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USAID/OTI Sri Lanka Field Report

December 2004


Program Description

USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives (USAID/OTI) program in Sri Lanka assists in generating greater support for a negotiated peace settlement to end the long-standing conflict. To accomplish this aim, USAID/OTI’s two objectives are to: increase collaboration and participation among diverse groups to set and/or address priorities; and, increase awareness and/or understanding of key transition issues.

Based on these objectives, USAID/OTI provides grants that: support positive interaction among diverse groups of people; promote participatory decision-making at the community level; im-prove livelihoods; and facilitate the flow of accurate information from multiple viewpoints.

Working with local NGOs, informal community groups, media entities, and local government officials, USAID/OTI identifies and supports critical initiatives that move the country along the continuum from war to peace. Development Alternatives, Inc. (DAI) implements the $14.8 million small grants program and manages USAID/OTI offices in Colombo, Trincomalee, and Ampara. Between program start-up in March 2003 and the end of December 2004, USAID/OTI cleared 263 small grants worth approximately $6.383 million.

Country Situation

Tsunami Devastates Communities along Sri Lankan Coast – The December 26, 2004 tsunami killed more than 30,000 Sri Lankans and displaced 800,000 from their homes. As of January 12, 2005, more than 6,000 persons are missing and 441,000 are displaced – half of them to 457 camps at schools, places of worship and community centers. All but one of 14 Sri Lankan districts adjoining the coast were affected, some reporting damage as far as two kilometers inland. More than 89,000 houses were leveled, and 70 to 80 percent of the country’s fishing fleet was damaged or destroyed. The Asian Development Bank estimates that 250,000 Sri Lankans will be pushed over the poverty line by the tsunami, which has disproportionately punished the poor. Landless fishers will be most affected by government plans to enforce and possibly increase the distance involved in an existing law that prohibits construction within 100 meters of the coast. The government was unable to cope with the number of corpses and after initial attempts to fingerprint and photograph bodies was forced to bury thousands of unidentified bodies in mass graves. Relief effort coordination has been centralized in Colombo within the Presidential Secretariat.

The Politics of Aid Could Affect Stalled Peace Process – Close observers of the Sri Lankan peace process, concerned about an opportunity lost for reconciliation between the Government of Sri Lanka and the Tamil Tigers (LTTE), have cautioned that the politics of relief could jeopardize their increasingly tenuous relationship. President Chandrika Kumaratunga’s objection to UN Secretary General Kofi Annan traveling to the LTTE-controlled Vanni on January 8, during his tour of the tsunami-affected region, has widened the gap between the parties. Initial conciliatory overtures and proclamations of solidarity soon gave way to finger pointing as Sri Lanka’s traditionally fractious politics began to figure into the emergency response. The separatist LTTE accused the government of channeling relief away from the North and East, whereas the Sinhalese-nationalist JVP accused the LTTE of using humanitarian aid to acquire arms. On a more promising note, collaboration between local government authorities, the Sri Lankan Army and the LTTE in the North and East has been good, according to reports from other donors and international aid workers. The continued absence of a jointly administrated mechanism to disburse relief aid and set priorities for the rehabilitation process is likely to keep the government and LTTE at odds.

Sinhalese Nationalist Party Taken to Task by International Community – On December 14 three of the Tokyo Conference co-chairs issued a joint statement calling for the Government of Sri Lanka to reign in the hard line junior coalition partner JVP from disrupting attempts to push forward the peace process with the LTTE. Ambassadors from the U.S., Japan and the Netherlands released the statement after a meeting with President Kumaratunga that was timed to coincide with the beginning of a visit by Norwegian peace envoys to the island in an attempt to jumpstart the stalled talks. The statement expressed dismay at the JVP’s attitude and pointed out contradictions between the government’s stated position on the peace process and recent JVP rhetoric that has been openly hostile to Norway’s mediation role.

Tension Dissipates in Trincomalee – The Eastern Province seaport town of Trincomalee, where OTI maintains a field office, was tense but calm in the aftermath of violence and tension in late November and early December. Prior to the tsunami, there was a heavy presence of security forces in and around Trincomalee town, and newly resurrected check points were being manned for the first time since the cease-fire agreement was signed in February 2002. The government had ordered a curfew on November 29 after one person was killed and four others injured by a grenade lobbed by unidentified attackers at a bus. The bus had defied a strike called by a suspected front organization for the LTTE in retaliation for pro-government opposition to the LTTE’s “Heroes Day” ceremonies on November 27. Members of a Sinhalese nationalist group, believed to have backing from the JVP, had protested the LTTE’s flag being displayed in government controlled areas.

USAID/OTI Highlights

A. Narrative Summary

Despite a second meeting with the LTTE in Kilinochchi in three weeks, USAID was unable to repair the broken process that had for one year allowed OTI to transport goods “tax free” from government-controlled territory in the South through the LTTE-controlled Vanni region to government-controlled Jaffna. Although USAID staff clearly re-stated its inability under U.S. law to pay the trucking charge imposed as of November 1, 2004, the LTTE continued to insist that only UN vehicles were exempted. OTI clearly stated that under such circumstances all current Jaffna-based projects would have to be curtailed and future work could not be considered. The USAID Mission has not yet been able to liaise with other donors facing this problem, given the end-of-year holidays and subsequent tsunami disaster.

OTI program staff from all three offices met for two days in mid-December to share best practices and lessons learned with the new strategic location approach recommended as a result of the September 2004 mid-term assessment and subsequent mini-strategy revision. OTI Country Representative, Justin Sherman, DAI Chief of Party, Laurie Pierce, and Regional Program managers, Brenda Barrett and Wayne Brook also participated. Program staff were heavily involved in preparing and presenting sessions, drawing on concrete experiences from their own regions and activities. The importance of having a shared vision among all stakeholders, and developing grant activities based on this, was acknowledged. Capacity issues of grantees and the challenges of developing quality activities within tight timeframes were discussed. On the whole, OTI’s post-September revised strategy was on track, the group concluded, but it would take time for some staff to adjust to the more proactive, labor-intensive approach required for grant development. Staff feedback from the post-seminar evaluation was extremely positive; a decision was made to hold such meetings on a quarterly basis with a participant-driven, needs-based itinerary.

B. Grant Activity Summary – March 2003 through December 2004

Focus Area Grants Cleared in December 2004 Estimated Budget for Cleared Grants December 2004 Total Grants Cleared Since March 2003 Total Estimated Budget for Cleared Grants Since March 2003
Community Impact Projects 0   79 $2,700,162
Livelihoods 1 $   1,435 65 $1,521,977
Media and Information 6 $144,370 60 $1,163,036
Conflict Mitigation 0   59 $  997,514
TOTAL 7 $144,370 263 $6,382,689

Six of the seven December grants were related to media and information. Four of these activities targeted the North-Central Province, comprised of the Anuradhapura and Polonnaruwa districts, where opposition to a negotiated settlement to the conflict is significantly higher than any other region of the country, according to results of a recent USAID-funded survey. OTI is supporting an indigenous non-governmental organization with an extensive network of partners at the village level in both districts to use a USAID-funded movie promoting tolerance and cooperation among communities as a tool for dialogue and trust building. This inter-related set of new activities enhances and extends ongoing inter-ethnic community building work OTI has done in the region using support for dairy farming and rehabilitation of irrigation schemes to re-connect villages whose ties were severed by the war. The seventh grant cleared in December supported the preparation of a detailed plan, including material and labor requirements, for the renovation of three additional irrigation tanks in the North-Central Province region.

Two other media and information grants that were cleared this month are supporting activities in the East and South. In the East, OTI is supporting an NGO umbrella organization to organize an art competition and seven two-day workshops in conjunction with International Human Rights Day in Trincomalee. The workshops are bringing together key people from the community from both the local government and civil society to learn about and discuss human rights, peace and democracy. These discussions are being transcribed and published in a book to be sent to national policy makers. In the South, OTI is bringing together past and current grantees to share best practices, discuss lessons learned and acquire new skills and knowledge that will help in designing and implementing activities that focus on community-based participatory decision making processes.

There were a number of grants being developed in December that ultimately were not cleared because of the tsunami. Of those, all activities that had direct relevance or could be adjusted to support the emergency response were cleared during the first two weeks of January.

C. Indicators of Success

OTI was quick to move and played a key role in the overall U.S. government immediate response to the December 26 tsunami, providing immediate support to the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) that arrived on December 27. With the USAID Mission Director, along with OTI key program staff out of the country for the holidays, OTI took the lead in briefing the DART on humanitarian needs and political sensitivities of aid distribution in Sri Lanka and provided field support for the DART and other donors to conduct rapid needs assessments in two southern and two eastern districts. On December 29 the Colombo-based Chief of Party and Operations Manager for OTI’s implementing partner Development Alternatives Inc. (DAI), were sent to manage the Trincomalee and Ampara field offices, respectively, while OTI’s Media and Information Program Manager and Acting Country Representative provided logistics support for the DART from Colombo. First-hand reports from OTI staff on site in affected areas of the South and East provided critical feedback to inform appropriate allocation of USAID resources in the overall US Government response, including the deployment of US military aircraft to transport emergency relief items to affected districts along the coast.

Sri Lankan Red Cross Society volunteers trained within OTI-supported activities were among the first to respond to the December 26 tsunami in both the Trincomalee and Ampara districts. Without instruction from OTI or any promise of additional funding, these youth – many of them wearing T-shirts and caps with the USAID/OTI logo – were immediately involved in providing first aid and helping local authorities remove corpses and clear debris. In the days following the disaster, medical authorities in Trincomalee, where the impact of the disaster was less severe, did not need the OTI-supported, multi-ethnic Sri Lankan Red Cross Society mobile teams to provide additional assistance. In Ampara District, however, OTI was approached by three hospitals in need of medical equipment for mobile teams seeing patients at camps for the displaced. Within one week, OTI had procured the requested items for all units – including in Kalmunai North that was visited on January 6 by a Congressional delegation led by Senate Majority leader Bill Frist.

D. Program Appraisal

As the devastating impact wrought by the December 26 tsunami became more apparent, even by the end of December it was clear to OTI Sri Lanka that its strategy will need to be reviewed given the post-tsunami reality. For the moment, OTI is throwing all of its resources into the tsunami response effort, both through new grants that are focused initially on clean up efforts and early reconstruction work, and by supporting the larger U.S. Government response to the emergency. While trying to maintain programming that is linked to the current OTI mandate in Sri Lanka, staff are being encouraged to focus on immediate response needs and target needs that are not being addressed. The situation is quite fluid and as things settle down, next steps will be evaluated more closely.

NEXT STEPS/IMMEDIATE PRIORITIES

In January USAID/OTI Sri Lanka will:

  • Continue to implement grants that are mainly focused on immediate tsunami response opportunities;
  • Work with the Mission to make decisions about the allocation of any additional tsunami-related funds that are made available from Washington.

For further information, please contact:
In Washington, D.C.: Rachel Wax, Program Manager, 202-712-1243, rwax@usaid.gov

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Thu, 24 Feb 2005 12:30:43 -0500
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