UNITED STATES DISTNCT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 
ELOUISE PEPION COBELL, et al., 
Civil Action No. 96-1285 (RCL) Plaintiffs, 
1 
) 1 
) 
(Special Master Alan L. Balaran) V. ) 
1 
) 
1 
) 
1 
GALE A. NORTON, et al., 
L 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION 
TO PLAINTIFFS' BILLS OF PARTICULARS IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE WHY INTERIOR DEFENDANTS AND 
THEIR EMPLOYEES AND COUNSEL SHOULD NOT BE HELD IN CONTEMPT 
FOR VIOLATING COURT ORDERS AND FOR DEFRAUDING THIS COURT 
IN CONNECTION WITH TRIAL ONE (FILED OCTOBER 19,2001) 
The United States submits this brief in support of the non-party respondents (collectively 
referred to as the "Named Individuals") against whom plaintiffs have filed their motion of October 
19, 2001 for orders to show cause (the "October 19,2001 motion"). The Court bikcated 
plaintiffs' contempt motion, severing the two named individual defendants, Gale Norton and Neal 
McCaleb acting in their official capacities, fiom the 37 Named Individuals. The Court conducted 
a trial ("Contempt II") and found for the plaintiffs on the issue of whether defendants Norton and 
McCaleb, acting in their official capacities, had acted in contempt of court. Cobell v. Norton, 226 
F. Supp.2d 1 (D.D.C. 2002) (the "Contempt II Order").' The remaining issue, whether the 37 
Named Individuals should be held in contempt of court, has been referred to the Special Master. 
' The Contempt II Order is on appeal. Cobell v. Norton, Case No. 02-5374 (D.C. Cir.) 
(argued Apr. 24,2003). The Special Master required the plaintiffs to submit Bills of Particulars ("Bills") setting 
forth the facts and circumstances that support their allegations of contempt against these 37 Named 
Individuals. Revised Procedures and Schedule for Investigation Into Plaintiffs' Motions for 
Orders to Show Cause, November 4,2002 at 3. Despite the Special Master's order, plaintiffs 
failed to submit Bills for 22 of the 37 Named Individuals. 
The Court's Contempt II Order precludes any further contempt findings against the 
government or any of the Named Individuals acting in their official capacities. Moreover, the 
plaintiffs have failed to provide the Court with a basis for proceeding against any of the 37 Named 
Individuals. Accordingly, further proceedings with respect to any of the 37 Named Individuals are 
not warranted. 
A. Prior Proceedings 
On October 19,2001, plaintiffs filed a Motion for Orders to Show Cause Why Interior 
Defendants and their Employees and Counsel Should Not Be Held in Contempt for Violating Court 
Orders and for Defrauding This Court in Connection with Trial One. On November 28,2001, the 
Court entered an Order to Show Cause granting plaintiffs' motion "as to the Interior defendants in 
their official capacities." That order directed defendants Norton and McCaleb to "show cause 
why they should not be held in civil contempt of court in their official capacities" upon four 
specifications: 
1. That defendants had failed to comply with the Court's Order of December 
2 1, 1999 to initiate a Historical Accounting Project. 
2. That defendants committed a fraud on the Court by concealing the Department's true 
actions regarding the Historical Accounting Project during the period from March 
2000 until January 2001. 
I. BACKGROUND 
- 2 - 3. That defendants committed a fiaud on the Court by failing to disclose the true status 
of the TAAMS project between September 1999 and December 21,1999. 
That defendants committed a fiaud on the Court by filing false and misleading 
quarterly reports starting in March 2000, regarding TAAMS and BIA Data Clean- 
UP. 
4. 
Order to Show Cause, November 28, 2001 at 1-2. The order stated that the "Court defers ruling at 
this time on plaintiffs' motion to order non-party employees and counsel to show cause." Id. at 1. 
On December 6,2001, the Court entered a Supplemental Order to Show Cause, adding a fifth 
specification that defendants committed a fiaud on the Court by making false and misleading 
representations starting in March 2000, regarding computer security of I M trust data. Plaintiffs' 
October 19,2001 motion did not address the IIM computer security issue which was the subject of 
the Supplemental Order to Show Cause, and plaintiffs did not amend their motion to include that 
specification. 
The five issues identified in the Orders to Show Cause were tried in the Contempt II trial, 
and resolved as to defendants in their official capacities in the Contempt II Order. As part of the 
Contempt II Order, the Court "deferred ruling on the plaintiffs' motion filed on October 19,2001, 
as it related to 37 non-party employees and counsel." 226 F. Supp. 2d at 155. The Court 
explained this deferment: "Upon consideration of the memoranda filed in support of and in 
opposition to the plaintiffs' motion, the record in this case, and the applicable law, the Court finds 
that it is not appropriate to order these individuals to show cause at this time why they should not 
be held in contempt of court." Id. Instead, the Court referred the matter "to Special Master 
Balaran so that he may develop a complete record with respect to these 37 non-party individuals." 
Id; see also id. at 162 ("It is further ORDERED that the plaintiffs' motion for order to show cause, 
filed October 19,2001, shall be REFERRED to Special Master Balaran. Special Master Balaran 
- 3 - shall issue a report and recommendation with respect to each of the 37 non-pa& individuals 
named in the plaintiffs' motion."). 
B. 
1 
Cobell v. Norton, Civ. Action No. 96-1285(RCL), Transcript 
The Bills of Particulars 
In a March 15,2002 hearing, the Court directed the plaintiffs to lay out "individual 
defendant by individual defendant specifications of what the contempt proceedings would be for 
those 39 people so that they each have an opportunity to address what the evidence is and what you 
are citing against any of those 39." 
of March 15,2002 Status Hearing, at 21:lO-14 ("3/15/02 Tr."). The Court reiterated that plaintiffs 
must state the specific charges a respondent would have to defend against and also "lay out what 
the, in your view, the evidence that would be supporting'' the specific charges. Id. at 21:21-23. 
Finally, the court concluded that "you need to specify by person so that each of them can respond to 
what the specifications would be and what the evidence would be so that each of them can have an 
opportunity to have due process." Id. at 23:7-10. As of September 17,2002, the date of the 
Court's referral of the October 19,2001 motion to the Special Master, the plaintiffs had provided a 
bill of particulars for only a single individual.2 
Following the Court's referral, the Special Master issued a memorandum dated November 
4,2002 setting out the procedures and schedules goveming the Court's referral of the plaintiffs' 
October 19,2001 motion and another contempt motion referred to him. In the memorandum, the 
Special Master provided plaintiffs with six additional months to file Bills with respect to the 
conduct of the 37 non-party individuals named in the October 19,2001 motion. Revised 
Procedures and Schedule for Investigation Into Plaintiffs' Motions for Orders to Show Cause, 
November 4,2002 at 3. The deadline for filing these Bills was set at May 1,2003. The Special 
Plaintiffs filed a Bill of Particulars against Edith Blackwell on August 21,2002. 
- 4 - Master subsequently denied both a letter request and a motion by plaintiffs to extend the May 1, 
2003 deadline for filing Bills. Plaintiffs did not appeal the denials of their letter request and 
motion for extension of the May 1,2003 deadline. 
On or about May 1, 2003, plaintiffs filed Bills against 15 of the 37 non-party individuals 
identified in the October 19,2001 motion. The Named Individuals against whom Bills have been 
filed are present or former officials or attorneys of the Department of the Interior (Bruce Babbitt, 
John Berry, Edith Blackwell, Michael Carr, Edward Cohen, Kevin Gover, Robert Lamb, Sabrina 
McCarthy, Anne Shields, and Stephen Swanson) and attorneys currently or formerly employed by 
the Department of Justice (Phillip Brooks, Charles Findlay, Sarah Himmelhoch, Lois Schiffer, and 
David Sh~ey).~ 
Plaintiffs did not file Bills against the remaining 22 non-party respondents, and the 
government accordingly does not address any allegations as to them. Indeed, since plaintiffs have 
failed to comply with the Court's March 15,2002 directive and the Special Master's November 4, 
2002 schedule with respect to these 22 individuals, and for the other reasons stated in the Praecipe 
filed on May 8,2003 on behalf of these 22 individuals, the Special Master should promptly 
recommend the termination of the current proceedings as to them. 
The Court's referral to the Special Master is limited to those matters encompassed by the 
plaintiffs' October 19,2001 motion. As noted above, the plaintiffs' contempt motions do not 
include the fifth specification identified by the Court in Contempt II (the IT Security specification). 
One of these Bills pertained to Edith Blackwell, against whom plaintiffs had previously 
filed it bill of particulars on August 21,2002, as noted in footnote 2 above. The government filed 
its response to this Bill on September 4,2002. The government's response is incorporated by 
reference herein. Based upon correspondence exchanged with the Special Master, the government 
understands that plaintiffs are limited to the specifications with which they charged Ms. Blackwell 
in their August 21,2002 Bill and that the Bill they issued as to her on April 29,2003 will not be 
considered. Exhibit 3. 
- 5 - Eleven of the fifteen Bills filed by the plaintiffs purport to address the IT spe~ification.~ Because ' 
the IT Security specification is not before the Special Master, it is not addressed in the 
government's response to plaintiffs' Bills. 
This brief addresses only the allegations made in the October 19,200 1 motion as 
particularized by the Bills filed against the 15 Named Individuals. 
11. PLAINTIFFS HAVE FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE 
A LEGAL BASIS FOR THE ISSUANCE OF SHOW CAUSE 
ORDERS AGAINST ANY NAMED INDIVIDUAL. 
Plaintiffs urge the Court to impose sanctions upon the Named Individuals for civil . 
contempt, criminal contempt andor fraud on the court. Controlling case law demonstrates, 
however, that the allegations made by the plaintiffs - even construed most generously in their favor 
- cannot sustain the legal theories they propound. 
A. Plaintiffs Have Failed to Establish a Legally Sufficient Basis for Civil Contempt 
Sanctions Against the Named Individuals. 
Standards for civil contempt have been set forth in the contempt hearings in this case, 
Cobell v. Babbitt, 37 F. Supp. 2d 6 (D.D.C. 1999) ("Cobell f'), and Cobell v. Norton, 226 F. 
Supp.2d 1 (D.D.C. 2002) ("Cobell If'), and the elements have been described by controlling 
authority in other cases in this circuit. The Court of Appeals held in Armstrong v. Executive 
Ofice of the President, 1 F.3d 1274, 1289 @.C. Cir. 1993): 
"There can be no question that courts have inherent power to 
enforce compliance with their lawful orders through civil 
contempt." Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 370 (1966). 
Nevertheless, "civil contempt will lie only if the putative contemnor 
has violated an order that is clear and unambiguous," Project 
B.A.S.I.C. v. Kemp, 947 F.2d 11, 16 (1st Cir. 1991), and the 
The Bills filed with respect to Bruce Babbitt, John Berry and Anne Shields do not 
reference the fifth or IT specification. Further, the Bill filed as to Edith Blackwell on August 21, 
2002, does not include any IT security issues. 
- 6 - violation must be proved by "clear and convincing'' evidence. 
Washington-Baltimore News paper Guild, Local 35, v. 
Washington Post Co., 626 F.2d 1029, 1031 (D.C. Cir. 1980). 
Thus, a party seeking a finding of civil contempt must initially show, by clear and 
convincing evidence, that (1) a court order was in effect, (2) the order clearly and unambiguously 
required certain conduct by the respondent, and (3) the respondent failed to comply with the court's 
order. SEC v. Bilzerian, 112 F. Supp. 2d 12, 16 (D.D.C. 2000); Petties v. District of Columbia, 
897 F. Supp. 626,629 (D.D.C. 1995). Plaintiffs' October 19,2001 motion and Bills do not satisfy 
their burden of establishing these elements and, in any event, articulate no remedy that they can 
possibly obtain from the Named Individuals that the Court has not already awarded them in its 
Contempt II Order. 
1. 
. 
There Is No Further Remedy Available to the Plaintiffs. 
Civil contempt sanctions are used either to obtain compliance with a court order or to 
compensate for damages sustained as a result of noncompliance. Food Lion, Inc. v. United Food 
& Commercial Workers Int '1 Union, 103 F.3d 1007, 1016 (D.C. Cir. 1997). Coercive contempt 
sanctions are intended to force the offending party to comply with the court's order. Coleman v. 
Espy, 986 F.2d 1184, 1190 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 913 (1993). Compensatory contempt 
sanctions compensate the plaintiff for damages that the offending party has caused by its contempt. 
Id. However, neither form of relief is available against the Named Individuals because they have 
no ability to "purge" past conduct, and the Court has already resolved the matter of plaintiffs' 
entitlement to relief in the Contempt II Order. 
A fundamental concept of civil contempt is that the contemnor "carries the key of his prison 
in his own pocket." Gompers v. Buch Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418,442 (191 I), cited in 
International Union, United Mine Workers ofAmerica v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 828 (1994). 
Thus, the individual found in civil contempt must be afforded the opportunity to purge the 
- 7 - contempt. See Bagwell, 5 12 U.S. 82 1, 829 (1 994) (“Where a fine is not compensatory, it is civil 
only if the contemnor is afforded an opportunity to purge.”). Purgation conditions are a necessary 
component of a civil contempt proceeding because civil contempt is “a remedial sanction used to 
obtain compliance with a court order or to compensate for damage sustained as a result of 
noncompliance.” Food Lion, 103 F.3d at 10 16, quoting National Labor Relations Board v. 
Blevins Popcorn Co., 659 F.2d 1173, 1184 (D.C. Cir. 1981). The goal of a civil contempt order 
is not to punish, but to exert only so much of the courtk authority as is required to assure 
compliance. Petties, 897 F. Supp. at 629. “Civil contempt does not exist to punish the contemnor 
or to vindicate the court’s integrity.” Morgan v. Barry, 596 F. Supp. 897,899 (D.D.C. 1984), 
citing Blevins. 
In accordance with the Court of Appeals’ holding in Blevins, a civil contempt order should 
‘I( be imposed, if at all, only at the conclusion of a three-stage proceeding involving 1) issuance of 
an order; (2) following disobedience of that order, issuance of a conditional order finding the 
recalcitrant party in contempt and threatening to impose a specified penalty unless the recalcitrant 
party purges itself of contempt by complying with prescribed purgation conditions; and (3) 
exaction of the threatened penalty if the purgation conditions are not fulfilled.” Blevins Popcorn, 
659 F.2d at 1184-85 (citing Oil, Chem. &Atomic Workers Innt‘l Union v. NLRB, 547 F.2d 565, 
581 (D.C. Cir. 1977)); see also SEC v. Bilzerian, 112 F. Supp. 2d 12, 16 (D.D.C. 2000) (penalty 
should be imposed only after recalcitrant party has been given an opportunity to purge itself of 
contempt by complying with prescribed purgation conditions). Although the Court held a trial 
against Interior Defendants on the very same allegations that plaintiffs now raise in their bills 
against the Named Individuals, the Court prescribed no purgation conditions for the Interior 
Defendants. Since the Court declined to prescribe purgation conditions for the party, it is difficult 
to imagine how the Named Individuals - none of whom currently has a role in the main litigation, 
- 8 - much less a decisionmaking role, and many of whom do not even work for the government any 
longer - could possibly fulfill any purgation conditions based on their past governmental 
activities. 
Coercive sanctions are not appropriate against any of the Named Individuals in any event 
because there would be no point in attempting to undo the allegedly contemptuous acts with which 
they are charged. Plaintiffs accuse the attorney-Named Individuals (Blackwell, Brooks, Carr, 
Cohen, Findlay, Himmelhoch, McCarthy, Schiffer, Shuey and Swanson) of such things as attending 
various meetings and providing inappropriate legal advice and/or comments on various documents 
and proposed courses of action. Aside from the fact that plaintiffs fail to explain how any 
particular advice or comment iTom any of the attorney-Named Individuals violated a court order, 
there would be no point in requiring these attorneys to retract the advice and comments about 
which plaintiffs complain. Such a retraction would have no effect whatsoever upon the course of 
this litigation because the matters to which the challenged advice and comments applied are over 
and done with. Nor could these individuals somehow “undo” their attendance at meetings in the 
past. Likewise, there would be no point in requiring the retraction of a Federal Register Notice or 
of Interior Defendants‘ budget proposals submitted to Congress several years ago, to the extent 
such matters could conceivably be deemed contumacious in the first place. The Court never 
required Interior Defendants, as a condition of purging the civil contempt it found in Contempt II, 
to revise the various plans and reports upon which it based its findings. Accordingly, there is no 
reason - and in fact no opportunity - for the Named Individuals to alter those documents at this 
point in time. Accordingly, the remedial purpose of a contempt order cannot be served where, as 
here, the allegedly violative act cannot be corrected. See In re Sealed Case, 250 F.3d 764, 770 
@.C. Cir. 2001) (“Because the Government could not undo the July 18 disclosure [of grand jury 
material], holding the Government in civil contempt would serve no useful purpose. . . .”). 
- 9 - Further, plaintiffs have identified no basis for compensatory damages against the Named 
, 
Individuals. As part of the relief granted the plaintiffs in the Contempt II ruling, the Court awarded 
plaintiffs their reasonable costs and attorneys' fees associated with that proceeding. The Court 
declined to designate its fee awards as "compensatory damages", but identified no other claim for 
monetary relief made by the plaintiffs in their October 19,2001 motion. Plaintiffs have not 
articulated any claim for compensatory monetary relief against the Named Individuals in their 
Bills. Since plaintiffs have already been awarded the full measure of compensatory relief they 
sought in their October 19,2001 motion, they are not entitled to any more. It would be perverse 
for the Court to permit these proceedings to continue for the sole purpose of allowing plaintiffs' 
counsel to run up additional fees when the plaintiffs themselves cannot possibly gain any further 
L 
relief beyond that which the Court has already awarded. See Bagwell, 5 12 U.S. at 827 ("[A] 
contempt sanction is considered civil if it is 'remedial, and for the benefit of the complainant."') 
(quoting Gompers, 221 U.S. at 441). 
Because the availability of a remedy "for the benefit of the complainant'' is an essential 
component of a civil contempt proceeding, and because in Contempt II the Court has already hlly 
adjudicated plaintiffs' claims for relief on the very same allegations as those set out in the Bills, 
there is no legal basis for a civil contempt proceeding against the Named Individuals on those 
allegations. There is, in other words, nothing more the plaintiffs can get from the Named 
Individuals that they have not already been awarded against the government. For this reason alone, 
the proceedings should be terminated. 
2. The Conduct Alleged by Plaintiffs Did Not Violate A "Clear and 
Unambiguous" Court Order. 
Plaintiffs' Bills accuse the Named Individuals of various "frauds on the court." Despite 
this styling of their allegations, in order to establish civil contempt, plaintiffs must still identify a 
- 10- "clear and unambiguous" order that applies to the person and specific conduct by the person that 
violates the order. Plaintiffs' failure to establish these elements is fatal to their contempt claims. 
As explained in Project B. A. S. I. C. : 
A court order, then, must not only be specific about what is to be 
done or avoided, but can only compel action fiom those who have 
adequate notice that they are within the order's ambit. For a party to 
be held in contempt, it must have violated a clear and unambiguous 
order that left no reasonable doubt as to what behavior was 
expected and who was expected to behave in the indicated fashion. 
"In determining specificity, the party enjoined must be able to 
ascertain from the four comers of the order precisely what acts are 
forbidden." 
947 F.2d at 17 (internal citation omitted). 
The "order" that plaintiffs claim the Named Individuals violated is the Court's December 
21, 1999 ruling. However, the Court of Appeals for this circuit has held unequivocally that civil 
contempt will not lie for alleged noncompliance with a declaratory judgment: 
As the Supreme Court has observed: "[Elven though a declaratory 
judgment has 'the force and effect of a final judgment,' 28 U.S.C. 0 
2201, it is a much milder form of relief than an injunction. Though it 
may be persuasive, it is not ultimately coercive; noncompliance 
with it may be inappropriate, but it is not contempt."' 
Armstrong v. Executive Office of the President, 1 F.3d 1274, 1289 @.C. Cir. 1993) (citing 
Steflel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452,471 (1974) (hrther internal citations omitted)). Plaintiffs are 
precluded from basing a motion for contempt upon alleged non-compliance with the Court's 
declaratory judgment. Moreover, the general directives contained in the Court's December 21, 
1999 ruling simply do not constitute a "clear and unambiguous'' order upon which a contempt 
finding could be based. 
In its briefs before the Court of Appeals appealing the Contempt II Order, the government 
has detailed its argument as to why the findings made by the Court in the Contempt II Order do not 
establish civil contempt or fraud on the court as to the official capacity defendants. The arguments 
- 11 - made by the government in its appellate briefs demonstrate with equal force why the allegations, 
as a matter of law, cannot establish that the Named Individuals committed civil contempt or fiaud 
on the court. We incorporate those arguments here in their entirety and attach the briefs, but not the 
Joint Appendix. See Exhibit 1 at 40-52; Exhibit 2 at 16-35. 
3. Plaintiffs Have Failed to Demonstrate That These Named Individuals Can Be 
Held in Civil Contempt, Given the Contempt I1 Trial and Order. 
a. 
Civil Contempt. 
As noted above, the only “order“ identified by plaintiffs in their Bills is the Court‘s 
December 21, 1999 ruling. That ruling was directed to defendants, not to any of the Named 
Individuals. None of plaintiffs‘ Bills refers to any actions or conduct by a Named Individual 
except in his or her capacity as a government official or employee - that is, in his or her official 
capacity. Plaintiffs have made no allegations, nor supplied any evidence, that any Named 
Individual violated a court order directed to him or her personally or while acting in h s or her 
personal capacity. While injunctive orders entered against the government are binding upon 
government employees acting as such, Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d), an order against the government does 
not apply to government employees in their individual or personal capacities. Hernandez v. 
O‘MalZey, 98 F.3d 293,294 (7th Cir. 1996) (“Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d), which makes an injunction 
effective against successors in office, does not create personal (as opposed to official) liability.“). 
As explained in Dobbs, Law of Remedies 2d 
and not in the interest of his principal or employer would not be in violation of an injunction 
directed to his principal or liable for contempt. Thus, the Named Individuals, acting in their 
personal capacities, were not “within the order’s ambit,” see Project B.A.S.I. C., 947 F.2d at 17, 
The Named Individuals Acted In the Course and Scope of Their Official 
Duties and Therefore Are Not Liable in Their Personal Capacities for 
8 2.8(5), an agent who is acting in his own interest 
- 12- and they cannot be held liable in their personal capacities for violating the December 2 1, 1999 
ruling. 
Plaintiffs’ counsel Dennis Gingold conceded as much during oral argument on April 25, 
2003 on the e-mail backup tape contempt matter when he acknowledged that former officials or 
employees cannot be liable for civil contempt.’ By this statement, Mr. Gingold acknowledged that 
the Court’s ruJings directed to Interior Defendants - including the December 2 1, 1999 ruling - 
bound the Named Individuals solely in their capacities as government employees, so that when a 
\ Named Individual left government employment he or she had no hrther obligations under those 
rulings. . 
b. 
has explained: 
Plaintiffs Are Barred From Proceeding Against The Named Individuals 
In Their Official Capacities 
As demonstrated above,\ plaintiffs’ claims against the Named Individuals concern solely 
actions taken in their official capacities. Any claim in this proceeding against the Named 
Individuals in their official capacities is a claim against the government. As the Supreme Court 
Official-capacity suits, in contrast, “generally represent only another 
way of pleading an action against an entity of which an officer is an 
agent.” Monell v. New York City Dept, of Social Services, 436 
U.S. 658,690, n.55 (1978). As long as the government entity 
receives notice and an opportunity to respond, an official-capacity 
suit is, in all respects other than name, to be treated as a suit against 
the entity. 
Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-66 (1985); see also Wyoming v. United States, 279 F.3d 
1214, 1225 (10th Cir. 2002), and cases cited therein. 
Oral Argument, April 25,2003, Tr. at 241. Exhibit 4. Named Individuals Babbitt, Carr, 
Cohen, Gover, Shields, Schiffer, Swanson and Berry are no longer employed by the government. 
- 1 3 - The doctrine of sovereign immunity bars the imposition of fines, penalties or monetary 
damages against the government, except to the extent that the United States has explicitly consented 
to such sanctions. The doctrine of sovereign immunity "stands as an obstacle to virtually all direct 
assaults against the public fisc, save only those incursions from time to time authorized by 
Congress." United States v. Horn, 29 F.3d 754,761 (1st Cir. 1994). A waiver of sovereign 
immunity must be definitively and unequivocally expressed and must appear in the text of the 
statute itself. Id. at 762, citing United States v. Mitchell, 445 U.S. 535, 538 (1980), and United 
States v. Nordic Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30 (1992). The determinations in this case that sovereign 
immunity does not bar either plaintiffs' claim for prospective action or their claim for 
retrospective relief in the form of an accounting6 have no bearing on the separate issue of whether 
the government has waived sovereign immunity for money damages for civil contempt. A waiver 
of sovereign immunity as to one available remedy does not, by implication, waive sovereign 
immunity as to other remedies. See Brown v. Secretary of the Army, 918 F.2d 214 (D.C. Cir. 
1990) (waiver of sovereign immunity as to back pay awards for discriminatory denial of 
promotion did not waive sovereign immunity for prejudgment interest on such back pay awards), 
cert. denied, 502 U.S. 810 (1991). 
The United States has not waived sovereign immunity from citation for criminal contempt, 
nor for court-imposed fines for civil contempt. Coleman v. Espy, 986 F.2d 1184, 1 191 (8th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 510 U.S. 913 (1993); United States v. Horn, 29 F.3d at 763; see also In re Sealed 
See Cobell v. Babbitt, 30 F. Supp. 2d. 24,31-33,38-42 (D.D.C. 1998) (denying 
defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings); Cobell v. Babbitt, 52 F. Supp. 2d 11,21 
(D.D.C. 1999) (denying defendants' motion for summary judgment); see also Cobell v. Norton, 
240 F.3d 1081, 1094-95 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (agreeing that plaintiffs' action was not barred by 
sovereign immunity). 
- 14- Case, 192 F.3d 995,999-1000 (D.C. Cir. 1999)Cper curiarn) ("...it is far from clear that Congress 
has waived federal sovereign immunity in the context of criminal contempt. . . . We know of no 
statutory provision expressly waiving federal sovereign immunity from criminal contempt 
pro~eedings.'').~ Accordingly, to the extent any monetary remedies plaintiffs may claim against the 
Named Individuals have not already been awarded in the Contempt II Order, sovereign immunity 
precludes such an award. 
The Contempt 11 trial against defendants Norton and McCaleb in their official capacities 
was a trial against the government. Plaintiffs' Bills present no factual or legal issue which was not 
litigated in the Contempt II trial. Indeed, the Bills quote liberally fiom the Contempt II record and 
the Contempt II Order. Consequently, the doctrine of res judicata precludes further litigation by 
the plaintiffs against the Named Individuals in their official capacities on the issues litigated in 
Contempt II.' Nor can plaintiffs obtain additional attorneys' fees from the government. As noted 
above, the Court has already awarded attorneys' fees "incurred by plaintiffs as a result of having to 
litigate" the Contempt II trial. 226 F. Supp. 2d at 152. The award of attorneys' fees in Contempt 
' As the Court acknowledged in the Contempt II Order, whether a court can order the 
government to compensate a party for losses sustained as a result of the government's contempt has 
not been decided by the Court of Appeals in this Circuit. 226 F. Supp. 2d at 154 n. 163. The 
District Court in United States v. Wahberg, 881 F. Supp. 36,41 (D.D.C. 1995), vacated and 
remanded, 112 F.3d 1225 (D.C. Cir. 1997), held that sovereign immunity barred recovery of 
damages as compensation for the government's violation of an injunctive order. The Court of 
Appeals vacated and remanded with directions to withhold a ruling on the sovereign immunity 
issue pending a determination on whether Waksberg had incurred damages. 112 F.3d at 1228. 
The doctrine of resjudicata bars a claim when there has been: (1) a final judgment on 
the merits; (2) involving the same parties or persons with whom they are in privity; (3) on the same 
cause of action. Polsby v. Thompson, 201 F. Supp. 2d 45,49 (D.D.C. 2002). The Contempt II 
Order is a final judgment for purposes of resjudicata, even though the Contempt II Order is 
currently on appeal. Wagner v. Taylor, 836 F.2d 596,598 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Hunt v. Liberty 
Lobby, 707 F.2d 1493, 1497 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
- 15- II is res judicata as to the amount of compensation recoverable by plaintiffs from the government 
as a result of the matters resolved in that proceeding and is res judicata as to the assessable 
monetary sanctions for the government's conduct. See Greenleaf v. Garlock, Inc., 174 F.3d 352, 
358-59 (3d Cir. 1999) (damage award in state court "reverse bifurcation" proceeding, in which 
damages were resolved before liability was adjudicated, precluded plaintiffs from seeking 
additional damages). Moreover, since plaintiffs may not seek further contempt remedies against 
the government, the government cannot be a losing party to whom fees may be 
B. Plaintiffs Have Failed to Demonstrate a Legally Sustainable Basis for the Issuance of 
Show Cause Orders for Criminal Contempt. 
The Court's order of reference to the Master includes plaintiffs' request for both civil and 
criminal sanctions against the Named Individuals. As shown above, plaintiffs' allegations do not 
meet the legal requirements for civil contempt sanctions. They certainly do not satisfy the 
heightened showing required for criminal contempt sanctions. Further, to the extent that plaintiffs 
i 
Plaintiffs' allegations against Named Individuals Brooks, Findlay, Himmelhoch, Schiffer, 
Shuey, Blackwell, Can; Cohen, McCarthy and Swanson concern, in whole or in part, their conduct 
as attorneys representing the government in this litigation. The doctrine of official immunity 
should preclude the award of compensatory damages to plaintiffs, including attorneys' fees, against 
these Named Individuals for conduct related to the advocacy function of representing the 
government in this litigation. See Fry v. Melaragno, 939 F.2d 832,836-837 (9th Cir. 1991) 
(government attorneys representing the United States, either as plaintiff or defendant, in civil trial, 
criminal prosecution or agency hearing, have absolute immunity fi-om damage claims arising from 
their conduct of the litigation); Christensen v. Ward, 916 F.2d 1462, 1474 (10th Cir. 1990); 
Bryan v. Murphy, 246 F. Supp. 2d 1256,1261 (N.D. Ga. 2003) (holding government attorneys 
absolutely immune from claims for money damages, as well as injunctive or declaratory relief, for 
conduct of their official duties in litigation); Moore v. Schlesinger, 150 F. Supp. 1308, 1313-14 
(M.D. Fla. 2001) (government attorneys had absolute immunity from damage claims arising from 
alleged "wicked scheme" of litigation misconduct: "[a]s Assistant United States Attorneys, the 
Defendants were charged with defending the public interest in Plaintiffs underlying civil suits and 
should not now fact the threat of liability for their choice of litigation strategies."). 
- 1 6 - seek punitive sanctions (including incarceration), the Named Individuals are entitled to the full 
measure of due process afforded in criminal proceedings, and the Special Master cannot preside. 
1. 
insufficient. 
Plaintiffs Have Not Alleged the Elements of Criminal Contempt. 
Plaintiffs' Bills seek the imposition of criminal sanctions, including incarceration. 
However, plaintiffs' October 19,2001 motion and Bills do not identifj the particular statutory 
provision upon which they base their claims of criminal contempt, the elements of the supposed 
criminal infiaction, or the conduct of the Named Individuals that they say constitutes a cnme.'O 
Accordingly, their claims for criminal contempt sanctions should be dismissed as legally 
To the extent Plaintiffs' Reply brief to their October 19,2001 motion articulated any basis 
for criminal contempt, it referred to "violations of orders." E.g., Plaintiffs' Reply at 4 ("Th[e] 
record directly implicates both criminal and civil contempt. There is no doubt that this Court has 
the inherent and statutorily-derived authority and a duty to protect and enforce its judgments and 
compel compliance with its orders, writs, processes, rules, decrees, and commands."). 
To convict a defendant of criminal contempt for violation of court orders, the Court must 
find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the person willfully violated a ''clear and reasonably 
specific'' order of the court. United States v. Roach, 108 F. 3d 1477, 1481 (D.C. Cir. 1997) 
lo Plaintiffs' October 19,2001 Motion itself did not specifically seek criminal sanctions, 
nor was that claim apparent fiom the proposed order attached to the motion. Only in their Reply 
brief did plaintiffs state their request that the Court impose criminal sanctions against the Interior 
Defendants and the Named Individuals. See Plaintzfs' Consolidated Reply to the Opposition of 
the Government and Individuals to Plaintiffs' Motions for Orders to Show Cause why Interior 
Defendants and Their Employees and Counsel Should Not Be Held in Contempt (filed Nov. 21, 
2001) ("Plaintiffs' Reply"). Plaintiffs' Reply referred to 18 U.S.C. 9 401 in a footnote, id. at 3-4 
n.5, but made no effort to specify the part of the statute on which they relied, nor the elements of the 
supposed criminal act(s) that they claimed the Named Individuals had committed. 
- 17- (citing United States v. NYNEX Corp., 8 F.3d 52, 54 @.C. Cir. 1993), and United States v. 
Turner, 812 F.2d 1552, 1563 (1 lth Cir. 1987)). For a violation to be "willful," the accused must 
have acted with deliberate or reckless disregard of the obligations created by the court order. 
Roach, 108 F.3d at 1481 (citing In re Holloway, 995 F.2d 1080, 1082 @.C. Cir. 1993), cert. 
denied, 51 1 U.S. 1030 (1994), and United States v. Greyhound Corp., 508 F.2d 529 (7th Cir. 
1974)). 
Thus, in order to support a referral for criminal contempt, plaintiffs must initially show that 
evidence exists that, if believed, could establish beyond a reasonable doubt that (1) a clear and 
reasonably specific court order was in effect, (2) the order required certain conduct by a Named 
Individual, and (3) the Named Individual willfully violated the court's order. For the same 
reasons that their claims fail to establish a basis for civil contempt, plaintiffs' claims cannot meet 
the even more stringent criminal contempt standard. See Section II(A)(2), above. 
2. Any Further Proceedings Before the Special Master on Plaintiffs' Motion and 
Bills Must Be Terminated. 
So long as there are any possible criminal ramifications for the Named Individuals in these 
proceedings, they must be terminated consistent with the Named Individuals' due process rights. In 
Bagwell, the Supreme Court noted that when a court undertakes to address certain indirect 
contempts, "criminal procedural protections such as the rights to counsel and proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt are both necessary and appropriate to protect the due process rights of parties 
and prevent the arbitrary exercise ofjudicial power." Bagwell, 512 U.S. at 833-34. In 
determining whether those accused of violating the Bagwell injunction were entitled to the 
protection of criminal procedure, the Supreme Court observed that the fines set by the trial court 
were "not coercive day fines, or even suspended fines, but [were] more akin to criminal fines 
- 1 8 - which petitioners had no opportunity topurge once imposed." Id. at 837. Similarly, here, 
plaintiffs do not ask the Court to attach any purgation conditions to the fines they seek against the 
Named Individuals. Further, as noted in Section II(A)(l) above, the Named Individuals are not in 
a position to purge any of the alleged contempts in any event. Accordingly, the fines that plaintiffs 
urge the Court to impose upon the Named Individuals inescapably must be categorized as criminal 
in nature - i.e., punishment for past acts. See National Org. for Women v. Operation Rescue, 37 
F.3d 646,658-62 @.C. Cir. 1994); Evans v. Williams, 206 F.3d 1292, 1296 @.C. Cir. 2000). 
Accordingly, the protections recognized as necessary by Bagwell must be afforded to the Named 
Individuals here. 
Since plaintiffs cannot obtain any coercive or compensatory relief from this proceeding 
against the Named Individuals, and since the plaintiffs have identified no purgation conditions that 
these individuals could effect, the proceeding - if it continues - must be carried out in accordance 
with the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the Named Individuals must be afforded their 
full measure of due process rights. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure do not provide for a 
special master to conduct an investigation with potential criminal ramifications. Accordingly, 
beyond conducting the present review of the plaintiffs' October 19,2001 motion and Bills for legal 
sufficiency, there is no hrther role for the Special Master in this matter. 
C. Plaintiffs Have Failed to Demonstrate a Legally Sustainable Basis for the Issuance of 
Show Cause Orders for Fraud on the Court. 
Relying on the Court's ruling in Contempt 11, plaintiffs claim that the Named Individuals 
should be sanctioned for "fraud on the court." Plaintiffs apparently view fi-aud on the court as a 
catch-all for any type of behavior that, while not violating a "clear and unambiguous" court order, 
they believe should result in fines, imprisonment and other contempt sanctions. 
- 19- It is far from clear that "fiaud on the court'' can serve as a basis for imposing a contempt 
sanction upon someone unless that person's conduct is also found to meet all the elements of civil 
or criminal contempt. It appears that plaintiffs allege a "fraud on the court" because they cannot 
identify a "clear.and unambiguous order" that the Named Individuals have allegedly violated. In 
any event, if the sanctions plaintiffs seek are even partially criminal in nature (and here they 
clearly are, since no civil contempt purpose can be served by imposing them), the Named 
Individuals are entitled to "the protection of criminal procedure." NOWv. Operation Rescue, 37 
F.3d at 661. This means, at a minimum, that the charge must "state for each count the official or 
customary citation of the statute, rule, regulation or other provision of law which the defendant is 
alleged therein to have violated." Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(c). Plaintiffs have not done this, nor have 
they even bothered to discuss the relationship of their allegations to the specific elements of "fraud 
on the court." These failures alone warrants the dismissal of their "fraud on the court" claims. 
The standards required for a finding of "fraud on the court" are more stringent than those 
for contempt based on violation of a court order. The facts alleged by plaintiffs cannot meet these 
stringent standards. In this Circuit, "[flraud on the court ... is fraud which is directed to the 
fraud between the parties or fraudulent documents, false judicial machinery itself and is not 
statements or perjury." Baltia Air Lines, Inc. v. Transaction Management, Inc., 98 F.3d 640,642 
@.C. Cir. 1996) (quoting Bulloch v. United States, 721 F.2d 713,718 (10th Cir. 1983). 
Examples of the type of conduct which constitutes fraud on the court include the bribery of a judge 
or the knowing participation of an attorney in the presentation of perjured testimony. Baltia Air 
Lines, 98 F.3d at 643. No such allegation is made here. As stated in Weese v. Schukman, 98 F.3d 
542 (10th Cir. 1996), 
- 20 - P 
Generally speaking, only the most egregious misconduct such as 
bribery of a judge or members of a jury, or the fabrication of 
evidence by a party in which an attorney is implicated will 
Baltia Air 
Lines, 98 F.3d at 643 (Although there were suggestions in the record that witnesses committed 
perjury or that counsel misled the court, "[tlhere is still no basis for a finding of fraud on the court 
as that concept has been defined. It is particularly noteworthy in this regard that any 
.'I). misrepresentations to the District Court were not relevant to the court's decision. . . Even 
assuming plaintiffs could establish the requisite scienter for any Named Individual (which they 
have not done), plaintiffs have identified no court ruling that the alleged conduct affected, nor have 
they demonstrated any interference with their presentation of their case. The plaintiffs prevailed in 
Trial 1, and the December 21, 1999 ruling gave them the relief the Court believed it 
constitutionally could award them. Thus, there is no clear and convincing evidence that the 
constitute a fraud on the court. Less egregious misconduct, such as 
nondisclosure to the court of facts allegedly pertinent to the 
matter before it will not ordinarily rise to the level of a fraud on 
the court. 
Id. at 552-53 (quoting Rozier v. Ford Motor Co., 573 F.2d 1332, 1338 (5th Cir. 1978)) (emphasis 
added). All of plaintiffs' allegations against the Named Individuals, even if they could prove 
them, would fall into the category of conduct described in the above-highlighted excerpt of the 
Weese decision. At the outset, therefore, plaintiffs have not demonstrated a basis for "fiaud on the 
court." See also Ex. 1 at 41-52; Ex. 2 at 16-35. 
Additionally, "fraud on the court" requires a showing of intent to deceive or intent to 
defi-aud the court. United States v. Buck, 281 F.3d 1336, 1343 (10th Cir. 2002). And controlling 
authority indicates that "fiaud on the court" does not exist unless the alleged misconduct has 
prejudiced the opposing party in presenting its case or has affected a court ruling. 
-21 - conduct described in plaintiffs' allegations has impacted this litigation, and there is no basis for a 
finding of "fraud on the court." 
Individuals be terminated forthwith. 
For the reasons stated above, the government urges that the proceedings against the Named 
CONCLUSION 
Respectfully submitted, 
ROBERT D. McCAL,LUM, JR. 
Assistant Attorney General 
STUART E. SCHIFFER 
Deputy Assistant Attorney General 
MICHAEL F. HERTZ 
Director 
Dodge Wells 
Senior Trial Counsel 
D.C. Bar No. 425194 
Tracy L. Hilmer 
D.C. Bar No. 421219 
TrialAttorney , 
Commercial Litigation Branch 
Civil Division 
June 2,2003 DATED: 
*5&zz- 
P.O. Box 261 
Ben Franklin Station 
Washington, D.C. 20044 
(202) 307-0474 
- 22 - UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 
ELOUISE PEPION COBELL, et al., 
Civil Action No. 96-CV- 1285 (RCL) Plaintiffs, 
V. 1 
GALE A. NORTON, et al., 1 
Defendants. 
'in this case, it is ths ,2003, day of 
ORDER 
Upon consideration of the Government's Memoranmm of Points and Authorities in 
Opposition to Plaintiffs' Bills of Particulars in Support of Motion for Order to Show Cause Why 
Interior Defendants and Their Employees and Counsel Should Not Be Held in Contempt for 
Violating Court Orders and for Defrauding this Court in Connection with Trial One, Filed 
October 19,2001, the Report and Recommendation of the Special Master, and the entire record 
ORDERED, that the plaintiffs' motion for order to show cause be and hereby is DENIED. 
Honorable Royce C. Lamberth 
United States District Judge cc: 
Tracy Hilmer 
Dodge Wells 
Sandra Spooner 
Commercial Litigation Branch 
Civil Division 
P.O. Box 875 
Ben Franklin Station 
Washington, D.C. 20044-0875 
Fax (202) 514-9163 
(202) 616-3085 
Alan L. Balaran, Esq. 
Special Master 
17 17 Pennsylvania Ave., NW 
12th Floor 
Washington, DC 20006 
(202) 986-8477 
Keith Harper, Esq. 
Native American Rights Fund 
1712 N Street, N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20036-2976 
(202) 822-0068 
Counsel for Plaintiffs 
Dennis M Gingold, Esq. 
Mark Kester Brown, Esq. 
607 14th Street, N.W. 
Box 6 
Washington, D.C. 20005 
(202) 3 18-2372 
Counsel for Plaintgs 
Elliott Levitas, Esq. 
1100 Peachtree Street, Suite 2800 
Atlanta, GA 30309-4530 
Counsel for Plaint@? 
Earl Old Person (Pro se) 
Blackfeet Tribe 
P.O. Box 850 
Browning, MT 59417 
(406) 338-7530 
Mary Lou Soller, Esq. 
Adam Feinberg, Esq. 
Miller & Chevalier 
655 15th Street, N.W., Suite 900 
Washington, D.C. 20005 
By First Class Mail 
Counsel for Chester Mills and Terence 
Virden 
Earl J. Silbert, Esq. 
Robert A. Salerno, Esq. 
Adam Hoffinger, Esq. 
Piper Rudnick LLP 
I 
1200 19th Street, N.W., 7th Floor, 
Washington, D.C. 20036 
Counsel for John Cruden, Jack Haugrud 
and Sarah Himmelhoch 
David S. Krakoff, Esq. 
Alessio D. Evangelista 
Jamie Abrams 
Christine Stroop 
Beveridge & Diamond, P.C. 
1350 I Street, N.W. Suite 700 
Washington, D.C. 20005-33 11 
Counsel for Daryl White 
Amy Berman Jackson, Esq. 
Trout & Richards 
1 100 Connecticut Avenue, N. W. 
Suite 730 
Washington, D.C. 20036 
Counsel for Edith Blackwell 
William H. Briggs, Jr., Esq. 
Marc E. Rindner, Esq. 
Ross, Dixon & Bell 
2001 K Street, N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20006-1040 
Counsel for Phillip Brooks 
Michael Bromwich, Esq. 
Anne Perry, Esq. 
Fried Frank Hams Shriver & Jacobson 
1001 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.Suite 800 
Washington, D.C. 20004-2505 
- 1 - B. Michael Rauh, Esq. 
Julie Campbell, Esq. 
Manatt, Phelps & Phillips, LLP 
1501 M Street, N.W. Suite 700 
Washngton, D.C. 20005 
Counsel for Neal McCaleb 
Barry Boss, Esq. 
Asbill, Junkin, Moffitt & Boss 
1615 New Hampshire Ave., N.W. Suite 200 
Washington, D.C. 20009 
William Gardner, Esq. 
Morgan, Lewis & Bockius 
1 1 1 1 Pennsylvania Avenue, N. W. 
Washington, D.C. 20004 
Counsel for Willa Perlmutter 
Barbara Van Gelder, Esq. 
Eric Lyttle, Esq. 
Wiley, Rein & Fielding LLP 
1776 K Street, N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20006-2304 
and 
Erika C. Birg, Esq. 
Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison 
1615 L Street, NW, Suite 1300 
Washington, DC 20036 
Counsel for James Eichner 
Roger Zuckennan, Esq. 
Leslie Kiernan, Esq. 
William Taylor, Esq. 
Zuckerman, Spader, Goldstein, Taylor & 
Kolker, LLP 
1201 Connecticut Avenue, N.W. Suite 700 
Washngton, D.C. 20036 
Counsel for Robert Lamb and Hilda Manuel 
Christopher Mead, Esq. 
London & Mead 
1225 19th Street, N.W. Suite 320 
Washington, D.C. 20036 
Counsel for Ken Rossman 
Robert Luskin, Esq. 
Patton Boggs 
2550 M St., Suite 500 
Washington, D.C. 20037-1350 
Counsel for Edward Cohen, Bruce Babbitt 
and John Leshy 
Plat0 Cacheris, Esq. 
John F. Hundley, Esq. 
Sydney J. Hoffmann, Esq. 
Baker & McKenzie 
8 15 Connecticut Avenue, N. W. 
Washington, D.C. 20006 
Counsel for John Berry and Glen Schumaker 
R. Christopher Cook, Esq. 
Jones Day Reaves & Pogue 
5 1 Louisiana Ave, N. W. 
Washington, D.C. 20001-21 13 
Counsel for Michael Carr 
Kathleen E. Voelker, Esq. 
1101 Connecticut Avenue, N.W., Suite 1000 
Washington, D.C. 20036 
Counsel for James Douglas 
Martha Rogers, Esq. 
Leon Rodriguez, Esq. 
Ober, Kaler, Grimes & Shriver 
1410 H Street, N.W., Suite 500 
Washington, D.C. 20005 
Counsel for Timothy Elliott 
- 2 - Herbert Fenster, Esq. 
Jane Ann Neiswender, Esq. 
Daniel G. Jarcho, Esq. 
McKenna, Long & Aldridge, LLP 
370 Seventeenth Street, Suite 4800 
Denver, Colorado 80202 
Counsel for Gale Norton 
James Johrison, Esq. 
Jamie Levitt, Esq. 
Morrison & Foerster 
1290 Sixth Avenue 
New York, NY 10104 
Counsel for Sabrina McCarthy 
E. Lawrence Barcella, Jr. 
Scham Robinson, Esq. 
Paul, Hastings, Janofsky & Walker LLP 
1299 Pennsylvania Avenue, N. W. 
Washington, D.C. 20004-2400 
Counsel for William Myers 
Stephen M. Byers, Esq. 
Miguel Rodriguez, Esq. 
Crowell & Moring 
1001 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W 
Washington, D.C. 20004-2595 
Counsel for Dominic Nessi 
Elizabeth Wallace Fleming, Esq. 
Trout & Richards PLLC 
1100 Connecticut Ave. NW, Suite 730 
Washington, DC 20036 
Counsel for Michael Rossetti 
Jeffiey D. Robinson, Esq. 
Dwight Bostwick, Esq. 
Melissa McNiven, Esq. 
Baach, Robinson & Lewis 
One Thomas Circle, Suite 200 
Washington, D.C. 20005 
Counsel for Lois Schifser and Anne Shields 
Steven J. Roman, Esq. 
John A. Gibbons, Esq. 
Dickstein, Shapiro, Morin & Oshnshy 
2101 L Street NW 
Washington, DC 20037-1526 
Counsel for David Shilton and John Biyson 
Michael Goodstein, Esq. 
Deanna Chang, Esq. 
Resolution Law Group, P.C. 
5335 Wisconsin Avenue, Suite 350 
Washington, D.C. 20015 
Counsel for Tom Clark 
Stanley Brand, Esq. 
Andrew D. Herman, Esq. 
Brand & Frulla 
923 Fifteenth Street, N.W. 
Washington, D.C. 20005 
Counsel for Peter Coppelman 
Hamilton P. Fox III, Esq. 
Kathleen M. Devereaux, Esq. 
Gregory S. Smith, Esq. 
Sutherland, Asbill & Brennan LLP 
1275 Pennsylvania Avenue, N. W. 
Washington, D.C. 20004-2415 
Counsel for Charles Findlay 
Thomas E. Wilson, Esq. 
John A. Ordway, Esq. 
Berliner, Corcoran & Rowe, LLP 
1101 17th Street, N.W., Suite 1100 
Washington, D.C. 20036 
Counsel for John Most 
Larry A. Nathans, Esq. 
Robert W. Biddle, Esq. 
Bennett & Nathans, LLP 
21p East Lexington Street, Suite 301 
Baltimore, MD 21202 
Counsel for David Shuey 
- 3 - Eugene R. Fidell, Esq. 
Matthew S. Freedus, Esq. 
Feldesman, Tucker, LeifuI, Fidell & Bank 
LLP 
2001 L Street, N.W., 2nd Floor 
Washington, D.C. 20036 
Counsel for James Simon 
- 4 -