted for the increasing level of international aid geared to democracy assistance, a significant portion of which was channeled through civil society organizations. The United States, for instance, devoted about one-third of its democracy assistance, or about \$100 million a year, to civil society in the 1990s.² In the Dominican Republic, this was reflected at the USAID Mission level in the Strengthening Civil Society Project.

USAID’s Strategic Objectives and Intermediate Results



B. Caveat

Since this assessment was originally conducted, events have transpired that will undoubtedly color some of the conclusions and recommendations. Therefore, it is important to interpret the report in terms of the period in which it was researched and written in late 2001.

² Marina Ottaway and Theresa Chung. “Debating Democracy Assistance: Toward a New Paradigm,” *Journal of Democracy*, Vol.10, No. 4, 1999, pp. 99–113.

II. BACKGROUND

Since 1962, numerous attempts have been made to establish a democratic system in the Dominican Republic. Yet Dominican politics have been dominated by the near-absolute control of the country by the executive to the detriment of democratic governance and modernization.³ In the early 1960s, attempts to establish a workable democracy failed, culminating in a civil war and the United States military intervention of 1965. The rise of Joaquín Balaguer to power in 1966 was yet another obstacle to the establishment and consolidation of democracy. Balaguer ruled until 1978, using a combination of political repression, economic modernization, and government clientelism. Competitive elections in 1978 marked the transfer to an electoral democracy, but this transition coincided with an economic crisis that deepened in the 1980s. During this period, the elected governments of the Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD) failed to bring about economic and political reforms needed to promote sustained economic growth, alleviate poverty, reduce income inequality, and consolidate democracy. The PRD eventually was defeated in the 1986 elections in the midst of growing popular discontent with the state of the economy and increasing evidence of government corruption. The accession of Balaguer to power again in 1986 posed new problems for democratic development. The new Balaguer government was less repressive than in the past, but not enthusiastic about seeking transparent and clean elections. Both the 1990 and 1994 elections were plagued by charges of fraud by opposition parties, and on both occasions Balaguer was reelected in highly disputed races. In addition, clientelistic- and patronage-based politics and ineffective government offered little hope for the kinds of political and policy changes that could lead to a consolidated democracy.

Within this environment, the Dominican Republic faced a major challenge to its putative electoral democracy in 1994. The reelection of Joaquín Balaguer in May 1994 was seen as fraudulent by many Dominicans and international observers alike and threatened to throw the Dominican Republic into political chaos.⁴ The existing political leadership seemed unwilling to or incapable of implementing the reforms necessary to guide the country out of political instability, and Dominican civil society's capabilities to participate in and advocate reforms were still inchoate. Yet there was evidence that business, civic, labor, and church leaders were interested in participating in the reform process to consolidate democracy. Since the late 1980s, Catholic Church representatives had discussed in the so-called "*Diálogo Tripartito*." Moreover, USAID/DR understood the importance of the role of civil society to promote a reform plan and help strengthen an incipient democratic system, and was already providing funds to that end. With Balaguer resisting change, and political parties plagued by vertical leadership and clientelism, strengthening Dominican civil society appeared to be the only alternative for a democratic reform program.

³ Rosario Espinal. "The Dominican Republic: An Ambiguous Democracy," in Jorge Domínguez and Abraham Lowenthal (eds.), *Constructing Democratic Governance: Latin America and the Caribbean in the 1990s*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996. Rosario Espinal and Jonathan Hartlyn. "The Long and Difficult Struggle for Democracy," in Larry Diamond, Jonathan Hartlyn, Juan Linz, and S. Martin Lipset (eds.), *Democracy in Developing Countries: Latin America* (Second Edition). Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1999.

⁴ Rosario Espinal. "Electoral Observation and Democratization in Latin America," in Kevin Middlebrook (ed.), *op. cit.*

Over a period of a little more than 10 years (1990–2001), the USAID Mission in the Dominican Republic increasingly supported civil society. In the early 1990s, it built a broad program to promote a democratic culture through civic education (the Democratic Initiatives Project or *Proyecto de Iniciativas Democráticas*—PID). It then moved to develop and strengthen the engagement of civil society leadership in key political reform activities capitalizing on reform needs that became evident in 1994. This program was implemented through the Group for Democratic Action (*Grupo de Acción por la Democracia*—GAD) and Citizen Participation (*Participación Ciudadana*—PC).

In 1991, the Mission’s Country Development Strategy Statement (CDSS) for 1992–1996, emphasized two major development objectives: achievement of broad-based, sustainable economic growth and strengthening of a stable, democratic society. The CDSS presented important changes of emphases over the previous four years (1986–1990). First, the Mission would foster macroeconomic stability within the framework of the structural reforms implemented by the government of the Dominican Republic in 1990. Second, the Mission would increase its efforts at strengthening democratic institutions and processes. These two objectives were seen as complementary, with political democratization serving also to facilitate economic reform.

Building on its long-term engagement with nongovernmental organizations in the provision of development services and programs, which dates back to the early 1960s, the Mission initiated its strategy of strengthening civil society capacity for advocacy and democratic culture. USAID worked through various sector development programs to strengthen civil society capacity to bring about economic and political reforms. These goals also became an integral part of the U.S. Embassy’s objectives in the Dominican Republic, which emphasized the consolidation of democratic institutions and practices and a more open economy to encourage international trade and investment.

To achieve these goals the Mission designed and implemented several civil society-based projects. The pillar of this new strategy was the PID, funded through a Cooperative Agreement with the *Pontificia Universidad Católica Madre y Maestra* (PUCMM), established in 1992 for 10 years with a total budget, originally, of US\$9.7 million. Two other cooperative agreements for democracy assistance were instituted later: Strengthening Civil Society I (SCS I) in 1995 and Strengthening Civil Society II (SCS II) in 1997.

The electoral fraud of 1994 and Balaguer’s resistance to democratizing and modernizing Dominican institutions provided the context for USAID to strengthen its civil society approach to political reform in the mid-1990s. The Pact for Democracy, signed in August 1994, in the midst of a severe electoral crisis, called for a reduced presidential term for Balaguer and the holding of new presidential elections in 1996, thus opening a window of opportunity for change. Immediately, USAID began the design of its Strengthening Civil Society Project to assist in the electoral process with the formation of a citizens’ coalition for fair elections, the organization of national electoral observation, and the development of a reform agenda that would reflect the priorities of civil society organizations nationwide. There is widespread agreement among analysts that civil society played a key role in securing fair and transparent elections in 1996. This successful experience led in 1997 to the Strengthening Civil Society II Project, which

sought to secure successful congressional and municipal elections in 1998 and ensure clean and fair presidential elections in 2000.

USAID and other U.S. funding sources were crucial to the important role that civil society played in ensuring clean elections in 1996 for president, in 1998 for congress and municipal governments, and in 2000 for the presidential race. Civil society organizations participated actively in monitoring these elections, making sure that the government and political parties complied with the agreement to hold fair elections; they also drafted an extensive national reform agenda that listed many of the concerns of civil society at the national and municipal levels. The USAID civil society program was also instrumental in positioning civil society organizations for other specific reform agendas. For instance, civil society played a key role in the appointment of a new Supreme Court in 1997 by pressuring the government to hold a transparent and competent selection process and suggesting names of possible appointees. The empowerment of Dominican civil society was also evident in early 1998 when President Leonel Fernández held a National Dialogue with hundreds of civil society organizations to set priorities for socioeconomic and political reform.

The Mission's civil society projects vary in their goals. The PID concentrates its work on civic education, civil society participation in electoral activities, and some political reform advocacy. As the political culture surveys conducted in 1994 and 1997 under the auspices of the PID well illustrate, changes in political culture do not happen quickly. As is discussed in this report, the surveys show that many Dominicans continue to hold authoritarian values after 20 years of electoral democracy. Yet, a very positive outcome of the PID has been the development of a network of civil society organizations engaged in democratic education and advocacy that now could possibly continue to work together, and the activism of reform-minded middle-class leaders with ties to various civil society organizations. The SCS I Project focused on electoral work to secure fair elections in 1996 and was highly successful. Funding the Action Group for Democracy, a coalition representing business, labor, and church groups, was essential in bringing together recognized leaders to persuade the Balaguer government to comply with the terms of the Pact for Democracy. Funding the National Network of Electoral Observers (*Red Nacional de Observadores Electorales*) was also important in preventing fraud at the polling stations. The 1996 elections were indeed the first undisputed elections of the past 30 years.

Lessons learned in this study reveal that USAID's engagement with civil society in the Dominican Republic was largely a result of the lack of capability of government institutions, little to no credibility in their operations, insufficient accountability, and the growing capacity of civil society organizations to advocate change. An essential element of the Mission's civil society political reform program was the recognition that in order to be successful, USAID and civil society had to interact at a different level of engagement than programs in the past. The new approach was essentially developed interactively with key elements of a middle- and upper-middle-class segment of civil society around 1990–91, and led to the formulation of the PID project. The new style of engagement had to address political issues of sovereignty and neutrality and, in order to work, the process had to be transparent and highly consensual. The responsibility and ownership of the program and its management practices were to be essentially Dominican; that is, the program would have to be accountable both from the perspective of USAID and in light of close scrutiny of Dominican civil society leadership.

In its efforts to contribute to a successful electoral process in 1994, USAID had signed an agreement with the Electoral Board in 1993, providing financial assistance for the reorganization of the administrative functions and improving the technical capabilities of electoral offices as well as for the establishment of a new voting registry. The International Foundation for Electoral Systems was chosen to provide technical assistance to the Dominican Electoral Board in 1993–94. With the economy stabilized, new electoral laws in place, a new voting registry, and an improved computing facility at the Electoral Board headquarters, the 1994 elections were expected to be reliable.

The inauguration of the Balaguer government in 1994 on the brokered terms of the Pact for Democracy opened some opportunities for changes and the possibility for a greater role for Dominican civil society. However, there was no certainty that Balaguer would comply with the Pact, and USAID could not trust Balaguer to promote democratic change or to cooperate with a policy that would lead to his own political demise in 1996. Also, party competition could not be counted on to bring about a smooth transition in 1996. Political parties had relied on clientelism and patronage as a major basis of support for decades, and personalistic leadership was likely to play a key role again. Similarly, other institutions of government were extremely weak and the toll of clientelistic and patronage-based politics favored by government institutions meant that it was unlikely that the government would or could participate in a major reform agenda. Moreover, the newly appointed Electoral Board, while a sound foundation for fair elections given the good reputation of its members, sought to keep its independence from all groups, including the USAID Mission, in view of the controversies surrounding the 1994 elections and the accusations of U.S. interventionism by ultranationalist elements in Dominican politics.

The option for the Mission was to intensify its support of civil society in an effort to strengthen the opportunities for political change and monitor the process leading to the 1996 presidential elections. Civil society may have been the only avenue available for the Mission at this stage of political reform and regime change, and there were substantial uncertainties and risks as well.

The success of the 1996 elections can be attributed to several factors:

- The appointment of honorable judges to the Electoral Board;
- The Board's improved administrative and technical capabilities;
- International expectations of a fair election; and
- The increased activism and vigilance of Dominican civil society in support of free elections.

For the first time, civil society organizations played an active role in proposing names of Electoral Board members, participated actively in educating citizens on electoral issues through workshops and mass media campaigns, organized a national network of electoral observers, and formulated a national reform agenda. There is little question that USAID's strategy to promote civil society as the major means for strengthening democracy in the DR was working.

III. METHODOLOGY

A. Methods

Several standard methods were used in collecting data for the assessment. These included:

- **Document Review.** Scores of documents were reviewed, including contract agreements, annual reports, bylaws, budgets, organizational charts, bulletins, previous evaluations, internal activity assessments, audits, and newspaper articles (see Bibliography).
- **Focus Groups.** Twenty-two focus groups were held throughout the country with PID subgrantees and PC electoral observers. Participants in the PID focus groups included program beneficiaries from a broad spectrum of organizations, socioeconomic classes, and professions.
- **Survey.** The *Centro de Estudios Sociales y Demográficos* (CESDEM) was contracted to carry out a nationwide survey of PID beneficiaries and PC electoral observers. Of a total proportional sample of 1,200 direct PID beneficiaries drawn from a list provided by the PID, 962 were interviewed. One-third each were from the National District, the Cibao Central and Cibao Oriental region, and the Enriquillo subregion. The survey of electoral observers included a total of 800 observers from a nationwide—i.e., Distrito Nacional and the North, South, and East regions—sample of 1,000 in 39 communities or neighborhoods. (See Annex 6 for more details.)
- **Key Person Interviews.** One hundred eight-seven key persons in local and national government, the Congress, the judiciary, politics and political parties, the media, civil society, the NGO community, PC, Fundación Institucionalidad y Justicia (FINJUS), the PID, and USAID were interviewed using semi-structured protocols.
- **Observation Visits.** Several organizations were visited by evaluators, including 17 subgrantees and the three project organizations (the PID, PC, and FINJUS).
- **Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats (SWOT) analysis.** A “mini-SWOT” exercise was conducted with the PID staff to identify key organizational issues. This was done as part of the institutional review.

B. Report Organization

The assessment is divided into four sections: the PID, PC, FINJUS, and Institutional Capacity. The first three correspond to evaluation of the impact of the respective program. The fourth is a review of the institutional capacity of all of organizations, with emphasis on their sustainability. Each section is subdivided into background, findings, analysis, conclusions/lessons learned/best practices, and recommendations.

IV. OVERALL FINDINGS

As pointed out in the Background section of this report, the Strengthening Civil Society Program (SCSP) has resulted in a stronger civil society and growing democracy in the Dominican Republic. As a matter of fact, it has been a remarkable 10-year journey, and the vision and endurance of the USAID Mission is to be commended. Aside from the specific findings detailed in the analysis section in this report, as consistent with the Scope of Work, it is very important to note four factors, or findings, that were critical to the overall success of the SCSP and that were not contemplated in the Scope of Work.

There was consensus among the key people interviewed that USAID's role in the SCSP was essential to the development of and successes enjoyed by civil society in the DR. This was especially significant in its support for key institutions, the PID and PC in particular. The USAID strategy worked for several reasons, and provides valuable lessons learned, not only for civil society programs, but also in general.

- **Long-Term Strategy.** USAID/DR's foresight to support the initiative over a 10-year period was critical. It provided the necessary time to build the projects carefully, let them take hold, and eventually reach out to a broad and receptive public. USAID understood that it was vital for an initiative intended to change a political culture to have at least a decade in which to be implemented. Even now, old political habits and relationships die hard. The recent selection of three supreme court justices in secret revealed the constant need to support efforts to sustain civil society organizations in order to continue the campaign for a transparent, accountable, responsive, and democratic political system. USAID understands that developing and sustaining democratic processes is a work in progress.
- ***Medio Paso Atrás.*** USAID realized that an essential part of its strategy to promote democracy in the DR was to maintain a low profile, allowing its Dominican grantees to take the visible lead in pushing for democratic reforms. This *medio paso atrás* (or one step behind) strategy was able to confer legitimacy and credibility to the effort as a *Dominican* initiative and was key to its success.
- **Flexibility.** USAID understood the need to be flexible in carrying forward the SCSP. Given the fluidity of the political situation in the DR, it was essential for the Mission to support a "demand" rather than a "supply" driven initiative. This helped to build a momentum to sustain the initiative.
- **Image.** Perhaps the most interesting—and in certain respects most important—finding, was the impact the SCSP had on the image of USAID and the United States itself. A history of intervention in the DR created an understandable animosity toward the United States. However, in the course of the SCSP, this changed radically. In interviews with key Dominicans across sectors, it became evident that the SCSP had produced an unexpected result: The Mission's support of the SCSP, including its "one step behind" strategy, reversed the image of the United States. It was no longer viewed as a self-interested bully, but as a country promoting the political as well as the economic welfare

of the people of the DR. Interestingly, the evaluators initially did not ask any questions about the image of the United States in the interviews. These were unsolicited views.

In general, the impact of the SCSP has been positive and broad in scope. Although more needs to be done to consolidate the gains made to date, civil society has been strengthened and plays an increasingly important role in the political processes. Moreover, an institutional capacity to sustain civil society initiatives exists. The large majority of the civil society organizations (CSOs) and other NGOs visited in the course of preparing the assessment demonstrated an increasingly broad if still uneven ability to develop and manage programs. While most of these organizations are not CSOs per se, the areas of work they represent—e.g., environment, health, education, etc.—require them to be active participants at some point in the political/policymaking system. This has created a multiplier effect that was also part of USAID’s strategy. In addition, the development of networks of CSOs and NGOs has helped expand and sustain civil society efforts.

V. DEMOCRATIC INITIATIVES PROJECT (PID)

A. Principal Findings

- All of the evidence to date indicates that the PID has been exemplary in ensuring appropriate representation of organized segments of Dominican society at all levels: on the Advisory Board, among the groups of subgrantees, among the daily participants, and in other activities. More than that, the PID has helped to establish communication lines among many of these groups. For example, the Board has served as an important forum in which leaders of different sectors of the society can get to know each other better and work more collaboratively. As part of the emphasis on communication, the PID has organized meetings four times a year to enable beneficiaries to share experiences, lessons learned, and best practices.
- There has not been a perfect geographic and sectoral balance. There have been differences, which reflect to great extent weaknesses in civil society organizations in the different regions and sectors of the country.
- Many of the most important Dominican NGOs have been PID subgrantees, and this is how the PID has been able to provide crucial support to promote a reform agenda.
- The PID's support to subgrantee groups and institutions has, in many cases, helped in the establishment and/or support of NGO networks and grassroots organizations involved in important reform initiatives.
- There has been substantial synergy among the varied USAID programs such as the PID, Grupo de Acción por la Democracia (GAD) (in its time), PC, and FINJUS, and other civil society strengthening programs.
- The PID has played an important role in helping to attain, strengthen, and forge linkages among a variety of civil society groups. It has done this by several means, including its participation in the Advisory Board, contacts and ideas shared in the four annual meetings with the subgrantee institutions, and subsidized help provided by some subgrantees to new candidates for assistance
- Effective training in democratic values was crucial to the success of PID activities with its subgrantees and beneficiary population. This training covered several topics, such as rotation of leadership, promotion of participation in general, ethnic tolerance, understanding of gender issues, and tolerance of dissent.
- Although many community leaders have a long history of participation, most were never formally trained in group skills and procedures, such as codifying and managing internal regulations, parliamentary procedures, preparing agendas and action plans, keeping minutes and maintaining financial accounts. Acquiring these abilities through the PID has strengthened the management of civil society organizations and improved the

capacities of other subgrantee groups in achieving their goals. In addition, the training has created a more orderly and democratic environment within the organizations.

- CSOs have improved liaisons with other groups and have built coalitions. Administrative and organizational assistance, as well as support with external literature, is frequently crucial for CSOs. The establishment of horizontal liaisons through similar groups is also critical, encouraging them to exchange information among themselves and thus create an environment that improves collaboration. To the extent that the goals and purposes of these alliances are managed by the groups themselves (and these groups, in turn, have real roots in their communities) from bottom to top, the probability of being sustainable and mutually reinforced is enhanced.
- Subgrantees have committed to their public officials without being co-opted. The most effective commitment programs at the local level were those that were based on a prior community organization and on the discussion of the needs of the community, attempting intervention with public officials as an intermediate, instead of an initial step. At the same time, without an effective collaboration from the state, progress is difficult, and the risk of state interference continues to be a possibility.
- It has been especially effective to be able to integrate the staff and students of the Community Extension Department and Nordesteana University's (UCNE) Legal Department into PID activities. The students and the extension program staff participate in teaching and supervising activities, free of charge, wishing to attain legal status. This also helps to attain sustainability.
- At the conclusion of the PID, establishment of four subgrantee groups with common interests represents the best model of alliances and the possibility of sustainability. The consortia reflect heterogeneity of interests within the civil society and the need for specific and continuous actions to achieve democratic participation and reforms from several viewpoints. The greater level of organization established by networks through the so-called Municipality Consortium seeks citizen participation through the local municipal governments. The other consortia are oriented towards civic education in schools, state institutionalism through promoting the civil and administrative careers within state entities and farmer organization to enact a law to protect farmers. Continuing the PID—or its efforts—is based on the support these consortia can be provided and the momentum they can achieve.
- There were initial important differences between the national population and the people who directly participated in the PID. Noticeable among PID participants were their higher educational level, their higher level of political activism, and their tendency to belong to grassroots associations. The data do not offer enough evidence to conclude that the PID population were wealthier than the general population.
- The differences between the PID and non-PID populations represent a problem in assigning impact to PID interventions based solely on the quantitative results of the surveys due to the absence of a baseline. However, it is possible to state that the

differences in attitudes, values, and political practices are due to a synergy effect between the PID's interventions and a subpopulation that is more educated, political, and socially committed than the average voting population of the country.

- The vision of democracy among the general population is primarily one of enjoyment of freedom. Meanwhile for the population who participated in PID programs, the democratic vision of a distributive justice through a better distribution of wealth competes with this vision.
- Attitudes towards democracy differ. Among the PID population, fatalistic values significantly lower than the general population. The results reflect the effect the program has had in reducing paternalism and fatalism, and that this reduction is due not to the differences between the populations, which could have existed from PID's inception, but to the magnitude of the differences. The differences in attitudes remained when controlled by years of studies, area of residence, and gender of the person interviewed.
- Consistently, the population that participated in PID programs has a more critical view than the general population of the operation of Dominican democracy. A smaller proportion of PID participants perceive the existence of freedom of speech without fear of repression, and an even smaller proportion perceive the existence of equal opportunities. The great majority of the general population and the PID participants perceive that inequality among the rich and poor vis-à-vis the law represents the main threat to sustainability of the democratic system.
- Despite the high proportion of PID participants who belong to political parties, the perception of the role of the parties is rather negative. Almost two-thirds of both populations deem that parties only serve the purpose of participating in elections every four years and less than ten percent in both populations consider that the parties defend all groups of society.
- Being active in a political party does not depend on socio-economic variables such as educational level or household income among the PID population. Neither is such participation significantly associated with the profession of religious faith or lack thereof. However, the proportion of those active in a political party increases in the marginal areas and is higher among men. In both populations, political activism increases the proportion of people involved in political activities favoring democracy.
- The analysis of the populations' trust in governmental, political, and nongovernmental entities and institutions brings to light the latent issue of governance and the danger of the sustainability of democracy based on political parties. Individually, greater trust is assigned by the general population and the population participating in the PID to the Catholic Church and the media. On the other extreme, the institution perceived as the least reliable is the political parties. Most of the general population has no level of trust in the key governmental institutions.

- The PID population shows an interest in politics beyond the national interest. Likewise, the proportion of the PID population that reads, discusses, listens to, or watches news on politics is substantially greater than the proportions found in the national population.
- The participation of beneficiaries of the PID in traditional political activities is much greater in the five activities researched, as is participation in meetings to solve community issues, attendance at political party meetings, attempting to convince other people to vote for the candidate of their preference, and participation in activities of the accountability type such as protests, manifestations, strikes, or lockouts.
- The levels of acceptance of traditional political activities are equally important in both populations for legal-type expressions, the scope of acceptance decreasing with the accountability nature of the activity, which are rejected by the majority of both the general and PID populations.
- The levels of trust in the electoral system is greater among the PID population than the rest of the population. The PID population trusted more generally in the results of the 2000 elections and trusts more that the JCE (Central Electoral Board) can guarantee free elections in the year 2002, and a greater proportion is thinking of voting in the next congressional and municipal elections.
- The PID population is more critical when evaluating governmental performance in the supply of services to the population than the national population. However, the assessment of governmental policies is similar in both populations, although a slightly larger proportion of PID beneficiaries perceive better governmental performance in all of the indicators observed. In both populations, the great majority perceives that the government almost never or never complies with the 36 laws, treats everyone equal, or delivers what it should. In addition, the majority perceives that the government almost never or never attempts to reduce differences between the wealthy and the poor or is sensitive to what the people want and need. In other words, little or no will is perceived to eradicate poverty and reduce social inequality.
- Despite the better assessment of governmental policies by the PID population, data reveal a greater rejection of corruption and abuse of power among the PID population than among the citizenship in general, expressed in rejection of clientelistic policies. However, paternalism remains and is accepted by the majority.
- The population's willingness to change power relations is expressed among the PID population as well as among the general population. The legislation that seeks to increase the representation of women in elective positions of the state apparatus has the support of more than four-fifths of both populations, and represents the most consensual reform. Reducing the power of the President of the Republic has the support of only a little more than half of the PID population and a minority of the general population.
- Among the beneficiaries of the PID, there is a greater proportion of people who wish to increase the power of neighborhood, community and farmer organizations than in the

general population, but the proportion that wishes to strengthen the power of mayors and aldermen, as well as unions, has less support and is slightly lower than in the general population.

- The reform of the constitution through a Constitutional Convention, with the option of including, in addition to the persons elected for the purpose, congressmen, congresswomen, and senators, is reaching an almost generalized consensus in the PID-participating population and a very high level of support among the general population.
- Support for rejection of presidential reelection is high among beneficiaries of the PID, while it hardly exceeds half in the general population. The populations are divided and lack broad consensus on important issues on the political reforms agenda that have to do with election processes and ideal mechanisms to conduct the election of presidents and JCE judges.
- There is generalized acceptance of the political role of women among the population influenced by the PID, and the general population. This acceptance is based on an appraisal of women's capacity to rule that is widespread among the people who participated in PID programs, where nine out of each 10 persons deem that women have equal or more capacity to rule than men; that ratio is a little less than two-thirds of the general population.
- The perception of equal opportunities for women to obtain good jobs and receive the same salaries is lower among the PID population, although the difference is not very significant. A large proportion of both populations perceive equality in terms of achieving a good education.
- The PID had an important indirect impact on the associations to which PID participants belong. The scale of institutionality, constructed with eight indicators shows the majority of the groups in a high category. However, democratic participation within the groups themselves is still weak. In more than half of the associations, the vote to elect directors is not secret and a third of the executive committee is elected through collective nominations. Their leaders are always or frequently the same people, and their bylaws allow reelection more than once. In two of five associations, the important decisions are made by the leaders with no participation of the members.
- A third of the population of direct PID beneficiaries believes that it is possible to participate in open town hall meetings (*cabildos abiertos*), and a slightly smaller percentage has done so.
- The personal and subjective appraisal of the PID activities by those population directly benefiting from its programs is impressive. Eight of 10 participants report that their way of thinking changed as a result of their participation in the programs. Most of them say the programs have had an impact on their family life. The impact inside the community organizations is mainly reported as an increase of internal democracy within the

associations and the forming of alliances. Among political activists, one-third reports an important increase in democratic practices of political parties.

B. Background

Initially, the PID's goals were to promote efforts to strengthen Dominican democracy, specifically in three ways. First, a permanent education program for democracy was envisaged, especially to promote citizen participation. Second, a series of actions was promoted to support institutional reform and modernization of the state, with the purpose of enhancing efficiency and impartiality. And third, similar support was envisaged for changes of political institutions and parties. However, as observed in the mid-term evaluation, the lack of will on the part of the government to commit to a serious dialogue on policies to conduct reforms leading to the modernization of the state or a political/institutional renewal caused the PID to gradually emphasize goals focusing on education for democracy in the civil society, and in the individual and organizational sphere. Undoubtedly, these goals fit into the original program concept; nonetheless, they were initially seen as part of the set of more ambitious subprojects.

It is commendable that the PID was able to respond with flexibility to the circumstances it confronted, and the logic behind USAID's total evolution strategy of civil society is well defined in "USAID Mission to the Dominican Republic: A Civil Society Strategy," 1998. This document observes that due to governmental resistance and the vertical and clientele political parties in force, the civil society was the only apparent basis for an effective democratic reform. It is absolutely crucial to consider the political context of the 1990-1996 period to understand this point. And it continues to be true today that attempting to work with the state and the political parties can be an extremely frustrating experience.

Certainly, a number of important projects in the areas of reform and modernization of the state, changes in political institutions, and supporting public pressure for free and fair elections were consolidated by the PID. Some topics were addressed by other organizations; for example, matters dealing with "professionalizing" and strengthening the judicial branch by *Fundación Institucionalidad y Justicia* (FINJUS) and other groups, with the support of USAID. PID has retained an important focus on matters such as democratic decentralization and municipal reform, and has promoted the attention of others, such as the role of people's advocate.

Over the last years, the PID has retaken on the matter of applying the civil service act. Nevertheless, here, too, constraints are evident constraints imposed by the political context. Progress has been extremely limited in terms of applying the 1992 law. The party currently in power, PRD, is a massive political party with a large active base. Given the strong tradition of the parties to solve the economic needs of their militants through clientelism and use of state resources, the pressures the PRD exerts on the government to replace state employees with people loyal to the PRD (as well as to expand the state payroll in general) have been substantial and the political will to ignore them has been low. The PID has helped to consolidate programs that have at least enabled state employees to become aware of the civil service in the country and of employees' rights under such legislation. There has been important participation success in some local government. Through projects, events, and considerable information diffusion, the

country is more conscious of the need to establish municipal governments that are more open and responsible and to implement a process with greater participation to determine municipal expenses. There are also certain interesting experiments that advance this process, facilitated by the PID's consolidation. For example, the PID has consolidated several Solidarity projects in the areas of participation and municipal democracy. In addition to having worked with leaders of community organizations, Solidarity has also worked with the municipal authorities. In the municipality of Villa González, the municipal budget is now developed and spent in a more public, transparent, and participatory manner. This has been possible partly because the municipal authorities, especially the mayor, have been cooperative. But Solidarity Foundation has become the official economic advisor of the municipal government, and since most of its budget comes from state resources, there is a possible risk. At the same time, this is no doubt a valuable and interesting point of reference of citizen participation in the local government.

Sustainability will be a serious challenge. USAID's support of the PID for 10 years was unusual. Nonetheless, for the types of changes sought in the political and institutional infrastructure of the country, it is possible that a more sustained program is necessary. Moreover, of all of the Dominican institutions and NGOs, PUCMM may be well-prepared to make a concerted effort to sustain the PID, even if only at a reduced level. What are the options to consolidate such a program? The country has neither philanthropic tradition nor a legal or tax structure to provide incentives for this. Therefore, private sector support will probably continue to be limited and sporadic. In addition, the private-sector is not used to granting funds following the "half a step behind" policy, has been institutionalized in the case of the PID. Other international assistance agencies will probably not provide the same sustained level of consolidation, although it is an option that must be carefully explored by the PID's Advisory Board. Other forms of sustainability may be explored for the different consortia. The different interests and reforms the latter support may open a range of alternatives among the donor institutions.

C. Analysis

1. Representation and Methodological Aspects

During the 1992 to 2002 period, the PID has successfully implemented 203 projects, some of which represent different stages of programs with the same subgrantee. Decentralization and municipal strengthening were the predominant focus in terms of the total number of projects approved (66 projects). In addition, there were other major areas over the PID's 10-year project life: civic education projects in schools (21 projects), gender activities (20 projects), and the farming sector (19 projects). The initiatives covered all of the country's regions, though there was a tendency to focus on the most populated centers. Therefore, 56 projects were located in the National District, and 93 in the region of Cibao. The eastern region had the fewest projects (only six), and the southern region had a total of 31 projects. The PID projects reached 8,824 direct beneficiaries, two-thirds of whom were women, which is an interesting finding since conventionally it is the men who are more involved in politics.

In measuring impact, it is essential to take into account that PID projects aimed at democratic and civic education did not necessarily seek immediate and observable institutional changes. Rather, they sought:

- to build institutional networks and associations that may advocate and implement the programs;
- to develop and disseminate appropriate materials and methods; and
- to generate the infrastructure of values and attitudes necessary to sustain democracy and attain its long-term enhancement.

These goals are built into the greatest number of projects (133 of 206 projects, that is, 65 percent, see *9 Years*, p. 10), and have remained a priority for the project. The professional, serious, and transparent management of the PID has also had an important educational impact. For instance, its bylaws and regulations on conflict of interests have served as models for other organizations of Dominican society.

To assess the PID's impact, particularly with regard to grassroots organizations and subgrantees that received funds, visits were made to different sectors within the National District and different locations in the provinces of Duarte, Salcedo, Espaillat, Santiago, La Vega, Monseñor Nouel, Sánchez Ramírez, Barahona, Baoruco and Independencia. Group interviews were conducted with the directors of subgrantee institutions, as well as with 13 focus groups composed of representatives from the grassroots organizations that were direct beneficiaries of the PID.

In addition to the qualitative methodology, the PID's assessment applied a survey to one of the direct beneficiary samples of recent PID programs and of programs that had been finalized for several years. This instrument kept the main survey questions on national political culture (DEMOS 2001) for comparison purposes. Furthermore, 35 questions were added to the instrument on grassroots associations in which direct PID beneficiaries participated. Thus, the methodology was intended to measure the impact not only in terms of values and practices of individuals, but within the community groups where these persons have a bearing.

The questionnaire used is included in Annex 5 and the simple design used to structure the sample is included in Annex 6. A sample was planned of 1,200 direct PID program beneficiaries: 400 from the National District, 400 from the central and northeast regions of the Cibao area, and 400 from the subregion of Enriquillo, in the southwest of the national territory. Samples of four to nine subgrantee organizations were also taken within each region. The size of the sample of each subgrantee institution was proportional to the number of total beneficiaries and the number of benefited men and women reported. The institutions focused on four types of projects: decentralization and municipal strengthening; civic education in schools; education of farmers; and projects oriented towards civil service and the administrative career.

The beneficiaries of the PID represent a population invited to participate in different programs of the PID's subgrantee NGOs due to personal characteristics of leadership to become teachers or students of specific schools that engaged in civic education and/or to occupy key positions in grassroots organizations. In other words, the population was either self-selected or guided by the NGO's, resulting in a multiplicative effect in the larger direct and indirect beneficiary population. When comparing the results of the DEMOS surveys, which measured political changes in the national population with a right to vote, with the PID's (ENPID) direct beneficiary survey, it is important to take into account the initial differences between both

populations; thus, the different measurements in the surveys cannot account mechanically for participation in PID programs. The PID population represents a more educated segment, with greater status and political and social leadership than the general Dominican population. PID programs typically selected persons with the expectation that they, in turn, would have a multiplying impact on a more extensive indirect beneficiary population.

The difficulty in measuring impact due to initial differences in the populations compared is partially obviated by the evidence provided by the qualitative data obtained through interviews and focus groups. Further analysis of qualitative data, as well as, like the additional subjective questions in the ENPID instrument on program impact, reveal evidence that the participants maintain that their participation in PID programs can account for a great change in their personal lives and in grassroots organizations. Therefore, methodological triangulation allows stating that the program had a greater impact than expected due to the synergic effect through a more educated selection and a population more socially and politically committed. In other words, the

Chart 1.1 Direct beneficiaries of subgrantee NGOs selected in the sample

REGION	SUBGRANTEE	PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION	
		%	Number
National District	Acción Comunitaria para el Progreso (ACOPRO)	27.4	87
	As. de Trabajadores del Estado (ATE)	7.9	25
	Centro de Estudios Sociales Juan Montalvo	31.2	99
	Centro Poveda	1.6	5
	Junta de Des. Comunal (COMA)	27.1	86
	Unión de Vecinos Unidos (UVA)	4.7	15
	Subtotal	100.0	317
	Percent of Total	33.0	
Provinces of the Central North and Northeast	As. para el Des. de la Prov. Espaillat (ADEPE)	10.7	31
	Asociación para el Desarrollo Inc. (APEDI) (Santiago)	10.0	29
	Campeños Federados de Salcedo (CAFESA)	11.4	33
	CEDEPAR	5.9	17
	CONCAMATI (La Vega, SR, Bonaó)	17.3	50
	Federación Reg. De Cooperativas (FECOOPCEN)	1.7	5
	Falconbridge Foundation (Bonaó)	14.2	41
	SOLIDARITY FOUNDATION (Villa González.)	13.8	40
	Universidad Nordestana (SFM)	14.9	43
		Subtotal	100.0
	Percent of Total	30.0	
Provinces of the South	CEAJURI (Barahona)	28.1	100
	FUSABI (Prov. Baoruco and Independencia)	8.7	31
	MUDE (Prov. Barahona, Baoruco and Pedernales)	34.0	121
	RADIO ENRIQUILLO (Enriquillo Sub region)	29.2	104
	Subtotal	100.0	356
	Percent of Total	37.0	
	TOTAL	100.0	962

PID was more effective because participants had better educational backgrounds, political conditions, and leadership abilities than had the persons been selected from the population as a whole, at random. This selection enabled the participants to capture and appropriate the messages of PID programs more effectively, thus enhancing knowledge, levels of awareness, and participation in political activities, as seen further.

Chart 1.1 shows the sample obtained according to subgrantee institutions. It was not always possible to contact the exact persons of the estimated sample framework, and it possibly has a self-selection bias, given that the participants had to travel from their communities to predetermined locations to be interviewed.

In the PID sample shown in Chart 1.1, the National District makes up one-third of the population; the provinces of the northern region, 30 percent; and those in the southern region, 37 percent. This means that the southern region is slightly overrepresented and the northern region is slightly underrepresented.

Participation in the various PID programs among the sample selected for the survey is shown in Chart 1.2, by gender and area of residence. Participation data were reported by the people interviewed. The municipal strengthening activities (59 percent) are predominant in the population as a whole (15 percent) followed by farmers' programs (15 percent) and civil education in schools (9.9 percent). While 8.3 percent were identified with other types of projects.

Municipal strengthening activities are predominant in the National District (84 percent) and in the southern provinces (53 percent). In the provinces of the north, distribution was diversified. Municipal strengthening programs reach 37 percent, followed by farmer programs (28 percent) and civic education in schools (22 percent). In the southern region, 12 percent identified their participation in PID through broadcasting stations, and in the northern provinces, 2 percent. Gender differences are not so marked. Among women, participation in municipal strengthening programs has a higher proportion (61 percent) than among men (56 percent), while a greater proportion of men participate in farmer projects (19 percent versus 13 percent) and women in civic education projects (11 percent as opposed to 9 percent).

Chart 1.2 Participation in the PID per category of main program orientation, according to the area of residence and gender. ENPID 2001.

Program Type	Region			Gender		Total
	National District	Region North	Region South	Female	Male	
	National	North	South			
Civic Education / schools	5.5	22.4	4.4	10.7	8.6	9.9
Municipal strengthening	83.7	36.8	53.2	60.9	55.8	58.8
Broadcasting Stations		1.8	11.8	3.5	7.1	5.0
ATE Union	7.1	0.7	0.5	3.2	2.3	2.8
Farmers' Organization	0.6	28.3	18.4	12.9	18.5	15.2
Others	3.1	9.9	11.8	8.8	7.6	8.3
Total	100.0	99.9	100.1	100.0	100.0	100.0

The duration period of PID programs represents a variable of interest, because sub-grantee NGOs participated in more than one project during a period that extended for ten years. Chart 1.3 shows the duration of direct participants in PID programs, according to gender. A little more than half of the beneficiaries (53.2 percent) participated in PID programs for less than one year. Close to one-third (27.2 percent) participated for a period of one year. A minority participated in more than one project, extending the period of participation to two years for 7.4 percent and three or more years for 9.7 percent.

	Gender		Total	
	Female	Male	%	Accrued
Program Duration				
Less than 1 year	56.5	48.6	53.2	53.2
One year	24.7	30.8	27.2	80.4
Two years	9.1	5.0	7.4	87.8
Three or more years	9.7	15.6	12.2	100.0
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	

2. Initial Differences among the PID Population and the General Population of the 2001 DEMOS Survey

2.1 Socio-Demographic and Economic Variables

- **Age Groups and Occupational Category at the time of Survey**

The age distribution of the PID beneficiary population means as a group it is better placed in the labor market than the population of the DEMOS survey. However, the percentage of women in PID programs (59 percent) versus in DEMOS (49.7 percent), does make this population more vulnerable to discrimination in the labor market. Chart 2.1 shows the distribution of both populations by age group. The ENPID population is primarily distributed in two adult age groups ranging from 35 to 54 years of age (52 percent), while in the DEMOS survey, this age group only represents 35.5 percent of the population. The DEMOS survey population is younger and older than ENPID: 44.6 percent falling in the 18 to 34 years of age group, as opposed to 32.2 percent in the ENPID; and 10.2 percent over 65 years old versus 3.3 percent in the ENPID. Because of their age, the younger groups and the older groups find it more difficult to participate or stay in the labor market.

Chart 2.1 Percent distribution per age group. 2001 DEMOS and ENPID.

Age Groups	ENPID		DEMOS	
	%	Total Accrued	% Total Accrued	
18-24	11.6	11.6	17.5	17.5
25-34	20.6	32.2	27.1	44.6
35-44	30.0	62.2	21.6	66.2
45-54	22.0	84.2	13.9	80.1
55-64	10.9	95.1	9.7	89.8
65 and over	3.3	98.4	10.2	100.0
No Response	1.6	100.0	--	
Total	100.0		100.0	
Number	962		3091	

Chart 2.2 Percentage per occupational category. DEMOS 2001 and ENPID 2001

Work at Time of Survey	ENPID	DEMOS
Had work or job	64.8	60.1
Did not work outside household	35.0	39.9
No information	0.1	--
Number	962	3091
Occupation	ENPID	DEMOS
Free zone	19.7	6.7
Other private company	36.2	36.7
Public sector	--	10.1
Employer (1-3 employees)	0.8	3.3
Employer (4 or more employers)	1.6	1.3
Self-employed worker	31.6	39.6
Non-remunerated family worker	0.8	1.6
Other	9.1	0
No information	0.2	0.5
Total	100.0	99.8
Number	624	1857

A greater proportion of people have work in ENPID (65 percent) than in the DEMOS survey (60 percent), as shown in Chart 2.2. This is true despite the greater proportion of women in ENPID. Occupational categories show the proportion of workers in private companies reaching 36 percent in both groups, and a greater proportion of workers in the free zone in ENPID (20 percent as opposed to 7 percent in the DEMOS survey). The proportion of employers is higher in the DEMOS survey, with 4.6 percent employers, versus 2.4 percent in ENPID. Likewise, self-employed workers reach 40 percent in the DEMOS survey and 32 percent in ENPID. The slightly higher proportion of persons employed in ENPID does not mean greater income. In fact, the DEMOS survey population has a greater proportion of self-employed employers and workers, with greater possibilities for capital accrual.

- **Years of Education**

The PID beneficiary population has more years of education than the general population. Chart 2.3 compares the years of education between the direct beneficiary population of the PID and the population of heads of household and the general population measured by the 1998 Central Bank’s income and expenditure survey, as well as the population with a right to vote in the 2001 DEMOS survey.

A third of the ENPID population obtained at least a college degree, while at the head-of-household level only 10.8 percent reached that level in 1998 nationally and only 11.7 percent of the 2001 DEMOS survey. Likewise, ENPID shows that 29.0 percent obtained at least a high school degree. In addition, only 1.2 percent in the ENPID did not attain any school level, compared with 15.8 percent of the head-of-household population in 1998 and 9.6 percent in the 2001 DEMOS survey.

Chart 2.3 Differences in years of education between the 2001 ENPID population, the general population in 1998, head-of household population in 1998, and the DEMOS 2001 survey.

	ENPID	DEMOS	GENERAL POPULATION	Head-of-Household Population
Characteristics	2001	2001	1998 *	1998*
Level of Education				
None	1.2	9.6	20.3	15.8
Primary	37.0	54.7	55.8	55.2
Secondary and vocational	29.0	24.1	16.9	18.2
College	32.7	11.7	7.0	10.8
Total	99.9	100.1	100.0	100.0

*SOURCE: Central Bank’s Income and Expenditure Survey, Volume III, Santo Domingo, 1999.

The data on years of education are shown in Chart 2.4 by area of residence and gender for the DEMOS and ENPID surveys in 2001. Differences by gender are not marked in any of the surveys, but the differences per residence zone are. In ENPID, the population was subdivided in three study domains: the National District and the provinces with much incidence of PID in the northern and southwestern regions of the country. It was not possible to differentiate between rural and urban areas because PID programs did not establish difference. In the National District, 16.8 percent of the population with a right to vote attained some college degree and 28.2 percent some secondary degrees, among direct PID beneficiaries, 43.4 percent attained a college education and 31.1 percent had some secondary education level. On the other hand, while the 2001 DEMOS shows a great difference between the urban and rural subpopulations, in ENPID, differences between regions can be attributed to sampling differences more than differences between populations.

Chart 2.4 Level of instruction per residence zone and gender, DEMOS 2001 and ENPID 2001

	2001 DEMOS area of residence				2001 ENPID area of residence			
	National	Urban	Rural	Total	National	Northern	Southern	Total
	District	Other	Other		District	region	region	
Level of Education								
Did not go to school	6.5	6.3	16.3	9.6	0.3	1.5	1.9	1.2
Primary 1-5	19.2	26.7	42.8	30.1	7.7	14.7	19.2	14.0
Primary 6-8	29.4	23.9	21.8	24.6	17.5	27.6	24.4	23.0
Secondary	28.2	28.2	15.6	24.1	31.1	27.6	28.2	29.0
College	16.8	14.9	3.4	11.7	43.4	28.7	26.3	32.7
Total	100.1	100.0	99.9	100.1	100.0	100.1	100.0	99.9
	Gender							
	Female		Male		TOTAL			
	DEMOS	ENPID	DEMOS	ENPID	DEMOS	ENPID		
Did not go to school		9.8	1.2	9.4	1.3	9.6	1.2	
Primary 1-5		29.8	15.5	30.5	11.9	30.1	14.0	
Primary 6-8		23.2	22.5	25.9	23.6	24.6	23.0	
Secondary		24.8	27.5	23.5	31.2	24.1	29.0	
College		12.5	33.3	10.6	32.0	11.7	32.7	
		100.1	100.0	99.9	100.0	100.1	99.9	

- **Quality of Life and Level of Income**

Chart 2.5 shows indicators of quality of life and level of income for the populations of the ENPID and DEMOS surveys in 2001 and the household population according to the 1998 national household income and expenditure survey. The PID beneficiary population indicators for quality of life are better than the population of the DEMOS survey, when comparing the presence of household electrical appliances, although the differences are not very significant and could be explained by the access to electricity. The ownership of a private car, with a difference of 0.9 percent is statistically negligible.

Likewise, the indicators of housing units are similar and in most cases may be explained by sampling errors. Very poor houses with earth floors and/or thatched roofs are minimal in both populations. The PID population has a greater proportion of concrete roofs (34 percent as opposed to 26.9 percent) and block or concrete walls (66.8 percent versus 62.9 percent). The PID population, however, has less access to public water pipelines, reaching 67.2 percent as opposed to 72.3 percent in the population of the DEMOS survey. Both populations show an improvement with regard to the indicators measured in the year 1998 by the Central Bank survey, with the exception of water from the public pipelines, which reached 85 percent of the total households in 1998.

Chart 2.5 Economic differences between the ENPID 2001 general population in 1998, and DEMOS 2001

Percentage distribution of indicators of quality of life and household

	ENPID 2001	DEMOS 2001	Household at the national level 1998*
Characteristics			
Different indicators of quality of life			
Color TV	70.9	66.0	52.5
Refrigerator	78.5	69.4	58.4
Washer	70.0	61.3	42.8
Private automobile	17.3	16.4	9.0
Different indicators of housing units			
Cement floor	75.7	77.6	74.4
Earth floor	4.2	6.6	6.8
Block or concrete walls	66.8	62.9	56.2
Palm plank walls	4.7	10.1	15.8
Zinc roof	61.4	71.0	68.5
Concrete roof	34.0	26.9	ND
Thatched roof	1.5	1.1	5.2
Pipe water	67.2	72.3	84.8

Value of the average monthly basket in quintiles of expenditure, ENGIH 1998

Monthly household income*	ENPID 2001 (%)	Quintiles		Monthly Average Expenditure in RD\$
		Population (%)		
Les than 2,500 pesos	30.0	1	22.6	2,528.22
2,500 to 3,799	18.7	2	21.6	3,755.08
3,800 to 4,999	11.4	3	20.8	4,955.39
5,000 to 7,000	14.2	4	19.0	6,694.16
More than 7,000	24.8	5	16.1	13,271.38
No information	0.7			
Total	99.8	National	100.0	6,240.84

NOTE: *1998 Central Bank Income and Expenditure Survey, Volumes II and III, Santo Domingo, 1999.

NOTE: The 2001 DEMOS measured the individual income of each person interviewed, not the household income.

Income in the DEMOS and ENPID surveys cannot be compared because the DEMOS survey measured the individual income and ENPID measured the household income. Therefore, income is compared to the average monthly expenditure, according to five household quintiles measured in 1998 by the Central Bank. The analysis of these *data does not allow us to state that the PID population has higher monthly income per household than the population as a whole*. Rather, the data show a concentration of 54.8 percent of the households between two extreme quintiles, the indigent and the wealthiest, with a proportion of indigents with less than 2,500 pesos of 30 percent in ENPID and a lesser proportion of 22.6 percent at the national level of households with an average expenditure of 2,528. The three strata with incomes ranging from 2,500 to 7,000 pesos represent 44.3 percent in ENPID and 61.4 percent at the national level, with average

monthly expenditures from 3,755 to 6,694 pesos.⁵

2.2 Social Status

Social status has been measured through the marital status and skin color, according to the dominant values in Dominican society. The color of the skin is not a status differentiator between the populations. Figure 2.1 shows the results of the ENPID and DEMOS surveys in 2001. The ENPID population does not have a higher social status according to criterion of a lesser appraisal of black skin predominant in western culture and very particularly in Dominican culture.

The greater status of the PID population is evidenced in their greater proportion of legalized marital unions (37.2 percent) and relatively low consensual unions (27.8 percent) shown in Chart 2.6, while among the heads of households at the national level in 1998, 30.8 percent report legalized unions and 38.6 percent consensual unions. In the population of the 2001 DEMOS survey, the gap is even greater, with 42.6 percent consensual unions and only 25.5 percent legalized unions. The differences in the remaining categories are minimal and may be generated by sample errors.


Chart 2.6 Marital status of the 2001 ENPID population, the general population in 1998, and DEMOS 2001 population.

	ENPID 2001	DEMOS- 2001	GENERAL POPULATION 1998*	Heads of Households 1998*
Marital Status				
Consensual union	27.8	42.6	19.2	38.6
Legal union	37.2	25.5	14.5	30.8
Divorces	3.2	2.1	1.4	3.7
Separations	10.5	12.1	3.7	8.4
Widowhood	4.3	4.9	3.2	9.7
Never married	17.0	12.9	58.0	8.8
Total	100.0	100.1	100.0	100.0

*SOURCE: 1998 Central Bank Survey on Income and Expenditures, Volume III, Santo Domingo, 1999.

⁵ It is important to note that the PID study obviated using the socioeconomic strata index as an independent variable, which was used in the previous political cultural surveys. Rather than a socioeconomic strata index, the previous surveys selected eight indicators of household goods at random, and then an attempt was made to build a scale of standard of living, without including variables on the quality of the housing unit. The procedure arbitrarily assigned weight to the strata, and used no statistical method to establish the validity of the indicators selected and their corresponding weight. Thus, this index was excluded from the analysis.

Figure 2.1 Self-Perception of Skin Color



2.3 Religious Profession and Political and Social Activism

Religious beliefs and political or social activism practices depend on the individual's view of his or her environment and his or her place in society. Theoretically, the spheres of religion and politics coincide. They offer a vision of the world that determines an attitude and a specific practice. Chart 2.7 shows the religions of the 2001 DEMOS and ENPID populations.

Chart 2.7 Religion of participants according to the region of residence, 2001 DEMOS and ENPID.

Religion	DEMOS	ENPID	DEMOS	ENPID	DEMOS	ENPID	DEMOS	ENPID
	National	District	Urban	North	South	Southern	Total	Total
			other	Region	other	Region		
Without Religion	20.9	14.8	20.8	5.9	21.0	19.2	20.9	13.9
Catholic	67.5	72.3	66.4	90.1	69.3	61.4	67.6	73.2
Christian	11.6	12.9	12.6	4.0	9.6	19.5	11.4	12.9
Total	100.0	100.0	99.8	100.0	99.9	100.1	99.9	100.0

The population of ENPID shows a greater proportion of Catholics (73.2 percent versus 67.6 percent) and a lesser proportion of people with no religion (13.9 percent versus 20.9 percent). Other Christian religions do not differ significantly between the two populations. The analysis of the subpopulations of the DEMOS survey by area of residence does not reveal significant differences; in contrast, the geographic areas of ENPID differ due to their religious practice. Catholicism is predominant in the northern region (90.1 percent) while in the National District and the southern provinces it attains proportions of 72.3 percent and 61.4 percent respectively. In the southern provinces the proportion of persons with no religion (19.2 percent) or practice another Christian faith (19.5 percent) is greater than these same groups in the ENPID at large. The data illustrate that the differences in religious professions may be established by geographic regions, and not by rural or urban area of residence. The political practices of the populations are shown in Chart 2.8.

Chart 2.8 Percent distribution of the population by political activism and party sympathy, according to area of residence and gender, DEMOS 2001 and ENPID.

Level of party activism	2001 DEMOS				2001 ENPID			
	Residence Area				Residence Area			
	National	Other	Other	Total	National	Northern	Southern	Total
In a party	District	Urban	Rural	Total	District	Region	Region	Total
Is active	16.4	16.6	18.2	17.1	32.9	29.4	38.6	34.1
Sympathizes	46.6	44.4	47.7	46.0	36.3	41.2	37.0	37.9
Is not active or does not sympathize	36.2	38.2	33.5	36.2	30.2	29.4	24.4	27.8
Refuses to answer	0.7	0.8	0.5	0.7	0.6	0.0	0.0	0.2
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100
Level of party activism in a party	Gender			Gender				
	Female	Male	Total	Female	Male	Total		
Is active	12.8	21.3	17.1	31.2	38.3	34.1		
Sympathizes	46.9	45.1	46.0	39.6	35.5	37.9		
Is not active	39.9	32.6	36.2	28.9	26.1	27.8		
No answer/refuses to answer	0.5	0.9	0.7	0.4	0.0	0.2		
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100		

The data reflects that *PID direct beneficiaries differ markedly from the population with a right to vote in their levels of political activism*. Thirty-four percent of this population is active in a political party, in contrast with 17.1 percent of the population 18 or older in the general population. The population that neither is active nor sympathizes with a political party is greater in the voting population of the DEMOS survey (36.2 percent) than in the PID population (27.8 percent). The differences by regions or rural/urban zones are not marked and may not be statistically significant. Slightly higher proportions are politically active in the “rural other” of

the DEMOS survey and in the southern provinces of ENPID. In both cases, these are areas with greater levels of poverty (Morillo 1997; ENGIH 1999, Vol. V).

The analysis of political activism by gender indicates that men have greater levels of activism than women in both populations. In the DEMOS survey, 21.3 percent of the men are active in a political party, in contrast with 12.8 percent of the women. In turn, 31.2 percent of the women who are direct beneficiaries of the PID, are activists, compared with 38.3 percent of the men.

The social activism of the PID population is still greater than its political activism. This difference is due not only to the selection process, but also to the impact of the PID among the direct beneficiaries, given that the program motivated and educated its beneficiaries to participate in solutions and decisions at the community level. Figure 2.2 and Chart 2.9 show these differences.

Figure 2.2 Graph of membership in civil society organizations




Chart 2.9 Index of belonging to civil society organizations (active or not so active member) according to years of survey DEMOS 2001, 1997 and ENPID 200.

Index of belonging to civil society organizations*	DEMOS		ENPID
	1997	2001	2001
Participates in none	54.0	50.9	2.5
Participates in one	25.0	27.4	15.9
Participates in two	11.6	11.3	34.9
Participates in three or more	9.4	10.4	46.7
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
Number	2660	3091	962

NOTE: * Does not include belonging to political parties.

While in the general population of the 1997 and 2001 DEMOS survey, slightly more than half did not belong to any type of association, among the population directly benefited by the PID, only 2.5 percent did not belong to any association. The differences are also notable in the number of associations in which there is participation. In the 1997 DEMOS survey, only 21 percent participated in two or more associations, slightly increasing to 21.7 percent in 2001 in marked contrast to

participation by PID beneficiaries, 81.6 percent of whom belonged to two or more associations.

2.4 Conclusion

The comparative analysis of the populations of the 2001 DEMOS and ENPID surveys revealed important initial differences in the selection of participants in the PID educational projects. PID subgrantee institutions intentionally invited people with the capacity to act as multiplying agents and effectively influence a wider population of people who did not participate directly in the programs to participate in their programs. The main differences between the two populations are found in age, gender, years of education, social status as measured by whether or not marital unions were legalized, religious observation, profession, membership in associations, and political activism. There are no important differences in social status as measured by self-declared skin color, occupational categories, or quality of life as measured by different indicators of housing and ownership of private automobiles.

Among the most important differences are the educational level and the degree of political and social commitment of the PID population, however there are minimal differences in the level of income and standard of life, which is unexpected since a greater proportion of the PID population had completed more years of study. These specific characteristics of the PID population are due to the fact that subgrantee institutions selected mainly people with leadership skills, but they were primarily living in marginal and poor areas. These people tend to have greater educational levels than the rest of the population, although their standard of living cannot differ much from the standard of the neighboring population or the rural community where they reside. In addition, of the 32.7 percent who had some degree of college education, only 16.5 percent completed college, a difference that bridges the gap with the 5.1 percent of the subpopulation in the 2001 DEMOS survey who completed the college level.

Incomes could not be compared directly because the DEMOS survey measured individual income in lieu of the household income. Household income was compared to the expenditures of the 1998 family basket, and a greater concentration of poor households were found in the PID

population, with 30 percent of the people with household income under 2,500 pesos, as compared to 23 percent at the national level with an equivalent expenditure average. On the other extreme, the population directly benefited by the PID had a greater proportion of households with an income of 5,000 pesos (39 percent), greater than the general proportion of 35 percent with monthly average expenditure exceeding that amount. This difference may be explained by an additional 11 percent of people with college degrees in the PID population. In synthesis, taking the group of households and the indicators of quality of life and level of income, the data do not offer sufficient evidence to conclude that the PID population was wealthier than the DEMOS population.

The differences in the two populations in terms of years of study, political activism, and membership in associations do pose a problem in assigning impact to the actions of the PID, based solely on the quantitative results of the surveys due to a lack of baseline measurements. However, it is possible to infer that the differences in attitudes, values, and political practices that will be presented in the following sections are due to a synergy effect between the actions of the PID and the selection of a more educated and politically and socially committed population. This is so because, as stated in the methodological section, the qualitative data and the questions added to the instrument to measure the perception of the impact on the participants offer evidence of changes experienced by the population of direct beneficiaries due to participation in PID programs.


3. Difference in Values and Attitudes towards Democracy and Authoritarianism

3.1 Fatalism and Modernity

Surveys on political culture and democracy in the DR revealed two types of societies: a fatalistic and traditional society, in which daily events and social facts are attributed to fate, to powerful persons, to providence, or to the forces of nature or divinity; and a society marked by modernity, in which each person takes control of and responsibility for his or her life, acting under the conviction that he or she is capable of influencing events and the surrounding environment. The traditional society produces fatalistic and passive values, where the person feels he or she can do nothing to change the situation. On the other hand, modern values influence people to act and associate to change the social reality.

Behavior representative of a traditional society was associated in the DEMOS surveys to the acceptance of factors external to the person as determinant to act and seek solutions to personal problems and that of society. Three of the external indicators defined by the authors of the political and democratic culture surveys (DEMOS) are shown in Figure 3.1 and Chart 3.1 for the 2001 DEMOS and ENPID surveys. These show that the PID population follows the same pattern as the general population, although it is less conditioned by external factors. The predominant indicator in both populations is the belief that *a good president should be like a father who must be approached to solve one's problems*. In both populations, the majority agrees, although the PID proportion is lower at 63.5 percent, as compared to 85.9 percent in the DEMOS survey.

Figure 3.1 Indicators of state paternalism and fatalism in social and personal behavior. 2001 DEMOS and ENPID



Fatalism or impotence associated with the notion that nothing can be done to change the political and macroeconomic situation of the country prevails in the population of voters, with 56.2 percent agreeing that *no matter how much one wants to change things, everything will be the same*. But only 26.8 percent of the PID population agrees with this statement, a marked gap of 29.4 percent compared with the general population. The third indicator, alluding to the individual situation of the person, shows that the minority in both populations thinks that their progress depends on good luck (30.4 percent in the DEMOS survey and 13.8 percent in the PID survey). These three indicators, deemed as external factors in the DEMOS surveys, provide evidence that the PID population is significantly less fatalistic and paternalistic than the national population. Consequently, it is to be expected that the population that participated in the PID programs assumes greater social and political leadership and exercises greater control over their personal lives.⁶

Chart 3.1 shows the three indicators of externality for the subpopulations related to three categories of schooling and the area of residence. In both populations and for the three indicators there is a proportionally inverse relation between the amount of education and the indicators of externality, as anticipated. The population of the DEMOS survey shows greater levels of paternalism and fatalism in the rural population, while the PID population shows them higher in the southern region. The paternalist concept of the presidency is held by the majority of all of the subpopulations, including those defined by several areas of residence, the lower being in the PID population with 12 years or more of study and in that of PID beneficiaries

⁶ The DEMOS surveys shaped an index to measure externality using four indicators: the last two indicators shown here and the acceptance of the statements “the country’s problems can only be solved if God wills” and “governmental corruption and politics can never be changed.” In ENPID this index was not built in because the externality concept cannot be measured directly and pertains to the field of psychosocial measurements with validation and consistency methods that were not used by the DEMOS surveys. Such dissimilar results by these indicators show that the correlation of standardized variables would have been very low and the scale could not have been constructed with those variables using a conventional statistical method such as the factorial analysis of the method of principal components.

residing in the National District; both cases include 50 percent of the subpopulation. The lowest percentage accepting state paternalism lives in the National District in ENPID, but the other two indicators of externality are lowest percentage in the northern region. This inconsistency is due to the low correlation between the state paternalism indicator and the indicators of fatalism or absence of social and personal empowerment.

Reduced paternalism is greater in both populations among the groups with six and more years of study for the indicator that equates progress in life with good luck. In both surveys, the reduction in percentage is almost half, with little difference between the groups with more years of study than 6 to 11 and 12 and more. The reduction of the subpopulations per area of residence is not important between the National District and the other urban areas in the DEMOS survey, although it is significant among the different regions in which the ENPID population is subdivided.


Chart 3.1 Percentage of the population that accepts as determinants factors external to the person per years of study and area of residence. 2001 DEMOS and ENPID								
Indicator:	Years of Study						Total	
	0-5		6-11		12 and more		DEMOS	ENPID
	DEMOS	ENPID	DEMOS	ENPID	DEMOS	ENPID	DEMOS	ENPID
A good president is like a father who must be approached to solve one's problems	94.4	85.0	86.7	71.0	67.6	49.6	85.9	63.5
No matter how much one wants to change things, they will remain the same	61.0	41.4	59.3	27.6	40.7	21.1	56.2	26.8
Having good luck is the best way to advance in life	40.9	24.4	25.3	12.6	20.1	11.2	30.4	13.8
Number	1227	147	1232	380	631	435	3091	962
	Area of Residence						TOTAL	
	National District		Other Urban	Northern Region	Other Rural	Southern Region	DEMOS	ENPID
	DEMOS	ENPID	DEMOS	ENPID	DEMOS	ENPID	DEMOS	ENPID
A good president is like a father who must be approached to solve one's problems	80.8	49.5	84.2	67.6	91.8	72.8	85.9	63.5
No matter how much one wants to change things, they will remain the same	52.7	24.3	55.2	17.3	60.0	36.1	56.2	26.8
Having good luck is the best way to advance in life	26.0	12.3	27.2	11.3	38.0	16.9	30.4	13.8
Number	742	325	1347	282	1002	365	3091	962

In the population measured by the 2001 DEMOS survey, the difference in the presidential paternalism indicator is not significant when gender is distinguished, nor is it in the ENPID population. Chart 3.2 shows the results. In the two other indicators of fatalism or externality, there is no consistency in the results according to gender. In the ENPID survey, the proportion of men with fatalistic attitudes is consistently lower than the proportion of fatalistic women.⁷ The results demonstrate the effect the PID program has had in diminishing paternalism and externality indicators in the population, given that the differences with the DEMOS survey are significant and kept controlled by years of study, area of residence, and gender.

Chart 3.2 Percentage distribution of the population that accepts as determinants factors external to the person, by sex, DEMOS 2001 and ENPID 2001

Indicator:	Gender					
	Female		Male		Total	
	DEMOS	ENPID	DEMOS	ENPID	DEMOS	ENPID
A good president is like a father who must be approached to solve one's problems	85.6	64.9	86.1	61.4	85.9	63.5
No matter how much one wants to change things, they will remain the same	58.2	30.6	54.2	21.3	56.2	26.8
Having good luck is the best way to advance in life	26.9	14.9	33.9	12.1	30.4	13.8
Number	1,536	568	1,555	394	3,091	962

Using the same questions in the three DEMOS and ENPID surveys allows for the analysis of change of attitudes during the 1994—2001 period and the comparison of the two populations with different characteristics. Chart 3.3 shows the changes in attitude in the national population as compared to the results in ENPID. The



presidential paternalism indicator increased among the general population during the period indicated, from 76.4 percent to 85.9 percent, versus a lower proportion of 63.5 percent in the PID population. The second indicator—no matter how hard we try to change things, they will remain

⁷ Absence of consistency between both indicators is once more an indicator of the need to construct and validate a more appropriate scale of externality or fatalism.

the same—increased during the 1994—2001 period from 37.4 percent to 56.2 percent, while only 26.8 percent of the PID population feels impotent to change the state of affairs. This increase could be associated with deceptions suffered under the Dominican Liberation Party (PLD) in 1996 and then under the Dominican Revolutionary Party (PRD) in 2000. The indicator of fatalism or externality at the personal level declined during the period from 35 percent to 30 percent, and only includes 14 percent in the PID population. Figure 3.2 graphically shows these results.

Chart 3.3 Percentage of the population that accepts external factors as determinants, 1994, 1997, 2001 DEMOS and 2001 ENPID.

	DEMOS			ENPID
	1994	1997	2001	2001
A good president is like a father who must be approached to solve one's problems	76.4	81.8	85.9	63.5
No matter how much one wants to change things, they will remain the same	37.4	46.5	56.2	26.8
Having good luck is the best way to advance in life	34.9	34.9	30.4	13.8
Number	2,425	2,660	3,091	962

3.2 Sense Given to Democracy

The vision of democracy as distributive or social justice was contrasted with the liberal vision of enjoyment of liberties through the following question: *In general, what do you prefer, a better distribution of wealth albeit with less freedom or more freedom even though the distribution of wealth remains the same?* Chart 3.4 shows the results of ENPID and the DEMOS surveys. As anticipated, the population that participated in the PID programs straddled both options. While in the general population in 2001 the trend is to widen the gap in favor of more freedom (60.0 percent) versus better distribution of wealth (36.3 percent), in the PID population, the proportion that prefers more freedom declines to 48.4 percent and the one that prefers better distribution of wealth increases to 42.7 percent. The difference between both visions of democracy is only 5.5 percent in the PID population, contrasting with 23.7 percent in favor of more liberties in the national population.

Chart 3.4 Percentage distribution of the population according to preference between equity or more freedom per years of 1994, 1997, 2001 DEMOS surveys and ENPID 2001

	DEMOS			ENPID
	1994	1997	2001	2001
Social justice vs. freedom				
Better distribution of wealth albeit less freedom	37.8	37.7	36.3	42.7
More freedom even though the distribution of wealth remains the same.	56.4	58.3	60.0	48.4
Other/No answer/Refuses to answer	5.8	4.0	3.7	8.8
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Number	2,425	2,660	3,091	962

3.3 Authoritarian Attitudes

To measure authoritarian attitudes, three questions were retained in the surveys on political culture and are shown in Chart 3.5, including the question on presidential paternalism previously expressed as an indicator of external determination. The PID population expresses lower levels of authoritarianism in the three indicators analyzed. The vision of the president as a father figure who protects and solves problems has increased in the population as a whole, and may be associated with the clientelism practice in which the president of the Republic acknowledges supporters with favors and protects his voters. Although to a lesser degree than the general population (85.9 percent), almost two-thirds of the PID population is affected by paternalistic authoritarianism (63.5 percent).

Forty-three percent of the PID population and 61.1 percent of the national population prefer more order in society even in exchange for less democracy. Should this indicator be construed as a sign of authoritarianism in both populations? Definitely not. The correct interpretation is that the answer is affected by the instrument. It can be argued that in the Dominican context, impunity and noncompliance with the laws do not enable the institutionality of the state entities and the civil society, preventing the real exercise of democracy founded on a social consensus expressed in the law. The answer of “more order” in fact may mean more institutionality, exercising order beyond what the law purports, which does not mean less democracy but the possibility that the latter may be exercised.

Indicators of authoritarianism	DEMOS			ENPID
	1994	1997	2001	2001
A good president should be like a father who must be approached to solve one's problems	76.4	81.8	85.9	63.5
More order even though there is less democracy	66.5	64.7	61.1	43.6
Only the man or the woman should make the decisions in the household	58.9	59.6	54.9	22.0
Number	2,425	2,660	3,091	962

The third indicator that measures democracy within the family shows that in the national population the vision of a single person as “head” of the household prevails; in the majority of the cases, this means the man in the household. The PID programs sought to change authoritarian attitudes in the household, and the results show a great difference from the population as a whole. Only 22.0 percent of the PID population supported the authority of one single person, corresponding to 16.7 percent for men and 5.3 percent for women. In turn, 76.7

percent stated that both men and women must make the important decisions in the household, in contrast with 54.9 percent of the population as a whole.

Chart 3.6 shows the results of the 2001 DEMOS and ENPID in measuring the authoritarianism within the family according to diverse sociodemographic characteristics of the household. The indicator of authoritarianism within the family according to the gender of the person interviewed reveals in both populations that there are no important differences between the men and the women, but there are important differences between the two populations. In the general population, authoritarianism is high in both men and women, attributing to men the power of making decisions in the household (49.4 percent), while the same protagonist role is attributed to women in a much lower proportion (5.5 percent). In turn, only 16.7 percent of the PID population attributes the important decisions to men, and 5.3 percent to women. The great majority of men (78.9 percent) and of women (75.2 percent) assigns the important decisions to the couple as a whole, a proportion that in the DEMOS survey is much lower (42.1 percent men and 47.4 percent women).

Chart 3.6 Indicator of authoritarianism within the family according to the characteristics selected, 2001 DEMOS and ENPID

	Who do you think should make the important decisions in the household?											
	Men		Women		Men and Women		Other		Refuses/does not know		Number	
	DEMOS	ENPID	DEMOS	ENPID	DEMOS	ENPID	DEMOS	ENPID	DEMOS	ENPID	DEMOS	ENPID
Gender												
Female	45.3	16.4	7.2	7.0	47.4	75.2	0.1	1.2	0.1	0.2	1,536	568
Male	53.5	17.3	3.7	2.8	42.1	78.9	0.5	1.0	0.1	1.1	1,555	394
Area of residence												
National District	42.1	13.5	5.1	8.3	52.6	76.0	0.1	1.8	0.0	0.3	742	352
Other Urban /North	44.8	21.7	5.6	3.7	49.1	73.2	0.5	1.5	0.1	0.0	1,347	282
Other Rural / South	61.2	15.9	5.6	3.8	33.0	80.0	0.1	0.3	0.1	0.0	1,002	365
Years of Study												
0—5	--	31.3	--	5.4	--	63.3	--	0.0	--	0.0	--	147
6—11	--	20.3	--	6.3	--	72.9	--	0.5	--	0.0	--	380
12 and more	--	8.7	--	4.4	--	84.8	--	2.1	--	2.0	--	435
Total	49.4	16.7	5.5	5.3	44.7	76.7	0.3	1.1	0.1	0.1	3,091	962

The analysis of the indicator of authoritarianism within the family according to area of residence shows great differences between the two populations and its classes or subpopulations. In the DEMOS survey, 61.2 percent of the residents in the “rural other” classification assign the protagonist role to men, followed by the “urban other,” with 44.8 percent and the National District with 42.1 percent. ENPID shows the provinces of the northern region with the highest level of authoritarianism (21.7 percent), followed by the southern region (15.9 percent) and the National District (13.5 percent). But more than geographic area or gender, the greater differences in the ENPID are explained by years of study. The proportion of persons who assign

the protagonist role to men is greater among persons with no schooling or who finished first to fifth grade of elementary (31.3 percent), followed by those who attained from sixth to eleventh grade (20.3 percent); only 8.7 percent of the persons with 12 or more years of study assign this function to the man in the household. Thus, controls for gender, area of residence, and years of study allow us to conclude that the PID had an important impact in reducing authoritarianism within the family.

3.4 Conclusion

The meaning of democracy by the voting population as measured in the 2001 DEMOS survey, differs from the meaning found in ENPID. The vision of democracy in the general population is primarily inclined towards enjoyment of freedom (60 percent), while in the PID population, the democratic vision of the distributive justice through a better distribution of wealth (36.3 percent) competes with the position that gives more importance to the enjoyment of liberties (48.4 percent). The measurement of attitudes towards democracy also differs in both populations.

The fatalistic or modern attitude was evaluated through three indicators. The symbolic figure of the president as a father figure who is approached to solve all problems prevails in the majority of both populations, although to a lesser degree where there has been PID intervention. The other two indicators reveal the trend to fatalistic values vis-à-vis social changes and the scope of personal advancement, by the majority of the population in the first case and by a minority in the second. In the PID population, the indicators reveal fatalistic values significantly lower than for the whole of society. The original propensity to externality was not used due to a low correlation among the few indicators used to construct it and the absence of a validation and consistency methodology. The results, however, reflect the effect the program has had in reducing indicators of paternalism and fatalism, and that this reduction is due not only to the differences between the populations, which could have existed from PID's inception, but to the magnitude of the differences. The differences in attitudes remained when controlled by years of studies, area of residence, and gender of the person interviewed.

Comparison of indicators of authoritarianism reveals a more democratic and less authoritarian attitude in the population participating in PID programs, according to the three indicators analyzed. The first finding, in addition to the dominant paternalistic current in Dominican society, is predominance in the population of authoritarianism within the family. Half of the national population assigns to men the important decisions of the household, while in the PID population only 16.7 percent assume this position. The main factor in household authoritarian beliefs is the level of schooling. While a third of the PID population with fewer than six years of studies assigns to men the power to make decisions, the proportion is reduced to 8.7 percent among those who attain 12 or more years of schooling.

4. Perception and Evaluation of Dominican Democracy and the Political System

4.1 Perception of Dominican Democracy

- **Principles of Freedom and Equality**

The perception of how democracy operates in the survey of political culture surveys was derived using two methods: the perception of liberties and that of equalities among different groups divided by gender, social class, race, religion, or ideology. Chart 4.1 compares the results of the political culture surveys in 1997 and 2001 with ENPID, according to the perception of existence of freedom of speech and respect for the opinions and activities of minorities. In the general population, the perception of unconditional freedom of speech did not change from 1997 to 2001, reaching close to two-thirds of the population. In ENPID, the perception is lower (58.6 percent) because a greater number (11.9 percent) believe that it depends. The proportions of DEMOS and PID populations who state that freedom of speech is nonexistent are similar.

Chart 4.1 Perception of the existence of freedom in Dominican democracy.

Percentage distribution of the population by perception of the existence of freedom of expression and respect for minorities, DEMOS 1997 and 2001, and ENPID 2001.

		DEMOS		ENPID
		1997	2001	2001
Freedom to say what you think without fear of repression	Exists	65.5	65.1	58.6
	Does not exist	--	29.4	28.7
	Depends	--	4.4	11.9
Respect for the opinions and activities of those who do not agree with the majority.	Exists	59.1	52.4	45.5
	Does not exist	--	41.0	43.5
	Depends	--	3.1	8.7
Number		2,660	3,091	962

Note: The proportions that did not answer were not presented. The results do not add to 100 percent.

Chart 4.2 presents the results of the questions related to the perception of equal opportunities in general for groups segregated by ideology, gender, and race, and equality in terms of the law for the poor and the rich. In all of the questions, a lower proportion of the population of PID beneficiaries perceive the existence of equalities than the population as a whole. On the other hand, both populations follow the same pattern, perceiving the greatest proportion of equal opportunities among the groups segregated by religion or ideology (57.1 percent in ENPID and 64.8 percent in the 2001 DEMOS). Secondly, more equality is perceived in the segregation per gender (51.8 percent in ENPID and 53.8 percent in the 2001 DEMOS). The latter was subdivided into two questions in ENPID to measure perceptions of gender equality in the sphere of work and in politics; there is a greater perception of equality on the job site (54.3 percent) than in the political realm (49.4 percent).

Chart 4.2 Percentage distribution of the population by the perception of existence of equality, by characteristic, DEMOS 1994, 1997, 2001 and ENPID 2001

		DEMOS			ENPID
		1994	1997	2001	2001
Equal opportunity without caring for religion or ideology	Exists	62.2	68.5	64.8	57.1
	Does not exist	32.4	28.8	31.9	37.5
Equal opportunity for men and women*	Exists	63.0	50.7	53.8	51.8
	Does not exist	33.1	46.4	43.4	43.8
Equal opportunity with no care for the color of the skin	Exists	52.3	53.1	53.7	40.6
	Does not exist	44.5	45.8	44.3	54.4
Equality of rich and poor under the law	Exists	23.0	19.0	23.0	17.2
	Does not exist	75.3	80.4	75.6	80.4
Number		2,425	2,660	3,091	962

NOTE: *ENPID subdivided the question in two categories: politics and work. The result was 49.4 percent say equality exists in the political sphere, 54.3 percent in the workplace. These results were averaged to compare with the DEMOS survey.

The perception of equality among persons regardless of skin color revealed the greatest difference among the general population (53.7 percent) and the PID programs (40.6 percent). In other words, the majority of the PID population perceives racial discrimination, which was to be expected because the PID population has a greater proportion of persons who declared having black skin and a lesser proportion of persons with white skin than the population as a whole. Finally, equality of social classes before the law, as measured by the perception of equal treatment for the rich and the poor, represents in both populations the greatest perception of discrimination. Its existence is perceived by 75.6 percent of the general population and 80.4 percent of the PID population.

The changes in perception of the population between 1994 and 2001 have remained stable, and the small differences may be explained by errors in sampling. The exception is the increase in the proportion of persons who perceive unequal opportunities between men and women. The PID population and the population as a whole perceive inequality in the same proportion (43.4 percent versus 43.8 percent in PID). In the other indicators, a greater proportion of the PID population perceives unequal opportunities. Which characteristics of this population condition the greatest perception of unequal opportunities for segregated groups? The data in Chart 4.3 relate perceptions of equality to level of schooling and the area of residence of the PID population.

People with more years of formal education perceive greater inequalities. The differences among the three groups of years of education are important. Among the people with five or fewer years of education, the proportion that perceives equal opportunities regardless of ideology, gender, or skin color is high. In particular, 70 percent of this group believes that there are equal job opportunities for men and women, while among those who attain 12 or more years

of study, the perception of equality declines to 44.4 percent. Likewise, 57 percent of the group with less formal education perceives equal opportunities regardless of skin color, while only 33.8 percent of the group with higher education perceives this equality.

Chart 4.3 Percentage distribution of the PID population by perception of the existence of equal opportunities, by years of education and area of residence, ENPID 2001.

	Equal opportunities no matter what			
	Religion or ideology	Political: gender	Work: Gender	Color of skin
Years of Education				
0-5	69.4	63.3	70.1	57.1
6-11	59.7	55.0	59.5	42.1
12 or more	50.6	39.5	44.4	33.8
Region of Residence				
National District	53.2	45.8	48.9	32.6
North Region	60.7	48.2	54.8	41.9
South Region	57.8	53.4	58.6	46.8
Total	57.1	49.4	54.3	40.6

The area of residence also bears on the perception of equality. Consistently, a lower proportion of the people resident in the National District perceive equal opportunities, while the provinces of the southern region have the greatest proportions of equality perception, except for the religious or ideological criteria. In this case, the northern provinces show a higher incidence of perception of equal opportunities regardless of the religious criteria. This difference is due to the greater religious homogeneity of the northern provinces and the greater heterogeneity in the southern region.

- **Knowledge and Beliefs on the Benefits of an Ideal Democratic Model**

The interviewed people were asked *What would you think is the most important benefit that democracy can give people?* Answers are depicted in Chart 4.4 for the 1994-2001 DEMOS surveys and for ENPID. The changes among the national population during the seven-year period are not significant. The proportion that reports work as a benefit declines (from 22 percent to 14 percent); the proportion that perceives a better distribution of income as a benefit increases (2 percent to 13 percent); the proportion that reports satisfaction of basic needs declines (12 percent to 3 percent); and the proportion that identifies peace, tranquility, and safety as the most important benefit increases (from 9 percent to 14 percent). This dispersion indicates an absence of consensus in the perception of the most important benefit and lack of knowledge of the characteristics of the democratic political system. The PID population offers different answers and a distribution mainly focused on two categories, instead of the dispersed distribution of the general population.

The difficulty among the general population in identifying the most important benefit is consistently expressed throughout the period of study; the category with the greater proportion of answers in 1997 and 2001 is *Does not know* (18.5 percent and 16.5 percent, respectively), slightly lower than the proportion of 19.2 percent reached in 1994.

In contrast, the percentage of the PID population that does not know which is the most important benefit reaches only 2.8 percent, while close to half the population identify the principal benefit as freedom (48.5 percent) and more than one-fifth (23.5 percent) perceive that the most important benefit is the equality of rights of the citizens. In other words, 72 percent of the PID population recognizes in the democratic political system the benefits that may be obtained from exercising the two basic tenets of the system, freedom and equal opportunities predicated on equal rights before the law.

Chart 4.4 Percentage distribution of the population identifying as the most important benefit of a real democracy, DEMOS 1994, 1997, 2001 and ENPID 2001

Benefits of a real democracy	DEMOS Survey			ENPID
	1994	1997	2001	2001
Freedom	9.9	7.9	9.2	48.5
Equal civil rights	-	-	-	23.5
Others	10.8	12.3	13.0	8.0
Satisfaction of basic needs*	12.3	11.9	3.4	4.9
Peace, tranquility, and security	8.8	13.1	14.3	3.8
Work	22.0	18.5	13.6	3.8
Does not know	19.2	18.5	16.5	2.8
Country improvement / problem solution	13.1	15.0	16.2	2.4
Refuses / none other	1.7	0.9	1.0	1.3
Better distribution of income	2.1	1.9	12.8	0.8
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Number	2425	2660	3091	962

NOTE:*Education, residence, medicine, health, and food.

Different levels of schooling do not alter the opinions of PID participants in this area. In the group with five or fewer years of study, 44.9 percent deemed freedom as the most important benefit and 21.1 percent identify equal citizen rights. In the group with 6 to 11 years of study, 50 percent consider freedom and 21.8 percent equal citizen rights as the main benefit. The group with higher education does not differ substantially in its replies; 48.0 percent identify freedom and 25.7 percent equality of citizen rights as the most important benefits of the democratic system. This perception of freedom and equal opportunities the democratic regime may offer is undoubtedly the result of the training received in the PID programs. Its sustainability is conditioned on the ideal model finding root, allowing equal opportunities to reduce the great social differences, and, in turn, enabling the practice of equal treatment of rich and poor in the

light of the law. This would change the current perception of 80.4 percent of the PID population and 75.6 percent of the general population that there is no such equality in the Dominican Republic.

- **Benefits Derived from Democracy Existing in the Country**

In both political culture surveys and ENPID, people were asked about the country’s existing democratic system: *Does the manner in which the political system in the country operates benefit you a lot, benefit you a little, negatively affects you, or has no effect on you?* Chart 4.5 shows the results. The main change between 1994 and 2001 in the general population is the increase from 18 percent to 30 percent of people who consider the political system working against them. The proportion of those who do not know, the indifferent, those who benefit little, and those who benefit much, all declined. Among the beneficiaries of the PID, the population that feels negatively affected does not significantly differ from the population as a whole, but the proportion of those who are indifferent does differ and is much lower (18 percent as opposed to 29 percent in the general population) and the proportion who reported benefits are higher (12 percent “benefited a lot” and 40 percent “benefited a little”).

Chart 4.5 Benefits received by the Dominican government by the person interviewed

Percentage distribution of the population by opinion regarding the personal benefits or damages received due to the performance of the democracy, DEMOS 1994, 1997, and 2001 and ENPID 2001

The way the political system of the country is working provides:	DEMOS Survey			ENPID
	1994	1997	2001	2001
Benefit a lot	9.9	9.4	9.0	12.0
Benefit a little	33.8	36.1	28.7	40.3
Negatively affected	18.4	22.1	29.8	28.7
Indifferent	33.1	29.0	29.0	18.2
No information	0.3	0.0	0.4	0.0
Does not know	3.9	2.4	2.9	0.6
Refuses	0.4	1.0	0.1	0.2
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Number	2,425	2,660	3,091	962

Chart 4.6 shows the opinions regarding the benefits resulting from democracy according to government performance. In both populations there is a clear relationship between the assessment of governmental performance and the perception of benefits or harm. In the 2001 DEMOS survey, those who assessed the governmental system as ineffective constitute the greater proportion of those who feel negatively affected (24.8 percent) by the political system versus 13.4 percent who assessed governmental performance as very effective. Among PID

participants, 41.6 percent of those who assessed government performance as very ineffective felt that they were prejudiced against, versus 19.6 percent who rated performance as very effective.

Chart 4.6 Opinions regarding the benefits received from the democracy functions, by governmental performance index, DEMOS 2001 and ENPID 2001

The way the democracy of the country is working provides:	DEMOS 2001				ENPID 2001			
	Governmental performance				Governmental performance			
	Very ineffective	Averagely effective	Very effective	Total	Very ineffective	Averagely effective	Very effective	Total
Benefit a lot	7.0	12.0	19.1	9.4	5.7	13.5	15.1	12.0
Benefit a little	35.8	36.5	36.6	36.1	34.3	40.3	46.0	40.3
Negatively affected	24.8	18.5	13.4	22.1	41.6	27.0	19.6	28.7
Indifferent	29.4	28.7	27.8	29.0	17.6	18.4	18.5	18.2
Does not know	3.0	4.3	3.1	3.4	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.8
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

- **Assessment of How Well Democracy Operates**

The PID population was asked if there was a democratic political system in the country. More than one-third (36.0 percent) reported that the existing system is not democratic, while 59.1 percent perceived it as being democratic. The remaining 4.8 percent do not know or refused to answer the question. Clearly, an important proportion does not perceive that the political system functions as a democratic system should. A reliable indicator as to how democracy operates was deemed to be the question: *To advance in life, is it better to seek opportunities for improvement here or leave the country?* 84.8 percent considered that it was better to seek opportunities within the country, 4.3 percent answered that it depended, and 10.8 percent deemed it was best to leave the country. Only one person did not know what to say.

In the DEMOS survey, the population in general was asked how well democracy operates. The percentage responding “badly” or “very badly” has increased and reached 49.2 percent of the population in 2001, while the percentage responding “well” or “very well” only reached 25.9 percent. The different survey questions are not comparable. It is possible, however, that the PID population, more committed to community organizations and political parties, has more hope in the democratic system functioning, given that only 11 percent deems it best to leave the country to be able to advance in life.

4.2 Levels of Organization and Opinions on Political Parties

- **Party Membership and Sympathy**

Chart 4.7 compares membership and party sympathy of the general population in 2001 and of the population participating in PID programs, according to area of residence and gender. The most

important difference is in party activism, which reaches 17.1 percent in the general population and doubles to 34.1 percent among PID beneficiaries. Consequently, the proportion of those who sympathize is greater in the general population (46.0 percent) than the in PID population (37.9 percent), as is the proportion that neither is active nor sympathizes, which reaches 36.2 percent of the voting population and 37.8 percent in the PID population.

When comparing populations by area of residence, the areas that may be considered as more marginal (“rural other” in DEMOS and southern provinces in ENPID) are those that reach the highest levels of party activism in both surveys (18.2 percent and 38.6 percent, respectively). Consistently, the “rural other” regions and the southern provinces have the lowest percentage of those who not active in or sympathize with a political party. The analysis of data according to gender reveals the similar patterns in both populations, with a greater activism among men, 21.3 percent in the general population and 38.3 percent in the PID population. Differences are also comparable, with a slightly higher difference among gender in the general population (8.5 percent) than in PID (7.1 percent).

Chart 4.7 Percentage distribution of the population by level of political activism, by area of residence and by gender, DEMOS and ENPID 2001

Level	DEMOS 2001				ENPID 2001			
	Area of residence				Area of residence			
	National District	Urban other	Rural other	Total	National District	North Region	South Region	Total
Activist	16.4	16.6	18.2	17.1	32.9	29.4	38.6	34.1
Sympathies	46.6	44.4	47.7	46.0	36.3	41.2	37.0	37.9
Nonactive	36.2	38.2	33.5	36.2	30.2	29.4	24.4	27.8
Refuses	0.7	0.8	0.5	0.7	0.6	0.0	0.0	0.2
Level	Sex			Sex				
	Female	Male	Total	Female	Male	Total		
	Activist	12.8	21.3	17.1	31.2	38.3	34.1	
Sympathies	46.9	45.1	46.0	39.6	35.5	37.9		
Nonactive	39.9	32.6	36.2	28.9	26.1	27.8		
Refuses	0.5	0.9	0.7	0.4	0.0	0.2		
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100		

- **The Role of Political Parties**

Three questions were used in the surveys on political culture and ENPID to measure the role of political parties: its role in facilitating or encumbering citizen participation in politics, the perception of the interests advocated by the parties, and who should select the candidates to electoral positions. Chart 4.8 shows the results of the DEMOS survey and ENPID according to area of residence and gender. Despite the great difference in the level of political activism

between the populations, the results of the first two questions do not show important differences. In both cases, close to two-thirds of the population deem that parties only serve to participate in elections every four years. In ENPID, a greater proportion of people (21.0 percent) maintained a noncritical position vis-à-vis the parties than in the population in general (13.7 percent), stating political parties enable people to participate at all levels. The proportions of people who perceived that the parties impede the participation of people in politics were 14.9 percent in the DEMOS survey and 15.9 percent in ENPID.

When the population is subdivided by area of residence and gender, there is much similarity in the high proportion that deems that parties only serve the purpose of participating in elections every four years. However, the proportion with a positive vision of parties differs among regions, and not so much among gender. In both surveys, the population of the National District reveals the highest proportion, of 17 percent in the 2001 DEMOS and 25.2 percent in ENPID that deems that the parties allow people to participate in politics. This percentage in “rural other” of the DEMOS survey only reaches 11.0 percent, and in the provinces of the northern region, 14.7 percent. Consistently, the provinces of the northern region in ENPID show the most negative opinion of political parties: 21.7 percent agreed with the statement that parties encumber the participation of people; in the National District and the southern provinces, this proportion does not reach 14 percent.

The limited functionality of political parties is also evident from the perceptions of both populations on the groups the parties defend. In a real democracy, parties must defend all society groups, an answer identified by only 6.9 percent of the population in the DEMOS survey and 9.0 percent in ENPID. The perverse use of parties to defend interests of only some groups or persons was identified by 36.8 percent of the general population and 43.2 percent of the PID population. The defense of the interests of the political parties, instead of the interests of the people, is yet another deficiency identified by 53.3 percent of the population and 45.9 percent of PID beneficiaries. In other words, the deviation by the parties from the objective to defend all society groups is perceived by 90.1 percent of the population measured by the DEMOS 2001 and 89.1 percent of the ENPID population, not very significant statistical difference. The data show that slightly more women than men perceive that parties defend all society groups; residents of the National District are slightly more likely to believe that as well.

The third question in Chart 4.8 measures the level of participation that the groups interviewed expect to have in the selection of candidates to electoral positions. Hence, the differences among the populations are significant and indicate a greater demand for democratic participation within the parties among participants in PID programs. While 77.1 percent of the latter deem that the base of each party should select the candidates for electoral positions, in the general population, only 57.8 percent have the same opinion. In both cases, the main differences are in gender, with a more democratic position on the part of men than of women. According to the area of residence, the National District shows higher proportions of democratic responses.

Chart 4.9 shows changes in the perception of political parties during the 1994 to 2001 period compared to the perception of the population participating in PID programs. The change observed reveals a more perverse vision of the parties. The proportion of people who think that parties serve only the purpose of participating in elections every four years increased from 56.2

Chart 4.8 Percentage distribution of the population by opinions on the utility of political parties, interests that they defend, and who should pick the candidates to electoral positions, by area of residence and gender, DEMOS 1997, 2001 and ENPID 2001

		Area of residence			Area of residence			Gender				Total	
		National District	Urban other	Rural other	National District	North region	South region	Female		Male		Total	
		DEMOS 2001	DEMOS 2001	ENPID 2001	ENPID 2001	ENPID 2001	ENPID 2001	DEMOS	ENPID	DEMOS	ENPID	DEMOS	ENPID
<i>The Political parties:</i>	Only work to participate in elections every four years	64.5	65.6	65.7	60.0	62.5	62.2	65.8	62.7	64.9	59.9	65.4	61.5
	Make the participation of people in politics hard	14.8	15.1	14.8	13.5	21.7	13.7	12.9	13.7	16.9	19.0	14.9	15.9
	Permit the people to participate at all levels	17.0	13.8	11.0	25.2	14.7	21.9	12.8	21.7	14.6	20.1	13.7	21.0
	Refuses	3.8	5.5	8.5	1.2	1.1	2.2	8.5	2.0	3.6	1.0	6.1	1.5
<i>The political parties defend the interests and needs of:</i>	Only the parties	48.3	54.9	54.9	40.3	49.3	48.5	51.8	43.0	54.8	50.3	53.3	45.9
	Just some groups or people	42.3	35.6	34.4	47.1	41.2	41.4	35.9	44.7	37.7	41.1	36.8	43.2
	All the groups of the society	7.6	6.7	6.6	11.4	7.0	8.5	8.0	10.2	5.8	7.4	6.9	9.0
	Refuses	1.8	2.8	4.1	1.2	2.6	1.7	4.3	2.2	1.7	1.3	3.0	1.7
<i>Who should select the candidates to electoral positions:</i>	The base of the parties	64.2	60.2	50.0	80.3	75.4	75.6	51.5	73.6	64.2	82.2	57.8	77.1
	The leaders	18.0	20.2	19.8	9.2	11.8	12.9	22.3	13.4	16.8	8.4	19.6	11.3
	The candidate for president	13.2	11.1	19.0	5.2	8.5	7.4	14.5	7.7	13.9	5.8	14.2	7.0
	Other / refuses	4.5	8.5	11.3	5.3	4.4	4.1	11.7	5.3	5.2	3.6	8.4	4.6
	Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Number	742	1,347	1,002	317	289	356	1,536	568	1,555	394	3,091	962	

Chart 4.9 Changes in the population on the perception of the political parties.

Percentage distribution of the population by opinions on the use of the parties, interests they defend, and who should select the candidates, DEMOS 1994, 1997, 2001 and ENPID 2001		DEMOS 1994	DEMOS 1997	DEMOS 2001	ENPID 2001	
<i>The political parties:</i>	Only work to participate in Elections every four years	56.2	62.6	65.4	61.5	
	Make the participation of people In politics hard	18.1	17.2	14.9	15.9	
	Permit the people to participate In all the levels	14.6	13.7	13.7	21.0	
	Refuses	11.1	6.4	6.1	1.6	
	<i>The political parties defend the interests and needs of:</i>	Only the parties	47.7	44.1	53.3	45.9
		Just some groups or People	38.3	41.7	36.8	43.2
All the groups of the society		8.3	10.2	6.9	9.0	
Refuses		5.7	4.1	3.0	1.7	
<i>Who should select the candidates to electoral positions:</i>	The base of the parties	56.6	56.5	57.8	77.1	
	The leaders	16.0	20.3	19.6	11.3	
	The candidate to president	15.7	14.2	14.2	7.0	
	Other / Refuses	11.7	8.9	8.4	4.6	
	Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	
Number	2425	2660	3091	962		

percent to 65.4 percent. The proportion that responded that parties permit people to participate at all levels reduced from percent 14.6 percent to 13.7 percent. . In the PID population a greater proportion believe that parties enable participation of people in politics (21.0 percent versus 13.7 percent in DEMOS 1997 and 2001).

- **Influence of Level of Political Activism on the Type of PID Participation.**

Although a third of the PID population is active in some political party, almost all of the population belongs to different community associations. This means that when comparing the subgroups who are or are not politically active, what are in fact being compared are people who are politically active who belong to community associations with nonpolitically active people who also belong to community associations. In the event that there are no differences, it may be concluded that the social struggles in the communities have an effect on both categories of persons, making political activism imperceptible. Chart 4.10 reveals the type of participation and the duration of PID programs, according to level of party activism. In other words, the question on how political activism bears on the selection of PID programs and their duration is examined. Activism is observed as a factor that partially explains participation in PID programs.

The data indicate that the different types of programs (Chart 4.10) people participate in do not differ significantly based on whether they are politically active, sympathize with a party or are not active. In the three categories, the municipal strengthening programs prevail, with a greater proportion among sympathizers (62.7 percent) and no statistical differentiation between activists (55.5%) and those or are not active (57.7 percent). Levels of activism vary little between the civic education programs in schools and the state workers' union. But the proportion of activists among those who identified themselves in broadcasting programs or farmer organizations is greater (6.1 percent and 19.8 percent) than the proportion of participants in those programs who neither sympathize with nor are active in a party.

The duration of PID programs was one year for 27.2 percent of the population and less than a year for 53.2 percent of the participants. Only a fifth (19.6 percent) spent two or more years in the programs. The data indicate that among those who are not active, the proportion that spent two or more years in PID programs (16.6 percent) is lower than among the sympathizers of (21.2 percent) or activists (19.9 percent) in political parties. It can be concluded that the level of political activism affects the duration of time spent in the programs more than which program. It is probable that the selection of the programs depends more on the opportunity offered by the subgrantee institutions in specific geographic areas and not on the preference of political parties to include their active members in PID programs. However, once they have joined, the tenure in the programs

Chart 4.10 Percentage distribution of PID beneficiaries by type and duration of program, according to level of political activity, ENPID 2001. .

Type of program	Level of commitment to a political party				Total
	Activist	Sympathizes	Nonactive	Refuses	
Civil education / school	9.5	9.6	10.9		9.9
Municipality	55.5	62.7	57.7	50.0	58.8
Broadcasting stations	6.1	4.9	3.7		5.0
ATE Union	3.4	1.6	3.4	50.0	2.8
Farmers' Organizations	19.8	14.0	11.2		15.2
Others	5.8	7.1	13.1		8.3
	100.1	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Duration	Activist	Sympathizes	Non active	Refuses	Total
Less than a year	55.7	49.8	54.7	50.0	53.2
One year	24.3	29.0	28.6		27.2
Two years	5.7	8.2	8.1	50.0	7.4
Three or more	14.2	13.0	8.5		12.2
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Number	328	365	267	2	962

tends to be slightly higher among political militants, which could be explained by a greater commitment by the parties to the programs.

- **Socioeconomic and Religious Factors that May Affect Party Options**

Belonging to a political party may be conditioned by sociodemographic factors. However, the analysis of independent variables with possible influence, such as the level of schooling, religion and household income bracket, do not confirm the effect of those factors on political activism. No statistically significant differences are found among levels of activism in terms of years of study (35.4 percent among the population with 0 to 5 years of study and 36.3 percent among the population with 12 and more years). Among the group of non-Catholic Christians, there is a slightly higher proportion of party activists (36.3 percent) than among Catholics (33.8 percent) or nonbelievers (33.6 percent), although this difference is not statistically significant. In addition, no differences can be established based on levels of household income. The proportion of party activists in the poorest quintile (38.8 percent) is technically similar to the proportion in the wealthiest quintile (39.7 percent). On the other hand, the data presented in Chart 4.7 indicate that the region of residence and gender have a slight bearing on the level of political activism. A greater proportion of men (38.3 percent) than women (31.2 percent) are active in some party. Party activism is greater among people residing in the southern provinces (38.6 percent) than in the National District (32.9 percent) or in the northern provinces (29.4percent).

- **Incidence of Party Activism in Practices Favoring Democracy and the Assessment of Governmental Performance**

Chart 4.11 associates level of political activity with the index of participation in political activities in favor of democracy, and with the index of opinion on governmental performance. Both indexes were constructed in ENPID following the methodology of the political surveys explained in the 1997 DEMOS survey. In both indexes, the indicators are objective and can be measured objectively, which facilitates the validity of the scales in the absence of standard validity procedures and consistency tests. Only one opinion indicator was substituted in the scale on government performance in the 1997 DEMOS survey, for the indicator in ENPID that evaluates performance in garbage collection This change hardly affects the compatibility between the scales.

The level of participation in political activities favoring democracy is measured by an index constructed with six indicators. The scales in the DEMOS and ENPID surveys are 100 percent compatible. Total results shown indicate that in both populations approximately a fifth did not participate in activities favoring democracy. However, while in the general population only 6.6 percent reported a high participation; the great majority report intermediate participation (72.0 percent), in the PID population, 22.5 percent reported moderate participation and 54.8 percent reported intermediate participation. In both populations, low participation in democratic activities is greater among those who are not active at all or do not sympathize with any party. The proportion reduces among the sympathizers and declines to almost half among the party activists. High participation, corresponding to having participated in the last 12 months in five or six activities in favor of democratic reforms, is quite limited in the population of the 2001 DEMOS survey,

including only 8.4 percent of active members, 6.7 percent of the sympathizers, and 5.4 percent among those who are neither active nor sympathizers. In the PID population, there are significantly higher proportions of participation, reaching 31.4 percent among party activists, 19.5 percent among sympathizers and 15.7 percent among those or are neither. This substantive difference in the three levels of the party activism variable means that the greater the level of party activism in the PID population does not in itself explain the greater participation of this population in activities favoring democratic reforms. It is also possible to attribute to PID's educational activities the greater proportion of activists and sympathizers to that of the general population.

Chart 4.11 Levels of political participation and evaluation of governmental performance by level of political activity. DEMOS 2001 and ENPID 2001.

Index	Levels	DEMOS 2001				ENPID 2001			
		Level of Commitment to a political party							
		Active	Sympathizes	Not-Active	Total	Active	Sympathizes	Not-Active	Total
<i>Level of participation in political activities in favor of democracy</i>	Low participation	13.0	20.9	25.4	21.0	17.4	20.3	33.0	22.8
	Medium participation	78.5	72.4	69.1	72.0	51.2	60.3	51.3	54.8
	Great participation	8.4	6.7	5.4	6.6	31.4	19.5	15.7	22.5
<i>Opinion on governmental performance</i>	Very ineffective	50.9	54.8	58.1	55.0	25.9	25.5	25.1	25.5
	Median effectiveness	34.8	35.4	34.5	35.0	45.7	46.3	49.4	47.0
	Very effective	14.3	9.8	7.4	9.7	28.4	28.2	25.5	27.5
	Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	Number	528	1,422	1,120	3,091	328	365	267	962

Chart 4.11 also shows the relationship between political activism and the index of opinion on government performance. The PID population is expected to have more stringent criteria than the population in general because of its participation in educational programs. But criticalness can be neutralized by activism in the official party. In the population as a whole, 55 percent evaluates government performance as very ineffective, 35.0 percent as slightly effective and 9.7 percent as very effective. This evaluation differs very importantly from the performance evaluation by the PID population, where the proportion that most negatively evaluates government performance is about half as large (25.5 percent) and that which rates performance as very effective is almost triple (27.5 percent). But level of political activism cannot explain these differences, given that in the three levels of the variable, the proportions do not differ in a statistically significant manner. Therefore, a hypothesis can be constructed, based on the qualitative data and the value impact reported further by the PID population, that in fact the best evaluation of government performance lies in the success that the greater participation of the PID population has had at the community level and in the success of the local municipal government in improving public services.

- **Influence of Political Activism on Attitude Towards Political Reforms**

The index to measure attitudes towards change or political reform is not compatible in the two surveys. In ENPID nine indicators of concrete reforms to the laws and/or current constitution were made. The DEMOS survey, in turn, selected five indicators of abstract opinion and two concrete indicators, the latter selected also in ENPID's index. Absence of strict validation and reliability procedures from both indexes merit greater effort in the future to ensure standardization. If both are valid, the results must be coherent with the differences found in the previous indexes. The PID population is expected to have a greater proportion of people prone to work for political reforms than the general population of the 2001 DEMOS.

Chart 4.12 compares the results of measurements in the two populations using two different instruments to measure attitude towards political reforms. Results indicate that the population in general shows a high willingness to change (70.0 percent) while in the PID population, acceptance of change is moderate (71.4 percent) and only 27.0 percent have a high willingness to change. The data really show the effect of the instrument. Had an instrument constructed for ENPID been used in the general population, the results would have been different. In addition, it is more probable that the willingness to change in the general population would be below what the 2001 DEMOS survey indicates, if the abstract opinion indicators were replaced with concrete indicators on changes that are on the discussion agenda.

The PID population is not willing to change many aspects that represent situational changes agreed to by the different parties during the 1994 political crisis. The changes introduced at that time were made to avoid violating the code established for the selection of candidates and to not permit the presidential reelection of Dr. Balaguer. As two electoral periods have passed, the topic of reforms is inevitable due to the change in circumstances that motivated them. From a more structural perspective, new political reform is possible. The scale constructed to measure the propensity towards change among the PID population, allows for a high score, even though there is disagreement with allowing presidential reelection and with combining the presidential, municipal and congressional elections, which are two of the most controversial changes. Results show, however, that almost two-thirds of the PID population agrees with six or fewer of the indicators. That is, there is resistance to change, even when leaving aside such changes as that of presidential reelections, which can be considered as a step backward or integrating all of the elections every four years, which can be considered an element that still provides the "weight" that presidential elections have in the municipal and congressional elections.

To conclude, in the PID population, four of the indicators resistant to change are: (1) disagreement with presidential reelection, 70.4 percent; (2) disagreement with joining the municipal and congressional elections with the presidential one, 52.6 percent; (3) agreement with maintaining the current formula of half plus one of the votes, 53.8 percent; and (4) agreement with maintaining the closed electoral colleges, 78.4 percent.

Chart 4.12 Index of disposition towards changes or political reform, by level of political activism,. DEMOS 2001 and ENPID 2001.

		DEMOS 2001				ENPID 2001			
Index	Levels	Level of political activism							
		Active	Sympathizes	Non Active	Total	Active	Sympathizes	Non Active	Total
<i>Disposition towards change or political reforms</i>	Low	1.7	3.6	4.5	3.8	2.1	1.1	1.5	1.6
	Moderate	24.5	26.4	26.9	26.0	68.0	72.6	74.5	71.4
	High	73.8	70.0	68.6	70.0	29.9	26.3	24.0	27.0
	Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	Number	528	1422	1120	3091	328	365	267	962

NOTE: Nonrespondents were omitted in the ENPID 2001 for the governmental performance.

4.3 Judgment on the Person Who Contributed the Most to Developing Democracy in the Country

In the PID survey, only one question was asked about political leadership: *Who do you think is the leader that has contributed to the most to development of democracy in the country?* The answers to this question are shown in Chart 4.13 according to gender and area of residence. There are important differences among the DEMOS and ENPID populations, though in both cases, the greater proportions of answers are concentrated in the same three leaders of the three major parties and an important proportion of persons did not know how to respond to the question.

In the population in general, Joaquín Balaguer was selected by the greatest proportion (28.4 percent), followed by José Francisco Peña Gómez (23.0 percent), by an important proportion that does not know how to respond (18.4 percent) and by Leonel Fernández (11.5 percent). The population of ENPID, in turn, identified to a greater extent, José Francisco Peña Gómez (37.9 percent), followed at a distance by those who do not identify any leader (14.9 percent), Joaquín Balaguer (14.0 percent), and, finally, Leonel Fernández (9.0 percent) and Joan Bosch (7.6 percent)

Chart 4.13 Percentage distribution of leaders reported to have contributed the most to the development of democracy by gender and area of residence of respondents, DEMOS 2001 and ENPID 2001.

	Leaders									Total	
	None	Leonel Fernández	Joaquín Balaguer	José Fco. Peña Gómez	Juan Bosch	Antonio Guzmán	Other contemporary politicians	Does not know/refuses	Other	Total	Number
DEMOS 2001											
Gender											
Female	4.2	13.2	28.1	15.8	2.7	3.5	5.8	25.1	1.6	100.0	1,536
Male	2.5	9.9	28.6	30.2	5.7	5.3	4.1	11.8	2.0	100.0	1,555
Area of residence											
National District	4.7	13.3	23.6	32.2	4.9	3.7	5.4	9.8	2.4	100.0	742
Urban Other	3.3	11.9	28.6	22.8	4.8	5.3	4.2	17.2	2.0	100.0	1,347
Rural Other	2.5	9.6	31.7	16.5	3.0	3.7	5.5	26.3	1.2	100.0	1,002
Total	3.4	11.5	28.4	23.0	4.2	4.4	4.9	18.4	1.8	100.0	3,091
ENPID 2001											
Gender											
Female	4.7	11.4	15.7	34.3	4.4	4.6	8.3	7.1	0.0	100.0	568
Male	4.2	5.6	11.7	43.1	12.2	3.6	9.1	11.4	0.0	100.0	394
Area of residence											
National District	2.8	5.2	8.9	52.9	6.8	3.4	5.2	14.8	0.0	100.0	317
North region	4.4	9.6	13.2	39.0	7.4	2.9	8.0	15.5	0.0	100.0	289
South region	5.5	12.1	19.2	23.8	8.5	5.8	10.8	14.3	0.0	100.0	356
Total	4.3	9.0	14.0	37.9	7.6	4.2	8.1	14.9	0.0	100.0	962

4.4 Assessment of Justice⁸

The PID survey inquired about the perception of improvement or worsening of the justice system in recent years. The perception of the majority is that justice has improved (68.4 percent) while for 27.7 percent it has not improved and 3.9 percent does not know or refused to answer the question. The perception of improvement is a relative concept. Chart 4.14 shows the perceptions of the general population of the factors that negatively affect the functioning of justice during the 1994 to 2001 period in contrast with the perceptions of the PID population:

⁸ This section is briefly analyzed because it was assigned and evaluated in the section corresponding to *Fundación Institucionalidad y Justicia* (FINJUS), which became USAID's principal partner in carrying out the activities of the civil society for the reform of justice. Some comparative data are offered with the 2001 DEMOS survey and the PID source of data is used in lieu of Participación Ciudadana's.

Chart 4.14 Negative factors that affect the performance of justice, DEMOS 1994, 2001 and ENPID 2001.

	DEMOS 1994	DEMOS 2001	ENPID 2001
Most negative factors for the performance of justice.			
The disobedience of decisions of judges	77.6	82.8	88.7
Court sentences sold	79.3	81.8	86.9
Prolonged and complicated trials	76.9	79.4	88.8
Judicial prosecution due to political reasons.	63.2	78.4	84.9
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0
Number	2,425	3,091	962

The four factors that negatively affect the functioning of justice worsened in the perception of the population in general from 1994-2001. Approximately four-fifths of the population deem that justice has been affected very much due to the disobedience of the decisions of judges, the sale of sentences, the slowness and complication of trials, and judicial prosecution due to political reasons. In the PID population, despite the fact that the majority thinks that justice has improved in recent years, there is still a proportion greater than in the general population that perceives that it has been very much affected by the four factors indicated above.

The PID survey ascertained the levels of functioning of the different actors involved in the implementation of justice. The results are shown in Chart 4.15. The best performance is attributed to the judges, with the highest proportion of good and very good ratings (40.7 percent); and the lowest proportion of bad and very bad ratings (20.0 percent). The prosecutors follow with a good or very good perception rating by 34.8 percent of the population and bad or very bad by 24.2 percent. On the other extreme, the law professionals are perceived as the worst by the highest proportion of persons (41.5 percent) while only a fifth (22.1 percent) considers them good or very good. The low quality of the managerial administration of justice is manifested in the reduced proportion that deems as very good or good the activity of the persons employed in courts, offices of prosecutors and judicial offices (27.5 percent) while a fourth of the population deems their functioning as bad or very bad.

Chart 4.15 Performance perception of the actors involved in the implementation of justice, ENPID 2001.


Actors	Performance Perception				Total	Number
	Very good / good	Regular	Bad / very bad	Refuses		
Judges	40.7	36.0	20.0	3.3	100.0	962
Prosecutors	34.8	37.7	24.2	3.2	100.0	962
Lawyers	22.1	33.2	41.5	3.2	100.0	962
Employees*	27.5	40.5	25.3	6.6	100.0	962

* Employees who work in courts, prosecutor offices, attorneys' offices, and judicial offices.

4.5 Trust in Organizations and Institutions

• State, Political and Governmental Institutions

The functioning of democracy demands development of social capital through trust in the organized institutions that regulate social relations. The absence of institutionality deteriorates the social consensus on which the democratic system is founded. Chart 4.16 shows the indexes of trust in state and nongovernmental institutions for the 1994–2001 period for the general population and the PID population. The PID population can be expected to be more educated and have greater levels of participation in political organizations and the civil society, and to be more critical of violations of standards and/or absence of institutionality. But, on the other hand, the high proportion of people committed to political parties may counteract the critical current among the PID beneficiaries.



The three groups in which the institutions have been divided for analysis demonstrate a pattern of trust in the population in general for the 1994 to 2001 period and a different one in the PID population. Figure 4.1 shows the pattern graphically. In all of the measurements of the DEMOS and PID surveys, the institutions and groups of the civil society that were included (Catholic and evangelical churches, media, and unions) had the highest trust scores, followed by the institutions of the state, while the political institutions had the lowest trust levels. On a scale of confidence from 0 to 2.0, the average of political and state institutions is below the 1.0 value of little trust, while nongovernmental groups reach an average of 1.18, between little or much trust. The longitudinal trend in the population in

general is to increase the trust in institutions and nongovernmental groups when the trust in state and political institutions declines. This pattern is expressed in a greater participation of the Catholic Church in the processes of political crisis and a lesser participation when the state and political institutions function with greater acceptance of the population. In turn, the data show that, on average, the PID population has more trust in the state institutions, in the political institutions, and in the nongovernmental groups than the population as a whole as measured by the 2001 DEMOS survey, with a difference of average scores that is not significant among nongovernmental groups.

Chart 4.16 Level of trust in governmental, political, and nongovernmental institutions, DEMOS 1994, 1997, and 2001 and ENPID 2001

Type of Institutions	DEMOS 1994	DEMOS 1997/a	DEMOS 2001	ENPID 2001/b
Government institutions				
Central Electoral Board (JCE)	--	1.25	--	1.18
Local Municipal Central Board	--	1.19	--	1.17
Justice	0.79	0.87	0.88	0.99
DNCD	0.89	0.94	0.87	0.86
Military	0.91	0.96	0.80	0.81
Police	0.83	0.90	0.75	0.70
<i>Average</i>	<i>0.86</i>	<i>1.02</i>	<i>0.83</i>	<i>0.95</i>
Political institutions				
President of the Republic	1.10	1.24	1.04	1.03
National Congress	0.75	0.74	0.73	0.81
Municipal authorities	0.84	0.82	0.71	0.84
Political Parties	0.54	0.55	0.48	0.64
<i>Average</i>	<i>0.81</i>	<i>0.84</i>	<i>0.74</i>	<i>0.83</i>
Nongovernmental groups				
Catholic Church	1.49	1.30*	1.50	1.49
Evangelical Church	--	0.96	1.05	1.18
Media	1.27	1.34	1.22	1.23
Unions	0.89	0.85	0.77	0.83
<i>Average</i>	<i>1.22</i>	<i>1.11</i>	<i>1.14</i>	<i>1.18</i>

NOTES: a) The 1997 DEMOS survey asked about bishops and priests, and the answers were averaged.

b) The index was built assigning the following values: No trust=0, Low trust=1, Much Trust=2.

Fluctuations in the measurements in the general population are associated with the circumstances beginning in 1994. The increase of trust in state and political institutions during the 1994 to 1997 period corresponds to the political crisis of 1994 and to the expectations of institutionality created by the reduction of the 1994 to 1996 electoral period to two years, and to the rise to power of a brand-new party. The decline in trust experienced after the 1997 survey can be construed as the result of the deception of the PLD governments during 1996—2000 and the PRD government for the length of the 2000—2004 period. Though the PID population shows higher levels of trust than the general population, it hardly reaches the levels of trust in the state and political institutions that were achieved in 1997 for the population as a whole. In addition, it does not significantly differ from the levels of trust in nonstate institutions attained in that year.

The analysis of individual indicators reveals that despite the lower social capital of the political institutions, within this group the Presidency of the Republic has a high score, well above the other institutions and comparable in 1997 to that of JCE and the Catholic Church, which received the highest scores. In 2001, the trust in the presidency declines from 1.24 to 1.04, but it maintains a high relative position, shifting from third place in 1997 to fourth place in 2001. The correct place could be sixth, because the 2001 DEMOS survey did not present the measurement of trust in JCE and local JCE, both with high scores in 1997 and in the PID population. On the other hand, in the ENPID as well as in all of the measurements of the DEMOS survey, the political parties occupied the last place or highest level of distrust. Consistently, among the two populations and the different measurements in time, the nonpolitical groups of the civil society, with the exception of the unions, attain the highest levels of trust; the Catholic Church ranks first and the media second, except for in 1997 in which the media are perceived to be more trustworthy than the Catholic Church.

- **Trust in Key Governmental Entities**

The index of trust in key governmental entities is 100 percent compatible among the DEMOS and ENPID surveys and includes eight key governmental and/or political institutions. The scale is not symmetrical; it assigns a wide interval of four to eight indicators as a measurement of *much trust*, while *intermediate trust* is measured by having trust in two to three indicators and *little* by having trust in one of eight indicators. This procedure is not conventional and if greater equality had been established between the intervals that measure the different levels of trust, distrust in key institutions would be greater than what the surveys suggest. For compatibility reasons, ENPID used the same method as the DEMOS surveys.

Chart 4.17 shows the levels of trust measured by the index of trust in key government entities for both populations. Despite the bias introduced in the scale to measure greater levels of trust than that which correspond to a standardized psychosocial scale, the instrument measures an alarming proportion of the population (53.5 percent) with no level of trust in the key governmental institutions. In the PID population, the proportion without any trust is 43 percent. The level of much trust is technically similar in the PID and in the population as a whole (13.7 percent and 12.9 percent, respectively), which has increasingly declined since 1994, when it reached 16.7 percent.

The greater trust in key governmental entities that the PID population demonstrates compared with the general population in 2001 is due to the level of political activism, as shown in Chart 4.18. The groups that are not active and do not sympathize with any party show a greater level of distrust than the population in general (56.9 percent as opposed to 53.5 percent in the 2001 DEMOS survey). Among those active in a party absolute distrust is lower (43.0 percent) and similar to the level of the general population in 1997, and much trust is higher (13.7 percent). This division reveals that *among the non-politically active PID population, the proportion of persons with distrust is higher and the population with much trust lower than the corresponding proportions of the population in general, as measured in 2001.*

Chart 4.17 Level of trust in key governmental entities, DEMOS 1994, 1997, 2001 and ENPID 2001

Index	DEMOS			ENPID
	1994	1997	2001	2001
Levels				
None	45.0	43.1	53.5	43.0
Little	21.9	22.0	19.6	21.3
Intermediate	16.3	17.5	14.0	22.0
Much	16.7	17.3	12.9	13.7
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Number	2,425	2,660	3,091	962

Chart 4.18 Trust in government entities by level of political activism, ENPID 2001.

Index	Level of Political Activism			Total
	Active	Sympathize	Not activists	
None	43.0	48.2	56.9	100.0
Little	21.3	22.2	22.5	21.9
Intermediate	22.0	19.7	15.4	19.2
Much	13.7	9.9	5.2	9.9
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Number	328	365	267	2

The area of residence is a factor that has a bearing on the trust in key governmental entities, as is the magnitude of the change experienced during the 1994 to 2001 period. Chart 4.19 shows these data. “Rural other” records the highest increase in absolute distrust (38.9 percent to 50.3 percent) and the greatest reduction in much trust (23.5 percent to 16.5 percent), followed by “urban other”, where the category with no trust increased from

48.1 percent to 57.1 percent, attaining the greatest proportion of distrust. In the National District, the levels of trust have remained relatively stable and the differences may originate from sampling errors. The PID population that resides in the National District has more trust in key governmental entities than their counterparts from the DEMOS survey, though the difference is not significant. The proportion with absolute distrust is lower (44.3 percent as opposed to 51.2 percent, DEMOS 2001) and that with high or intermediate trust is greater (31.4 percent as opposed to 29.5 percent, DEMOS 2001). The remaining divisions of areas of residence differ and are not compatible, given that both the northern and southern regions in the PID include urban and rural areas. Within the PID population, the National District has the lower proportion of people with absolute distrust and the greater proportion with average and high trust.

Chart 4.19 Level of trust in key governmental entities, by area of residency, DEMOS 1994, 1997, 2001 and ENPID 2001

DEMOS												
Index	National District			Urban other			Rural other			Total		
	1994	1997	2001	1994	1997	2001	1994	1997	2001	1994	1997	2001
None	48.5	42.4	51.2	48.1	46.9	57.1	38.9	39.8	50.3	45.0	43.1	53.5
Little	22.5	23.5	19.3	23.7	22.7	20.0	20.2	19.5	19.3	21.9	22.0	19.6
Average	16.6	20.1	16.3	14.0	15.5	12.8	17.4	16.8	13.9	16.3	17.5	14.0
High	12.4	14.0	13.2	14.1	15.0	10.1	23.5	23.9	16.5	16.7	17.3	12.9
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Number	1,053	946	742	517	907	1,347	856	808	1,002	2,425	2,660	3,091

ENPID 2001				
	National	Northern	Southern	Total
	District	region	region	
None	44.3	49.6	52.6	49.0
Little	24.3	23.2	18.9	21.9
Average	23.1	18.0	16.7	19.2
High	8.3	9.2	11.8	9.9
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Number	317	289	356	962

4.6 Conclusion

Consistently, the population that participated in the PID programs has a more critical vision than the population in general of how Dominican democracy functions. A smaller proportion of PID participants perceive the existence of freedom of speech and smaller proportion perceives the existence of equal opportunities. The issue of social inequality is perceived to be more important than the absence of freedom of speech due to fear of repression. Inequality between the rich and the poor under the law is the principal threat to the sustainability of the democratic system, which is perceived as incapable of applying the law equally to the rich and the poor by the great majority of the general population (76 percent) and of the PID participants (80 percent). Inequality based on religion is perceived less, and, even then, a third of the population and a little more of the population participating in the PID programs confirm its existence in Dominican society. The general and PID populations agree that there are unequal opportunities among men and women. For the PID population, racial inequality is more widespread than that of gender discrimination as compared to the general population. The level of education increases the perception of inequality, as does residence in the National District.

In addition, the PID population has well-defined expectations of the most important benefit that a democratic system can offer. Instead of disperse answers and a high proportion of

persons who do not know what benefits democracy offers, the PID survey shows that almost half the population identifies freedom and more than a fifth report equal citizen rights as the most important benefits. Both populations have a similar proportion—approximately one-third—that considers the political system harmful but, among the people participating in the PID, a greater proportion responded that it benefited them a lot or a little. This benefit affects the rating government performance as effective or ineffective. Those who feel harmed by the political system comprise 42 percent of the persons who evaluated government performance as very ineffective, and only 20 percent among those that evaluated it as very effective.

The level of party activism is one of the most important variables that differentiate the PID population from the rest of the population; 34 percent of PID beneficiaries are active exactly double the proportion of the general population, and a smaller proportion are neither active nor sympathize with any political party. Despite the greater proportion of political activists in the PID, the perception of the role of the parties is rather negative in both populations, although in ENPID, a greater proportion of people maintained a non-critical position with regard to the functioning of the parties, as could be expected. But almost two thirds of both populations consider that the parties only serve to participate in the elections every four years and less than 10 percent, in both populations considers that the parties defend all of the groups of the society.

The level of political activism of the PID population does not depend on socio-economic variables as level of schooling or household income strata. It is not associated significantly with the profession of religious faith or nonbelief. However, the proportions of party activists increase in the more marginal zones of both populations, the provinces of the south for the PID and the area “rural other” for the 2001 DEMOS. Men are more active than women, and differences are comparable in both populations analyzed.

In both populations political activism increases the proportion of people who participate in political activities in favor of democracy. However, the greater proportion of party activism in the PID population does not explain by itself the greater participation of this population in pro-democratic reforms; participation of sympathizers and those not active in political activities in favor of democracy in the PID population is higher than in the same category of activism in the whole of the population.

In the same manner, political activism cannot explain the higher appraisal the population makes of governmental performance, where the proportion that most negatively evaluates performance is reduced to more than half of the results in the 2001 DEMOS survey, and that which appraises performance as being very effective is almost triple among PID participants. The opinion on government performance does not change in a form statistically significant among the groups defined by their level of party. Because of this, and because of evidence furnished by the qualitative and quantitative data on grassroots associations analyzed later in this document, it can be concluded that the best appraisal of government performance lies in the success of the PID population in mobilizing the communities and the local governments in the improvement of public services.

ENPID used an instrument based on concrete indicators to measure willingness to accept political reform; therefore, results are not comparable with those of the population as a whole as measured by the 2001 DEMOS survey. With a more concrete scale that includes most of the changes that are the object of public debate, a moderate predisposition to change (71.4 percent) was found. A majority resisted specific changes, such as, presidential reelection; institution of joint elections for president, congress, and municipal positions; reduction of the current formula for presidential elections; and implementation of the open caucuses during elections.

The PID population is more critical than the population as a whole of functioning of Dominican justice. The four negative factors that affect Dominican justice are perceived in greater percentages among the participants of the PID programs. Among the actors in the justice system, the worst performing are the law professionals, the best performing are the judges, followed by prosecutors. The low quality in the justice administration is demonstrated in the low ranking of performance of employees who work in courts, prosecutors' offices, and judicial offices, second worse to only the lawyers.

The analysis of trust in governmental, political, and nongovernmental entities and institutions brings to light the latent problem of governance and the danger of sustainability of democracy based on political parties. The longitudinal trend in the population in general is to increase trust in nongovernmental and political institutions when the trust in governmental institutions declines, and to diminish the trust in the institutions of the civil society when the trust in state and political institutions increases. The highest level of trust is assigned by the general population and by the PID population to the Catholic Church and the media. On the other hand, the institution perceived as less trustworthy, with a score of 0.48 in the general population and 0.64 in that of the PID, on a scale of 0.00 to 2.00, is that of political parties, the institution on which rests the democratic representation system. On the scale of measurement, this score is close to the zero (0) limit of no trust for the general population, and closer to the score of little trust for the PID population. On the other hand, the analysis of the trust in eight key governmental entities confirms the problem of governance. The majority of the population has no level of trust in key governmental institutions, while among the PID population, the proportion with no trust is reduced to the level existing in 1997 of 43 percent.

5. Political Interest and Participation and Credibility in the Electoral System

5.1 Interest in Politics

The interests of Dominican citizens in politics were directly surveyed through the question: *Do you have much, little, or no interest in political topics?* This first approximation is not precise and may generate false positives. Two other indicators capture the veracity of this answer with more precision. The next question ascertains the interest of the person interviewed in being informed: *Do you frequently, sometimes, or never read, listen to, or watch news on politics?* The third indicator refers to a position that reflects a greater level of interest in politics without demanding any particular action: *Do you frequently, sometimes, or never discuss political topics with other persons?* Chart 5.1 shows the

results of these three questions, according to gender, for the 2001 DEMOS survey and ENPID. The PID population was expected to be more interested in politics than the national population.

Chart 5.1 Percentage distribution of the population by level of interest in politics, by gender, DEMOS 2001 and ENPID

		Sex				TOTAL	
		DEMOS 2001		ENPID		DEMOS	ENPID
		Female	Male	Female	Male		
Interest in political issues	Much	9.7	17.4	31.5	50.3	13.6	39.2
	Little	32.0	36.5	48.6	38.3	34.2	44.4
	None	57.2	45.6	19.7	11.2	51.4	16.2
	Refuses	1.1	0.5	0.2	0.3	0.8	0.2
Reads, sees, and hears news on politics	Frequently	26.9	43.5	50.8	64.7	35.3	57.7
	Sometimes	54.2	45.2	43.0	33.8	49.7	39.2
	Never	18.8	11.0	4.2	1.3	14.9	3.0
	Refuses	0.1	0.2	0.0	0.3	0.2	0.1
Discusses political issues with other people	Frequently	9.4	22.6	34.7	54.3	16.1	42.7
	Sometimes	34.5	40.1	45.4	34.0	37.3	40.7
	Never	55.9	36.8	19.5	11.4	46.3	16.2
	Refuses	0.2	0.5	0.4	0.3	0.3	0.3
	Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	Number	1,536	1,555	568	394	3,091	962

The majority of the Dominican population reports not being interested in political topics (51.4 percent) and only a small proportion is very interested (13.6 percent). In contrast, among the PID population, only 16.2 percent is not interested and 39.2 percent is very interested, with the remaining population reporting a low level of interest. The interest reported in political topics is conditioned by the gender of both populations, with a greater interest among men than among women. The difference in gender is very marked, particularly in the PID population, with 50 percent of the men very interested in political topics as opposed to 32 percent of the women.

In a general sense, the data of both surveys coincide in showing that a greater proportion of persons receive political news than discuss political topics, and even more than the proportion that reports having an interest in politics. Of the general population 35.7 percent frequently kept posted on political topics versus 57.7 percent of the PID participants; both of these proportions above the reported levels of interest. Men receive political news in a greater proportion than women in the national population (44 percent as opposed to 27 percent of women) and in the PID, where the difference between men and women was 22.4 percent, greater than the difference among the population of voters. On the other hand, the interest measured by discussing on political topics with other persons declines among both

populations and is closer to the level of interest reported on those topics. Again, gender differences are maintained. A greater proportion of men in both populations frequently discuss politics. There is a marked difference in proportions between the two populations (54 percent of the men of the PID as opposed to 23 percent in the national population; and 35 percent of the women in the PID versus 9 percent in the national population). The persons who never talk about politics make up an important portion of the population (46 percent), close to the proportion that reported not having any interest in political topics (51 percent).

Among the PID beneficiaries, those who never talk about and report having no interest in political topics are the same (16.2 percent), thus marking a substantive difference with those in the national population.

Chart 5.2 shows the division of the populations according to the area of residence. The statement of interest is not significantly different among the areas of the DEMOS survey study, likewise there is little difference among the subpopulations that frequently, sometimes, or never discuss political topics. But the proportion of persons in the National District and the “Urban other” area receive political news with greater frequency (41 percent and 39 percent, respectively) than those residing in the rural area (26 percent). The pattern of interest is different in the sphere of the ENPID study. The persons that reside in the National District consistently report more interest, receive more news, and discuss political topics more frequently than the residents in the northern region; and the residents of the northern district have greater proportions in the three indicators than the persons who reside in the southern provinces.

Chart 5.2 Percentage distribution of the population by level of interest in politics, by area of residence and politics, DEMOS 2001 and ENPID

		Demos 2001			ENPID		
		National District	Urban Other	Rural Other	National District	Northern Region	Southern Region
Interest in political issues	Much	13.7	13.2	14.0	46.5	39.7	32.3
	Little	37.5	32.4	34.3	39.7	44.9	48.2
	None	48.7	53.2	50.9	13.5	15.1	19.5
	Refuses	0.0	1.2	0.8	0.3	0.4	0.0
Reads, sees, or hears news on politics	Frequently	40.7	39.1	26.0	71.4	53.3	48.8
	Sometimes	48.5	47.2	53.9	27.4	44.5	45.8
	Never	10.7	13.5	19.8	1.2	1.8	5.5
	Refuses	0.0	0.2	0.3	0.0	0.4	0.0
Discusses political issues with other people	Frequently	17.1	17.9	12.7	57.5	37.1	33.7
	Sometimes	37.0	37.1	37.9	31.4	44.5	46.3
	Never	45.6	44.7	48.9	10.8	18.0	19.7
	Refuses	0.4	0.2	0.5	0.3	0.4	0.3
Total		100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Number		742	1,347	1,002	317	289	356

5.2 Political Participation


- **Membership in Organizations**

ENPID followed a methodology developed for the 1997 DEMOS survey. First, a similar organization list was developed, and the person interviewed was asked whether or not he or she belonged to each group. If yes, the person was asked to clarify whether or not he or she was an active or not active. Chart 5.3 shows the results of the 2001 DEMOS survey and ENPID. For the analysis and compatibility of the data, the organizations are grouped into categories and by index of belonging.

Chart 5.3 Indicators of membership in organizations (active/not-so-active members), DEMOS 2001 and ENPID			
		DEMOS	ENPID
Membership indicators		2001	2001
	Neighborhood Board	23.8	36.7
	Popular community organizations	5.9	26.4
	Women's groups or associations	3.2	21.1
	Farmers' organizations	7.0	18.1
	Church community	10.1	18.1
	Other not mentioned	5.7	17.7
	Parents' association	9.9	16.8
	Sports and cultural club	10.1	12.2
	Professional associations	5.2	11.9
	Unions	5.3	8.7
	Group of housewives	2.7	8.1
	Ecological organization	1.3	4.6
	Political	17.1	34.1
	Member of at least one	53.8	97.5
Types of organizations of active and nonactive membership	Political	17.1	34.1
	Territorial	31.6	89.2
	Professions and abilities	15.3	38.7
	Parents association	13.1	37.9
	Sports and cultural club	10.1	12.2
	Other organizations	6.9	17.7
Index of belonging to organizations (active and nonactive members)	Does not belong to any	46.2	2.5
	Belongs to one	26.2	15.9
	Belongs to two	14.0	34.9
	Belong to three or more	13.5	46.7
		100.0	100.0
	Number	3,091	962

The three indicators dealing with belonging to organizations, according to active or not active membership, reveal substantial differences among the two populations compared. In none of the variable categories does the general population attain a proportion higher than

Figure 5.1. Active and Non-Active Membership in Non-political Associations. 2001 DIP and ENPID.



that of the PID. This difference was to be expected, given that the subgrantee institutions selected leaders of grassroots associations to participate in the programs or motivated participating persons to exercise leadership through community organizations. Thus, only 2.5 percent of the PID population did not belong to any association at the time of the survey, as compared to 46.2 percent of the voting age citizens of the general population. Another important characteristic is that, excluding activism in political parties, PID beneficiaries in their majority belong to two (34.9 percent) and three and more associations (46.7 percent), while in the general population, these proportions only reach 14.0 percent and 13.5 percent, respectively. The differences according to the type of association are illustrated in Figure 5.1. great difference in membership in women’s associations can be attributed to the percentage of women in each survey (21.1 percent in ENPID and 3.2 percent in the 2001 DEMOS survey). In turn, the neighborhood groups have the highest proportion of members of both populations. The data also reveal the large participation of religious leaders in the PID; belonging to ecclesiastical grassroots communities 18 percent versus 10 percent in the general population.

When the associations are grouped by category, common patterns are observed among both populations, although with very marked differences. The associations of a geographic commonality nature have the highest proportion of membership (89.2 percent in ENPID and 31.6 percent in the DEMOS survey), followed by labor associations (38.7 percent in ENPID and 15.3 percent in the DEMOS survey), by parents’ associations (37.9 percent in ENPID and 13.1 percent in the DEMOS survey), and by political parties (34.1 percent in ENPID and 17.1 percent in the DEMOS survey). The greatest participation in geographic associations is accounted for primarily by the extensive participation in neighborhood

groups (36.6 percent in ENPID and 23.8 percent in the DEMOS survey), in grassroots organizations (26.4 percent in ENPID and 5.9 percent in the DEMOS survey), and in women’s associations or groups (21.1 percent in ENPID and 3.2 percent in the DEMOS survey).

On the other hand, the higher proportion of the PID population with membership in labor organizations is due to the importance given to programs such as civic education in schools, training of farmers, and civil and administrative career developed by PID subgrantee institutions.

- **Participation in Traditional Political Activities**

Chart 5.4 presents five variables selected in the DEMOS survey as indicators of traditional political activity. During the 1997 to 2001 period, a reduction in participation is observable in the national population in these activities. Even though the differences are not large, the reduction pattern is consistent in all of the activities. The participation of the PID population is significantly higher in all of the indicators. Almost this entire population participates in meetings to solve problems in the neighborhood, city, or community; and more than half attend the political party meetings and try to convince other people to vote for the candidate of their preference. Civil activism is also very high, particularly when compared with the national participation. Forty-five percent of the PIDD population participates in protest demonstrations, compared with 10 percent of the national population; close to one-third (29.4 percent) participates in strikes or lockouts, compared to a minute proportion of the general population (4.3 percent).

Chart 5.4 Participation in traditional political activities			
Percentage distribution of the population that participates frequently or sometimes, by gender, 1997, 2001 DEMOS and 2001 ENPID			
	DEMOS	DEMOS	ENPID
	1997	2001	2001
Participates in meetings to solve problems in the neighborhood, city, or community	57.0	52.1	95.0
Attends political party meetings	31.2	28.6	54.0
Tries to convince other people to vote for the candidate of their preference	33.8	31.4	49.8
Participates in protest demonstrations or other	11.4	9.8	44.7
Participates in strikes or lockouts	5.1	4.3	29.4

Chart 5.5 shows the index of participation of the PID population in traditional political activities, which has been constructed with the five indicators of Chart 5.4. The index only includes the people who reported participating frequently, omitting the category of occasional participation included in the above chart.

The construction of the index with the index of participation in traditional activities enables analysis of the factors external to the program that affect participation in traditional activities. The gender division is the factor that most determines high participation (participates frequently in 3 to 5 of the activities). High participation is more prevalent among men (25 percent) than among women (14 percent), and the proportion of inactive women (24 percent) is higher than that of inactive men (16 percent).

The area of residence is a greater factor in participation in political activities than the level of formal education. In the northern provinces there is a smaller proportion (13 percent) with high participation, although the inactive proportion is slightly higher in the National District, which has the highest proportion of high participation (22 percent). Years of education slightly influence the high participation, but only when dividing the population into those with less than five or more than six years of education. The variations in the inactive proportion is not statistically significant among the groups with different education levels.

Chart 5.5 Index of participation in traditional political activities, by gender, area of residence, and education, ENPID 2001

	Participation			TOTAL	
	High	Moderate	Inactive	Percent	Number
Gender					
Female	14.4	62.0	23.6	100.0	568
Male	24.9	59.6	15.5	100.0	394
Years of Study					
0-5	15.6	64.6	19.7	99.9	147
6-11	19.5	60.8	19.7	100.0	380
12 and more	19.1	60.0	20.9	100.0	435
Area of residence					
National District	21.5	56.3	22.2	100.0	317
Northern region	12.9	66.5	20.6	100.0	280
Southern region	20.5	61.1	18.4	100.0	356
Total	18.7	61.0	20.3	100.0	962

NOTE: The five indicators used are shown in Chart 5.4, but only the subpopulations that frequently participate are included here. The index categories were assigned the following values: inactive = agrees with 0 of the indicators; moderate participation = agrees with 1-2 of the indicators; high participation = agrees with 3-5 of the indicators.

- **Acceptance of Traditional Political Participation**

The DEMOS survey inquired as to the willingness of the population to participate in activities “that some people hold to protest, demand rights or express their ideas.” The types of activities were read so the people could respond if they agreed, disagreed, or if it depended. Chart 5.6 shows the data on the people who agreed in the 2001 DEMOS and ENPID, by gender, educational level, and area of residence

Chart 5.6 According to the traditional political activities conducted, by gender, educational level, and area of residence, DEMOS 2001 and ENPID

	Agrees with activities to protest, claim rights or express ideas:											
	Legal Demonstrations		Neighborhood or community lockouts		National strikes or lockouts		Land occupation		Occupation of churches or other places		Number	
	DEMOS	ENPID	DEMOS	ENPID	DEMOS	ENPID	DEMOS	ENPID	DEMOS	ENPID	DEMOS	ENPID
Gender												
Female	78.1	80.6	30.9	49.6	17.2	30.8	20.2	18.3	14.6	11.6	1,536	568
Male	82.5	80.2	37.9	52.0	24.8	33.8	22.3	21.6	13.2	13.7	1,555	394
Years of study												
0-5	76.3	69.4	28.8	42.9	14.8	20.4	25.5	27.2	16.3	14.3	1,227	147
6-11	81.5	78.7	34.9	47.1	21.6	30.8	21.5	20.8	13.4	11.6	1,232	380
12 or more	85.8	85.7	44.6	56.3	32.1	37.0	12.5	16.1	10.2	12.6	631	435
Area of residence												
National District	79.5	76.9	31.2	49.2	17.7	31.4	14.5	8.9	7.9	8.0	742	317
Urban other/ North	79.6	82.7	36.5	41.2	24.6	23.2	18.8	12.1	12.7	9.2	1,347	289
Rural other/South	81.8	81.9	34.0	58.9	18.7	39.2	29.6	34.8	20.0	18.9	1,002	356
Total	80.3	80.5	34.4	50.6	21.0	32.0	21.3	19.6	13.9	12.5	3,091	962

The most moderate forms of protest gain a more generalized acceptance than other forms that defy the laws and/or have social and economic consequences for the rest of the country or for the sector itself. Thus, the legal manifestations in both populations reach the higher level of acceptance (80 percent), followed by the acceptance of neighborhood or community lockouts (34.4 percent in the DEMOS survey and 50.6 percent in ENPID). Even though moderate, these forms of struggle have been relatively stable in the society’s acceptance, given that in 1997, the acceptance of legal demonstrations reached 79 percent of the population and neighborhood or community lockouts 36 percent.

The majority of both populations rejects the most disputed types of protests. Only one-fifth of the national population agrees with the national strikes or lockouts (21 percent) or with land occupations (21 percent). The PID population has a greater acceptance of national strikes (32 percent) and accepts land occupations less (19.6 percent). Occupation of churches or other public places has the lowest rate of acceptance (highest rate of rejection) among both populations (13.9 percent national and 12.5 percent PID).

When the acceptance rates are analyzed by gender, the differences are not significant in the PID population and are expressed more in the national population in such activities as community or neighborhood lockouts or national strikes, with a slightly higher acceptance among men than among women. In turn, differences in acceptance proportions among the different groups formed by years of studies are more marked in both populations and do not follow a linear relation. The proportion of acceptance of legal demonstrations, neighborhood lockouts, or national strikes increases with the level of schooling in both populations. However, the relation is inverse when the protest activities are illegal, as is the case with land and church occupations. In both populations, the people with more years of education have less acceptance of the occupation of lands or public areas. In addition, the PID population with less than 12 years of study has less acceptance of the occupation of public places than the national population.

The area of residence also influences the acceptance of political activities that are conventionally carried out. In both populations, the most disputed activity indicators reveal the most important differences according to the area of residence. In the national population, "Rural other" has the highest proportion of people who accept occupations of land (35 percent) and of churches or other public places (20 percent). However, national strikes and neighborhood lockouts have more acceptance in "Urban other" (25 percent and 37 percent respectively). All political protest activities have less acceptance in the National District. In the PID population, the National District also has the lowest levels of acceptance as compared to the provinces in the northern and southern regions, with two exceptions: community lockouts and national strikes are less accepted in the provinces of the north. In turn, the provinces in the south in the ENPID population have the highest level of acceptance, except for the legal demonstration activity, in which the northern provinces are not technically different from the southern ones.

Chart 5.7 compares the indexes of interest in politics and belonging to organizations, as well as the acceptance of national lockouts or strikes, by gender and school level, in the 2001 DEMOS and ENPID surveys. The joint analysis of the three indicators in each of the populations studied does not establish an association between the interest in politics a person may have, his or her participation in some organization, and his or her approval to participate in contestation activities such as national strikes or lockouts. The proportions in the three indicators reveal important differences in both populations.

Gender differences are significantly expressed in the three indicators in the national population, but not in the population affected by the PID, where the only significant difference in statistical terms is the lesser interest of women in politics. The level of education, however, increases interest in politics, membership in any organization, and approval of lockouts and strikes in both populations. Given that virtually the entire PID population belongs to at least one organization, this variable does not depend on any particular factor.

Chart 5.7 Percentage that agreed with the index of interest, belonging to some organization and approval of lockouts and strikes, by gender and school level, DEMOS and ENPID 2001

		Has much/a lot of interest in politics	Belongs to some organization	Approves of national lockouts/strikes	Number
		Gender			
2001 DEMOS	Female	28.5	44.0	17.2	1,536
	Male	45.8	54.1	24.8	1,555
ENPID	Female	56.0	96.8	30.8	568
	Male	70.0	98.5	33.8	394
		School level			
2001 DEMOS	0-5	25.4	43.5	14.8	1,227
	6-11	37.6	49.3	21.6	1,232
	12 or more	59.4	59.3	32.1	631
ENPID	0-5	39.5	100.0	20.4	147
	6-11	55.2	97.1	30.8	380
	12 or more	75.0	97.0	37.0	435
Total	2001 DEMOS	37.2	49.1	21.0	3,091
	ENPID	61.7	97.5	32.0	962

5.3 Electoral Participation and Credibility in the Electoral System

The levels of trust in the electoral system have increased since 1994 and are greater in the population that participated in the PID programs than in the national population. The 1994 DEMOS survey found that only 36.3 percent of the population with the right to vote trusted the final figures offered by the Central Electoral Board. Three months prior to the 1994 elections, only 46.0 percent trusted the validity of the final results that the JCE would give. The 1997 DEMOS reported an increase in credibility (73.8 percent of the population trusted the results of the 1996 elections and 68.3 percent trusted that the JCE could guarantee clean elections for 1998). Chart 5.8 presents trust indicators in 2001, compared to the PID beneficiary population.

Chart 5.8 Indicators of trust in the electoral system, by social demographic characteristics, DEMOS 2001 and ENPID

	Trust in the electoral system							
	Trust the results of the 2000 elections		Trust that JCE guarantees clean elections for 2002		Plans to vote in the 2002 elections		Total Number	
	DEMOS	ENPID	DEMOS	ENPID	DEMOS	ENPID	DEMOS	ENPID
Gender								
Female	71.3	82.9	59.8	67.8	61.3	73.1	1536	568
Male	82.2	87.1	70.5	72.8	68.2	77.4	1555	394
Years of Study								
0-5	74.8	84.4	64.8	71.4	68.5	78.9	1227	147
6-11	75.5	81.6	66.1	64.5	63.4	71.6	1232	380
12 or more	83.0	87.4	64.1	74.0	60.3	76.3	631	435
Area of Residence								
National District	77.9	86.8	63.6	74.8	60.1	73.5	742	317
Other urban/north	74.6	89.3	63.9	66.2	61.0	77.9	1347	289
Other rural/south	78.9	79.2	68.1	68.2	73.4	73.7	1002	356
Total	76.8	84.6	65.2	69.9	64.8	74.8	3091	962

Of the national population, 76.8 percent trusted the results of the 2000 elections, a slightly higher proportion than trusted the results of the 1996 elections. The PID population, which is more educated and committed to political and social activities, had a higher proportion (84.6 percent) of people who trusted the 2000 elections. Gender influences the level of trust, which is higher in men in both populations than in women. Among people with 12 or more years of formal education there was reported a higher level of trust in the 2000 elections than those with less schooling. For both DEMOS and ENPID populations, there are differences in the level of trust by area of residence. However, the regional distribution is different. For the national populations, trust was the lowest in the northern “Urban other.” For the ENPID population, the lowest level is in the southern provinces.

The proportion of the population that trusts the JCE to guarantee the next elections has not significantly changed between the 1997 and 2001 DEMOS surveys. In 2001, 65.2 percent of the national population trusted the JCE to guarantee the 2002 elections, a proportion slightly higher in the ENPID (69.9 percent). Gender has an influence on the trust of the JCE, though more intensely in the national population than the PID. In both, men have more trust in the JCE to guarantee the validity of the 2002 elections. Schooling does not influence trust in a statistically significant manner, and the area of residence slightly increases trust in the “Rural other” area of the DEMOS and in the National District of the PID population.

The intention to vote in the 1998 elections, as measured in the 1997 DEMOS survey, was reported by three-quarters of the population with the right to vote. In 2001, the intention to vote in the 2002 elections declined to 65 percent, while the PID population reached three-quarters of the population (74.8 percent). Like the two indicators above, a slightly higher proportion of men plan to vote in 2002, and in both populations the lower level of education increases the intention to vote. In the DEMOS survey, residence in “Rural other” is associated with a higher intention to vote and as is residence in the provinces of the northern region among the PID population.

- **Conclusion**

The PID population shows a higher interest in politics than the national population. Likewise, the proportion that reads, listens to, or watches political news and discusses politics is substantially greater than the proportions found in the national population. In both populations, men show a higher interest than women do in political issues. The area of residence affects the national population that receives political news, with lower proportions in the rural area. In the regional subdivision of the PID population, the people who reside in the National District consistently report more interest, receive more news, and discuss more about political issues than the residents of the northern or southern provinces.

Membership in civil society organizations and political parties reveals an important gap between the populations. In the PID, there is a generalized belonging and it exceeds the belonging of the national population in each type of organization. While in the national population 46 percent do not belong to any entity, among PID beneficiaries this proportion is only 2.5 percent. In addition, most of the PID population belongs to two or more associations as compared with a much lower proportion in the national population. Membership in political parties is also unequal, with double the proportion of political activists among the PID beneficiaries.

Participation of the people interviewed in traditional political activities shows great differences between the populations, as can be expected of populations with marked differences in belonging to social, labor, and political associations. The participation of PID beneficiaries is much greater in the five activities researched, such as participation in meetings to solve community problems, attending political party meetings, trying to convince other people to vote for the candidate of their preference, and participating in contestation activities, such as protest demonstrations and participating in strikes or lockouts. The construction of an index with these indicators confirm that in the population affected by the PID, men have a higher participation and women are more inactive; people with six or more years of schooling have a higher proportion of participation, even though the proportion of those inactive is similar in the three groups of school level; and the people living in the National District and in the provinces in the southern region have greater proportions of high participation than the residents of the northern region.

The levels of acceptance of traditional political activities are equally high in both populations for legal demonstrations. This level of acceptance decreases as demonstrations become more confrontational, and in fact, confrontation is rejected by the majority of both

populations. The occupations of lands and churches and other public places are the most rejected activities and are influenced by geographical divisions more than by differences of gender or education. The occupation of lands, churches, and other public places finds support principally in the “other” regions of the national population and in the southern provinces of the ENPID. National strikes or community lockouts have more acceptance in the “Urban other” area of the national population and in the southern provinces in ENPID.

In the electoral sphere, the levels of trust in the system are higher among the PID population than among the rest of the population. The latter trusted, in a more generalized manner, in the 2000 election results, trusted more that JCE can guarantee free elections in the year 2002, and a greater proportion planned to vote in the next congressional and municipal elections. This is expected, given the program efforts by the PID to educate in this sense, the absence of criticism after the 1994 crisis, and the participation of the civil society in observing the elections managed by *Participación Ciudadana*.

6. Perception of Personal Economic Situation and of Government Management

6.1 Perception of Personal Situation

Perceptions of personal economic situation and of labor changes that have taken place in the last five years are not the same between the national population and the one that participates in PID projects. Chart 6.1 reveals the changes according to the self-assessment of the people interviewed during the 1994 to 2001 period in the national population, as measured by the DEMOS and ENPID surveys. In 1994, 21.7 percent of the national population considered their personal economic situation good or very good, while in 2001 this proportion declined to 14.2 percent of the national population. Their positive perception of their work situation in the last five years declined from 27 percent to 19 percent. As shown Chart 6.2, the PID population that considered its situation good or very good (13.4 percent) does not significantly differ from the national. However, the PID population who reported that its situation was as bad or very bad (38.3 percent) is much less than the national (52.5 percent). In the PID population, close to a third considered that its situation improved and a smaller proportion considered that worsened (34.4 percent as compared to 44.9 percent in the 2001 DEMOS survey). This difference is related to the higher educational levels of participants of PID programs than among the rest of the population.

Chart 6.1 Self-evaluation of the economic and labor situation during the 1994 to 2001 period

Percentage distribution that considers their personal economic situation is good or very good and that their situation improved in the last five years, 1994, 1997, 2001 DEMOS survey and ENPID

Perception of personal situation	DEMOS		ENPID	
	1994	1997	2001	2001
Perceives personal economic situation as very good/good	21.7	16.9	14.2	13.4
Work situation improved in the last five years	27.1	20.2	19.3	30.5
Number	2,425	2,660	3,091	962

The breakdown by gender presented in Chart 6.2 does not show significant differences in the perception of personal economic situation between men and women in the national population. In ENPID, a slightly higher proportion of men appraises their situation as being bad or very bad, and a higher proportion of women identifies it as regular. On the other hand, the changes perceived in the labor situation in the last five years are assessed differently among men and women. In both populations, women perceive more than men a stability or stagnation in their economic situation. In turn, a greater proportion of men than women perceived that their situation improved in the last five years (24 percent in the 2001 DEMOS survey and 33 percent in ENPID) and another higher proportion of men perceived that their situation worsened (48 percent in the 2001 DEMOS survey and 36 percent in ENPID).

The area of residence affects the perception of personal economic situation and the change experienced in work in the last five years. In both populations, residence in the National District increases the positive appraisal of personal economic situation and, in the case of the national population, reduces the proportion of those who reported their situation as being bad or very bad. In the national population, residence in the National District also increases the improvement assessment in the job situation (26 percent) much higher than residence in the “Rural other” area (13 percent). But in the subdivision of the ENPID, residence in the National District and the provinces of the northern region does not affect the perception of improvement or deterioration in the last five years, while in the provinces of the southern region, the proportion that reported improvement is reduced by more than half (17 percent compared to 39 percent in the provinces of the northern region) and the proportion that reported a worsened situation, increases significantly (44 percent as compared to 28 percent in the northern region).

Chart 6.2 Self-assessment of the personal economic and labor situations, by area of residence and gender

Percentage distribution of the population by its opinion of the personal economic and labor situation, according to place of residence and gender, 2001 DEMOS and ENPID

Economic situation		Area of Residence					
		DEMOS 2001			ENPID		
		National District	Other Urban	Other Rural	National District	Northern Region	Southern Region
Assessment of the personal economic situation	Very good/good	18.2	13.1	12.7	18.1	16.2	7.1
	Regular	33.1	35.1	31	42.8	53.3	48.8
	Bad/very bad	48.7	51.7	56.3	38.5	30.5	44.1
Work situation in the last five years	Improved	25.9	20.3	12.9	38.2	39.3	17.0
	Continues the same	32.9	34.6	39.2	30.2	31.6	37.8
	Worsened	41.1	44.8	47.9	29.5	27.9	43.6
	Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Number		742	1347	1002	317	289	356

Economic Situation		Gender				Total	
		DEMOS		ENPID		DEMOS	ENPID
		Female	Male	Female	Male		
Assessment of personal economic situation	Very good/good	13.5	14.9	13.0	14.0	14.2	13.4
	Regular	33.2	33.4	50.4	44.7	33.3	48.0
	Bad/very bad	53.2	51.7	36.2	41.4	52.5	38.3
Work situation in the last five years	Improved	14.9	23.6	28.5	33.2	19.3	30.5
	Continues the same	43.2	28.2	35.7	30.2	35.7	33.5
	Worsened	41.5	48.2	33.1	36.3	44.9	34.4
	Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Number		1,536	1,555	568	394	3,091	962

NOTE: Cases with no response were omitted; thus the total percentages do not add up to exactly 100 percent.

6.2 Assessment of Governmental Performance Evaluation in the Administration of Public Services

Chart 6.3 shows the assessment of public services as being good or very good during the 1994 to 2001 period, as measured by the DEMOS survey, compared with the assessment of the population directly benefited by PID. An ascending, positive, and linear appraisal is observed in the proportion of people who evaluate public education and public hospitals as being good or very good. In turn, the assessment of good or very good performance of potable water services, garbage collection, public transportation, and social services (IDSS) decreased in the 1997 measurement, to increase later in the year 2001 to proportions above that of 1994. The construction of popular housing units and electricity services receive the

worst evaluation; linearly, the construction of housing units declined from a favorable evaluation by 39 percent of the population in 1994 to 19 percent in 2001, while electricity services dropped from 24 percent to 9 percent during the same period, receiving the worst evaluation of all of the services. During this period, two events affected the management of the latter: the international assistance in the reconstruction of homes after the damages of Hurricane George in September 1998, and the privatization process of the electricity services during the government of Dr. Leonel Fernández. In both cases, expectations were apparently frustrated.

The PID population has more stringent criteria to evaluate the performance of the services than does the national population, showing important differences through the measurements of the 2001 DEMOS survey. The potable water service, which along with public education, occupies first place in the population’s assessment (47.5 percent), is reduced by more than half in the assessment of PID participants (21.4 percent), while public education reached a proportion of 38.8 percent, followed by garbage collection services (31.3 percent) and public transportation (28.8 percent). Both populations coincide in pointing out the two worst services, the construction of popular housing units and electricity service. Figure 6.1 shows these results.

Chart 6.3 Perception of the performance of public services during the 1994 to 2001 period.
Percentage distribution of the appraisal of good and very good in several public services, 1994, 1997, 2001 DEMOS and ENPID

Good/very good public services	1994	1997	2001	ENPID 2001
The service of potable water	44.3	39.1	47.5	21.4
Public education	37.9	45.3	47.5	38.8
Garbage collection	30.6	28.1	44.4	31.3
Public transportation	31.9	26.0	42.6	28.2
Public hospitals	26.2	27.4	37.9	23.0
Social Security (IDSS)	25.3	21.3	32.5	21.0
The construction of housing units	39.1	26.0	19.2	12.7
Electricity services	24.4	13.6	9.2	2.7
Number	2,425	2,660	3,091	962

Health and public education are key factors in the struggle against poverty. Appraisal of performance in these areas changes substantially. The national population in 2001 (Chart 6.4) had the highest evaluation of public education services from the population that lives in the “Rural other” area (60 percent), much higher than the evaluation of the “Urban other” residents (44 percent) and the National District residents (36 percent). In ENPID, differences are not great; the positive evaluation of education in the National District is 41 percent, 44 percent in the northern provinces, and 33 percent in the southern provinces. The low proportion in the PID population that evaluates these services positively may be due to higher expectations and more stringent evaluation criteria. Although differences are less significant, the same pattern of evaluation is observed for public health hospitals.

Figure 6.1 Assessment of governmental performance as good/very good, 1994,1997, 2001 DEMOS and ENPID




Chart 6.4 Evaluation of public services, according to area of residence.

Percentage distribution of the national population and the PID that consider that several public services are good/very good, according to area of residence, 1994, 1997, 2001 DEMOS and ENPID.

Public Services	National District				Other Urban			Other Rural			Region	
	DEMOS		ENPID		DEMOS			DEMOS			North	South
	1994	1997	2001	2001	1994	1997	2001	1994	1997	2001	ENPID	
Good or very good												
Potable water	54.9	35.0	45.4	20.9	37.9	42.0	54.1	35.0	40.8	40.4	20.9	22.2
Public education	25.6	36.8	36.4	40.9	34.6	45.7	44.0	55.0	54.9	60.4	44.4	32.6
Garbage collection	36.8	25.1	50.1	35.7	33.9	33.0	48.6	20.8	26.2	34.5	32.7	26.3
Public transportation	25.8	17.2	41.8	38.4	31.1	27.5	41.0	39.8	34.5	45.5	30.8	19.2
Public hospitals	15.8	21.9	31.6	21.5	24.4	27.1	36.4	40.0	34.2	44.7	30.8	18.4
Social Security (IDSS)	20.3	18.9	27.1	22.1	22.7	19.3	31.9	32.9	26.5	37.3	24.3	17.5
Popular housing units	43.9	28.8	21.3	15.1	34.1	23.2	16.9	36.1	26.0	20.9	16.9	7.4
Electricity services	28.6	10.4	14.6	3.1	15.9	13.0	5.3	24.4	18.1	10.4	1.9	3.0
Number	1,053	946	742	317	517	907	1,347	856	808	1,002	289	356

6.3 Assessment of Government Policies

The people interviewed were asked: *Do you consider that in this country the government abides by and enforces the laws almost always, hardly ever, or never?* Five similar questions on government policies were asked in the DEMOS 2001 survey, as shown in Chart 6.5. For all of the indicators, the majority of both populations perceived that the government hardly ever or never abides by the laws or enforces them (60 percent DEMOS and 53 percent in ENPID); treats everyone the same (74 percent DEMOS and 71 percent in ENPID); is sensitive to what people want and need (65 percent DEMOS and 60 percent in ENPID); tries to reduce the differences between people with high and low incomes (60 percent DEMOS and 62 percent in ENPID); and is accountable to people for what it does (70 percent DEMOS and 60 percent in ENPID). The absence of institutionalism perceived

Chart 6.5 Perception of government performance, according to area of residence.

Percentage distribution of different opinions on government performance, according to area of residence, DEMOS and ENPID 2001

		National	National	Other	Northern	Other	South.	Total	Total
		District	District	Urban	Region	Rural	Region		
		DEMOS	ENPID	DEMOS	ENPID	DEMOS	ENPID	DEMOS	ENPID
The government abides by and enforces the laws	Always/almost always	41.5	49.2	35.6	44.1	39.2	44.9	38.2	46.2
	Almost never/never	57.6	50.2	62.3	54.4	57.8	54.8	59.7	53.1
	Refuses/Does not refuse	0.9	0.6	2.1	1.5	3.0	0.3	2.1	0.7
The government treats everyone the same	Always/almost always	25.9	19.5	21.0	27.6	27.3	27.1	24.2	28.1
	Almost never/never	73.3	69.5	77.4	71.3	70.5	72.6	74.2	71.2
	Refuses	0.8	0.9	1.6	1.1	2.2	0.3	1.6	0.7
The government is sensitive to what the people want and need	Always/almost always	33.8	38.8	31.3	37.5	30.8	41.4	31.7	39.4
	Almost never/never	64.8	60.0	65.7	61.4	64.9	57.8	65.2	59.6
	Refuses	1.4	1.2	3.0	1.1	4.2	0.8	3.0	1.0
The government tries to reduce the difference between people with high and low incomes.	Always/almost always	34.2	36.6	32.1	33.1	35.3	34.2	33.6	34.8
	Almost never/never	62.8	60.0	62.9	61.4	55.2	63.3	60.4	61.6
	Refuses	3.0	3.4	5.0	5.6	9.4	2.5	6.0	3.6
The government is accountable to people for its actions	Always/almost always	27.4	42.8	24.6	41.2	28.6	33.7	26.6	38.9
	Almost ever/never	69.8	55.4	72.1	57.8	66.2	64.9	69.6	59.7
	Refuses	2.8	1.8	3.3	1.1	5.2	1.4	3.8	1.4
	Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	Number	74.2	317	1,347	289	1,002	356	3,091	962

by the majority in three indicators is accompanied by the perception of a lack of social policies addressed to eradicate poverty and diminish social inequality.

Differences between the populations are small, but the general population is more critical of government policies than the PID population, except regarding the perception that the government almost never or never ever tries to reduce economic inequalities. Although the margin of difference is not statistically significant. The biggest difference is shown in the perception of 40 percent of the PID population, as compared to 27 percent of the national population, that the government always or almost always accounts for its actions. This 13-point percentage difference may result from the experience of the government's accountability reports to the municipal authorities in the most successful municipalities of the PID programs.

Differences according to geographical areas in the national population show there is a higher proportion that perceive the government does not function in the "Other urban" area, and the lowest proportion in the "Other rural" region, even though the differences between areas are small. In turn, for the PID population surveyed residing in the National District the perception of absence of functionality in abiding by and enforcing the laws, treating everyone the same, reducing economic differences, and being accountable to the people is lower. In both populations who reside in the National District, the most important differences are expressed in the highest proportion (42.8 percent) in the PID that perceives that the government is always or almost always accountable, versus 27.4 percent of the national population. On the other hand, a smaller proportion of the PID population thinks the government treats everyone the same, as opposed to 25.9 percent of the national population. In other words, the PID population tends to be more critical of government functions in the National District only in the perception that it exercises unequal treatment of its citizens. When removing this data, the National District PID population is the least critical of how the government functions.

The finding is paradoxical, because it contradicts the expectations of greater criticism on the part of the population that participated in civil education programs and that is politically and socially more committed to the development of democracy in the country. Two alternative reasons for this are possible. First, there is the existence of different and less democratic values and attitudes among the PID population, which contradicts other findings and the evidence of qualitative investigation. Second, there may be a neutralizing effect of the participative experience in local governments by an important proportion of the PID population directly benefited. But to explain the paradox, it is necessary to rule out that the PID population has less democratic values and attitudes than the general population.

6.4 Political Values and Attitudes

Chart 6.6 shows the data on eight indicators of values and attitudes of equality among the national population, as measured by the 2001 DEMOS survey and the participants of PID programs. Equal proportions of both populations (86 percent) agree that they would vote for a good candidate of a different religious belief and they also believe in the right to vote of Dominican citizens residing abroad. But in the other indicators, the populations do not coincide in the same proportion. The least important differences are that 41 percent of the


PID population believes that homosexuals should be allowed to occupy government positions, compared to 35 percent of the national population; and a higher proportion (45 percent) of citizens favor the right to vote of the police and military, which in the PID population only reaches 36 percent. The first response reflects discrimination and intolerance towards homosexuals in the majority of both populations. The second reflects the unwillingness of the majority to allow any type of involvement of the military forces in politics, an involvement still fresh in the history of the latter half of the twentieth century.

Chart 6.6 Political equality indicators

Percentage distribution of the population in the 2001 DEMOS survey and ENPID, according to political equality indicators.

Agrees with greater political equality:	DEMOS	ENPID
Homosexuals should be allowed to occupy government positions	34.8	40.9
Would vote for a good candidate of different religious belief	86.1	86.6
Men and women should make important decisions in the household	44.7	76.7
Women have equal or more capacity than men to rule	62.5	89.5
Women should participate in politics as men do	69.7	--
Women should have greater participation in politics	--	96.2
The right to vote for Dominicans residing abroad	86.0	86.0
The right to vote of the military and police	44.5	36.3
The right to vote of Dominican children and grandchildren of Haitians	63.3	--
Right to vote of children born in DR of Haitians with illegal residence in the country	--	43.3
Number	3,091	962

The most important difference between the populations is reflected in the attitude towards women. The population that participated in the subgrantee PID programs had the opportunity to reflect, learn, and put into practice nondiscriminatory behavior towards women in the household, politics, and society. Thus, 45 percent of the citizens believe that both men and women should make important, joint decisions in the household—instead of only men, solely in the majority of the alternate questions; in the PID population, this position is shared by 77 percent. In the political sphere, 63 percent of the national citizens think that women have equal or greater capacity than men to govern, a proportion that reaches 90 percent in the PID population. Another indicator of political participation was measured differently, though approximately. Seventy percent of the citizens voice their opinion that women should participate in politics the same as men, and 96 percent of the PID population believe women should have greater participation in politics. Figure 6.2 shows these findings graphically.



Acceptance by the Dominican population of the first and second descendents of Haitian citizens was researched superficially in both studies, given the complex nature that has historically ruled the relations between the countries. But, currently, the historical roots and racial differences are unimportant in the light of the economic and social consequences of the massive immigration under inhuman and exploited conditions of the Haitian labor, characterized by the total absence of legal documents both in terms of the country of origin and those of the country of destination, whether when crossing the border or when remaining without documents after completion of a labor contract. The question in the DEMOS survey instrument induced the answer, on asking *for the right to vote of Dominican children or grandchildren of Haitians?*⁹ Of the national population 63 percent answered in the affirmative.

ENPID considered the difficulty of generalizing the legal standing of an immigrant population that remains in the country under different conditions and modalities, including transient births in Dominican hospitals due to the free services available and the scarcity of hospitals in Haiti. This is why the PID beneficiaries were asked about *the right to vote of children born of illegal Haitians in the Dominican Republic*. This way the question excludes Haitians with legal permanent residence and second-generation grandchildren. The affirmative answer in the PID population was 43 percent, which represents an important acceptance that is not far from half of the population, but 20 percentage points below the national population of citizens. Evidently, had the national population been asked this question, results would have been wholly different.

Another political value that may differ between the populations is whether or not political clientelism and paternalism are accepted. Chart 6.7 shows three indicators that reflect a higher rejection of political clientelism in both populations than of paternalism and an

⁹ Being Dominican implies the right to vote; thus, the question is ambiguous and generates inconsistent responses. The results are more an effect of the instrument than the actual measurement.

important difference of greater rejection among the PID population of clientelism practices than of paternalistic behavior. The population that participates in the PID programs rejects, to a higher proportion (81 percent) than the general population (71 percent), the practice of people who use political power employing family members, relatives, and friends. Additionally, the majority of the PID population (64 percent), rejects the idea that a government official should distribute economic favors and other benefits to those who contributed to help him or her reach a high position. In the national population, an important though minority proportion (47 percent) rejects this practice.

Acceptance of paternalism, however, is more widespread in both populations. Only 14 percent of the population rejects the idea of an authoritarian and presidentialist government that hides behind the more benevolent figure of a father. Although in the PID population rejection of this position is almost triple (36 percent), it is a minority position. This information reflects how difficult it is to change the attitudes deeply rooted in the history of Trujillo’s regime and the tyrannical ways of the principal Dominican political leaders of the latter part of the twentieth century.

Chart 6.7 Disagrees with the indicators of clientelism and paternalism in the national population.

Percentage distribution of the population that disagrees with the indicators of clientelism and paternalism, 2001 DEMOS and ENPID

Disagrees with:	DEMOS	ENPID
A person reaching the government and employing families, friends, and relatives	70.6	81.0
An official distributing economic favors and other benefits to the people that contributed to their reaching the government	47.3	63.9
A good president should be like a father whom you approach to have your problems solved	13.7	36.0
Number	3,091	962

The critical perception of corruption in governmental institutions and the civil society is associated with the personal ethics used to judge an act or procedure as corrupt. Chart 6.8 shows three indicators of perception of corruption in both populations, as well as the moral judgment of PID participants on moderate or serious corruption in government, political, labor, nonprofit associations, and grassroots organizations.

The most important and generalized affirmation in both populations is that corruption in Dominican governments and politics is a serious or very serious issue (94 percent of the national population and 96 percent in PID). In addition, 90 percent of the PID population considers that there is no guarantee that abuses of power are curtailed and sanctioned, as opposed to almost half of the national population. Corruption reflected in the affirmation that indictments of past government officials predicated on corruption are moved by political interests perceived more by the national population (63 percent) than by that of PID (57 percent). This exception can be attributed to the higher political activism of the PID population.

In the PID survey, interviewees were asked: *In your opinion, which of the following groups do you consider are very corrupt, moderately corrupt, less corrupt or not corrupt?* The data reveal that only JCE judges and leaders of NGOs and community organizations are not perceived by the majority as being very or moderately corrupt. In the other cases, the majority is perceived as corrupt, with the police (84 percent) and government officials (83.4 percent) heading the list, closely followed by political party leaders (79.3 percent), legislators (73.2 percent), mayors (71.3 percent), union leaders (65.8 percent), prosecutors (62.6 percent), judges (60.7 percent), and businessmen (58.4 percent).

Chart 6.8 Indicators of perception of corruption, DEMOS 2001 and ENPID		
Agrees with:	DEMOS	ENPID
Corruption in Dominican governments and politics is a serious or very serious problem	93.7	96.2
There is no guarantee that the abuses of power are curtailed and sanctioned	48.9	89.7
Legal action due to corruption against past government officials is moved by political interest	62.9	57.2
Groups considered very corrupt or moderately corrupt:		
Police	--	84.0
Government officials	--	83.4
Political leaders	--	79.3
Legislators	--	73.2
Mayors	--	71.3
Union leaders	--	65.8
Prosecutors	--	62.6
Judges	--	60.7
Businessmen	--	58.4
JCE judges	--	45.4
NGO leaders	--	33.2
Community organization leaders	--	21.1

6.5 Conclusion

The PID population considers that it is in a good or very good personal economic situation does not differ significantly from that of the national population. However, the PID population that considers its situation bad or very bad is smaller. The greatest difference refers to the labor situation, given that close to one-third of the PID population reports that its work situation improved in the last five years, as compared to one-fifth of the national population that reports improvement. In both populations, a higher proportion of men than women consider that their work situation improved. In addition, in both populations, residence in the National District increases the positive appraisal of personal economic situation.

The PID population has more stringent criteria than does the national population to assess government performance in the supply of services to the population. Potable water service, which, together with public education is the service best evaluated by the national

population, is significantly reduced in the evaluation by PID participants. Both populations agree on the two worst services: construction of public housing and electricity services. Health and education services are evaluated in different ways, depending on area of residence. The majority of the “Rural other” in the national population evaluates public education in a positive manner; much higher than the residents in the other urban and in the National District. In ENPID, geographical differences are not major; public education is better evaluated in the Northern provinces and in the National District. The same pattern of evaluation can be observed of public health hospitals.

Both populations agree in their assessment of government policies, although a slightly higher proportion of PID beneficiaries perceive better government performance in all of the indicators observed. In both populations, the majority perceives that: the government hardly ever or never abides or enforces the law, treats everyone the same, or is accountable to people for its actions. These results indicate lack of or little government institutionalism. Also, the majority perceives that the government hardly ever or never tries to reduce the differences between rich and poor or is sensitive to what the people want and need. In other words, little or no will is perceived to eradicate poverty and diminish social inequality.

Despite the better appraisal by the PID population of government policies, the data reflect a higher level of rejection of corruption and abuse of power among the PID population than among the citizens in general, as expressed by rejection of clientelism policies and that model of government. But paternalism persists and is accepted by the great majority. On the other hand, a higher proportion of the PID population shares the values of gender equality in the domestic and political milieu. Consequently, the positive assessment of government policies, with slightly higher proportions in the PID population, can be explained by the neutralizing effect of the participatory experience in local governments among people directly benefited by the PID.

7. Political Reforms and the Status of Women

7.1 Direction of the Reform

In ENPID, various questions were included that enabled comparison of the direction of and willingness to accept the reforms between the PID and the national populations. These are shown in Chart 7.1, divided into two categories: the reforms or willingness to change the power relationships among different governmental, and nongovernmental, or other groups; and the legislative and /or procedural reforms that are currently being debated, as well as the best procedure to attain this.

The willingness to change the relations of power most generally is expressed and defined among the national population and the PID in the support of legislation that proposes that at least 33 percent of the candidates in elective positions should be women. The proportions do not significantly differ between the populations, 86 percent in the PID and 84 percent in the national. The three areas subdivided in the DEMOS survey reach similar proportions with a higher proportion in favor of female candidates in the southern provinces and less support in the north.

Chart 7.1 Principal political reforms, according to area of residence, DEMOS 2001 and ENPID

Type of reform	Area of Residence						TOTAL	
	National District		Other Urban	Northern Region	Other Rural	Southern Region	Demos	ENPID
	Demos	ENPID	Demos	ENPID	Demos	ENPID		
Changes among power groups:								
At least 33 percent of the candidates should be women	84.7	82.5	85.0	79.8	81.4	92.9	83.8	85.7
Increase power of community entities	62.7	83.4	58.7	78.7	59.0	81.9	59.8	81.5
Increase power of farmers' organizations	70.1	78.8	73.0	83.5	76.4	85.2	73.4	81.5
Strengthen the power of mayor and legislators/more power	63.1	64.3	66.2	63.2	94.0	57.5	65.1	61.4
Increase power of unions	49.8	51.7	55.0	61.8	59.3	51.8	55.1	54.6
Reduce power of the President of the republic	47.4	61.2	45.4	57.4	64.9	44.7	44.4	53.8
Legislative and/or procedural changes:								
Reform constitution through constituent assembly	71.3	87.9	73.4	89.7	68.0	88.8	71.1	88.8
Presidential reelection is not a good idea	60.4	69.2	61.4	71.0	50.8	71.0	57.7	70.4
Maintain half plus one of the votes in the presidential elections.	46.1	51.7	48.8	55.5	44.1	57.0	46.6	54.8
Join the congressional, mayor, and aldermen elections with the presidential elections.	57.9	44.0	62.3	38.6	64.4	50.7	61.9	45.0
Change the election of JCE judges for majority of the senators and house representatives	41.5	54.2	41.2	56.3	36.2	53.7	39.6	54.6
Totally modify the Dominican justice system	70.6	--	72.4	--	63.5	--	69.1	--
Change the unremovability of the judges	--	60.9	--	59.9	--	61.6		60.9
Number	742	317	1,347	289	1,002	356	3,091	962

Following support of female candidates in both populations, PID beneficiaries are most willing to increase the power of community and farmer organizations (82 percent in both). The national population shares this opinion to a lesser extent to support farmer organizations (73 percent), but the proportion that supports increasing the power of community organizations is smaller (60 percent). The greater support of the people that participated in the PID programs for grassroots organizations community and farmer groups—was expected, given that this population generally belongs to civil society associations.

Mayors and aldermen are the only government group that the majority of both populations wish to have more power. In the rest of the cases, the populations are inclined to issue less or the same amount of power than currently exists. The change in favor of municipal authorities implies the decentralization of the central government, a position slightly higher

in the national population than in the PID (65 percent as opposed to 61 percent). More support is expected for decentralization, particularly in the population most influenced by the PID, given the emphasis of local programs and national recognition activities on municipal participation. Less support than expected could be the result of the deception suffered in the municipalities where the efforts of community organizations to participate in their local governments have been useless. However, albeit to a lesser proportion than expected, the trend is towards decentralization, with 54 percent of the PID population and 44 percent of the national population favoring reduction of the power of the President of the Republic. This last proportion represents an increase from 38 percent reported in the 1997 DEMOS survey. Even though higher support to reduce the power of the presidency was also expected, the results are explained by widespread state paternalism among the national population and that of the PID, which obstructs the introduction of reforms that would undermine presidential power.

The second group of reforms researched is characterized by changes in the laws and the Constitution of the Republic. In the national debate there is emphasis on the need to introduce reforms to the Constitution. In many cases, the differences do not revolve around whether or not there is need for the reforms, but on who participates, how, and when they should be carried out. The procedures to achieve reforms have dominated the debate on them. Even the legislation already approved to increase the proportion of women candidates to 33 percent continued to be debated because it was not handled with the ideal procedure to achieve the spirit of the legislation.

The debate on the Constitution reform has revolved around who should conduct it. In ENPID the following was asked: *In your opinion, should the reform of the Constitution be carried out by: the National Assembly (Senators and house representatives), a constituent assembly of citizens elected expressly for those purposes, or an assembly of senators, house representatives, and citizens elected for such purposes?* Both populations favor the reform. The position that house representatives and senators should be the ones to reform the Constitution has the support of only 18 percent of the population and 9 percent of the PID population. Change by means of a constituent assembly is supported by 71 percent of the national population, while in the PID population, 52.5 percent supports the constituent with citizens elected for this purpose, and 36.3 percent an assembly with elected citizens also including senators and house representatives. The PID population was asked when to reform the Constitution of the Republic; 46 percent responded in favor of reforming it before the 2002 elections and 38 percent after the elections.

In 1994, to prevent the reelection of Dr. Joaquin Balaguer, which was opposed by major sectors of the civil society and the opposition, the parties agreed at that time of crisis to forbid consecutive presidential terms. Currently, the debate has come up again as those who opposed Balaguer assume power now and reintroduce reelection through the support of militants. The PID population rejects the immediate presidential reelection (70 percent), but the national population is divided on the issue (58 percent reject it), with less rejection in the "Other rural" area (51 percent).

Likewise, the reform introduced in 1994 related to electing the President with the majority of half plus one, instead of the relative majority, has been a debated issue. The difficulty in

reaching this number of votes is solved by introducing a second electoral round, which made possible in 1996 the alliance of minority parties and the electoral defeat of PRD, the party with the relative majority that presently controls the legislative and executive branches. The survey results show that support for changing the presidential election form again and maintaining it is divided between the populations. The PID population is slightly inclined to maintain the absolute majority formula (55 percent) and the national population of voters is inclined to modify it (47 percent in favor of maintaining it). The 2001 DEMOS survey, however, specifically asked if the run-off electoral round benefited Dominican democracy. Seventy-seven percent of the population responded negatively, considering that the run-off electoral round is harmful to democracy, and only one-fifth deemed it to be beneficial. Inconsistent responses in favor of maintaining absolute majority formula while rejecting the run-off round reveals ambiguity and little understanding of the issue.

Another important electoral aspect introduced after the 1994 modifications was separating the presidential elections from municipal and congressional elections. This measure was predicated on the “political pull” of presidential elections towards people of the same party in municipal and congressional candidacies. A result of this separation is the holding of elections every two years, with the ensuing halt and/or reduction of the activities and public services favoring proselytism for the elections. This unwanted effect, together with the higher government costs and excess of officials and employees involved in election processes every two years, has renewed the debate on whether to join or keep the elections separate. The balance is towards joining the elections according to the national population (62 percent), although this is a minority position in the PID population (45 percent).

The issue relative to supporting a reform to make the election of JCE judges a more participatory process was pursued. The JCE is the key entity in determining elections. A question specifically asked dealt with whether or not to include the majority of the senators and representative in the process of selecting the judges. Opinions are divided, and reflect less support than expected: 40 percent of the national population and 55 percent of the PID population. The population probably has little knowledge of the current procedures and did not fully understand the question, however, this is outweighed by the level of trust there is in the JCE, as previously discussed.

The judicial system is yet another instance of inquiry. The overall question in the DEMOS survey on “totally” changing the Dominican justice system revealed 69 percent of the population in favor. In ENPID the following question was asked: *Do you consider that the Supreme Court judges should remain in their positions for a set number of years or retain their positions up to retirement if they act properly?* Only 36.8 percent supported the actual status of remaining up to retirement, and the majority (60.9 percent) supported term limitations for judicial positions. These were unexpected results and reflect the opposing opinion to a judicial reelection system. Probably, had the question in the instrument included an explanation as to why the unremovability of Supreme Court Justices judges was being proposed, the results would have been different.

Three factors that can influence willingness to reform were researched by subdividing the populations according to area of residence, education level and gender. The area of residence does not drastically affect willingness to reform, in most areas. Support for

increasing to one-third the proportion of women candidates is higher among the ENPID population that resides in the southern provinces. Giving more power to farmer organizations finds the least support in the national population that resides in the National District and the “Urban other” areas. Empowering of mayors and senators was supported by 94 percent in the “Rural other” areas of the national, population and increasing the power of unions attains its highest level in the northern region of ENPID. The other changes do not show important differences by region or areas for either population.

Chart 7.2 shows the willingness to reform depending on the level of formal education. Basic differences are found in both populations, but not in the same magnitude, reflecting the synergy effect of the program with the levels of schooling and possibly of assigning impact to intervention of the PID. So, the proposal to reduce the power of the President of the Republic, associated with government paternalism increases with important differences in the PID population in the higher education levels, shifting from 38 percent among those with no formal education or did not make it to the sixth grade of elementary school, to 49 percent among those who completed 6—11 years of studies, up to 64 percent among those who had 12 or more years of schooling. The changes in the population among the different school levels only increased from 38 percent to 48 percent. Opposing immediate presidential reelection is a generalized position when year of education increases, but more importantly in the national population. The PID program neutralizes the effect of education, raising the opposition to reelection in all of the levels of education.

Chart 7.2 Indicators of willingness to political reforms, according to years of education DEMOS 2001 and ENPID 2001

Types of Reforms	Years of Education							
	0-5 years		6-11 years		12 or more		Total	
	Demos	ENPID	Demos	ENPID	Demos	ENPID	Demos	ENPID
Changes among power groups								
At least 33 percent of the candidates should be women	80.5	89.1	84.8	87.6	88.1	82.8	83.8	85.7
Increase power of community organizations	--	73.5	--	80.8	--	84.8	59.8	81.5
Increase power of farmer organizations	--	83.0	--	81.3	--	83.4	73.4	82.5
Strengthen the power of mayors and aldermen	65.7	--	65.8	--	62.4	--	65.1	61.4
Increase the power of mayors	--	46.9	--	54.2	--	57.5	55.1	54.6
Reduce the power of the President of the Republic	39.5	38.1	47.1	48.7	48.4	63.7	44.4	53.8
Legislative and/or procedural changes:								
Reform Constitution through the Constituent Assembly	63.8	86.2	75.5	85.9	76.8	91.8	71.1	88.8
Presidential reelection is not a good idea	52.6	69.4	59.4	68.4	64.5	72.4	54.8	70.4
Maintain half plus one of the votes in the presidential elections	41.3	60.5	49.7	55.3	50.7	52.4	46.6	54.8
Join the congressional, mayor, and aldermen elections with the presidential elections	27.7	54.4	32.5	44.5	41.5	42.3	32.4	45.0
Change the election of JCE judges by majority of senators and representatives	--	42.2	--	51.3	--	61.6	39.6	54.6
Totally modify the Dominican justice system	61.9	--	74.6	--	72.3	--	69.1	--
Change the unremovability of judges	--	49.7	--	62.1	--	63.7	--	60.9
Number	1,227	147	1,232	380	631	435	3,091	962


Support for the greater inclusion of women is not significantly affected by levels of schooling, nor is support for strengthening the power of unions and aldermen. Support for the reform of the Constitution through a Constituent Assembly, formed solely by people elected to such purpose or including part of the house representatives and aldermen, increases in both populations among the most educated.

The reforms to some processes do not have the same pattern of support among both populations. Support for joining the presidential with the municipal and congressional elections increases with the education level of the national population, but in the case of the PID, it decreases. It is possible that the fear of “political pull” of the presidential candidature is stronger among the group of people who participated in the PID projects, because they belong and are active in community grassroots organizations and in local committees of different political parties. This is strictly tied to the struggle for more autonomy and community participation, which could be affected by the political pull of the election of people detached from local interests.

Gender differences are illustrated in Figure 7.1. The light lines correspond to the men and women who participated in the PID and the black ones to the national population. In almost all of the indicators, women and men who participated in the PID reached higher proportions than the men and women of the national population. Within each population, men attain higher proportions than women.

The figure shows important consensus in the three areas among the four subpopulations: (1) maintaining the legislation that no less than 33 percent of the candidature should be occupied by women— this being an important result because it is equally supported by men and women in both populations and has the highest proportion; (2) strengthening the power of mayors and aldermen; and (3) increasing the power of unions. The only reform showing the PID population with lower proportions than that of the national population is the desire to continue separating presidential elections from the municipal and congressional ones. For the majority of the people who participated in the PID educational programs, the danger of political pull exists more for men than for women.

Figure 7.1 Political reforms by gender, DEMOS y ENPID 2001



7.2 Status of Women

- **Political Role**

As discussed above, the participation of women in politics is a concern that has found an answer in the legislation that mandates that 33 percent of the candidates of political parties be assigned to women. This quota reflects the low profile that women have in elective positions, and the absence of election procedures that effectively guarantee that positions and not candidatures be occupied by women.


The people interviewed were asked, *Do you agree or disagree with the greater participation of women in politics?* Chart 7.3 shows the results, by gender, for the 1997 and 2001 DEMOS and the ENPID surveys. During the 1997–2001 period the proportion did not technically change, although the 1997 measurement (86 percent) showed an important growth for 71.5 percent in 1994. The acceptance of the political role of women is significantly higher among the PID beneficiaries (96.2 percent) than among the national population (86.9 percent) with a generalized level of acceptance among women (97.4 percent) as well as men (94.4 percent).

Chart 7.3 Acceptance of a greater participation of women in politics, by gender, DEMOS 1997, 2001 and ENPID 2001

	Female			Male			Total		
	DEMOS		ENPID	DEMOS		ENPID	DEMOS		ENPID
	1997	2001	2001	1997	2001	2001	1997	2001	2001
Women should participate more in politics:									
Agree	86.0	87.8	97.4	84.3	86.1	94.4	85.3	86.9	96.2
Disagree	12.1	10.4	2.3	14.6	13.2	5.1	13.1	11.8	3.4
Depends/Refuses/Does not refuse	1.9	1.8	0.4	1.2	0.7	0.5	1.6	1.2	0.4
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Number	1,529	1,536	565	1,231	1,555	394	1,660	3,091	962

The second indicator on the role of women in politics is more direct. The people interviewed were asked: *Do you think women have more or less capacity than men to govern?* Figure 7.2 graphically shows the answers. In the general population, 35 percent consider that women have less capacity than men to govern, but among the group of people who participated in the PID program, this proportion is reduced to 10 percent, while the majority considered that women have the same capacity as men to govern (58 percent compared to 35 percent in the DEMOS) and almost a third considers that women have more capacity.

Figure 7.2 Appraisal of the capacity of women to govern DEMOS and ENPID 20001



Analysis of the answers by gender indicate that among the women of the national population, opinions are equally divided among the three positions, but this is not true for men. A larger proportion of men considered that women have less capacity to govern (40 percent) and a lower proportion deemed that they have more capacity (22 percent). Among the population that participated in the PID programs, only 15 percent of the men and 6 percent of the women consider that women have less capacity to govern. Women in these programs show a high self-esteem, 40 percent think that women have more capacity than men to govern, compared to 18 percent of the men that share this appraisal.

In the ENPID, the geographical regions moderately influence the discriminatory vision towards women, the northern provinces reaching the highest proportion of those who deemed that women have less capacity and the lowest proportion among those who believed that the capacity of women is higher. In turn, the geographical divisions of the DEMOS survey have no effect on the opinion regarding the capacity of women to govern. Another influencing factor is the education level. In ENPID, people with more education perceive women more on equal terms, thus reducing the numbers who see women with greater or lesser capacity than men. To the extent that the level of schooling declines, extreme opinions increase.

- **Perception of Equal Opportunities**

To compare the perception of equal opportunities between men and women among PID beneficiaries and the national population, three questions were selected out of the DEMOS survey. The interviewed people were asked: *Do you think that women in this country are given the same opportunity as men to get a good job? Earn the same salary? Get a good education?*

The answers compared to the 2001 DEMOS survey are shown in Chart 7.4 with populations subdivided by area of residence, gender and school level.

In ENPID, the perception of equal opportunities is less than in the national population, but in both populations the perception of lack of opportunities is high when job and salary, instead of education, are taken as reference. Salary is perceived as the principal difference in the national population, in which only 56.2 percent deemed that there are equal opportunities to earn the same salary, as compared to less than half of the PID population. The perception of equal opportunities to get a "good job" is not significantly different from the equal salary perception, as perceived by 58.4 percent of the national population and 48.2 percent of that of PID. In contrast, 88.7 percent of the population and 85.2 percent of the PID beneficiaries perceive equal opportunities to obtain a "good education." This difference was to be expected because of the high female college registration.

The area of residence has little effect on the perception of equal opportunities in the National District, urban other and rural other defined in the 2001 DEMOS survey. However, for the PID population, area of residence does affect this perception. Among the people participating in the PID project, the perception of equal opportunities in the three areas researched is lowest in the National District. The differences between the general and PID populations residing in the National District reflect that the PID is more critical and perceives that there are not equal opportunities for women to get a good job and earn the same salary.

Years of study make no difference between the two populations. The category of people with less years of schooling tends to perceive a much higher proportion of equal opportunities. In the national population, the group with less formal education has the highest proportions of perception of equal opportunities for women to obtain a good job (69 percent) and the same salary as men (65 percent). Perception of equality decreases when the level of schooling increases, to 44 percent and 46 percent, respectively, for people with 12 or more years of studies. On the other hand, the perception of equal opportunities to obtain a good education does not differ significantly among the levels of education for both populations. In the PID population, the levels of education produce the same effect as in the national population and the differences in proportions that perceive equal opportunities, even though a little lower than in the national population, are not significant. But gender differences have a larger impact.

In the observations of the DEMOS survey, men tend to perceive equal opportunities to obtain a good job (64 percent), to earn the same salary (63 percent), and to obtain a good education (92 percent) in a much higher proportion than women do (53 percent, 50 percent, and 85 percent, respectively), with respective differences of 11.7 percent, 13.2 percent and 6.6 percent. Among the people participating in the PID, however, the trend to see equal opportunities is inverse. A lower proportion of men (46 percent) than women (50 percent) perceive equal opportunities to obtain a good job, to earn the same salary (48 percent as compared to 51 percent) and to obtain a good education (84 percent vs.86 percent). Although these differences are not important, they are consistent and, in addition, evidence the trend and power of conviction in the reflexive and autocritical process of PID programs. Differences by gender and their different behaviors in each of the two populations can be explained due to the effect of the program.

Chart 7.4 Percentage of the population that thinks that in the country women and men have the same opportunities of getting a good job, earning the same salary, and obtaining a good education, according to the selected variables, DEMOS 1997, 2001 and 2001 ENPID

	2001 DEMOS				2001 ENPID			
	Agree with equal opportunities for men and women to obtain:				Agree with equal opportunities for men and women to obtain:			
	Good Job	Same Salary	Good Education	Number	Good Job	Same Salary	Good Education	Number
Area of Residence								
National District	59.0	55.7	89.2	742	40.0	42.8	83.4	325
Urban Other/North	55.5	54.7	88.9	1347	51.5	51.1	87.5	272
Rural Other/South	61.9	58.6	88.2	1002	53.2	54.0	85.2	365
Years of Study								
0-5 Years	68.7	65.0	89.4	1227	64.6	63.3	88.4	147
6-11 Years	55.3	52.9	88.5	1232	51.3	51.3	85.5	380
12 or more	44.4	45.7	87.9	631	40.0	43.0	83.9	435
Gender								
Female	52.5	49.6	85.4	1536	49.8	50.7	85.9	568
Male	64.2	62.8	92.0	1555	45.9	47.5	84.3	394
Total	58.4	56.2	88.7	3091	48.2	49.4	85.2	962

7.3 Conclusion

Willingness to change power relations is expressed among the population of the PID in the same way as among the national population. The legislation that seeks to increase the representation of women in elective positions of the government has the support of more than four-fifths of both populations, and represents the reform with the most consensus. In turn, reduction of the power of the President of the Republic only attains support of a little more than half of the PID population, and is a minority position among the national population. This last result does not satisfy the expectations of a wide support to sustain a more democratic reform to diminish the existing presidentialism. But this can be explained because of the widespread paternalism in both populations that perceive power as symbolized by the benevolent figure of the father. On the other hand, among PID beneficiaries, there are a greater proportion of persons who wish to increase the power of neighborhood, community, and farmer organizations (82 percent), but the proportion of people who wish to strengthen the power of mayors and aldermen, and of unions, is smaller and is slightly lower than among the national population.

Chart 7.5 Assessment of indicators of women's autonomy, by gender, DEMOS 1997, 2001 and 2001 ENPID

	Female			Male			Total		
	DEMOS		ENPID	DEMOS		ENPID	DEMOS		ENPID
	1997	2001	2001	1997	2001	2001	1997	2001	2001
Should allow pregnant women decide whether or not to have a child									
Should be allowed	50.2	53.9	64.6	42.7	49.9	55.1	47.0	51.9	60.7
Should not be allowed	48.7	45.1	31.2	56.1	49.1	41.6	51.8	47.1	35.4
Other answer/refuses/does not answer	1.1	1.0	4.2	1.2	1.0	3.3	1.2	1.0	3.8
Should make important decisions in the household									
The man of the house	53.2	45.3	16.4	55.4	53.5	17.3	54.1	49.4	16.7
The woman	6.3	7.2	7.0	4.4	3.7	2.8	5.5	5.5	5.3
The man and woman	40.4	47.4	75.2	39.7	42.1	78.9	40.0	44.7	76.7
Other answer/refuses/does not answer	0.4	0.1	1.4	0.5	0.6	1.0	0.4	0.4	1.2
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Number	1,529	1,536	568	1,31	1,555	394	3,091	3,091	962

Reforming the Constitution through a Constituent Assembly, with the option of including house representatives and senators in addition to the people elected for this purpose, reaches an almost generalized consensus among the population that participates in the PID, and a high proportion in the national population.

The reform to reinstate the immediate reelection of the President of the Republic is currently one of the most debated reforms. Rejection of reelection has a high level of support among the beneficiaries of the PID, while it scarcely exceeds half among the population as a whole. This rejection increases with education level. Other reforms that have to do with the election process and ideal mechanism to hold the elections of the President and JCE judges find support in approximately half of the PID population and a higher proportion of the national population. But in both cases results mean that the populations are divided and lack broad consensus on important issues on the political reform agenda.

The main differences between the populations represent the greater impact of the PID. The most important differences are found in that a higher proportion of the population that has participated in the PID programs agree with increasing the power of the community and neighborhood organizations, and with rejecting presidential reelections. The most similar positions, and which may represent less program influence, focus on a high consensus of supporting the 33 percent quota for female candidatures, strengthening the power of mayors and aldermen, and increasing the power of unions.

Acceptance of the political role of women is generalized among the population influenced by the PID and very high among the national population. This acceptance is based on an appraisal of the capacity of women to govern, which is widespread among the people who participated in the

PID programs, where 9 out of 10 people consider that women have the same or more capacity than men to govern, a ratio that reduces to a little less than two-thirds of the national population. Among the most educated people, the perception of the capacity of women to govern equals that of men; and at a lower level, the perception is closer to the extremes of greater or lower capacity. The men in both populations tend to perceive women as having less capacity; and in the provinces of the northern region, a higher proportion perceives women as having less capacity to govern and lower proportion perceives them as having more capacity.

The perception of equal opportunities to get a good job and earn the same salary is lower among the PID population, although differences are not significant. High proportions of both populations agree on a perception of equal opportunities to get a good education.

The men in the national population tend to perceive more equal opportunities for women to get good jobs and the same salary: however, the men who participated in the PID programs, are even more critical than women, and although differences are not great, they tend to perceive fewer job opportunities and less equal salaries for women. The smallest appreciation that there are not equal opportunities for women recognizes that there is gender discrimination in the workplace and income earned. This perception on the part of the men participants in PID programs demonstrates the impact of this program among the men that participated, an impact that is even higher among men than women.

The interventions of the PID in the local arena had an important impact on the relationships of couples. While a high proportion of women and the majority of men in the national population leave the important decisions of the household to men, a reduced proportion does so among PID program participants. Likewise, a major proportion of the program participants admit that women have a right to decide whether or not to have a child. This result varies significantly among the regions, reaching the highest proportion in the provinces of the south, and the lowest in the provinces of the north, where the proportion of Catholic people is higher.

8. Indirect impact of the PID on Associations

8.1 Introduction

The previous sections compare the data of the national population measured in the DEMOS 2001 survey with the results of using the same instrument on the population directly benefited by the PID. The objective of this section is different. The attempt is not to measure the direct impact of the PID on the person participating. Rather the objective is to analyze the indirect impact of the PID on the associations to which the people who participated in the program belong. The associations, and not the people, are the unit of analysis. The data collected are answers to new questions on the associations in which the person is active. Only 2.5 percent of the people who participated in the PID programs report they do not belong to any association, while 15.9 percent belong to only one association, 34.9 percent to two associations, and 46.7 percent to three or more associations. The instrument collected data from a maximum of four associations per

informant, rejecting the associations that were reported more than once. A total of 1,827 associations make up the sample.

8.2 Institutional Strengthening of Grassroots Organizations

To measure the impact of the PID on the institutional strengthening of the associations where the population of direct PID beneficiaries participate, eight different indicators were used, and five of the most important are shown in Chart 8.1. The informants reported legal standing for 57 percent of the associations, the lowest proportion of all of the indicators. But this is an unusually high result given the bureaucratic resources and aspects required to achieve legality. The evidence of focus groups confirms that there is great confusion on this subject. Many people do not know the difference between municipal recognition and the local registration of their legal standing. In other cases, the individual groups assume they have legal standing because they are affiliated with boards, federations, or other associations of higher levels that do have it. Thus, the 57 percent of the associations reported to have legal standing is overstated.

Seventy-five representatives of associations participated in the focus groups. After discussing the concept of legal standing, only 32 percent had really achieved it, which confirms the imprecision of the survey data, where the concept was not explained at the moment of the interview. Legal standing is obtained by presidential decree, pursuant to Law 520. The procedures required make it difficult for small associations to deal with the red tape to obtain legal recognition, thus obstructing their capacity to open bank accounts and acquire the rights pertaining to legal standing. Absence of legal standing also makes it impossible to obtain approval of grants and government and international projects that require the legal status of associations.

The other indicators are important to achieve the consensus of procedures, accounting records, and collective memory of the meetings and group agreements. These indicators are all high, according to the ENPID data, with a range of 67.0 percent of the associations with accounting books to 81.2 percent with internal written regulations. Assigning impact to the interventions of subgrantees and direct PID beneficiaries is predicated on the testimonies presented in the interviews with subgrantee organizations and the data from focus groups with members of associations that participated in the PID programs. The subgrantee organizations endeavored to institutionalize standards and procedures internally in grassroots associations.¹⁰

The data from the focus groups show that the remaining indicators of the 75 associations represented in this sample—which represent a diversity of subgrantees, and are not statistically representative—are higher than in the ENPID sample, with the exception of *written internal regulations*, which are slightly lower. The ENPID data show that 80 percent of the associations have bylaws, an even higher proportion (87 percent) among the associations in the focus groups; 79 percent in ENPID, and 95 percent in the focus groups, have records of the minutes of their

¹⁰ In the absence of a baseline, the data on grassroots associations in the National District collected in 1994, (Vargas 1994:79-81), provide an approximate parameter for comparison. Of a sample of 197 associations, Vargas found that 69.0% had bylaws, 61.9% had established internal standards, 67.5% had accounting records, and 83.3% kept records of meetings. Unfortunately, this study did not request the legal status of the associations. The comparison also lacks validity because ENPID included a wider geographical area that includes rural groups.

meetings; and 67 percent in the ENPID and 80 percent in the focus groups keep records of their financial statements.

Chart 8.1 Individual indicators of institutionalism among associations, by socio-demographic characteristics, ENPID and focal groups, 2001

Characteristics	Institutional Indicators				
	Legal standing	Bylaws	Minutes of the meeting	Accounting records	Written internal regulations
Beginning Date					
Before 1978	75.1	89.0	88.6	77.1	87.8
1978-1992	59.3	85.2	84.4	72.2	85.6
1993-1999	52.7	73.0	76.7	62.1	79.5
2000-2001	39.7	59.2	63.1	53.1	67.0
<i>Cramer's V:</i>	.153 ^{xxxx}	.161 ^{xxxx}	.134 ^{xxxx}	.115 ^{xxxx}	.114 ^{xxxx}
Number: 1572					
Size of the group					
Less than 20 members	47.2	70.9	72.9	60.2	74.7
21-40	54.1	76.7	79.6	65.7	81.5
41-80	59.0	77.3	80.6	68.9	83.5
81-200	66.4	86.7	82.3	62.8	84.1
201+	71.9	89.2	85.1	80.7	89.2
<i>Cramer's V:</i>	.107 ^{xxxx}	.125 ^{xxxx}	.103 ^{xxxx}	.123 ^{xxxx}	.102 ^{xxxx}
Number: 1827					
PID's Approach					
Civil Education	61.0	78.5	80.5	70.5	86.0
Municipality	54.7	78.3	79.4	69.5	79.5
Radio station	48.5	74.2	77.3	56.1	87.1
Civil Career	80.0	88.9	75.6	80.0	80.0
Farmers	55.1	76.0	78.2	61.2	77.8
Other	68.5	78.5	76.5	65.1	88.6
<i>Cramer's V:</i>	.095 ^{xxxx}	Not significant	.077 ^x	.091 ^{xx}	.073 ^x
TOTAL	56.8	77.9	78.8	67.0	81.2
Number: 1827					
Data on Focal Groups					
• Total of 75 Associations	32.0	86.7	94.7	80.0	78.7

Institutional indicators differ among the populations. The older groups founded before 1978 have the highest proportion of institutional indicators, reaching 75 percent with legal standing and 89 percent with bylaws. The institutional indicators show a *relation directly proportional to age group*, increasing in the older groups and declining in those recently founded. This is a sound trend of formalizing procedures with the age group, although the proportion of groups that

suffered mortality during the period is unknown. Cramer's V coefficient shows the statistically significant relation with a statistical significance level to reject nil hypotheses (of no difference) of $p < .0001$ in the majority of cases.¹¹

The group's institutionalism also increases with its size, as verified by the increase in all of the individual indicators in Chart 8.1. Groups with fewer than 20 members have lower institutionalism indicators, which increase in a statistically significant manner groups of 21 to 40 members. Differences among groups of 21—40 members and 41—80 members are small and acquire greater importance in groups of 81—200 members and those of 201 and more persons. Thus, among the groups of smaller and larger size there is an important qualitative leap. Legal standing shifts from 47 percent to 80 percent of the associations, statutory regulation goes from 71 percent to 89 percent, recording of agreements in written minutes increases from 73 percent to 89 percent.

The focus of the program also has a bearing on the level of institutionalism, as can be expected. The people incorporated into the civic education and civil service programs are teaching professionals and professionals who work in government offices. They belong to a middle class associated with unions. In both cases, these unions reach higher proportions of legal standing, accounting records, and bylaws. The lowest indicators are for those that self-defined their incorporation into PID programs through radio stations, with only 49 percent with legal standing and 56 percent with financial records. Differences are not important in the remaining indicators.

Chart 8.2 Index of the institutionalism of associations	
Questions	Indicator
106	Has legal standing
108	Executive Committee meets at least once a month
109	The General Assembly meets a few times a year or frequently
110	The Association has some type of affiliation with other groups
115	The Association has an agenda for its meetings
116	The Association has legal standing
117	The Association has accounting records
118	The Association has internal written standards
Code categories	
None	Disagrees with the indicators
Low	Agrees with 1-2 of the indicators
Intermediate	Agrees with 3-5 of the indicators
High	Agrees with 6-8 of the indicators

¹¹ Since variables are shown in the form of proportions, the sample distribution used in testing the hypothesis comes from the distribution of the Square Chi. In its place the Cramer V Coefficient is obtained by extracting the square root of the Square Chi and dividing it by double the sample size. This procedure standardizes the value of the coefficient, given that the Square Chi is very sensitive to the size of the sample. The levels of statistical significance are shown for the asterisks added to the association coefficients, that is: * $p < .05$, ** $p < .01$, *** $p < .001$, **** $p < .0001$.

To arrive at a measurement of institutionalism, an index with eight indicators was constructed, as shown in Chart 8.2, which defined four levels of institutionalism, none, low, intermediate, and high. Chart 8.3 shows the results of the scale built, divided into sub-populations according to region, by rural, urban, or mixed areas of the associations, and by the beginning year of the group.

The scale shows a high level of institutionalism for two-thirds of the associations (68 percent) intermediate for 28 percent; and only 3.8 percent with a low level of institutionalism. The division of the associations by area of residence, does not show statistically significant differences in the levels of institutionalism, but it does show differences according to areas and period of foundation. The associations with rural and urban members have the highest proportion (79 percent) in the category of high institutionalism, followed by the ones located in rural areas (67 percent), while the urban associations have a lower proportion in the category of high institutionalism (63 percent) and a higher proportion in the category of low institutionalism (5.2 percent).

Chart 8.3 Institutional index of grassroots associations, ENPID 2001					
Percentage Distribution of index categories according to region, area, and age group					
Region	Categories of Index of Institutionalism of the Associations				Total
	None	Low	Intermediate	High	
National District	0.2	6.0	24.4	69.4	100.0
North	0.0	3.7	27.3	69.1	100.1
South	0.0	4.0	29.8	66.1	99.9
Cramer's V	Not significant				
Area					
Urban	0.1	5.2	31.6	63.1	100.0
Rural	0.0	4.6	28.9	66.5	100.0
Mixed	0.0	2.6	18.5	78.9	100.0
Does not know/refuses	0.1	4.5	27.5	67.9	100.0
Cramer's V	.105 ^{xxxx}				
Year of Foundation					
Before 1978	0.0	1.2	19.2	79.6	100.0
1978 to 1992	0.0	3.8	20.8	75.4	100.0
1993 to 1999	0.2	3.9	33.3	62.6	100.0
2000 to 2001	0.0	6.7	44.7	48.6	100.0
Cramer's V	.124 ^{xxxx}				
TOTAL	0.1	3.8	28.2	68.0	100.0
Number: 1,827					

The age group is the strongest determinant of institutionalism. The groups founded before 1978 have a higher proportion (80 percent) in the high category of institutionalism, followed by 75 percent in this category in groups founded between 1978 and 1992. A lower proportion (63

percent) of the groups founded from 1993 to 1999 reaches the high category, which is reduced to 49 percent in the groups with less experience, founded in 2000 and 2001.

8.3 Democratization of Grassroots Organizations

Democracy in government —civil society relations cannot be attained if within the civil society associations themselves authoritarianism continues to prevail. This is why internal democratization of the associations to which the people who participate in PID programs belong, is an important goal of the programs of subgrantee organizations. In the DEMOS surveys there is a majority trend towards authoritarian values and attitudes. The programs and activities of the PID sought to counteract this trend. In the above sections, important differences could be verified in values and attitudes among the population participating in PID programs and the national population. The question here is, *Are changes in attitudes enough to change authoritarian practices in real exercises in democracy?* The knowledge of these practices can be far from the answers to the questions analyzed in the above paragraph on authoritarianism.

Ten indicators were developed to ascertain the nature of democratic or authoritarian practices within the grassroots associations to which the direct beneficiaries of PID belong. Chart 8.4 shows the results of the interviews. Some of the indicators reflect mostly democratic practices, but others have not changed. The principal indicators of democratic practices are:

- The board of directors is elected by a meeting of all of the members of the association or by one community meeting in 90 percent of the organizations.
- In 83 percent of the associations, the board of directors meets at least once a month, and in 66 percent all of the members meet at least once a month.
- In 69 percent of the associations, the political parties “Do not participate” in the elections for elective positions, even though 18 percent attempt to and 9 percent achieve them.
- The leaders of the associations are frequently reelected (64 percent), even though 12 percent are always the same people and 19 percent frequently are.

The authoritarian practices and procedures that contribute to authoritarianism are:

- Casting public votes instead of secret votes in 52 percent of the associations.
- Group nominations for elective positions in a third of the associations.
- Persistence of an important minority of associations (31 percent) in which the leaders are always or frequently the same people.
- Reelection to board member positions more than once in 37 percent of the associations.
- The authoritarian positions of the board of directors of 41 percent of the associations when making important decisions without participation of the members.

The balance between authoritarian and democratic practices brings to focus the threat of authoritarian practices within grassroots organizations. Exercising a public vote by simply raising a hand, together with the unilateral decision of the board of directors in two of each five

associations, automatically reflect the weakness of these groups. Nonetheless, the PID beneficiaries do not necessarily perceive these practices as the most threatening.

Chart 8.4 Indicators of democratic practices, ENPID 2001					
	Number	%		Number	%
Who elected the board?			Do you agree with the participation of political parties?		
Community meeting	605	33.1	Agrees	214	11.7
Members of the assembly	1030	56.4	Disagrees	1579	86.4
The last board	71	3.9	Does not know/refuses	34	1.9
Agents outside the groups	11	0.6	Who makes the important decisions?		
Government organizations	6	0.3	Board of directors of association	748	40.9
Political parties	1	0.1	Board and members during regular meetings	425	23.3
Elections have not been held	67	3.7	During the meetings	608	33.3
Does not know/refuses	36	2.0	Second-level boards	10	0.5
Confidentiality of the vote			Other	6	0.3
Secret	792	43.3	Does not know/refuses	30	1.7
Public	950	52.0	How is board of directors elected?		
Does not know/refuses	85	4.6	By group (slate)	626	34.3
Board reelection			By position (individual)	1094	59.5
Always the same	216	11.8	Does not know/refuses	107	5.8
Frequently the same	349	19.1	How frequently does the board meet?		
Frequently reelected	1169	64.0	More than once a month	1147	62.8
Does not know/refuses	93	5.1	Once a month	371	20.3
Do the Bylaws allow reelection of the Board of Directors?			Several times a year	110	6.0
Yes, once	484	26.5	Once a year	22	1.2
Yes, more than once	679	37.2	When a problem requires it	113	6.2
No	314	17.2	Other	8	0.4
Does not know/Refuses	350	19.1	Does not know/refuses	56	3.1
Do political parties participate in the elections?			How frequently does the assembly meet?		
Yes	167	9.1	More than once a month	855	46.8
No, but they attempt to	334	18.3	Once a month	353	19.3
Do not attempt to	1266	69.3	Several times a year	238	13.0
Does not know/refuses	60	3.3	Once a year	148	8.1
			When a problem requires it	177	9.7
			Other	11	0.6
			Does not know/refuses	45	2.5
Total	1,827	100.0		1,827	100.0

In focus groups, the participants were asked which practices threatened the sustainability of their associations. The threat most frequently mentioned was coercion by the political groups to gain control of the association, mainly by electing people who at the same time were members of their political parties. Thus, elections that take place by a simple raising of hands represent a real

threat. In city or farmer communities, where everyone knows each other and primary relations are very close, people will probably not vote against their neighbor, family, buddy, or person who lends money in case of emergencies, even when it is thought that the person elected can endanger the autonomy of the group. The ENPID data show that the associations can have a much higher proportion of activists and sympathizing members, than the proportion of members in the population as a whole.

To obtain a global measure of democratic practices within grassroots organizations, an index was constructed with seven indicators of democratic practices, shown in Chart 8.5. Chart 8.6 reveals the percentage distribution of the associations according to their position in the index of democratic.

Chart 8.5 Index of democracy within associations	
Questions	Indicators
119	The Board or Managing Committee is elected by the community or by an assembly of members
120	The Board of Directors is elected by secret ballot
121	Immediate reelection of the board members is allowed only once, or not at all.
122	Board members are elected individually and not by slates
123	Most of the leaders are frequently changed
124	Political parties do not participate in the election of board members.
126	Important association decisions are made during the meetings of all of the members.
Coding Categories	
None	Disagrees with all of the indicators.
Low	Agrees with 1 – 2 of the indicators.
Average	Agrees with 3 – 5 of the indicators
High	Agrees with 6-7 of the indicators

The results differ from the index of institutionalism of the associations, where the majorities reach the high category. Evaluated from the point of view of democratic practices, only a fifth (20.7 percent) of the associations has high-level democratic practices. The majority (71.8 percent) are in the intermediate category and 7.4 percent are in the lower category.

Democratic practices are affected by the rural or urban areas of the association, its location in a specific region of the country, its period of foundation, or its age group. In all of the cases the differences are statistically significant. The associations in the northern provinces have the highest proportion of democratic practices (28.7 percent) and the lowest proportion (3.4 percent) in the two inferior categories of democratic practices. The difference between the National District and the provinces of the subregion of Enriquillo in the south are negligible (18.4 percent and 16.7 percent respectively). In turn, the difference between areas is important. The associations of the rural area have a higher proportion (25.6 percent) in the category of high democratic practices than urban associations (18.5 percent) or those of a mixed nature (17.8 percent).

The differences determined by age group are important only among the young groups founded between 2000 and 2001 and the ones founded before 2000. The young groups tend to be less democratic and less institutionalized, as seen above. The fact that in time the groups increasingly acquire more democratic and institutionalized practices means that they are willing to change and are receptive to the intervention of educational organizations in the practice of democracy.

Chart 8.6 Index of the democratic practices of associations, according to area of residence and date of foundation, ENPID 2001

Region	Index of Democratic Practices				Total
	None	Low	Intermediate	High	
National District	1.0	7.9	72.7	18.4	100.0
Provinces of the northern region	0.6	2.8	68.0	28.7	100.1
South region provinces	0.7	8.7	74.0	16.7	100.1
<i>Cramer's V = 111</i> ^{xxxx}	Number: 1,827				
Area					
Urban	0.9	6.9	73.7	18.5	100.0
Rural	0.2	6.7	67.6	25.6	100.1
Urban/ rural	0.7	6.6	74.9	17.8	100.0
Does not know/refuses	66.7	0.0	33.3	0.0	100.0
<i>Cramer's V = 192</i> ^{xxxx}	Number: 1,827				
Total	0.7	6.7	71.8	20.7	99.9
Year of foundation					
Before 1978	0.0	5.3	74.3	20.4	100.0
1978-1992	0.1	3.8	70.4	25.7	100.0
1993-1999	0.7	6.8	71.4	21.1	100.0
2000-2001	1.7	16.8	68.7	12.8	100.0
<i>Cramer's V = 106</i> ^{xxxx}	Number: 1,572				
TOTAL	0.5	6.7	71.2	21.6	100.0

8.4 Mechanisms and Procedures Used to Meet Community Needs

The PID provided the persons who participated directly in the program with the technical instruments to make community diagnostic and strategic plans, and also educated them on constitutional rights, content of municipal laws, and their participation in applying them at the local level. The interviews with NGOs and grassroots groups that were PID subgrantees, and with the direct beneficiaries through focal groups, offered evidence of the empowerment effect caused by the practice and use of technical instruments in the struggle towards defending their interests, as will be seen more extensively in section D on case studies and in the section E on aggregation and articulation at the national level. To learn and quantify the procedures used by the associations to satisfy community needs and/or problems, an open-ended question was asked in ENPID, and an alternative was offered to mention the three procedures most used by the

different associations. In this question, the unit of analysis is not the association but the beneficiary of the PID, who responds taking into account the practice of the associations to which he or she belongs. Chart 8.7 shows the results.

In general, the way to solve community problems and/or needs is to make formal requests and/or lobby authorities, which were mentioned by 56.2 percent of the people interviewed, while 17.7 percent reported having held community meetings. Only 3.6 percent reported confrontational methods. Other nonconventional methods are not frequently used: collection of funds (5.4 percent), use of massive media (2.3 percent), and educational or cultural procedures (2.7 percent). Approximately half of the people interviewed reported a second method. The alternate method follows the same pattern as the basic one. Requests and pressure on the authorities were mentioned by 52.3 percent of the people and community meetings to reach consensus by 13.4 percent as an alternate mechanism. Only a fifth of the interviewees offered a third mechanism. Of those, 31.7 percent reported requests and pressure on the authorities as a third mechanism, and 10.6 percent reported confrontational tactics.

Chart 8.7 Methods used to solve community needs and/or problems, ENPID 2001

	First Procedure		Second Procedure		Third Procedure	
	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number
Institutional/lobbying	56.2	541	52.3	266	31.7	63
Community meetings	17.7	170	13.4	68	8.5	17
Collection of resources	5.4	52	6.3	32	5.0	10
Confrontational	3.6	35	7.9	40	10.6	21
Cultural/educational	2.7	26	3.1	16	5.0	10
None	2.2	21	0.2	1	0.5	1
Media	2.3	22	2.8	14	6.0	12
Others	2.7	26	3.5	18	5.5	11
Does not know	7.2	69	10.6	54	27.1	54
TOTAL	100.0	962	100.1	509	99.9	199

8.5 Participation in the Municipal Government

The participation of civil society groups in local municipal governments is one of the most important achievements of the PID. Without local participation, it is hard to imagine how democracy can participate at the central government level. Thus, the democratic experience of the groups represents a real redefinition of democracy in the country and contributes to the modernization of state organization relations with the local civil society. The fact is that the media has given little importance to the slow and tortuous transformation that is taking place in governance at the local level in a number of municipalities. Ignorance can be the result of the concentration of population and the media in the city of Santo Domingo, minimizing the importance of events occurring outside the capital city. Another reason is the prevalence of authoritarian relations in the central government, which blocks and curtails innovations arising at

the local level. The quantitative data of ENPID on municipal governments are shown in Chart 8.8.

The people interviewed were asked if their municipalities held open town council meetings. The data contained in Chart 8.8 show that a third of the population that participated in PID (33.6 percent) perceived that their municipalities hold open town council meetings and 19.3 percent did not know. The people who reported participation of their organizations represent 29.1 percent, close to the population that reports having access to them.

Chart 8.8 Perception of direct participants in the PID of open council town meetings, ENPID 2001			
Meetings of municipal authorities:	Number	%	% Accrued
Open	323	33.6	33.6
Closed	453	47.1	80.7
Does not know/refuses	186	19.3	100.0
TOTAL	962	100.0	
Participation of community organizations belonged to in open town council meetings during years prior to survey			
Number of open town councils	Number	%	% Accrued
1-2	129	13.4	13.4
3-4	84	8.7	22.1
5-7	35	3.6	25.8
8-12	28	2.9	28.7
13+	4	0.4	29.1
Does not know/refuses	53	5.5	34.6
None	657	68.3	100
TOTAL	962	100.0	

The qualitative data of interviews and focus groups, review of the literature of several subgrantees' organizations and of the project itself, offer evidence of systematic efforts by territorial organizations to interact with and change the authoritarian form of government of city councils. The concept of "open town council meetings" has meant the establishment of an active participation process that involves the creation of a strategic planning proposal, establishment of priority needs, and building of general consent among the municipal authorities to clearly define the annual budgets of the municipalities with transparency and accountability. In the next section, a case study the municipality of Villa González in the province of Santiago provides an in-depth description of the characteristics and achievements of the community in redefining the concept of open town council.

The geographic characteristics of the local governments are shown in Chart 8.9, according to region and municipality location. These data differ from previous data in that the organization itself, and not the person interviewed, is the unit of analysis; but like the other measurement, it is not an objective measurement that verifies whether or not there are open town councils; rather it

measures the subjective perception of the person interviewed. More than a third of the associations (37.3 percent) have access to open town councils. The regional distribution reveals that the northern provinces have a higher proportion of associations with access to open town councils (47.3 percent) than those of the southern region (35.4 percent) or of the Municipal District (29.5 percent). The Municipal District responses refers to the same city town council of the National District, where a majority proportion greater than two-thirds of the organizations represented in the National District sample perceive that the municipal meetings of the National District are closed. The perception of access to open town councils according to area is not significantly different in statistical terms. This result was to be expected, given that each municipality –whether characterized by open or closed meetings— has urban and rural communities.

Chart 8.9 Location of grassroots organizations with access to open town council meetings, according to region and residential area, ENPID 2001

Location of the organization	Type of Municipal Meetings			Total
	Open	Closed	Does not know	
Region				
Municipal district	29.5	46.3	24.2	100.0
Northern provinces	47.3	45.7	7.0	100.0
Southern provinces	35.4	54.4	10.1	99.9
Cramer's V: .191 ^{xxxx}				
Number: 1,827				
Area				
Urban	36.4	48.8	14.9	100.1
Rural	38.9	49.5	11.6	100.0
Urban/rural	36.3	51.1	12.7	100.1
Does not know	66.7	33.3	0.0	100.0
Cramer's V: not significant				
Number: 1,827				
Total	37.3	49.5	13.2	100.0

8.6 Association Achievements

The subjective appraisal that people give of their social and political achievements is important and reflects the efforts exerted towards the outlined goals and the possibility of sustainability of its actions in the long term. The people interviewed were asked an open-ended question, and were asked to choose the three most important achievements of no more than four associations they belonged to. The results are shown in Chart 8.10. The highest proportion of the achievements reported refer to the internal life of the groups: higher level of institutionalism, better democratic practices, increased group memberships, drafting bylaws, and obtaining legal standing. This type of achievement was reported in the first place for 38 percent of the associations, 28 percent in the second place, and 18.1 percent in the third.

The second type of achievement was reported in the category of service and infrastructure works that permit improvement in the quality of life of the community. This type of achievement was reported in first place for 22.1 percent of the associations, 27.1 percent in the second place, and 28.9 percent in the third place. The achievements related to alliances and more political participation were reported for 16.5 percent of the associations in the first place, 26.1 percent in the second place, and 28.5 percent in the third place.

Chart 8.10 Association achievements during the last 12 months before the survey, ENPID 2001

Percentage distribution for the three mayor achievements of associations.

Type of achievement	Description	First achievement		Second achievement		Third achievement	
		Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
Within the association	More institutionalism	206	11.3	30	2.0	26	2.1
	More democracy	274	15.0	167	11.3	58	4.6
	Drafting of bylaws	36	2.0	38	2.6	13	1.0
	Obtaining legal standing	25	1.4	19	1.3	16	1.3
	Increased membership	151	8.3	172	11.6	116	9.1
	Subtotal / within the association		692	38.0	426	28.8	229
Creation of alliances and participation in politics	Alliances with other groups	214	11.7	275	18.6	240	18.9
	Participation in open town councils	25	1.4	30	2.0	39	3.1
	Participation in municipal meetings	53	2.9	66	4.4	68	5.4
	Participation in PID consortia	3	0.2	11	0.7	11	0.9
	Appointing the mayor	2	0.1	6	0.4	3	0.2
	Subtotal / alliances & participation		297	16.3	388	26.1	361
Service or other infrastructure works.	Project financing	50	2.7	40	2.7	24	1.9
	Construction of a community hall	67	3.7	75	5.1	53	4.2
	Reconstruction of homes	136	7.4	140	9.4	136	10.7
	Construction of water system	72	3.9	66	4.4	65	5.1
	Provision of electricity	62	3.4	64	4.3	57	4.5
	Construction of roads	19	1.0	18	1.2	32	2.5
	Subtotal services/infrastructure	406	22.1	403	27.1	367	28.9
Other	Other	303	16.6	179	12.1	169	13.3
	Does not know	129	7.1	88	6.0	142	11.2
	TOTAL	1,827	100.0	1,484	100.0	1,268	100.0

8.7 Personal perception of the Impact of the PID

The subjective perception of the impact of the PID was determined by asking the interviewees whether the PID had much, little or no impact on their way of thinking, their family lives, the internal democracy of the group or groups to which they belong, alliances established with other groups, participation in the municipal government, implementation of democratic practices in the workplace, school, or university, and within their political party. When the answer was affirmative, they were asked how it had had an impact, by means of another open-ended question. Chart 8.11 shows the results. All of the answers reflect high levels of perceived impact. The highest impact has been on the way of thinking, family relations, and internal democracy of the associations they belong to, and democracy in the workplace. The lowest level of impact is perceived in democracy within the university or school where they study and the political party in which they are active.

- **Impact on Way of Thinking and Intrafamily Relations**

The highest proportion of much impact (81 percent) was reported *in the way of thinking*. Only 1.2 percent reported that the program hardly had any impact, and another 1.4 percent could not answer the question. The modality of change is expressed in the acquisition of new knowledge and the expansion of their learning capacity (51 percent), having an open mind (13 percent), becoming a more conscientious and human person (9 percent), experiencing personal growth (9 percent) or becoming a person of independent thinking (2 percent). In “*family relations*”, 59 percent reported much impact and 35 percent little impact. The first identified impact in the sense of experiencing more harmony (35 percent), more communication (16 percent) or better relations (18 percent).

- **Impact on Community Organizations**

The impact on community organizations is expressed as an increase of democratic practices within the group (64 percent) and in the establishment of alliances (41 percent). Internal democracy is defined as greater participation (30 percent), more harmony within the group (15 percent), more consensual decisions (13 percent), more unity and teamwork (6 percent), and higher acceptance of responsibility (5 percent). The establishment of alliances is primarily understood as more support and coordination of activities with other groups (51 percent), strengthening already existing alliances (23 percent), and diversification of the relations among the groups (6 percent).

- **Impact on Municipal Governments**

Participation at the municipal level has been an important goal of PID programs. This goal is hard to attain because it requires coordination within and outside of the community, strategic planning, and the will of the municipal authorities to allow the participation of community organizations. Despite all this, 44 percent of the people interviewed reported that the PID had had a lot of impact on municipal participation and another 44 percent reported little impact. This

impact was expressed as a contribution to the administration of the municipality (30 percent), solution of community issues (20 percent) and greater motivation to participate (22 percent).

Chart 8.11 Perception of the population who have benefited from the impact of the PID in their personal lives, associations, workplace, political parties they are active in and schools where they study or work, and their municipalities, ENPID 2001

IMPACT	Way of Thinking		Family Relations		Internal Democracy of the Group		Alliances between Groups	
	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number
Much	81.1	780	58.8	562	63.9	587	41.1	351
Little	16.3	157	34.5	329	30.5	280	45.3	387
Almost none	1.2	12	5.2	50	3.6	33	8.8	75
Does not know/Refuses	1.4	13	1.5	14	2.1	19	4.8	41
Does not apply	--	0	--	7	--	43	--	108
Total	100.0	962	100.0	962	100.0	100.0	100.0	962
IMPACT	Municipal Participation		Democracy in the Workplace		Democracy in School/ University		Democracy in the Political Party of Militancy	
	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number
Much	43.8	398	47.2	298	20.6	53	35.3	109
Little	43.6	396	41.5	262	24.9	64	44.7	138
Almost none	7.7	70	8.2	52	7.4	19	13.3	41
Does not know/refuses	4.8	44	3.0	19	47.1	121	6.8	21
Does not apply	--	54	--	331	--	705	--	653
Total	100.0	962	100.0	962	100.0	962	100.0	962

- **Impact on Workplace and School**

Although a significant number of PID subgrantees were focused on civic education in schools and civil services and administrative careers, giving rise to two important consortia their proportional participation was a minority within the PID programs. In addition in the work and educational sphere, including college education did not limit the activities of these two consortia. Of the people who work, 47.2 percent responded that the PID had a big impact on democracy in the workplace, and 41.5 percent responded that it had little impact. Schools were considered to have felt the least impact (20.6 percent much impact and 24.9 percent little impact). A high proportion 47 percent responded that they did not know if PID activities had an impact on democracy at school. This perception reflects the difficulty of breaking the teacher-student hierarchy, where the student is the object and not the subject of his or her own learning. On the other hand, these results cannot be interpreted as a positive appraisal of the civic education programs in schools, given that the population benefiting from the PID includes teachers and students who did not specifically participate in these programs.

- **Impact on the Political Parties**

Among the population who are politically active, 35 percent perceived that the PID had much impact on the internal democracy of their political parties, 45 percent reported it had little impact, and 20 percent reported it did not have or they did not know if it had any impact. If this perception is real, the PID indirectly fulfilled an important objective of changing authoritarian practices within the political parties.

8.8 Notes on the PID Programs not Evaluated in ENPID

It was not the specific objective of the final evaluation survey of the PID to evaluate the different programs of the PID subgrantee organizations: civic education in schools, civil services and administrative careers, municipal strengthening, and farmer organizations. The evaluation of these programs was conducted through focus groups and interviews. Sustainability of the PID activities depends on the four consortia formed by the subgrantee organizations in the areas mentioned and analyzed in case studies and national level articulation sections.

8.9 Conclusions

The PID project was successful in involving organizations of the poorest social segments of the society through NGOs, whether directly or through second-level federations. These organizations have acquired knowledge on their rights and the handling of technical instruments that allow them to be self-sufficient, participate, and voice their positions to defend their interests. Monitoring and feedback, as well as development of methodologies and abilities, enabled the PID to begin a process of institutional growth and strengthening of democratic practices with transcendental effects on the associations to which the direct beneficiaries of the PID belong.

There has been a paradigm shift in the demands of grassroots organizations. Violent confrontations have been replaced by viable participation mechanisms, with proposals of consensual and viable solutions. Municipal participation reflects a new relation between local authorities and leaders of community and neighborhood association. The old ways of clientelism have been replaced by an active role of grassroots organizations and their leaders, enabling them to participate in preparing budgets, invest in infrastructure works, and ensure financial accountability. But this is not a generalized change, and there is the danger of the situation not becoming widespread without supporting institutional and financial resources. There are still challenges, given that not all organizations have democratic practices. In approximately one third of these, the leaders tend to centralize power and political parties intervene in the elections of their board members.

The high number of political activists within civil society organizations does not represent, in itself, a danger to democracy. Theoretically, the role of a political leader can be more compatible with the role of a political activist. However, that has not been the history of the political party-civil society organization relationship in the DR. Repeatedly, the unions and farmer organizations have divided not in response to the defense of their own interests, but in

response to the internal politics within the organizations. This is why, it is necessary to: clearly define the political roles of civil society organizations; continue with the democratic strengthening movement and participatory leadership within the civil society organizations; continue providing technical support to institutional strengthening; expand the experiences of the PID to other communities that were not originally included; and extend to the health sector the defense of the sexual and reproductive rights of women. The health sector was not the target section of the PID activities and the grassroots organizations did not involve themselves in improving the quality of the health services in the hospitals of the Ministry of Health (SESPAS) and IDSS. In addition, the grassroots organizations were not conscious of the need to monitor hospital services to allow the medical and nursing staff to comply with their work shifts and to protect the sexual and reproductive rights of women.

D. Case Studies

Primarily, the PID has implemented its activities through its subgrantees. This section reviews a selected sample of projects implemented by five PID subgrantees, focusing on the observations resulting from group interviews with subgrantees and focus groups with grassroots associations' representatives who participated in the PID programs. Unfortunately, time constraints did not allow for the evaluation of the other subgrantees. Some regions of the country were not included. Projects associated with special populations, such as sexual workers, incarcerated women and the handicapped were also excluded. This review highlights the participation of subgrantees in specific types activities.

1. Community Participation at the Municipal Level: Solidarity Foundation

The Solidarity Foundation located in Santiago completed three projects financed by the PID. In 1995, civil education activities began with grassroots organizations in three municipalities of Santiago—Jánico, Licey and Villa González. A second project, *Municipal and Community Participation*, was approved in 1998. Through these project activities, political education at the community level was strengthened and proposals were developed to improve the relationship between the civil society and local governments. In 2000-2001, the *Solidarity Foundation* trained civil society leaders as *agents for local development* through the Municipal and Democratic Participation project. Training was provided in basic skills to carry out community diagnostics and develop strategic plans.

The “*Agents for Development*” generally tended to work with local neighborhood boards. These boards organized the population within a community and were more interested in participating in the activities of the PID than other grassroots associations. The executive committee of a board representing these communities was democratically elected. Several means were used to foster participation. For example, buses with loud speakers announced elections throughout the community, pamphlets were distributed house to house, and the candidates promoted themselves through community campaigns.

In their own words, the members of Association of Agents for Development “act as catalysts within civil society organizations.” As a result of this internal promotion and of having adopted democratic practices, they reported that the active membership of several groups had increased. According to a local agent: “the groups develop because they are trusted and heard by the rest of the community. They have been able to close down noisy bars and find solutions to community issues.”

In the municipality of Villa González, the civil society leaders have increasingly earned the respect of the local officials. They have learned to conduct community diagnostics and write sound proposals. They understand municipal procedures and participate without fear in formal sessions and meetings. They have shown their intelligence and have been effective in negotiating with local officials. In their communities, they also reported that confrontations between the different political parties have given way to consensus.

The relationship between the civil society and political parties has also changed. As a focus group member indicated, “there is no conflict between the activists of the different political parties. They work with us to transcend party interests.” The aldermen of the different political parties are invited to visit the communities and “we have direct communication with the municipal authorities.”

The most important aspect of this relationship in the municipality of Villa González is the dynamic process of an open municipal or town council meeting. In the country, there has been considerable confusion regarding open town councils, partly because political parties and community groups, in general, have understood that these meetings are supposed to be beneficial because they allegedly promote democracy and local participation. Consequently, many municipal officials, as well as civil society organizations in the National District and throughout the country may say they have open municipal sessions, based on the fact that the municipality has approved resolutions accepting open town councils or simply because citizen participation is included in the current municipal legislation.¹² However, in many cases, especially in the densely populated National District, the open town councils have become little more than a simple formality and have not met the expectations of the all of the residents due to the small number of these sessions and the greater capacity of mobilization of the middle-class groups.

For many grassroots organizations, the municipal sessions are open because the citizens can attend as observers or add an issue for discussion, even then responses or the responsibility of the groups continue to be low. Certainly, in the PID beneficiaries survey used for this evaluation, 30% of those surveyed in the National District reported having open town councils. This percentage increased to 35% in the southern provinces and to 47% in the north.

In this context, the work of the Solidarity Foundation and of associated community organizations is particularly interesting, insofar as, it is transforming the open town council into a much more effective participatory process tool. Instead of considering the open town council as a simple

¹² According to the lawyers of CEAJURI, the municipal sessions are open every 15 days, as shown in Article 19 of the current municipal legislation, therefore, in the southern region the focus has been on applying the law, and not on changing it.

formal meeting, PID beneficiaries understand it is a continuous participation process, requiring a considerable degree of organization and work before and after the sessions. This process also requires the will of the elected officials to listen, to, participate, and be held accountable. To achieve this, PID beneficiaries first divided the municipality into urban and rural areas to allow for a sub-sector plan within the municipality. Then, with the active participation of the CSOs, they prepared a development agenda for each area. This agenda was subsequently presented to the mayor and the municipal legislators. Only then did the third phase of holding the open town council in the area and focusing on the preparation of agenda and setting priorities begin. The goal was to enter into an agreement that would result in the concrete activities to be included in the annual municipal budget.

In Villa Gonzalez, in addition to the three-step process described above, the municipal government also has held two town councils for annual accountability of funds (this has also been done in different municipalities of the Salcedo province) and elects committees to supervise the monitoring of the delivery of agreed upon services and/or public works. The process, as explained by the leaders of the different associations of the Villa González municipalities, involves the following seven steps:

- First, the municipality is divided into regions (political jurisdiction in the municipalities are known as sections).
- Second, the different CSO and the communities in each area coordinate to develop an agenda, including strategic objectives to increase the quality of public services and/or investment in public works, such as the building of a water system, bridges and roads, installation of traffic lights, construction of recreational parks, investment in sports facilities, and community centers, among others.
- Third, open town councils are held in each area with the participation of the communities, the organizations, the Association of Agents for Development and members of the Solidarity Foundation. Needs of the community are ascertained and priorities assigned—based on the constraints of the municipal resources and a decision made regarding what specific services and the public works are to be delivered. What is agreed upon is included in the municipal budget for the following year. Then, committees with the mandate to supervise budget execution are elected among the CSO’s participants—one in each of the six areas.
- Fourth, an Engineering Company is hired to prepare the technical budgets for each of the public works projects.
- Fifth, the annual municipal budget is prepared using the technical budgets presented by the engineers.
- Sixth, the agenda for development included in the budget is implemented and supervised by the supervising committee of each area.

- Seventh, the municipal officials lead open sessions to review the current project budget. The mayor and the treasurer report in detail on income and expenses. This is an opportunity for the supervising committee or any resident of the area to ask questions about the budget.

This cooperative relation between the civil society and the political system seems to have borne fruit in several ways. For example, the municipality has opened a Department of Culture and Community Relations and committees selected from the civil society—in each of the six areas—supervise the execution of the annual budget. Also, legislation was outlined to protect the environment. The community groups have perceived that the local government is sensitive to the needs of the community by assigning resources to fix the problems with electricity, water, and sewer systems and to rebuild schools. The municipality passed a law (9/99 of June 24, 1999) that designated the Solidarity Foundation as an advisor to the municipality with the purpose of monitoring the community participation process and preparing the municipal budget. In addition, in an effort to ensure this process would continue, even after the elections of new municipal officials in 2002, the municipal council unanimously approved a resolution that legally institutionalizes the practice of open town councils, participation in budget building and monitoring, and two town council meetings to be held each year when the local government will be held accountable by civil society groups and the general population.

From the perspective of the sub-grantee organization and the groups associated with the community, the key challenges for the future include taking the necessary steps to:

- Maintain the unity and the participatory process.
- Modernize the municipality through technological innovations.
- Make the residents of the municipality responsible for the payment of municipal taxes for the services rendered.
- Include in the participation process reforms of the school and health systems.

Important steps have been taken to ensure sustainability, but there are still some concerns. The legislation in itself does not guarantee sustainability. The Dominican Republic has had a long history of laws that have not been effectively implemented. Notwithstanding, the CSOs of Villa González have firstly built the sound basis for organizations and programs and secondly have effectively promoted the legislation to ensure gains and agreements with the local government. In this sense, they may be more successful than other CSOs who make up the *Municipal Forum* in the National District. The latter have focused more on the municipal resolutions to institutionalize civil society participation at the local level than on the organization and the processes needed to guarantee success. The continued presence of the Solidarity Foundation and the Association of Agents for Development is important, as is the successful participation of several political leaders.

This activity has been a valuable experiment in achieving more responsibility and transparency of the local governmental processes. It has shown how it is possible to move away from behind-closed-door decision making that results in dependence and clientelism, and frequently leads to corruption charges because it is not possible to supervise the manner in which the funds are really spent. This is the type of change in the culture and political practice that the PID has attempted to build by strengthening social groups and encouraging the most democratic and

productive exchanges between state and political institutions, on the one hand, and social organizations on the other. At the same time, the success of this process has been possible because the municipal authorities, particularly the mayor, have collaborated. Nevertheless, since the Solidarity Foundation has shifted from an exclusive approach of assisting community groups to becoming official economic advisors to the municipal government and a growing part of its potential budget comes from government sources (particularly if the PIDPID funds are not available), there is a potential risk of co-optation.

2. Using University Resources to Support Civil Society Organizations: Universidad Católica Nordestana

The Dominican Republic has more than 30 universities. In addition, the largest institutions, particularly Universidad Autónoma de Santo Domingo (UASD), have campuses in some of the provinces of the country. Very few universities were subgrantees of the PID. One exception was Universidad Nordestana that used its resources to educate and institutionalize grass root organizations, to encourage the communities to become democratically involved at the municipal level, and to assume a supporting role with local politicians and governmental officials.¹³

Universidad Nordestana was founded in 1978 in the city of San Francisco de Macorís, in the center of the northeastern region. It has a community program that includes the five provinces of this sub-region. The first PID project that the university implemented took advantage of its community program to offer civic education to 200 leaders and 30 organizations from the communities of the Duarte province. Participants were selected from a list of all of the rural and urban grassroots associations in the municipal provinces. The university mobilized its students and staff to visit leaders of these organizations to explain the project and provide them with introductory letters and brochures. A second project, “Education for Democratic Participation,” that targeted the principal community organizations of the province followed the success of the initial civic education endeavor. The goal of this second project was to educate the CSOs in democratic values, strengthen them institutionally, and prepare them to find solutions to common problems.

Nordestana is an example of a university that is willing to reach out to the community and play a supporting role with local government officials. Through its Extension Department, leaders who graduated from the first project have met every fifteen days. In these meetings, they have learned strategic planning and planned their own training activities and inter-community exchanges. In addition, the university provides groups with free legal assistance to enable them to establish their own by-laws and regulations and obtain legal status, thus increasing their institutional base.

The participation of the university has gone beyond these activities in three important ways:

¹³ Recently, the University has been transferred to the Catholic Church, and is changing its name to Universidad Católica Nordestana.

1) *It has helped to begin a community participation process at the local government level similar to the one described above for Villa González (open town council) in several areas of the municipality of San Francisco de Macorís. This experience has been so positive that it has helped to generate demands and expectations from other areas that wish to have their own community meetings to present development plans to the mayor and aldermen. University representatives have been present at the sessions, and have proven to be important allies of the poor. For example, in the area of La Piña de Jaya, six of these eight projects that were presented at the beginning of the “open town councils” have been completed.*

2) *Nordestana has begun to improve the efficiency and impartiality of the local government by not only facilitating open town councils, but also by establishing a series of points of contact with the local officials, as well as, with the political parties. For example, the university has invited political parties, local municipal officials, and the chief of police and army to lectures and panels on human rights and the role of the civil society and municipalities. The municipal authorities have requested the university to implement a course on municipal issues targeted for municipal officials.*

3) *This program has encouraged the participation and institutionalization of many community groups, the exchange of experiences, and the formation of community councils in urban and rural areas. As a result, many alliances have been initiated. One of them, Central de Juntas de Vecinos of the Jaya area, includes eight different “parajes” (rural communities) of the municipality of San Francisco de Macorís.*

This activity has also been an extremely positive experiment in promoting community participation and democratic governance. At the same time, some focus group participants identified a number of concerns and constraints. There was a perception that the processes have not yet matured, nor become institutionalized. Some community groups perceive that municipal officials are more sensitive to the Universidad Nordestana than to the CSOs. In addition, its geographical scope has been limited to the area of La Piña de Jaya while other municipalities of the province have not been integrated to the participatory process. As a result of the perceived progress yet with so much work still pending, many of the focus group participants expressed their concern that without the continuous financial support of the PID, the education process and collective action could be considerably stymied.

It is also apparent that the progress of certain principal objectives is limited. For example, the November 1999 final evaluation of previous project found that only 25% of 30 community groups in the eight-month program had reformed and updated their by-laws, even though the Nordestana Law School offered to help. Similarly, the 1999 evaluation showed that only 30% of the organizations included in the program had managed to implement their activities.

The sustainability of this program is dependent on three factors:

- Continuous commitment of Universidad Nordestana
- Role of the graduates of these programs
- Establishment of new coalitions of organizations

The first two factors are intertwined because Nordestana, through its Community Extension staff, encourages graduates of the PID program to meet as a group every 15 days. This provides a permanent and continuous liaison and learning among different grassroots organizations. In addition, the Nordestana School of Law has provided free consultation to groups helping them to prepare their regulations and obtain legal conditions. The third factor for sustainability is the community alliance with the municipality of San Francisco de Macoris (SFM). Undoubtedly, the future extension of the open town councils to other areas of the municipality of SFM, and other municipalities of the province would strengthen sustainability. Without a certain degree of success it is difficult to maintain active and united organizations.

3. Integration of Farmers into the Democratic Process: CAFESA

Integrating the small farmers into the democratic process is very important. Their primary struggle has been to keep alive a way of life in the Dominican Republic that is slowly disappearing under continuous encroachments. Supporters of this way of life, argue that it is crucial to defend the production of small farmers because its defense is vital to food security for all of the population. By maintaining coffee, cacao, avocado, and other fruit plantations, small farmers are protecting the earth, preserving the river basins, and reforesting the mountains. When small farmers come together to defend their interests, their demands benefit not only the rural population but the urban population as well.

Campesinos Federados de Salcedo, Inc. (CAFESA), is a coalition of 61 associations of the small farmers of Salcedo, founded in 1978. CAFESA has identified five principal organizational objectives:

- Encourage membership to work for the community and their families.
- Raise the living standards of its members.
- Preserve natural resources.
- Contribute to reforestation, particularly in the Jamao and Partido river basins.
- Identify community problems and offer alternative solutions.

The federation received three PID grants. CAFESA received support to promote democratic values taking gender into consideration within their associations, more participation in the municipal and provincial governments, democratic values in the family, and its role of leadership through a five-year community diagnostics and strategic planning program.

In the course of the focus groups, 10 different CAFESA federations were represented. Its leaders expressed that DPI, transformed CAFESA.

“Before the PID [program], we were disorganized. We did not know how to prepare an agenda, how to write minutes of our meetings, how to speak to other communities, and how to address municipal authorities. Now, we have learned to take democracy to our families. We have learned how to speak and listen to other groups. We have no more fear. Before, we had dictators, now we have democracy and nobody dominates the groups. Now the leaders of CAFESA come from the mountain; in the past, they came from the valleys.

[The] PID [activity] opened our eyes. We were freely educated and now we educate others. Now that we have learned, we have the power to attract others. Each member of our organization is a teacher. Our organizations are strong and we are no longer afraid to claim our rights. Originally, we thought that the municipalities belonged to politicians and that their politics were none of our business. Now we have open town councils in our communities, and we have been able to achieve many things such as, irrigation systems, equipment and materials to build our roads and help to build our chapels”.

Changes have occurred, not only within the internal structure of the organizations, but also with regards to their work with agricultural producers:

“In the past we use to burn our forests to plant. Now we do not burn them. We have gone outside of our communities to seek assistance and join other institutions. We are working with ADEPE on an agricultural-forest project to protect the Jamao and Partido river basins. We have different animal and agricultural projects with the technical assistance of CIID and *Servicio Alemán de Cooperación Técnica [German Technical Cooperation Service]*. ”

The CAFESA members have identified a series of significant challenges that still remain. Many associations do not have legal status. In most municipalities there has not been effective communication or effective communication mechanisms between CAFESA and the local authorities. Members also perceived that in most of the municipalities the role of farmers has not been appreciated, for example, as potential protectors of the forests. The members state that the politicians and governmental officials were involved in deforestation and that CAFESA had not found an effective way to prevent deforestation. . Underlining all of these concerns is the need to increase the quality of life of rural families.

When the project concluded in December 2000, the Operational Unit of PID reported important results. CAFESA had increased the number of member associations from 56 to 61 grassroots groups. In addition, 42 leaders from the Board of Directors of CAFESA and grassroots groups were trained in democratic values and practices and 30 leaders were trained in strategic planning. Leaders carried out a community diagnostic with the participation of community members and identified solutions. The results from this diagnostic were presented to the municipal authorities in open town councils. The PID report and interviews conducted for this study both confirm that the mayor of Salcedo has been open to the idea of community participation. However, the same cannot be said for most of the municipal officials of the province.

There are some reasons to be cautiously optimistic regarding the short-term sustainability of democratic practices and gender equality. CAFESA has formed a team of 21 “promoters” to continue the process of civil education. CAFESA has also established a team of women to monitor the implementation of the gender values at all levels of the federation. For them, the key question is whether the farmers will migrate in the future in search of a better quality life. CAFESA also needs general assistance and technical training to strengthen its institutional capacity to achieve long-term organizational stability.

4. Integration of the Poor from the South Eastern Subregion of Enriquillo

A geographic study of poverty in the country (Morillo Pérez 1997) that used 1993 census data found that the sub-region of El Valle (provinces of Azua, San Juan y Elías Piña) and Enriquillo (provinces of Barahona, Pedernales, Baoruco and Independencia) had the highest percentage of poor homes (75%). The effectiveness of implementation of the PID programs in the southeast was measured through evaluation of five subgrantees from the provinces of Enriquillo: *Radio Enriquillo*, *Centro de Educación y Asistencia Jurídica* (CEAJURI), MUDE, *Servicio Social de Iglesias Dominicanas* (SSID) y *Fundación Salud y Bienestar* (FUSABI). The methodologies used by each of these organizations varied, depending on the resources, nature, prior experience, and target population of each subgrantee. In some cases, several subgrantees used a similar methodology, but with different target groups. FUSABI is discussed in the next section five, followed by *Radio Enriquillo* and CEAJURI in section six.

5. Achieving Unity, Success and Legitimate Representation at the Community Levels

FUSABI helps to establish and support the activities of the Community Development Committees (CDCs) or Community Councils (*Consejos Comunitarios*) with two delegates from all of the grassroots organizations of the urban or rural communities. The delegates elect their own Board of Directors or Committee. Largely due to this organizational process and a broad acceptance of these Boards as legitimate, a participatory diagnostic process of community needs and a strategic plan have been achieved. These plans have been presented and negotiated with the local authorities and the donors.

The *Community Development Committees* function as advocacy groups for the community. At the same time, they are internally organized to ensure the democratic participation of a wide variety of community associations with different interests or needs at the community level. The CDCs have been elected in a transparent process and are governed by defined rules. They permit the democratic participation of their members and help to bring together communities for specific demands. Consequently, the CDCs have represented their communities to the authorities, the ministers, and local and national agencies. For several reasons, however, including the widespread poverty of these provinces, a declining population, and the geographical distance from central authorities, the CDCs have been more successful securing private-donor resources than national or municipal governmental resources.

FUSABI, with the support of the PID, has taught the democratic skills and techniques to these community groups. At the same time, the PID sub-grantee has respected the independence of CDCs, assuming the “one step behind” philosophy. Chart 5.1 shows some of the achievements of CDC’s development approach for five different municipalities of the provinces of Baoruco and Independence. The issue is not simply that a road to a water system was built. What is critical is that the investment would not have taken place without organizing the community organization into action. These achievements are the result of a long process. The communities first determined and prioritized their needs, planned and prepared proposals, and followed up these steps by applying pressure on local governments, state institutions and international

agencies day after day. Success in these projects was the result of the diagnostic studies, proposals, and pressure. The communities' achievements are a result of their sustained efforts of which they are rightly proud.

Chart 5.1 Municipal achievements of the Communities of the Sub-region of Enriquillo		
Municipality	Development project Cultural goal	Community
POSTRER RÍO	Library, high school, rebuilding of clinic and latrine construction project	Postrer Ríos
LOS RÍOS, (DM)	Construction of water system, development of housing projects, rebuilding of roads, and irrigation channels. Support for the demands to change this district into a municipality.	Los Ríos
	Construction of a rural clinic	Clavellina
	The farmers began and organized to lay the water mains underground. PROPEUR is establishing an office in Los Ríos.	Rural areas
GALVÁN	Prepared a reforestation project for the Mayagual river (to be presented to donors). Purchase lands with waterways through INDHRI, as well as other resources.	Municipal rural areas
	Construction of sport facilities, latrines and rebuilding of housing units. Land to construct a community center. Creation of children's associations where they will learn theater, poetry, and dance.	Galván
	Construction of schools	Río Grande
VILLA JARAGUA	Fire fighting group formation. Road opening VJ-Higüero Water ways (Public Works and INDHRI) Search for donors to construct water systems and buy an ambulance.	Villa Jaragua, urban and rural area
NEIBA	Creation of a Water and Health Committee leading to the construction of a water system in the Northern area. (Resources from GO, NGOs and World Vision).	Neiba.
	Construction of 60 latrines y rebuilding of 45 housing units, construction of two grade schools, gardens, meat production, wells, waterways, 400 hectares of land for school and community center.	Neiba and other communities
	Training in Disaster Mitigation, adult literacy programs for 12 communities.	12 communities of the NEIBA
	"Poderosa" state lands have been donated to <i>Asociación de Campesinos sin Tierra</i> (Association of Landless Farmers)	Rural areas

There are some reasons for optimism regarding the sustainability of CDCs due to their deep roots within the community and the success in helping the communities to achieve their demands. Despite these important achievements, there are still a few challenges. One challenge is division among community groups. Based on the legislation approved by President Fernandez' administration, NGOs can participate in municipal councils. FUSABI is concerned that the NGO's that may participate are not the legitimate representatives of their communities as

are the CDCs but instead represent an elite group. The risk is that these NGO could replace the role of community leaders by using their ability to project an image of greater leadership and to catch the attention of the media. Another risk is that relationships between CDCs and the municipal authorities are not equal across all of the municipalities. In the municipality of Los Rios, the mayor is a member of a Development Council; the CDC has legal standing only in this municipality. In other municipalities, the CDCs have formal bylaws and organizational structures. Additionally, the experience of the CDCs up to now has been limited solely to the municipalities where the PID project has been active. Moreover, none of the municipalities have changed to the open town council model and to a budget process with greater participation, responsibility and transparency.

6. Synergy: Using the Participatory Methodology, Mass Media Coverage and Knowledge of Municipal Laws: Radio Enriquillo y CEAJURI

Radio Enriquillo is located in Tamayo, in the province of Baoruco, close to the city of Barahona and has a strong influence on the city of Barahona (the largest and most important sub-region of Enriquillo). The radio station was founded and is managed by a Belgian religious order. Radio Enriquillo has received several grants from the PID. Radio Enriquillo's role in the region during the 1996 elections was important. It helped to sponsor several community meetings that led to the development of a government radio program. Its most recent project, *Ensayos en Democracia*, (Essays in Democracy) 2000-2001 focused on promoting the participation of organized groups with local governments. The program sought the participation of the CSOs to develop the annual municipal budgets and participation in open town councils. Workshops were the primary method used to accomplish these objectives. The results of these workshops were transmitted on the radio. The scope of the work focused on the four provinces of the sub-region of Enriquillo.

The *Centro de Educación y Asistencia Jurídica, Inc.* (CEAJURI), was founded in Barahona in 1988, by the same Catholic religious order as Radio Enriquillo. CEAJURI participated in a PID project with a two objectives: to strengthen democratic and cultural values; and to promote the implementation and enforcement of the existing municipal laws. The project sought to include two mayors and four legislators from Barahona in its education programs.

The populated sector of these provinces has a large small farmer population, organized in different groups: *Junta Campesina de la Zona de Caña*, *Junta Campesina Nueva Esperanza from the Yaque River*; *Junta Agropecuaria Comunal from Cabral* with a mix of 17 urban and farmer associations, *Junta Comunitaria de Cristóbal*, and *Junta de Asociaciones Campesinas del Valle de Neiba*. Recently, the GRECA group and Radio Enriquillo in liaison with the Belgian Catholic Order promoted the formation of the Farmer--Neighborhood Confederation in the southern region, *El Retoño*, which adds more than 300 urban and rural associations. They held their first conference on May 1, 2001.

Radio Enriquillo has completed eight workshops with community leaders, municipal authorities, and legislators. As a result of these workshops, the CSOs of the Municipality of Paraiso have met once a month with government officials. The Deputy Mayor of Vicente Noble has become a

member of the Radio Enriquillo team to promote the participation of other local officials in the activities of Radio Enriquillo. The goals, however, have not been achieved. Generally, it has been difficult to secure the participation of the municipal authorities in the Radio Enriquillo Workshops.

In the Municipality of Barahona, only the mayor has participated in the CEAJURI workshops. The municipality, however, lacks a participatory budget process and an effective accounting system. The most important achievement has been to increase CSOs interest in demanding participation. A Provincial Council of Neighborhood Boards was formed and the neighborhood groups now make their demands at a local level, instead of traveling to the National District, as in the past. In addition, a group (the *Monitoring Team for Local Management*) has been formed to monitor local politics, involving the Provincial Council and five other associations.

E. The PID Interest Aggregation/Articulation At National Level

While the PID gradually concludes almost ten years of operations, many of its subgrantees have formed into four consortia—Municipalities, Farmers’ Organizations, Civic Education, and Civil Service and Administrative Career—to sustain activities indefinitely after the project ends. The objectives, the structure and operations are analyzed as follows:

1. *Consortio Municipal* (“Municipal Consortium”)

The subgrantees that have made the local government their principle interest belong to the *Consortio Municipal*. A total of 34 organizations are members of the Consortium, including EPCA, CE-MUJER, CEDEPAR, Solidarity Foundation, and the Juan Montalvo, S.J. Social Studies Center¹⁴, all of who comprise the executive board which is coordinated by Ricardo González from CJM. The objectives of this Consortium are as follows:

- To conduct a systematic evaluation of the participation of the organizations experienced in municipal activities.
- To promote the mechanisms for the participation of civil society groups at the municipal level.
- To support the proposed legislation of CONARE¹⁵ and seek to modify the proposed bill during the judicial hearing in the congress.
- To strengthen the network of organizations for decentralization purposes.

¹⁴ Other members of this consortium are FIDEP, CIEPO, CEPAE, CEPA, EDUDELIC, UVA, OFIPAC, IDEC, ACACDISNA, Radio Mariné, FUDEVA, CEZOPAS, Fundación Mujer Iglesia, Oficina Técnica de Salcedo, Universidad Católica Nordestana, GRIPAC, Participación Ciudadana, IDDI, CESODECO, CEAJURI, Radio Enriquillo, ASPROVITA, CIECA, CEDEE, COSECHA, Y ACOPRO.

¹⁵ Originally, the Consortium’s proposal was to strengthen the draft of the legislation for the Municipal Organic Law, which FEDOMU is currently reviewing. After discussion, the objective was changed to adopt the CONARE proposal and negotiate with FEDOMU.

The consortium is active in establishing alliances to push for reform of municipal legislation with the *Red para la Descentralización*, a coalition with a broader base than the Consortium, involving close to 400 organizations. It has also approached the *Federación Dominicana de Municipios* (FEDOMU), headed by the mayor of La Vega. In October 2001, a meeting with FEDOMU will be held in order to try to arrive at a consensus on the proposed municipal legislation. A series of lobbying activities and nationwide promotion of the legislation were also on the agenda.

The strength of the *Consortio Municipal* lies in the fact that the subgrantees (like grassroots organizations) have been able to work closely with municipal authorities and in open town meetings to participate in budget preparation of community development plans. These coalitions, it should be noted, are not dependent on PID money for their sustainability.

It is not easy to generalize about local governments. Some municipalities resist change, while others open their doors to civil society organizations and to individual citizens. All of the mayors interviewed for this evaluation agreed that the Organic Municipal Law (the national statute authorizing municipal powers and functions) needs to be modified to allow for decentralization and provide greater municipal autonomy.

There are other organizations and/or programs with similar objectives that have received some relatively modest funds from IDB, Oxfam, and the European Union. In October 2000, a network of organizations that support decentralization got together for the first time to establish the Network of Civil Society Organizations in Support of Decentralization. This national coalition includes more than 300 NGO's and grassroots organizations and is actively monitoring local government meetings. Many groups are also members of *Corsorcio Municipal*, whose mission is to strengthen the participation of civil society and the network coalitions at the municipal level.

Another important contribution comes from the Program to Strengthen Civil Society Organizations with Instituto Tecnológico de Santo Domingo (INTEC), supported by Oxfam and the IDB. Its goals address the participation of the civil society in democracy and development, the dissemination of pertinent information and the strengthening of the CSO's network and its relations with the government. The program has already prepared the legislation proposed for a legal structure of CSOs, municipal taxes and public policies, with the objectives of: (1) strengthening the participation of CSOs in public policies and decision making, and improving the CSO's-government relations; (2) introducing transparency in political decisions; and (3) debating pertinent global development concepts.

- **Conclusion**

The probabilities of enacting the legislation to provide greater municipal autonomy and institutionalize the participation of civil society are quite good, particularly if presented before the 2002 elections. There is room for some optimism because many subgrantees are experienced at lobbying and getting resolutions passed at the local level of government. In addition, some groups already have developed proposed legislation on municipal autonomy, including

Participación Comunitaria en la Gestión Municipal, Unión de Vecinos Activos(UVA¹⁶), and Municipalidad y Participación Comunitaria.

The strength of the Consortium comes from the changes in state-civil society relations that have already taken place in many municipalities (see PC section). These changes could not have been achieved without the agreement and support of the mayors. The mayors want decentralization, modernization, and a larger portion of the national budget. Some have accepted the participation of civil society by giving priority to their agendas and to budget for development, and at least one municipality has established elected civil society committees to monitor local government activities. In addition, the mobilization of different CS networks in support of new legislation increases the likelihood of success.

Nevertheless, the challenge this Consortium faces is not limited to the approval of the legislation and its sustainability. Without additional support is not likely to happen. Lawmakers in the DR have a practice of changing legislation at will to fit the interests of particular power groups or parties. The real challenges relate to:

- The ability that the civil society groups in each of the 120 municipalities and the National District have to continue and increase their participation at the municipal level.
- Expanding local participation and grass root programs in municipalities where the local government has resisted change.
- Using innovative mechanisms for effective participation in all of the municipalities, particularly in the National District, where the action has been the focus of political reforms.
- Oversight of and contribution to the modernization of the municipalities, a process initiated only recently.
- Integrating political reforms and developments in all of the municipalities.

There is no doubt that this consortium has a very important role. Municipalities constitute a trial space for the real participation of the CSO's in open interaction with political parties and elected officials. They also provide sound experiences for modernization and government impartiality. They represent change in the political structures from the bottom up.

2. *Consortio Campesino (Small Farmers' Consortium-SFC)*

The SFC is made up of the 13 farmer federations that have participated in the PID's civic education activities.⁴ The SFC's work with the PID has resulted in the adoption of internal

¹⁶ This group is not an NGO, but a grass root organization that participates in more than ten neighborhoods in Herrera. This proposal reached Congress and has been important to other proposals.

democratic procedures and the creation of a farmer organization network. Many groups have learned strategic planning skills and have acquired an understanding of governmental mechanisms, together with their rights and duties as citizens. Small farmers have been particularly active at the municipal level in the northern and northeastern regions, negotiating to improve infrastructure, such as opening of roads, construction of water supply systems and community centers. There has also been a synergetic effect as a result of the cooperation between the civic education programs and the water conservation and reforestation projects, such as the case of *Federación Noreste de Santiago* and the ADEPE and CAFESA Project in the provinces of Salcedo and Espaillat aimed at preserving the Jamao River Watershed.

The SFC was established in May 2001 and planed to recruit 4,370 members in its first seven months. Its objectives are:

- To make the national population aware of the significant role that small farmers play in Dominican society.
- To systematize the lessons learned with from using different strategies that have contributed to improve the quality of life of small farmers.
- To promote institutional development of the consortium with the purpose of maintaining democratic practices within small farmer organizations.
- To prepare and negotiate a law proposed for the protection of small farmers.

It will be difficult—probably impossible—for the SFC to achieve all of its goals in the short term. There are several factors that work against solving the problems of Dominican farmers through legislation. First, a discussion document that the Consortium is studying to define solutions provides a lot of data, but little analysis. It does little to explain the causes of the declining role of farmers in agricultural production and the significant diaspora of the rural population to urban centers. Second, it does not adequately explain the factors contributing to the decline of the sector in terms of a percentage of the GDP and as a source of employment, nor does it examine the causes and the magnitude of the process of deforestation and the consequences for sustainability of life on the island. Third, the past role of the government in the macroeconomic policies that have caused agricultural production to decline in favor of urban importers, industrialists and consumers has not been addressed.

Any analysis of the sector that does not take into account past and present macroeconomic policies and does not include a sociological review of the obstacles to promoting a farmer class

¹⁷ From the North Central Region: *Federación de Grupos Campesinos, Inc.* (FEGRUPA) and *Asociación para el Desarrollo de la Provincia Espaillat, Inc.* (ADEPE), COCODESI of San José de Las Matas, *Fundación Pro-Conuco, Inc.* (PROCONUCO) of Altamira, CEPOCS of Navarrete, and CONCAMATI-La Vega. From the Northeastern Region: *Asociación Central de Agricultores Luz y Esperanza of Nagua* (ACALEN), ASOPROVISTA and *Campesinos Federados de Salcedo, Inc.* (CAFESA) from Salcedo; , CONCAMATI- Provinces of Sánchez Ramírez, Monseñor Noel and La Vega; and JACASA in Samaná. From the southwestern Region: FEDECARES and UCA in Dajabón.

capable of identifying and generating solutions to their problems will be useless when drafting a bill to protect small farmers. Alternative models to develop small plantations and/or generate rural employment to satisfy the needs of Dominican farmers requires coordinated efforts and extensive discussions.

Another of the Consortium's weaknesses is the absence of farmer organizations from important agricultural regions, particularly of the reformed sector of the government and from the agricultural communities of the sugar mills. There is no representation from the three provinces of the sub-region of El Valle, from the eight provinces of the southeastern region, from the four provinces of the southeastern region, from the four provinces, from the northeastern sub-region, and from the province of Duarte the center of agricultural production of the northeastern region. The farmer groups throughout the country need to agree on a legislation that, due to its very nature, will probably generate opposition among certain economic groups.

Inside its member federations, the Consortium has learned valuable lessons that can provide micro solutions to environmental preservation and income generation issues. This is the case of the Jamao's river basin agricultural-forestry project, led by *Asociación de Desarrollo de la Provincia de Espaillat, Inc.* (ADEPE). The PID projects have addressed the leaders of 80 farmer associations since 1995. The SFC has worked in 47 communities to establish 750 tree and fruit farms and has integrated 18 sector committees related to the River Basin Management Committee. Its motto carries a strong message that underlines the hard task of combining small farmers and sustainable agriculture: "Through community participation and strategic alliances, we can train, reforest, produce food, and generate income to achieve a better quality of life and preserve the environment". SFC plans to use this and other successful stories when presenting their case seeking legislation that protects their interests. FEDECARES will present its experience with the commercialization of agricultural commodities: CEPRAJU and CAFESA will present their "Farmer to Farmer" program; and FEGRUPA and ALCALLEN the model for rural associative companies.¹⁸

- **Conclusion**

This Consortium is not currently sustainable, even though the small farmers need some kind of organized presence to promote their interests as part of civil society. Its heterogeneity and extension across the country hinders organizational activities. But, it is essential to remember that the solutions to small farmers' problems are important to the entire nation. There is a risk of continuous deforestation on the island. In addition, urban industries are not capable of absorbing a continuous and massive rural-urban migration.

3. Civic Education Consortium

The PID's civic education topics were meant to reach a general audience. Yet when several educational institutions approached the PID, a different type of civic education program, targeting different levels of primary and high school education, was born. Its beginnings are

¹⁸ In February of 2002, at the time of extending and reviewing the report of this evaluation presented on October 2001, the Bill was in the Legislative Branch.

important to understand the rapid achievements of the program (Towards the Creation of a Civic Culture in the School) initiated in 1997. Three initial advantages gave this program a head start.

First, subgrantees that initiated this school-oriented program were experienced and firmly committed to raising the quality of education in the schools they serviced. Second, the PID Consultative Counsel and Operations Unit recognized the importance of this project and sought resources through USIS and Falconbridge Foundation to underwrite the program. Third, international institutions provided expert input that was rapidly adopted. CIVITAS, an international network of civic education, provided assistance in the conceptualization of the program, and two experienced experts from the Center for Civic Education (CCE), based in Los Angeles, came to the country to assist in its development. They provided teacher training and selected texts from CCE manuals to be translated and adapted to the Dominican reality. This important task was completed by a Dominican educator, Gladys Graciela Garcia Romero, and published by USIS and the PID.

The first textbook translated, *Education for Democracy*, addressed the second cycle of the primary level of the education system and the second book, *I Learn to Coexist* was published for young students of the first cycle of primary education. In addition, two guides and a selection of texts were published: *Let's Live Democracy*, published by *Central de Servicios Pedagógicos* in 1998. These educational books and instruction guidelines have provided the necessary tools to apply civic education based on the principles of authority, justice and responsibility. One indicator of the success of this program was the publication of a textbook and manual for high school students in August of 2001, *Formación Ciudadana* (Building of Citizenship), written by the same author, Graciela García Romero. The book is very interesting, with texts and selected situations that reflect Dominican political and socioeconomic conditions.

The Consortium, formed by 11 organizations and schools, is coordinated by the *Central de Servicios Pedagógicos*, sharing executive responsibilities with the *Centro Poveda* and the M. Gómez Foundation. Other institutions participating in the Civic Education Consortium are IDEFA, PROJOVEN, FISOE, *Colegio Miguel Angel Garcia* and the *Oficina Técnica Provincial de Salcedo*. Its purpose is to strengthen and consolidate civic education in the DR through the institutionalization of the Consortium and the creation of a national network of teachers. By the end of the project the consortium seeks to achieve four ambitious goals:

- Expansion of the Civic Education Consortium to the national level; making students, teachers, and directors aware of the importance of civic education;
- Hosting of a Latin America Forum on Civic Education
- Creation of a Network of Civic Education Teachers, to expand coverage of the program
- Introduction of civic education in all schools as part of a national curriculum through the Ministry of Education (SEE) and at universities with schools of education

To achieve these goals the Consortium will develop a five-year strategic plan, including a series of income-generating activities. Communication will also be promoted through brochures, posters and web pages.¹⁹

Unquestionably, this consortium seeks a cultural transformation that transcends the immediate and the limited scope of the schools that participated in the program. Its expansion to the public sector entails the possibility of turning it into the most important cultural transformation project ever in the Dominican Republic. The importance of this consortium remains in the fact that it is capable of changing attitudes and values, transforming students and teachers into more responsible citizens. Thus, it is at the center of civic education. Given the financial assistance, there is no doubt that this group of organizations is capable of creating a measurable impact on Dominican political culture. To be effective, it has to become part of the education system and it is currently succeeding at this.

The strength of this consortium is in the quality and systematization of its experiences, the commitment and training of its members committed to civic education. Furthermore, the program's simplicity makes it easily adaptable to all schools, most likely with little or no opposition. Conditions are also favorable on the part of the Secretariat of Education. There is already a governmental policy and a statute in place including civic education in the educational system. The Secretariat is lacking a methodology and a plan of study, which the PID subgrantees have already developed and approved, and could be easily adopted by SEE. The combination of these factors increases the probabilities of success.

The former and current Secretary of Education have been approached and both have given verbal support to include the civic education program in the Ministry's curriculum. Yet, political rather than educational priorities have tended to prevail. In addition, many teachers have lacked classroom supervision and are not always sufficiently trained

Expanding the program to public schools can be a difficult task. It will take time, patience and resources to change teachers who are used to years of authoritarian behavior and repetitive teaching. On the other hand, the subgrantees of the PID are skilled, determined and committed and have already engaged some public schools for the program.

Additional financial support is needed to expand the civic education experience to public schools. It is not likely that the Ministry will finance this program, given its reduced budget and deficit of classrooms for 140,000 students. But it may be willing to implement the program with external aid. An opportunity may be opening through the *Programa de Apoyo a la Reforma y Democratización del Sistema Educativo*, with support from ONFED (European Fund for Development) in the amount of DR\$234million for reform and democratization of the educational system. This effort may also be coordinated with universities through their community extension programs, particularly in places where other PID projects have been highly successful.

¹⁹ At the beginning of March 2002, the PID had made agreements with the SEE financing to start the project in public schools.

4. Civil Service and Administrative Career Consortium

Law 14-91 of 1991 established the Civil Service and Administrative Career within government institutions. This was an act essentially devised to stop excessive patronage, professionalize the public sector, and give civil servants the right to appeal their unjustified dismissal. The PID supported "*Asociación de Trabajadores del Estado*"-ATE) (Association of Government Workers) - the public employee union - in its effort to educate public workers to exercise pressure to have the law applied, particularly its stipulations against arbitrary and politically motivated dismissals.

So far, public employees have only been partly successful. According to ATE, there have been improvements in severance payments and the rate and frequency of personnel turnover has declined, especially under the current administration. Although no precise numbers could be found, ATE indicated that there are presently "thousands" of appeals of allegedly political dismissals in process. Part of the problem is budget. ATE officials assert that 76% of claims have not yet been settled due to a lack of appropriated funds. So while there may be greater enforcement of the law, successful appeals still cannot be finally concluded.

ATE coordinates the Consortium together with two other institutions, UNASE y FENATRASAL. Their objectives are to:

- Promote and defend the rights of public employees, particularly with regards to the application of Law 14-91.
- Instruct civil servants regarding the new procedures to apply the law.
- organize public employees and represent their interests and assist them in seeking redress for their grievances.

The Consortium has developed an action plan, with the support of the PID, to conduct 30 workshops with participants from Ministry of Education (SEE), the Ministry of Health (SESPAS), the Ministry of Agriculture (SEA) and the Ministry of Public Works (SEOPC), and SEF. The purposes are to make public employees aware of their rights under the law and to organize them to press the government for adequate enforcement and compliance. One sign of encouragement has been the cooperation of National Planning Office (ONAP) and CNUS. Another is that for the first time managers are giving permission to employees to attend Consortium workshops during working hours.

- **Conclusion**

If the Consortium is successful, it will help to strengthen and modernize state institutions. Continued paternalism obstructs the professionalism of organizations, promoting incompetence and problems within its ranks that have plagued Dominican governments. Changing government employees every time a new administration is elected -at central and municipal level- is a loss of

human resources. This also perpetuates the corruption that has infected the government and rendered it inefficient.

While ATE and other Consortium members have not yet achieved their goals, they have experienced success, in view of the fact that it is a small consortium with relative financial stability. ATE, for example, provides its members with 1% of their salaries, a large and organized constituency and business experience.

5. Recommendations

Municipal Consortium

- Coordinate efforts with project co-financing from other international agencies.
- Decentralize the funds through regional coalitions.
- Disseminate success stories through videos and other media.
- Invest in training efforts oriented to municipal officials in management areas and democratic practices.

Small Farmers' Consortium

This consortium is very weak. It would involve an extended commitment to develop it - to the point where it could be self-sustaining. To the extent possible, the PID should increase its efforts with the SFC to craft and implement a strategy to acquire funds from non-USAID donors to support its operations until it reaches a viable measure of self-sustainability.

Civic Education Consortium

- Extend financing until all of the regions of the Secretariat of Education have at least one pilot plan involving regional universities. There is the risk of centralization by the universities of Santo Domingo, and their extended community programs are not necessarily better than those in the provinces.
- Expand into areas where municipal projects have succeeded. A synergetic effect will ensue given that many students, teachers and parents are already participating through community and municipal actions.
- Seek financial partners, such as the Program to Support the Reform and Democratization of the Education System, under ONFED (European Development Funds) that has allotted RD\$234 millions to the reform and democratization of the educational system.

Civil Service and Administrative Career Consortium

This consortium focuses on a series of small problems that deal with the enforcement of the civil service law. But there is limited mandate in this sense. The consortium represents a major electoral district that is moderately well organized, insofar as belonging to the same organization

–i.e., civil service. This consortium is also relatively self-sufficient. It would still be useful if the successor to the PID, if it exists, offered technical support to assist the members to acquire donor funds. After all, the civil service is an integral part of the government and, as such, it is in a position to assist towards an advanced application of the CS's agenda. This is crucial to insure effective application of political reforms.

F. Conclusions and Lessons Learned

Looking at all of the experiences together, and sometimes relying more on an individual case than on the combined experiences of the NGOs, there are important lessons learned:

- The most important lesson learned could be that of the *medio paso atrás* or “one step behind” logic which is so important in the relations between the AID and the PID's Advisory Board. Also important has been the constructive relations between NGOs and CSOs subgrantees with whom they have worked. The effective, autonomous, authoritarian CSOs need organizational, technical and material assistance, but they also need respect and encouragement to define their own goals.
- It was important for CSOs to learn to respect not only the value of democracy in terms of participation and tolerance to dissent, but also in terms of development and institutional administration, such as leadership, responsibility, establishment of appropriate procedures and the transparency of financial transactions. These were probably assimilated to varying degrees and several levels of success through CSOs.
- Also important was practice in the processes and techniques of strategic planning and in determining sources of possible assistance, which also had been assimilated to varying degrees across CSOs.
- Changes in attitude, however, are not enough to become a community leader. The leader must have knowledge and skills to lead the process of building a participatory community evaluation and develop skillfully written proposals. Leaders have to become advocates of community development plans.
- The program of Universidad Nordestana enhances the value that a community extension program can have to help sustainability, providing the staff and creating the space for continuous interaction and exchanges through local groups. It also highlights the important role to be played by local universities particularly outside of the National District.
- Successful programs were built on a strong community foundation and effectively involved government figures who were open to this kind of interaction. Also important, however, was organized and sustained follow-up. Less successful were those projects that sought control or required the interaction of trust funds without a prior effective organization.

- Indeed, municipal officials are more likely to accept the participation of CSOs if these show legitimate community backing, bring to the meetings community diagnoses developed through organized, participatory processes, and present concrete technical proposals to meet community needs.
- The CAFESA program showed that small farmers are capable of learning technical skills and assuming responsibilities and a negotiating role beyond simple land demands. They are finding solutions to the problem of low income through increased production of agricultural commodities, in part by reforestation and preserving the environment.
- The creation of effective institutional alliances at the community level is essential. The premature creation of networks of different CSOs of communities which lack internal institutionalization runs the risk of that these will reflect more the objectives of outside organizers than their own internal priorities. These “premature” alliances tend to be dependent, inefficient and easily co-opted by the interests of political groups, churches or the NGOs that promote them.
- Knowledge of the law has been an important motivation for citizens to demand their rights at the municipal government level.
- The "Radio Enriquillo" program has particularly emphasized how the use of mass media to report on the results of CSOs programs is an effective tool to create awareness among a large number of people.
- Large provincial or regional coalitions may be ineffective at the municipal level, given that they transcend municipal boundaries and therefore their demands cannot be met by any single local municipal budget.
- It is hard to support CSO's with no level of success, no matter how limited. Success is defined in a variety of different forms, and could lead to notable consequences: self-esteem, verbal assertiveness, enthusiasm, and willingness to share, learn and participate.
- The success of a municipal government program with open town council participation requires an extensive prior community organization, community follow up, and support from the municipal authorities.

VI. PARTICIPACION CIUDADANA (PC)

A. Background

PC was formed in 1993. The founding members were mostly middle- and upper-middle-class intellectuals, journalists, and businesspeople who sought to raise public awareness of the importance of fair elections in 1994. After that electoral debacle, PC sought to expand and extend its activities by organizing a network of observers. At the same time, USAID responded by launching its Strengthening Civil Society Project, composed of four components:

- Building capacity within civil society for more effective support of the 1996 electoral process;
- Creating a trained network of electoral observers and conducting a quick count;
- Carrying out a citizen education campaign focusing on the rights and responsibilities of voters; and
- Fostering broad citizen participation at the local level in formulating a national agenda for reform.

As an organization in the making without legal status, PC was unable to qualify for direct USAID funding in 1995–96. Initial funding for PC therefore came from the National Endowment for Democracy, and then from the PID and GAD. In addition, the Inter-American Institute for Human Rights/Center for Electoral Promotion and Assistance (IIDH/CAPEL), provided support to PC, assisting in election monitoring activities.

Funding PC in this early period (1995–1996) was important for several reasons.

- First, it helped broaden the base of civil society organizations supported by USAID. While GAD was viewed as an elite-run coalition, housed in an elite Catholic institution, PC was composed of independent thinkers with previous links to the left (journalists, intellectuals, and social activists).
- Second, PC was very successful not only in recruiting 5,000 electoral observers in 1996, but also in promoting a grassroots movement that inspired thousands of people, many of them young and female, to engage politically and participate with conviction and dedication in the electoral process. Indeed, by May 1996, when national elections took place, the *Red de Observadores Electorales* (Electoral Observers) had surpassed PC in number of members and its diversity of membership.
- Third, funding PC helped to lay the groundwork for a closer relationship between PC and the Mission, which culminated in a cooperative agreement in 1997 through the Strengthening Civil Society II Project.

In brief, PC played a key role in making it possible for many citizens to become politically active by joining the *Red de Observadores Electorales*, while GAD was instrumental in bringing together representatives from elite organizations (business, churches, universities, NGOs) to act as a pressure group on behalf of fair elections.

A second phase of the SCS Project capitalized on the successful civil society initiative in the 1996 elections and sought to underwrite Dominican efforts to establish a more participatory, representative, and functional democracy. Initial support for this project was in the form of a cooperative agreement directed to *Participación Ciudadana* in several stages:

- Initial and preliminary institutional support for the organization and development of a more sustainable program of electoral monitoring.
- Support for monitoring the May 1998 municipal and congressional elections and initiating analyses for electoral reforms.
- Support and preparation for the national presidential elections in the year 2000. In addition, the project included support for the development of advocacy for reform activities, and civic education and mass media programs organized in support of reform initiatives. Initial funding to PC was US\$3.1 million for a 28-month period, with total five-year funding (1997–2002) planned at US\$9.4 million, to end in September 2002.

PC attained this privileged status among civil society organizations by playing a stellar role in the 1996 elections. The recruitment of a network of about 5,000 observers, many of them young people and women (over 40 percent in both categories), and the accurate quick count gave PC a great deal of credibility among Dominicans across social sectors as well as among international donors. After signing the cooperative agreement with the Mission, PC found itself faced with having to manage a complex set of several objectives. This was a significant challenge for a civic organization that started small, with a Santo Domingo-based membership and rapidly mushroomed in size nationwide as a result of successfully recruiting thousands of volunteers for electoral observation. Compounding the challenge was the fact that PC lacked consensus among its leaders as to what should be the size and focus of the organization.

Thus, PC went through a difficult period of adjustment in the aftermath of the 1996 elections. Its potential membership had grown in size, and decentralization surfaced as an important issue to be resolved after the elections. Facing urgent political challenges, PC received in April 1997 a US\$47,458 bridge grant to advocate for electoral reforms and develop a plan for the future. In November 1997, PC began to restructure. The governing National Assembly elected a National Commission that included several of the original PC founders who had the trust of the USAID Mission. The bridge grant and the formation of the National Commission were key factors that facilitated larger USAID funding to PC in subsequent years.²⁰ In addition, PC strengthened its financial management capacity.

The approved PC activity had four components:

- Support for 1998 congressional and municipal elections;
- Advocacy for reform;

²⁰ “Strengthening Civil Society II: Results Package,” USAID/DR, July 1997.

- Civic education and mass media; and
- Institutional strengthening.

The activities of the first three components were not necessarily to be carried out exclusively by PC. A key orientation of the program called for PC to link activities with other civil society organizations, acting as a convener or partner in cooperative endeavors.

PC's electoral observation work in the May 1998 congressional and municipal elections was a major and successful undertaking. The campaign to recruit volunteers, which relied extensively on free TV and radio spots, resulted in the recruitment of 13,000 volunteers, 10,000 of whom were actually deployed. The volunteers received training on electoral laws, rules, and methods of observation. About 70 percent of all the polling stations were observed. A parallel count was also conducted in some key districts. However, in spite of the campaign to encourage people to vote, 47 percent of the electorate abstained. Three factors seem to account for such a high level of abstention, unknown in recent Dominican electoral politics:

- The elections generated less interest because they were the first congressional and municipal votes held separately from presidential elections.
- The congress ending its term in 1998 had been highly ineffective, polarized, and plagued by accusations of corruption.
- Balaguer's party ran a poor campaign and the *reformistas* may have abstained in large numbers.

On the positive side, however, the 1998 elections were free and fair, with no major disputes ensuing over the voting results.

Organizing the network of observers for the 1998 elections was PC's central activity during the first half of 1998. This work included the campaign to recruit volunteers, the recruitment process, the training of volunteers, their deployment on election day, the quick count, and the post-election evaluation. Different opinions among PC board members and officers over the significance of this activity and the means to accomplish it led to conflicts within PC's board and among its executive officers. This led in July 1998 to the forced resignation of PC's executive director under allegations of excessive use of power and the lack of democratic decision-making.

This institutional crisis was quickly settled with the appointment of an acting executive director who had the trust of key PC leaders and staff members. Yet, the two fundamental challenges facing PC at the time remain in place to date: (1) whether to remain a small, elite-run organization, or opt for a large membership; and (2) whether to be a civic organization that mobilizes people around specific reform issues with limited financial resources, or to operate like an NGO that seeks large amounts of resources to implement its own activities and even fund others. In 1999 and early 2000, these two debates were deferred as PC work focused on preparing for the May 2000 presidential elections. Once again, the electoral observation work was outstanding and the quick count reliable and precise.

Since 1998, PC has also worked on the "articulation" of various civil society organizations in

promoting political reforms and stopping attempts by powerful groups to reverse democratic reforms already instituted. The first test came in the second half of 1998. The overwhelming victory of the Dominican Revolutionary Party in the 1998 congressional and municipal elections stunned the other two main parties: the Dominican Liberation Party (PLD), in control of the executive branch of government, and Joaquín Balaguer's Social Christian Reformist Party (PRSC).

The PLD and the PRSC attempted to modify the Constitution to revoke judicial reforms and allow for reelection of the President. In addition, they sought the support of PRD dissidents in Congress to put in the congressional leadership individuals who opposed the decisions of the main PRD leaders. They also ignored the majority of municipalities won by the PRD and elected a *reformista* to the presidency of the Dominican League of Municipalities. All these attempts to overrule the electoral majority of the PRD in Congress and at the municipal level led to tensions among the political parties. Once in control of the Senate, the PRD responded by appointing a new Electoral Board without consulting other political parties or civil society organizations. While the election was legal because the Constitution grants this power to the Senate, in previous years part of the implicit agreement to improve electoral processes had been selecting the Electoral Board in consultation with political parties and civil society organizations.

In the midst of these conflicts, PC formed *Foro Ciudadano*, a coalition of civil society organizations assembled to advocate for more democratic reforms as well as preservation of those reforms already instituted. PC coordinated the *Foro* during the first six months of its existence, with other civil society organizations rotating the coordinator position subsequently. As PC eventually reduced its role in coordinating the *Foro*, the political relevance of this coalition of civil society organizations faded correspondingly.

In the post-2000 presidential elections, PC embarked on expanding its range of activities. New programs are now in place dealing with the judicial system, public administration, political parties, women in politics, and neighborhood associations in middle-class sections of Santo Domingo City. Both the overall mission of PC and its newly acquired technical capabilities have been used to justify the expansion of the range of programs and activities. One downside has been that PC is now viewed by other civil society organizations and NGOs as a competitor for funding. Moreover, by adding programs, PC devotes less energy to solving pressing and pending organizational issues such as the size and composition of the organization, the nature of its leadership, decision-making, and power structure, and the organization's financial sustainability.

B. Principal Findings

- The gradual engagement of civil society in the Dominican Republic and USAID funding to civil society organizations were based on the limited capabilities of government institutions, little credibility of public officials and politicians, and insufficient public accountability. Since government institutions were not appropriate choices in the 1990s for a political reform program, USAID opted to focus its attention and funding on key Dominican civil society organizations. PC was identified as one of them.

- Capacity in civil society grew in the 1980s during the early years of the democratic transition, and a significant achievement in the 1990s was the integration of this evolving civil society capacity into a focused political reform program that the USAID Mission in Santo Domingo prioritized for funding throughout the 1990s. This funding reached PC in 1995 and expanded in 1997.
- A decisive programmatic objective of USAID democracy strategy in the mid-1990s consisted of civil society advocacy for political reform largely based on high-profile issues of national interest. This was the case with election monitoring in 1996, 1998, and 2000. This part of the strategy relied heavily on the electoral work of PC and capitalized on the attention of the country in the 1996 electoral process as a result of the disputed general elections of May 1994 and the signing of the Pact for Democracy in August 1994.
- In 1995–96, USAID developed, with PC, a civil society-based election monitoring effort and allocated funding through the PID and GAD. The newly created *Red de Observadores Electorales* was highly effective in deploying electoral observers nationwide in 1996 and accurately predicting electoral results with its quick count.
- USAID has collaborated with a civil society leadership that is essentially a modernizing force from business, professional, and intellectual groups. They come primarily from a cross-section of the middle and upper-middle class. This civil society-based modernizing elite shares a commitment to democratic reforms, and its dialogue and negotiations with key political decision-making groups have been critical for the success of their activities. This is certainly evident in the area of electoral observation, where PC activities have been highly successful.
- In spite of the elite-based nature of the USAID-funded organizations like PC, they collaborate with organizations of diverse social backgrounds and regions in the country. For instance, PC relies heavily on many social organizations nationwide to establish the network of electoral observers. This provided the linkages between the USAID programs and organizations and larger segments of Dominican society.
- As a result of its electoral monitoring efforts, PC developed a following among many concerned citizens who wanted to participate politically but disliked traditional forms of participation through political parties. The large number of young people and women recruited as electoral observers serve as examples.
- PC, however, remained a relatively small organization in terms of formal membership. While many of those who participate in PC activities may feel that they are PC members, the reality is that only a small number of them are active, dues-paying members. In this regard, PC is an elite organization with the capacity to mobilize large numbers of volunteers.
- The technical capabilities and know-how achieved in great measure as a result of USAID financial support has been critical to the political legitimacy and credibility of PC.

- The training of electoral observers and the accuracy of the quick counts (both costly programs) have served to substantiate the nonpartisan nature of PC.

C. Analysis

1. Interest Aggregation

PC is a relatively small organization in terms of formal membership (dues-paying members with voting rights). However, in the process of organizing the *Red de Observadores Electorales* in 1996 and subsequent elections, PC recruited thousands of volunteers to participate in election monitoring activities (up to 12,000 in 2000). Many of these observers identify with PC's mission as a civic organization committed to democratic reforms, yet many of them have not formally joined PC, and PC does not actively seek their affiliation. For example, in the survey conducted for the assessment, 42 percent of respondents indicated they were members of PC, but only 10 percent said they paid dues. Thus, PC has shown its ability to mobilize large segments of Dominican society to carry out its activities (electoral observation in particular), but has not grown in size or significantly transformed its class composition or power structure. It is interesting to note, in this regard, that 83 percent of the electoral observers surveyed had never before participated in political activities, yet 80 percent asserted that they had little or no interest in politics.

Thus, PC remains a small, elite-run organization, with a remarkable ability to mobilize larger constituencies cyclically for specific purposes. For example, 93 percent of respondents to the survey believe that PC observers will be needed for the 2002 municipal and congressional elections, as well as for the 2004 presidential race. There is no other organization of its kind in the Dominican Republic, and USAID capitalized effectively on the potential of this organization to change political practices and promote political reforms, particularly, in the electoral arena. The *Red de Observadores Electorales* has been the most important initiative undertaken by organized civil society in the Dominican Republic, both in terms of the volunteers who participated in the process and in helping to transform entrenched practices of electoral fraud and irregularities.

There are different opinions within PC leadership as to how much of a national presence the organization should have. To date, this remains an unresolved issue. PC has its national headquarters in Santo Domingo, where 29 *núcleos* also operate; it has 18 committees in various regions of the country and 105 active *núcleos* in the interior of the country. PC activates more *núcleos* at election time for the purpose of organizing electoral observation.

PC has been a leader in promoting reform initiatives, particularly in the electoral processes. It has relied on Dominican NGOs and social organizations to recruit members for its own activities, especially electoral observation; yet PC has not actively embraced the priority issues of other organizations. Instead, PC has stated its own objectives and has pursued them with the support of other groups and adequate funding. This can be viewed as a limitation of PC when it comes to evaluating the relationship of equal partners in civil society. However, it can also be

viewed as one of PC's strengths since it has allowed the organization to pursue its goals with determination.

In the electoral process, the role of PC has been crucial. PC was formed in the aftermath of the electoral disputes of the 1990 general elections. In an attempt to secure a fair election in 1994, USAID funded and worked closely with the Electoral Board, improving its technical and administrative capabilities. In spite of these efforts, the fairness of the 1994 election was highly questionable and the results were challenged by opposition parties, in particular the PRD, which came in second, and the U.S. Embassy in Santo Domingo. It was in the wake of these controversies and after the signing of the Pact for Democracy that PC received the first flow of funding from USAID (in 1995). Since then, PC has been a key actor in Dominican electoral politics, particularly in working toward achieving electoral transparency.

Electoral reform, per se, has been a complex process. The electoral reforms of 1994 had been discussed as part of a project funded to *Siglo XXI*, a Dominican NGO, by the PID. However, electoral reforms instituted as part of the constitutional reforms in 1994 were exclusively discussed and agreed upon by the top leadership of the three main political parties, with no participation of civil society organizations in the discussions or negotiations. PC and other civil society organizations have also proposed and discussed subsequent electoral reforms, and the new laws have incorporated demands from civil society such as the quota for women candidates. Yet the reform process has been guided in large measure by political party interests. For instance, changes to the Electoral Code instituted in 1997 were passed in Congress primarily because the new electoral legislation in Congress established public funding for electoral campaigns.

PC has also promoted the formation of strategic coalitions of social organizations and NGOs to bring about democratic reforms or contain attempts to reverse them. In addition to fostering *Foro Ciudadano* in early 1999 to overcome the political crisis generated by interparty rivalry and the attempts of political parties to manipulate important branches of government (Congress, the Municipal League, the Electoral Board), PC has also worked in coalitions for an independent judiciary, both in 1998 and more recently in 2001. The coalition for an independent judicial system has been composed of PC, FINJUS, *Association of Dominican Business Lawyers* (ADAE, acronym in Spanish), and Dominican Association of Young Business Persons (ANJE, acronym in Spanish). PC has also participated in *Red de Redes*, a coalition of NGOs to negotiate policy issues with the Dominican government, and is a member of the program *Fortalecimiento de la Sociedad Civil* (FOOSC), funded by the IDB and housed at the *Instituto Tecnológico de Santo Domingo* (INTEC).

In general, USAID civil society partners have been key players in the area of political reform. Indeed, it could be asked, what could PC have accomplished without the funding it received? Although a full answer to this question is impossible, it is very likely that without such funding PC would not have been able to conduct a comprehensive electoral observation program or the quick counts. The fact is that the level of funding needed for these activities is unavailable locally to civil society organizations.

To date, PC is the leader among civil society organizations in the electoral reform process. It has developed the technical capabilities and political credibility to participate in national discussions, negotiate with reluctant electoral authorities and political party representatives, and monitor elections. As a result, PC has gained much legitimacy as an advocacy group in the political arena. PC's work in the area of constitutional reform began in 1998 when it participated in the coalition for an independent judiciary, and in 2000, PC more formally incorporated constitutional reform as an area of work. In March 2001, PC was one of the organizations with representation in the Constitutional Reform Commission appointed by President Hipólito Mejía to make recommendations to the President as to how and when to modify the Dominican Constitution.

2. Participation and Representation

Over the past few years, there has been an intense debate in the Dominican Republic about how representative existing civil society organizations are of Dominican society. The debate has intensified as civil society organizations (including NGOs, civic organizations like PC, and think tanks like FINJUS) have become more outspoken in political debates and more active in the political process. Both political party leaders and some public opinion makers have indicated that those organizations are elite-based and elite-run, and do not represent large or grassroots constituencies.

The fact is that with the exception of business associations, no civil society organization in the Dominican Republic is large enough to be able to claim the representation of an important segment of Dominican society. USAID civil society partners are not different; they do not represent Dominican society broadly speaking. USAID partners are part of an elite network of social organizations (including some NGOs, universities, think tanks, and business associations) whose leaders have the social standing and political power to negotiate political reforms with political parties and government authorities. This is a loose network of organizations that at times of crisis tends to join together to preserve democratic reforms or promote pending reforms.

Both the PID and PC are part of this elite network, yet they have developed a strong relationship with some grassroots organizations. The PID has done it because it provides funding to some of them, and PC because, in mobilizing the population to recruit electoral observers, it has relied on many grassroots organizations nationwide. Therefore, in spite of their elite position, USAID partners have important links to grassroots Dominican organizations.

Business and labor have been dealing with the public sector and political parties for several decades. Larger, service-oriented NGOs have dealt with the public sector for quite some time as well. Newer NGOs, neighborhood organizations, and civic groups are the newcomers in Dominican politics. In spite of their heterogeneous goals, they have come together in recent years to demand democratic reforms. This has been in part facilitated by USAID funding to many of these organizations through the PID or the SCS project.

The first major acknowledgement on the part of government of the existence of these organizations came in early 1998 when the government of President Leonel Fernández called for a "National Dialogue." In several meetings throughout the country and a general assembly

gathered in Santo Domingo in March 1998, President Fernández and his cabinet sat with hundreds of civil society representatives to discuss a reform agenda. The experience was new in Dominican politics and generated controversy over the intentions of the government. Was the purpose to co-opt civil society organizations or to truly listen and respond to their demands? In the end, the main complaint was not that the government had co-opted social organizations, but that the government did not deliver in line with the demands discussed and approved at the “National Dialogue.”

More recently, under the Mejía administration, new commissions have been formed that incorporate representatives from civil society organizations: Decree 407-01 creates the *Consejo Nacional de Seguimiento de Asociaciones sin Fines de Lucro*, with representatives from NGOs and the government. The purpose of this Council is to address issues regarding the allocations of public funds to NGOs and address issues related to the formulation and implementation of social policies. The Council has not been very active since its creation, but the step to create it was taken. President Mejía also appointed a Commission for Constitutional Reform in March 2001 with representatives from civil society to make recommendations on how to modify the Dominican Constitution. PC was represented on this commission.

The relationship between civil society organizations and political parties has been for the most part tense and difficult. Part of the ideology that guides activists in civil society is that political parties are corrupt and incapable of resolving the country’s problems. As a result, there is a sort of anti-party orientation within civil society organizations. On the other hand, political parties feel that civil society is invading their territory and questioning their authority, that civil society organizations do not represent important segments of Dominican society, and that the leadership of civil society organizations is composed of individuals who want political power without participating in party politics. In recent days, the anti-civil society discourse among politicians, now led by President Mejía, has intensified as the coalition for an independent judicial system questioned the procedures followed to appoint three new supreme court judges.

Over the last few years, the Electoral Board has taken PC into account in its activities and planning. The process that led to achievement of this status was difficult. In 1996, the Electoral Board allowed only a small number of electoral observers (about 500) to be assigned to polling stations. Yet, by 2000, the number of electoral observers allowed was around 10,000. In 2000, PC also worked in pre-electoral activities with the approval of the Electoral Board, as was the case with the national identity card verification process.

The programs funded by USAID have certainly contributed to strengthening the capacity of institutions of Dominican civil society to plan and execute actions. The role of civil society organizations in election monitoring is the stellar example. Civil society organizations are now decisive actors in national politics. PC, in particular, has a high profile in political debates and is frequently seen as the “symbol” of civil society. PC capacity to continue in the future with a strong reform agenda will in part depend on its financial sustainability and on its ability to clearly define its goals and role as a civil society organization. Currently, the relationship between civil society organizations and the government, as well as with political parties, is becoming more complex. In order to remain decisive actors in national political life, civil society

organizations must learn to engage with key actors in political society from a position of strength and independence.

USAID-funded programs have incorporated a sizable number of women. In the case of PC, among electoral observers in 2000, 49 percent were women. At the leadership level, PC has also included women, and the current General Coordinator is a woman.

3. Impact

The most significant work of PC has been in terms of changing electoral practices. Very well organized electoral observation helped to change significantly a history of disputed elections. Since 1996, elections in the Dominican Republic have been fair and perceived as legitimate by the parties involved, including many Dominican citizens. PC observers themselves cast a vote of confidence in the system, indicating by a majority of 88 percent in the assessment survey that they felt confident in the electoral results. PC has also created a precedent by being the first and most important civic organization in the Dominican Republic working in the area of political reform. PC's work in the electoral arena also led to changes in some electoral rules, such as allowing the presence of national electoral observers at the polling stations. There was no experience with this kind of citizen participation in the Dominican Republic prior to PC's work.

Since 1994, it has been more difficult for the government to make important political decisions, particularly those relevant to democratic governance, without taking into account the views of civil society organizations. This was clear in the appointment of electoral judges in late 1994 and supreme court judges in 1997, although CSOs were basically frozen out of the selection of supreme court judges just recently in September 2001. Civil society organizations have also been active in the passing of legislation protective of women's rights, such as Law 24-97 against intra-family violence and the quota for women candidates, both approved in 1997. In general, civil society organizations are likely to express their views whenever issues of general interest are discussed in the country. One of the most outspoken organizations is undoubtedly PC.

The increasing presence of civil society groups in Dominican society has changed the political landscape. In spite of the tensions between government and civil society groups and between political parties and civil society groups, it has become increasingly more difficult for the government or political parties to make important political decisions without taking into account the views of civil society organizations, at least the views of those organizations with more political might, as in the case of PC.

D. Conclusions, Lessons Learned, and Recommendations

The Strategic Framework. Three operational characteristics significantly strengthened the engagement of Dominican civil society organizations like PC in the design and management of USAID project activities: (1) the *medio paso atrás* (one step behind) approach adopted initially with the PID program and implemented subsequently with PC, which deferred decisions on key programmatic issues to civil society representatives, with USAID officers playing a more limited

role; (2) long-term funding—the PID was funded for 10 years and PC for five years on a renewable basis; and (3) flexibility and the ability to innovate as new issues emerged.

Successful Civil Society Program. The USAID Mission’s civil society strategy has been quite successful to date. There was adequate engagement of the middle- and upper-middle-class opinion makers participating in the reform agenda, which produced a significant momentum for reform and an evolving reform consensus. PC’s successful work in the electoral arena serves as an illustration. However it is important to recognize that while elements of Dominican civil society have been successfully engaged in reform agendas, the process and stage of development is far from irreversible. Some of the key elements of the success of the civil society reform activism to date have been and will continue to be dependent on collaboration, inclusive representation and participation, and technical capabilities

Collaboration. The approach within civil society and with USAID has been highly collaborative and marked by ownership of key opinion makers. This approach has not been built on “good will” alone, but on a process of defining operations and management approaches that structure the relations within this group on the basis of professionalism and thoughtful and constructive activism. This style of collaboration began with the PID and continued with other partners like PC.

Representation and Participation. USAID has carefully ensured representation and broad participation of key elements of Dominican opinion makers. Membership is purposeful and includes representatives from various social groups, including the media, business, labor, professionals, neighborhood leaders, and religious leaders. This group of key opinion makers has helped to communicate the purpose of the political reform, guide the direction and content of reform, and deflect criticisms from other interests. The continuation of an effective civil society program requires such participation and representation.

Technical Capability. PC relies on trained professional staff for its operations. It has demonstrated its ability to recruit thousands of electoral observers in three consecutive elections (1996, 1998, and 2000) and to produce quick counts of high accuracy and reliability. This technical capability has allowed PC to secure a nonpartisan position in Dominican politics that should be preserved. Yet, not all participation in politics can be secured by technical success. This poses a major political challenge for Dominican civil society organizations, particularly as other civil society groups and/or political parties challenge their legitimacy as political reform advocates.

Civil Society and Political Reform. The reliance on civil society to sustain a political reform program is in fact a double-edged sword. As the political reform program evolves, the level and type of engagement of civil society organizations with the government and political parties change. Dominican politics and civil society are currently at a crossroads. Civil society organizations like PC can show important accomplishments in their political advocacy strategy. Yet, there seems to be an emerging assault by the government and the ruling party on civil society. Empowered by its control of the executive, the legislative and the municipal branches of government, the PRD has initiated an offensive against civil society’s political advocacy.

Meanwhile, many social organizations and coalitions have been weakened either by the government's co-opting strategies or by internal conflicts. This may create a vacuum of power in the near future that could further strengthen the current anti-civil society attitude of the ruling party. In turn, the weakening of civil society would constitute a major blow to the long and difficult, yet somewhat successful, attempts to promote democracy.

Contesting the Legitimacy of Civil Society. In the last few years, political leaders have recognized the constructive role of civil society and its contribution to political reform. Indeed, the political landscape has changed significantly as a result of civil society engagement in political reform and civil society organizations are now more frequently consulted or taken into account. Yet, civil society organizations are also frequently viewed as a significant threat to the established interests of political parties and government officials. These challenges take the form of claims against civil society organizations, such as their limited representation and, therefore, questionable legitimacy in political reform and advocacy.

Elites and Mass-Based Organization. The roles played by emerging elites and key opinion leaders within civil society have been very successful and the strategy of engagement of this group has been equally successful. Elite and middle-class professional engagement will continue to be important to focus attention and definition of the roles of civil society and their relationships to the state and political parties. Also, the emerging elite groups and their involvement will be essential to mediating changes to the established political decision-making apparatus and influencing the character of discussions and debate. Care must be exercised to maintain the linkages within this group and their access to key decision-makers and their special access to the state and political parties. However, as the strategy for political democratization evolves, the emerging elite and middle-class professional consensus that has been a major factor in the success of civil society organizations to date needs to be adjusted and recognize the appropriate claims for broader representation from mass-based civil society.

Social Base. Initially, civil society had an advantage in its relationships with government and political parties since many citizens saw politicians and government officials as corrupt and inept. However, at this time, the threat facing civil society identified above (contesting its legitimacy) is likely to increase as politicians undergo scrutiny by civil society. A preventive measure would be to strengthen civil society representation with a broader social base. In order to do this, civil society organizations like PC may have to develop broader and more inclusive mechanisms for participation and representation. In this case, critical issues of association and organization will develop as a result of the need to establish a broader and more representative base. Yet, these critical issues must be addressed because Dominican civil society is not at a stage of development to permit it to withstand significant claims against its legitimacy or representation. Indeed, it is frequently the case that civil society organizations do not have a broad social base. As indicated before, in spite of its outstanding capacity to attract volunteers, PC remains a very small organization with a highly concentrated leadership.

Civil Society Expectations. As civil society expands, there will be explosions of interests and expectations for improvement in the quality of life of the majority population and more participation. Unfortunately, many of the expectations and interests will not be met even under

the most optimistic scenarios. Indeed, as mass-based civil society extends its organization and engagement, unmet expectations and frustration will occur. Civil society organizations could be at the forefront in the representation of demands, which will be directed at the state and political parties. In order to address these concerns and rising expectations, civil society will have to engage in systematic analysis and advocacy for representative changes and policies directed toward improving the lives of the majority population. It will also be essential to anticipate the possibility of destabilization and the need to provide training and technical support for alternative dispute resolution. In the case of political advocacy groups like PC, carefully choosing the priority issues is essential to make their work relevant to large segments of Dominican society.

Decision-Making and Political Participation. Civil society will have to be especially vigilant about counterclaims from government and political parties about their own preeminent roles and responsibilities in setting political reform and monitoring politicians and government officials. This is critical in the Dominican Republic given the highly personalized and autocratic leadership styles that have prevailed in the past. In order to encourage and strengthen the full engagement of civil society, multidimensional government-civil society-political party programs should be developed. However, the nature of the roles of government and civil society should not evolve into the one-sided dialogue that has characterized much of the interaction between civil society and public-sector organizations in the past. The engagement in direct policy analysis and dialogue with the government and political parties will become even more important in the future and should stress linkages with community and the established technical skills of NGOs. Unless civil society fills the void in analysis and advocacy created by the patronage-based programs of government and political parties, the politics of the past could easily remain or return. Program partnership will be required that is based on the engagement of civil society in policy and advocacy in dialogue with government and political parties over economic and political reforms. Support for defining the terms of the interaction and venues for dialogue will be essential.

Managerial and Financial Capabilities. A main challenge of many civil society organizations in the Dominican Republic is their limited managerial and financial capabilities. Private local funding is limited and public funding is highly politicized. As a result, organizations that wish to establish political independence from local groups tend to rely on international funding for their programs. PC is currently in this situation. Yet international funding is ephemeral and, in order to remain active and secure in the long run, PC must improve its financial capabilities and autonomy from any specific source of funding. As is the case with developing a broad social base of support, attaining financial security and autonomy constitutes a major organizational challenge.

The Mission's Resources for Civil Society Support. Considering the challenges that are readily apparent from co-optation by government, competition with political parties, the need for integration, and the development of working partnerships within civil society, significant technical support is necessary to identify, define, and implement organizational and management systems to support reforms. Support is needed almost across the board for organizational and operational models to develop and sustain the dialogue within the civil society and with the government and political parties that will strengthen and organize the weight of civil society

behind policy changes and steady progress of political reforms. The significant lesson learned from earlier periods remains valid: Political parties and government alone are unlikely to support policy changes and political reforms that detract from their own interests and their established patronage agendas.

VII. FUNDACION INSTITUCIONALIDAD Y JUSTICIA (FINJUS)

A. Background

The USAID/Dominican Republic 1997–2002 Strategic Plan reflected the need to sustain the momentum of democratic change following the 1996 free and transparent election, to promote participatory reform—including that of the critical justice sector—and to address long-neglected social sector and poverty issues. Strategic Objective No. 3 (“A more participatory, representative and better functioning democracy achieved”) had two intermediate results (IR): IR3.2 Strengthen the Rule of Law and Respect of Human Rights, and IR3.3, Enhance Anti-Corruption and Public Administration Systems.

Both IRs proposed to work with the government to achieve major reforms and to maintain strong support for civil society. However, due to financial and personnel constraints, USAID decided to work only in a few areas of potential highest impact on the democratic consolidation process. In accordance with these IRs, a Grant Agreement was signed with the Dominican Government (USAID Project No. 517-0272) in September 1997 to develop a “Strengthening the Rule of Law and Respect for Human Rights” project to be funded by a total of \$14,500,000—a USAID contribution of \$10,800,000 combined with a local contribution of \$3,700,000 (cash and in-kind contributions). In the Grant Agreement, the main objective was to strengthen the rule of law and respect for human rights; within this objective, broader participation of civil society was seen as an important tool to achieve Rule of Law (ROL) results of a more adequate legislative framework for justice reform and more effective monitoring and oversight of government justice reform and anticorruption efforts.

To implement the Rule of Law Grant, the Mission employed two of the available Justice indefinite quantity contracts (IQCs). The contract with the National Center for State Courts (NCSC) was aimed primarily at executing a court administration program aimed at increasing justice efficiency, and the contract with Chemonics was to strengthen the Public Defense and respect of human rights. The civil society activities of the program did not have a traditional implementation mechanism. There was no grant or cooperative agreement with a Dominican organization to carry out a defined program to enhance civil society participation in justice reform. USAID used the Justice IQCs or specific purchase orders.

Moreover, there was not a specific defined ROL civil society long-term strategy with identified objectives, results, activities, schedules, indicators, and resources. Specific ROL civil society activities were mainly carried out by already successful and credible civil society organizations when their presence and effort was judged likely to build a correlation of forces able to achieve a specific ROL result. In most cases, USAID took advantage of windows of opportunity and supported tactical activities that generally stand alone. Due to this approach, a systematic follow-up of funded activities rarely took place. This approach also made it difficult to identify clearly those results primarily attributable to USAID support, and to measure their level of impact, particularly as there were no previously defined indicators or benchmarks for either impact or performance.

FINJUS became the primary USAID partner in implementing civil society activities for justice reform. FINJUS is an NGO that was created by members of the Dominican private sector. Since 1995, it has received USAID funding for specific activities. USAID also has supported, to a lesser degree, PC and Acción Contra la Corrupción (ACC) ROL initiatives.

USAID and its partners had differing recollections of the chronology and nature of the ROL-related civil society activities financed with Mission funds. There was no single program document or set of documents to facilitate following the trail. Compounding the problem was the fact that there also had been a significant turnover in FINJUS personnel since 2000, and many new high-level officials were not present at the many discussions between USAID and FINJUS during the previous years. Nevertheless, an effort was made to interview the most knowledgeable partners with whom USAID has worked since 1996. In addition, a search of all purchase orders and other financing documentation was necessary. FINJUS, PC, and ACC were requested to produce a complete list of activities carried out by them with USAID support. Specifically, these NGOs, and other USAID-funded ROL programs such as the Proyecto de Modernización de Tribunes (PMT) and the Proyecto Fortalecimiento del Estado de Derecho (PFED), were asked to make a list of activities, indicating their genesis, nature, and duration. They also provided information on what they believe had been achieved and the level of success, as well as the amount of funds spent. This exercise made it possible to identify the USAID-funded activities.

B. Principal Findings

- Civil society was seen as an important element in promoting and monitoring judicial reform.
- The ROL civil society activities were aimed at supporting the achievement of the general objectives of the USAID/Government of Dominican Republic Bilateral Agreement and USAID ROL Program results framework, but there was not a specific ROL civil society strategy under which activities were carried out. Besides, the fact that USAID did not use a conventional procurement mechanism (i.e., neither a grant nor a cooperative agreement) made it difficult to identify the activities primarily attributable to USAID support and to measure their level of impact.
- Civil society ROL initiatives were mostly successful, but their impact was often limited by their diffuse and sporadic nature, with the exception of those focused on criminal procedure reform.
- There is a perception that the impact of judicial reform to date only serves the elite and that the scope of the reform is decided by a very few.
- There is also a perception that USAID always works with the same ROL civil society organizations and that these organizations are elite (small clubs with limited access)
- FINJUS is perceived as a think tank, not representative, but with strong credibility in the political and legal communities. Nevertheless FINJUS is viewed as supportive of the democratic reform process.
- No women's groups are actively involved in the ROL civil society activities. Nevertheless, some activities focused on or benefited women. The Public Defense Program at FINJUS, for example, provided legal counsel to **several women** and some

seminars focused on specific women's issues such as domestic violence and the implementation of the Law 24-97.

- The absence of a lead NGO in the anticorruption arena is a serious handicap in the fight against corruption. In this area, FINJUS, PC, ADAE, ANJE, and others want to follow but not take the lead.
- USAID funding is perceived as very positive. It has allowed FINJUS to have a more active role in justice reform and has balanced the organization's agenda, which otherwise would have concentrated on defense of private-sector interests.

C. Analysis

1. Efforts to Make Justice a Priority in the Country's Political Agenda

In the early 1990s, the Dominican system of justice administration had seriously deteriorated. Corruption was endemic. The political parties had a strong influence in justice decisions and a Supreme Court of aging justices was little more than a puppet of the Executive Branch. In 1996, FINJUS, with IDB financial support, produced an assessment of the justice sector²¹ that was widely debated in a National Forum in September 1996. The newly elected President, Leonel Fernández, gave the opening speech at the Forum and committed himself and his government to fulfilling the electoral campaign promises to improve justice, commitments that were strongly pressed by civil society groups, mainly FINJUS, National Council for Private Enterprise (CONEP), and ANJE. The Forum produced a list of recommendations that were presented to the President and his newly appointed Commissioner to Support Judicial Reform.

To maintain the momentum and pressure for justice reform, the new Commissioner formed a Commission to Reform and Modernize Justice with members of the Supreme Court, the Bar Association, CONEP, and labor unions. The Commission did not achieve much as a group, due to internal disagreements. Nonetheless, from October 1996 to September 1997, it did organize a series of nine massive seminars (600 to 1000 persons each) to discuss and reach consensus on the main elements of future justice reforms. USAID financed eight of the nine seminars on the condition that civil society organizations and representatives would be invited to participate. The results and papers presented at these eight seminars appeared as publications that were also financed by USAID.

Commissioner's Seminars Financed by USAID from October 1996 to September 1997

These seminars and subsequent publications were essential to defining guidelines for future reforms, increasing community awareness of the importance of judicial reform, promoting citizen participation in the reform process, and maintaining the issue as a key item on the government's political agenda. This set of seminars was USAID's first major bilateral effort to involve civil society in the ROL Program.²²

²¹ Rivera-Cira, "Diagnóstico del sector justicia en República Dominicana y recomendaciones para la acción, FINJUS," September 1996.

²² Previous limited efforts in this area were a justice stakeholder analysis and the Public Defense program financed through ILANUD, largely with USAID regional funding.

Subject	Date	Titles of the Justice Publications
1. The Judicial Statute (Judicial Career)	Oct. 1996	“Reflexiones y recomendaciones sobre el Estatuto del Magistrado”
2. Law of the Sea	Nov. 1996	“Derecho Marítimo y del Mar”
3. Budget Autonomy of the Judiciary	Jan. 1997	“Automomía Presupuestaria del Poder Judicial”
4. Land Legislation	Feb. 1997	“Recomendaciones para la Reforma de la Ley de Tierras y otras disposiciones legales relacionadas”
5. Arbitration, Intellectual Property and Judicial Ethics	April 1997	“Arbitraje, Propiedad Intelectual y Etica Judicial”
6. Judicial Organization	May 1997	“Sugerencias para la Reforma de la Ley de Organización Judicial”
7. Criminal Procedures and Criminal Law	July 1997	“Recomendaciones para la reforma de la Codificación del Derecho Procesal y Sustantivo Penal”
8. Civil Law and Procedures Codes	Sept. 1997	“Propuestas de Reforma a los Códigos Civil y del Procedimiento Civil”

Source: Commissioner for the Reform and Modernization of Justice, 1997.

In March 2000, USAID underwrote an assessment of the justice sector and judicial reform to measure improvements and identify the remaining challenges. The analysis was published during the political campaign to pressure the political parties to keep judicial reform on their political agenda.²³

2. Public Defense Program

The Public Defense Program was implemented by FINJUS from 1995 to August 1997. USAID provided funding for it from November 1995 to October 1996 and again from April 1997 to August 1997 (17 months). The objective was to establish a public defense system to respond to the need for legal aid for low-income defendants facing criminal charges. Universidad Nacional Pedro Henrique Ureñas (UNPHU) and ILANUD started previous efforts in the early 1990s under the auspices of the Supreme Court, but the program was discontinued because of lack of funding and support from the judicial authorities.

The FINJUS ROL program was financed through a grant obtained from the PID and run through the PUCMM (1995–1996).²⁴ FINJUS could not obtain a second grant from the PID to continue the program and, as a result, managed the initiative with its own resources from November 1996 to March 1997. In April 1997, USAID gave FINJUS a direct contribution that kept the program running for an additional six months. During this period, a group of public defenders was trained and made more than 2,000 criminal judicial appeals and closed 435 cases.

There was hope that the judiciary would institutionalize the program, but it lacked the necessary political will. In addition, USAID decided to suspend the effort in late 1997. Finally, in May

²³ Rivera-Cira, Tirza, *El Sector Justicia y la Reforma Judicial en la República Dominicana*, FINJUS and PMT, Santo Domingo, March 2000.

²⁴ During this period, the program assisted 213 inmates and had 10 trained public defenders. These defenders also gave several lectures in communities promoting the service.

1998, following a USAID recommendation, the Office of the Commissioner to Support Judicial Reform (an Executive Branch agency established in 1996) and the UNPHU signed an agreement to reestablish the Public Defense System. The program was revived in July 1998 with government funding. From July 1998 to July 2000, another group of 30 defenders was trained and provided technical assistance with USAID funding. During this period the program assisted in 3,000 cases and resolved 1,700. Unfortunately, this group of defenders was almost totally replaced during the most recent change of government—mainly for political reasons, but also because of national budget cuts that reduced the Commissioner’s funds by almost half. However, USAID intervention at the highest political levels helped secure new funding to be allocated to the Commissioner’s Office to permit it to continue with the Public Defense Program.

Recently, the President of the Republic, by Decree No. 904-01, created the National Office of Public Defense in the Justice Reform Commissioner’s Office, with a main office in the National District and others in the different Judicial Departments. A new group of 50 public defenders has been selected and is working in Santo Domingo, San Francisco de Macorís, Santiago, La Vega, La Romana, and San Pedro de Macorís. USAID has provided technical assistance to make the selection as transparent as possible under the political circumstances. Nevertheless, almost all of the members of the new group belong to the governing political party. Once again, the defenders will have to organize and be trained to adequately perform their functions. In addition, they need assistance to design a case tracking system and build a network of subsidized defender services.

The repeated turnover of personnel in the Public Defense Program has limited its potential impact. The program, for example, has not been able to decrease the high percentage of prison inmates awaiting trial (82 percent). The Public Defense Program is very far from being institutionalized within the Dominican justice system. Nevertheless, efforts initiated by ILANUD in 1992 and continued by FINJUS, as well as the persistence of the Commissioner’s Office and USAID in the last five years, have made the program difficult to eliminate and have helped to create public opinion that believes in the need for a permanent public defense system.

There is currently draft legislation in Congress to establish an Institute of Public Defense. Despite the achievements of the program, and public support, the proposal still has provoked significant political opposition. Amazingly, the very idea of a publicly funded defense for the indigent still has enemies, as many politicians believe that anyone charged with a crime and jailed is a criminal who does not deserve publicly financed legal defense. Nevertheless, others recognize the need for due process and how important it is to respect the constitutional right to defense in court, and the obligation of the state to provide for it as set forth in Article 8, Section 2J of the 1994 Constitution.

3. Election of the Supreme Court and Strengthening of Judicial Independence

The 1994 constitutional reform established the National Judicial Council (NJC), whose only assigned function is to appoint the judges of the Supreme Court. The Council consists of the President of the Republic, the President of the Senate, a senator from a party other than that of the Senate President, the President of the Chamber of Deputies, a deputy from a party other than

that of the President of the Chamber of Deputies, the President of the Supreme Court, and a second member of the Supreme Court chosen by that Court.

For three years, the selection of a new Supreme Court was stalled, as the Dominican political parties could not agree on the selection of the second senator. Finally, in 1997 a second senator was chosen and the NJC was established. However, the way was still not clear, as there were strong political interests that continued to oppose an independent judiciary. Congress and the political parties resented the fact that the new Supreme Court would have the power to appoint the country's judges, a power held by Congress prior to the 1994 constitutional reform.

Eventually, the NJC was able to select the new Supreme Court judges, in what turned out to be a signal victory for civil society. The Council held more than 11 sessions before actually selecting the new judges. During the process, USAID officials met several times with civil society organizations to help define a participation strategy and to provide technical assistance.²⁵ FINJUS, PC, ADAE, and ANJE formed and led the "Coalition for an Independent Justice,"²⁶ which played a vital role in making the selection the most objective possible. The Coalition carried out a civic campaign, "Transparency: the Proposal of Civil Society," financed by local resources, to promote the presentation of candidates. A list of 252 persons was the result of proposals by several organizations. Besides the four previously mentioned organizations, CONEP, the political parties, the Bar Association, and some universities also presented candidates.

The civil society organizations exerted strong public pressure on the Council to establish objective criteria for selection and to avoid confrontation among the political parties. Civil society pressure also caused the Council to permit live televising of the meetings where the candidates were interviewed. This innovative mechanism injected unprecedented transparency into the process. Throughout, the press continuously recognized the role of the civil society in reducing the power of the political parties and strengthening democracy through wide and pluralistic participation of civic groups in a crucially important governmental decision-making process.²⁷

The civil society Coalition for an Independent Justice again played a very important role a year later, in August 1998, when Congress passed the Judicial Career Law. Despite the clear language and intent in the 1994 Constitution, the Law as passed did not respect the principle of life tenure during good behavior established by the Constitution. The law stated that the judges could be

²⁵ A Guatemalan constitutional expert, César Barrientos, was hired through a USAID purchase order to help define the conditions and requirements for the qualifications of a Supreme Court judge.

²⁶ The 15 civil society organizations that formed the Coalition were: Acción Contra la Corrupción, Alfalt Dominicana, Asociación Dominicana de Abogados Empresariales, Inc; Asociación Dominicana de Propiedad Intelectual (ADOPI); Asociación Nacional de Jóvenes Empresarios, Inc, (ANJE); Centro de Investigación para la Acción Femenina (CIPAF); Coordinadora de Mujeres del Cibao; Fundación Institucionalidad y Justicia (FINJUS); Fundación Mujer-Iglesia; Fundación pro Defensa del Derecho del Propietario, Inc.; Instituto Dominicano de Desarrollo Integral (IDDI); Juventud y Desarrollo, INC.; Movimiento Cívico Participación Ciudadana; Mujeres para el Bienestar; and Núcleo de Apoyo a la Mujer.

²⁷ See for example, Adames, Fausto Rosario, "Los partidos no quieren a la sociedad civil," *Gaceta Judicial*, Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic, 24 July–7 August 1997, p. 10.

appointed for only four years. The Coalition presented a petition of unconstitutionality before the Supreme Court, which held that the law as passed was unconstitutional. Thanks to this timely and vigorous civil society intervention, judges now appointed under the requirements of the law have life tenure.

In 2001, a reduced Coalition for an Independent Justice,²⁸ led again by FINJUS, PC and ANJE, with ADAE participation, tried to promote an objective selection process for the three vacant positions on the Supreme Court. In August 2001, the President of the Republic called the NJC to duty. Some members of the NJC wanted the Council to go beyond mere election of the three judges. They proposed to cut the life tenure of the judges²⁹ and to select a new President of the Supreme Court from members of the party in power. The Coalition again carried out a courageous campaign for “Justice without Politics.” The approximately \$180,000 campaign was mainly financed by Dominican businessmen who perceived the political threat to a major judicial reform and hard-won judicial independence. USAID backed the local initiative and contributed a modest amount of around \$12,000 to discreetly help in financing the campaign.

The public campaign was successful in exerting pressure on the political parties to keep the NJC agenda focused on the three vacancy appointments, but, in the end, they failed to prevent a politically inspired selection process. This time, despite public scrutiny, the political parties and the Supreme Court concluded a shameful deal. More than 100 candidates were dismissed arbitrarily and out of the public eye. The Reformist Party, the Revolutionary Dominican Party, and the Supreme Court each presented one candidate, who was promptly approved by the others. This arrangement confirms the perception measured in the survey conducted for the evaluation. Fully 98.9 percent of those polled considered that politicians “always” or “almost always” take advantage of public positions for their own and not the public’s benefit.

The most painful experience for the Coalition, whose members first were invited to observe the selection *in situ*, and then were uninvited a few hours before the event, was to see the President of the Supreme Court and the other Supreme Court judge—beneficiaries of the previous transparent NJC process—joining in the blatantly political game. Days earlier, the President of the Supreme Court had promised the Coalition to vote only for candidates who previously had been judges, in accordance with a Supreme Court agreement to protect the Judicial Career.

The 1997 selection of the first new Supreme Court was a sign of hope and the beginning of an important judicial reform movement. Now, four years later, the selection of the three replacement judges made clear again that judicial reform in the Dominican Republic still has many political enemies and that the political parties see judicial independence as an obstacle to their power that needs to be eliminated. The September 2001 NJC session was televised and vigorously criticized by the media and the members of the Coalition in the following days.³⁰

²⁸ In 2001, the active members of the group were 10 organizations: ANJE, ADAE, FINJUS, PC, AAJ, Alfalit, CEDAIL, Centro de Estudios Sociales Juan Montalvo, ADME, and CONEP.

²⁹ In polling on political culture among PID beneficiaries and PC observers the opinions were very divided on the issue of Supreme Court judges’ terms. 50.9 percent preferred a limited number of years; 47.3 percent had the opposite position and expressed the view that judges should be in the Supreme Court until their retirement.

³⁰ See: “*Judicatura. Decepciona elección de jueces SCJ*,” “*Coalición califica de decepcionante la selección de jueces de la SCJ. Censura actuación de Subero Isa y Castellanos*,” in *el Siglo*, September 14, 2001. “*Mejía admite*

The foregoing events, including the second public campaign to promote an open selection of members to the Supreme Court, represent some of the most widely recognized efforts to date organized by elements of civil society to enhance the Rule of Law. The activities were led and mainly financed by civil society organizations with local resources.

During the process, USAID provided support in an active but discrete way. It quietly lobbied at the highest political levels to back the efforts of the civil society coalition, and provided technical assistance when it was requested. Low-profile USAID intervention in this case proved to be effective. Promotion of judicial independence was a national issue of tremendous importance, and without the efforts of civil society judicial independence would have been totally at the mercy of the political parties. Despite the fact that the 2001 Supreme Court election results were not those hoped for by civil society, its participation did manage to turn back the planned NJC direct assault on judicial tenure, exposed the vacancy-filling scheme of the political parties, and created public opposition to their actions in the NJC.

4. Criminal Justice Reform

a. Criminal Procedure Code Reform

In 1996, the Government established five different commissions to deal with the reform of the country's main legal codes (criminal, criminal procedures, civil, civil procedures, and commercial). The Justice Reform Commissioner's office coordinated the commissions, but there was an overarching political, social, and legal consensus on the scope and importance of the reform. In accordance with the objectives of its Strategy and ROL Intermediate Result, USAID decided to promote the criminal procedures reform and to involve the civil society in the process.

Through the existing IQC with the NCSC, consultants were hired to work with FINJUS to produce a draft of a new Criminal Procedures Code, to assist in the organization of a series of seminars/workshops, and to collaborate in the drafting of analytical publications on the subject.

The publications were six bulletins, called "*Juicio al proceso*" (Judgment of the Process), that critically analyzed different aspects of the criminal procedure reform. They discussed the main problems, analyzed empirical data on criminal procedures caseloads and the cost of the current criminal procedures, and proposed solutions reached in several seminars/workshops. Regional experts, local prosecutors, judges, defense lawyers, and law school professors participated in these seminars/workshops to study the Criminal Procedures Code requirements and forge technical and social consensus on moving the Dominican mixed classic inquisitorial system towards a more fully adversarial system. The effort drew upon other regional experiences and generated debate in magazines such as *Gazeta*.

In these activities, several discussions were held on the scope of the reform, as well as to analyze the proposals prepared by FINJUS and the government. The philosophy and policy goals behind

hubo un acuerdo político en designación de jueces. Revela Balaguer pidió Romero Confesor fuera escogido." "*Justicia Independiente opina es retroceso llevar a Suprema cuadros políticos de partidos,*" "*Abogados también cuestionan,*" in *Listín Diario*, September 15, 2001, page 4 A.

both drafts have proven to be similar, and FINJUS has worked with Congress to produce a unified proposal. Currently, there are strong possibilities that the Code will be approved in Congress. This reform would impact greatly in the justice sector, seeking simplification of procedures, transparency of actions, and respect for due process guarantees.

In the criminal procedures reform, FINJUS's contribution has been vital. FINJUS brought in experts from different Latin American countries where criminal procedure code reforms have already been established. Its participation enriched the discussion of the criminal procedure reform.

b. Independence of the Public Ministry and Prosecutors' Statute

It is fundamental that a thorough criminal procedure reform focus not only on the procedures themselves, but also on the institutions that manage and implement the process. One of the most important is the Public Ministry, the agency that carries out the prosecutorial function. In the criminal process, the prosecutor determines the charge and, with the support of the police, must present the evidence against the defendant. In the Dominican Republic, the Public Ministry is part of the Attorney General's Office (*Procuraduría General de la República*). The Public Ministry is part of the Executive Branch and, thus, its personnel are subject to turnover with every change of government. The political party in power controls the institution. The prosecutors lack independence and are constantly under political pressure.

During the previous government, USAID, the Justice Reform Commissioner's Office, and FINJUS began to focus on the necessary reforms of the Public Ministry. Through the NCSC IQC, USAID invested substantial resources in technical assistance and equipment for the *Procuraduría General* and the *Fiscalía del Distrito Nacional* (Prosecutors Office for the National District). The latter covers the national capital district and deals with approximately 60 percent of the cases handled by the Public Ministry nationwide. Important reforms took place (strategic planning, reorganization of offices, specialization of prosecutors to deal with difficult or complicated cases, conciliation services, protection for battered women, etc),³¹ but unfortunately almost all of them disappeared with the change of government and the subsequent turnover in staff.

The need to reform the Public Ministry was a repeated topic of discussion in the criminal procedures reform deliberations during the previous government. The former Justice Commissioner's Office even prepared a proposal for a new law to reform the institution that was presented to former President Fernández in December 1999. However, during the electoral campaign and after the inauguration of the new government, the Public Ministry reform was put on the back burner and almost forgotten.

Toward the end of 2000, FINJUS and USAID moved to revive the issue, and USAID provided funds to FINJUS, through a purchase order, to organize a "Public Ministry Week" from November 27 to December 1, 2000. The new Attorney General and high-level Public Ministry

³¹ For more information on the former reforms, see Rivera-Cira, Tirza, "El sector justicia y la reforma judicial en República Dominicana," FINJUS and Court Modernization Project, USAID, 2000.

officials were invited to participate. The objective of the week of conferences with local and international speakers was to revive the issue and commit the new authorities to the need to reform the institution to fulfill its key role.

The effort seems to have had some effect, and, at present, the reform proposal of the former Justice Reform Commissioner's Office is under study in the Justice Committee in the lower chamber of Congress. Also, the group of law clerks serving the Attorney General is preparing another proposal. However, it seems to be more political and less ambitious than the previous one. The main issue is how to establish a group of prosecutors with functional independence.

The project of the former Justice Reform Commissioner's Office proposes a Public Ministry totally independent from the Executive Branch, with a group of prosecutors selected by open competition and who would enjoy some degree of tenure. The other proposal is to continue with a Public Ministry under the Executive Branch, appointing prosecutors for four years. They would be entitled to tenure after two consecutive appointments of four years.³²

The Public Ministry Week—implemented as part of the effort to establish a Public Ministry—was a very pointed and effectively focused activity. It was useful in reintroducing an issue of great importance to criminal reform, but the establishment of a functionally independent Public Ministry plainly lacks consensus among the political parties. The Public Ministry is still a political prize for members of the incumbent party, and with the loss of the Judiciary the political parties are reluctant to concede more politically attractive jobs to civil service status.

c. Police and Citizenship

Throughout the criminal procedures reform discussions, one of the issues of greatest concern was the police. For the average citizen, the police are the first step in the justice system. In the Dominican Republic, the National Police have been an authoritarian institution frequently linked with human rights abuses. The National Police exercise a dual function as administrative and judicial police. The latter function confers criminal investigative authority that is supposed to be exercised under the supervision of the prosecutors and the courts. There appears to be little understanding or acknowledgement by the National Police of their role as an operational auxiliary to the criminal justice process. National Police reportedly routinely ignore or refuse to obey orders or instructions issued by a prosecutor or judge. Criminal suspects frequently die in police custody or are killed rather than arrested.³³

In 1999, USAID provided resources to FINJUS to conduct two seminars on the role of the police in a democratic society. Resources also were given to Latin American College of Social Sciences (FLACSO) for a seminar on the subject. As a result of these seminars and many critical articles published in the national press as well as television and radio reports, the National Police have become more concerned with their image and are careful to report deaths of detainees as having

³² Information from focus group with the Attorney General's law clerks (*abogados ayudantes*).

³³ Muriel Perroud, "Abusos policiales, delincuencia y violencia," *El Siglo*, September 30, 1999; Socorro Monegro, "Alrededor de 170 mueren a manos de la PN en siete meses," *El Siglo*, September 12, 1999; Eduardo Jorge Prats, "Nuestra guerra sucia," *Rumbo* No. 294, September 20, [1999?], p. 24.

“died in an exchange of gunfire with the National Police.” Nevertheless, the police as an institution have not changed, and the hard-line policy of the current director of the National Police is frequently applauded by the public because of a popular perception that crime has increased.

Currently, FLACSO has a Program on Police and Citizen Perception of Security financed by the National Secretary of Interior and Police, but the National Police, though legally subordinate to this cabinet ministry, do not accept its authority and continue to act independently.

In addition, ANJE, FINJUS, and ADAE submitted a petition to the Supreme Court seeking a ruling that the police tribunals are unconstitutional. The tribunals, a special jurisdiction that tries police officials charged with crimes against civilians, including violent and nonservice-related crimes, has been strongly opposed by civil society human rights organizations because they have tended to protect violent police practices. The class action suit was submitted to the Supreme Court a year ago and it is expected the Court will decide soon if police tribunals are constitutional.

While police reform is probably the most difficult and intractable of all ROL issues, thus far USAID has provided funds only for very specific activities without a defined strategy to promote reform.

5. Popular Consultations to Prepare the Second Judicial Conference and the Next Five-Year Judicial Strategic Plan

This was an activity partially financed by USAID to support the efforts of the Judiciary to prepare the recommendations to be submitted to the Second Judicial Conference in a more participatory way. The Judiciary, through the Judicial School, asked FINJUS and PC to carry out public “consultations” in the country’s nine judicial districts. Participating in the consultations were neighborhood groups, grassroots organizations, NGOs, women’s groups, religious groups, business associations, and provincial and municipal authorities and judges. The consultations took nine weeks (October 19 to mid-December 2000) to complete, and each consultation was three days in duration. On the first day PC met with the grassroots organizations of each district; on the second day FINJUS convoked the business associations and the municipal and provincial authorities; and on the third day, judges were given the proposals presented during the prior two days and responded with their own proposals and comments. There were three main topics of discussion:

- Mission Vision and Values of the Judiciary;
- Ethics of the Judiciary; and
- Needs of the Judiciary.

The different proposals were organized and classified around the three topics of discussion in various groups. February 2, 2001, the day of the Second Judicial Conference, the Judiciary invited as observers representatives of the civil society groups that participated in the

consultation process. During this day, judges from all over the country discussed and voted on the proposals to define the Judicial Strategic Plan for the next five years.

One interesting set of proposals on Needs of the Judiciary concerned the need to establish a permanent dialogue between the judiciary and civil society to define judicial reform, and the judiciary's obligation to inform the public about judicial statistics, case load management, evaluation of judges, and the judicial budget. The best ways to provide such information were thought to be the mass media, workshops for judges and citizens, and the establishment of suggestion boxes in the courts.

There is no doubt that the consultation mechanism used to prepare the Second Judicial Conference was innovative and initiated a process of dialogue between the Judiciary and civil society. Nevertheless, there is no clear idea about the proper follow-up mechanisms to channel civil society participation in judicial planning. The Director of the Judicial School believes the process was fascinating and highly participatory, but insists that the follow-up on the consultations is not the primary responsibility of the School. The Director of Public Policies and Liaison with Civil Society considers that the way that the consultation process was organized and driven did not really allow the public to express its opinions on the Judiciary.³⁴ In the view of PC, the process created a participatory movement that has formed "*Comités Vigilantes de la Justicia*" in the nine Judicial Districts, but these committees do not have a clear notion of exactly what they can do and how they can do it.

In this case, USAID supported the Judiciary's initiative through technical assistance and partial funding for the consultation process. But once again, it appears that the next steps are not defined, and there is as yet no clear strategy for civil society participation in judicial planning or management. PC should clearly define the real possibilities of participation of the *Comités Vigilantes de la Justicia* before investing in their establishment.

6. Popular Legal Education

USAID, through its Cooperative Agreement with PC, has provided resources to carry out workshops and produce materials designed to make the justice system more accessible to the Dominican people. From March through July 1999, 14 workshops (*Talleres de Reforma Judicial*), sponsored by the Coalition for Independent Justice (PC, Centro Juan Montalvo, Alfalit, ADAE, and FINJUS), were carried out to discuss the future of the Judiciary. The participants were members of community and grassroots organizations. In the workshops, the participants discussed the role of the Judiciary, individual constitutional rights and guarantees, the mechanisms to appoint and grant tenure to judges, and the penitentiary system.

From March to July 2001, PC carried out 30 workshops (*Talleres Básicos de Justicia*) to inform 1,112 participants from different regions about legal principles and basic concepts on how the justice system functions. During these workshops a general feeling emerged that:

³⁴ Interviews by the consultant, August 2001.

- There is no justice;
- “Justice” only punishes the poor;
- There is extensive corruption in the system of administration of justice;
- The public is skeptical about the judicial reform; and
- The situation will only change to grant more benefits to those with economic or political power.³⁵

Popular education efforts can be very diffuse and not produce much impact unless they are organized around concrete issues and provide education or information directly useful for the population. PC has been very successful in training election observers precisely because it has provided very targeted and specific information. The impact of these ROL workshops is difficult to measure. It is likely that there are small groups in the provinces interested and motivated, but the objective is not clear. Popular legal education by itself cannot resolve the problem of access unless it is accompanied by some access mechanisms such as the establishment of alternative dispute resolution programs

The PC Justice Program also includes, among other things:

- A public campaign about access to justice targeted to the poor (brochures and videos);
- Training of 600 people in alternative dispute resolutions; and
- Promotion for the creation of 30 “*comités vigilantes de la justicia*” in all of the country’s provinces.

USAID’s current ROL Program with PC seems both very ambitious and not very well defined. PC does not seem to have a very clear idea about its goals with the public campaign. Also there is no a definition of the role to be played by the “*Comites de Vigilantes de la Justicia*.” PC has limited resources to establish and monitor 30 of these committees, located all over the country. Moreover, it does not have a clear notion about what to do after it trains 600 people in alternative dispute resolution. It would be advisable for PC to focus on very limited activities that combine popular education, training and a pilot project in a specific community before expanding an activity or program countrywide.

7. Anticorruption Efforts

An additional area of the USAID/ROL program was the Good Governance/Anti-Corruption component. In the Fernández Administration (1996–2000), the Departments for the Prevention of Corruption and of the Controller were established in the Attorney’s General Office, and the Controller General’s auditing systems were updated. Nevertheless, there was no political will to file criminal charges of corruption against public officials. During the current administration, the Department for the Prevention of Corruption has become more proactive. Some cases have been investigated and some public officials from the former government have been prosecuted. It has also called former President Fernández and some of his alleged collaborators to respond to

³⁵ Adan Bernardo, “*Informe sobre actividades educativas del Programa de Justicia*,” August 2001. Document prepared for Tirza Rivera.

corruption charges, but the debate has ended in a political fight between the PRD and the PLD. There is still no clear or consistent political will either to investigate or to prosecute public officials. In the survey, a majority of PID beneficiaries and the PC electoral observers (60.3 percent) believed that accusations and criminal charges of corruption are mainly motivated by political interests. Only 31 percent thought that serious efforts are made to combat corruption. In this area, there have been only a few efforts made by USAID to provide technical assistance in strategic planning to the Department for the Prevention of Corruption in order to focus on and attack the long history of corruption within the government, and to develop a National Anticorruption Plan.

USAID efforts to support civil society organizations in fighting corruption have also been limited and modest due to a lack of clear objectives by civil society on the issue. Nevertheless, this is an area of major concern for several groups. FINJUS, PC, ACC, and the IDB/INTEC Program for the Strengthening of Civil Society in Dominican Republic consider corruption as one of the main problems that impede democracy and development. In the survey, the overwhelming majority of respondents (94.3 percent) identified government corruption as “serious” or “very serious.” They considered government officials, police, and the leaders of the political parties as the most corrupt, but felt that corruption exists in many other groups. It is interesting that the perception about judges and prosecutors was the second most favorable.

Chart 7.1 Corruption in the Dominican Republic (PC Polling)	
Group	% perception of “very” and “somewhat” corrupt
Government officials	78.3%
Policemen	75.8%
Political party leaders	73.5%
Congresspersons	63.8%
Businessmen	47.9%
Prosecutors	48.4%
Judges	47.2%
NGO leaders and directors	30.8%
Judges of the Electoral Tribunal	30.1%
Leaders of community organizations	23.7%

Source: PC Polling on Political Culture, September 2001.

Action against Corruption was formed in 1997. A well-known businessman and group of Dominicans led this NGO. In March 1999, USAID provided approximately \$40,500 for the organization of a national week on “Corruption and its Negative Effects on Society,” with the participation of international speakers. Transparency International also co-sponsored the activity. In 2000, USAID paid three months’ salary of the ACC Executive Director, and a National Conference on Anti-Corruption was organized jointly by ACC, the Department for the Prevention of Corruption at the Attorney General’s Office, and the Controller General’s Office. During this conference the presidential candidates presented their ideas on fighting corruption.

Nevertheless, after these activities ACC could not obtain financial resources for its projects and finally dissolved. The organization lacked leadership and the business community was very

reluctant to monitor or denounce cases of corruption. This is the case because members of the private sector need the cooperation of government officials to run their businesses. In addition, they lack trust in the Public Ministry as an instrument to investigate and prosecute corrupt government officials. Others believe that corruption is also endemic in the business community and that nobody or very few are untainted by it. For these reasons, USAID chose not to invest scarce funds in the organization, and did not approve its requests for more substantial funding.

In 1999, PC denounced a case of misuse of public funds by the President of the National Congress. The Public Ministry did not pursue the case and PC was accused of political persecution. As a result of this experience, the organization decided to follow another line of action. In 2000, PC signed an agreement with the Department for the Prevention of Corruption to participate in developing the National Anticorruption Plan. A massive seminar with more than 200 organizations was held to define the outline of the plan. A Consultative Commission has been formed, including PC, *Asociación de Jóvenes por la Paz* (ASOJOP), and the Protestant churches as represented by the Anglican Church. The civil society groups have suggested establishment of Social Auditing Commissions formed by citizens from local communities to supervise public works. Nevertheless, the Executive Branch has not yet accepted the proposal.

FINJUS also has floated some anticorruption proposals. Currently, the organization is requesting USAID funding to promote and lobby for a group of new laws that promote transparency in the use of public funds and facilitate corruption prosecution. These laws are:

- Modifications to the National Budget Law;
- Law against Illicit Enrichment;
- Law for the Adjudication of Public Works;
- Public Purchases Law; and
- Statute for the Public Ministry.

FINJUS again has defined its role as promoter for a new legislative package, but is reluctant to denounce individual cases of corruption.

These activities are still incipient and not well developed. Civil society groups are seeking to do something to combat corruption but there is no clear idea about how to proceed. It seems that there is no real political will in either the public or private sector to combat corruption. USAID has contracted consulting services to help it determine how to deal with the issue, taking into account its past experiences with government and civil society.

8. Others

During the past three years, USAID, through the PMT and the PFED, financed (approximately \$100,000) a wide spectrum of activities aimed at linking the program with the community or supporting selected civil society activities. The international consultants who came through the two projects participated in TV programs and lectures with civil society organizations. Sponsored activities included:

- Study tour to Miami with Judicial and civil society representatives on Domestic Violence.
- Study tour of law school deans to Washington to see human rights programs. (After this trip, the Universidad Autónoma de Santo Domingo—UASD—established a course on Human Rights.)
- Participation of law students in Inter-American Contest on Human Rights.
- Seminar with the UASD on violence and citizen security.
- Partial financial support for publication in four major newspapers (*Listin, Siglo, Hoy, Caribe*) of the Law School Deans' Declaration on Judicial Independence.
- Co-financing with the World Bank, the International Law Institute, the Organization of American States, and the United States Information Services of several seminars on banking (*secreto bancario, lavado de dinero, seguridad bancaria, etc.*).

9. Activities Characteristics

It can clearly be said that successful ROL-related civil society activities tend to reduce the likelihood that reforms will not be carried through and, to the extent that they promote transparency, may deter political interference and corruption. In general, the USAID-funded civil society activities described in the previous section were successful, but their impact was often reduced by their limited and sporadic nature. With some exceptions, they were more often tactical and isolated activities rather than programs, and the lack of a clear definition of objectives and indicators at their inception has made their impact often difficult to measure. For example, with the activity receiving the greatest USAID support, criminal justice reform, what was the expected result for the Criminal Procedure Code: the production of a civil society proposal, the approval of the new Code or its implementation? What was the expected result and what was the success indicator for the police reform activities: to stop police abuses, to reform the organization, to enact new legislation, and/or to create public support for the reform?

In virtually all cases the activities responded to a particular circumstance and were not part of a systematic civil society ROL overarching strategy. There was usually no plan to continue advocating for the proposal generated in the seminars, workshops, campaigns, etc. In many cases, the activities were based on a felt need to respond to urgent situations. There is no doubt that there was a desire by USAID and its partners, mainly FINJUS, to take advantage of windows of opportunity, and many of the actions taken in these situations produced important results. USAID/ROL officers asserted that they made tactical decisions to let certain advocacy themes drop temporarily from public attention, and that these decisions were based on changing priorities, judging the tactical moment, and adjusting advocacy tools to advance the programs. Whether or not the intermittent character of most civil society ROL activities was due to a conscious plan, the lack of continuity and clarity of purpose for USAID counterparts or stakeholders made evaluation of impacts difficult.

In every impact analysis it is important to measure the amount of resources USAID invested in its programs. In the case of ROL civil society activities, financial support has usually been relatively very limited. In the first Supreme Court election, and the defense of judicial

independence and tenure, USAID invested relatively modest amounts of funds. The main support came from local Dominican resources, and success was the result of the commitment and leadership of FINJUS, PC, and ANJE.

In the criminal procedure reform (around \$600,000),³⁶ the impact has been significant, but there is still a long way to go. Half of the work has been completed, but approval of the draft legislation is still pending in the Congress. The single bill version now awaits floor debate in the Senate and it is expected that after Senate approval it will be submitted to the lower house, the Chamber of Deputies, where the chamber president has said she will promote its approval by the end of December. However, USAID is not optimistic it will be debated until early next year.

Moreover, the eventual implementation of the Code would be another significant programmatic challenge. Implementation of new criminal procedures codes in Latin America has been very difficult. Judiciaries usually do not have the resources to hire new personnel, remodel physical structures, and train existing personnel on the new process. Moreover, lawyers in many cases become antireform forces that boycott the new procedures and do not know how to apply them. Without systematic education, it is difficult to change an inquisitorial system to a more fully adversarial system.

The activity in favor of a functionally independent Public Ministry (supported with \$23,000) follows a similar pattern. A proposal has been presented to Congress, but it seems to have fewer possibilities for approval than the draft Criminal Procedures Code. An independent Public Ministry will seriously affect political parties' interests. Currently, the Public Ministry, as part of the Attorney General's Office, is at the mercy of the political power in government. The prosecutors are easily removed and appointed after each election. And prosecutorial decisions are frequently affected by political motivations. Therefore, the establishment of a functionally independent Public Ministry plainly lacks consensus among the political parties. The Public Ministry is still a political prize for members of the incumbent party and, with the loss of the Judiciary, the political parties are reluctant to concede more politically attractive jobs to civil service status.

The FINJUS seminars and newspaper articles on police reform can be credited with causing a decrease in the number of deaths reported by the police as result of gunfire exchanges between suspected criminals and the National Police. But the National Police remain very authoritarian and there seems to be little space for further change. Nevertheless, a congressional commission recently discarded a "non-reform" police reform bill developed by the military and police members of the Secretariat for Interior and Police and sponsored by President Mejia. There has been a vigorous debate on the topic and it is among the top priorities of the legislative agenda. Currently, USAID-funded technical assistance has collaborated in the analysis and drafting a more reform-oriented alternative version, and a new bill has been submitted to the Chamber of Deputies for consideration.

³⁶ It included several seminars/workshops, hiring of national and international consultants, and production of publications, as previously mentioned.

The investment in the Public Defense System (\$211,000) has made modest improvements in the availability of legal representation for the poor. Over 2,600 cases handled on behalf of the poor in 1999 and more than 6,000 cases in the year 2000 represent some hope in a country with a prison population of around 18,000. Moreover, recently, six more public defense offices have been opened,³⁷ and an important professional and citizen constituency has been created around the need for institutionalization of the program.

The workshops and consultations at the community level about justice reform have initiated an important and unprecedented dialogue between justice officials and their communities, but there is not yet a clear strategy about how to proceed further. In relation to the legal education brochures, there is no way to measure whom they have reached and how useful they may have been.

The impact of the anticorruption efforts is probably the most ambiguous. There seems to be less citizen tolerance for corruption and impunity, but there is no clear political will or disposition on the part of the private sector to take effective measures to sanction corruption. There seems to be consensus on the need to stress prevention, and the need for legislation that increases transparency and facilitates the prosecution of corrupt officials, but there is no strong volition actually to prosecute corrupt officials or private citizens. There are more civil society groups interested in the subject, but there is no defined strategy or approach.

The evaluators and USAID/DR estimate that the Mission has spent more than \$1,200,000 on civil society ROL activities, of the \$14,000,000 total invested in ROL programs since 1995. This means that less than 10 percent was spent in ROL civil society activities designed to help insulate important reforms from political interference.

The recent change of governments has shown once again that many of the advances achieved during one administration can be easily erased by a change of authorities and personnel. For example, many of the improvements (strategic planning, reorganization of offices, conciliation services, protection for battered women, etc.) that were promoted by USAID in the *Fiscalía del Distrito Nacional* have almost disappeared. And the recent irregular election of three members of the Supreme Court shows that political parties will continue to try to erode the political independence of the Judiciary.

In many cases, the effective intervention of FINJUS, PC, and the Coalition for an Independent Justice proved to be the only mechanism available to promote or reactivate the discussion of important judicial reforms that had been ignored or suppressed by political interests. Important attitude and policy changes have come about as result of these programs. The most significant have been the strengthening of a civil society group able to stand by principles and combat political interests. Through them, the first election of members of the Supreme Court became possible and was conducted in an unprecedented transparent way. The Coalition for Independent Justice has played a fundamental role in supporting the Judiciary against attacks on judicial

³⁷ In La Vega, La Romana, Barahona, Montecristi, San Juan de la Maguana, and San Cristobal in addition to those currently operating in Santiago, Santo Domingo, and San Francisco de Macoris.

tenure and independence. In addition, FINJUS has played an important role in drafting and lobbying for the Criminal Procedures Code and in the promotion of a functionally independent Public Ministry and a democratic police force.

10. Representation of Dominican Society by USAID ROL Civil Society Partners
a. Recognition and Advocating Power

In interviews it was frequently mentioned that the current judicial reform is the product of an elite whose scope and direction were decided by a very few. Many respondents to the survey said that the current reform had not extended justice to all Dominicans, especially the poor. Fully 80.8 percent indicated that they had little to no trust in the justice system overall. This is virtually identical to the response in the DEMOS survey of 1997. The Catholic Church (by 53.8 percent) and mass media (by 42.3 percent) continue to be the institutions that people trust most. Surprisingly, the sample indicated more confidence in the President (22 percent) than in the justice system (19 percent). The main reasons for such low confidence levels in the administration of justice included selling of judicial resolutions (84.4 percent) and violation by the police and other state officials of judicial decisions (84.4 percent).³⁸

Nevertheless, justice is more trusted than members of Congress (11 percent) or the police (8.1 percent) In an encouraging sign, however, there is a perception by two-thirds of the sample that the administration of justice has improved.

Chart 10.1 Perception of Justice Improvement in the Last Years	
Perception	Percentage
Justice has improved	66%
Justice has not improved	31%
No knowledge/ no answer	3%
Total	100%

Source: PC Polling on Political Culture, September 2001

The majority (67.2 percent) thought that justice is not equal for all; that rich and poor are not equal before the law (76.8 percent); and that the laws are not applied fairly to the poor. There is also a strong perception that power abuses go unchallenged and unpunished (55 percent).³⁹

There was consensus to recommend to USAID that it support reforms whose main purpose is to increase access to justice—not only to the formal court system, but also to alternative conflict resolution mechanisms. Aside from awareness education, justice reform needs more involvement on the part of grassroots constituencies and civil society organizations. To be successful,

³⁸ The polling questions lump together all justice sector actors—police, prosecutors, and judges—into a single category of the “justice system,” which makes it difficult to isolate concerns about which particular institutional actor is actually generating a particular level of confidence or disapproval.

³⁹ These perceptions are slightly better than those from the 1997 DEMOS survey. In this polling, 80.4 percent thought that there was no equality between rich and poor before the law and 91.4 percent that the law only punished the poor.

education and participation have to be targeted to obtain a predefined goal, like the establishment of community alternative dispute resolution groups, legal assistance to inmates' families, or assistance to victims of criminal offenses

There was a general view that USAID always works with the same few ROL civil society organizations, and that they are dominated by the same group. Some respondents said that they are a small club with limited access. FINJUS is mainly perceived as a think tank, run by a professional, educated elite that is not representative of the Dominican public at large, but that enjoys strong credibility among the political and legal community. Some persons interviewed think that FINJUS always invites only the same people to its activities. In the survey, only 38 percent indicated that they were aware of FINJUS's existence, but 72 percent of these respondents expressed the view that the organization has fought to improve justice in the DR.

PC has more access to grassroots organizations and is seen as more pluralistic than FINJUS. But there is also an impression that it is managed by a professional, educated elite that uses other, particularly local, groups only during elections and afterwards ignores them. In many focus groups conducted as part of the assessment there was the impression that PC was acting on its own, that decisions were made among its directors without consultation with the observers network, and that, therefore, it was losing some credibility and support for its activities. In the justice field, PC does not have the same level of credibility as FINJUS, and people connect the former mostly with the promotion of free elections.

Both PC and FINJUS have strong advocating capabilities and are recognized by government entities and political groups for their genuine contributions to justice and electoral reform. The President of the Supreme Court clearly has stated that without their help, political independence for the Judiciary would have not been achieved. The current government's Commissioner for Justice Reform has also indicated that many politicians applaud these organizations' roles and success in strengthening ROL, but are afraid to support them publicly because of the possible political consequences.

That FINJUS and PC are decisive actors in national political life was proven particularly by their presence on the commission established in Congress to make recommendations to the President on the constitutional reform. The political landscape and balance has changed measurably as a result of these two organizations. Their positions have an impressive weight, attested to in part by the fact that the traditional political parties of the country frequently resent their importance. As these NGOs have become such important political actors, the political parties are forced to negotiate with them. This is positive in the sense that the political parties have found it more difficult to cut deals that run counter to the public interest. By contrast, the new importance of FINJUS and PC has made them easier targets for critics.

In a curious twist, some interviewees suggested that while previously these two NGOs were only monitoring the political processes and raising issues, they now are negotiating directly with the political parties, and this deeper involvement may make them "accomplices" if democracy should somehow fail. This fear is understandable, because the constitutional reform now being considered is seen by many as a political scheme invented by the PRD to take away the political

independence granted to the Judiciary by the 1994 Constitution and restore it to congressional control, thus making the Judiciary part of the spoils system.⁴⁰

Partially as a result of the persistent work of FINJUS, PC, and the Coalition for Independent Justice, civil society now plays an important role in fighting abuses of political power. Not all battles will be won, as the recent election of new members to the Supreme Court has demonstrated, but these organizations represent a group of voices that the political parties never heard before, and more voices imply a stronger democracy. These organizations, mainly FINJUS, have been crucial in promoting and pressuring for current judicial and legal reforms. They are respected and credible, even though they are not broadly representative organizations. In the Dominican Republic, as in many Latin American countries, there are very few ROL-related civil society organizations with credibility. In the Latin American context, FINJUS is frequently used as an example and is known abroad for the key role it has played in the country's judicial reform.

The absence of any NGO in the anticorruption arena analogous to FINJUS has made civil society efforts for concomitant reforms very difficult. Anticorruption is an area in which FINJUS, PC, ADAE, ANJE, and others are interested, but they do not want to take the lead. The subject is very complicated in a country with historic endemic corruption. The disappearance of ACC is unfortunate, but probably reflects the great difficulty of sustaining any effective anticorruption effort supported by Dominican civil society. Nevertheless, Presidential Decree 783-01, signed by President Mejia on July 24, 2001, creates an Advisory Presidential Council for Prevention and Combat of Corruption (*El Consejo Asesor en Materia de Lucha Anticorrupción de la Presidencia de la República*), which, in addition to the Attorney General, Controller General of the Republic, Director of the Department for Prevention of Corruption, district attorneys of Santo Domingo and Santiago, Secretary of State for the Presidency, and Presidential Juridical Counselor, also includes three civil society NGOs as voting members (PC, Alianza ONG, and Asociación de Jóvenes Amantes de la Paz) and an additional three coalitions as non-voting alternates (*suplentes*), *Voluntariado Nacional de Prevención de la Corrupción* (VONAPRECO), *Foro Ciudadano*, and *Bloque de Organizaciones No Gubernamentales* (BONGS). Civil society is sitting at the National Plan Against Corruption table, and USAID's earlier assistance has probably at least fostered shared attitudes that any resolution of the country's serious corruption problems requires civil society presence.

Healthy and active civil society organizations are frequently one of the only assurances of stability and continuity of reform after a change of power, however democratic. Only prominent and respected civil society actors can ensure that the process continues in a country where transformation of justice sector institutions is being strongly resisted by political interests. The traditional parties see not a new era in justice and democracy, but rather the erosion of a patronage system that has served their political interests well.

Experience from previous USAID justice reform projects in Latin America showed that promotion and even achievement of legal and technical reforms within justice sector institutions

⁴⁰ For some interesting discussion on the constitutional reform, see: *Reformar la Constitución ¿Capricho o necesidad?* *Gaceta Judicial*, No, 115, September 6–20, pp. 10–14.

has not been enough to guarantee sustained change and effectiveness. To counteract the natural inertia within and frequent political pressures from outside of justice sector institutions, improvements in internal technical and organizational capacities have to be accompanied by monitoring and advocacy by civil society organizations. Only in this way is it possible to ensure that judicial reform is implemented and community interests served.

b. Support of International Donors for Civil Society Activities—USAID Presence and Perception by Civil Society

International donors have given relatively modest amounts of funds to ROL-related civil society activities. The IDB and the World Bank rarely give grants to civil society organizations. International donors tend to deal directly with state justice sector organizations (Judiciary, Ministries of Justice, attorneys general, police, etc). Nevertheless, in the Dominican Republic, at the end of the Balaguer era when the integrity of the Judiciary was very seriously questioned, the IDB became the first donor to give a grant (\$125,000 in nonreimbursable technical cooperation) to FINJUS. The purpose of the grant was to carry out a justice sector diagnosis and propose recommendations for reforms. The resulting document was discussed in a major national forum and its recommendations were presented to then recently elected President Leonel Fernández.⁴¹

Shortly after the IDB grant in 1995, USAID became the second international donor to provide financial aid to FINJUS—to carry out the Public Defense Program, made possible by a grant through the PID (\$211,000) and later by a purchase order. In the following years, USAID was the main international donor to provide resources for the set of different activities already described. Nevertheless, during 1998–1999, FINJUS got a small grant from the World Bank (\$42,000) to develop data on civil and labor courts. FINJUS also was awarded a small grant (\$20,000) from the German Foundation Konrad Adenauer to conduct workshops addressing the role of the police in a democratic society. In addition, FINJUS received \$60,000 from the Inter-American Foundation for public legal education in selected communities (*Programa Justicia y Ciudadanía*), and another grant from the Spanish Embassy (\$28,000) to promote establishment of the Ombudsman in the Dominican Republic.

For FINJUS, the availability of USAID funding for ROL activities has been very positive. It has allowed the organization to carry out activities that would have been impossible with its own resources. It has also permitted FINJUS to play a more active role in the promotion of justice reform and has balanced an agenda that otherwise would have concentrated basically on the defense of private-sector interests. The funding has allowed a more pluralistic approach to justice reform. At the moment, USAID is the main international donor for the organization and a new USAID grant, for \$290,000, is being negotiated to continue promotion of the Criminal Procedures Reform, the independence of the Public Ministry, and the analysis of the police role, as well as discussions on the new Ombudsman and intellectual property rights.

In order to ensure sustainability, USAID funds should not only be directed to programs to promote reform but should also focus on strengthening the institutional capacity of the

⁴¹ Tirza Rivera-Cira, “*El Sector Justicia en República Dominicana. diagnóstico y recomendaciones para la acción,*” FINJUS, IDB, June 1996.

cooperating civil society organizations. It is vital that these organizations define long-term strategies and plan for their financial sustainability before USAID funding ends, although in the particular case of FINJUS itself, its sustainability is virtually guaranteed.⁴² Therefore, future ROL civil society programs should include funds for institutional strengthening of the civil society organizations involved-

Judicial reform in the Dominican Republic is still perceived as not having reached the grassroots. It is seen as an elite reform that has not facilitated access to justice. A Supreme Court with credibility, a Judicial School, a less corrupt Judiciary, judges with tenure, and a better institutional infrastructure have not yet been able to make justice more efficient or accessible. Moreover, the ROL organizations promoting judicial reform are very few and, even when they have credibility, they are not perceived as representative. Judicial reform is a long-term enterprise where political opposition frequently produces retreats. Therefore, the need for broadly based constituencies is vital to keep vested political interests in check. Judicial reform is still very fragile.

The proposed constitutional reform could be a threat to judicial independence if it eliminates the permanent tenure of the judges. Criminal justice reform is still pending. The Ministry and Public Defense Office are still very vulnerable and inefficient institutions. Police reform has not even begun. The Criminal Procedures Code requires approval in Congress and its implementation will necessitate changes in the existing legal culture. The penitentiary system has not improved, and the high rate of inmates held without trial continues. There are no established mechanisms to defend crime victims. The situation of the legal profession requires urgent redress. There are more than 20 universities graduating more than 3,000 lawyers who in many cases do not have the skills and knowledge to function as legal professionals. Corruption in the government and private sector is endemic. Transparency and accountability will be pressing issues over the next five years, including public expenditure control, illicit enrichment, money laundering, and transparency in government procurement. Last, but not least in importance, access to justice and improvement of justice efficiency are vital to permit reforms to reach the groups most in need and to legitimize reform of the judicial sector.

Previous USAID ROL civil society activities focused mainly on influencing decision-makers. In order to promote greater access to justice and mobilize constituencies around the judicial reform, future ROL civil society activities and programs should both target policy and institutional reforms and provide direct legal services to populations in need.

D. Conclusions, Lessons Learned, and Recommendations

- **USAID/DR should include a stronger ROL civil society component in which USAID partners have a clear understanding of how specific activities are interrelated and contribute to achievement of program objectives.**

⁴² FINJUS has an endowment, was created and is actively supported by the private sector, and has a funding base independent of donor support.

The new USAID/DR strategy should include a stronger ROL civil society component. Certainly it should be complementary to the major projects aimed at justice sector institutions, but it is necessary to design a concrete program strategy (not simply a set of activities) with clear objectives, goals, lines of action, and indicators to focus efforts and increase impact. It is fundamental that USAID partners should have a clear understanding of how specific activities are related to each other and contribute to achievement of program objectives. At the end of this assessment, USAID was negotiating a specific grant agreement with FINJUS that seems to be an important step towards a more result-oriented relationship between the two organizations.

- **USAID funds should not only be directed to programs and activities to promote justice reform but should also focus on institutional strengthening of the USAID partners.**

In order to ensure sustainability, USAID funds should not only be directed to programs to promote reform but should also focus on strengthening the institutional capacity of the cooperating civil society organizations. It is vital that these organizations define long-term strategies and a plan for their financial sustainability well in advance of the termination of USAID funding. Therefore, any future USAID ROL civil society program should include funds for institutional strengthening of the civil society organizations involved.

- **USAID ROL civil society program reforms should facilitate access to justice to populations in need, as well as press for policy changes.**

Previous USAID ROL civil society activities and programs have been mainly directed at influencing policy reforms, and have not been focused on facilitating assistance to target populations in need (children, women, the poor, prisoners, etc.) to gain them more access to justice. To complement civil society group efforts at influencing decision-makers, funds have to be set aside to address the specific needs of these same civil society groups. In order to both promote access and form broad-based constituencies around the judicial reform, it is recommended that future ROL civil society strategies focus not only on policy reforms, but also include mechanisms to channel legal services to populations in need. The latter should be targeted initially around a concrete project or specific set of community-identified issues to maximize efforts and impact.

- **USAID should reach out to a more diverse group of NGOs and civil society organizations to make the process more representative and link it to the community.**

In the ROL field, USAID should reach out to more NGOs and civil society organizations. FINJUS and PC are two credible organizations, but to make the process more representative and connected, other organizations, such as universities, have to get involved. The Coalition for an Independent Justice has played an important role, but its lack of resources, organization, and clear long-term objectives have caused it to miss opportunities to recruit other civil society organizations to join in common cause. Therefore, other ways to involve more civil society organizations and networks should be explored. It is important that these other organizations feel they are obtaining recognition and empowerment by their

participation and that they are not brought in only to increase pressure when FINJUS and PC are advocating a particular reform.

- **Advocacy power and credibility have been the main assets of ROL civil society organizations.**

Dominican civil society organizations focused exclusively or significantly on justice reform are still very few, but FINJUS and later PC, together with a handful of other organizations, have played a vital role in promoting the reform of the justice sector. They are credible and have been instrumental in limiting the power of the traditional political parties. They enjoy a reputation of standing on principle and support democratic reform processes. They have been able to develop a strong advocacy group with access to the press and to decision-making circles. Nevertheless, they still lack coordination to devise strategies and form united fronts to press for greater impact in legal reform.

- **ROL civil society activities complemented and enriched justice reform initiatives initiated in the justice sector institutions.**

The several concrete activities supported by USAID looked to achieve ROL results specified in the Bilateral Government Agreement, but also responded to justice reform initiatives promoted by the Judiciary, the Government Justice Commissioner's Office, or the National District Prosecutor's Office, etc. They helped to maintain justice as a priority in the country's political agenda, force political parties and government authorities to do certain things better (e.g. selection of judges, drafting of legislation, etc.), and established opportunities for dialogue between the justice institutions and the civil society.

- **USAID's low-profile involvement proved to be correct.**

In most activities USAID kept a low profile. The ROL civil society organizations, mainly FINJUS and the Coalition for an Independent Justice, took leadership, ownership, and credit for the actions financed by USAID. Justice reform is a very sensitive matter in the DR, and the financial support provided by USAID must continue to be discreet and must not be seen as U.S. manipulation or intervention in local affairs. There is a general perception that USAID funding of ROL activities has been very positive and respectful in this sense.

- **The resources used to finance ROL civil society activities produced an impact, but a better balance is required between the amounts of financial resources allocated for them and those invested in ROL programs with justice institutions.**

ROL civil society programs have proven to be effective, but only 10 percent of total ROL funding was invested in this area. A reconsideration of this balance is very important because USAID is the main international donor providing funding to ROL civil society organizations. Other international donors (World Bank, IDB, etc.) have only sporadically financed these activities.

- **USAID programs should be designed to increase representation and formation of more broadly based constituencies to keep the political power in check. Judicial reform remains fragile.**

Judicial reform is a test of endurance where political interests frequently block progress; therefore, the need for broad constituencies is vital to keep political power in check. Judicial reform is still very fragile and important issues are pending and need to be forcefully addressed in the next five years.

VIII. INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY REVIEW

This section constitutes a review of the institutional capacity of the PID,⁴³ PC, and FINJUS, as well as selected NGOs and community-based organizations (CBOs) with which the PID and its subgrantees have worked. The purpose is not to provide a detailed examination of the structures, functions, and systems of these organizations; rather, it is to assess their “sustainability” to be able to continue their activities after termination of USAID support, and to determine if a “process” of democratization has been and can be sustained indefinitely.⁴⁴ In this sense, the issue of organizational sustainability involves two questions: 1) Are there NGOs and CBOs that can achieve self-sustainability to carry on work begun under the CSP? and 2) Has the Strengthening Civil Society Program helped promote sustainable *processes* of greater citizen participation, advocacy, transparency, and networking? In other words, have the organizations involved in the program acquired the tools to help bring about and sustain political reform and make government at the local and national levels more responsive to grassroots needs and demands, and is that process working?

A. Principal Findings

- There exists a large and heterogeneous NGO community in the DR, ranging from virtually single-person entities to large and complex organizations with budgets in excess of US\$1 million.
- Many and perhaps most NGOs are “sustainable,” at least on a subsistence level. With several notable exceptions, their individual impact is marginal, but as part of a network they have the institutional strength to be able to contribute measurably to the sustainability of democratic processes.
- The overwhelming majority of NGOs have a minimal resource base, but still continue to exist, however marginally.
- NGOs have mixed management and institutional capacities. Not surprisingly, the larger organizations tend to be much stronger and better managed, although not always. In general, however, only a handful have the institutional capabilities to manage significant donor-supported projects.
- A secure NGO financial base cannot necessarily be equated with effective management.
- Many NGOs receive government funding, but most do not. There is no official definition of an NGO, or of the different types that exist. In addition, as there are scarcely any criteria for government funding, this has made it easy for many self-proclaimed NGOs to qualify for state support.

⁴³ The PID is not an institution as such, but a project under the administrative umbrella of the Pontificia Universidad Católica de Madre y Maestra. Nevertheless, it operates as an institutional or administrative entity with its own procedures, policies, budget, board, and staff. This will be discussed in detail later in this section of the report.

⁴⁴ Time and resources did not permit in-depth, detailed institutional audits of the organizations, nor was this the specific objective in the Scope of Work. Rather, the assessment focused on determining if the organizations have “the formal operations, management and financial capabilities to be autonomous from the government and political organizations.” The short answer to that question is “yes.”

- Most NGOs are characterized by a highly personalistic leadership style and tend to be single-issue groups. Even so, many are involved in civil society types of activities, attempting to influence public decisions that impact their issues and constituents.
- Extensive NGO networking exists, which has resulted in a much greater impact on developing civil society and the political processes than otherwise would have been the case.
- Networking is a key to sustaining institutional participation in the democratic processes.

B. Background

Previous sections of this report have described the clear and positive impact of the SCSP. There is little question that USAID's support of civil society in the Dominican Republic over the past 10 years has yielded results, impressively so at times. This is especially the case when put into historical context. The political culture of the Dominican Republic has been far from inclusive, pluralistic, accountable, and participatory in character. Throughout its history, the country was dominated by authoritarian regimes, some more repressive than others. Yet in the space of a decade, the SCSP, along with international pressure and other factors, has been able to help strengthen democracy, promoting grassroots participation in both the electoral and governmental decision-making processes. Dominican democracy is still fragile, but through the efforts of PC, FINJUS, and the PID, among others, it continues to grow and strengthen.

In order to keep nourishing the successes already achieved, NGOs and CBOs will need to continue to play an important role in civil society. They constitute a vast if extremely heterogeneous network, ranging from informal neighborhood organizations (e.g., *Clubes de Madres*) to well-established and -financed operations such as the *Instituto de Desarrollo Integral*. There is no official count of the number of NGOs and NGO-type organizations that exist in the DR. The most reliable figure is from Jorge Cela's report, *La diversidad en busca de su unidad*, which sets the number at over 20,000.⁴⁵ This includes all forms of not-for-profit organizations, including NGOs, CBOs, chambers of commerce, professional associations, and other organizations.

One reason for the proliferation of NGOs is Law 520, the enabling legislation permitting the existence of NGOs without defining or regulating them. Another important reason may be found in the national budget. In the current fiscal year, the budget line for government support to NGOs is \$RD884,000,000, or 1.5 percent of the budget.⁴⁶ According to dozens of articles in the press, substantiated by interviews with key third-sector actors, the budget for NGO support constitutes in no small part a slush fund for politicians who establish their own "NGOs" through which they channel public monies for private and political purposes. This is not to say that funds are not distributed to legitimate organizations as well; they are. However, as one highly experienced NGO director put it, the existence of the government NGO fund and its support to not-for-profit organizations has a definite downside and is the Achilles' heel of the legitimate NGO community. In other words, state resources have tended to taint the third sector, tarring both

⁴⁵ Jorge Cela, *La diversidad en busca de su unidad: inventario de articulaciones de la sociedad civil dominicana y propuestas para mayor y más amplia articulación*, Santo Domingo, December 22, 2000.

⁴⁶ Interview with David Luther, July 2001, Santo Domingo.

legitimate and corrupt organizations with the same brush. This is believed to have had a negative impact on nongovernmental funding, although no evidence was found to support the contention.

But the issue is not so much how *many* organizations exist as it is how many are effective and sustainable; specifically, are there NGOs and CBOs that have participated in the SCSP that can be judged self-sustaining? Are they capable of sustaining their activities in the absence of USAID—and even other donor agency—support? And what does it mean to be “sustainable?”

1. Defining “Sustainability”

Starting with the last question first, “sustainability” is a difficult concept to define as there are potentially many competing definitions. In the case of this report, sustainability refers to the ability of an organization (i.e., NGO⁴⁷) to secure and maintain the resource base to permit it to carry out activities as consistent with its objectives over an indefinite period, with an administrative infrastructure capable of passing standard external audits and donor agency evaluations.

It is ironic that their very reliance on external funding creates a dependency that makes it difficult for many NGOs, especially larger ones, to achieve self-sustainability—i.e., financial independence. Nevertheless, an increasing number of NGOs everywhere have developed a series of income-generating activities independent of donor assistance. Some are particularly sophisticated, creating, for example, for-profit subsidiaries whose profits are channeled into the NGO. This is true even in the Dominican Republic, where the Instituto de Desarrollo Integral has formed a housing construction company as a revenue source. Others charge dues to members. Some, such as FINJUS, offer services for a fee. Even so, according to the Technical Coordinator of the Dominican Civil Society Organizational Strengthening Program, the vagueness of the current statutory framework can limit the ability of NGOs to generate income, as there are really no guidelines to determine what is statutorily permissible. Moreover, the law permits charitable deductions only for corporations and not for individuals, and not-for-profits are assessed estate taxes against bequeathals.

The fact is, however, that many NGOs—especially those involved in civil society activities—will, by their very nature, be “dependent” on some sort of external funding if they are to implement critical activities. In that sense, they will never be completely “self-sustainable,” and it is unrealistic to suggest otherwise. In fact, sometimes in the international donor community self-sustainability is seen—or defined—in part as shifting from dependence on one donor to another. In the definition used here, sustainability can include diversifying the donor base, as well as engaging in other kinds of income-generation activities such as fees-for-service, membership dues, advertising, affinity cards, etc.

There is one other dimension to sustainability that requires clarification or definition; that is, internal NGO democratization and accountability. Casual observation of the many organizations visited and otherwise observed in the course of this assessment shows that most tend to be

⁴⁷ This definition does not include CBOs, which tend to be informally organized, have a rudimentary administrative infrastructure, if any at all, and are unincorporated.

personalistic in their leadership style, although there is awareness of the need for more internal democratization. This is not surprising in a culture where *personalismo* features so prominently. While strong leaders are important to organizational effectiveness, they are also a potential weakness, unless this strength is somehow in part institutionalized. Organizational democratization and accountability, therefore, are not just altruistic concepts, but have very practical implications. One of the responsibilities of organizations is to groom others to assume increasing leadership responsibilities across of the board. In addition, greater participation in the decision-making process builds teamwork and spirit, enriches decisions, and makes organizations more *sustainable* in terms of their staff and operations. So while greater organizational democratization and accountability may not be directly linked to financial sustainability, they help determine the viability of an organization to attain its goals and develop the kind of credibility that can lead to increased financial support.

2. Sustainability

In the Dominican Republic, there is a plethora and diffusion of an infinite number of associations, most of which seem to be more social than political in character. While conventional wisdom might suggest that this means that there are fewer of the already scarce resources to help support pressure groups seeking political reforms, there are clearly many NGOs/CBOs that are “sustainable,” at least in the minimal sense of the word. If the estimates of the numbers of NGOs/CBOs are anywhere near correct, there were thousands of organizations that existed prior to the SCSP and thousands that have been in operation during the 10-year period of the program that have received no donor assistance.

Needless to say, the overwhelming numbers of these entities are miniscule, are informal, have no national presence and are not even incorporated. Dominicans appear to have a strong associative character, and in virtually every neighborhood and village there are organizations such as *Clubes de Amas de Casa*, *Juntas de Vecinos*, and similar groupings. Actually, this has helped expand the SCSP impact, and the PID, for example, has worked through many of these neighborhood organizations to widen its scope and impact.

In addition, there are larger, more structured organizations that are incorporated, have written bylaws and procedures and function in a more formal—and sophisticated—way, and many of these organizations have been funded by the PID. But even they represent a diverse range of organizational capacity and potential for sustainability. For example, *Fundación Falconbridge* is a well-organized institution with an established management system, a reliable funding base of US\$900,000 annually from a secure corporate sponsor, and a well-trained and internationally experienced administrator. At the other end of the spectrum is the *Círculo de Mujeres con Discapacidad*, a small (4.5 permanent staff) organization that has an annual operating budget of \$30,000.

The consensus of key persons involved in the NGO and CBO communities who were interviewed is that the large majority of not-for-profits operate at a subsistence level. Even in the case of larger and more developed organizations, it is reasonable to suggest that the absence of deductions for individual giving, the lack of greater corporate sponsorship, the restricted ability

to access state funds (self-imposed or otherwise), particularly under Law 520 (which has no criteria established for defining eligible organizations, establishing transparent application processes, and monitoring funds), finite donor resources, and the dearth of the skills required to develop and package proposals for projects has left most NGOs financially weak.

There is agreement among NGO leaders who were interviewed that management training is required, even for the larger organizations. This is not surprising and is consistent with experiences elsewhere. This is not to say that all NGOs are poorly managed. However, it can be inferred that most NGOs in the Dominican Republic—including PC and FINJUS, as well as many PID subgrantees—require training in management, as well as in fund raising, both of which are critical factors for achieving and maintaining self-sufficiency.

The Mission helped sponsor preparation and publication of an NGO catalogue⁴⁸ that lists 115 not-for-profit organizations considered capable of managing projects supported by private enterprise, international donors, and philanthropic foundations. They constitute an impressive network of organizations representing the interests of those who live on the economic, social and political margins. Most of these entities serve to aggregate and articulate the concerns of those who otherwise would have little or no input into public decision-making. Their very existence helps to move forward the processes begun by the SCSP.

The issue of organizational sustainability actually involves two questions: 1) Are there organizations—NGOs—that can achieve self-sustainability to carry on work begun under the SCSP? and 2) Has the civil society program helped promote sustainable *processes* of greater citizen participation, advocacy, and networking? In other words, have the organizations involved in the program, and others, acquired the tools to help bring about political reform and encourage government at the local and national levels to be more responsive to grassroots needs and demands? These issues are explored below in an institutional review of the PID, PC, and FINJUS.

C. The PID

1. Principal Findings

The PID:

- May be distinguished from the other major USAID civil society initiatives in that it was a creation of the Mission and is a project with a finite duration rather than an institution.
- Has been effectively managed and enjoys a strong staff that is both committed and technically qualified.
- Has received strong administrative support from the PUCMM.
- Has strengthened project preparation and management on the part of its subgrantees, and helped promote to varying degrees greater internal democratization.

⁴⁸ *Catálogo de organizaciones sin fines de lucro: productos y servicios*, Alianza ONG, Consejo Nacional de la Empresa Privada and the Inter-American Foundation, June 2000.

- Helped strengthen NGO networks that made possible PID successes and represent sustainability.
- Still has to finish developing a workable alternative to sustain its activities after March 2002.

2. Analysis

a. Organizational Sustainability

The fact that the PID has produced measurable results over the past nine years is testimony itself to the positive impact it has had in civil society, where it has played a key educational role. The PID has funded and provided oversight to 206 projects. It has helped form and expand grassroots awareness and knowledge of the rights and responsibilities of citizens, as well as the voting and political processes, all vital to informing the public and mobilizing the political participation that is basic to a functioning democracy. The PID has been able to do this in no small measure because of a capacity to develop and manage projects effectively. However, the fact remains that the PID is a project and not an institution, although in essence it operates as such within the larger organizational structure of the PUCMM.

The PID section of this report describes in some detail the positive impact of the PID as a major contributor to the development of an increasingly functioning civil society in the Dominican Republic. Its credibility, reach, and programmatic successes are well documented. This section of the report will review the institutional infrastructure that has served as the base for management of PID's activities. This is especially important as the PID faces eventual termination of USAID funding and will have to look to other sources and mechanisms for generating income if it is to continue. Success in acquiring additional—and more stable—resources depends in large measure on a demonstrated institutional capacity for administrative, program, and financial management. As it is the PUCMM that serves as the administrative home of the PID, this should not be too difficult if the University seeks to continue the project.

The PID's program successes are complemented by and partly a result of effective management—within both the PID itself and the PUCMM—that is formal in its structure, written procedures, and compliance with internal and USAID guidelines, but more informal in its day-to-day implementation. This is consistent with the culture of many NGOs, which tend to attract people who are firmly committed to a set of ideals but who not infrequently resist overly formal management procedures that are perceived as restrictive and obstacles to attaining important program goals.

This is by no means to suggest that the management of the PID is not serious; it is, and it is professional. However, the organizational culture is one in which personal rather than institutional relationships characterize interactions among staff, creating an informal, positive, and dynamic atmosphere. Testimony to this is a turnover rate that is virtually nil. All professional, and most support, staff have remained with the PID since their initial employment. This has created organizational and programmatic stability and an institutional memory that has helped the PID achieve its many successes. At the same time, a changing Consultative Council brings in new perspectives and fresh experiences to help maintain an organizational dynamism.

The PID enjoys strong leadership. Its Director is charismatic, energetic, and committed. Her strengths are complemented by an equally qualified and dedicated staff. Together they form a strong team. It is instructive to note that one of the strengths identified in a “mini” SWOT workshop conducted by the evaluator was that decisions are discussed and not imposed. So while the Director is clearly a forceful personality, she also practices as well as preaches participatory management. In addition, she delegates sufficient authority with commensurate responsibility, enabling staff to function independently. Staff are given assignments and then allowed to make decisions on their own at the operational level. Communications tend to be informal, which is not uncommon in a small, collegial organization.

Workloads are large. Staff routinely put in extra hours. There are lengthy and thorough processes involved in awarding subgrants, which take an average of three months to complete, including legal, financial, and management reviews of the applicant organizations. Similarly, there is close monitoring of the subgrantees once the award is made. Subgrants are awarded only after applicants successfully pass these reviews, an evaluation by the Coordinating Committee, and final approval by USAID—which has only rejected three out of 209 project proposals. As funding is fixed, there is little room to either expand personnel or reduce activities. Observation and interviews with staff indicated a general ability to complete tasks on time and meet objectives. The programmatic successes experienced by the PID reinforce the observations.

The PID is supported institutionally by the Vice Rectorate of the PUCMM. It is a program housed by the University, which provides it with administrative support and has served as “administrative anchor” for the PID. This has no doubt contributed to the smooth operation of the program, and has relieved it of a considerable measure of administrative responsibilities (in financial control, purchasing, contracting). The University charges no overhead as such, but rather assesses a “transaction fee” on a task-by-task basis.

Overseeing the PID is a General Assembly, Consultative Council, and Coordinating Committee. The Coordinating Committee works most closely with the Director, and its members as well as those of the Council have played a very supportive role. However, it is the Director who provides the most forceful leadership and is viewed as the “face” of the PID, according to several key public and third-sector leaders.

Is the PID sustainable? By definition, as a project, it cannot be without an institutional base. For the life of the project the institution has been in the PUCMM, and it is safe to say the University is indeed sustainable. PID activities, if the PUCMM or other (i.e., non-USAID) donors so chose, could continue. If that were the case, there would likely be a period of adjustment after the present director leaves. She has provided valuable leadership to the PID. However, it has never been institutionalized. The staff have performed well and are by now seasoned professionals in their respective fields. Yet her departure would create a leadership void. Any continuation of the PID—that is, its activities—would have to address that issue up front, both in terms of seeking an equally effective replacement and working closely with the staff during any transition.

The leadership of the PID is understandably concerned about the future of its efforts. It would like to see its 10 years of investment and hard work protected and continued. Will its legacy be sustained? If so, how? What can be done? With the future in mind, the PID has been working to develop four *consorcios*. The consortia are comprised of 400 NGOs. However laudable the objective, the *consorcio* concept has some weaknesses, among them:

- Lack of administrative infrastructure;
- Potential intra-consortium rivalries for resources;
- Need to develop management and leadership skills; and
- Lack of a resource/funding base.

It would be possible to strengthen the consortia, particularly the civic education and civil service groups. And there are definite advantages to this alternative, including:

- Maintaining an existing network that has produced results;
- Keeping together a highly experienced and effective staff;
- Sustaining an existing momentum; and
- Using existing networks to expand scope of impact.

But a detailed plan of action would have to be prepared, along with a budget, and appropriate funding secured. USAID has long made clear that it has no plans to provide funds to the PID after March 2002. A decision would have to be made about where to locate the current PID staff (all or, more likely, a small core contingent), who would be required to provide the requisite technical support in the development of the consortia. As an alternative, the PID director sees the PID-RES (Economic and Social Reform Initiative) project as conceivably serving this function. However, the PUCMM would have to agree with this—i.e., maintaining PID or PID-RES staff to provide assistance to the consortia. Moreover, there are questions as to whether PID-RES has the capability to assume such a role and if it is indeed the most appropriate option. Other alternatives that may be more feasible exist and are discussed below in the subsection on recommendations.

But there is another dimension to sustainability in this case, and that is the sustainability of the *processes* initiated by the PID and other SCSP NGOs.

b. Sustainability of the Process

With an initiative such as the SCSP, it is not possible to decouple institutional from process sustainability. They are inevitably linked. Political participation of the kind promoted by the SCSP at some level requires coordinated interest aggregation and articulation, and that means some kind of organizational presence. The PID has enjoyed several accomplishments toward that end. It has:

- Worked with and through non-civil society NGOs to disseminate information on the democratic processes and the rights and responsibilities of citizens in a democracy.
- Promoted large-scale public awareness of democracy and citizen rights in the Dominican Republic.

- Helped to open up and decentralize the governmental decision-making processes.
- Provided assistance to NGOs and CBOs with which to organize grassroots participation in public decision-making.
- Helped introduce and increase awareness of civil society issues among the NGO community.
- Provided voter education.

All of this would not have been possible without the network of NGOs and CBOs through which the PID worked. Even at the point when individual citizens participate in elections or attend public meetings on their own, there will still exist a need for organizations to consolidate and *institutionalize* the process. The large majority of the organizations that could conceivably be candidates for PID support have not been established to promote civil society. Rather they have been created for other purposes, dealing with issues such as the environment, health, education, family violence, rehabilitation, etc. However, all at some point must deal with government and politicians in order to attempt to influence policy changes, resource allocations and other public decisions that affect their constituencies. What the PID has done is to create widespread awareness of the democratic processes through the NGOs with which it has worked (see Section V).

This is an effective way to develop consciousness and provide education on civil society and democracy, reaching out to a broad and diverse community of interests. It is consistent with the PID strategy, unstated as it may be, to “let a hundred flowers bloom.” A potential downside, of course, is that by using such a large universe of NGOs, the PID runs the risk of funding organizations that are incapable of effectively managing resources. Indeed, according to PID staff, the smaller subgrantee organizations tend to have the weakest management systems and have required the closest monitoring.

According to those NGO officials interviewed, the PID did assist them in improving their capacity to prepare and manage projects, as well as sensitize them to the need to be more accountable and democratic internally. *Campesinos Federados de Salcedo* (CAFESA), for example, elected two women presidents and one woman treasurer as a result of PID influence. And *Círculo de Mujeres con Discapacidad* (CIMUDIS) was able to improve its financial management capability with PID assistance. Although not all organizations receiving PID support have sophisticated or strong management systems,⁴⁹ their cumulative impact on strengthening the civil society has been substantial and unequivocal, as has been documented in the previous sections of this report. Thus, as measured by impact, there is little question but that the resources have been managed adequately.

Some of the NGOs interviewed were clearly self-sustaining. *Asociación de Trabajadores del Estado* (ATE), for example, was able to maintain its operations through membership dues. Although it is a union, dues are voluntary. By contrast, CAFESA relies substantially on the PID funds, which account for 30 percent of its budget. It has already taken steps to make up the

⁴⁹ It is instructive to note that some of the smallest NGOs, with the most elementary management systems, have been in existence for the past three decades, demonstrating a measurable capacity for sustainability, however tenuous it may be.

anticipated termination of PID funding, and is actively seeking support from CORDA, a Dutch development foundation.

NGOs tend still to be characterized by personalistic leadership, although interviews indicated a growing awareness and fact of greater participation of members in organizational decisions. Several NGO directors, staff, and members stated that the PID had been responsible for promoting this change in behavior. It should be noted, in addition, that all of the NGOs to which the PID provided funds still exist, and those that have been reviewed for this assessment still participate in civil society activities. The fact that these organizations, most of which are not CSOs, have been *concientizadas* in democracy points to the sustainability of the process across sectors. This is not to suggest that the PID has had complete success. Indeed, results have been somewhat mixed, as was already discussed. But overall the PID has achieved its goals and generally excelled in its performance.

The NGO subgrantees constitute a loose network, made up more by their institutional nature than by design. The PID realizes this and, as has been described elsewhere, is taking steps to try to institutionalize some kind of follow-up to its activities over the past decade through the development of the *consorcios*.

Although institutional capacity may be minimal among many NGOs, institutional *survival* seems to flourish. Indeed, as already suggested, part of the problem may be that the sheer number of NGOs is such that it dilutes both the human and financial resource bases needed to sustain organizations in a more effective way. For example, interviews with NGO directors indicated that while there is a lot of activity, there are disproportionately few results. While this could not be documented, the suggestion is persuasive.

One way to compensate for this problem is through linkages or networks, combining individual NGO resources and uniting for shared purposes. Indeed, *articulación de la sociedad civil* has been a constant theme, almost a mantra. A recent study showed that 63.6 percent of those NGOs interviewed belonged to some kind of alliance.⁵⁰ The most frequently cited were *Foro Ciudadano*, *Foros para la Participación Municipal*, *Red de Redes de ONG*, *FOSC*, *CNUSO*, and *Confederación de Juntas de Vecinos*. Almost 70 percent of the networks relied on financing from membership dues. Only 15.9 percent received donor funding. One-quarter sold services, and 45.5 percent indicated that they relied on more than one source of income. This shows a high level of self-sustainability among the NGO networks. Although it does not necessarily translate into a similar level for the NGOs themselves, it does show a sustainability of the process of political participation and reform.

⁵⁰ Jorge Cela, “*La diversidad en busca de su unidad: inventario de articulaciones de la sociedad civil dominicana y propuestas para la mayor y más amplia articulación*,” Santo Domingo, December 12, 2000. All of the statistics cited in this section are from the Cela report.

3. Follow-up

It is difficult to separate sustainability of the “process” from sustainability of the organizations that promote civil society. The networks of NGOs and CBOs across sectors have been key to advancing democracy in the DR. In a certain sense these organizations have been the process. The PID has been instrumental in providing support to a wide spectrum of non-civil society NGOs for democracy awareness and education projects. And, as has been documented earlier in this report, the impact has been significant.

USAID funding for the PID is due to terminate in March 2002. This will clearly constitute a void and be felt throughout civil society in the DR. In a certain sense it will also be a test of the PID’s impact. That is, how much of the results of its work can be sustained in its absence? The data show the nature and extent of the impact, but cannot measure its longevity. It is reasonable to predict that much of what the PID has accomplished will continue. It will have left behind NGO staff trained in democracy, as well as materials that can be replicated and updated. By the same token, it has developed an awareness of civil society and increased capacity to deal with political institutions among NGOs that have been established for reasons other than political reform, such as education, health, environmental protection, business, etc., but which at some level and some way interact with the political processes.

There is little question that the impact of the project has been a key to opening up the political processes in the Dominican Republic to greater citizen awareness and participation. But there is still much to do. As one respondent put it, the process of democratization of the Dominican Republic is generational. In that context, it is essential to keep expectations and judgments realistic. Even in the most advanced and mature democracies there are vicissitudes in the course of politics and civic life (witness Florida, for example). The democratization and strengthening of civil society that has been nurtured for 10 years by the PID above all is a work in progress.

4. Conclusions and Lessons Learned

- Sustainability of the democratic processes in the DR largely depends on an active institutional presence of NGOs. The existence of the PID over the past decade has helped to strengthen organizations involved in the civil society, increasing their impact and thereby fostering democracy.
- The PID’s efforts in promoting networks led to an expanded and more sustained impact than otherwise would have been the case. Networks create synergies to multiply outcomes and are key to success. A few NGOs, even the larger and more institutionally established organizations, have relatively limited impact. That is why aggressive networking is so critical: It enhances the *institutional* strength of an initiative.
- The close collaboration of the Mission with the PID contributed to its success. USAID worked with the PID to maintain project focus and provided support in strengthening the organizational processes for managing its 206 subgrantee projects. This, coupled with the “*medio paso atrás*” strategy, proved to give the PID the organizational capacity plus the credibility as a *Dominican* project (institution) it needed to succeed.

- The PID was also successful because of strong management and a well-qualified team. Their technical skills along with a strong sense of commitment to civil society were instrumental in strengthening the institutional capacity to implement civil society projects.
- Long-term USAID support was critical to PID programmatic successes. It also gave the PID the breathing room and stability necessary to build the staff and institutional capacity to sustain its efforts. In a project as challenging as reform of civil society, it is imperative to provide support over a relatively long period. The cultural changes required to build support for and encourage participation in democracy are not always easy to promote and sustain. After centuries of authoritarianism it is unrealistic to expect a three- to five-year project to change attitudes and develop the conditions in which real democratic roots can take hold.
- The administrative support from the PUCMM was equally key in creating and supporting the institutional capacity of the PID to achieve its goals. Housing the PID in the University also added to its credibility and legitimacy as a Dominican initiative.

5. Recommendations

- **Follow-up.** Funding for the PID is due to terminate in March 2002. As may have been predicted, the PID leadership and staff would like to see their work sustained. Compelling arguments can be made for providing continued support to the PID, or at least some kind of organization or set of organizations to carry on its activities. The PUCMM would be an obvious “home” for the PID. But it is important to underscore the fact that support would have to come from international donors other than USAID. The PID, *as a project*, was always envisioned to have a finite life. Doubtless the PID should have taken more aggressive steps in putting together a sustainability strategy. As early as 1998, the Council had discussed the issue and, according to the Director, actually prepared a proposal for non-USAID donors. Nothing came of those efforts, and the *consorcio* strategy was developed. The big problem is time. Unless a donor is willing and able to commit support quickly, it is doubtful that the PID (i.e., its activities) will be sustained.

While in theory it might be possible for one or more NGOs to pick up where the PID has left off, little has been done to develop that kind of strategy (outside of the consortia). The advantage to this arrangement would be that given the appropriate NGO(s), there would be a proven and experienced institutional structure in which to manage activities and seek funding. The big problem, of course, with respect to any strategy to continue in an organized fashion PID activities, is time. At this juncture there is little hope unless an NGO or donor agrees quickly to continue to fund the PID or the PUCMM takes it under its institutional wing.

- **Consorcios.** The *consorcios* are an attractive concept but, as has already been pointed out, there are potentially significant weaknesses in their implementation. The Vice Rector of the PUCMM has suggested that one option might be for the Government of the Dominican Republic to assume the responsibility for funding civic education,

conceivably underwriting consortium activities. However, direct public funding of such an effort could be open to manipulation and could taint the credibility and legitimacy of the consortia.

One problem with the consortia is that they have very uneven capabilities. The Small Farmer Consortium (SFC), for example, is very weak, while the Civic Education Consortium is relatively strong. If PID activities are extended by other means, one objective could be to work with the consortia to strengthen them to the point where they can actually sustain themselves independently through dues, grants, and other funding mechanisms. Despite some of their drawbacks, the consortia represent a large network of NGOs vital to the sustainability of an effective civil society. One alternative would be for the PUCMM to house all or some of the consortia, maintaining a reduced technical unit as staff. The PUCMM, needless to say, would have to agree with this arrangement and seek funds from international donors and, perhaps, the Dominican government.

- **An endowment.** At some point, it might even be possible to establish an endowment to permit the NGO to operate with complete autonomy from the state. This would be an ideal option, as it would provide both financial stability and relief from donor dependence. There are numerous examples of NGOs that have put together endowments. If desirable and feasible, funds could be invested in the endowment by the government along with other donors. The key would be to have a board of trustees not dominated by the government so that key policy decisions would be made by a group balanced among private donors, international agencies, and, if appropriate, the government. While it is true that no real tax incentives exist in Dominican statutes, a 501(c)(3) organization could be established in the United States, for example, to receive tax deductible donations from international companies and individuals from the Dominican expatriate community who would be willing to support such an effort. This has been done successfully elsewhere and is an option the PUCMM may want to consider—if it ultimately houses the PID.

Not all of these options would necessarily be completely feasible. But it is important to “think outside of the box” and consider any and all potential alternatives.

D. Participación Ciudadana

1. Principal Findings

- PC has its origins as a movement, unlike the PID and FINJUS. That has led to an “identity crisis” as it moved more into managing projects, creating mission confusion.
- PC lacks clear strategic guidelines, priorities, and goals, with has resulted to a large extent in policy and program decisions driven by budget considerations.
- PC has a proven track record in its core area, but lacked the institutional capacity and experience to manage more effectively the funds provided to it by USAID.
- Management is committed but needs strengthening.
- PC needs to consolidate its local base.

2. Analysis

While the PID has provided critical awareness and educational services to the public, PC has been responsible for mobilizing voters to participate in the electoral process, helping them give voice to their political opinions, and ensuring open and fair voting through national elections monitoring at the local level. Together, the PID and PC have created a momentum for greater democracy that has been sustained over the past several years. There is no guarantee that the process will be sustained indefinitely, however; even stronger democracies, such as Chile for one, have not necessarily been immune from threats. However, what PC and the civil society program in general have done is to help move the political culture from one that was essentially neosultanic⁵¹ to one that is increasingly democratic. There are still strong vestiges of the old culture, including patron-client relationships, elitism, personalism, and status ascription. But this may have been predictable. It is not possible to change completely within five to 10 years a political culture that has been the cause and effect of 500 years of authoritarianism.

PC may be distinguished institutionally from the PID and FINJUS by the fact that it has evolved from a “movement” into a more formal organization. While some of the leadership still refers to PC as a movement, the fact of the matter is that it is an incorporated NGO with a board of directors (*Consejo*), bylaws, and established accounting and management systems. As is true of many NGOs, there is a desire to maintain the *mística* of its origins and mission, and that can constitute a substantial strength (and also potentially a weakness, as will be discussed subsequently). It helps to attract support and committed staff and projects an image that can serve to legitimize the organization’s activities. Indeed, this has been the case with PC.

Institutionally, PC continues to undergo somewhat of an identity crisis, irrespective of assertions to the contrary by some.⁵² This is not particularly unusual or unexpected for an organization of its type. PC has enjoyed a great deal of success in helping to bring greater transparency to and participation in the electoral processes. This success, ironically, has given it the kind of reputation and credibility that has resulted in its transition away from being a movement to becoming a more conventional organization, taking on additional responsibilities under the broad rubric of civil society. This kind of change is frequently difficult to make, particularly as in the case of PC there is not unanimity among the leadership as to whether the organization should maintain its “purity” as a movement or continue to institutionalize its capacity as a national NGO implementing a growing portfolio of projects beyond its original purpose—effectively maintaining its hybrid character. If PC decides to remain a movement, then it may be difficult for it to manage projects effectively. If it chooses to be more of an NGO, however, it could still maintain its electoral monitoring functions, and perhaps even enhance them (this is not intrinsically a zero-sum proposition). What it runs the risk of losing is some of its *mística* and public persona as a movement.

⁵¹ See Jonathan Hartlyn, *The Struggle for Democratic Politics in the Dominican Republic*, the University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, 1998.

⁵² See Jorge Cela’s “*Lecciones aprendidas: documento final, retiro de Participación Ciudadana sobre informes de las evaluaciones de Leticia Ayuso y Rosario Espina*,” November 2000. Cela argues that there is no identity crisis. By contrast, interviews with members of PC’s *consejo* indicated a diversity of views.

At this juncture, PC is institutionally vulnerable in that it has yet to establish itself firmly as a focused organization with clear priorities and strategic guidelines. The first article of the bylaws does have what could be defined as a mission statement, although it is not called such.

PC is a non-partisan, civic movement in the social arena that influences, develops consensus and linkages with public authorities and political parties. Its purposes are to promote the articulation of civil society and stimulate citizen participation with the purpose of achieving the political, institutional and democratic reforms that are required by the Republic and are required for fair and balanced social development.

The statement is appropriately general, but perhaps too ambitious. At the very least, it needs to be refined and focused through a set of specific strategic goals and measurable objectives. Interestingly, it clearly states that PC is a civic “movement.” As a first step, the leadership needs to revisit that statement to see if it conforms to what the majority believes is or should be the actual mandate.

PC has several strengths and weaknesses that will eventually determine its ability to become sustainable. But the key question is: as *what*? If it opts to retain its character as a “movement,” then there is a greatly reduced likelihood that it could achieve the kind of sustainability to permit it to operate the donor-sponsored programs in its current portfolio. If it chooses to become a full-fledged NGO (or something close to it), it most likely could become sustainable with some technical assistance to strengthen its current management systems. Moreover, it could do this without entirely losing its character as a movement.

a. Strengths

PC’s main strengths are not institutional in the sense that it has an efficient and effective administrative infrastructure. Rather, it has:

- A national presence that allows it to participate as a major actor in the political processes;
- A network of organizations and volunteers at the community level to promote civil society (*la articulación de la sociedad civil*);
- Legitimacy that lends credibility to its voice and serves to help mobilize the electorate across class lines;
- A mystique that enthuses people (although there are signs of incipient alienation in some local areas);
- A proven track record in galvanizing the electorate to vote and advocate for reforms; and
- An established and credible reputation.

There is little question that PC also has a highly committed professional staff and board. However, it takes more than commitment and enthusiasm to manage an organization to the extent that it can achieve a reasonable level of self-sustainability, which is the issue to be explored.

PC is not entirely without organizational assets and resources either. It has:

- An administrative infrastructure with basic financial management and administrative systems;
- A staff with skills and experience;
- A network of supporters and volunteers; and
- An experienced manager as *Coordinadora del Consejo*.

These resources constitute a base from which PC could be molded into a more organized and effectively managed NGO. But once again, the key question of its institutional identity has to be decided before it can take concrete steps to improve its organizational performance.

b. Weaknesses

The challenge for PC is to institutionalize its strengths in an organization that has a clear direction, well-defined priorities and goals, manageable strategies and the administrative capacity to implement its initiatives effectively. Many of the organizational problems currently faced by PC are not entirely of its own making. The fact that USAID injected millions of dollars in grant funds into an organization with a modest budget based on dues-paying individual members, and that was not entirely prepared to manage efficiently such a large resource increase, resulted in significant management challenges. Further compounding the problem is that the types of projects funded by the Mission expanded somewhat PC's original objective of promoting and "articulating" civil society and mobilizing the people to participate in the political processes, particularly elections. This has created some confusion as to what the actual mission of PC is or should be, at least as interpreted programmatically, and is in part a case of budget driving policy (far from uncommon in organizations with donor funding). It also has resulted in some duplication of effort and confusion with other NGOs. For example, some observers believe that PC's judicial project is more appropriate to FINJUS, which specializes in dealing with legal and judicial issues. Similarly, PC's initiative to create a think tank makes its mandate even more challenging to define. Given the fact that PC still has not developed a strategy focusing on specific issues within an agreed-upon framework, providing it with additional resources has made this an even more difficult issue to manage.

While there is nothing necessarily extraordinary or wrong with a single institution managing different kinds of endeavors (after all, many do), it is important that there be an adequate administrative and financial base to ensure effective operations (something that can be accomplished with the right amount of technical assistance and training). And, as has just been discussed, there clearly needs to be consistency among the activities *within the context of a strategic framework*. This is particularly essential if PC is to acquire sustained self-sufficiency. It cannot realistically expect to be an effective organization if it lacks the focus and resources to implement specific and coordinated activities. While PC refers to a strategic plan, there is none, aside from a compendium of its work plans for the period 1997–2002.

In addition, as the *Coordinadora* freely admits, one of the results of the lack of a strategic plan has been work overload and lack of focus. She is in the process of restructuring PC so that selected staff are in charge of specific activity areas (along the lines of the four PC project components), rather than participating in a little of everything. This, she believes, will help create efficiencies to enhance the impact of PC's resources and energies. This is an appropriate approach, but even more needs to be done, particularly with respect to ensuring that the various programs are advancing a specific *institutional* strategy.

There also is a series of relatively minor administrative defects. For example, according to the *Encargada Administrativa* there are no travel and per diem forms. Reimbursements are requested informally. The four senior administrators (heads of administration, electoral observation, articulation, and education) only meet irregularly, limiting communication, although a LAN has been installed to facilitate electronic intra-office correspondence. All new hires have to be approved by the *Consejo*, a cumbersome and needless process, certainly in the case of junior and support staff. Personnel evaluation forms are only now being drafted.

By themselves, these and other deficiencies, such as those pointed out in several annual external audits, do not represent a significant problem. However, their cumulative impact along with no strategic planning, lack of leadership continuity at the *Coordinador* level and, over the years, general inattention to and relative inexperience with administrative issues have produced a management system that is still struggling to consolidate its capacity to administer a much larger budget and organization.

The work plan for the period May 2001 through September 2002 is unwieldy and overly ambitious. The document itself is 75 pages, inordinately and unnecessarily long and complicated for a work plan. It does not include any specific resource or staff assignments (outside of the general project component), which should be part of a manageable work plan. And the sheer number of activities and objectives casts serious doubt on the ability of PC actually to carry out the plan fully and meet specified goals in a timely and complete way. Given the fact that only two months have passed since its drafting, there has not been sufficient time to measure any results. However, several problems make it unlikely that PC will be able to implement the plan entirely:

- There is no strategic framework—or plan—to guide activities, give them focus and establish priorities. This reflects in part the more fundamental problem of a lack of agreement on what the organization should be and therefore do.
- While the Executive Director and *Coordinadora* have been working to strengthen management, there are still organizational weaknesses that need to be corrected before PC can begin operating at a level that will enable it to administer the broad range of tasks it has set for itself.
- PC has somewhat of a tarnished reputation. It is seen not as entirely distinct from politicians, as it calls on its network only during election cycles. This is understandable, given its original mandate of mobilizing the electorate to vote, but it has done little to explain its role to the network.

- As specific staff assignments by activity have not been included, it is difficult to determine if there are enough resources to achieve objectives.

A summary document of the PC retreat to discuss the evaluations conducted by Leticia Ayuso and Rosario Espinal,⁵³ drafted by Jorge Cela, cited a set of management and organizational problems, including a lack of effective coordination among the *consejo*, *comité coordinador*, and staff. Under the current *Coordinadora* these issues are being addressed. However, they point to a larger problem within the *consejo* itself in that it has not yet given clear direction to PC, largely because of a lack of clarity on the organization's identity and mission. Until the *consejo* decides this issue—along with the other key decision of whether to remain an elite organization or expand its membership significantly at the national level—there is little likelihood that it will be able to provide the kind of strategic and managerial direction PC needs to consolidate itself institutionally and focus on a well-defined mission.

Another key problem has been PC's slow start in developing a self-sufficiency strategy. The last three external audits (1997–2000) concluded that PC needed to diversify “new sources of funds and actions to increase the self-sufficiency of the institution.”⁵⁴ So did the Cela report.⁵⁵ Yet until recently PC has done little to develop a strategy to comply with the recommendations. As PC currently enjoys substantial funding from USAID, it has not felt much pressure to expand its financial base. Instead, it has focused its efforts on trying to manage a large portfolio with a proportionately weak organizational infrastructure.

To their credit, both the *Coordinadora* and the Executive Director are aware of the problems and have been taking steps to deal with them. The *consejo* finally set as a priority development of a self-sustainability strategy. In an interview with the *Coordinadora*, she listed several reasons why little had been done to strengthen PC's capacity to become self-sufficient, specifically:

- The members of the *consejo* are volunteers and do not have the time required to develop a self-sufficiency strategy themselves.
- The staff (*equipo técnico*) has not pushed for the strategy.
- External events have distracted PC from working on a strategy, specifically the constitutional reforms that are being proposed.
- The *consejo* is embarrassed to ask for funds and feels that donors should come to them instead.

PC did contract a consultant early in the year to assist in developing a strategy, but this did not work out. Instead, PC is now in the process of hiring a full-time staff person to do the work. This makes sense in that there would be a full-time professional on the payroll to coordinate both the development and particularly the *implementation* of the strategy, as a kind of director of

⁵³ Jorge Cela, “Lecciones aprendidas: documento final, retiro de Participación Ciudadana sobre informes de las evaluaciones de Leticia Ayuso y Rosario Espinal, November 1, 2000.

⁵⁴ Deloitte & Touche, “Financial Audit of the Participation of Organized Civil Society in Democratization of Cultural and Political Practices in the Dominican Republic Project,” 2000, 1999, and 1998.

⁵⁵ Cela, *op. cit.*

development. It is also consistent with the *consejo's* decision to make financial sustainability a priority for 2001.⁵⁶

PC has written organizational processes and procedures that are standard, some of which are being updated, and a personnel evaluation system is being put into place and position descriptions finally drafted. From what could be determined, staff turnover is relatively low except at the top, and this constitutes a problem. The chairperson serves for only one year. This may be very democratic and in keeping with the organizational *mística*, but it does not:

- Allow for continuity of leadership required to strengthen the organization;
- Give clear institutional focus and direction;
- Permit sustained follow-up, both institutionally and programmatically; or
- Maintain program and management policy stability.

In addition to the impact on the management of PC, these issues weaken PC's capacity to attain any measurable self-sufficiency.

The uneven relationships with its membership and others at the community level is a growing institutional concern. PC's network, almost by definition, has been episodic; that is, it comes into play during elections and then fades until the next cycle. (It could be argued, by contrast, that its new USAID-funded projects will give PC more of a sustained presence. However, those projects do not necessarily involve the same communities and people who are involved in election monitoring.) PC has done very little to communicate with the network in the interim, distancing people it needs. In several of the focus groups, the evaluators listened to complaints about this (real or perceived).

PC's major strength comes from its presence and successes in observing elections and mobilizing the vote. This is its core mission. It needs to be mindful of the grassroots that makes possible its successes. Similarly, it needs to be aware of the elite nature of its leadership and take steps to democratize it. This is key to its viability and sustainability as an institution (or movement). Like a politician, it cannot afford to ignore its base.

This is especially important in light of the weak structure at the municipal level. According to its Executive Director, PC still needs to raise the level of its national presence. As Cela notes,⁵⁷ at the same time it also needs to take steps to increase decentralization and democratization of authority. This would go a long way toward strengthening its constituency.

3. Sustaining the Process

Just as the education and awareness training promoted by the PID is basic to sustaining the process of democratization, so too is the ability to mobilize the voting public to exercise the franchise. If the core work of PC is to be sustained (and sustainable), steps will have to be taken to involve others to expand upon PC's efforts. This is the critical importance of decentralization.

⁵⁶ Interview with PC Executive Director Javier Cabreja, August 14, 2001.

⁵⁷ Cela, "*Lecciones aprendidas*."

PC is a political reform organization. Most other NGOs represent specific sectors of constituencies. It will be necessary to sustain a mobilization—and *articulación*—of these groups to maintain the *process*.

PC has the infrastructure potentially to do this. However, it will have to strengthen its institutional capacity and management in order to move in this direction. By the same token, it will have to seek a more stable and diverse funding base than it has at present. The leadership is aware of this, as has been discussed. But PC needs first to reconcile its identity crisis, focus its mission more precisely and develop and implement a strategic plan.

4. Conclusions and Lessons Learned

- PC's "identity crisis" has impeded its ability to perform more efficiently and effectively. The lack of clear focus is a result of incomplete agreement on what the organization ultimately is: a movement or an institution. At the end of the day, it appears to be a little of both, and the balance is still unclear. This makes it difficult to set clear and consistent programmatic priorities and goals, hobbling more effective management.
- It is understandable that PC would not want to dilute its *mística* as a movement. That has been its hallmark, but has had more recently some negative consequences, as has been pointed out elsewhere in this report. By becoming a full-fledged NGO, however, PC could still maintain and even expand its work in electoral monitoring and mobilizing the vote. It could do this without losing its character as a movement (Solidarity in Poland, for example, went from being a movement to an organization). At the same time, it would be able to develop an institutional capacity to manage projects within the framework of a clear mandate.
- The short (one-year) tenure of the *Coordinadores*—which is also a function of the movement complex—compounds the problem. Without the ability to follow-up on policy and management initiatives provided by multiyear terms, it is difficult for PC to strengthen its management and ultimately its programs.
- Delegating more authority and responsibility to the position of Executive Director is one way to help correct this problem, but it still would not make up entirely for the kind of institutional policy stability that comes from a board of directors. This is another key issue the leadership of PC needs to decide on sooner rather than later if it is to consolidate and effectively manage its expanding mandate and program activities.
- In addition, the lack of planning is both a cause and effect of management problems. If PC enhanced its strategic planning processes, this would help define and sustain institutional policies required to give the organization focus and direction, and ensure that resources are allocated according to an agreed-upon strategy. PC is aware of its institutional problems and has even taken steps to correct some of them. But until the basic issue of identity is resolved clearly, it will continue to experience institutional difficulties.

5. Recommendations

- **Strategic planning.** PC needs technical assistance and training in developing a strategic planning process and plan. It needs first to define its institutional identity and then decide what its mission, goals, and priorities are to be.
- **Organizational strengthening.** As part of the strategic planning exercise, PC needs to seek assistance in conducting a detailed institutional diagnosis, reviewing its mission, structure, and functions. This should include an evaluation of the role, structure, and composition of the *consejo* and *comités*, particularly with respect to management. The structure of PC should follow its functions, which, in turn, need to be defined strategically, not just in response to available donor funding for purposes that may not fit into PC's goals and mission.
- **Leadership roles.** A similar review should be conducted of the role, authority and responsibilities of the Executive Director and senior staff. It is critical to ensure that clear and consistent leadership is exercised, especially if PC continues to evolve into an organization in contradistinction to a movement.
- **Management training.** Relevant technical assistance and training should be provided to help PC strengthen its management capacity. Similarly, with its expanded role and changing mandate, there is a need for PC's management, and board, to acquire new skills to meet new challenges.
- **Consolidating the base.** A strategy needs to be developed and implemented to consolidate PC's local base. This should include a public education/relations initiative to explain what it is PC does and how its activities fit into the local communities.
- **Self-sustainability strategy.** PC should begin the process now of preparing and implementing a detailed self-sustainability strategy. Although it is in the process of hiring a director of development, it is important that he or she first be involved in putting together a well-defined and measurable strategy to achieve self-sustainability to guide activities in a coherent way. This should be part of the strategic planning exercise, and also tied in to any organizational changes that may take place.

E. FINJUS

1. Principal Findings

- FINJUS has a secure financial base that distinguishes it from the PID and PC and makes it sustainable.
- There is relatively little activity in raising significant international donor funds to expand institutional activities.
- Leadership has been strong but personalistic, leaving FINJUS with a weak institutional management capacity. That is both a cause and effect of inadequate planning.
- There is little networking to help expand impact by leveraging resources.

2. Analysis

FINJUS is not dissimilar from PC in that it is “sustainable” but definitely needs institutional strengthening to increase its efficiencies. Fortunately for FINJUS, it has a core funding base and established fee-for-service activities that make it much more sustainable than PC, which depends increasingly on donor—i.e., USAID—funds, and the PID, which is a project. In addition, aside from USAID and IDB funds, FINJUS has been able to raise small amounts of donor assistance from German, Spanish, and multilateral institutions. But these grants have been less than \$50,000 and were used for specific events rather than broader institutional support.

Despite more than seven years in operation, however, FINJUS’s management remains relatively underdeveloped. As recently as the end of July 2001, an “*Evaluación preliminar*” was conducted by PriceWaterhouseCoopers (PWC) in which several important administrative deficiencies were identified, although PWC did conclude that FINJUS had sufficient administrative capacity to manage potential USAID-funded initiatives. For example, FINJUS did *not* have:

- Adequate cash controls;
- Sufficient insurance coverage on fixed assets;
- A computer network for multiple users or back-up system procedures; or
- An adequate system for maximizing savings on purchases.

While the weaknesses pointed out by PWC have either been or are in the process of being corrected, another important management deficit—the lack of adequate planning—has not been addressed. In 1998, FINJUS contracted a consultant to develop an institutional strengthening strategy and strategic plan.⁵⁸ Neither document actually sets forth a clear set of strategies with specific, measurable objectives, implementation procedures, resource requirements, or performance indicators. Two years earlier, in 1996, a more detailed and complete strategic plan was developed, but there was no evidence of any follow-up to the plan. Indeed, it was not made clear why the two 1998 strategy documents were prepared so soon after the 1996 plan was put into place.

What FINJUS lacks, at this point, is a strong administrative system and management, as well as development and implementation of a manageable strategic plan and planning process, to set a clear direction for the organization. The issue with FINJUS is not so much whether or not it can be self-sustaining (it already is), but if it can be managed well enough to make a measurable difference in strengthening civil society. Since its founding in 1993, FINJUS has had three Executive Directors, all of whom have been considered dynamic. The current Chairman of the Board assumed his position last year, along with the new Executive Director and other professional staff. Interviews reveal the perception that the new group is less credible and assertive, partly because its members are relatively young and not yet well-established. Given the generally weak FINJUS administrative infrastructure, this could present a problem, making all the more urgent the need to strengthen institutional capacity.

⁵⁸ Sergio Espejo Yaksic, “*Estrategia de fortalecimiento institucional Fundación Institucionalidad y Justicia, Inc.*” and “*Institucionalidad y justicia: la ejes[sic] estratégicos [sic] de la reforma judicial.*”

Despite these weaknesses, FINJUS has had a positive impact, as described earlier in the report. However, with stronger management, FINJUS should be able to improve its performance through greater cost-effectiveness and focus. Moreover, FINJUS does have one signal strength: a secure funding base. FINJUS is different from many NGOs in that it was created and funded by the private sector. Its membership (of 120 individuals and corporations) has helped establish an endowment. The target is \$600,000 (RD\$10 million). At present, US\$240,000 has been collected. The Director of Administration indicated that FINJUS expects to meet its target within two to three years. In addition, members raised US\$480,000 to purchase the entire floor of a highrise to house FINJUS. Obviously, this gives the organization a significant resource base to ensure its financial sustainability.

The new group urgently needs to define its own strategy and goals. Moreover, the fact that the new Executive Director just resigned from office to run as a candidate for senator from Santiago could weaken further FINJUS management if there is not a quick effort to recruit a strong manager (as well as leader) and develop and implement a long-term institutional strategy. The installation of a new Executive Director would be an opportune moment for FINJUS to review its mission, define its priorities and goals, design its strategies, and set benchmarks to monitor its progress toward clearly established objectives.

There is a certain urgency for FINJUS, as some disaffected former members are in the process of establishing a new organization that may compete with it—a new think tank called *Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, Políticas Públicas and Acciones Colectivas* (CECPUAC). These individuals feel that FINJUS does not deal with all of the issues they believe to be important, and they also harbor personal resentments against some members of FINJUS's Board of Directors. While this new organization is a positive development in that an additional Dominican think tank would be promoting justice reform, FINJUS not surprisingly feels it would threaten its leadership in the field.

Relations between FINJUS and USAID have not always been smooth. The financial and management problems that arose during implementation of the Public Defense Program impelled USAID to undertake a series of audits to assess FINJUS's capability to administer funds adequately. During this time, USAID was forced to use different procurement vehicles to finance FINJUS ROL activities (IQCs, purchase orders, and limited scope grants with other organizations like the *Comisionado*). This situation was a source of confusion and misunderstandings for both parties. One of the most difficult moments was in 1999 when USAID funding for the Dominican Republic was held up in Congress, and FINJUS had pending obligations with consultants that required immediate payment. FINJUS did not have the resources to pay the consultants already contracted to participate in the discussion of the new Criminal Procedure Code, and USAID could not provide funds through the IQC because of the U.S. congressional prohibition.

3. Conclusions/Lessons Learned

- FINJUS's secure core funding base provides a degree of financial stability to allow for more stable long-range planning. In a word, it is sustainable. However, until FINJUS puts in place an adequate planning process, it will not be able to manage its resources efficiently. It is important to underline the fact that secure funding does not necessarily translate into effective management.
- Similarly, the strong personalistic style of leadership of FINJUS has resulted in weak institutionalization of the decision-making processes, further eroding management capacity.
- Despite its growing endowment, FINJUS, if it wants to expand its impact, needs to develop a fund raising strategy. Its endowment can be helpful in leveraging funds from international donors and other sources.
- As a creation of the private sector, FINJUS is basically elitist. If it is to expand its impact, it needs to network much more aggressively. In terms of good management, this would produce economies of scale to increase its cost-benefit ratios and help sustain its initiatives.

4. Recommendations

- **Strategic planning.** FINJUS should review its mission and role and develop a long-range strategy. This should be a manageable document and process, one that fits the institutional capacity of FINJUS. Moreover, the strategic plan will require sustained follow-up and review to make adjustments and internal and external conditions change.
- **Management training and assistance.** This needs to be complemented by technical assistance and training to strengthen FINJUS's management and administrative systems, and to train staff on how to implement a strategic/work planning process.
- **Board training.** Board training should be provided, especially in the role Board members play in planning and operations. This would be an integral part of the management training process. It is essential for both management and the board to understand and agree upon their roles and how they are implemented.
- **Institutional review.** As a first step, FINJUS should contract for a thorough institutional diagnostic. This is the key to the other steps in strengthening the organization. FINJUS has program experience and a secure financial base. This gives it advantages that have not yet been exploited to improve its performance.

F. Overall Conclusions and Lessons Learned

- The institutional capacity to sustain civil society initiatives exists. The large majority of the CSOs and other NGOs visited in the course of the assessment demonstrated a broad if uneven ability to develop and manage programs. While most of these organizations are not CSOs per se, the areas of work they represent—e.g., environment, health, education, health, etc.—require them to take part in the political/policymaking process at some point, making them participants in the civil society at large. This has a significant multiplier effect, in essence expanding institutional capacity.

- Similarly, while the large majority of the organizations have only marginal institutional capacity, their ability to form networks has helped sustain their impact and achieve some measurable results. Networking is a key to success in civil society efforts.
- In fact, these institutions sustain the *process* of democracy, serving as alternatives to more formal political articulation and aggregation mechanisms, especially the political parties, to access and influence the decision-making processes.
- While most NGOs do not receive international donor support, many do, especially some of the more important ones that have a relatively large constituent base. This has made a difference in that it has permitted CSOs and other NGOs to expand the scope and effect of their activities. Although the institutional infrastructure was already present, the fact that international donors provided support, especially at critical junctures such as in 1996, helped to strengthen the capacity of the institutions to carry out their objectives.
- Sustainability is a relative concept. Some NGOs are virtually self-sustaining and have access to secure sources of income. The vast majority are not, but are able to subsist. That is why networking is so important in terms of developing a broad-based “institutional” capacity to effect political reform.
- International donors need to be prepared to provide “sustained” support over a period of years to ensure measurable change and impact. USAID’s 10-year funding for the PID was a remarkable display of foresight and yielded concrete results. The irony is, of course, that the PID is not an institution and thus runs the risk of losing its ability to sustain its work. The lesson is that more effort should have gone into taking earlier steps to institutionalize it.
- The *medio paso atrás* strategy was well-conceived and implemented. It gave the Dominican institutions the ability to gain credibility and produce results.