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1625 Massachusetts Ave. NW, Suite 550, Washington, D.C. 20036 USA Tel.: 202-332-2853 Fax: 202-332-8257 Internet: info@widtech.org

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# Women's Participation in Angola's Reconstruction and in Its Political Institutions and Processes

by

Marcia E. Greenberg Della McMillan Branca Neto do Espirito Santo Julia Ornelas

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#### PREFACE

The WIDTECH team is pleased to report that, as was hypothesized by USAID's Mission in Angola, the women of Angola are a determined and active population who have the capacity to support the U.S. Government's fundamental goal in Angola, namely to strengthen peace and stability. USAID's theory rests on four causal connections: (1) that peace and stability in Angola depend on effective democratic processes; (2) that USAID's programming can and should support such processes; (3) that the success of USAID programs depends on well-designed and implemented programming; and (4) that U.S.-supported programs would be better designed and implemented if Angolan women participated in needs assessment and implementation.

The WIDTECH team believed USAID's theory. Yet we feel compelled to note that we have found even more women's strength, interest, and capacity than we had anticipated. Our research confirms USAID's proposal that it strengthen its programming in Angola by ensuring that women play a critical role in both U.S. programming and Angolan civil society generally.

Moreover, there are numerous opportunities to support Angolan women's efforts to establish a peaceful and open society. In particular, throughout Angola there is a rich and active community of local organizations organized by and for women (except the noteworthy lack of organizations in Moxico and Kwanza Sul). These organizations are already active, but could be more effective if they had some assistance. They would also be strong partners for USAID programs.

Yet there are constraints to women's participation, of which three are critical: (1) Angolan attitudes toward women's roles in society, (2) information flows to women, and (3) inadequate efforts to involve women in the design and implementation of technical assistance programming.

There are two ways for USAID to increase the role of Angolan women in its programming: incorporate them more fully into existing programming to ensure that women are getting their share of opportunities and assistance, and target some assistance at women's initiatives in particular. It is true that some in the foreign assistance community, especially the Swedes and Norwegians, have been supporting women in Angola for several years. It is no coincidence that the Swedes started their work two years ago — including support for the Secretariat for the Promotion of Women and funding for "barefoot" advisors for battered women — and that a number of the new women's associations were founded in 1995. Yet there are gaps and needs that have yet to be addressed. At this juncture, it is very important that USAID establish strong working relations with the Ministry for Women. Whenever intervention involves something beyond gender training or hiring practices of U.S. private voluntary organizations and nongovernmental organizations, the Ministry should be a key partner (Annex10 provides information about the Ministry's programs).

We have written this report to provide background and guidance for a variety of readers including USAID in Washington, the USAID Mission in Luanda, and others in Angola who are concerned about ensuring women's participation in Angolan society. Thus we have crafted a section on history and socio-economic conditions to suggest the underlying bases for women's position in Angolan society. Since the team's work was divided into two parts — analysis of the Mission's Strategic Objective #1 on Resettlement, Rehabilitation and Food Self-Reliance, and Strategic Objective #2 on Civil Society and Political Institutions — we address these objectives in separate chapters. Since much of the SO#1 assistance has a real history and track record, the chapter on SO#1 is organized by type of activity. Each section links observations of projects with recommendations for improvement. In contrast, the SO#2 section addresses a brand new area of USAID assistance. Consequently, the observations are more societal than programmatic, and the recommendations suggest a general plan and structure for Democracy and Governance assistance.

The Annex section of the report begins with a copy of the Action Step Report that the team presented as draft recommendations to USAID in Luanda on April 29, as the American members of the team were leaving Angola. At the Mission's request, we summarized the steps with attention to their priority and to the specifics of day-to-day implementation.

The remainder of the annex materials go beyond the team's analysis and recommendations to provide additional reference materials. First, we provide a list of references that were consulted in preparation of the report (Annex 2). Following that are annexes that include a list of people and organizations that provided input to the WIDTECH investigation (Annex 6), and other supplementary information. The last three annexes relate to women's organizations, women's projects and the Ministry for Women.

The research and the ideas in this report are the result of a great deal of input and collaboration. We note that the staff and management of the U.S. partner organizations that are implementing USAID's strategies were open and responsive to inquiries and suggestions about gender. We also appreciated input and contributions from Angolan clients and partners of USAID programs, and from collaborating government institutions. We would like to acknowledge that our way was prepared in part by the Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children — both through their Mission report and from a personalized briefing.

We would like to thank all those at the U.S. Embassy and at USAID in Angola for their support, their patience and their input. The team was impressed by Ambassador Steinberg's vigilance and determination to identify situations where women's input has been lacking and to advocate their integration. In addition, none of the preparations would have been possible without the help of Muneera Salem-Murdock and Murl Baker in Washington.

Finally, and most importantly, we want to thank Nicholas Jenks. Not only did he have the foresight to recognize the importance of integrating women more fully in USAID's programs in Angola, and to take advantage of G/WID's capacity to help him identify the constraints to and opportunities for women's participation, but he also took pains to ensure that he got as much as possible from the WIDTECH team.

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# **GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS**

AAD	Angolan Action for Development
AAMJ	Association of Angolan Women Lawyers
CCF	Christian Children's Fund
CREA	Creative Associates International
CRS	Catholic Relief Services
ERSP	World Bank's Emergency Social Recovery Program
FAA	Armed Forces of Angola
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FAS	Fund for Social Support (Fundo de Apoio Social)
FNLA	National Front for the Liberation of Angola
FONGA	Forum of Angolan NGOs
GURN	Government of Unity and National Reconciliation (seated in April, 1997)
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IMC	International Medical Corps
INE	Angolan Institute for National Statistics
IOM	International Migration Organization
IRI	International Republican Institute
IRSEM	Institute for Socio-Professional Reintegration of Ex-Military
LIMA	League of Angolan Women/UNITA
LWF	Lutheran World Federation
MINARS	Ministry of Assistance and Social Rehabilitation
MPLA	Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola
NDI	National Democratic Institute
NGO	Nongovernmental Organization (used primarily with regard to the U.S. organizations
	implementing USAID's Democracy and Governance program, and to Angolan
	organizations that have achieved a legal status and basic institutional structure).
OMA	Organization of Angolan Women/MPLA
OTI	Office of Transition Initiatives/USAID
PAM	World Food Programme (Programme Alimentaire Mondiale)
PVO	Private Voluntary Organization (used primarily to refer to the organizations that are
	USAID partners for SO#1 activities)
QA	Quartering Area
SeCOR	National Institute for Reintegration
SO	Strategic Objective (for USAID)
UCAH	U.N. Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit
USAID	U.S. Agency for International Development
UNAVEM	U.N. Angola Verification Mission
UNHCR	U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	U.N. Children's Fund
UNITA	National Union for the Total Independence of Angola
VVAF	Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation
WC	Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children
WFP	World Food Programme

# **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

#### **INTRODUCTION**

If Angolans are ever to put war behind them, they must realize that Angola's women are a critical asset for building and maintaining a lasting peace. In early 1997, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) Mission in Angola hypothesized that greater women's participation was needed, and asked USAID's Women in Development Office (G/WID) for technical assistance through the WIDTECH project. WIDTECH assembled a team of four experts: WIDTECH's democracy and governance specialist, Marcia Greenberg; an anthropologist with expertise in Africa, agriculture and resettlement, Della McMillan; an Angolan lawyer who is vice-president of the Association of Angolan Women Lawyers, Julia Ornelas; and an economist who leads one of the most effective nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in development in Angola, Branca Neto do Espirito Santo. The team's goal was to identify barriers to women's participation and recommend opportunities for enhancing women's contribution to democracy and economic restructuring within USAID programs. The process also entailed building a general understanding of the circumstances of Angolan women.

The team was divided to cover two of USAID/Angola's [revised] strategic objectives (SOs):

- 1. Increased resettlement, rehabilitation and food self-reliance of war-affected Angolan communities (SO#1) and
- 2. Increased national reconciliation through strengthened civil society and political institutions (SO#2).

Over the course of five weeks, the WIDTECH team conducted research in five provinces (Bie, Cuanza Sul, Huambo, Malange, and Luanda). The SO#1 team conducted more than 300 interviews (one-on-one or in small groups), and reached another 200 people in larger sessions. The SO#2 team ran six focus groups to discuss Angolan women and the media, unemployment, poverty, violence, human rights and customary versus state law. The team also met with three gatherings of women in the *musseques* (shanty towns) of Luanda and with women from LIMA and ADEMA in Bailundo. The full team met with the Minister of Women to explore opportunities to cooperate in achieving her Ministry's objectives and those of USAID/Angola.

### HISTORICAL AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC BACKGROUND OF ANGOLAN WOMEN

• There are at least nine major ethnolinguistic groups in Angola, some of which are matrilineal and some are not. They share two characteristics that are important for women: historic acceptance of polygamy, and the economic importance of women in supervising most crop production activities.

- Women in Angola are not a homogeneous group. Their differences depend on education and economic well-being, urban or rural living, government or UNITA affiliation, and stable or displaced residences. Program design and recommendations must take these differences into account.
- Throughout their colonial control of Angola, the Portuguese separated men from their families first through three centuries of slave trade and then through an extensive, tightly orchestrated system of forced labor on plantations. Consequently, women have historically had to provide food and other basic needs for themselves and their children.
- Missionaries, both Catholic and Protestant, provided most of the educational opportunities for non-Portuguese Angolans. They educated Angolan men to be leaders. They focused women's education, however, on home economics, nursing and teaching. To this day, most training that is proposed for women even by women's NGOs is limited to sewing, embroidery and cooking.
- Although it was common throughout Africa for colonial powers to leave behind an unskilled workforce, most countries have had several decades to focus on human capacity development. In Angola, years of war have interfered with this process (except for a small and wealthy elite). While this poses problems for economic development, the need for widespread training opens opportunities to train women as well as men.
- For decades, churches have been critical sources for education, social services and information. Most women are affiliated with a church, and participate in the church's *sociedade de senhoras* (or women's group).
- Despite their neo-Marxist or egalitarian rhetoric, both the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) and the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) seem to have relegated women to "traditional" support roles, with only some few exceptions in leadership.
- War's negative impacts on women have included a substantial increase in female-headed households and polygamy (which Angolan women say leaves them physically and economically vulnerable), a growing population of land-mine-injured women, and widespread reliance upon customary or neo-customary "legal systems" for lack of any effective formal system.
- The years of war have also had some positive side effects for women. For example, women separated from their home communities have needed to speak Portuguese as a lingua franca. In addition, women have had opportunities to develop skills and experience while taking over jobs and activities while men were fighting. Ironically, women's struggle to survive seems to have counteracted tendencies toward passivity that typifies other postsocialist societies and to have fueled innovation and entrepreneurial activities.

### **BARRIERS AND OPPORTUNITIES**

### Barriers

1. There is inadequate participation by women in all phases of USAID project decisionmaking.

While humanitarian and development organizations are increasingly sensitive to women as beneficiaries, they are still not engaging women in earlier phases of assistance — especially needs assessment, project design and project implementation. In many cases, the staff of USAID grantees lack sufficient gender sensitivity to develop culturally appropriate strategies for increasing women's participation, or to train new staff and to explain gender-focused approaches to their partners. All too often the hiring practices of USAID-funded private voluntary organizations (PVOs) tend to miss, exclude, or discourage employment of Angolan women.

2. Standard methods of disseminating information about USAID-funded projects do not reach Angolan women.

There are two impediments to effective communication, the means and the message. The means are flawed because there is heavy reliance on channels of communication that Angolan women do not use, such as radios, circulars to municipal hospitals and health posts, newspapers, and networks of NGOs. Women typically receive information in two ways: (1) from male leaders, such as *sobas*, church pastors, and school teachers; and (2) through their churches' *sociedades de senhoras* (women's groups). However, messages that reach women often lack meaning for women or for the intermediaries responsible for relaying the information. Rarely do the messages (for example, invitations to participate in programs or apply for employment) explain why women might want to respond.

3. A lack of reliable and gender-disaggregated data is distorting project design and implementation to the detriment of Angolan women.

Decades of war have impeded efforts to collect any data in Angola for five reasons.

- Both the government and UNITA have closed access to some of the areas they control, making it difficult to gain firsthand information.
- The collapse and disrepair of communications and transportation systems have made it impossible, dangerous, or costly to collect information.
- There are local language barriers to ensuring clear understanding of questions and issues.
- Frequent movements of displaced populations make it difficult to ensure that all populations are covered without duplication.
- $\Box$  The reality on the ground has changed constantly.

Beyond the general difficulties of collecting information, efforts to understand women's needs are only very recent. But in the last year there have been several good studies: a World Food Programme study (Tall, 1996), the Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children mission report (Diaz, 1997), a World Bank study (Declich, 1997), and a recent Angolan study, *O Perfil da Mulher Angolana no Desenvolvimento* (Cohen dos Santos, 1997). Still, however, there is a need to collect simple and up-to-date data, including the number of women-headed households and their needs, literacy levels, and mastery of Portuguese; women's skills and backgrounds for employment; and the needs of women in areas historically occupied by UNITA.

4. Angolan women typically cede decision-making power and control to men.

At first glance, the position of women seems stronger than it is, because women are represented in the highest levels of government, including the two very important ministers of Petroleum and of Fisheries. But beyond the circles of a narrow, family-based elite, there is a pervasive culture of excluding women from systems of control. Roles are distinct in Angola: women work very hard, but remain in a private domain and are not decision-makers. Men operate in the public realm, lead, and make decisions affecting all of society, such as making or continuing war. If Angola is to enjoy an effective democracy, it cannot exclude 50 percent of the population, namely women, from assessing needs, setting priorities, and allocating resources.

5. Efforts targeting women's political participation tend to focus on quantity rather than quality: the number of women's votes, rather than informed votes; and the number of women as political candidates, rather than their chances to win.

Women did turn out to vote in 1992. Yet interviews in villages and communities served by USAID projects exposed the fact that women typically have little, if any, information about candidates, platforms or issues. Although they know their own needs, they do not know which candidate will work for them. As for women in leadership positions, there are no women at the regional level as governors or vice governors; and at the national level, 25 of 215 members of the National Assembly are women. The way that power and resources are being allocated in transition suggests that women may have difficulty even maintaining that level of involvement. Beyond these, the greatest problem is whether additional women are interested in taking leadership positions, have the skills and resources to campaign, and can negotiate within the political parties to have a position on party lists to make them viable candidates.

6. Currently, Angola's formal legal system is virtually useless for women.

In Angola's post-conflict environment, people defend their rights, person and property any way that they can — often using guns, family influence, and money (graft). While the rule-of-law should protect all members of society, it is those who lack other means of defense who need it the most. Yet while the language of the Angolan Constitution and some laws may protect women, the application of the law does not. Angolan women know little or nothing about the laws, cannot access legal counsel or courts, and are constant victims of police brutality and graft.

#### **Opportunities**

1. A variety of women's groups, ranging from informal initiatives to new professional associations, offer critical bases for women's participation in Angolan democracy and in civil society.

Many women in Angola are already working together. Their initiatives lie along a continuum from informal groups with common interests, to interest-based initiatives, to community-based organizations, to NGOs. At each level, there is a critical need for capacity building. The women themselves are eager for technical assistance and would make good use of it.

2. USAID/Angola need not start its democracy and governance programs from scratch, because the extensive network built by PVOs in the humanitarian, reconstruction, and agriculture programs offers a foundation for civic education and democracy initiatives.

Since USAID humanitarian and agriculture programs have reached at least 1.5 million people, there is a broad platform and network through which to spread and enhance democratic support. There are opportunities for democracy projects to work with the PVOs and their beneficiaries to leverage their impact.

3. There are "best practices" in Angola that could be emulated by USAID grantees designing projects to support democratic processes.

Although most PVOs do not have experience supporting the elements of democracy, such as representation, participatory decision-making, transparency and community-building, there are several programs that offer relevant experience. Creative Associates International, Angola's Fund for Social Support, Christian Children's Fund (CCF), and the U.N. Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit (UCAH) technical committees have been fostering participatory processes in Angola. Those programs offer valuable lessons about how to introduce Angolans to democracy.

### RECOMMENDATIONS

#### **Regarding Reconstruction, Resettlement and Agriculture Programs**

- To help Angolans achieve sustainable food self-sufficiency, USAID must substantially increase the number of women who are extension agents, leader farmers, and Seeds for Freedom test farmers. To improve the success of these programs, USAID should consider:
  - Mandating that PVOs place women in 50 percent of the positions relating to agricultural research and extension;

- Helping PVOs devise ways for women to work as extension agents in the areas where they live, so that the programs benefit from agents who know the population and farming conditions, and the women agents are able to work with the PVOs while remaining close to their families; and
- Insisting that all grantees' recruiting processes include contacts with networks of schools, women's religious groups, extension groups, and *sobas*.
- To obtain critical, up-to-date data on which to base plans for project design and implementation, USAID should enlist its PVOs and NGOs (and their field workers or extension agents) in simple data collection relating to
  - The number, socio-economic conditions, and farming systems of female-headed households;
  - Whether women speak Portuguese and literacy levels; and
  - The existence, structure, and purpose of any women's groups.

Such information is critical, but does not require large, expensive, time-consuming studies.

- When supporting infrastructure rehabilitation, USAID should insist that women be involved in the conceptualization of projects in order that they address women's needs (for example, to spend less time and effort on fetching water and grinding meal), incorporate women's experience and know-how, and involve women in construction and maintenance.
- When providing assistance for people who have been injured by land mines, USAID must direct attention to the plight of disabled women in Angola. USAID should focus on their immediate needs by ensuring that they receive prostheses. It should mandate that 50 percent of prostheses go to women. But it is also extremely important that USAID recognize that unless disabled women have the capacity to access special transportation and healthcare, their ability to provide for their families will be diminished. USAID should support their long-term capacity to produce food, care for their families, and participate as active citizens by ensuring that they receive capacity building within the Democracy and Governance (D&G) programs to organize as interest groups.

### **Regarding Democracy and Governance Programs**

- USAID should foster the growth of civil society in Angola by supporting "proto-NGOs" (community-based initiatives or community-based organizations and interest groups) arising from its SO#1 beneficiary client groups (for example, midwives, disabled women, and relatives of underage soldiers).
- In a follow-up phase, USAID will have the opportunity to link the strengthened base of SO#1 community organizations to election preparation for women. This is an essential and

invaluable base, because limiting D&G assistance to a handful of scattered women's groups would not achieve the country-wide impact sought by USAID.

- In the meantime, USAID's grantees should strengthen and build the capacity of existing NGOs and associations by working with them on specific projects.
- It is important to focus some effort and resources on the nearly one-third of Angolan women who now live as internally displaced persons (IDPs) in the *musseques* of Luanda.
- USAID-funded PVOs should be required to focus D&G programming on strengthening women as political candidates within the political parties so that they may win places in the National Assembly.
- USAID-funded D&G projects should reorient their civic education and election preparation to ensure that women can make informed decisions as voters.
- The U.S. Embassy and USAID should support the reestablishment of the rule of law that will protect Angolan women. Legal literacy is certainly important, and women must know about the law. But this alone will not suffice, because it is of little help to educate women about a system that is non-functional. Thus the United States should also help ensure that courts are functional, that women can enjoy fair and just assistance in them, and that women have access to legal counsel.
- There must be a concerted effort to ensure women's participation in USAID programs. Assistance tends to flow to those who are already in the system, which increases the disparity between a male elite and marginalized Angolan women. Without skills and resources, women cannot compete as equal and effective partners.

# **Critical Steps and Short-Term Follow-Up**

The WIDTECH team recommends that USAID/Angola:

- Constitute a Women's Advisory Committee that would include the Angolan members of the WIDTECH team, a representative from the Angolan Ministry for Women, and representatives from LIMA and ADEMA, from the OMA Center for Battered Women, from the Methodist Church's Women's Committee, and from each province where USAID is currently working. The committee would bring information about existing initiatives and women's needs, while advising on design and implementation. It would also serve as a conduit back to Angolan women about USAID's resources and programs.
- Enlist G/WID assistance to run a Gender Guidelines Workshop for USAID grantees in Angola. The workshop should result in (1) sector-specific gender guidelines for project design and implementation, such as for humanitarian assistance or agricultural research and extension, and (2) staffing plans of action to increase the hiring and training of Angolan women.

- Lend political and financial support to the UNCAH/National Institute for Reintegration initiative to ensure that the processes of demobilization and resettlement include support for women. USAID should finance a short-term gender expert who would be responsible for convening the first meeting of a Task Force on Women's Issues and for ensuring that the Task Force produces a Gender Action Plan.
- Arrange for Angola-based PVOs and NGOs to share their experiences with one another. In particular, D&G and agricultural programs would communicate more effectively with rural Angolan women by learning from the success of land-mine awareness programs in reaching and educating women. The CCF collaboration with traditional *sobas* and *catequistas* should be a model, as well as CCF's methods of working through traditional organizations to distribute information to women.
- Require that its grantees report on women's participation in all phases of their projects and credit those who effectively integrate women.

### CHAPTER 1

# **INTRODUCTION: WIDTECH'S APPROACH IN ANGOLA**

USAID's Office for Women in Development established the WIDTECH project to help USAID improve women's participation in its programs. Therefore WIDTECH's role in Angola was not the broad investigation of women in Angola; its narrowly defined role was to identify opportunities and constraints that encourage or inhibit women's full participation in USAID's programs.

Thus the WIDTECH team focused on understanding what USAID is doing in Angola, and on identifying ways to increase women's participation within those programs. The parameters of USAID's work in Angola are defined by three "strategic objectives," and WIDTECH was asked to focus on the first two (Table 1). The goal of the study was to provide background information about women's needs and capability in Angola, along with specific, focused recommendations for ways to guide USAID's "strategy formulation and activity design" (USAID/Angola 1997:7).

#### TABLE 1 USAID'S STRATEGIC OBJECTIVES IN ANGOLA, 1997

Strategic Objectiv	<b>/e #1</b> : Increased resettlement, rehabilitation and food self-reliance of war-affected
Angolan communit	ies.
IR#1: Increased le	vels of food security in communities where there are significant numbers of
resettled people.	
IR#2: Improved he	alth status in areas covered by PVO partner and other donor programs (with
funding leveraged	by other donors).
IR#3: Rehabilitatio	n of war victims and other vulnerable groups (e.g. amputee victims of land mines,
	umatized children, underage minor soldiers, and war-separated children).

**Strategic Objective #2**: Increased national reconciliation through strengthened civil society and political institutions.

Source: R4 1997:19, USAID 1997

#### THE G/WID WIDTECH TEAMÊ

The team was composed of four full-time experts who worked together from March 23 to April 29, 1997. The WIDTECH team was led by Marcia Greenberg, a lawyer with experience with participatory processes who is WIDTECH's Democracy and Governance specialist. She was accompanied by Della McMillan, an anthropologist with expertise in Africa, agriculture, and resettlement.

The Americans were joined by two Angolans: Julia Ornelas, a lawyer who is vice-president of the Association of Angolan Women Lawyers, and Branca Neto do Espirito Santo, an economist who leads one of the most effective development NGOs in Angola. Both women had attended the Beijing conference. In addition, the team enjoyed part-time collaboration with Clarisse Kaputo, an Angolan journalist who has worked with and followed UNITA forces for the last seventeen years. The collaboration with Angolan experts was critical for several reasons. First, it facilitated the Americans' ability to understand Angolan history, politics, and women's situations. Second, they were extraordinarily helpful in arranging access to people and organizations. Third, they were essential partners in research, analysis, and formulation of recommendations that make sense in the Angolan context. Lastly, and very importantly, they are the key to the long-term sustainability of the team's work because they are able to continue working with USAID, with the U.S. NGOs and PVOs and with other individuals, organizations and government offices that will have impact on Angolan women's lives.

The team started its research process in Angola by drafting a letter that summarized its objectives and its intended approach, and had the USAID Mission Director review and approve it. The team then translated the letter into Portuguese and distributed it to all individuals and groups with whom it had interviews or discussions. It was a useful tool both for dispelling fears and rumors, and for publicly announcing the team's objectives. Inadvertently, the letter served as a sort of press release, having generated a newspaper article about WIDTECH (Annex 7).

# REGARDING RESETTLEMENT, REHABILITATION AND FOOD SELF-RELIANCEÊ (SO#1)

The first broad programmatic area where USAID intervenes in Angola is to support "increased resettlement, rehabilitation and food self-reliance of war-affected Angolan communities" (R4, 1997).

Currently, the U.S. Government supports more than 20 types of activities under Strategic Objective #1 (Table 2). In their current form, many of these projects support a package of activities that include emergency food assistance, as well as water resource rehabilitation, primary health care, and basic crop development assistance for war-affected populations. Most of these diversified "transitional" projects grew out of the PVOs' initial, graduated response to the 1993 emergency. Other SO#1 projects are more tightly focused on the achievement of a single activity such as nutritional monitoring or primary health.

The gender issues associated with reconstruction and rehabilitation efforts differ according to the type of activity within a project. They are also strongly affected by the population's circumstances with the resettlement process. For example, many of the populations that benefited from the first generation of food assistance are now well on the way to reestablishing basic food sufficiency, and may even be generating a small surplus for trade or sale. Others are just beginning the rough transition of rebuilding after returning home from a city or secondary transition site to which they had fled. Others are still in temporary conditions of secondary transition sites waiting to return home.

To ensure that our analysis recognized the fundamental differences in needs, opportunities, objectives and constraints, WIDTECH's SO#1 team (McMillan and Neto do Espirito Santo) focused its analysis on specific types of activities rather than on individual projects (Table 2).

TABLE 2 THE USAID ACTIVITIES RELATING TO SO#1 THAT THE WIDTECH TEAM OBSERVED

QA = Quartering Area	Bie/Kuito QA: N'Tucko	Cuanza-Sul	Huambo	Malange QA: Catala	Luanda
1. Emergency assistance: food, basic health care, housing, blankets, and clothing to IDPs in urban centers	X	Х		X	
2. Vaccination Programs (children and women)	x	x			
3. Feeding malnourished children					
4. Food for work: Roads	Х				
5. Food for Work: Rebuilding latrines		x			
<ol><li>Food for Work: Rebuilding schools and health posts</li></ol>	x	x			
7. Repairing water systems				х	Х
8. Demobilizing underage soldiers			х	х	
9. Monitoring and advising demobilized underage soldiers and their families			x	x	
10. Monitoring and advising the demobilized soldiers and their families	Х			Х	
11. Interviewing displaced populations in urban centers to determine their constraints to resettlement	х			x	
12. Helping displaced populations resettle	x			х	
13. Distributing agricultural tools	Х	х			
14. Distributing seeds	х	х		х	
15. Testing seed varieties		х			
16. Agricultural extension		х		Х	
17. Land mine surveys	х				х
18. Land mine awareness		Х		Х	
19. Community organization			х		
20. Therapy for traumatized children	х		х	Х	
21. Housing/food support for orphans (including Food for Work)	Х				

The goals of this analysis were:

- 1. To examine current patterns of women's participation as clients, employees, and administrators at each project stage (needs identification, planning, implementation, monitoring and evaluation), in a representative sample of USAID-funded activities on the ground;
- 2. To analyze the major barriers to different categories of women participating in and receiving the benefits from these activities; and
- 3. To develop recommendations for strengthening women's participation and benefits.

Because Angola is a large country (twice the size of Texas) with vast differences based on geography, history, ethnolinguistic background and war experience, it was essential that the team look at Angolan conditions and USAID programs in a variety of locales. However, the WIDTECH team faced constraints of time and transportation. Due to sporadic hostilities and armed forces, banditry, disrepair of roads, and the pervasive danger of land mines, travel was unusually difficult. Little travel is possible by road and air travel is predominantly by means of World Food Programme flights.<sup>1</sup>

Nevertheless, the SO#1 team managed to conduct research in five provinces (Bie, Cuanza Sul, Huambo, Malange, Luanda). Those sites were selected in consultation with USAID/Angola to ensure a representative sampling of USAID-funded activities. Because of logistical and transportation difficulties in Angola, there were a few cases when the team was unable to see a program first hand in the field. In those cases, the team interviewed provincial and national level supervisors in Luanda and reviewed documentation (noted as "Luanda" in Table 2).

The actual research consisted of structured, open-ended interviews with five groups of female project clients, male and female employees and administrators of PVOs, and various leaders. The goal of the interviews (which loosely followed a basic predetermined outline to increase comparability between interviewers) was to describe past and present patterns of women's participation in different decision-making processes associated with USAID-assisted projects. The interviews also examined the access to or lack of information about available resources and assistance that might be present in the policies and practices of donors, international NGOs, local NGOs, the government, and communities.

The SO#1 team also met with representatives of the United Nations' Humanitarian Assistance Coordinating Unit (UCAH), Angola's Community Referral System for Demobilized Soldiers (SeCor), and several foreign NGOs (Table 3). In all, the SO#1 team interviewed approximately 336 individuals one-on-one or in small interview settings, and met with about 200 more individuals in larger information sessions (Annex 6).

Types of Interviewees	# interviewed
National and provincial administrators and elected leaders	15
Civil Service employees	48
Employees of USAID-funded NGO projects, national level	19
Employees of USAID-funded NGO projects, provincial level	48
USAID & U.N. agency employees associated with USAID-funded initiatives	25
Direct beneficiaries of USAID programs	88
Local leaders (male and female, traditional leaders, religious leaders and leaders of local organizations such as women's groups [OMA,LIMA])	93
Total number of interviewees	336

TABLE 3 NUMBER OF SO#1-RELATED INTERVIEWS BY TYPE OF INTERVIEWEES

In addition to general questions about project participation, the team focused a special analysis on the priority needs and constraints of four categories of vulnerable women (see also UCAH 1995c: 8):

- 1. The wives, companions and mothers of demobilized soldiers or those waiting to be demobilized;
- 2. Single female heads of families;
- 3. Internally displaced war-affected persons or IDPs living in non-sponsored secondary "traditional" communities or in USAID-assisted secondary "transit" communities, or having recently returned to their "home"<sup>2</sup> community; and
- 4. Women mutilated by mines or other actors of war.

#### **REGARDING DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE PROGRAMMING (SO#2)**

The democracy and governance component entailed four approaches. First, the SO#2 team (Greenberg and Ornelas) met with representatives of women's groups, and with representatives in a number of government ministries.<sup>3</sup>

Second, the team met with representatives of NGOs engaged in democracy and governance work for USAID, including, NDI, IRI, PACT, and World Learning. They also met with NGOs that are doing related work, such as Search for Common Ground, and Creative Associates International (CREA).

Third, the SO#2 team held focus group discussions on six topics:

- 1. Women and the media
- 2. Women and unemployment
- 3. Women and poverty
- 4. Women and violence
- 5. Women and human rights
- 6. Women and the law (customary versus state)

The team also held three focus group discussions in the *musseques* of Luanda:

- One in the market with women fish vendors;
- One with women at the Evangelical Baptist Church of Angola in Palanca in the municipality of Kilamba Kiaxi; and
- One with Kimbanguista women from the Kikongo ethnolinguistic group who fled to Zaire in 1961 for security, returned to Angola after 1975, and arrived in the *musseques* only in recent years.<sup>4</sup>

Fourth, the team traveled to Huambo, Bailundo, and Luvemba where it met with women leaders and women's NGOs. In Huambo, the team visited the regional office of the Secretary for the Promotion and Development of Women, women participating in an OIKOS project outside of Huambo, and traditional birth attendants from an IMC training program. In Bailundo, the team met with the leaders of LIMA and ADEMA, and in Luvemba, with the women's group of the local church.

### **WORKING WITH THE MISSION**

To ensure that the team was looking at issues and sources that would be most helpful to USAID, and to ensure that recommendations would be practical and feasible, the team consulted with USAID/Angola as follows:

- The team met with Nicholas Jenks, the Mission Director, and with program officers Alexis Robles and Kimberly Smith.
- $\Box$  The team provided a proposed outline of its report about one week after arriving.
- The team provided a summary of observations and recommendations five days before departure.
- The team met with Mr. Jenks and the incoming director two days later to discuss that summary.
- The team produced a revised document two days later that summarized proposed Action Steps.
- $\Box$  The team met with the Mission Director to discuss the proposed Action Steps.
- Incorporating the Mission Director's input, the team produced a revised Action Steps report that it left with USAID/Angola on the day of departure (Annex 1).

The team met with the U.S. Ambassador both at the beginning of its assessment and mid-way through its work. In the Ambassador's absence, the team leader met with the Deputy Chief of Mission just before departure. At the Mission Director's suggestion, the team held a press conference several days before departure.

# **REPORTING AND DEBRIEFING**

There have been three additional pieces to WIDTECH's efforts to report and de-brief.

- 1. Marcia Greenberg and Della McMillan de-briefed USAID in Washington on May 28, 1997;
- 2. Julia Ornelas participated in a WIDTECH seminar in Washington on June 11, 1997, to share lessons and concerns relating to ways in which the legal systems in post-conflict circumstances in Africa fail to protect and support women; and
- Marcia Greenberg and Della McMillan de-briefed the Women's Commission on Refugee Women and Children experts who had been in Angola in December 1996 on June 20, 1997.<sup>5</sup>

The WIDTECH team was charged with assisting the Mission in Angola, and, with the invaluable collaboration with Branca Neto do Espirito Santo, Julia Ornelas and Clarisse Kaputo, the team gathered a great deal of information. Consequently, rather than focusing only on the observations and recommendations requested by USAID/Angola, this report shares additional information gathered over the course of five weeks. Chapter Two suggests the historical and socio-economic sources of women's roles and conditions in Angola.



#### **CHAPTER 2**

# HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONTEXT REGARDING ANGOLAN WOMEN

#### **INTRODUCTION**

Angola presents a special set of challenges. The country has huge economic potential because it contains vast mineral resources, especially oil and diamonds, and fertile land.<sup>1</sup> The international community is well aware of this. Investors and traders are eager to return to Angola, as evidenced by their slow but steady return to Luanda in April 1997, when the new Government of National Unity and Reconciliation was being seated.

This same wealth has set the stage for more than 30 years of war. Since 1961, the survival, education, and economic prosperity of Angolans have been undermined by three phases of war. The anti-colonialist liberation struggle against Portugal extended from 1961 to 1975. It was followed by the long civil war among the MPLA, UNITA and the FNLA, concluded with the Bicesse Accord of 1991. That accord was ruptured, however, by the brief but bloody "third war" of 1992-94. Dislocation has included approximately 3 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) out of a population of about 13 million and 300,000 refugees.<sup>2</sup>

In November 1994, the two dominant factions, the MPLA and UNITA, agreed by the signing of the Lusaka Protocol to lay down their arms. Since then, Angola has made some steps toward peace and reconstruction. They have engaged in a process of demobilization. The United States has joined the United Nations in supporting a massive effort to help both sides demobilize their vast war machines (UCAH, 1997 a, b).<sup>3</sup>

As the situation on the ground has changed, so too has the character of foreign assistance. From the resumption of fighting in 1992 until 1996, emergency assistance was needed to help the entrapped urban populations survive. Foreign aid focused on basics such as food, water and healthcare. In this stage, the foreign assistance community paid relatively little attention to gender issues.<sup>4</sup> (see also WFP, 1996).

But the foreign assistance community, including USAID, is now shifting to a new phase of assistance. With the establishment of a new Government of Unity and National Reconciliation (GURN) in April 1997, foreign donors can collaborate with Angola to rebuild its economy, and work to lay the foundations of a unified government and civil society structures. To ensure sustainable processes, they are helping to build human capacity.

This period of transitional assistance is the time for those who provide assistance to change their approaches, both in general and toward women. Many demobilized soldiers have been at war for most of their adult lives. In deciding whether to lay down their arms and return home, or to stay with their military units, the option of "home" is often unappealing. On the physical side, their homes often lie in devastated villages or bombed out urban centers. Their families and communities have been scattered. Moreover, stark economic realities do not match the demobilized soldiers' post-war dreams of technical training and employment.

Consequently, there is increasing recognition of the vital role that women must play. Demobilization will not work unless men find viable alternatives. But it is the women who have the capacity to ensure that the alternatives are attractive. The wives and mothers of soldiers must bear much of the burden of rebuilding the homes, communities, and economic activities to which the soldiers will return.

Although many Angolan women appear determined to lay the foundations for a peace-time society, they face additional challenges. A rise in polygamy means that many women cannot depend on physical or economic support from their husbands. Further, women have been forced to bear the brunt of the increased labor and discomfort caused by disrupted roads and water systems. In rural areas, women are some of the most directly affected by land mines because of their active role in getting water and farming in the most heavily mined zones.

For those who are interested in supporting Angolan women in their efforts to build a secure and peaceful society, it is important to understand who the women of Angola are. In this chapter, we strive to paint an accurate and complete picture of the variety of women in Angola in three ways:

First, we describe the cultural and historical roots of women's roles in Angolan society.

Second, we suggest that there are cultural, social, economic and war-related differences among the women of Angola. Any work with or on behalf of Angolan women must begin with a clear recognition that they are not a homogeneous group. To ensure that references to "Angolan women" and to "women's participation" do not imply one-size-fits-all solutions, we offer mini-profiles of nine types of women whose interests and needs must be recognized by USAID programs and others.

Third, we provide a brief overview of some of the standard data sources on Angolan women, including some reservations about using these data for planning purposes. The central recommendation stemming from this observation is the need for USAID-funded projects to limit their reliance on national and regional level surveys. Although these data may appear useful for portraying broad trends, it is subject to very important inter and intra-regional variations.

#### HISTORIC INFLUENCES ON THE ROLE OF WOMEN IN ANGOLAN SOCIETY

#### **Ethnolinguistic Roots**

The gradual cessation of the civil war and resurgence of a number of once suppressed regional or ethnic political parties has renewed interest in Angola's traditional ethnolinguistic groups (Zenos, 1996). The early MPLA leadership was dominated by the assimilated *mestiço* and Methodist-educated Kimbundu (Mbundu) elite, while the UNITA leadership was dominated by Congregationalist-educated Ovimbundu (or Umbundu) from the central highlands (Henderson, 1992; Zenos, 1996).<sup>5</sup> Most documents describe 10 major ethnolinguistic groups: eight Bantu and two non-Bantu (Koisian and Portuguese) (Henderson, 1992).

There is little information on the different gender ideologies that prevail in Angola's major ethnic groups. Yet we know that some Angolan ethnic groups (notably the Kongo<sup>6</sup> and the Ambo<sup>7</sup>) are matrilineal, i.e. they trace their descendants through the mother's line. In matrilineal societies women usually hold a better status in the household and within the kin grouping than in patrilineal societies, and inheritance of land goes through the mother or mother's brother rather than through the fathers (Declich, 1997; Henderson, 1992).

In addition, all groups, matrilineal as well as patrilineal, share two key features: the historic acceptance of polygamy and the economic importance of women in supervising most crop production activities (Henderson, 1992).

The ethnolinguistic diversity and the related variations in women's roles affect foreign assistance in several ways: First, it is not appropriate (or effective) for the foreign assistance community to employ standardized policies for allocating property, land or project benefits. Second, ethnolinguistic diversity means that one is likely to find some variation in "traditional" concepts about women's role in society. Third it underlies the need to need to provide crop extension programs in local languages.

At the same time, however, we suggest that it is important that one not overemphasize ethnicity as a meaningful category for the analysis of gender issues — except for a small minority of elites (see Zenos, 1996). Historians emphasize that historically there was a strong pattern of "inter-group relationships of tolerance and common culture [which have] become obscured, by European misunderstandings to the benefit of an often false picture of violent rivalry in the past" (Davidson, 1976).

#### **Colonial Influence**

Several factors in the colonial period reinforced the rural women's role as key economic providers for their families. Especially important was the early, sustained and widespread use of forced labor that separated men from their families. The numbers are compelling. Historians estimate that over three centuries of Angolan slave trade, 16 million Angolans were shipped overseas, 12 million of whom died in transit (Bossema, 1988 in Sogge, 1992).

But the division of families continued. After slavery was abolished, the Portuguese maintained an extensive, well-orchestrated system of forced labor on plantations. By 1954, half a million Angolans — more than 10 percent of the population — had fled the country to escape involuntary labor and Portuguese taxation (Sogge, 1992).<sup>a</sup> These developments forced women to be more economically independent.

There were contradictory forces that biased their participation in the modern sector. For example, the Catholic Church provided some educational opportunities (Henderson, 1979, 1992; Bender, 1978). Catholic education for the masses focused on basic elementary education to teach prayers and Catholic doctrine. Although the Church gradually expanded the number of elementary schools, only a small number of students continued secondary education at seminaries, the primary goal of which was to create a male priesthood (Henderson, 1979). The Protestant missions' emphasis on

each person's being able to read the "word of God in his own language" (ibid.) called for schools above the catechistical level academically, but below the seminary standards.

While many of the missionary-sponsored secondary schools (both Catholic and Protestant) trained women as well as men, the women's training focused on home economics, nursing and teaching. Many of the women trained in those mission schools married the men trained in the male schools who became the first generation of Angolan liberation leaders (see Henderson, 1979; Henderson, 1992). Access to education facilities varied widely, with areas such as east Angola being extremely underserved (Henderson, 1979).<sup>°</sup>

The Portuguese influence also marginalized women in another way. The Portuguese established a highly centralized system of direct rule.

The African population was incorporated into a centralized political and administrative structure that was based in Lisbon and implemented through offices in Luanda. Little autonomy was given to the Luanda government itself, and virtually none was given to provincial or local governors; traditional authorities lost significance within this system (Neto in Zenos, 1996).

Women were further marginalized within the colonial system by being excluded from almost all of the low-level administrative positions and appointed chieftain (*soba*) positions that were open to assimilated Africans.<sup>10</sup> A number of legacies from this inherited colonial tradition that excluded women persist and should be recognized in current efforts to incorporate women in issues as varied as agriculture and local governance.

Another legacy of Portuguese colonialism was a very limited pool of skilled talent. The Portuguese did not teach or develop skills among Angolans. When the Portuguese left Angola after independence, they took their expertise with them. While such a legacy may have been typical of most post-colonial societies, most have now had time to build local capacity. In Angola, however, decades of civil war have prevented the steps that are necessary to erase that human capacity deficit.

#### The Impact of the Church

The patterns of religious conversion that started in the late 19th century created new institutions and patterns of participation that have important implications for USAID programs aiming to promote civil society and development.

The church has been and continues to be one place that women play a very active role. This pattern was observed in the *musseques* (poor shanty-town neighborhoods) as well as in the rural areas controlled either by the government or by UNITA. Every visit to a village or *musseque* included discussions with several very active women's religious groups associated with the local churches. It became clear that the social and economic role of the ties created by these groups is especially critical for poor female-headed households. It was noteworthy that if one measures civic or social activity in terms of numbers of recorded meetings and the organizations' role in disseminating information about USAID-funded initiatives, then these church groups appeared to be more active than the women's political organizations associated with the MPLA and UNITA — OMA and LIMA respectively.

These same interviews underlined the critical association of the church — both past and present — with development. Both Protestant and Catholic churches have played a major role in basic literacy and in primary and secondary education, and both have played important roles in promoting primary health, agriculture, and occupational training (see Henderson, 1992).

This strong association of the Church with basic literacy, education and social support suggests that church-related groups offer one of the best opportunities for building the local political alliances that are a necessary foundation for post-war civil society and development. The Churches and African church leaders played a similar role in forging the new ideas and institutions that first gave birth to the liberation struggle in the 1960s (Bender, 1976; Henderson, 1992).

The same religious groups and leaders are likely to play an important role in facilitating the economic and social reintegration of the female-headed IDP households returning home or to a secondary transit zone.

#### War-Related Changes

More than thirty years of war have also had profound economic and social implications for women's participation in Angolan society and in USAID programs. Military culture appears to have reinforced some of the negative stereotypes of a "woman's place" that were introduced in the colonial education system.

Despite their neo-Marxist, Maoist, or egalitarian rhetoric, neither the MPLA nor UNITA seems to have incorporated women on an equal basis with men. Both military organizations supported and encouraged active women's organizations — LIMA and OMA. Yet they used these women's groups largely to support military efforts or political goals. For example, although women were used to gather and analyze intelligence data; to obtain and control the transportation of supplies; and to serve as nurses and midwives in support of the troops, they played a less important role as frontline fighters. Some male military officers, parliamentarians, and scholars acknowledged that women had been relegated to such "secondary" roles in war-time culture, and suggested this would have to change in the post-war context.

For purposes of USAID project planning, another important impact of war has been the substantial increase in female-headed households. While this figure has been estimated at about one-third, the actual figure is probably much higher." The precise number of female-headed households has not been established conclusively (Declich, 1997, reviews different assessments). Although an increase in female-headed households is one of the normal impacts of war, the situation in Angola is complicated by the especially long duration of the war and the population displacements. These factors have combined with cultural acceptance of polygamy to increase the incidence of multiple wives. This in turn means that there has been a net decrease in the amount of time and resources that men living in such families are investing in individual women and their children (Declich, 1997). Other evidence — including recent INE statistics that show that an extremely high percentage of female-headed households (and their dependents) fall into the very poorest poverty strata — further supports the position that USAID-funded projects should target assistance to female-headed households (FAO, 1997; UCAH, 1995; INE, 1996 a, b, c; MINARS, 1993).

Moreover, war has increased women's labor burden and weakened their health. These conditions can be attributed to a variety of factors, including:

- Although civilian deaths and injuries were not recorded by age or gender, a broad consensus in 1992 attributed 40 percent to children, 30 percent to women, and 30 percent to men (Sogge, 1992);
- Many more women died of preventable illness and hunger than from armed action (ibid.);
- The increase in female-headed households (Cohen, 1997; INE, a, b, c; Declich, 1997);
- High rates of forced migration to urban areas that were ill-prepared to accommodate such numbers;
- The increased dependent-to-worker ratio caused by absentee husbands and the sky-rocketing number of orphans (UCAH, 1995; Sogge, 1992; INE, 1996 a, b, c);
- Increased strenuous, manual labor caused by the breakdown of small-town grain mills and oil presses (Sogge, 1992);
- The breakdown of health and sanitation that has resulted in a substantial increase in child birth mortality and infant deaths (Sogge, 1992; Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children, 1996); and
- Women's greater vulnerability to land mines because mines are often located in areas where women farm, collect water, or go to market.<sup>12</sup>

But, war has had some unintended benefits for women. During our interviews, a number of women suggested that an unintended impact of widespread military service and wartime displacement has been to increase the use and understanding of Portuguese (see also Sogge, 1992). Particularly for women who left their homes to support UNITA, and associated with men and women from other regions of Angola, Portuguese was needed as a lingua franca.

Meanwhile, some women in government-held cities may have enjoyed a different benefit of war. Just as American women had the opportunity to take jobs in industry and offices during World War II, there have been opportunities for educated Angolan women to get salaried positions, training, and advancement in the absence of men.

This is significant for post-conflict rehabilitation for several reasons. Job experience contributes to the human capacity development of women — particularly, if not primarily, in Luanda. At the same time, however, this may be a problem in the context of demobilization. If men return to the cities to take up the "good" jobs, employers may dismiss female staff. While such decisions may seem unfair and discriminatory, it is important that men find employment opportunities in civilian jobs. Until the economy generates more jobs, unemployed men may either turn back to war or turn to illegal activities (*New York Times*, June 17, 1997).

It will take quite a while for the formal sector to provide sufficient jobs for these men. For this reason, several donors are encouraging the development of new employment opportunities through the informal sector, trade, and small manufacturing. Other donors are focusing on micro-credit schemes for women.

Women may be better prepared to begin their own businesses and to become entrepreneurs than men, although we are not aware of data to support this theory. Many of the men who have been fighting all of their lives have not had experience with financial matters, trade and business management. They need to begin with basic skills. In contrast, women have been working in government offices, private sector businesses, and banks and may thus have more experience from which to do business.<sup>13</sup> This may be a factor for donors seeking to support private sector development.

### The Legacies of Central Planning and Emergency Assistance

Another legacy affecting women in Angola is the MPLA's experiment with socialism and central planning. Angola's Marxist ideology somewhat resembled that of other socialist countries in proclaiming equal rights and opportunities for women. Yet this ideology seems to have had little impact on the average woman and her role in the home or political arena.

Similarly, some elite women were trained in, and are accustomed to functioning in, a socialist, centrally controlled system. This experience might influence their conceptions of business, development and management.

But in a strange and ironic way, war-related behavior may have negated the socialist behavior. The need to be aggressive and self-sufficient in war seems to have counter-acted some of the passivity that typifies socialist systems. The WIDTECH team was struck by the legacy of self-sufficiency that helped Angolans to survive.

Moreover, unlike other countries beset by war — such as Mozambique, where hundreds of millions of dollars and aid workers arrived to support the victims — Angola received relatively little humanitarian assistance before the outburst of the "third war" in 1992 (Sogge, 1992):

True, Cuba provided a substantial amount of technical assistance: teachers, medical workers, scholarships and so on. A few Northern donors have stood by Angola down through the years. But in the main, it was the people who kept themselves going by relying on their own strength, their own ingenuity, and their own instincts for survival.

A recurrent theme in many of our interviews was the fear that government and donor programs that distribute food aid might quash this highly adaptive, self-help mentality and create a new culture of dependence.

# VARIATIONS IN NEEDS AND PERSPECTIVES: NINE ILLUSTRATIVE TYPES OF ANGOLAN WOMEN

Women in Angola are anything by uniform. While this observation may seem obvious, it is often overlooked. But any long-term attempt to build sustainable development and democratic processes in Angola must address the needs and build on the strengths of these diverse groups.

#### **Upper-Class Women**

There is a small group of highly educated women who come from prominent families and occupy prominent positions in government and UNITA areas. Many were educated in Protestant and Catholic mission schools. They tended to marry prominent men from the same schools who represented the first generation of Angolans to lead the churches and ministers across a full range of the political spectrum. The younger women in this class in the government areas were often trained in the midst of the fractious environment of the University of Luanda during the 1970s and 1980s, in communist countries like the former Soviet Union, Cuba, or the former East Germany, or more recently, in Portugal.

Many former student radicals and guerrilla fighters are now married to prominent political, business, and church leaders whose status and resources free their spouses to work full-time in the public sector, especially in social ministries. A key concern for these women is the difficulty of ensuring that the constant disruptions that have plagued government-area high schools and universities during the last decade do not prevent their children from obtaining a quality education. The younger UNITA elite women have generally had fewer opportunities to study overseas than women their same age in government areas. Yet because of a highly effective system of UNITA war-time schools, their children's education has often been less interrupted. Elite women on both sides of the major political divide exhibit strong commitment to leadership in their ministries, churches, and a vibrant array of women's church and political organizations.

Elite women have spent long periods in exile in other areas of Angola or abroad — in Zaire, Zambia, South Africa, Portugal, Cuba, and France. Many of these women speak English, Russian, German, French, or Spanish.

Yet there has been emotional damage. Many of these women — in both the government and UNITA political camps — have had their lives directly affected by losing a male relative gunned down in a political assassination or killed on the battlefield.

#### Middle-Class Women in Government-Held Cities

This category of women is sandwiched between the top-ranking elite of Luanda and the poor urban women of the *musseques*. Located in Luanda or provincial cities, these women typically are or were married to men who occupy middle and lower level positions in urban businesses, government, and NGOs. Few have more than primary school education. Yet a small minority of them received secondary school education that has allowed them to move into poorly paid positions on the bottom and middle level of the major ministries.

Many of these women have experienced the direct devastation of war as their houses were shelled, food supplies cut off, and social services disrupted in the cities where they lived or took refuge. In our interviews, they identified as key concerns the extremely high cost of food, disruption of basic services like potable water, and the need for easier access to cement and tin roofing with which to repair their homes.

Part of their post-war experience includes the burden of taking in orphaned relatives or relatives' children who are sent to town to attend school. A significant number are widows or de facto heads of household heads who can count on little short-term or medium-term support from a man.

These women are rebuilding the social infrastructure, housing the orphans, and otherwise assuming a major portion of the social burden of the war with very little input into the political process other than through church organizations and OMA.

#### Middle-Class Women in UNITA Areas

In contrast to the middle-class women in the government areas, most middle-class women in the UNITA areas have primary or secondary school education and have survived 20 years of civil war either in small, isolated municipalities or in rural areas.<sup>14</sup> Cut off from most formal government structures for health, education, and food, these women played a direct role in designing alternative structures to support civilian and military populations. Many worked as nurses and midwives tending to the large ever-shifting family areas that accompanied the highly mobile UNITA troops. Others were involved in public relations and journalism, abroad or in Angola; or as teachers, health, and sanitation workers paid "in-kind" from cooperatively worked village farms. Their war-time activities were coordinated through UNITA and LIMA, the UNITA women's group, and their highly stratified systems of hierarchical command through the political structures.

#### Poor Women in the Urban Musseques of Luanda

The constant stream of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) to Luanda is causing constant expansion of the city. The "new sections" of the city, called the *musseques*, are characterized by makeshift homes and a total lack of infrastructure. These are not zoned or likely to be zoned in the short term; there is no electricity or running water. In fact, the government is unlikely to provide services or infrastructure for two reasons. First, this would require expenditure of funds that the government would rather spend on other needs, and the people of the *musseques* have no political muscle. Second, government officials say that they do not want to make the area more livable, because they want people to return to their homes. They are afraid that, if people find life in the *musseques* comfortable, they will stay.

Many in the *musseques* are poor women and their children, and the overwhelming majority of households are headed by women. Many have arrived only recently. A substantial number do not speak or understand Portuguese despite an increasing need to use Portuguese as a lingua franca. Few are literate or have any formal education.

These women survive through small-scale commercial activities and small plots of peri-urban agriculture. Economic survival requires working long arduous days and commuting long distances to urban markets. They usually have no alternative to leaving their children home alone, with little or no supervision.

In contrast to neighborhoods in smaller provincial capitals, such as Malange or Kuito, where IDP women often live surrounded by a web of extended family and village ties, the majority of women in the *musseques* live in small extended families of relatively isolated, nuclear female-headed households. The single-most important cross-cutting social institution is the church. Church groups and markets are their primary sources of information.

#### Women Disabled from Mines

Because every day more women are disabled by land mines, disabled women are among the fastest-growing groups in Angola.

Our interviews confirmed the observation made elsewhere — that a high percentage of these women are widowed, divorced, or separated single heads of households. Most women we interviewed at the ICRC Ortho-Center of Bomba Alta in Huambo are either widowed with children, or have husbands with multiple wives. This family status means that they are forced to rely on small commerce and agriculture to support themselves and their families.

To take care of themselves and their children, these women must obtain prostheses and other assistance. Yet to be fitted, they are required to have shoes, and must pay for transportation and for food while in hospital. Some said they cannot avail themselves of proffered assistance because they are unable to provide food for their families during the month-long hospitalization. Frequently, their economic and social isolation makes it difficult for them to incur even the smallest additional expenses.

This same isolation means that some disabled women are not connected to the normal channels of communication by which information on prostheses is distributed. Women have also indicated that their handicap tends to isolate them from the social networks through which they might otherwise get information about special handicapped services or new development opportunities, like revolving credit associations and crop extension services.

Of course those who have received prostheses said these had helped them get around. Yet they also pointed out that acquiring prostheses is only a partial solution to much larger problems. Their biggest concerns are economic. One woman started a small micro-enterprise but was disadvantaged in the active competition with non-handicapped women. Three were farmers, and one, a vendor in the town market, sold small amounts of the agricultural products she produced.

Most can count on almost no social or economic support from their extended families. Although all identified themselves as either Catholic or Protestant, they indicated they were not actively involved in any women's religious group. Many of the mothers said that they could not send their children to school because they cannot afford the school materials. Of the women we interviewed, one had a sixth grade education and could speak and write Portuguese, but none of the others could do either. None of the interviewed women were aware of any special association that pulls together handicapped women. Yet since they are all from the same village, they know one another and share a common set of complaints.

#### **Poor Rural Women**

Some of the rural women live in their home villages, and some have been displaced and live in new areas. For most, however, their day typically starts with one to two hours of fetching water, followed by two to three hours to grind grain. The typical rural woman then spends a full work day tending to the fields that she farms with her children and her husband, if she has one. Often she grows a small area of tomatoes, garlic, or onions that she may barter for maize, salt or manufactured products.

Cash is rarely seen. When it is, it is typically in the small 10,000 kwanza notes that are virtually worthless outside of the rural market center.

The waving grain and cleanly swept village spaces belie the reality of over 35 years of highly disruptive war and dislocation. One group of women, living in a peaceful UNITA village, described how they had been forced to abandon their present village site from 1982-1987. Many families are dispersed, but some are coming back.

The two leader farmers we interviewed expressed their appreciation for the USAID-funded food aid and seeds and tools programs that allowed them to return home from the provincial capital "barrio" where they took refuge from 1992-1996. When asked about their priorities, they replied "pots and pans." When asked again, they said clothes. The extension agents accompanying us agreed that the women appeared to have little concept of the benefits of crop research and extension programs. This confusion may have arisen because extension agents often arrive in the same vehicles as the food monitors.

War-time displacement appears to have increased the number of rural women who understand basic Portuguese. Though very few can both read and write, even in the most isolated villages, we found several women who had some primary school education who could read and write.

Although every UNITA village where we interviewed had a LIMA representative, the organization was not always active, while nearly every village had a very active network of Protestant and Catholic women's church groups.

#### Women in Transit Camps

Not all of the IDPs who took refuge in the urban centers during the 1992-93 war have gone home. For one reason or another — often a change in political control in the urban area from which they came — they believe that it is not safe to return. In the interim, USAID has assisted these IDPs to identify safe transit camps to which they can temporarily relocate. Many women in these camps are

from urban and peri-urban centers that were the sites of the fiercest fighting in 1993. Some have declared their intention to return home, but are still waiting to assess the chances for peace and safety.

We were surprised to encounter a significant number of former civil servants — school teachers, nurses, and civil service administrators. Some have been there for over a year; others are newcomers who have recently joined family members who arrived when the camps were first established. Interviews suggest that the official figures currently being collected and analyzed by the PVOs can mask the very high percentage of adult IDPs that are women and female heads of households.<sup>15</sup> Most have undergone several displacements and lost many family members, including husbands and children.

In and around the camps, many have built their own brick houses. A few have also started to grow crops in the areas around the camps with the seeds-and-tools packages they received. Due to delays in receiving seed, few harvested successful crops the first year, and there is little money and few if any sources for non-farm employment, except selling wood.

#### Women in Demobilization Camps ("Quartering Areas")

While some of the women in the demobilization camps had been combat soldiers, the majority followed and accompanied the armed forces. The women we interviewed described a life of mobile towns adjacent to the troops that even included elementary schools and midwifery centers for the soldiers' wives and children.

The women living in the 15 Quartering Areas that have been created as a "half-way houses" toward full demobilization of the UNITA troops came to these areas with their husbands. Of those interviewed, all but one was forced to leave her home village when she was a child to "follow the troops," first with their fathers and then with husbands whom they met during the war. All of the women we interviewed expressed a high level of uncertainty about where they will end up after the war. Most indicated that they expect to return to their husbands' home village — where they have never been — to live with relatives whom they have never met.

Quite a number received basic reading and writing skills from military or UNITA "bush" schools. All but two (one who stayed home and farmed; another fished) "walked with the men." Seven held responsible war-time jobs: a birth attendant, a school teacher, three carried arms and supplies and farmed; one ran guns to the front lines; another was responsible for organizing the transportation of supplies from UNITA villages to the troops.

There is noteworthy realism among these women about what lies ahead. In response to questions about their plans after full demobilization, they say: "Get settled and back on our feet producing food." They have few illusions about what they will find. Several indicate that they are not even sure they will find a village.

Not one of the nine women we interviewed can count on sustained support from her husband. All nine women belong to polygamous households: six of the husbands have two co-wives living with them in the camp; one has three and another four. Some co-wives complain about having to share their rations with the junior wives. The soldier husbands of the women in the demobilization areas typically face two options: 40 percent<sup>16</sup> will be integrated into the newly united troops, the Armed Forces of Angola (FAA), the others will become civilians. One woman was illustrative of those whose husbands are being posted to the FAA. She said that she still did not know where her husband has been posted. Although she would like to join him, it is highly unlikely that she can count on joining him in the near future. To date there are no family areas and many of the soldiers are being posted to "alien" zones where their former UNITA spouses might not be welcome. It is likely that many wives of men reposted to FAA will return as single female-headed households to their husband's or their family's home area.

Those whose husbands are slated to demobilize also face an uncertain future. Many of the second and third wives currently living in the camps (there are often other wives at other sites around the country) are new companions that the soldiers have just met in the quartering process. Some of the first wives we interviewed indicated that they may return home while their husbands choose to live with the new wife adjacent to the quartering area. This is especially true at Quartering Areas like Caculama near Malange that have active markets, as well as strong economic potential or are located near diamond mines or trade routes.

#### Mothers (and Other Female Relatives) of Underage Soldiers

The Christian Children's Fund (CCF) has been working to identify the parents or a relative of children separated from their families. Once such a family member has been found, a *catequista* works through CCF to coordinate with the International Office of Migration for the child to return to the village. Minors arrive with an initial cash settlement, as well as a basic food stock and a seeds-and-tools kit.

Contrary to expectations, many of the underage soldiers have returned with women, and in the case of demobilized minors near Malange, with some members of the woman's extended family. Interviews with the *catequistas* and the mothers of these soldiers highlighted that the real problems of readjustment surface only after an initial "honeymoon" period during which the family is still excited by the youngster's return.

Once the cash settlement runs out, it is usually the mothers who have to shoulder the additional burden of the demobilized children. While a few soldiers were working with their fathers or uncles in the field, many of the returned soldiers were unwilling to work. Mothers also found that the young men often returned without official papers, identity cards, and birth certificates. Moreover, having spent their entire first payment, they often lacked the funds that are necessary to acquire new papers."

Lastly, most mothers we interviewed said they felt the ritual of purification was absolutely vital to the soldiers' ability to forget their bad memories and to reintegrate into the community. Yet frequently they lacked sufficient funds to perform the necessary purification ceremonies. Commonly, older women, usually mothers, aunts, or grandmothers "sponsor" the reintegration of traumatized children and demobilized underage soldiers, supporting these boys and young men, their wives, and other dependents, until they receive their second payments.

#### DATA AND STUDIES ABOUT ANGOLAN WOMEN

A growing number of studies document the critical situation of Angola's women (Annex 2; also Cohen dos Santos, 1997, and Declich, 1997). Yet the majority of these studies have relied on the same base of data from Angola's fledgling Instituto Nacional de Estatística (INE), the World Food Programme (WFP), and UCAH. These data can be useful for painting a broad-stroke picture of population movements and the huge regional differences in the demographic impact of the war, but there are several reasons why these data, and in some cases the studies that relied on them, may not be useful for USAID project planning.

Very few of the principal studies disaggregate data by gender, other than main demographic backgrounds. Declich notes that despite an accumulation of data, there has been relatively little analysis that would help planners understand the special needs, concerns and constraints of women.

Second, many studies that focus on women's needs and circumstances are flawed by the use of data collection and analytical techniques that focus on the male-headed household. For example, men's responses to the question about the number of household dependents, which may not even be living in the same geographical location, often have little bearing on the "real household structure in Angola" (Declich, 1997). Declich points out that another fundamental problem is that most studies use the household as the basic unit of analysis, but treat female-headed households with dependents as exceptional "vulnerable groups," rather than as the norm.<sup>18</sup>

A third basis for distortion is the likelihood that the process of macro-level statistical research is not capturing information about a large segment of the population. Unless there is good reason for doing so — such as becoming eligible for emergency food handouts — dislocated people typically do not register with any authority, foreign or domestic (Sogge, 1992). This is especially true in Angola, where census surveys have been used to determine regional quotas for military recruits as well as for allocating food, water, labor, and lodging.

For all these reasons, planners associated with USAID projects should be cautious about basing their project planning on analysis of national or even provincial level statistics. It is imperative that more attention be focused on what types of planning, monitoring, and evaluation data are needed, and how these data should be gathered.

There are three expeditious and effective ways to gather the necessary data:

1. Local, Participatory Information Gathering. To inform their project design and ensure full participation, project planners need meaningful census data. It is also important, however, that male and female prospective clients, as well as the leaders in the state, military, and "traditional" local realms where they work, understand the research goals and have some say in the research design. In addition, projects should not shy away from controversial topics, such as income, non-farm employment, or projected settlement patterns, but must conduct research in ways that do not jeopardize the safety of the respondents or their communities. Declich proposes a low-cost, two-step methodology that offers "a temporary solution for a shortage of gender sensitive data and statistics."<sup>19</sup> She recommends using leaderidentified focus groups to identify key issues and develop more broad-based survey research. Declich suggests that a similar model of participatory research could be used to improve the overall quality of planning data with regard to women.

Declich tested this methodology on the demobilized soldiers' families in two Quartering Areas — Loindumbale and N'gove. One result of this participatory methodology, which included high levels of leader input into the design of the survey instrument and presentation of the survey goals, was to provide policy relevant information on gender issues that could not be gleaned from baseline camp surveys. For example, contrary to donor expectations, Declich's research revealed that about one-third of the women at the two sites did not expect to follow their husbands once they left the Quartering Area (19 percent in Loindumbale and 47 percent in N'gove). The same research showed that the women who had followed the troops and fought possessed a wide range of entrepreneurial and organizational skills that could be used to jump-start transition enterprises, and that many of them suffered from a wellfounded fear of persecution" because they could form an easy target for revenge, especially when left behind by the husband/father."

2. **"Genderizing" Analyses of Existing Data on USAID-funded Initiatives.** A simple, if partial, solution to the current dearth of gender-sensitive planning data would have project administrators disaggregate some of the existing data. The WIDTECH team was impressed at the speed with which a number of USAID-funded projects were able to disaggregate by gender existing client lists and employment figures for agricultural extension, mine awareness, and transit area programs. In most cases they seem able to "re-analyze" provincial-area data with a hand calculator in only a few hours.

Declich reports a similar experience with IOM. Although the initial report that INE prepared on IDPs living in seven provincial camps (INE 1996b) showed that on average about one-third were female-headed households, there was no attempt to describe the socio-economic characteristics of these households. Following Hansen and Declich's request, IOM disaggregated the data by sex of the household's head. Declich reports that "this new assemblage of data provides some important insights as regards number of dependents, occupation, and provinces of destination of female-headed households of the IDPs in these camps" (1997).

3. **Modify Donor Reporting Procedures and Requests**. Re-analysis has its limitations, because failure to ask the right questions means that some data do not exist. Often women have been neither the subjects of the inquiry nor the interviewees. To institute the first two steps toward collecting basic and critical gender data, it is important that the requisite information be linked to changes in USAID and other donor monitoring procedures. Declich suggests (Declich 1997: 4):

push[ing] international organizations, implementation agencies as well as NGOs...to produce...gender sensitive information and demographic data....[by making it a requirement that the]...implementing organizations have to attain while designing and implementing their actions.

If USAID staff are required to collect basic types of information, and if they are working in circumscribed communities (villages, demobilization sites, etc.), then they have the capacity to gather the requisite data. Insofar as data are needed for informing project design, it is not necessary to encourage, fund or require large, expensive studies. A sample of the simple type of survey that could be used follows this report as Annex 5.

#### CHAPTER 3

# WOMEN IN RESETTLEMENT, REHABILITATION, AND AGRICULTURE PROGRAMS

While the WIDTECH team was originally asked to review USAID/Angola's new Democracy and Governance portfolio, USAID subsequently asked the team to expand its scope of work to address its Resettlement and Rehabilitation programs. USAID asked the team to identify barriers to women's participation within various categories of assistance: emergency food aid, land mine awareness programs, agricultural research and extension, rehabilitation of infrastructure, assistance to wives of demobilized and underage soldiers, prosthetic assistance, and assistance for traumatized children and family-tracing. USAID also sought opportunities to increase women's participation or to improve the impact of its existing programs on women.

#### **EMERGENCY FOOD ASSISTANCE**

Angola is in the initial phase of a new wave of humanitarian needs that will be significantly different from those of the past, in terms of both the people who need assistance and the way to assist them.' In this transition period, the demands will be for smaller amounts of critical aid to support mass migrations across political lines expected to follow fast upon the peace, for example, between previously held UNITA areas and government areas, and from neighboring countries. Some of this aid is likely to be routed through Food-for-Work programs to assist with rehabilitating basic infrastructure. Women were major beneficiaries of the first generation of large-scale food assistance programs, because of strict enforcement of USAID targeting guidelines.<sup>2</sup> In general, women were not actively involved in the needs assessment, design, or implementation of these programs. Nor were very many women hired as food monitors or administrators.<sup>3</sup> A recent gender assessment of World Food Programme (WFP) projects found similar low levels of employment of women "on their staff...and distribution teams" (WFP, 1995; 1996).

WFP distributes two-thirds of humanitarian aid in Angola. Its experience, and that of the other regional NGO programs such as CARE and World Vision, shows that involving women as village contact persons, food monitors and administrators can increase the speed and efficiency of food aid distributions (WFP, 1996a, 1996b, 1997). These same experiences show that more active involvement of women in the needs assessment and distribution phases of humanitarian assistance can increase the effectiveness of efforts to target vulnerable groups like Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) and female-headed households.<sup>4</sup>

In the start-up phase of new, more tailored humanitarian assistance, USAID should ensure that gender-related lessons from the recent WFP Gender Action Plan and the wider regional programs of Save the Children/USA, CRS, World Vision, CARE, and other U.S. PVOs that work on emergency food distributions, be shared with PVO employees working on USAID-supported programs in Angola.

USAID should continue to enforce its requirement that men be listed on the food card of one of their wives for emergency food distributions.

USAID should require that PVOs increase women's participation as employees in order to design better methods of reaching women as beneficiaries and to enable women to benefit from the capacity building inherent in working with the PVOs.

#### **PROMOTING LAND-MINE AWARENESS**

While the war may be over, land mines remain hidden all over Angola. This is a continuing threat to all Angolans, but is particularly real for women who need to work in the fields and to children who run freely in open spaces. It will not be possible to remove this terrible threat completely. There are few records of where the mines were placed, and they are difficult to find.

It is therefore essential that Angolans learn as much as possible about how to avoid areas likely to be mined. While foreign donors are funding efforts to remove mines, there is also a serious effort to educate through "Mine Awareness Programs." To be effective, these programs must reach all people threatened by mines, irrespective of age or gender. Because of the urgency, the consequences of failing to reach threatened populations, and the recognition that program success depends on full participation, these programs have developed the best expertise in Angola on how to reach women as beneficiaries. We still have some concerns, however, about the extent to which women participate in writing scripts, designing programs, reaching audiences, performing, and managing programs.

Mine awareness programs are noteworthy for two reasons. First, the programs have been successful in reaching women as clients.<sup>6</sup> Second, the programs have effectively reduced the number of accidents affecting women and children.<sup>6</sup>

Despite success in reaching women as clients, the first generation of USAID-funded programs have employed relatively few women as mine awareness instructors or coordinators. The highly successful World Vision program at Malange employs 17 trained mine awareness instructors who are responsible for actual teaching/village contacts, but only one is female. All of the six municipal supervisors are men, as are both of the coordinators.

This failure to employ women represents a significant lost opportunity because many of the older, more established programs are models of effective training of extension agents and village-level contact people. These same programs could be effective ways of disseminating information about development resources, civic education and democratic processes to women in rural areas. One noteworthy approach is how some of the mine awareness programs have successfully used two- to four-week courses, and continuous on-site education, to train individuals with primary school education but little previous background in the use of a wide variety of innovative teaching techniques. These techniques include the use of theater, puppets, small group participatory training and discussion sessions.<sup>7</sup>

More effective dissemination of lessons learned from these successful emergency projects requires that greater attention be paid to hiring and training women employees during the remaining phases. Although we did not visit any of the land mine awareness programs being developed by Catholic Relief Services (CRS) in the Benguela/Lobita Region, these projects have been cited as an example of how training and equipping women, many of them mine accident survivors themselves, to serve as mines awareness instructors has "raised their social status in the community and garnered respect from the men they supervise" (Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children, 1996).

Some mine awareness programs, like Africare's, are still in the planning phases, while others, like World Vision at Malange, may be winding down or extended, and PVOs involved in these programs should develop hiring and recruitment plans to ensure greater women's participation. To increase the number of women applying for jobs, PVOs running mine awareness programs need to develop clear strategies and steps by which to publicize employment opportunities to women's, school, and church groups.

Care should be taken to ensure that staff associated with new mine awareness programs visit more established programs to be more aware of lessons learned in general and lessons learned for reaching women clients and hiring women instructors and administrators in particular.<sup>8</sup> In one of the newer mine awareness programs, one of two mines awareness instructors was female. Yet not one of twelve current students for unpaid village-level instructors was a woman. Because this particular mine awareness program is just starting, it could benefit from contact with more experienced programs, such as that operated by World Vision.

The mine awareness projects are significant as best-practice models, not only for mine awareness, but as methods of conveying information to marginalized or difficult-to-reach populations. Because of the urgency of reaching women and children who live and work in remote areas and who typically receive little information, the mine awareness projects have developed creative and effective means of teaching and communication. Their methods, including village-based training, theater, and puppetry, have proved effective in transmitting information to women and children and involving them as clients. As new agricultural extension programs and new D&G projects look for ways to communicate with the general population, the staff of PVOs implementing these projects should visit some of the more established and successful mine awareness projects.<sup>9</sup>

#### AGRICULTURAL RESEARCH AND EXTENSION

As USAID shifts from humanitarian assistance to sustainable development, it is emphasizing food self-sufficiency. Its agriculture initiatives focus on a new generation of crop extension programs built on the earlier success of its seeds-and-tools emergency program. The primary goals of these programs are to help farmers learn new, higher-yielding crop production techniques and replenish their stock of well-adapted seed by testing new open pollinated varieties that have proven successful in neighboring countries and Angola.<sup>10</sup>

Typically these programs require several sorts of expertise and roles. In the research and testing phase, there must be leader or test farmers to try out the new seeds and determine their viability in the soil, climate and culture of Angola. Once crop varieties are identified, extension agents distribute the seeds and tools, and teach Angolan farmers to cultivate the new crops. Technical and managerial staff are required by the PVOs responsible for the programs.

Women are critical participants in these programs because they are the primary farmers in Angola. While men have been fighting, women have been growing food. Women farmers know the soil, prepare the food, and are responsible for feeding the families. Therefore, if Angolans are to enjoy food self-sufficiency, women must be involved in deciding the crops that they will grow, assessing the seeds and tools, teaching one another new methods, and distributing food through markets.

Women's participation is inadequate in USAID programs for four reasons: Although some of the programs expressed an interest in recruiting women, currently very few of the senior technical staff, extension agents, contact farmers, or on-farm seed-testers are women. Very few of the village *sobas* and male extension agents have been sensitized to why or how they might better target women farmers. After decades of war, few male or female rural farmers outside the commercial sector understand the gains they might enjoy from participating in crop extension." Finally, with only a small percentage of women having been chosen as leader farmers and to test new seed varieties, there is an increased chance that new research and extension programs will not adequately address the goals and needs of women farmers. Our research suggests that despite the demonstrated success of some of USAID's emergency agricultural initiatives to help farmers reestablish themselves, there is a strong risk that some of the follow-on transitional initiatives may advocate inappropriate agricultural extension models.

• Differential Goals and Needs of Women Farmers but Insufficient Number of Women Leader Farmers and Test Farmers. In each of the two cases where we asked men and women to rank their priorities for increasing crop production, the men's and women's rankings were quite different. The same interviews showed that the priority attributes (storage, processing, leaf and/or stalk qualities, cycle, disease resistance) that women considered in their ranking were different from those considered by the men. In two sets of group interviews, in Kwanza Sul and in Malange, women rated beans their top priority while men favored maize. Women often look not only at the bean itself, but also at whether a bean variety's leaves will be suitable for sauces that provide a major source of daily vitamins, as well as whether leaves may be saleable at market for cash income. Such responses suggest a need for USAID projects to develop better systems for identifying and responding to different patterns of female participation, needs, and concerns in the farming systems they serve. Similarly, substantial data suggest that Angolan women have

extensive knowledge of the area's complex, well-adapted dryland and irrigated agricultural systems.

Short-term efforts to reinstate the country's food self-sufficiency must expand beyond the current system that employs only a small number of women as extension leader farmers or Seeds for Freedom test farmers. A system that fails to include these women runs the risk of reaching inappropriate conclusions and of developing ineffective extension models and seed varieties because rural women's special needs, expertise and preferences for specific crops and crop qualities are not adequately addressed. To ensure that women's expertise, constraints, and goals are considered in the design of research and extension programs, USAID should consider mandating that 50 percent of leader farmer positions and 50 percent of the Seeds for Freedom test farmers be women.

• Limited Number of Women Who are Currently Employees or Extension Agents.

Despite the significance of women in rural crop production, both as independent producers and as members of household production units, women occupy a small minority of the paid extension and supervisory positions in the more established projects. One of the first USAID-funded crop extension programs in one of its more established provincial bases employs 30 extension agents, of which only 4 are female, and 5 technicians/supervisors, 4 of whom are men. These low levels of female employment occurred despite a deliberate attempt on the part of the PVO to recruit and hire women.

USAID should consider mandating that 50 percent of administrative and staff positions relating to agricultural research and extension programs be for women.

• Limited Number of Women Who Apply for Extension Positions. USAID-funded PVOs in Angola express interest in hiring women, but confusion and uncertainty about why they are not successful in recruiting them. One explanation that emerged in our interviews is that the current work practice of having extension agents travel out from a central base is difficult for women who must usually balance their work commitments with commitments to child care. Our interviews suggest that the same extensive commitment of extension agents also decreased the effectiveness of commuting male extension agents. Another reason is that many of the women who might be eligible for positions are not getting information about openings. Even women with access to NGO networks that enable them to get information about the positions reported that they were often not well-informed about work conditions and/or that the physical difficulties of the work were exaggerated.

Some of the better educated village and peri-urban women we interviewed appeared to have approximately the same educational profile as the extension agents being hired. Many of these women expressed their interest in applying for paid positions as extension agents or Seeds for Freedom test site monitors if they could serve in the communities where they live.

Before staff recruitment campaigns start for several new agricultural extension and research programs that are currently under consideration, it is essential that PVOs determine the reasons why women have not applied or been selected for extension positions in older, more established programs.

USAID-funded projects should consider new models in which women extension agents could be hired to serve the communities where they live. This model would make it easier for women to serve in these positions. PVOs associated with these projects might request information on promising models for hiring and posting women extension agents that have worked in other African countries.

Projects should also consider developing new mechanisms for identifying promising women candidates by publicizing the position requirements and employment conditions through such non-traditional networks as schools and women's religious and extension groups.<sup>12</sup> These same publicity campaigns might include public presentations by women extension agents or technicians as "role models." Projects might also consider creating short-term research and extension employment opportunities thereby allowing projects a socially acceptable method of screening promising candidates with experience who might not otherwise satisfy minimum educational or written examination standards.

• Limited Number of Women in Senior Technician and Administrative Posts. The long-term sustainability of USAID's existing and projected investment in crop extension and research is threatened by the low number of women serving in senior and technician posts. Here again, administrators report that few women apply for these positions. Those that do apply are often eliminated by incomplete academic credentials.<sup>13</sup>

If present patterns continue:

- Few women from the surrounding provinces will apply for these positions, even if encouraged to, because they don't have the necessary high-level academic training.
- Provincial women with the necessary secondary school training to apply for highlevel agricultural training are likely to be unable to continue their education because of financial constraints.
- PVO administrators will be tempted to fill mandated quotas by hiring "qualified" Angolan women with the correct academic credentials from Luanda. These women often do not speak the local language or know the region. This pattern of long-distance recruitment often requires the women to leave part or all of their families behind, resulting in frequent absences from the job and little long-term commitment to the region once project funding stops.

Neither USAID nor the PVOs would endorse systems that bring in unqualified staff. There are several reasons, however, why we believe that stated or standard job criteria are not necessary or effective:

- This work relates to agriculture, where Angolan women have extensive real-life experience.
- Technical, academic qualifications are not always necessary for the jobs.
- Many men in Angola also lack the experience necessary to perform the tasks.

- Some women may have some of the educational or experiential background without the requisite certificates or supporting documentation.<sup>14</sup>
- After years of war following colonial exclusion of many Angolans, Angola faces a significant educational deficit. Many people will have to learn on-the-job or from coursework concurrent with their jobs.
- Programs risk being less effective and less successful for lack of women's perspectives and abilities in implementation.

PVOs must examine their hiring criteria and identify exactly what skills and academic preparation are necessary for a particular job. There should also be a deliberate effort to design new strategies for publicizing public and private sector employment opportunities for women in agriculture.

Furthermore, since USAID is committed to wrapping up its assistance in five years, many skilled expatriates are likely to leave. But there is a relative lack of skilled agricultural workers in Angola. Thus there is an urgent need to train Angolans in key areas that are likely to become relevant in later stages of these programs, such as agricultural economics, animal science, rural sociology, extension education, and veterinary medicine. These trainees might be women.

PVOs could achieve two objectives at once: involving women in agriculture programs, and developing a pool of skilled agriculture specialists. PVOs should hire women for jobs they can handle and "train them up" to other positions. For example, USAID-funded projects might offer short-term employment to talented local women holding university degrees in related fields, or who entered an agricultural science program that was interrupted by the war, and combine this employment with opportunities for on-the-job training, workshops, and distance education (through the University of Dar-es-Salaam, the University of Zimbabwe, or UNISA, if language skills permit).

• Limited Information about Women's Participation and Organizations with which to Sensitize Authorities and Extension Staff and Orient Policy. The design of more effective USAID-supported agricultural research and extension programs to target women farmers' programs requires better planning data on the women living in these communities. Not one of the village or regional extension staff we spoke with had accurate information on the number of female-headed households, active women's groups, or women who could either understand, read and write Portuguese. Likewise we found very little written analysis on gender roles in particular cropping systems (the chief exception to this was Lazary, 1996).

USAID-funded agricultural programs need to organize their extension agents to work through local authorities to gather simple, basic data on the number and socio-economic conditions and farming systems of female-headed households and disabled women in the communities where they intervene. They should also gather information on Portuguese literacy levels and language competence, as well as information on the structure and functioning of the major women's organizations, to identify the most effective mechanisms for reaching women farmers. Whenever possible, this information should be gathered by the extension agent, not by a separate researcher hired for this purpose.

# REHABILITATION OF WATER, HEALTH, AND EDUCATIONAL INFRASTRUCTURE (THROUGH FOOD FOR WORK AND OTHER PROGRAMS)

USAID contributes to a number of projects that rehabilitate basic water, transportation, health and educational infrastructure as part of their overall commitment to rural development. These projects reduce women's labor time and provide access to food aid until cropping systems are fully reestablished. Some of these activities are supported by Food for Work; others are not.

Our interviews with project clients and administrators suggest that with a few notable exceptions<sup>15</sup>, the first generation of USAID supported infrastructure rehabilitation projects were implemented in an emergency mode with very little input from women into the initial needs identification or planning phase. One result has been to lower the long-term sustainability of some of these interventions — especially wells and latrines — by diminishing the women's commitment to maintenance and regulation. Similar results were observed in various WFP initiatives, leading to the recent recommendation that WFP should aspire to having 60 percent of its participants in Food for Work projects be women (WFP, 1996).

Both administrators and clients emphasized that a key factor influencing women's interest in these projects was whether or not they understood how a particular program would affect their lives. If women did not, for example, understand the connection between dirty water and disease, they typically showed little motivation to help build or maintain sanitation and water infrastructure. For this reason the PVO administrators with whom we met emphasized the critical need for health and sanitation training for women to precede any sort of rehabilitation project. Unfortunately many donors see sanitation training as a luxury add-on to infrastructure projects. In contrast, most administrators and village leaders said that this type of training was an absolute necessity to eliciting sustained female participation, guaranteeing long-term sustainability.

The willingness of women living in the two transit sites supported by CARE outside Kuito to make the bricks and provide the labor necessary to build their own houses (with Food for Work assistance) demonstrates women's interest in undertaking reconstruction projects that respond to their perceived needs. Another example of this was observed in the village of Luvemba (San Miguel, Bailundo), where women provided stones and some of the labor to construct a road, a hospital and a school.

USAID-funded PVOs should facilitate women's active involvement in the conceptualization of infrastructure rehabilitation projects so that these may both respond to women's needs and include women in construction and maintenance.

# WIVES AND FEMALE RELATIVES OF DEMOBILIZED SOLDIERS AND UNDERAGE SOLDIERS

USAID continues to support United Nations efforts to supervise the demobilization of Angola's fighting factions into fifteen quartering sites for troops and their families. U.N. officials anticipate that all troops will be demobilized and the quartering sites closed by July or August 1997 (UCAH, 1997).

The United Nations' Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Unit (UCAH) was the agency responsible for coordinating the quartering sites and early planning for demobilization. A new U.N./government agency — SeCOR/IRSEM (a UNDP agency combined with an Angolan government agency) — is now the main agent responsible for programs to facilitate the soldiers' reintegration once they leave the camps and convert to civilian life.<sup>16</sup> The early structure of demobilization and reintegration, as well as the political conditions, have made it difficult for the various U.N. agencies (UCAH, SeCOR, OMI) and government agencies (IRSEM) to communicate among themselves in general.

As a consequence, it was difficult for them to communicate how best to expand their programs to include women. Both agencies have valuable experience about gender issues in other countries that could be usefully employed. Since the new process of demobilization requires that agencies work in closer collaboration, it is hoped that they will work effectively to address the needs of women.

To date the vast majority of planning and institutional development (e.g. IRSEM/SeCOR/UNDP, UN/UCAH) to support military demobilization has focused on the needs of the soldiers and not on their families.<sup>17</sup> This failure to consider women constitutes a major oversight in the planning process that could jeopardize the long-term stability of the demobilization and peace process. Now that the priority goal of a unified government has been achieved, there is no further justification for ignoring the needs of women.

Failure to support women will exacerbate the economic impoverishment of the female-headed households on whom the demobilized soldiers will rely during their initial readjustment period (one to two years).<sup>18</sup> Because wives typically take care of the basic needs of food and childcare, the wives' difficulties will result in slower readjustment of soldiers to new forms of employment and lifestyles. Gender impacts are exacerbated by the large number of wives likely to be demobilized into situations in which they are de facto heads of households, with few if any prospects of support from their husbands.<sup>19</sup> For these reasons, there is a critical need to facilitate the economic integration of the women living in the quartering areas to their chosen zone of immigration.<sup>20</sup>

One UCAH representative has suggested that it would be easier to address the issues of women near the demobilization camps if UCAH could identify clusters or networks of women who might serve as its partners in addressing women's needs. As the life styles and needs of women in these camps has caused a natural solidarity among them, there might be ways to use groups of women in the camps as forums through which to familiarize women with their rights to certain types of demobilization and reintegration assistance.

Meanwhile, UCAH is establishing or encouraging "Technical Committees for Demobilization and Reintegration" in eight provinces: Benguela, Uige, Huambo, Malange, Moxico, Huila and Kuando Kubango. These committees are intended as participatory processes, including the foreign PVOs and regional or local administrators, for allocating foreign assistance.<sup>21</sup> While these are broad-based and potentially democratic processes, no thought has been given to if or how they might address women's needs.

One of the most pressing issues with direct relevance to the sustainability of the peace process is the need to increase the capacity of the central U.N. supported planning structures (UCAH, SeCOR/IRSEM) and the U.S.-supported NGO initiatives to address a wide range of gender issues being created by: (1) the rapid demobilization of soldiers; and (2) the design and staffing of a new generation of "reintegration" programs. Any delay in leadership on this topic is likely to result in the design of government-donor reintegration programs that fail to consider women. This is also an area where a relatively small additional investment of resources by USAID could make a major impact on the sustainability of earlier USAID investments in demobilization.

Stronger leadership will require using the U.S. Government's funding for the UCAH Technical Committee on Demobilization and Reintegration to encourage the creation of short- and medium-term staff positions within UCAH and SeCOR that can focus full-time on gender issues in the demobilization and reintegration. It will also require organizing and convening the first meeting of the Task Force on Women's Issues that was constituted, at the request of the U.S. Ambassador, by the UCAH Technical Committee on Demobilization and Reintegration.<sup>22</sup> The output of the first meeting of the Task Force on Women's Issues should be a Phase One Gender Action Plan to address some of the most pressing gender issues in demobilization and reintegration programs coordinated by UCAH and SeCOR/IRSEM. A sample agenda for the first Task Force Meeting and Gender Action Plan might include:

- UCAH Civic Education. Analyze current health and civic education programs serving women in the quartering areas not yet demobilized to see how these programs might be used to prepare women still living in the quartering areas for the psycho-social and economic realities they are likely to encounter during reintegration.
- SeCOR/IRSEM Counseling Referral and Information Services. Help SECOR formulate appropriate plans for counseling, information and referral services to anticipate the needs of women leaving the quartering sites.
- SeCOR/IRSEM Recruitment and Employment Structure. Make recommendations for how SeCOR can increase the effectiveness of its reintegration services by increasing the number of women who apply for and are hired for key community, provincial and national positions, including the new "community social coordinators."
- Gender Training. Identify priority needs for participatory gender sensitivity training that could be carried out by one or two Luanda-based consultants (with active input from UCAH and SeCOR staff on preplanning).

Another way to increase support for women who are resettling would be to include their interests on the agenda of UCAH's technical committees. These committees could serve as an institutionalized mechanism for supporting women. Women should be included in them, and funds should be designated for addressing women's needs. In this way, the committees might demonstrate the importance of women in decision making, ensure that women's perspectives are included, and

ensure that women's concerns would be addressed in the design of SeCOR/IRSEM's reintegration programs.

#### **DISABLED WOMEN**

Although women represent an estimated 40 percent of all the disabled — and as high as 60 percent in heavily mined provinces such as Moxico and Kuito — on average only 10 percent of all prostheses have been distributed to women (Declich, 1997; UNHCR, 1996).<sup>20</sup> Since many of the organizations providing prostheses appear to be gender sensitive, there is a need to try new approaches to increasing the numbers of women receiving this assistance. Previous studies cite women's poverty and social isolation as a constraint that makes it difficult for them to afford the costs for shoes or transportation (Women's Commission, 1996). In response to this observation, several organizations, including U.S.-supported ICRC, have implemented programs to assist women with transportation and other costs.

Nevertheless, the organizations providing prostheses are still finding that they do not serve enough women. In the course of in-depth interviews with disabled women, the WIDTECH team identified some additional constraints, including:

- **Informational barriers.** Disabled women are isolated from the current mechanisms, mostly rural hospitals, by which printed information about programs is distributed.
- **Family and childcare responsibilities.** Women are concerned that, while they are hospitalized, they will not be able to provide food for their children.

While there are many individual women whose lives have been shattered by land-mine accidents, there seems to be little or no group efforts to access resources. Although a recent UCAH document describes four Angolan NGOs working for the disabled, and one local NGO (UCAH 1995: 28-32), we did not encounter any evidence that these groups were concerned with special programs to recruit or target disabled women.<sup>24</sup> Rather, we noted the virtual absence of any institutional mechanism for orchestrating or lobbying for the special needs of disabled women.

We also noted that despite the demonstrated expertise of many of the bilateral and international organizations involved in handicapped programs, there was no evidence of organizations following any sort of gender action plan that was adapted to the specific conditions of Angola. This lack of consideration of gender was reflected in the proposed Memorandum of Understanding of the National Coordinating Board for Orthopedics (Grupo de cordenação dos programas ortopedicos, GCPO).

USAID should encourage the directors of its projects with ICRC and Veterans International to provide national leadership on the issue of disabled women by ensuring that at least one paragraph on gender issues is added to the two page Memorandum of Understanding that has recently been discussed by the GCPO. These organizations should also be encouraged to explore new opportunities to assist disabled women they serve to organize themselves into recognized groups.

Funded projects should be encouraged to increase service to women by establishing quotas as well as improving the distribution of information about their services to disabled women. This publicity effort would be facilitated by the production of one- to two-page information flyers (one in Portuguese and one in simple Portuguese with drawings) that ICRC and the Veterans International could distribute to PVOs, churches, *sobas*, and market authorities as well as hospitals and health posts in the areas where they intervene.

USAID's democracy and governance program should seek any groups of disabled women that are beginning to work together, and support their development into an advocacy group on behalf of Angolan women suffering from land-mine injuries. Their disabilities will affect their earning capacity, ability to care for their children, educational opportunities, and their health for the rest of their lives. Only if they work together do they have any possibility of influencing the policies and allocations of the Ministries of Labor, Health, Education, MINARS, and others or of accessing private and foreign assistance.

Given the extremely large number of disabled men and women in Angola, all USAID projects should be sensitized to their needs and required to include and monitor disabled women's participation in their funded activities.

# WOMEN AFFECTED BY OTHER VULNERABLE GROUPS (MOTHERS OF TRAUMATIZED CHILDREN AND FAMILY TRACING)

USAID support for a series of school and community-based programs to promote the psychosocial reintegration of war traumatized children has included active female participation at every level of the program. The same program has pioneered new methods for "training up" women with secondary school education or some university training to serve as salaried trainers, and shorter, less intensive training courses to "train up" primary school, kindergarten (PIQ) teachers to serve as voluntary community trainers. One of the unanticipated results of the programs has been that many of the clients have regrouped themselves into informal interest groups that have applied for and received additional funding, from non-USAID sources, for micro-projects (CCF, 1997).

Unfortunately, however, most of the provincial programs we visited did not appear to be very well connected to other USAID-funded PVO activities in the same region. This meant that the CCF trainers and staff were often unaware of other reconstruction and rehabilitation resources that the mothers could access to further or develop group projects. This disconnectedness to the wider PVO networks in the region also meant that the other PVOs were not learning as much as they could from this project's best practices.

The MINARS/SCF/UK family tracing program is another example of best practice for including women at each stage of project design and implementation. The same project has done an excellent job of improving the lives of many women by reuniting them with lost children. Yet, while the women may be glad to be reunited, the mothers, aunts, and grandmothers usually end up being the primary caretakers. It is unfortunate that the program has not invested resources in helping these women manage the increased economic burden of reunification.

USAID should continue support for these relatively small, fine-tuned projects that generate a variety of short and medium term benefits for women and their dependents. USAID might enhance the positive spread effects of this program by creating small funds that could be used to foster travel and meetings to facilitate the exchange of information and experience.

Whenever possible, project efforts to encourage women clients to organize group projects should be encouraged. One mechanism for doing this would be for USAID to create a small addition to their existing funding which could be used to "seed" group projects. The sponsoring organizations should also explore the possibility that some of these organizational efforts might be reinforced by other NGO programs in the regions where they intervene or special leadership training for women's groups that may coalesce around and/or be reinforced by these programs. One avenue for leadership training would be for CCF to introduce a half-day module on "community development resources" into its two week training course.

Both programs should encourage their staff to participate more actively in the technical committee meetings coordinated by SeCOR/IRSEM, UNHCR, and UCAH in the areas where they intervene. This would be a means of identifying other PVOs (beyond U.S. funding) willing to support the follow-up needs of families for food, basic health care, school materials and construction material.

To date, CCF's training for traumatized children has concentrated on educational facilities in urban centers. Although urban based teachers and kindergarten instructors were enthusiastic about their participation in CCF training, CCF should consider expanding its programs to some rural and peri-urban communities.

Other USAID-funded programs should be encouraged to study the training and publicity methods of these projects as an example of "best practice" in working through traditional organizations to distribute information to women. CCF's successful record in "training up" women with secondary school or some university education is a best practice that should be analyzed and discussed as a model for increasing the number of women extension agents, mine awareness instructors, and food monitors employed on USAID-funded projects.

# CHAPTER 4

# WOMEN IN DEMOCRACY, GOVERNANCE, AND CIVIL SOCIETY

Through its Strategic Objective #2, USAID seeks to support peace and stability in AngolaÊ through democracy, governance, and the strengthening of civil society. After Portuguese control, theÊ combination of wars and socialism resulted in governmental systems that are malfunctioning, partially-functioning and non-functioning.Ê

In 1991-1992, however, there was a strong attempt at democracy during the elections. InÊ designing and implementing its new D&G program, USAID is certain to consider the lessons andÊ legacies of the 1992 elections. One critical lesson may be that the apparent number of votes does notÊ necessarily establish the legitimacy of election results. It is not enough that there be absolute numbersÊ of people voting, and that they may cast their votes free of pressure and in secret. Two additionalÊ factors are critical for an election to reflect Angolans' wishes and address their needs. People must castÊ their votes with sufficient information to make knowledgeable choices, and voters must represent aÊ demographic breadth and diversity that includes men *and women* from different geographic, ethnic andÊ political groups.Ê

To understand the objectives and the approaches of USAID's D&G Program, it is important to  $\hat{E}$  recognize that USAID expects to be in Angola for only five years. Consequently, USAID seeks to put  $\hat{E}$  its resources into initiatives that will be sustainable and that will build local capacity. The WIDTECH  $\hat{E}$  team suggests that Angolan women are important for achieving a variety of D&G objectives:  $\hat{E}$ 

D&G Objective	Women's Role
	Women as voters and candidates: civic education
Building foundations for free and fair elections.	and participation in political parties.
Advocate for open, democratic system.	Women as outspoken citizens, in the media.
Catalyst for sustainable initiatives in civil	Women as project managers and NGO leaders.
society.	
Sponsor new models that demonstrate new	Women equally represented as decision-makers
processes and attitudes, e.g. transparency and	and participants.
participation.	
Strengthen capable leaders with integrity.	Women in leadership positions.

The WIDTECH team was invited to Angola to review USAID's programming because the  $\hat{E}$  Mission recognized that achieving solid, legitimate democratic institutions will require women's  $\hat{E}$  participation. This study is premised on the hypothesis that the more women are incorporated into  $\hat{E}$  Angola's fledgling democracy, and the more women engage actively in Angola's civil society, the  $\hat{E}$  greater the chances that a fragile peace may evolve into a solid democracy.  $\hat{E}$ 

#### BARRIERS TO WOMEN RECEIVING THE BENEFITS OF DEMOCRACY

To achieve a viable and lasting democracy, the people of Angola must overcome a number of  $\hat{E}$  obstacles. But in nearly every case, those obstacles loom even higher before the women who might  $\hat{E}$  participate in an open society. If women are to constitute a primary source of democratic behavior and  $\hat{E}$  activity, then they must receive help in overcoming those obstacles. The barriers to women's  $\hat{E}$  participation in political processes and civil society are discussed in turn below.  $\hat{E}$ 

#### **Political Culture**

The people of Angola are familiar with colonialism and socialism, but not with democracy. People are not used to putting themselves forward, or to making a vocal and active stand for that which  $\hat{E}$  they require. This is exacerbated for women, who are hampered by the combination of this overall  $\hat{E}$  culture and an endemic lack of self-confidence. It is important to note, therefore, that if assistance to  $\hat{E}$  democracy assumes that a population will respond to offers of technical assistance and access help,  $\hat{E}$  then such assistance will in most cases result in limited women's participation. The average woman is  $\hat{E}$  not likely to put herself forward. Furthermore, women are not used to having anyone offer them a  $\hat{E}$  chance to help. Women in our focus groups said that in their homes men bark commands and women  $\hat{E}$  simply respond, without realizing how much they are accepting.<sup>1</sup>

In addition, the combination of traditional and war-time practice means that decisions are made $\hat{E}$ and priorities are set by top-down command or force. Throughout Angola one sees uniforms  $-\hat{E}$ military, police and UNAVEM — and all three forces are nearly exclusively men. Women are not $\hat{E}$ accustomed to being in command positions. Nor do they have mental images or expectations of $\hat{E}$ women in uniformed command. $\hat{E}$ 

As a result of years of war, there is no predictable or reliable system upon which people can $\hat{E}$  depend to plan their careers or lives. They cannot save their money for children's education because of  $\hat{E}$  hyperinflation. Also they cannot count on their children to support them in their old age because of  $\hat{E}$  war-related deaths and injuries, as well as poor health services.  $\hat{E}$ 

Under such circumstances, some people feel compelled to grab what they can get as soon  $as\hat{E}$  they can. This is a basis for seeking immediate rewards and for corruption. For women, they simply $\hat{E}$  find that they must put nearly all of their time and attention into survival: they work long hours to make $\hat{E}$  enough money to feed their children and to pay for private education offered by the church. There is $\hat{E}$  neither time nor energy for much else. $\hat{E}$ 

#### **Political Processes and Institutions**

#### **Ineffective Communications Impede Political Discourse and Participation**

Any long-term solution to Angola's reconstruction and rehabilitation will demand strong $\hat{E}$  participation of women in the civil processes that elect leaders and hold these leaders accountable. At $\hat{E}$  present, women's ability to participate in this type of election process — as voters or as elected leaders $\hat{E}$  — is woefully insufficient. Interviews in the villages and communities served by USAID projects $\hat{E}$  revealed the fact that those women typically have little if any information about candidates or platforms. $\hat{E}$  In addition, women attached to groups or organizations have little understanding of how they might $\hat{E}$  organize to meet their needs. $\hat{E}$ 

Angola is fractured by two severe impediments to communication. As a matter of logistics,  $\hat{E}$ Angola is a large country with infrastructure that has been destroyed or neglected for more than twenty  $\hat{E}$ years. The telephone system is nearly useless. For direct contacts and personal communication, land  $\hat{E}$ mines pose constant and serious risks to travelers.  $\hat{E}$ 

If, under these circumstances, women could be reached by and could communicate with one $\hat{E}$  another through conventional media — such as newspapers, televisions, and radios — there would be $\hat{E}$  some means of overcoming communications problems. In fact, however, it quickly becomes apparent $\hat{E}$  that these systems do not reach women. The are four impediments to communication with women: $\hat{E}$ 

- Newspapers are only an option if women read and if the newspapers reach them. They areÊ delivered only intermittently to provincial cities, and are very difficult to get outside majorÊ areas. In addition they are quite expensive. For women who are illiterate, newspapers areÊ irrelevant.Ê
- 2. Women do not have time to listen or read. They are in the fields or in the markets, fetching $\hat{E}$  water and grinding meal. $\hat{E}$
- 3.Ê Communication costs money, for newspapers, televisions, radios, and batteries.Ê
- 4.Ê Culturally, women do not listen to the radio in Angola.<sup>2</sup>

Meanwhile there is the exacerbating problem of language. Many Angolans do not speak  $\hat{E}$  Portuguese. There are at least six major national languages, and another dozen at least beyond that. This is particularly serious for women — not only women in the provinces, but also women in the  $\hat{E}$  *musseques* of Luanda who live in isolated communities where they continue to function with their  $\hat{E}$  national languages.  $\hat{E}$ 

Moreover, women tend to communicate and organize through informal means rather than the  $\hat{E}$  traditional printed and electronic media. Yet even these informal systems have been weakened by  $\hat{E}$  drawn-out war. Again, it is harder for women to meet face-to-face because transportation systems  $\hat{E}$  have fallen apart and land mines constantly endanger travelers. In addition, meeting their families'  $\hat{E}$  basic economic needs demands more of women's time and energy. Very little is left for group  $\hat{E}$  activities.  $\hat{E}$ 

Lastly, there are particular problems relating to women in UNITA dominated areas. First, the  $\hat{E}$  conduits of information from Luanda to these women are particularly bad. As of late spring 1997, they  $\hat{E}$  were not represented in the Ministry for Women. UNITA women do not have representatives in  $\hat{E}$  Luanda to gather and relay information to them. There is also a problem of information flows in the  $\hat{E}$  other direction: little is known in Luanda about women's needs — and women as resources — in  $\hat{E}$  UNITA areas. Concerted efforts are needed to bring them into the loop.  $\hat{E}$ 

There is a critical need to improve the dissemination of information to women by identifying  $\hat{E}$  alternative ways of communicating with them. Without information, women will not be viable  $\hat{E}$  participants in the various aspects of democracy: voting, running for office and involvement in civil  $\hat{E}$  society.  $\hat{E}$ 

#### Technical Assistance and Capacity Building Tend to Reach Only Insiders

If one takes a snapshot look at women in democracy in Angola today, the picture is not  $a\hat{E}$  promising one. On the government's side, of the 215 representatives currently seated in the National $\hat{E}$  Assembly, there are but 25 women (18 MPLA, 4 UNITA, 3 PLD).<sup>3</sup> The government has included $\hat{E}$  four women as Ministers (all MPLA) out of 32, and 8 women as Deputy Ministers (7 MPLA and  $1\hat{E}$  PLD) out of 53. It is true that the women ministers include some very significant portfolios: $\hat{E}$  Petroleum, Fisheries, Culture and Women. Since, however, these women come from prominent $\hat{E}$  families, their socio-economic status belies any illusion that they represent opportunities for all Angolan $\hat{E}$  women. $\hat{E}$ 

The representation of women was not helped by the addition of representatives put forth by $\hat{E}$ UNITA pursuant to the Lusaka Protocol. Not one UNITA Minister, Ambassador, Governor, Vice-Governor, or Administrator is a woman. Now that the GURN is established and the Territorial $\hat{E}$ Administration is being extended, there is a fundamental basis for stabilizing the society. But among $\hat{E}$  the Governors, Vice-Governors and Administrators there are no women; and among the municipal and $\hat{E}$  communal administrators the number of women is insignificant. $\hat{E}$ 

Although women are not intentionally excluded, there are two "gender-blind" systems that  $\hat{E}$  result in low women's participation in training in political processes and campaigning. First, the U.S.-funded projects tend to offer training to people who are already in the National Assembly or who are  $\hat{E}$  already government officials. Because there are very few women in those positions, the capacity-building and -strengthening efforts are reaching men, men's groups, and men's interests.  $\hat{E}$ 

Second, untargeted, "general admission" offers of democratic assistance are not much better at  $\hat{E}$  including women. In some cases, opportunities for capacity-building workshops and conferences are  $\hat{E}$  offered broadly, to anyone qualified and interested. In such cases, it is assumed that all those who want  $\hat{E}$  to will partake. Yet information is often distributed through offices and organizations where there are  $\hat{E}$  not many women, or through media that do not reach them. If democracy training is offered only in  $\hat{E}$  suggested above, without conscious strategies to attract and involve women, they will remain outside  $\hat{E}$  of the system.  $\hat{E}$ 

#### **Political Party Insecurity Engenders Fear of Expanded Participation**

In the long term, the legitimacy and the effectiveness of Angola's democracy depends on  $pen\hat{E}$  and inclusive political parties. While there are some elite women involved in the political parties, they  $\hat{E}$  rarely hold leadership positions.<sup>4</sup>

One impediment to women's greater participation is that it is difficult to build or expand an  $\hat{E}$  open society when those in power feel weak and vulnerable. Political parties and leaders fear the  $\hat{E}$  strengthening of others, in large part because they do not feel confident about their own capacity to  $\hat{E}$  "play the game." No amount of democratic rhetoric will change the reality that those in power will  $\hat{E}$  work with desperation to maintain their power. This means that those who are within the system (men)  $\hat{E}$  will seek to monopolize foreign assistance to grow increasingly adept at using political tools, such as  $\hat{E}$  party building. Those outside of the system (women) will remain amateur and weak.  $\hat{E}$ 

Women begin as outsiders, and will be increasingly excluded as viable participants. Since they  $\hat{E}$  constitute a tiny fraction of those within the system, they will enjoy relatively little access to capacity  $\hat{E}$  building. As long as party and government leaders are allowed or invited to select participants for  $\hat{E}$  training or exchanges, women will not participate equally.

#### The Constitution and the Legal System

#### Written, Positive Law Fails to Protect or Support Women

**The Constitution.** Because a number of skilled and influential women participated in drafting $\hat{E}$  the 1992 Constitution, elite Angolan women are fairly satisfied with what it says. $\hat{E}$ 

Yet they point out that words on paper do not suffice. There are some significant provisions  $\hat{E}$  that require implementation or enforcement. The Angolan Constitution and official legal system appear  $\hat{E}$  to protect women and grant them equal rights and responsibilities along with men. Yet the ongoing  $\hat{E}$  conflict has virtually obliterated that system's role in Angolan women's lives. Women do not know  $\hat{E}$  about the system, and the system is virtually nonfunctional  $\hat{E}$ 

Instead, both urban and rural communities around the country rely on customary law, neocustomary practices, and decisions by *sobas* purporting to follow them.<sup>5</sup> In many cases, these $\hat{E}$  alternative systems put women and children at risk. $\hat{E}$ 

The Constitution will be subject to amendment by the National Assembly. If women (or theirÊ interests) are not effectively represented in the National Assembly, future amendments to theÊ Constitution will lack women's input. There are likely to be many decisions in the near future aboutÊ which laws require changes, what regulatory framework is needed, and how to ensure the effectiveÊ implementation of the country's rule-of-law. If such decisions include women, there are opportunitiesÊ to establish solid and effective protections for women's participation and advancement. If not, newÊ rules and systems will be put in place that are likely to ignore impacts on or needs of women, and thatÊ could weaken or eliminate existing protections for women.Ê

#### Comparing Women's Protections under Positive Law and According to Practice

**Inheritance:** The positive law enables a widow to inherit her home from her husband. But according to traditional law, which is now most widely applied in Angola, a widow is at the mercy of her husband's family, and waits anxiously to see whether they will allow her and her children to stay in the home and keep their possessions. In the past, a husband's family gained control of his property to enable it to take responsibility for supporting and protecting his widow. Nowadays, in a society of poverty and want, the families seem to grab what they can, and the woman is simply left homeless and destitute.

**Divorce:** A divorced woman has rights under Angola's positive law. Those rights assume, however, that she was married according to the positive law system. Since many marriages are not officially sanctioned, the women are not entitled to the protection of positive law in case of divorce.

**Polygamy:** Officially, according to both state law and prevalent Christian churches, polygamy is not permitted. In fact, however, polygamy has become extraordinarily common throughout Angola, at all economic levels. Women find they have little clout in their households. Husbands come to them for economic support. If husbands are not happy with a wife's performance or support, they can leave her for another, or sometimes beat her as well.

**Child support:** In all three situations polygamy, the lack of state-sanctioned marriages and the inapplicability of divorce law — mothers have no legal means of requiring the fathers of their children to support them financially.

**Commercial/Trade Law.** The law that prohibits vendors from selling their goods in the  $\hat{E}$  streets is purportedly justified by the need for order and safety. When people sell to cars, cars are  $\hat{E}$  stopping along the roads. When people sell along the sidewalks, there is not space to walk.<sup>6</sup>

Technically, the law applies to male and female vendors. In practice, this law has  $a\hat{E}$  disproportionate adverse impact on women. First, men can avoid law enforcement fairly easily. They $\hat{E}$  are quite mobile with their goods, and they can run quickly if pursued by the police. In contrast, $\hat{E}$  women often have a child strapped to their backs and have goods on their heads. It is not unusual for  $a\hat{E}$  woman to be pregnant as well. Their chances of getting away are quite low — and the police officers $\hat{E}$  know it. Second, the police also do not feel threatened by women. When apprehended, the women are $\hat{E}$  rarely carrying weapons and are vulnerable. Third, there are many reports of police beating women. There are also reports of women being thrown into jail cells, where they are kept without contact with $\hat{E}$  the families and without money with which to contact their families or pay their way out (especially if $\hat{E}$  the police have already taken whatever they had). $\hat{E}$ 

Moreover, women are afraid of the police at home as well as in the streets. Police often  $go\hat{E}$  directly to their homes in the *musseques* and demand payments.

The police face several problems. Not all those who appear to be police really are. Some men $\hat{E}$  who have been expelled from the police or military were allowed to keep their uniforms. Second, $\hat{E}$  while the police may have had training, without accountability it has not been inadequate for changing $\hat{E}$  their habits and mentality. Unless the highest levels establish that police brutality will be punished, $\hat{E}$ 

rules of conduct need not be respected. Finally, the police are underpaid, and use "enforcement" of the  $\hat{E}$  street vendors law to fill their pockets.  $\hat{E}$ 

**Education, Application, and Enforcement.** As has been indicated with regard to the  $\hat{E}$  Constitution and to family law, it is not the letter of the law that poses problems in Angola, but  $\hat{E}$  implementation. A judicial system is needed to apply, interpret, and enforce the law. But as is typical  $\hat{E}$  in conflict and post-conflict situations, the legal system is virtually nonfunctional. First, there has been  $\hat{E}$  little legitimate legislative process to pass laws. Second, there is little enforcement of the laws. Third,  $\hat{E}$  insofar as there are any courts struggling to function, they are seriously underfunded.  $\hat{E}$ 

While the breakdown of the legal system potentially affects all citizens, the consequences for  $\hat{E}$  women are most dramatic. When a positive legal system does not function, there seem to be two  $\hat{E}$  alternative sources of protection: force and traditional dispute resolution. Those members of society  $\hat{E}$  who lack physical strength and weapons, namely women and children, most need the law's protection.  $\hat{E}$  If the strong win, women often lose, and there are many accounts of women physically thrown out of  $\hat{E}$  their homes by husbands who have taken a new wife.  $\hat{E}$ 

Depending on the temperament of the local *sobas*, women may also lose in traditional dispute $\hat{E}$  resolution. This varies according to the individual leader, the presence of extended family, and the  $\hat{E}$  community. If women had access to the positive legal system, it would often protect them more  $\hat{E}$  effectively. Yet the average women in Angola — particularly those who live in rural areas or in the  $\hat{E}$  *musseques* — neither know about the law nor know how to access legal counsel or assistance.  $\hat{E}$ 

#### An Illustration: Formal Law Does Not Curb Violence Against Women

Violence against women is the quintessential example of how women need protection by the  $\hat{E}$  legal system, how they do not know about its protections, and how enforcement is either non-existent  $\hat{E}$  or not available to them. Women are "shaken down" by police officers, thrown out of their homes by  $\hat{E}$  husbands who have taken new wives, and sexually assaulted in quartering areas. Yet in most cases,  $\hat{E}$  women feel (and are) quite powerless to do anything about it.  $\hat{E}$ 

Moreover, their lack of recourse is a prevalent problem because there is a growing culture of  $\hat{E}$  violence. Angolan society is not suffering the effects of a war that "came and went." War extends  $\hat{E}$  back more than thirty years. And the violence of war has led to increased violence both in the streets  $\hat{E}$  and homes. Moreover, the violence can also be attributed to the severe decline in economic well-being.  $\hat{E}$  The socio-economic decay of Angola, with the numbers of people who are displaced, unemployed and  $\hat{E}$ 

impoverished, contributes to further delinquency and violence.Ê

Women in Luanda worry most about violence in the streets, by legitimate police, irregulars $\hat{E}$  dressed as police, and delinquents. They say there are stories every week, and they still do not know a $\hat{E}$  fraction of how much goes on. Women are vulnerable in the streets because they cannot flee and are $\hat{E}$  often carrying a child on their back and their goods on their heads. There are also stories of pregnant $\hat{E}$  women being chased by the police. $\hat{E}$ 

Moreover, the police are brazen. They will shake down women in the street, but they will also  $\hat{E}$  go to woman's home, particularly in the *musseques*, and demand payment. The police are aware of the  $\hat{E}$ 

women who are out working in the informal market and who are bringing home money for their $\hat{E}$  families. $\hat{E}$ 

Women speak quite clearly about feeling that there is no recourse. They say that the judicial  $\hat{E}$  system does not function and that they would be going up against the insiders. Moreover, privileged  $\hat{E}$  and educated women say that most women do not know how to access help from the legal community.  $\hat{E}$ 

But in addition to violence by the police, women in Angola agree that there is violence in their $\hat{E}$  homes. Some say it is based in a cultural acceptance of beating women.<sup>7</sup> Though there are no data to $\hat{E}$  support it, they think that domestic violence has been exacerbated by men's polygamy; when husbands $\hat{E}$  don't like what one wife does, they can abuse her and go to another. Women are also caught in bad $\hat{E}$  situations because they lack the economic means to walk away from a husband who beats them and to $\hat{E}$  live somewhere else. $\hat{E}$ 

#### **OMA Center for Helping Battered Women**

OMA's legal advisory section has been helping women for over a decade. During that period it has handled 1,750 cases. While there is debate in Angola about whether OMA will survive as an organization now that it is no longer connected to the MPLA, this particular project continues to address a critical need.

The Center has a cadre of advisors first staffed by individual lawyers, and has more recently partnered with the Angolan Women Lawyers Association. This group has helped to train "barefoot counselors" to help women. There are now approximately 45 regular volunteers and two paid staff to run the Center. The Center has received some early sponsorship from the Swedish government.

Women know of the Center in three ways: referred by the police, referred by OMA's provincial offices, or referred through word-of-mouth. Women at the Center recognize several needs: from working to educate the police to publicizing their services so that more women know about them (see Annex 9 for further information).

The plight of rural women, and of women in Quartering Areas, is less well understood, again $\hat{E}$  because information is harder to collect. These areas also must be studied, and will require $\hat{E}$  collaboration with those international and Angolan organizations that are active in particular local or $\hat{E}$  provincial areas. UCAH wants to do this with in-house capacity, but would need to hire someone to be $\hat{E}$  responsible. It lacks the requisite resources  $\hat{E}$ 

The Swedish Embassy has sponsored a study on violence against women, the results of which  $\hat{E}$  were due in May and should now be available. $\hat{E}$ 

#### **OPPORTUNITIES FOR WOMEN IN ANGOLAN DEMOCRACY**

Having taken the brunt of the wars and seen both their lives and the lives of their children $\hat{E}$  destroyed by war, women know its costs. They are dismayed by the degree to which Angolan society $\hat{E}$  has regressed, and they see how much must be restored. On every level and in every area, there are $\hat{E}$  examples of women struggling to strengthen and empower themselves. Women in the *musseques* are $\hat{E}$  attending literacy classes or sitting in during the children's classes. Women participating in an OIKOS $\hat{E}$ 

project in a village 17 kilometers from Huambo, who do not speak Portuguese and have little  $\hat{E}$  information about the world around them, express real hunger for learning to read. Women in the  $\hat{E}$  sociedade da senhoras in San Miguel/Luvemba send delegates for training that is shared with their  $\hat{E}$  group.  $\hat{E}$  See Annex 9 for a list of needs that they had prepared for the USAID visit.  $\hat{E}$ 

#### The Centro de Educação Basic (Center for Basic Education) in Bailundo

CEB was formed by 15 women concerned about a lack of *creches* or daycare for children in Bailundo. The center started with 50 children, last year had 150, and in 1997 is serving 450. There is no discrimination; the center accommodates all. The staff welcome orphans and displaced children, some of whom suffer from trauma, and hope to integrate them in society.

CEB has *no* state support, and exists only on private contributions. It started by using a church and its chairs for teaching space. Now, however, with the ever-increasing numbers, CEB has tried to start classrooms outside. The WIDTECH team saw some students learning in a structure that had a roof and no walls — and the youngest children were sitting attentively in rows under a tree. (See Annex 9 for CEB letter.)

#### NGOs and Women's Groups Needing Support

While women are not included in decision making, they are mobilizing to provide social  $\hat{E}$  services, obtain education for their children, and rebuild the country. There are many ways in which  $\hat{E}$  women in Angola are already working together and getting information. In Luanda, there is now a  $\hat{E}$  Gender Network that includes: AAD, ACORD, ADEMA, ANGOBEFA, APROMUC, ASSOMEL,  $\hat{E}$  BPC, CICA, DW, FONGA, LWF, OIKOS, OMA, OPM, OXFAM, SEPDM, and UTCA. The  $\hat{E}$  WIDTECH team was warmly received by LIMA and ADEMA, two major groups in the UNITA  $\hat{E}$  capital of Bailundo. Each has clear organizational structure, existing projects, and a number of  $\hat{E}$  proposals (Annex 9).  $\hat{E}$ 

Women's initiatives lie along a continuum from informal groups with common interests, to $\hat{E}$  interest-based initiatives, to community-based organizations to NGOs. FONGA, which is the Forum $\hat{E}$  for Angolan NGOs, has about 30 member organizations, of which approximately 20 are led by $\hat{E}$  women.<sup>9</sup> Some critics complain that FONGA does not include everyone, or that it does not do enough. $\hat{E}$  While this*may* be true, it is to be expected.<sup>10</sup> Many of these groups are no more than two years old. They are in the early stages of building their institutions, setting their priorities, and implementing their $\hat{E}$  strategic agendas. $\hat{E}$ 

## ADEMA and LIMA in Bailundo

The Association for the Help and Development of Angolan Women and Children (ADEMA) was established in April 1995. Its leadership and administrative staff are approximately twenty women. ADEMA's objectives are:

- to guarantee support for women's economic development, especially in rural areas;
- to identify opportunities for women's education and training;
- to support children, particularly those without protection; and
- to create mechanisms to support abandoned children.

ADEMA's projects include:

- help for widows and children in the quartering areas;
- help for wives of demobilized soldiers;
- a School for Training Women, focusing primarily on cooking, sewing and baking, with some training in typing; and
- a garden to train single women to grow vegetables and use the food to feed malnourished children.

The League of Angolan Women (LIMA), also very active in Bailundo, is a national organization affiliated with UNITA. LIMA is extraordinarily well organized and makes a strong impression. It is now focusing on the impacts on women and children from the war. In particular, the organization is concerned about children who have lost their mothers in childbirth because of rising maternal mortality, and about women who are widows or have been abandoned by their husbands.

LIMA has three pilot projects in Bailundo:

- A Center for Women's Training,
- A Home for Abandoned Children, and
- An Agriculture/Small Animal Husbandry project producing food for women and children.

LIMA's Association of Women Lawyers has made some tentative steps toward cooperation with the Angolan Association of Women Lawyers (AAMJ).

There is a critical need for capacity building to move each sort of women's group to a more  $\hat{E}$  advanced stage of effectiveness. But there are many viable and interested partners. Women are eager  $\hat{E}$  for technical assistance and would make good use of it. On these foundations and through those  $\hat{E}$  channels, USAID has the opportunity to support women as full and complete members of Angolan  $\hat{E}$  society. If women are to help set priorities for peace, education, or economic opportunity, local  $\hat{E}$  initiatives are the basis for gaining experience, confidence, and access to society — just as is the case  $\hat{E}$  regarding their access to foreign assistance.  $\hat{E}$ 

## The Association for Support of Abandoned Children (AACA) in Luanda

The AACA started in June 1994 and obtained a building in September 1996. The AACA serves girls from the streets. Twenty-eight girls, ranging in age from 5 to15, now live at the AACA, and approximately 50 others come for meals. If they had the money, they would open a second building. No one knows how many girls are living on the streets, but there may be thousands.

AACA is run by 18 employees, all of whom are volunteers. Previously, staff were paid from a EU/OIKOS grant. The Association does not receive support from MINARS or from the Institute for Children. The Ministers of Petroleum and of Fisheries have donated money personally. One company, **Intercomercial Moagem**, has given money for a school that serves 150 students. AACA still needs funds for teachers, books, meals, and transportation. The girls also get music and English lessons at the Swedish Embassy. AACA's list of sponsors is impressive, including international organizations, embassies, companies and prominent individuals.

The organization has partners with facilities in Lobito in Benguela Province, and in Amboim and Gabela in Kwanza Sul.

# **Experience and Best Practices to Emulate**

# **CREA** Community Building Project

CREA has been working with small communities in both government and UNITAadministered areas. This program aims to mobilize people at the local level, help them organize  $a\hat{E}$ broad-based initiative, set priorities, and implement their projects. Projects range from repairing $\hat{E}$ bridges and roads to carrying out agricultural extension and rehabilitating schools. It is an integrated $\hat{E}$ approach that gives assistance, but mainly helps people to help themselves. $\hat{E}$ 

Each project follows several steps:Ê

- CREA begins with a questionnaire that covers the population, the comparative advantages,  $\hat{E}$  and resources. It considers which NGOs are active in the area, as well as productive  $\hat{E}$  patterns, disruptions, and social conflict.  $\hat{E}$
- CREA helps the community organize a "Grupo de Trabalho" ("GdT") that typicallyÊ includes priests or ministers, *sobas*, local civil leaders, and *catequistas*. In addition, theÊ community is required to find women to participate. (In Luvemba, a small village outsideÊ of Bailundo, women from the *sociedade de senhoras* are representatives on the GdT.)Ê
- $\Box$  The GdT then submits projects proposals and CREA helps to evaluate the feasibility. $\hat{E}$
- The entire community is involved in choosing the project. The community is givenÊ information about the process, including the potential projects and the inputs necessary forÊ each. Voting includes everyone and is done with twigs or sticks.Ê
- Finally, a contract is drawn up and signed in a public ceremony.  $\hat{E}$

CREA has learned a number of lessons about women's participation.Ê

- Express, concerted efforts are needed to ensure that women are part of the program. $\hat{E}$
- Their participation must be legitimized by local leaders (men). $\hat{E}$
- It is necessary to help women develop self-confidence. Sixty-five percent of the time theyÊ do not speak up unless asked, but once women get involved in the process they develop aÊ voice.Ê
- Women can make a project a success or save one in trouble. In one case, a project was notÊ moving forward and CREA threatened to pull out. The women catalyzed the process byÊ making the (painting) work a family activity.Ê
- There are opportunities to get women involved in something other than sewing andÊ cooking. Since women have traditionally been builders, CREA capitalizes on thatÊ experience to keep them involved in mainstream activities.Ê

#### Fund for Social Support/Fundo de Apoio Social (FAS)

Funded by the World Bank and initiated by the Angolan Ministry of Planning in 1994, FASÊ was the Angolan government's first public acknowledgement that poverty was growing, both as aÊ result of government cutbacks and as 3 million IDPs were flooding into the cities. But while FASÊ addresses the needs of socially and economically marginalized populations, it was created "to mitigateÊ

FAS is structured as a quasi-independent entity. Its board is half government representatives  $\hat{E}$  and half "civil society," including NGOs, associations and church representatives. The program is  $\hat{E}$  decentralized to work through provincial teams that have the same public-private management and  $\hat{E}$  decision-making structure. So far, FAS is operational in three provinces: Cuanza Sul, Benguela, and  $\hat{E}$  Namibe.  $\hat{E}$ 

Like CREA, FAS focuses on activating people, broad-based participation, capacity building, $\hat{E}$  and transparent processes. The community is mobilized through a "Núcleo Communitário" (NC) of  $\hat{E}$  four to five community representatives, one of whom must be a woman. In addition there are at least  $\hat{E}$  two women on the team that works with the community." Moreover, the rules of project and funding  $\hat{E}$  selection state that if there are two communities with the same number of points but one is run by a  $\hat{E}$  man and the other by a woman, preference is given to the woman. They also give preference to  $\hat{E}$  projects that have the greatest number of women and children as beneficiaries.  $\hat{E}$ 

#### The U.N.'s Technical Committees: An Opportunity to Learn from CREA and FAS

The U.N.'s technical committees (UNTCs) that help allocate foreign assistance are  $\hat{E}$  demonstrating the value of open, democratic decision making. The UNTCs are beginning to engage  $\hat{E}$  Angolans, including the Governors or Vice-Governors of the Provinces, in transparent processes of  $\hat{E}$  group decision making.

There does not seem to be any explicit effort to include women as participants, or women's  $\hat{E}$  needs as a focus, and there should be. Based on the experience of FAS and CREA, they should  $\hat{E}$  recognize the value of women's participation, and the need to make it a requirement. Insofar as  $\hat{E}$  women are under-represented on the government side, it is important to include them in a "civil  $\hat{E}$  society" delegation, as is done on the FAS boards. The benefits would be threefold:  $\hat{E}$ 

- 1. Women would enrich and improve the decision-making process with their knowledge and  $\hat{E}$  perspective.  $\hat{E}$
- 2. Men would grow increasingly comfortable with women's participation in the process, andÊ recognize its benefits.Ê
- 3.Ê Women would gain experience that would prepare them to step into the public realm.Ê

#### **Impacting Newly Formed Legal and Judicial Institutions**

The third war prevented full implementation of the Constitution that was drafted in 1992. Now, $\hat{E}$  with the establishment of the GURN and of normal, stable government, a number of critical institutions $\hat{E}$  should be established soon — particularly the Constitutional Court and the High Council. If these $\hat{E}$  bodies are formed, there will be an opportunity to appoint a number of new judges. $\hat{E}$ 

The future selection of judges is critical. On the Constitutional Court, they will determine  $\hat{E}$  whether women have the full protections of the Constitution. On other courts, they will determine the  $\hat{E}$  extent to which women can rely on the positive law instead of having to accept the application of  $\hat{E}$  traditional law. It is important that women be part of the judicial system to identify ways in which it  $\hat{E}$  does not serve or protect women.  $\hat{E}$ 

While the Constitution calls for a Constitutional Court (Articles 134 and 135), the court does  $\hat{E}$  not yet exist.<sup>12</sup> Article 135 provides for lawyers and judges to be involved in nominating its seven  $\hat{E}$  judges. The President nominates three judges, including the President of the Court; the National  $\hat{E}$  Assembly elects three judges; and the Supreme Court elects one judge. Women should be included in  $\hat{E}$  the selection of those judges. They should insist on input and on being apprised in advance of those  $\hat{E}$  being considered, so that they may give an opinion about the judicial temperament of nominees. The  $\hat{E}$  Angolan Association for Women Lawyers might be a leader in this effort. $\hat{E}$ 

Similarly, Article 132 of the Constitution states that a High Council shall manage and discipline  $\hat{E}$  the judicial bench, but that council has not yet been formed. Instead, the President makes judicial  $\hat{E}$  appointments at will. To date, all Supreme Court justices have been appointed by the President. In  $\hat{E}$  addition, though Article 66(h) provides for the President to appoint Supreme Court judges, it is  $\hat{E}$  supposed to be after hearing from the High Council of the Judicial Bench. It is time for the High  $\hat{E}$  Council to be constituted. This process should be open, competitive and informed by women's input.

A volunteer organization of women lawyers, AAMJ's focus areas are violence against women, peace and reconciliation, training in legal literacy, and research on legal issues. Members take on a variety of volunteer cases each month. They also support OMA's Center for Battered Women, and have a component in their program for Reconciliation and Peace, which they want to get to areas "on the other side," in UNITA territory.

There are also a number of legal reforms that concern AAMJ, including:

- The tensions between traditional practice and official law;
- Inheritance rules that recognize "blood family," as opposed to marriage;
- Land rules that mean that women work on the land while it belongs to their husbands;
- Divorce rules that require men to give only very minor support for children; and
- The lack of enforcement for laws that ought to protect women.

Since there are few women in the National Assembly, the association would like to establish some advisory committee to give opinions on proposed legislation.

Although the AAMJ has been very active, it faces two immediate constraints. First, it uses an office in the Ministry for Women, but cannot gain entry to that office outside of office hours. In the evenings and on weekends when AAMJ members have time to dedicate to their volunteer work, they cannot get inside. Second, they still work without any equipment. In addition, members are eager to connect with women lawyers in other parts of Africa, a goal that requires better access to English (or French) instruction. The U.S. Embassy has recently promised the AAMJ grant money to support publication of a legal guide.

# RECOMMENDATIONS

 USAID should support the growth of civil society in Angola by encouraging "proto-NGOs" (community-based initiatives or community-based organizations and interest groups) arising from its SO#1 beneficiary client groups. Most AngolanÊ women struggle to survive and meet their basic needs, such as food, water, healthcare, andÊ security. They do not have the time to discuss concepts such as democracy andÊ participation when the linkage to meeting these needs is not yet clear.<sup>13</sup>

For many Angolans, civic education, human rights, and democratic participation will not  $\hat{E}$  mean anything until they have learned the value and effectiveness of working together. Before substantive democratic programming will have meaning for many women in  $\hat{E}$  Angola, they need to be prepared to receive, appreciate, and use that information.  $\hat{E}$ 

Mapping the interest group networks developed through SO#1 programs is an efficient and  $\hat{E}$  effective way to broaden and deepen community-based cooperation. Such groups would  $\hat{E}$  include women in agriculture, women near or from the demobilization camps, women  $\hat{E}$  needing accessible water, and disabled women. In each case, the beneficiaries of SO#1 $\hat{E}$  assistance share an interest or need that would motivate them to work together and to seek  $\hat{E}$  the benefits of cooperation and organization. This approach will be more effective than  $\hat{E}$  starting with new focus groups or organizations, because contacts have been made,  $\hat{E}$  relationships built and credibility established.  $\hat{E}$ 

After cooperating and learning together about their most immediate and pressing issues,  $\hat{E}$  they would be an effective group for D&G training. An illustration of how this would  $\hat{E}$ 

work in Angola can be found in the Christian Children Fund's programs for traumatized  $\hat{E}$  children. After working together on a critical shared issue, the trainees have started their  $\hat{E}$  own community projects.  $\hat{E}$ 

2. In a follow-up phase, USAID will have the opportunity to link the strengthened base of SO#1 community organizations to election preparation for women. Once capacityÊ building and confidence building of proto-NGO interest groups have enhanced theirÊ absorptive capacity, they will be better able to benefit from substantive D&GÊ programming. Early programs that promoted community organization and leadershipÊ training can then be supplemented by more specialized demonstrations, extension orÊ theater productions aimed at increasing women's understanding of the electoral process,Ê democracy and related issues.Ê

This process will require coordination among three agents: the SO#1 PVO that has beenÊ working with the interest groups, the new interest group promoters, and the SO#2Ê democracy programs. The D&G NGOs would be responsible for working with provincialÊ and local level authorities, and women, to develop appropriate training materials inÊ Portuguese and in local languages. This work can be started now, before groups are readyÊ to receive courses or sessions.Ê

3. In the meantime, USAID's grantees should strengthen and build the capacity of existing NGOs and associations by working with them on specific projects. There areÊ NGOs and associations, such as the Association of Women Lawyers, several associationsÊ of women journalists, the Association of Women Police Officers, OMA, and LIMA, thatÊ have an interest in issues relating to democracy and governance but lack the capacity toÊ implement programs. (For further information on these organizations, see Annex 8) IfÊ USAID's D&G organizations work to develop some programs with them, it would getÊ some of the work done while strengthening the NGOs.Ê

This relates particularly to human rights and legal literacy training, and to developing the  $\hat{E}$  media. For example, although civic education programs developing radio programs may  $\hat{E}$  not benefit many women as listeners, these programs might benefit women by  $\hat{E}$  strengthening them as the reporters, producers, and managers in a system of free and open  $\hat{E}$  media.<sup>14</sup> Such programs might also offer civic education programs for men that incorporate  $\hat{E}$  some gender sensitizing and prepare them for enhanced women's participation. $\hat{E}$ 

To maximize impact and women's participation, it would be helpful to follow these  $\hat{E}$  guidelines:  $\hat{E}$ 

- Those planning and providing training should not leave attendance at training toÊ chance. They should make sure that women are fully involved.Ê
- If possible, efforts should be made to include women's groups approaching the  $\hat{E}$  level of NGOs.  $\hat{E}$
- Efforts should be made to hold training seminars outside of Luanda.<sup>15</sup>

- 4. It is important to focus resources on the nearly one-third of Angolan women who now live in the *musseques* of Luanda. Since none of USAID's Strategic Objective #1Ê projects are being implemented in the *musseques*, there is no project-based network onÊ which to build a democracy and governance program. But because nearly 2.5 millionÊ people, or about a quarter of the Angolan population, now lives in the outskirts of Luanda,Ê of which at least 50 percent are women, this population should not be ignored. TheseÊ women could constitute a significant portion of the electorate. If, however, no concertedÊ effort is made, they will either not vote at all, or will base their votes on instruction ratherÊ than information. As they live and work around Luanda, they are in fact quite accessible,Ê particularly if their church organizations are engaged as partners.Ê
- 5. USAID-funded PVOs should be required to focus D&G programming on strengthening women as political candidates within the political parties so that they may win places in the National Assembly in the next elections. The next elections inÊ Angola will be absolutely critical, because those elected to office will become strongerÊ politicians through on-the-job learning. If women are to be a real force in Angolan politics,Ê and to influence decision-making about national priorities and the use of Angola'sÊ resources, they must do well in the next elections.Ê

Unless action is taken to strengthen women within the political parties, it is likely that they $\hat{E}$  will barely maintain, or possibly lose, seats in the National Assembly.<sup>16</sup> Unless this issue is $\hat{E}$  addressed, it is likely there will continue to be only a small number of women with either $\hat{E}$  the connections or skills to run for office. The longer this pattern persists, the tougher it $\hat{E}$  will be to reverse.<sup>17</sup>

More specifically, it is important that parliamentary and political party training avoid  $\hat{E}$  ostensibly neutral practices that tend to exclude women. Party activists and organizers  $\hat{E}$  should:  $\hat{E}$ 

- Take care not to offer training only to those people who are currently sitting inÊ Parliament;Ê
- Not settle for token representation of a couple of women in any group;  $\hat{E}$
- $\square$  Make sure training and programming are offered outside Luanda;  $\hat{E}$
- Focus programming on political parties generally, while requiring that theyÊ designate significant numbers of women to participate; andÊ
- $\Box$  Not leave inclusion of women's issues to the discretion of guest lecturers. $\hat{E}$
- 6. USAID-funded SO#2 projects should reorient their civic education and election preparation to ensure that women are equally represented. Getting information andÊ civic education to women must take two factors into account the means of reachingÊ them and the content that will be relevant to them. It is generally understood that womenÊ cannot be reached effectively with newspapers or television. While democracy programsÊ in other countries often turn to radio as a viable alternative, our team concluded that inÊ Angola, radio is not a reliable means of reaching women.Ê

Instead, women must be reached in more direct, personal ways. Yet we do not recommendÊ that programs simply start from scratch in a community. Instead, it is important to findÊ local groups, PVOs, or NGOs already working in a community, especially if they workÊ with women. We propose three alternatives for disseminating information: through theÊ sociedades de senhoras in the churches, through the groups of women who have becomeÊ part of the USAID network, or through proto-NGOs. It may then be possible to developÊ civic education or training with those groups as pilots for other places, for example,Ê through the OIKOS project with women 17 kilometers outside of Huambo, or theÊ sociedade da senhoras in Luvemba.Ê

It is essential that voter preparation goals not be merely "head-counting." It is not enough  $\hat{E}$  to focus on getting women to the polls; they need to vote in an informed way, knowing  $\hat{E}$  which candidates represent their interests and priorities.  $\hat{E}$ 

7. The U.S. Embassy and USAID should support the reestablishment of the rule of law to protect Angolan women. In order that women can rely on the law to protect them, it isÊ necessary to inform them that the laws are able to protect them. The state legal system is ofÊ no use to women who do not know about it, and legal literacy campaigns should beÊ initiated to ensure that women know about the state system.Ê

But knowing about the law is not enough unless:Ê

- Courts are functional;  $\hat{E}$
- Women can enjoy fair and just treatment in the courts; and  $\hat{E}$
- Women have access to legal counsel. $\hat{E}$

Thus protection of women's rights requires a two-pronged effort: to ensure that the system $\hat{E}$  is properly funded and staffed, so that women have access to lawyers and that judges are $\hat{E}$  willing to uphold their rights, and to apprise women of their rights and opportunities $\hat{E}$  through legal literacy and civic education campaigns.<sup>19</sup>

Consequently, it is important to strengthen the Association of Women Lawyers so that  $it\hat{E}$  may speak loudly, forcefully, and effectively on behalf of women who need the legal $\hat{E}$  system for protection. $\hat{E}$ 

In addition, three particular issues would benefit from U.S. comment:Ê

- **Repealing or revising the street-vendors' law.** While this law appears neutral onÊ its face, it has a disparate impact on women. This law should be eliminated, or atÊ least revised so that it exempts women who sell less than a specified amount perÊ month.Ê
- Ensuring that women have equal opportunities to benefit from privatization. The Constitution of 1992 refers to privatizing state-owned property: "Land, whichÊ is by origin the property of the State, may be transferred to individuals or corporateÊ

bodies, with a view to rational and full use thereof, in accordance with the law."Ê Article 12(3). With the establishment of the GURN, some attention will be paid toÊ Constitutional provisions that were suspended when war broke out in 1992. Investors and speculators will soon be pushing to purchase land, and there is aÊ danger that land will go to insiders and to those whom the legal system supports. Since women typically work the land, and since they should have equal access toÊ opportunities, they should end up with their share. But if a concerted and carefulÊ effort is not made, women are likely to be excluded from the benefits ofÊ privatization.Ê

• Encouraging a transparent and participatory process for judicial appointments. The selection of representatives and judges for the High CouncilÊ and the Constitutional Court should be a transparent process that ensures thatÊ appointees pass the tests of professional qualification and integrity. WithoutÊ focusing on women specifically, this should ensure a judicial process that accordsÊ women fair and equal access to justice.Ê

Lastly, to address violence against women specifically, the United States should take four  $\hat{E}$  steps:  $\hat{E}$ 

- Support UCAH research on women in quartering areas or newly resettled.  $\hat{E}$
- Support those Angolan women's organizations that address domestic violence, e.g.Ê OMA's Center in Luanda that helps battered women, by helping to strengthen it asÊ an institution and to spread its expertise to other parts of Angola.Ê
- Deal with police violence against women either within the framework of UNAVEM's political and human rights officers, or by supporting the efforts of new Association of Women Police Officers and of the Association of Women Lawyers. Ê

•  $\Box$  Support the reestablishment of a fair, functional, and accessible legal system. $\hat{E}$ 

8. There must be a concerted effort to ensure women's participation in USAID programs. If the United States is committed to strengthening democracy across society,  $\hat{E}$  and to including women, three approaches are imperative:  $\hat{E}$ 

First, the system tends to provide training to people who already have opportunities and  $\hat{E}$  access. This is particularly true of training members of the National Assembly or in  $\hat{E}$  political parties. To have a viable and dynamic democracy, it is important to broaden the  $\hat{E}$  pool of participants.  $\hat{E}$ 

Second, two excellent examples exist of programs that focus on broad, diverse  $\hat{E}$  participation, and therefore include women in needs assessment, planning, decision  $\hat{E}$  making, and implementation. USAID should be cognizant of these approaches — one in  $\hat{E}$  the U.S.-funded program of Creative Associates International and one a World Bank-funded program, the FAS (Fund for Social Support) in the Ministry of Planning. USAID  $\hat{E}$  should encourage its grantees in Angola to learn more from and about those two programs.  $\hat{E}$ 

Third, assistance should be focused on "the next generation," on those groups or initiatives  $\hat{E}$  that could become the next round of Angolan NGOs, but have not yet had the training and  $\hat{E}$  experience to become formal institutions; on those people who might vote in the next  $\hat{E}$  elections, or whose voices might influence the priorities of government, but who do not  $\hat{E}$  know how to mobilize the vote or raise their voices.  $\hat{E}$ 

In many cases, these next generations are women. USAID's democracy and governance  $\hat{E}$  assistance can reach them, but it must consciously seek them out, determine their interests  $\hat{E}$  and potential, and design and structure the assistance so that it is genuinely accessible to  $\hat{E}$  them.  $\hat{E}$ 

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# ENDNOTES

## **CHAPTER 1**

<sup>1</sup> Lack of transportation, and scheduling disruptions caused by the inauguration of the new government, meant that some activities were analyzed through interviews with project staff and document review in Luanda.

<sup>2</sup> What constitutes "home" is not always clear when women resettle in their husband's home communities where they may never have lived.

<sup>3</sup> We tried repeatedly to meet with the Minister of Justice. The Minister was unavailable because of the impending seating of the new Government. Immediately thereafter, he left the country on holiday.

<sup>4</sup> These focus group discussions were ably led by Emilia Fernandes from Development Workshop.

<sup>5</sup> The purposes of the de-briefing were:

- To report on steps that USAID has taken, or plans to take, that will relate to some of the issues raised in the Women's Commission's report. (We also explained the constraints, both political and economic, under which USAID is working, its Strategic Objectives, and the ways in which it addresses certain issues while other bilateral donors or multilateral institutions address others.)
- To provide updated information on issues they raised in their mission and report.
- To share lessons learned for future missions and collaboration what we have called the "one-two punch": First the Women's Commission's investigatory missions identify ways in which refugee women are not receiving assistance and support to which they are entitled; subsequently G/WID assists USAID to identify ways in which it, along with others, can improve participation and the delivery of assistance to women.

## **CHAPTER 2**

<sup>1</sup> According to Angolan government publications, "With production running at nearly 600,000 barrels a day, Angola is the second-largest producer of oil in Sub-Saharan Africa after Nigeria. Crude oil accounts for 90 percent of total exports, more than 80 percent of government revenues, and 42 percent of the country's GDP." Some of the world's largest oil companies, including Chevron, Texaco, Offshore Pipeline International, and Exxon, are present in Angola.

<sup>2</sup> There were an estimated 1.2 million IDPs as of 1992, a number that has increased since that time (Hansen 1997). <sup>3</sup> But while the peace process moves haltingly forward, there have also been renewed hostilities in the northeast of Angola since the fall of Mobutu in Zaire.

<sup>4</sup> The initial gender awareness seminar organized by the World Food Program (WFP) in November 1996, in collaboration with PNUD, HCR, OMS, UNICEF, UCAH, and the supporting NGOs and MINARS showed that most NGOs had no institutional policy regarding women's issues. The few notable exceptions were NGOs whose leaders had a personal commitment to gender issues (WFP 1996: 2).

<sup>5</sup> The MPLA-related Kimbundu comprise 23-26 percent of the total population while the UNITA-affiliated Ovimbundu (or Umbundu) from the central highlands are 33-38 percent of the total population. (Henderson 1992; Zenos 1996:2)

<sup>6</sup> According to Henderson (1992: 12): "Only women of free status carried the clan community of blood. The mother and son were of the same clan, but the father remained a stranger in the clan sense, even though he did provide access to a paternal kinship or kitata. The clan, which was represented by and administered by an elder, regulated most social relations. It . . . . guaranteed access to the clan territory of which the ancestors, founders of the first settlements, remained 'owners.' The transmission of land rights and the line of descent operated from material uncle to nephew. The clan created the conditions for security and solidarity."

<sup>7</sup> The Ambo compose less than 3 percent of the population, but have most of Angola's cattle. They reside in extended matrilineal families with well-defined totemic clans (Henderson 1992: 15).

<sup>8</sup> Soon there was also a sudden dramatic increase in large-scale population movements to other areas within and outside Angola because of aerial bombings and fighting that catalyzed the onset of the liberation struggle in 1961.

<sup>®</sup> Even this type of mission education was heavily concentrated in those urban areas and regions of greatest commercial interest to the Portuguese. The early Catholic education system was heavily influenced by the Portuguese concept of total cultural assimilation.

<sup>10</sup> Legal distinctions between whites, "assimilated" blacks, and "indigenous" blacks created a basis for racial and ethnic antagonism that continues (Bender 1978: 149). "Ostensibly intended to protect the interests of Africans, the indigenato explicitly set up a regime of social and political inequality by dividing the population into two separate judicial categories: indigena (also referred to as uncivilized, unassimilated or native), which included all Africans and mestiços not adjudged to be civilized; and não-indigena (or civilized), which included all whites and assimilados (mesticos and Africans considered civilized)." (Bender 1976: 149-150).

<sup>11</sup> Of the most immediate impacts of the high death rate of men is that women outnumber men in almost every age group (UCAH 1995c: 8). In 1995, the INE estimated that there were 92 men for every 100 men; in the 20-24 age group there only 70-75 men for every 100 women (ibid.). Recent data from IDP camps in 7 provinces (Bengo, Benguela, Kuando Kubango, Kwanza Sul, Huila, Luanda Sul, and Moxico) showed female-headed households ranging from a low of 25 percent of Luanda Sul to a high of 63 percent in Kuando Kubango with the other five provinces showing figures ranging from 32 percent to 38 percent (INE 1996). A recent re-analysis of a 1996 IOM survey (to separate out female-headed households) estimated that 48.3 percent of the households living in the IDP camps at Dondo, Benguela, Luanda, and Viana were female headed, and 31 percent at Jamba, Lobita and Cuacao.

We agree, however, with other studies that the actual figures are probably much higher (see also Declich 1997). <sup>12</sup> Studies estimate that "women and children comprise approximately 80 percent of the newly injured, post-war land mine victims." (See, for example, Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children 1997: 2).

<sup>13</sup> Similarly, women have been maintaining agricultural traditions and expertise: "Surveys of farms in the 1960s suggested that three out of five farmers (most of them in the central highlands) practiced some form of small-scale irrigation based on these moist lands. Perhaps to the surprise of plantation bosses, this micro-irrigation accounted for 80 percent of all irrigated land in Angola. With the war limiting access to rain-fed fields, Angolan farmers — the majority of the women — expanded and intensified their use of irrigated olonacas to feed their families." (Sogge 46-47).

<sup>14</sup> While we are glad to have been able to gain some understanding of this group, we believe there is a need for further investigation. Previous reports on gender issues in Angola have had very little information about women in UNITA-held areas. (The chief exception to this is Declich's short-term research on women living in two quartering areas (Declich 1997)). In addition, the Ministry for Women does not represent UNITA women. There is a need to build bridges with these women, to gain a better understanding of their needs and initiatives, and to invite their participation. We were pleased to begin this process through meetings in Bailundo and other UNITA areas where we interviewed, but encourage follow-up soon.

<sup>15</sup> National figures show 30-50 percent are female heads of households; the reality is probably higher. When project officials disaggregated the existing census figures at our request, they found that 642 of 860 (75 percent) households are headed by women (project figures, 3.4.97). We found an even higher ratio of female-headed households (83 percent or 364 out of 438) in the transit villages referred to as "Andulo" (ibid.).

<sup>16</sup> The August 1996 plan for demobilization and reintegration of ex-combatants details the procedure for creating a unified national army of 26,300 former UNITA troops and 63,700 GRA (government) troops, and reintegrating into civilian society the remaining 100,000 demobilized soldiers (48,700 from UNITA and 51,300 from the GRA) (USAID 1997: 9).

<sup>17</sup> The women interviewed stated that although the official price of basic civil documents was only 1 million kwanza, the authorities would usually demand up to 7 million.

<sup>18</sup> She argues that (1997:9) "in order to overcome the legacy of existing bias in data planning, implementation and monitoring, women should be given more attention as individual workers, traders, and farmers and not simply as belonging to households supposedly headed by a husband."

<sup>19</sup> The Women's Commission on Refugee Women and Children (1996:28) and the World Food Program (Tall 1996:3-4, 7; WFP 1995:8-9) have made similar recommendations.

## **CHAPTER 3**

<sup>1</sup> A WFP case study of gender issues in emergency relief operations in Benguela and Cuando Cubango (WFP 1995:6) noted that "during the emergency operation in Angola, WFP, for example, did not explicitly define rules for the implementation or control of gender perspectives in emergency operations due to the prioritization of the purely logistical component of the emergency itself."

<sup>2</sup> In contrast to many other food assistance donors, USAID requires that food distributions be made to women and that men with dependents be listed on one of their wives' cards.

<sup>3</sup> One typical USAID-supported provincial NGO commodities program included a chief administrator (male), six senior food monitors (2 female, 4 male), and 14 food monitors (13 male; 1 female).

<sup>4</sup> The head of the commodities program at World Vision in Malange observed that the women who served as village-based coordinators were more concerned about ensuring the timely update of beneficiary lists, and the scheduling of and attendance at food distribution points, than were their male counterparts.

<sup>5</sup> More than 50 percent of adult beneficiaries of one of the most established USAID-funded mine awareness programs (the World Vision Program at Malange) are women (54,017 women, 46,851 men, and 111,370 children to date) (Boaventura 1997: 3).

<sup>6</sup> One project coordinator stated that prior to receiving training, some villages were experiencing one accident per month. In the month before our visit to Malange, there was not one recorded accident in any of the villages currently covered by the program.

<sup>7</sup> World Vision has organized its Mine Awareness Program in Malange so that a team concentrates on one zone for approximately six months, after which they move to another zone within the same municipality. The program has a three phase training sequence (which appears to typify mine awareness programs):

- Basic Training Courses based on posters and pamphlets: Each course involves two trained mine awareness instructors, who conduct a 3-4 week training course in one village for approximately 25 people invited by the *soba*. Class instruction consists of lectures, pamphlets, wooden models of mines, and site visits. Classes are three hours each day in the morning.
- II. Popular theater productions: A UNICEF-funded initiative in Luanda trained nineteen actors and dancers who have written their own scripts. Their salaries and expenses are paid with food-forwork money, and World Vision provides transportation to the villages.
- III. Puppet Program: This phase targets children schools and villages. The Norwegian Peoples Aid (NPA) provided a 15-day training course for each instructor to learn to use puppets to illustrate mine awareness lessons for children.

World Vision also has developed a program to target "leader farmers" in extension programs, and there are plans for future use of video.

<sup>8</sup> Such inter-program exchange was difficult to organize during the emergency phase of USAID assistance.

<sup>9</sup> There is also an additional opportunity here: As some men and women develop skill in theatre and puppetry, they can be an important cultural and educational resource in Angola. But to remain players outside the mine awareness programs, they need to learn to use those skills as their means of support. They will need capacity building to identify opportunities, promote their services, manage their finances, and function as viable NGOs or businesses. As communicators and purveyors of information and education, they may become instrumental and effective players in Angolan civil society, and USAID-funded PVOs involved in democracy and civic education training might support them.

<sup>10</sup> Other agriculture issues are also important to women, such as access to land and credit. As the WIDTECH team was asked to focus on existing programs and identify ways to increase women's participation, these issues were not within the scope of WIDTECH's work.

<sup>11</sup> One apparent source of this confusion is the fact that extension agents often appear with food aid. While a truck may be delivering humanitarian assistance, the extension agents often "hitch a ride." But when farmers see the agent with the aid, they mix the two concepts, and assistance relating to seed protection or harvest protection gets melded into discussions of new planting techniques and seed varieties.

<sup>12</sup> One PVO training coordinator emphasized that PVOs have tended to avoid broad-based announcements of positions to avoid the extremely large number of unsuitable candidates who often apply. <sup>13</sup> This death, of multiple and the extremely large number of unsuitable candidates who often apply.

<sup>13</sup> This dearth of qualified applicants is caused by the tremendous disruption in educational training that occurred during the war. Few men or women under 40 have had access to continuous training unless they went abroad. Those who did get formal university training in agriculture tend to be concentrated in areas near Luanda, or near the university center in Huambo. Few in this younger age bracket had access to any formal university training in the core UNITA areas unless they were among the few who went abroad. The result is that, although Angola has a significant number of domestically and foreign-trained female agronomists (concentrated in the major urban areas), there are an even larger number of women who may have partially completed degrees in agronomy or related fields, such as veterinary medicine. Many who had their agricultural education interrupted, or who had the necessary secondary school qualifications to begin university studies, were prevented from doing so by financial difficulties exacerbated by the burden of child-rearing, and by the transportation and living costs of moving to a university center.

<sup>14</sup> A similar problem exists in healthcare. Many women who accompanied the UNITA troops learned medical skills at the elbows of accomplished and skilled doctors. They do not, however, have formal education. In health care, as well as agriculture and other fields, there will be a need for some sort of equivalency testing.

<sup>15</sup> CARE staff in Luanda report two outstanding examples of dynamic water users' associations with high levels of women's participation in Cunene and Lubango. Both projects employed women as extension agents.

<sup>16</sup> Although SeCOR/IRSEM's current priority is the demobilized soldier, they are considering expanding the agency's mandate to include refugees and other Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs).

<sup>17</sup> Initial planning for demobilization focused almost entirely on soldiers. The three priority questions were: (1) Where are we going to live? (2) Who are we going to live with? (3) What are we going to do? Each of these questions involves a series of decisions on the part of the soldier that have implications for their benefits and for their families. The question of where you are going to live and with whom is very difficult for soldiers who may have left a so-called home area when they were very young. Moreover, the very process of being in the military, which meant that they moved around the country — often taking wives from different places — means that they have many options about where to live. The situation is further complicated by the evidence that many demobilized soldiers make their final decisions about where they will go based on what their former military superiors "advise." One goal of the civic education classes was to encourage soldiers to consult with their families before making the final choice about where to go and with whom. The issue of what they are going to do is complicated by the fact that many soldiers have known only war and have little knowledge of market conditions for different trades in areas where they plan to resettle, hence donors recommend veterans training programs. Policy coordination to promote an integrated response to demobilization and reintegration was complicated because a different U.N. agency was tasked with carrying out each set of issues.

<sup>18</sup> We spoke with representatives of the *catequistas*, officials and senior women (aunts and mothers, most of whom were widowed) associated with the early effort to demobilize 1,000 underage soldiers. All emphasized that senior women and dependents (wives, children, and even relatives of the new wives) were playing a major role in providing basic support for the soldiers once they had exhausted their initial \$200 cash payment. The women and *catequistas* emphasized that the women were providing for the expanded needs of their families by crop production with very little assistance from the soldiers. Although a few underage soldiers were reported to be helping on the fields, they were spending a good deal of their time sorting out access to demobilization payments, obtaining civil papers, and making new social connections to a family and community they hardly knew.

<sup>19</sup> Possibly as high as 80-90 percent, depending on the camp (see also Declich 1997).

<sup>20</sup> One group of de facto female heads of household who count on only limited support from demobilized soldiers are the wives of the 40 percent of UNITA soldiers who have been reposted to the new combined national army (FAA). One unintended consequence of extending the quartering period from 3 months to 12-16 months was that many of the soldiers took new wives they met in the villages near the quartering areas. The dramatic increase in polygamy among soldiers is an additional problem for the high percentage of women who are attached to men with more than one wife (possibly as high as 80-90 percent in some cases).
<sup>21</sup> We were somewhat concerned to learn that U.S.-funded PVOs do not seem to attend the UCAH Technical

<sup>21</sup> We were somewhat concerned to learn that U.S.-funded PVOs do not seem to attend the UCAH Technical Meetings very regularly. The explanation may be that they are sufficiently funded and are not seeking additional resources. These meetings are important, however, for exchanging information, identifying synergies, and finding resources for beneficiaries of U.S. programs who may have additional transition and demobilization needs.
<sup>22</sup> This committee should include representation from UCAH, SeCOR, UNITA, MINARS/IRSEM, and the Ministry for Women, as well as USAID and other donors that have supported UCAH and vulnerable demobilized groups.

<sup>23</sup> It should be noted that the U.S.-supported ICRC program at Huambo is 7 percent above the average, with 17 percent of the prostheses distributed to women.

<sup>24</sup> The Association of War Disabled of Angola (AMIGA), an Angolan NGO, began in September 1992, originally as a cross-disability group limited to disabled ex-combatants from both sides. As a result of international contacts, AMIGA has broadened its membership to include all disabled war victims. Membership was estimated to be 7,000 in Luanda province and 15,000 throughout the country in 1995. The Angolan National Association of the Disabled (ANDA) is the oldest association of persons with disabilities in Angola, and the focal point for organizing and consciousness-raising activities. ANCA is the Angolan National Association of the Blind. ADDA is a recently formed national sports association for the disabled. The Angolan Red Cross (CVA) has agreements with the Ministry of Health to administer and provide food and supplies for temporary residential facilities at the orthopedic workshops of Viana and Neves Bendinha (UCAH 1995: 30-31).

## **CHAPTER 4**

<sup>1</sup> A UNITA representative taking his seat in the National Assembly said of participation of women: "L'héritage pese encore ici. Il y a préjugés comme racism." He pointed out that UNITA schools have been open to girls as well as to boys. He said he is worried that the increased incidence of polygamy has made women feel less respected and secure.

<sup>2</sup> Since it was understood that most women do not watch television or read newspapers, radio seemed the best method. NDI's proposal says that radio "reaches" 80 percent of the population. Surprised by this figure, we expect that it is based on the fact that *technically* radio reaches the locations and language groups that encompass 80% of the population. In reality, however, not very many women are listening.

<sup>3</sup> This information was obtained when 5 UNITA representatives had not yet taken their seats. The Parliament should have 220 representatives.

<sup>4</sup> The big exception, of course, is the Partido Liberal Democrático that is led by Analia de Victoria Pereira.

<sup>5</sup> We make a distinction between customary law and "neo-customary practices." The former refers to traditional legal systems that had their own foundations and rationale, and that often incorporate conflict resolution mechanisms that protect all members of a community. The latter are revisionist practices that are often declared or invented without any real authority or understanding of community responsibility. In either case, the decision-maker is often a chief, whom Angolans call a *soba*.

<sup>6</sup> Incredibly, another justification that we suggested was that it looks bad to foreign visitors that people are selling goods in the streets.

<sup>7</sup> Even in the context of a Mine Awareness theater production, the man who was trying to prevent a child or woman from going near a mine raises his arm to hit her to stop her. This seems to be "normal."

<sup>8</sup> Luvemba is within territory that has been administered by UNITA. This is a traditional group. They used to send representatives to the Chilom Mission (Protestant) where they learned skills that they would teach at home.

Currently, the *sociedade* has individuals responsible for teaching sewing, cleaning, children's care, civic education, soap-making — and a financial treasurer. New brides go to a center about 7 kilometers away for education.

<sup>a</sup> Another association called "CONGA" is for all NGOs, including foreign ones.

<sup>10</sup> In fact, the Association of Angolan Women Lawyers is not a member of FONGA, and FONGA is not participating in the Gender Network.

<sup>11</sup> The FAS and CREA process for involving women could be instructive at higher levels as well. In the early spring the Joint Commission held a meeting with the Secretary General of the United Nations. Out of 40 participants, there was only one woman, and she was the Russian ambassador's interpreter. Unless some concerted effort is made, women are not part of the process.

<sup>12</sup> In the meantime, Article 6 states: "Until such time as the Constitutional Court has been instituted, the Supreme Court shall exercise the powers provided for in Articles 134-135 of the Constitutional Law."

<sup>13</sup> A poster in Nigeria encouraging women to vote shows a woman who is pregnant, fetching water and carrying her child on her back. The caption reads, "If you vote and you vote right, there is no reason why you need to go through all of this." It would be effective for women in Angola to learn this concept by experiencing the power of group action to solve pressing basic problems.

<sup>14</sup> There are opportunities to work with women in radio through LAC, a radio station that is owned and run by women and that extends throughout the country.

<sup>15</sup> Because Angola is a large country, and women need assistance that so rarely reaches them, we believe it is important that technical assistance be delivered outside of Luanda *whenever possible*. It should be a rule of thumb that training and conferences should be held in Luanda *only if* there is a clear and specific justification for an exception to the rule.

<sup>16</sup> The measures may need to be quite strong, more than we would recommend or implement here. For example, Uganda requires *quotas* for women at all levels of government. We are not recommending such a system for Angola, but we recommend that Angolans (and those who provide foreign assistance) consider why the Ugandan government thought it necessary to take such strong measures. While we may not support exactly that system, we point to Uganda as an example of a country that recognized the situation was unlikely to improve sufficiently *absentÊ strong measures*.

<sup>17</sup> If IRI insists on defining its target group as those who are currently *within* the National Assembly, it will build capacity of very few women. As long as capacity building does not reach women as much as it reaches men, men will become ever stronger and politically adept as politicians while women can hardly compete. The next round of elections will be critical, and it is very important to ensure that women have opportunities to be elected. This means getting them into the political parties as active members, helping them build their own constituencies and ensuring that they have a chance to be on the top ranks of the parties' lists.

<sup>18</sup> Article 36(2) states: "The State shall make provision to ensure that justice shall not be denied owing to insufficient economic means." This should be a basis for insisting that the government put resources into the judiciary.

# **CONTRIBUTORS**

# GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, ANGOLAN NGOS AND INDIVIDUALS CONTACTED BY WIDTECH TEAM, MARCH-APRIL 1997

## WITHIN ANGOLA

#### In Luanda

AACA, Association for the Support of Abandoned Children AAD, Branca Neto dos Santos Acomil, Maria da Conceicao Saldanha & Cesinanda Xavier ADPP, Agnetta Dahner, Rikke Viholm, P. Jenson ADRA, Filomena Andrade; Roberto Victoria, Francisco Flores Africare, Tim McRae; Pedro Siloka, Herbert Fisher, Andrea Masters; Raimundo Carvalho, Antonio Dias; Suzanne Matheos, Marcel Abies; Andre Sumeno, Luis Coxe; Pedro Chitucu AIA/CAA, Gabriela Cohen Angobefa, Miguelita Andre & Maria Fernanda **Angop**, Carolina Fontes AAMJ, Association of Women Lawyers, Julia Ornelas, Eduarda Borja, Idalinda Rodriges, Margarida Jordao, Anacleta Pereira Association of Women Journalists, Ilda Carreira, Clarisse Kaputo, Carolina Fortes in Huambo, Maria Angelica Association of Women Police Officers (AMPA), Maria Helena Santos in Huambo: Matilde Pedro Anibal, our faithful driver Care International, MJ Conway and Jim Stearns; M. Osman, Guerra Freitas, Fernando Eduardo, Gabriela Lopes, Irene Maria Menezes, Helen Ngolo CRS, Catholic Relief Services, Karin Greenblatt Center for Atendimento Da Mulher, Helena Milagre, Concercao Pombal, Efigenia Lopes CCF, Christian Children's Fund, Maggie Brown and Marcia Jovanovic, Amabel Fradique, Ana Maria Matilde Samuel, Fernando Alexandre Canzaji; Samuel Pindas; Carlinda Monteiro, Julia Antonio, Carla **Oueiros**, Edward Green, Michael Wessells CICA, Lourdes Diego Almida Development Workshop, Henda D. Pinto de Andrade and Emilia Fernandes Flor da Vida. Clarisse Caputo FNLA. Amelia Florinda Antonio FONGA. Joaquina de Sousa e Almeida Handicap International, Sue Eitel ICRC, Claude Amiet, Manuel Montandon INE, Institute Nacional Estatistica, Julia Grave INE, Institute Normal de Educacao, Luisa N'Gueve International Foundation for Education and Self-Help, Momodou K. Mambouray International Medical Corps, Huambo & Luanda, Mary Weir, Monica Onyango, Sofia Eylama, Gorgelia Sili, Rita Candumba International Republican Institute, David J. Kramer and Lloyd O. Pierson

Dr. Almerindo Jaka Jamba, former Minister of Education, UNITA; Parliamentarian/GURN Edmund DeJarnette, Former U.S. Ambassador to Angola LAC, Sara Fialto & Maria Luiza Franconi Ministry of Education, Vice Minister Alexandra de Victoria Pereira Ministry of Finance, Francisca Fortes Ministry of Planning/FAS, Cesaltina Abreu & Victor Hugo Guilherme Ministry of Territorial Administration, Joao Bastista Kussumua, Deputy/Vice Minister Ministry of Assistance and Social Reinsertion, Vice-Minister Eufrazina Lopes Maiato, Maria da Luz Pirilo de Sa Magalhaes, & Filomena Maria dos Santos Correia Victor; Enoque Pedro & Azevedo Dias Timberio (Kuito) Ministry of Women, Minister Joana Lina Baptista Cristiano and Vice-Minister Filomena Delgado Antonio Miranda M. Mujinga, interpreter National Democratic Institute, Carrie Manning & Charles Stonecipher, Luis Vieiro, Carmen Lane, Andy Castonguay **OMA**, Alzira Caldeira da Silva, Eulalia Rocha, Helena Pascual, Maria Rosa Filipe (Huambo) **PACT**. Catherine Gibbons **PDA**. Josefa Webba Radio National de Angola, Ana Maria Correia & Ilda Carreira Save the Children/US: Brian Cavanagh Save the Children/UK, Patricia McLaughlin, Roberto Denny, Maria Lucilia Search for Common Ground, Julie Nenon, Leila Manji, Alberta Uimbo Gomes SeCOR/IRSEM: Jose Salema, Ana Felgueiras, Glaucia Vaz Yoshiura Swedish Embassy, Ambassador Lena Sundh Maria Lucilia Coelho UCAH, Ramiro Lopes da Silva, Carlo Scaramella, Jennifer Johnson, Carlos Rios; Elizabeth Rasmusson, Anthony Zenos UNACA (Union Nacional dos Camponeses Angolanos), Teresa Carvalho UNAVEM, Maitre Beve, Fred Mallya, Paula Serrao Emerson, Lieutenant Colonel Araujo United Methodist Church (IMUA), Women's General Desk, Victoria Jose dos Santos Agostinho, Maria de Lourdes, Margarida Hendes, Maria Manuelle Cassell, Regina F.S. Duarte, Rita Curimenha, Engracia Antonio da Silva U.S. AID/Angola: Kimberly Smith, Alexis Robles, Nicholas Jenks, Tom Carter, Bill Seeger, Rosa and Rildo U.S. Embassy/Angola: Ambassador Don Steinberg, DCM Jim Hamilton, Dan Pike, Randall Bennett, Sheila Jones Voice of America, Amelia Mendes World Food Program: Felix Bamezon World Learning. Fern Tedoro World Vision, Castro Camarada, Philip Chester, Alistair Clewlew, Cosmos Magorokosho, Lenor Lazry, Pedro Gaspar Manual, Isabel Gomes, Gabriel Alexandre Boaventura, Laurenes Manuel Artures, Domingos Jukuim Antonio Cahoje, Isabel Marcal Neto, Josefa Manasses, Bekele Hankebo; Steve Ray, Margaret Ann McClean, Phil Readman In the *musseques* 

Concern, Gualter Ingles

**IRSEM**, Antonio Francisco de Andrade

Maria and Ana Kambela, Kimbanguistas, two pastors, and three other women

Oxfam, Dept. of Social Development & Gender, Maria Augusta Peixoto

**UEBA (United Evangelical Baptists of Angola)**, Kumba Suzana, and group of fourteen women Market of Rosa Pinto: group of approximately 15 women, and two leaders of the Market Association

# **Outside of Luanda**

#### Bie province:

*Kuito*: 5 leaders, 38 government employees, 11 PVO staff, 19 clients, 50 client leaders, 2 UN representatives, 1 journalist
Manuel Congimbi, *Soba*, Kuito
Antonio da Conceicao Gomes Goncalves, Governor
Goncalves Antonio, Vice Governor
Berta Mendonca, Lar de Cangola Orphanage
Laurentina Chissemba, Lar Herois Orphanage
INAFOPE, Castro Jean & Efraim Camela
SeCOR/IRSEM, Stanislaus Bonnet and Paulino Chivale *N'Tucko*: 2 Africare doctors, 4 Africare employees, one UNITA colonel *Andulo*: 5 leaders, 6 PVO staff, 1 UN representative
Colonel Nato, Comandante Regional
Brigadeiro Prata, Governor
Candimba Felix, Vice-Governor
Tan. Cor. Hermelindo

## Cuanza Sul province/Waco-Kungo:

5 government employees, 5 PVO staff, 14 clients, 20 women leaders, 6 male leaders Costaphin Nalumingo

#### Huambo province:

Huambo city: 8 government employees, 10 PVO staff, 8 clients
Creative Associates Aidan Patrick Egan, Debra Ann Vidler, Tracy Lloyd-McRae, Tendayi Gwaradzinba, Thomas Tanguis, America Chitunda
ICRC and six traditional birth attendants in Huambo
Approximately 15 professional women and leaders (in focus group)
OIKOS program in Huambo, and approximately 20 women from the village 17 kilometers from Huambo
Ministry of Women: Lotti Nolika (Delegado en Huambo); Salome Caietula, delegate from Chingenje
Bailundo:
ADEMA, Margarida Nalembe and approximately 15 ADEMA leaders
Center for Basic Education Boas Novas, Alice Vasco Miguel Pongolola
LIMA, Bailundo, Helena Kaquinda, Miraldina Jamba, Adelaide Carlos and approximately 15 others
Lizbeth Satumbo Pena, Secretary for Humanitarian Assistance (UNITA)
Sociedad de Senhoras, Comunidade de S. Miguel, Luvemba

## Malange province:

*Catala*: 3 leaders, 2 PVO staff, 14 clients, 3 UN representatives General Assobie da Bala, UNITA Colonel Eunice da Silfa, UNITA Major Carlos Belchior, UNITA

# **OUTSIDE OF ANGOLA**

Genny Abel, London School of Economics Professor Gerald Bender, University of Southern California **Embassy of the Republic of Angola**, Olga Mundombe & Armando Francisco **FAO:** William Sorrenson Senhora Maria Joao Franca, attorney, judge (and wife of the Angolan Ambassador to the United States) Free Angola Information Service, Jardo Muekalia

Arthur Hansen, University of Florida

Linda Haywood, Howard University

Lawrence W. Henderson, retired missionary, Durham, N.C.

Stephen Kyle, Cornell University

Joseph Miller, University of Virginia

Richard Mkondo

Rui Rodriguez, Cranston, R.I.

Samuels International Associates, Michael A. Samuels & Lawrence Julihn

Robert Thornton, University of Wittswatersrand, Johannesburg

U.S. AID/Washington: Murl Baker, Melissa Brown, Cate Johnson, Kelly O'Keefe, Deborah Mendelson,

Muneera Salem-Murdock, Marc Scott, Bill Yeager,

Lisa VeneKlausen, the Asia Foundation

Vietnam Veterans of American Foundation, Wendy Batson

Women's Commission for Refugee Women and Children, Mary Diaz and Elizabeth Walker

World Bank, Manuela V. Ferro